Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Joel Michael Guy, Jr., Petitioner v. Tennessee

Supreme Court briefApr 1, 2024

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No. _____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

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JOEL MICHAEL GUY, JR., PETITIONER

STATE OF TENNESSEE, RESPONDENT

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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE TENNESSEE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

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APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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Appendix A:

Opinion of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023)

40a

Appendix B:

November 16, 2023 Order of the Tennessee Supreme

Court Denying Rule 11 Application

Appendix A:

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023)

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

evidence supported convictions for abuse of a corpse.

679 S.W.3d 632

Editor's Note: Additions are indicated by Text and deletions

by Text .

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee,

AT KNOXVILLE.

STATE of Tennessee

Joel Michael GUY, Jr.

No. E2021-00560-CCA-R3-CD

November 15, 2022 Session

FILED April 28, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Criminal

Court, Knox County, Steven W. Sword, J., of two counts

of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony

murder, and two counts of abuse of a corpse stemming from

murder of his parents, and was sentenced to two consecutive

life sentences plus four years. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Criminal Appeals, Witt, J., held that:

defendant did not have standing to challenge search of

parents' home as overnight guest;

police officers' warrantless entry into home was justified by

exigent circumstances;

warrantless seizure of defendant's backpack from guest

bedroom was justified by plain view doctrine;

warrantless seizure of store receipt from bag on counter in

upstairs bathroom of defendants' parents' home was justified

by plain view doctrine;

probative value of evidence that defendant's parents intended

to end their financial support of him outweighed any

prejudice;

statute criminalizing the abuse of a corpse was not

unconstitutionally vague; and

Affirmed.

Procedural Posture(s): Appellate Review; Pre-Trial Hearing

Motion.

*642 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County,

No. 110145, Steve Sword, Judge

Attorneys and Law Firms

Eric Lutton, District Public Defender; Jonathan Harwell (on

appeal and at trial), and John Halstead (at trial), Assistant

District Public Defenders; and Mark Stephens (at trial),

Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joel Michael Guy, Jr.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D.

Ward, Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District

Attorney General; and Leslie Nassios and Hector Sanchez,

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State

of Tennessee.

James Curwood Witt, Jr., P.J., delivered the opinion of the

court, in which Timothy L. Easter, and John W. Campbell, Sr.,

JJ., joined.

OPINION

James Curwood Witt, Jr., P.J.

*643 The defendant, Joel Michael Guy, Jr., appeals his

Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts

of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony

murder, and two counts of abuse of a corpse, challenging

the denial of various motions to suppress evidence, the

admission of certain evidence, the constitutionality of the

statute prohibiting abuse of a corpse, and the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions of abuse of a corpse and

arguing that the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him

to a new trial. Because the defendant did not have standing

to challenge the warrantless entry into the house where the

murders occurred, we affirm the denial of the defendant's

motion to suppress evidence seized from the crime scene on

grounds different than those upon which the trial court relied.

Even if the defendant had standing to challenge the entry into

the house, the entry was supported by probable cause and

exigent circumstances, and the evidence was in the officers’

plain view. The trial court correctly concluded that the search

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

of the backpack was an appropriately-conducted inventory

search. The trial court did not err by refusing to suppress

surveillance video obtained using the receipts discovered

from the unlawful search of the defendant's Louisiana

residence because the trial court correctly concluded that

the police would have inevitably discovered the surveillance

video during the course of the investigation. The trial court did

not err by admitting evidence that the victims intended to stop

providing financial support to the defendant. The proscriptive

statute criminalizing the abuse of a corpse is not void for

vagueness, and the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to

support the defendant's convictions of these offenses. Finally,

because we conclude that the trial court did not commit any

error, no error obtains to accumulate. We affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

The Knox County Grand Jury charged the defendant with

two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts

of felony murder, and two counts of abuse of a corpse related

to the deaths and dismemberment of his parents, Joel and

Lisa Guy, inside their Knoxville home on Goldenview Lane

in November 2016.

2016, Mr. Guy told her that he and Mrs. Guy planned to tell

the defendant at Christmas that he would be responsible for

paying his own bills. Ms. Whited testified that when she and

Mrs. Guy discussed the victims’ retirement plans, Mrs. Guy

stated that she would no longer be able to financially support

the defendant.

Ms. Tyler testified that she went to the victims’ home

for Thanksgiving with her three sons and that the family,

including the defendant, were together from approximately

10:30 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. The defendant was staying at the

victims’ house. Ms. Tyler said that the defendant typically

remained in the bedroom and did not spend time with the

rest of the family, but that “Thanksgiving was completely

different. The moment that I arrived, [the defendant] was

talking to us.” She said that Mrs. Guy had kept everything

that the defendant had collected and had memorialized “his

entire life in boxes upstairs.” The defendant and Ms. Tyler's

sons brought the boxes downstairs, and the defendant gave

his toys and games to Ms. Tyler's sons, which she believed

to be “odd.”

According to the evidence presented at the defendant's

September 2020 trial, the victims were planning to retire

and sell their home in Knoxville, and they had purchased

Mr. Guy's family home in Surgoinsville. Angela Crain, the

daughter of Mr. Guy and the step-daughter of Mrs. Guy,

testified that on November 17, 2016, Mr. Guy informed the

family via text message that the victims sold their Knoxville

home and had to be out of the home by December 13th.

Jennifer Whited, Mrs. Guy's supervisor, stated that Mrs. Guy

submitted her resignation notice on November 21st and that

her last day of work was scheduled to be December 2nd.

Ms. Tyler brought her laundry to do at the victims’ house

because her dryer had broken. When she parked her car near

the home so that she could easily take all of her clothes to

the laundry room located upstairs, she saw “big totes” in the

back of the defendant's vehicle. One tote was inside the other,

and the lids were on them. She went upstairs at the victims’

house to do laundry and to check on her children because she

found it odd that they were interacting with the defendant.

The defendant was staying in the bedroom near the top of the

stairs, and Ms. Tyler said that every time she went upstairs,

the defendant was “right behind” her, which she found to be

strange.

Multiple witnesses testified that either Mr. Guy or Mrs. Guy

expressed that due to their retirement, they would no longer be

able to financially support the defendant. Ms. Crain testified

that Mrs. Guy told her that “it was time for [the defendant]

*644 to stand on his own two feet.” Michelle Dennison

Tyler, the daughter of Mr. Guy and the step-daughter of Mrs.

Guy, stated that in late October 2016, the victims informed her

of their retirement plans and told her that the defendant would

need to find employment because they would no longer be

able to financially support him. Robin White, Mr. Guy's sister,

said that Mrs. Guy informed her that upon retirement, she

could no longer be able to financially support the defendant

and that he “needed to be on his own.” Renee Charles, Mr.

Guy's sister, testified that one week before Thanksgiving

While upstairs, Ms. Tyler entered the victims’ bedroom and

noticed nothing out of the ordinary, recalling that the bed

was made and that the bathroom was clean. The upstairs area

also included a bathroom attached to the victims’ bedroom,

another bathroom located down the hallway and to the right

from the bedroom where the defendant was staying, and a

laundry room located across from the second bathroom. She

said that the victims had a dog that they “pampered” and

would never lock inside a room. Ms. Tyler testified that Mr.

Guy owned a large number of guns that he kept loaded, but

she did not see any guns lying out over Thanksgiving. Mr.

Guy also had security cameras inside the house, which were

present over Thanksgiving but were missing when Ms. Tyler

returned to the residence with police after the victims’ deaths.

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

Ms. Charles testified that on Friday, November 25, 2016,

which was the day after Thanksgiving, she spoke with

Mr. Guy, who stated that the victims planned to go to

Surgoinsville and to return to Knoxville at approximately

3:00 p.m. Ms. White spoke to Mr. Guy via telephone at

approximately 1:00 p.m., and Mr. Guy stated that he and the

defendant had brought Mr. Guy's boat to Surgoinsville and

that they planned to leave soon. Ms. Charles called and sent

text messages to Mr. Guy *645 on Saturday and Sunday, but

he did not respond. The victims also did not respond to Ms.

Tyler's calls and text messages over the weekend. Chandise

Fink, the daughter of Mr. Guy and the step-daughter of Mrs.

Guy, testified that although she spoke to Mr. Guy almost every

weekend, she did not hear from him on Saturday or Sunday,

which surprised her because Sunday was her birthday.

Ms. Whited testified that Mrs. Guy was scheduled to begin

work at 7:00 a.m. on Monday, November 28th but never

arrived. At approximately 7:15 a.m., Ms. Whited began

sending her text messages, but Mrs. Guy did not respond,

which Ms. Whited believed was “highly unusual.” Ms.

Whited continued sending text messages to Mrs. Guy, as well

as Mr. Guy, and she called but did not receive a response. Ms.

Whited said that it was unusual for Mrs. Guy to miss work

without notice, and, concerned for Mrs. Guy's wellbeing, Ms.

Whited called the police and requested a “welfare check.”

After some time had passed and Ms. Whited was still unable

to contact either of the victims, she contacted the police again

and asked what officers found during the “welfare check.”

Ms. Whited was told that “everything seemed to be fine,

that nothing looked out of place.” She asked the police to

return to the victims’ home because she “knew that something

was not right.” She said that Mrs. Guy had plans for a

retirement lunch with co-workers that day and that she would

not have canceled or “just blown them off” without calling.

Approximately 30 minutes later, a detective contacted Ms.

Whited and asked additional questions about Mrs. Guy, but

Ms. Whited was unaware of anything that occurred.

Ms. Whited said that Mrs. Guy's employment benefits

included a $500,000 life insurance policy and that Mrs. Guy

had elected to split the payout of the policy evenly between

her designated beneficiaries, Mr. Guy and the defendant. Ms.

Whited did not know whether the defendant was aware that

Mrs. Guy had designated him as a beneficiary for her life

insurance policy.

Ms. Tyler testified that on the Monday after Thanksgiving,

she planned to go to the victims’ house after work to check on

them if she did not hear from them that day. That afternoon,

Ms. Whited told her that “there's something wrong” and that

she needed to contact the detectives. Ms. Tyler met with

a detective and recounted the events of the Thanksgiving

weekend and told him that the defendant had been present.

Ms. Tyler said that she was appointed as the executor of Mr.

Guy's estate after his death and that she became aware of

large payments that had been made out of Mr. Guy's account

after his death “for utility” and “for school” at Louisiana State

University (“LSU”), as well as a $10,000 payment to the

apartment complex where the defendant lived.

Knox County Sheriff's Office (“KCSO”) Detective Stephen

Ballard, a patrol officer at the time of the victims’ deaths,

testified that he responded to the victims’ residence on

Goldenview Lane for a welfare check on Mrs. Guy. He

knocked on the front door and rang the doorbell, but no one

responded. He walked around to the side of the house and saw

a small fence surrounding the backyard with a locked gate. He

saw a dog house in the backyard and “whistled” for the dog,

but he did not receive a response. He returned to the front of

the house and again knocked on the door and rang the doorbell

to no response. The house had a “For Sale” sign in the front

yard; vehicles were parked in the driveway; and the light in

the foyer was on inside the residence. He estimated that he

was at the residence for five to 10 minutes.

*646 KCSO Detective Jeremy McCord, the lead

investigator in this case, testified that he was notified on

November 28, 2016, that Mrs. Guy's employer was concerned

because she did not come to work that morning even though

she had a lunch or event with co-workers planned. He learned

that Mrs. Guy's failure to show up for work or answer

telephone calls was “uncharacteristic of her.” He learned that

Detective Ballard had conducted a welfare check earlier in

the day but that the caller continued to insist that something

was wrong. Detective McCord, Detective Ballard, Officer

Jared Graves, and Officer Benjamin Gresham went to the

Goldenview Lane residence to conduct a “welfare check.”

Detective McCord testified that upon his arrival, he noticed

vehicles parked in the driveway and a “For Sale” sign in the

front yard. The back fence was closed; the front door was

locked; and groceries were visible in the front foyer of the

residence. He also noticed that despite the sale sign in the

yard, there was no realtor box on the front door. Detective

Ballard testified that he and other officers spoke with some

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

of the victims’ neighbors to determine when the victims

had been seen last. Detective McCord testified that because

the vehicles, which he determined belonged to the victims,

were in the driveway, he believed the owners of the vehicles

could be inside the residence and need assistance. He and

Detective Ballard climbed over the fence into the backyard,

and Detective McCord saw that the back door was missing

a doorknob and that “the glass was warm from ... the inside

of the house.” He also noticed “some kind of strange odor,”

which he described as “chemical in nature.” He described

“feeling very odd” about the circumstances and noted that

“[t]here was something ominous about it.” He called the

realtor, who told him that a lockbox should have been on

the front door and suggested another avenue of entry was

possible. Detective McCord observed that the front doorknob

did not match the deadbolt and stated that someone appeared

to have removed the doorknob and lockbox from the front

door and replaced the doorknob with the doorknob from the

back door. An officer located a garage door opener in one of

the vehicles and opened the garage door. Detective McCord

said that “[a]s soon as the garage door was opened, you could

feel heat.” He decided to enter the residence “to conduct a

welfare check.”

The officers entered through the interior garage door, which

was unlocked, and Detective McCord announced the presence

of law enforcement as they entered. Detective McCord said

that they were “immediately being hit with odor and heat, very

extreme heat.” Detective Ballard also observed containers of

chemicals on the floor and stated that from the time that he

entered the residence, he felt “a tingling” on his forehead

due to the smell of chemicals. Immediately inside the door,

Detective McCord saw bottles and various other items on the

floor and a purse and two wallets on a table, which further

alarmed him because most people have their wallets when

they leave their residence. In the kitchen, he saw a pot on the

stove and noticed that the stove and oven were on. He saw

what appeared to be feces on the living room floor. He noticed

perishable items among the groceries on the foyer floor, and

he saw a large number of long guns on the dining room table.

Detective McCord stated that nothing that he was observing

“ma[de] sense.”

The officers moved up the staircase with Detective McCord

leading, and the detective noted that the upstairs was hotter

than the downstairs. He heard a dog barking and said that

the dog would bark for a period, stop, and then whimper. He

noticed a stain of what appeared to be blood on the *647 wall

of the stairwell. At the top of the stairs, he observed clothing,

“sharp instruments,” a bucket, and “reddish-brown staining

on the floor, the wall. It's going all over the place.” As he

looked down the hall, he “saw hands not connected to a body.”

Detective McCord entered the master bedroom where he saw

a roll of plastic on the bed and items scattered on the floor. As

he entered the en suite bathroom, he saw an array of tools and

lights on the floor, knives, and “two tubs with what appeared

to be body parts liquifying.” He noted that the bathroom “was

hotter ... than most places” in the house. At that point, he

instructed the officers to exit the residence the same way in

which they entered. He reiterated that his purpose during the

initial entry into the house was to “make sure that people

are okay if they're inside.” Once he saw the scene upstairs,

he became concerned with “preserving the crime scene.” He

acknowledged that the officers did not fully clear the house

during the initial entry, particularly the room where the dog

was eventually found, explaining that “out of an abundance of

caution, I made sure that we had enough personnel to safely

clear that ... room.” Upon reentry with additional officers, he

cleared the laundry room, finding only the dog.

At some point, Detective McCord returned to the kitchen,

looked in the stockpot that was on the stove, and discovered

a severed head. The Regional Forensic Center personnel

removed the body parts from the scene, and the liquids in

which the bodies were found were placed in a container by

the Environmental Protection Agency for storing biochemical

components.

Officers with the KCSO forensic services unit processed

the crime scene at the Goldenview Lane residence. Officers

collected three gasoline cans from the garage that were each

filled with approximately 15 gallons of a liquid believed to

be gasoline. Officers also located a small piece of paper towel

with reddish brown staining and what appeared to be a bloody

shoe print in the garage. Entering the residence through the

garage and into the kitchen, officers observed two wallets, a

set of keys, vise grips, a hammer, a magazine, a purse, and

money on a table. One of the wallets contained the driver's

license of Mrs. Guy, and the other wallet contained the driver's

license of Mr. Guy. A bleach spray bottle, a bag of trash,

towels, rolls of trash bags, three containers of bleach, a bottle

of muriatic acid, an unopened container of baking soda, and

a lighter were on the kitchen floor. A red cellular telephone,

a pair of blue disposable gloves, and an empty prescription

bottle for “Joel M. Guy” were on the kitchen counter. A

doorknob and a realtor's lockbox were in fluid in the kitchen

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

sink. The stove was on, and a large stockpot with a lid was

on the stovetop.

Guns and boxes of ammunition, a part of a doorknob, and a

screwdriver were in the dining room. Forensic Officer Sandi

Campbell testified that it was “very, very warm” inside the

house and that the downstairs thermostat located in the foyer

by the front door was set to 90 degrees. Groceries were

on the floor of the foyer; the perishable items, including

bacon, sausage, lunch meat, and ice cream were no longer

cold; and the ice cream was “completely melted.” Officer

Campbell observed reddish-brown staining, which appeared

to be blood, down the side of the wall leading up the staircase,

on a child safety gate, on the banister, and on the wall at the

top of the stairs. Clothing that “had been cut,” two black Nike

tennis shoes with staining, and a “cast iron” iron were in a pile

on top of the stairs. An empty bottle of crystal drain opener

that said, “Lye 100 percent,” several *648 empty six-pound,

eight-ounce containers of “Number 2 Sewer Line cleaner,” a

stainless steel kitchen knife, and scissors were also at the top

of the stairs.

Officer Campbell heard a loud noise from the master bedroom

and found a heater turned on its highest setting and blowing

in the room. A large amount of items were piled on the

bedroom floor, including two black trash bags, an empty

package of Clorox gloves, a Walmart bag containing gray

workout pants, a gray long-sleeve T-shirt, and two pairs of

gray socks, “a 3M dust mask,” an unopened gallon container

of Liquid Fire “drain line opener,” Flexon hose packaging,

an HDX extension cord, Sharpie markers, safety goggles, “a

Defiant heavy-duty timer,” a shower head, vise grips, a piece

of plastic packaging, three unopened bottles of food-grade

hydrogen peroxide, two glass dropper bottles, a large roll

of clear plastic that appeared to have been cut, a mountable

heater, “a Bayco work light,” a glass blender pitcher and

“Breville blender base,” stuffed animal toys, a hammer, a

flashlight, light bulbs, an empty sprayer bottle, and two PostIt notes with handwriting.

While heading into the en suite bathroom, Officer Campbell

saw plastic sheeting on the floor that appeared to match

the roll of plastic sheeting found in the bedroom and “two

large Rubbermaid-type tubs.” Both tubs contained body parts

in liquid and “were kind of bulging on the sides.” The

showerhead had been removed inside the bathroom, and

“a garden hose-type thing” had been attached in its place.

“Dishwashing gloves” were on the bathroom counter, and a

kitchen knife was in the sink. Officer Campbell found another

heater inside the bathroom that was not on at that time, but

she noted that the master bedroom area of the house was the

warmest part of the house and that the upstairs was warmer

than the downstairs. The upstairs thermostat was set to 95

degrees.

In the second bedroom, which Ms. Tyler had identified

as the bedroom where the defendant had been staying,

Officer Campbell found reddish-brown staining on the floor,

a suitcase, “tops to blue Rubbermaid containers that were

similar, if not the same ones” as found in the en suite

bathroom, textbooks, four prescription bottles, some of which

“are for Joel M. Guy and one of them is for Lisa Guy,”

a box of Hornady Critical Defense Buckshot 12-gauge, 80pellet ammunition, an open box of “medical-type” gloves,

an unopened package of Clorox brand gloves, a container of

food-grade hydrogen peroxide with reddish-brown staining,

a backpack, reddish-brown staining on the bed, a laptop

computer, a towel with staining, a Walmart bag containing

“a Bayco work light,” an opened container of food-grade

hydrogen peroxide, and a single blue glove. Inside the

suitcase, she found a Post-It note that had the handwritten

address for “Dan Boudreaux's Ace Hardware” in Napoleon,

Louisiana, and stated “Rooto 6.5 pound sewer line cleaner—

$19.99.” Also among the contents of the suitcase, she found

gray Banana Republic underwear and a knife sheath “stamped

with USMC.”

In a third room that was located across the hall from the

second bedroom and was being used for storage, Officer

Campbell found reddish-brown staining on the door frame

and “a Miracle Blade III knife.” A towel and a pile of clothes

that included two pair of gray Banana Republic underwear

and a white T-shirt were on the floor of the upstairs hall

bathroom. Several items were on top of the vanity, including

a set of keys to a Kia car, a Samsung Galaxy S5 cellular

telephone, a 16-ounce bottle of hydrogen peroxide, multiple

blue disposable gloves, Charmin wet wipes, multiple pieces

of medical tape, zinc ointment, a *649 sock, cash and coins,

first aid tape, a “knife marked USMC and six spacers,”

a receipt from the Walmart on Parkside Drive indicating

a purchase at 3:35 p.m. on November 26, two 16-ounce

bottles and one 32-ounce bottle of “91 percent Isopropyl

alcohol, triple antibiotic ointment,” Dermoplast pain relieving

antibacterial spray, and a large amount of reddish-brown

staining.

In the laundry room, Officer Campbell found a gray fleece

blanket, a brown fleece blanket, two white wash cloths, one

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

sock, and two pairs of gray Banana Republic underwear that

were similar to those found in the hall bathroom. In the

exercise room at the end of the hall, she saw “a pile of clothes

with staining and a couple of knives,” including a Victorinox

kitchen knife and a stainless steel kitchen knife. Some of the

clothing had been cut. She noted a large amount of reddishbrown staining inside the room, and she found a white hand

towel with staining and “a set of what appeared to be male

human hands that were severed from any other part.”

Retired KCSO Officer Thomas Finch, an expert in fingerprint

examination, identified six prints from the scene as belonging

to the defendant, including prints found on a package of

Clorox gloves, a package of Charmin wipes, “a tape package,”

a box of gloves from the dresser in the upstairs guest bedroom,

and a palm print from the upstairs hall bathroom.

KCSO Officer Rachel Smith testified that on November

30, 2016, she photographed and inventoried evidence at the

forensic laboratory. Inside the purse collected from the eat-inkitchen table, she found a grocery list and a receipt from the

Walmart on Parkside Drive from November 26, 2016, at 12:18

p.m. At the laboratory, she photographed and opened the

maroon backpack collected from the upstairs guest bedroom

where the defendant stayed. Inside the backpack, she found

a calculator, an instruction manual for a residential gas water

heater that had been printed on November 23, 2016, at 4:12

p.m., a black notebook, a book from a Co-Op book store in

Baton Rouge, an umbrella, a computer mouse, and several

books inscribed with the name “Joel Guy” on the inside

covers. The black notebook contained a syllabus for a Fall

2016 class, pages of math problems, and handwritten notes,

the legible portions of which said the following (bullet points,

underlying, strikethroughs, and other markings in original):

• Get killing knives - quiet - multiple

• Get carving knives to make small pieces

• get rid of bodies inside house - their and my DNA already

there

• open up doggie door to provide entryway

• flush chunks down toilet (not garbage disposal)

• get plastic sheeting for disposal process

• get hollow-point bullets just in case - will be seen buying

bullets; just use computer room gun → check to make sure

there are bullets (last resort)

• He's not alive to claim her half of the insurance money →

all mine ($500,000)

• flood the house.

• turn heater up as high as it goes → speeds decomposition.

*650 • bleach reacts with luminol just like blood → douse

area with bleach

• big sprayer

• lye

• trash compactor?

Body gives time of death → alibi

• Don't have to get rid of body if there is no forensic

evidence on the body.

• HIS FINGERPRINTS AND DNA

• Minimize things I touch throughout visit.

• Wear gloves and socks to prevent fingerprints and

footprints

• Get sledgehammer - crush bones

• Drop something down the garbage disposal to break it →

get him on the ground fixing it → kill him with the knife

• Bring blender and food grinder - grind meat

• Clean up mess from him before she gets home

• get bleach - denature proteins

• Kill her with knife. Kill dog after. Leave alive. Take dog

with you

• get plastic bin for denaturation process

• does not matter where they're killed - just get rid of bloody

spots to prevent evidence of time of death (not the mattress

or couches)

• Place her in shower. Turn on hot water and point at her to

get rid of forensics. Remove her clothes and take them

with me for disposal

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

• Place him in plastic bin and use it to get him into the

upstairs bathroom.

• Cut off his arm and plant his flesh under her fingernails.

Place her hand with his DNA so that his DNA is not

washed away by shower.

• Use sodium hydroxide to destroy his soft tissue and soften

bones for transport. Baste once every hour to accelerate.

• Flush sodium hydroxide down the toilet.

• Wash out bin with handheld showerhead and then direct

handheld into toilet to flush everything out of the pipes

and into the public waterway.

• Douse killing room(s) (Kitchen?) with bleach.

• Place hair curler with flammable paper and flammable

containers of gasoline in four locations: his killing room,

her killing room, his bathroom, her bathroom.

Her assets

Her life insurance - $500,000 (possibly more with double

indemnity)

With him missing/dead, I get the whole thing

All her other assets are joint

*651 Go to him if missing. Unknown if he is dead.

His assets (includes all joint property if missing. When he

gets all joint property, also gets joint debt)

Knoxville house - homeowner's insurance possibly, but

probably worthless after fire - owe $100,000

Surgoinsville House - appraised at $400,000+ (worthless

with Renee on property)

• Wipe down areas near killing rooms and bathrooms.

• turn heaters up to 90 [degrees] to melt fingerprints and

dry everything.

• Set her phone to send me a text message late Sunday to

prove that I was in BR and she was alive

• Leave through front door and wipe down door knobs.

• Timer for flammables set for Friday at 10 am → so they

can't report it.

Another page of the notebook had the following handwritten

notes:

Ultraviolet light shows fingerprints

Check mail before leaving.

Another page of the notebook had handwritten notes with the

heading “Destruction of Bodies” and listed the percentage of

fat, protein, water, and “other compounds” in the human body.

The last page of handwritten notes listed the victims’ assets

as follows:

His 401K - $80,000 (possibly left after taxes)

He could possibly have savings and/or investment accounts

Officer Sandlin said that much of the evidence recovered from

the victims’ residence corresponded to the notes in the black

notebook. On December 1, 2016, Officer Sandlin searched

Mrs. Guy's red Kia Sportage, finding two bags and receipts

from Petsmart on Parkside Drive from November 26, 2016,

at 11:23 and 11:26 a.m.

Special Agent Kim Lowe of the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation (“TBI”), an expert in serology and DNA

analysis, determined that the scissors recovered from the top

of the stairs had the blood of Mr. Guy and the defendant

on the blade and the blood of Mrs. Guy on the handle. A

knife recovered from the top of the stairs had Mr. Guy's

blood on the blade and Mrs. Guy's blood on the handle.

Pieces of medical tape and several gloves collected from the

upstairs hall bathroom had the defendant's blood and DNA.

Two gloves collected from the upstairs hall bathroom had

Mrs. Guy's blood and at least one of the gloves also had

the defendant's DNA. The DNA of both Mr. Guy and the

defendant were on the fingernail clippings from Mr. Guy's

right hand. The defendant's blood was also found by the child

safety gate at the top of the stairs, on a knife collected from

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

the primary bedroom, and on at least one other knife. A

knife collected from the bathroom off of the master bedroom

had the blood of the defendant and Mr. Guy. The blood on

the wall of the exercise room belonged to Mr. Guy. The

black notebook collected from the backpack contained the

defendant's DNA.

KCSO Officer Edward Wassman, a digital forensic examiner,

testified that he responded to the scene to collect a laptop, a

Microsoft Surface Pro, that was found in an upstairs bedroom

and an attached external hard drive. He said that the laptop

was “in the middle of the bed,” was unlocked, and was

running “a Samsung application.” When he “hovered the

mouse over that application,” the laptop displayed a Gmail

address connected to the application. The laptop was also

“running Bit Locker,” which he described as “a Microsoft

security tool that keeps anyone that doesn't know a password

to the Bit Locker inscription from looking at the hard drive.”

When he began the data extraction, the computer restarted and

required a password or facial recognition to access the hard

drive. Because the laptop was “bit-locked,” he was unable to

view the data on the hard drive.

*652 Officer Wassman collected a Dell Inspiron desktop

computer from the downstairs of the victims’ residence and

was able to perform a data extraction on the computer.

He discovered that on November 26, 2016, at 12:15 p.m.,

“seven USB devices were connected at the same time to this

computer, which seemed to be a significant event.” He found

a Google search for “sodium percarbonate” on November

27, 2016, at 8:05 a.m. and a deposit transfer confirmation,

a deposit transfer validation, an account summary, and a

services log-in for a Capital One 360 bank account on

November 27th at 10:49 a.m.

Officer Wassman performed a data extraction on two

Samsung Galaxy cellular telephones. On the first one,

enclosed in a pink case, he found text exchanges between the

owner of the device and “Joel Michael.” The last use of that

device was on November 25, 2016, at 5:12 p.m. On the second

cellular telephone, enclosed in a black case, he discovered a

message from U.S. Bank on November 27, 2016, at 9:38 a.m.,

alerting that “Your card, 5773, was charged $1,025 at Bursar

Operations.” Another message from U.S. Bank two minutes

later read, “Your card, 5773, was charged $2,051.03 at Bursar

Operations.” A third message from U.S. Bank at 9:41 a.m. that

day read, “Your card, 5773, was charged $1,589.78 at Bursar

Operations.” Upon further investigation, Officer Wassman

determined that “Bursar Operations” was associated with

LSU. The State also offered an account statement from Mrs.

Guy's Suntrust Bank account via affidavit, which statement

showed a check card purchase at “Submeter One, LLC” in

Louisiana for $3,090 on November 28, 2016.

Detective McCord testified that he learned from Ms. Tyler

that the defendant had stayed at the victims’ house for

Thanksgiving. A Walmart receipt was located in the upstairs

hall bathroom showing purchases made on November 26th

at 3:35 p.m. of items recovered from inside the residence.

Detective McCord obtained the Walmart security camera

footage from the times marked on the Walmart receipt in an

attempt to determine who made the purchase. The description

that Ms. Tyler gave of the defendant's vehicle matched the

vehicle seen on the Walmart video being driven by the person

who made the purchases, later identified as the defendant.

In the video, the defendant, who had what appeared to be

bandages covering injuries on his right and left hands, was

seen purchasing items from the first-aid section that were

consistent with the items found in the upstairs hall bathroom.

Officers recovered a Walmart receipt from Mrs. Guy's purse

dated November 26th at 12:18 p.m., listing items purchased

that were consistent with the groceries in the foyer. Detective

McCord obtained video footage from Walmart of Mrs. Guy's

purchasing the groceries, and in the video, Mrs. Guy appeared

to be wearing the clothing that was piled at the top of the stairs

and carrying the purse and wallet that were found on the table

in the eat-in-kitchen.

Detective McCord obtained an arrest warrant for the

defendant and issued a “be-on-the-look-out” notice detailing

descriptions of the defendant and his vehicle. Vigilant

Solutions, a license plate recognition software, tracked the

defendant's vehicle driving through Mississippi, capturing

images of the vehicle on November 28th at 12:31 a.m. CST

in Meridian, Mississippi; November 28th at 1:05 a.m. CST

in Heidelberg, Mississippi; November 29th at 7:08 a.m. CST

in Meridian, Mississippi; and November 29th at 7:37 a.m.

CST on Interstate 59 near Pachuta, Mississippi. Detective

McCord said that on November 29th, he was contacted

by Academy Sports in response to “an attempted firearms

purchase” at their store by the defendant. *653 Detective

McCord stated that he believed he received the alert shortly

after the defendant attempted the purchase.

Lieutenant Scott Henning, a supervisor in the homicide

division of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office,

testified that he assisted in arresting the defendant on

November 29, 2016. After the defendant was transported

10a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

to the police office, a crime scene technician photographed

him in Lieutenant Henning's presence. Lieutenant Henning

noticed bruising and an abrasion or “burn-type injury” on the

defendant's upper right arm, scratches on the back of his right

elbow, scratches and bruising on his upper legs, bruising and

“red marks” to his back, injuries to his right and left thumbs,

a “slice” to the inside of his left thumb and on his right hand,

and scratches to both hands, a wrist, and both palms.

Lieutenant Henning had the defendant's vehicle impounded

and obtained a search warrant before processing it for

evidence. In the floorboard of the passenger's seat, he found

Ziploc bags containing “various loose pills, medication.” In

the trunk, he found a large red gasoline can, a meat grinder,

a kitchen appliance, a large metal bowl, and “a mixer-type

thing.” A second gasoline can was found under the floor of

the trunk with the spare tire. Also in the car, he found a

McDonald's receipt from Trenton, Georgia, a receipt from a

Knoxville Walmart dated November 24, 2016, and a “Capital

One Bank ATM receipt” from a location in Baton Rouge dated

November 29, 2016, at 11:48 a.m.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Agent Gerry

Coleman, assigned to the New Orleans Violent Crimes

Task Force, testified that he assisted the KCSO in their

investigation of the defendant. On December 1, 2016, he

went to an Ace Hardware store in Napoleonville, Louisiana,

approximately 25 to 35 miles outside of Baton Rouge, and

obtained video surveillance footage from November 7, 2016.

The video showed a man in a white T-shirt and gray shorts

purchasing “a jug of something.”

Retired FBI Special Agent Robert King testified that in

November 2016, he worked in the violent crimes unit of the

New Orleans/Baton Rouge office and assisted in arresting

the defendant on November 29, 2016. He obtained security

camera footage from a Lowe's in Gonzales, Louisiana,

showing the defendant's making two purchases on November

11th. Special Agent King obtained security camera footage

from a Home Depot in Baton Rouge and two receipts for

transactions made on November 18th, one for the purchase of

a 1.5-gallon sprayer and a 32-ounce bottle and the other for

two 12-inch brown cords and two “digital HDT[s].” Special

Agent King also obtained video footage of the defendant

at an Academy Sports store on November 18th, 19th, and

29th. On November 18th, the defendant looked at firearms,

ammunition, and electronics. According to the receipt, the

defendant purchased “united cutlery USMC.” On November

19th, the defendant returned to the store with a bag, walked

down the same aisle and section where he had been on

the previous day, picked up a different item, and made an

exchange or return of “some type of knife or blade.” Finally,

Special Agent King obtained video footage from a Walmart in

Baton Rouge that showed the defendant purchasing two blue

tote containers on November 21st.

Michael McCrackin testified that he lived in Baton Rouge

from 2006 through 2015, had known the defendant from

high school and college, and was a roommate with him for

a period of time. The defendant attended his first semester

of college at George Washington University before attending

LSU beginning in 2007. Mr. *654 McCrackin said that on

December 10, 2016, he received a telephone call from the

defendant, who was in the Baton Rouge jail. A portion of

the call was played to the jury during which the defendant

told Mr. McCrackin that he believed that “we genuinely had

a very, very realistic chance of being happy if I got around

to doing that” and that “I pretty much f***ed everything up.”

The defendant stated, “Tell me I'm a f***ing idiot, tell me why

did I do this.” During another portion of the call, the defendant

told Mr. McCrackin that his rent for his apartment was prepaid “through August.” When Mr. McCrackin asked how the

defendant managed to pay the rent, the defendant replied that

one of the last things that his mother did was to pay the rent.

During cross-examination, Mr. McCrackin said that he first

met the defendant when they attended boarding school

together at the Louisiana School for Math, Science, and the

Arts. He and the defendant were roommates at the boarding

school, and after the defendant enrolled at LSU, they became

roommates again. He estimated that he and the defendant

lived together for approximately five years of their 10-year

friendship and that he considered the defendant his best friend

during that time. Mr. McCrackin said that he never met the

defendant's father and met the defendant's mother only once

despite their living only an hour away in Luling, Louisiana.

He did not know that the defendant had sisters and was not

aware of the defendant's receiving communication from any

family members other than telephone calls from his mother.

The defendant was socially awkward, and after high school,

he became increasingly withdrawn and would stay in his room

up to days at a time. The defendant had friends in high school

and early in college but had no friends by the time that Mr.

McCrackin left Baton Rouge in 2015. Mr. McCrackin said

that the defendant would regularly go to his parents’ house

for Thanksgiving and some Christmases. He knew that the

defendant was traveling to Knoxville for Thanksgiving in

2016.

11a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

During redirect examination, Mr. McCrackin testified that

he was surprised that the defendant had never told him that

he had sisters. He said that he knew that the defendant's

mother supported him financially and that he never knew

the defendant to have a job other than an internship through

“a summer research program.” He believed the defendant's

isolation to be of his own choosing.

Doctor Amy Hawes, a deputy state medical examiner,

testified as an expert in forensic pathology. She said that

recovering the victims’ remains from the scene “was a

very complex process” and that ultimately, the victims’

remains were transported to the forensic center where she

performed the autopsies. She determined that Mr. Guy had

been dismembered in that his arms had been removed at the

shoulders, his legs had been removed at the hips, and his

head was “completely skeletonized.” She found a defect of

the bone of his forehead but could not determine what caused

it due to the poor condition of the bone in that area. Other than

the skin “from his lower neck down to around his buttocks,”

Mr. Guy's skin was dissolved by chemicals. Doctor Hawes

said that because so much of Mr. Guy's tissue and some of the

bone had begun to dissolve, she could not determine the exact

number of wounds sustained, but she was able to identify 34

sharp-force injuries to Mr. Guy's back consisting of “either

stabs or cuts,” varying in length from one to seven inches and

up to six inches deep. Mr. Guy also had five stab wounds

on the left side of his abdomen. He sustained injuries to his

liver, lungs, kidneys, and ribs. Doctor Hawes also found small

abrasions and *655 linear incised wounds on Mr. Guy's

severed hands. She said these wounds were “classic defensive

injuries” and were “consistent with someone putting their

hands at either a defensive motion or potentially grabbing

a sharp-edged weapon as a way to defend themselves.” She

determined Mr. Guy's cause of death to be multiple sharpforce injuries.

Doctor Hawes determined that Mrs. Guy was also

dismembered in that her head was completely severed from

her body, her arms were dismembered at the shoulders, and

her legs were dismembered at the knees. The skin on Mrs.

Guy's back was “relatively well preserved” compared to her

front, “where there was almost no skin left.” Doctor Hawes

said that Mrs. Guy's head was found in a large pot of liquid

in the kitchen and that the liquid in the pot had a “slightly

different character” than the liquid in the plastic tubs, noting

that the liquid in the pot did not have a strong chemical odor.

Mrs. Guy's scalp and hair were still intact. Doctor Hawes

determined that Mrs. Guy sustained at least 25 sharp-force

injuries to her back that were approximately six to seven

inches deep and five “relatively superficial” stab wounds on

her buttocks. Mrs. Guy sustained injuries to her heart, aorta,

lungs, left kidney, liver, “third thoracic vertebrae,” ribs, and

right shoulder blade. Doctor Hawes determined Mrs. Guy's

cause of death to be multiple sharp-force injuries.

Doctor Hawes testified that among the chemicals found inside

the victims’ residence was muriatic acid, a strong type of

hydrochloric acid that could dissolve or “sluff” the skin,

and “a very strong concentration of sodium hydroxide” that

could cause burns to the skin. She noted that a warning on a

bottle of food-grade hydrogen peroxide said that it could be

“mildly corrosive” upon skin contact. Although she could not

determine whether any of the knives found at the scene caused

the specific injuries to the victims, she said that the knives

were capable of inflicting the sharp-force injuries and could

have been used to dismember the victims.

Doctor Murray Marks, an expert in forensic anthropology,

examined the victims’ remains for “skeletal trauma” after the

autopsies at the request of Doctor Hawes. He testified that

Mr. Guy was identified by fingerprints and that Mrs. Guy

was identified by “an orthopedic appliance.” He determined

that Mr. Guy had some skeletal trauma that was perimortem,

“occurr[ing] around the time of death,” and some that

occurred postmortem. The perimortem trauma was primarily

to the ribs with six right ribs and six left ribs having at least

16 cut marks or slices. Those marks ranged from “kind of

a grazing line to a somewhat deep incision to a complete

severing” and were inflicted primarily from the back. Mr. Guy

also had perimortem trauma to the right scapula or shoulder

blade caused by a “more blunt” object. The postmortem

trauma included dismemberment of his arms from the torso at

the joints, the hands from the forearms at the wrist joints, the

legs from the torso at the hip joints, and the right foot from

the ankle joint. He found “the broken-off tip of a non-sharp

metal object” embedded in Mr. Guy's musculature, which he

said indicated that more than one weapon was used to cause

Mr. Guy's injuries. He found no evidence of sharp-force or

blunt-force trauma to Mr. Guy's skull but noted that from the

middle part of the forehead down to the left part of the upper

jaw was missing due to damage from the chemical exposure.

Doctor Marks said that all of Mr. Guy's sharp-force injuries

and dismemberment could have been inflicted with a knife.

Doctor Marks testified that Mrs. Guy suffered sharp-force

injuries to 21 ribs, *656 nine on the left side and 12 on

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State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

the right side, and skeletal trauma to her scapula, “both left

and right humerus,” and “the radius and ulna of the lower

arms.” The injuries to her ribs ranged “from very fine incised

lines to chips and wedges and complete ... perforation.”

Her right scapula had nine wounds that were associated

with dismemberment at the joint. He did not find any cut

marks on Mrs. Guy's tibia and fibula due to the damage

from chemical exposure. He said that Mrs. Guy's head was

removed “between the second and third cervical vertebra,”

that her arms were removed at the shoulders, and that her right

hand was removed at her wrist. The blood vessels between

the first and second cervical vertebra were broken from bluntforce trauma in the area. The first cervical vertebra was also

“chipped or damaged” due to “forceful movement back and

forth of the vertebral column against the skull,” which Doctor

Marks speculated was caused during the dismemberment

of the head. The second cervical vertebra showed evidence

of “sharp-force trauma or slicing.” He concluded that Mrs.

Guy's injuries, including the dismemberment, could have

been inflicted with a knife.

The State rested. After a Momon colloquy, the defendant

elected not to testify. The parties stipulated that the defendant

had no prior criminal record before this case. The defendant

did not present any additional proof.

On this evidence, the jury convicted the defendant as charged,

and the trial court imposed life sentences for the first

degree murder convictions by operation of law and merged

the appropriate convictions, resulting in two first degree

murder convictions. After a sentencing hearing, the trial

court imposed a sentence of two years’ incarceration for

each of the abuse of a corpse convictions and aligned all

sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of two

life sentences plus four years.

After a timely but unsuccessful motion for new trial, the

defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. In this appeal, the

defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motions to suppress certain evidence, by admitting evidence

of the victims’ intent to end his financial support, and by

denying his motion to dismiss the abuse of a corpse charges;

that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions

for abuse of a corpse; and that the cumulative effect of the

trial errors mandates a new trial.

I. Suppression

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress much of the

evidence seized in this case. As is relevant to this appeal,

the defendant asked the trial court to suppress the evidence

seized from the victims’ Goldenview Lane residence, the

evidence gleaned from the search of the defendant's backpack

seized from the residence, surveillance videos obtained “as

fruit of the unlawful search” of the defendant's Louisiana

residence, and the evidence obtained during the execution of

the search warrant for the defendant's vehicle. The defendant

challenged the constitutionality of the police officers’ initial

and subsequent entries into the Goldenview Lane residence

and argued that the officers’ seizure of the backpack from

a bedroom and a Walmart receipt from a bathroom were

not justified by the plain view doctrine, that the subsequent

warrantless search of the backpack was unconstitutional, that

the affidavits supporting the search warrant for the defendant's

apartment and car failed to establish probable cause, and

that any evidence obtained as a result of the executions of

the search warrants constituted fruit of the poisonous tree,

requiring *657 suppression. The State filed responses,

asserting that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the

officers’ entries into the Goldenview Lane residence, the

seizure of the evidence from the residence, and the search of

the backpack. The State also maintained that the affidavits

supporting the search warrants for the defendant's apartment

and car established probable cause.

At the December 2018 suppression hearing, the defendant

testified that he grew up in Luling, Louisiana, where he

lived with the victims until he entered a residential boarding

school in high school. While in high school, the defendant

returned to the victims’ Louisiana home in the summer.

After graduating high school in 2006, the defendant enrolled

in George Washington University in Washington, D.C. and

transferred to LSU after a single semester. The victims moved

to Greeneville, South Carolina, in 2006 and to Knoxville

in 2007. The defendant stated that Mrs. Guy gave him a

key to the Goldenview Lane residence in 2007 and that he

purchased a garage door opener for the house, which Mr. Guy

programmed.

The defendant testified that he visited the victims’

Knoxville residence “[a] few times a year,” including for

“Thanksgiving” and “a smattering of other holidays, like

my birthday, my mother's birthday, Mother's Day, that sort

of thing.” During those visits, the defendant slept in “my

bedroom,” a room that contained some of his belongings,

including books, clothing, a couple of figurines, and one or

two pieces of furniture from the house in Luling. He stated

13a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

that the victims did not place any restrictions on where he

could go in the house and that he believed that he could go in

any room in the house that he wished. He maintained that he

believed that he had an expectation of privacy in the house.

The defendant testified that, prior to Thanksgiving 2016, he

had last visited the victims’ residence in March. When he

visited at Thanksgiving, he brought his dog with him. He

also brought his laptop, his suitcase, and his backpack. He

identified a photograph of the backpack, which was on the

floor and next to the bed in the bedroom where he was

staying. He also identified a photograph of the contents of the

backpack, including his books and his notebook. He said that

his half-sister came to the residence for Thanksgiving dinner

but did not spend the night. On the day after Thanksgiving,

the defendant helped Mr. Guy move a boat from the Knoxville

residence to a house that the victims had purchased in

Surgoinsville. After the boat was moved out of the garage, the

defendant parked his car inside the garage at the Knoxville

residence.

The defendant said that he left the house on the Sunday

after Thanksgiving to return to Baton Rouge, explaining that

he “had some rather severe cuts on my hands” and “was

worried about losing my left thumb and so I needed medical

treatment, or so I thought.” He claimed that he chose to

travel all the way back to Baton Rouge because he did not

have health insurance and was dependent on the LSU student

health center for his medical care. He left the majority of

his belongings at the victims’ house, including his laptop,

suitcase, and backpack. He arrived in Baton Rouge early on

Monday morning, obtained medical treatment for his hands,

went to Walmart and Albertsons to purchase medication, and

then returned to Knoxville. When he arrived at the victims’

residence, he saw yellow crime scene tape in the yard and

a police vehicle parked in the driveway, and he noticed that

the victims’ vehicles were no longer in the driveway. He

immediately turned around and returned to Baton Rouge. The

defendant *658 testified that he lived in a gated apartment

complex in Baton Rouge and that he generally parked in a

specific parking spot next to his building. On the Tuesday

after Thanksgiving, he left his apartment to check his mail and

was arrested on the sidewalk just in front of his car.

During cross-examination, the defendant agreed that he was

a Louisiana resident and had lived in Louisiana for most of

his life, having attended high school, college, and graduate

school in Louisiana. He stated that in November 2016, he

was 28 years old and unemployed. He described himself as “a

nonmatriculating graduate student” at the time of the offenses

and explained, “That means that I wasn't actually involved in

a degree program, that I was taking graduate-level courses.”

He said that he moved into his Baton Rouge apartment in

2007 and had lived there continuously since that time. He

agreed that he renewed his lease in August 2016 and that

on November 23, 2016, he paid just over $9,000 in advance

on his monthly rent of $910. He agreed that he did not have

an ownership interest in the Goldenview Lane residence, but

when asked whether he lived there, he replied, “Debatable.

I considered it my home.” He conceded that he “spent the

majority of the year in the Baton Rouge apartment” and that

the last time he had spent every night in the victims’ home

was “[p]robably 2004.” The defendant acknowledged that the

victims were in the process of selling the Goldenview Lane

residence at the time of the offenses and that they were also in

the process of packing and moving their possessions into the

Surgoinsville residence. The defendant identified a number

of items inside a bedroom in the Goldenview Lane residence

as belonging to him and identified other items as belonging

to the victims. He agreed that his handwriting was in the

notebook that was found in his backpack.

The defendant testified that he sustained several incised, or

cutting, wounds to his hands that were serious enough to

require medical attention but insisted that he drove more than

nine hours to seek medical assistance because “[s]tudents

receive free health care from LSU.” The parties stipulated

“that those injures occurred during the course of an altercation

with his parents.” The defendant agreed that his mother paid

all of his living expenses, including any expenses related

to his medical care and treatment. He also admitted that he

made the $9,200 payment on his rent while he was at the

Goldenview Lane residence for the Thanksgiving holiday.

Nevertheless, he maintained that he felt it necessary to

drive from Knoxville to Baton Rouge because he could not

otherwise afford medical treatment for the injuries to his

hands. He admitted that he took his dog with him when he

left the residence to go to Baton Rouge for medical treatment.

He conceded that when he returned to Knoxville and saw the

police presence at the victims’ residence, he did not stop and

make any inquiry about what might have happened at the

residence and did not, at any point, assert a privacy interest in

the residence or its contents. He said that he did not call either

of his half-sisters because he did not know their telephone

numbers.

Detective Jeremy McCord was called as a witness by the

defense and testified that during the search of the Goldenview

14a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

Lane residence, officers found a Walmart receipt dated

November 26, 2016, inside a Walmart bag in “the upstairs

bathroom.” Detective McCord went to the Walmart location

identified on the receipt and obtained surveillance video from

November 26th. The video depicted the defendant driving his

vehicle to the store and purchasing the items listed on the

receipt, including two kinds of peroxide, isopropyl alcohol,

bacitracin, *659 and Dermoplast. By entering the license

plate number of the vehicle that the defendant was seen

driving on the video into a license plate recognition database,

Detective McCord traced the vehicle on its route to Baton

Rouge on Sunday and back to Knoxville on Monday.

Detective McCord testified that when he initially arrived at

the Goldenview Lane residence, he “was operating off of”

information from the victims’ daughter, Michelle Dennison

Tyler, that she had had no communication with either of

the victims since seeing them on Thanksgiving. Based on

this information, officers conducted a “welfare check” at

the residence. He acknowledged that he learned later that a

neighbor told Detective Ballard that he had seen Mr. Guy on

the Friday after Thanksgiving.

Detective McCord testified that officers with the East Baton

Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant on

the defendant's Baton Rouge apartment and that receipts from

Academy Sports, Home Depot, Lowe's, and Ace Hardware

were found during that search. Detective McCord and local

officers collected surveillance video from the stores identified

in the receipts. The videos showed the defendant purchasing

items found in both his apartment and the Goldenview Lane

residence. Detective McCord noted that “[w]e would have

ended up at most of the stores anyway, if not all of them” even

without the receipts “based off of Knoxville.” He said that

suggesting that the “immediate impetus” for collecting the

surveillance videos was the receipts seized from the apartment

was “kind of painting a narrow picture” and ignoring the

impact of evidence collected in Knoxville. He said that he

would have obtained surveillance video from the stores even

without the receipts seized from the apartment and that, at

most, “what Baton Rouge provided us was that specific time

frame. Instead of going back 30, 45 days” before the offense,

he could narrow it down to a single day. Detective McCord

testified specifically that officers would have responded to

Academy Sports even without a receipt indicating that the

defendant had been there because officers learned from the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that the defendant

had attempted to purchase a firearm at the store. He stated

that a note regarding the Ace Hardware store was found in

the Goldenview Lane residence and that officers could have

used the UPC product codes on the items in the residence to

determine where the items were purchased.

During cross-examination by the State, Detective McCord

testified that he initially went to the victims’ residence

on Goldenview Lane on Monday, November 28, 2016, to

conduct a welfare check. He explained that at approximately

9:42 a.m., Mrs. Guy's employer called 911 and reported that

Mrs. Guy had not shown up for work and had not called to

say she would be absent, which was out of character for her.

Officers went to the residence, but when no one came to the

door, they left. Sometime “within the next three hours,” the

records division received a call in an attempt to report Mrs.

Guy missing. He recalled that the caller reported that Mrs.

Guy failed to attend a pre-scheduled “get-together” and that

her failure to attend was “very alarming” to the complainant.

Detective McCord decided to go to the residence with other

officers because the behavior and circumstances seemed

“odd” to him.

Upon arriving at the residence, Detective McCord observed a

“For Sale” sign out in front of the residence but did not see

a lockbox from the realtor on the doorknob of the front door

even though he was aware that lockboxes from the realtor are

typically placed on the front door *660 whenever a house is

for sale. He noticed “some discoloration differences between

the doorknob and the deadbolt.” He looked through the

transom window on the front door and saw “groceries laying

right there at the threshold of the door.” A photograph of

the foyer showed cases of beer and Walmart bags containing

groceries sitting on the floor by the front door.

Based on these observations and the earlier calls, Detective

McCord walked to the back of the house and discovered that

the doorknob to the back door was missing. He touched the

back door, which was “extremely hot.” He placed his nose to

the hole where the doorknob would have been and smelled “a

weird smell, a chemical, cooking.” He added, “I've smelled

plenty of bodies that are in various forms of decomposition.

It's just like a really odd chemical smell in the air that

happens when your body starts ... when there starts being

issues there. And, again, extreme heat.” Alarmed, Detective

McCord, “suspected there could be something going on.”

He called and spoke to the realtor, who confirmed that the

residence belonged to the victims and identified the make and

model of each of their vehicles. Both vehicles were parked

in the driveway and were unlocked. The realtor suggested

using the garage door opener to open the attached garage and

15a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

enter the house. Detective McCord found the garage door

opener in one of the unlocked vehicles and used it to open the

garage door. As soon as the garage door opened, Detective

McCord felt “extreme heat [and] a smell that is never going

to leave me.” At that point, the officers knocked on the

door from the garage into the house, identified themselves as

KCSO officers, and shouted that they were “there to check on

them, make sure they're okay.” The officers then entered and

proceeded “to clear the residence” and to attempt to determine

whether someone inside the residence required aid.

On an entry table, Detective McCord observed the victims’

wallets containing their identifications, the keys to the

vehicles in the driveway, cash, and Mrs. Guy's purse. He

also saw grocery bags, containing “perishable goods, chicken,

bacon, some ice cream. Things normally people would

immediately put up when they get home.” Detective McCord

found the presence of the groceries “alarming.” He noted

scratches on the interior portion of the doorknob on the front

door and stated that it appeared as if “recent work” had been

performed on the doorknob. Further inside the residence,

Detective McCord saw chemicals, bleach, a bleach sprayer,

a tarp, and towels on the floor. The kitchen sink was filled

with water and “fizzles and the bubbles.” The realtor box that

should have been on the front door was in the sink, “fizzing

and bubbling.” A large pot was boiling on the stove, and

the officers could feel the heat from it. Detective McCord

stated that the officers initially did not look inside the pot

because they were searching for people inside the home.

When officers later looked inside the pot, they found Mrs.

Guy's decapitated head. The thermostat inside the home was

set to 93 degrees, but the ambient temperature exceeded this.

After clearing the first floor, officers proceeded up the stairs,

where Detective McCord observed “the most horrific thing

I've ever experienced as a police officer.” Blood was on

the wall and the floor. Female clothing in a large pool of

blood, two large containers of sewer line cleaner, and a

pair of scissors were on the floor at the top of the stairs.

The clothing appeared to have been cut. At the end of

the upstairs hallway, Detective McCord saw two severed

hands. Inside the largest bedroom, he saw bags, “tarp-like,

material,” food-grade *661 hydrogen peroxide, Liquid Fire,

“working lights,” and tools on the floor, and plastic sheeting

lay on the bed. A hose was connected to the showerhead in

the connected bathroom, which was also covered in plastic

sheeting, and two large, blue Sterilite containers contained

human body parts. A knife lay next to one of the bathroom

sinks.

A lid to one of the containers was located in the bedroom

that the defendant later claimed was his. In that same room,

officers saw an open suitcase of clothing on the floor and a

laptop on the bed. Detective McCord observed a handwritten

note stating the address for Dan Boudreaux's Ace Hardware

and information regarding sewer line cleaner. He saw what

appeared to be blood on the door leading to the bedroom,

a box of gloves, and a bottle that was “consistent” with the

bottles in the master bedroom and that appeared to have blood

on it. The closet contained no clothing but contained a crock

pot, a box of Clorox brand gloves, and a Walmart bag that

itself contained trash and food. Blood also was on the bed.

In the bathroom just past the bedroom, Detective McCord saw

a large amount of blood as well as gray shorts, underwear, and

white T-shirt on the floor. A large knife and a Walmart bag

containing a receipt lay on the sink; a bottle of peroxide and a

pair of blood-soaked gloves lay inside the sink; and multiple

pairs of bloody gloves lay discarded nearby. Photographs of

the vanity showed a large knife next to a partially opened

Walmart bag, and a portion of the receipt can be seen lying

on top of other items inside the bag. Officers obtained

surveillance video from Walmart for the time stamped on

the receipt, and Detective McCord stated that the clothing

on the bathroom floor was consistent with the clothing the

defendant wore in the surveillance video. In that video, the

defendant's hands were wrapped and bandaged. The Walmart

receipt indicated that the defendant had purchased two bottles

of hydrogen peroxide and two bottles of isopropyl alcohol,

and Detective McCord was aware that these products could

be used to erase DNA and fingerprint evidence.

The severed hands lay in the doorway of the bedroom at

the end of the hall. Inside that room, Detective McCord

observed “a copious amount of blood right here in the corner”

and “various cutting instruments.” He saw the clothing that

belonged to Mr. Guy on the floor. Detective McCord agreed

that he observed all of the evidence as he was clearing the

residence during the “welfare check.”

Detective McCord testified that the backpack and Mrs. Guy's

purse were collected and inventoried at a later time by

forensic services officers. He stated that the typical procedure

employed by the forensics unit was to inventory items

collected at a crime scene.

Detective McCord said that authorities were working on the

assumption that the bodies in the containers were those of

16a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

the victims, but neither victim had yet been identified. He

said that authorities also knew that the defendant had left the

residence. The Walmart receipt for the groceries found lying

in the entry of the house indicated that they were purchased

approximately three hours before the defendant returned to

the same Walmart to purchase the hydrogen peroxide and

isopropyl alcohol. Detective McCord contacted the victims’

daughter, Ms. Tyler, who told him that she had been unable

to reach Mrs. Guy since the family had dinner together on

Thanksgiving despite having telephoned her at least twice.

Ms. Tyler told Detective McCord that the defendant had been

at dinner and that he was staying at the house. Ms. Tyler

described the defendant's vehicle to the detective and *662

stated that she specifically remembered having seen a large,

blue plastic tote in the defendant's vehicle, saying that she

remarked on the tote at Thanksgiving dinner.

Detective McCord obtained a warrant for the defendant's

arrest. FBI agents arrested the defendant outside of his Baton

Rouge apartment on Tuesday, November 29th. On that same

day, officers learned that the defendant had attempted to

purchase a firearm at an Academy Sports store in Louisiana.

Detective McCord said that based on a note found in the open

suitcase in the Goldenview Lane residence that contained

the address of an Ace Hardware store in Louisiana, he

would have followed up with that Ace Hardware store

regarding the cleaning solvents and other items found in

the Goldenview Lane residence. Because the defendant had

purchased cleaning solvents at a Knoxville Walmart and other

items found in the house appeared to have been purchased at

Lowe's and Home Depot, the detective said that he also would

have investigated whether the defendant purchased items at

a Walmart, Lowes, and Home Depot near his Baton Rouge

residence.

During redirect-examination, Detective McCord confirmed

that the first call reporting that Mrs. Guy had not reported

for work came in just before 9:50 a.m. and that Detective

Ballard responded to the call. The second 911 call was

made around noon reporting concern for Mrs. Guy's welfare.

After the second call, Detective McCord contacted Detective

Ballard and told him that he was going to the Goldenview

Lane residence, and Detective Ballard, Officer Gresham,

and Officer Graves met him there. When he arrived at the

residence, no one answered the knocks at the door, but a dog

could be heard barking off and on from inside the residence.

Detective McCord acknowledged that he did not hear any

sounds of a struggle or calls for help coming from the house.

He said that he climbed the fence to reach the backyard and

saw that the back door, located behind a clear glass storm

door, had a hole where a doorknob would have been. He said

that he lowered his head toward the door, smelled “a very

unique smell,” and felt heat coming from the back door, but

he did not share that information with the other officers on

the scene.

Detective McCord testified that officers found a garage door

opener in one of the unlocked vehicles in the driveway, which

he used to open the garage. Upon opening the garage, he

could feel heat and smell chemicals and said that “everything

changed the second that garage door opened.” He reiterated

that officers went to the residence to conduct a welfare check

and that, during a welfare check, “efforts are made to make

entry into those houses with as minimal damage as possible.

It's a routine law enforcement call.” He knew that no calls for

an ambulance had come from the house and that both vehicles

were still in the driveway. From this, he surmised that it was

likely the victims were still inside the residence.

After clearing the house other than the room from which

the dog was barking, officers “held the downstairs” until

a sufficient number of units arrived to go upstairs and see

if anyone was in the room with the dog. After the dog

was secured, Detective McCord and other officers re-entered

the house and “cleared the residence” to determine whether

anyone was alive inside the residence. Along with other

evidence, officers collected the backpack, which was taken

to “the City County Building” and inventoried by a forensic

technician.

During recross-examination, Detective McCord identified a

photograph of the backpack and agreed that the backpack

*663 was in plain view inside the residence. He testified

that a notebook found inside the backpack included notes on

using high heat to “speed[ ] decomposition” and flooding the

house to “cover[ ] up forensic evidence.” He acknowledged,

however, that he did not know the contents of the notebook

before applying for an arrest warrant.

The State called East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office

Lieutenant Scott Henning, who testified that on November 29,

2016, he learned that an arrest warrant had been issued for the

defendant who was believed to be in Baton Rouge. FBI agents

were conducting surveillance at the defendant's apartment and

confirmed that the defendant's vehicle was there. Lieutenant

Henning verified the defendant's Baton Rouge address and

obtained search warrants for the defendant's residence and

vehicle. He said that prior to the search warrants being issued,

17a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

the defendant was taken into custody by FBI agents when the

defendant exited his apartment.

The search warrant for the defendant's car and the affidavit

supporting the issuance of the search warrant were entered as

exhibits during the hearing. According to the application for

the search warrant, probable cause existed for the issuance

of a search warrant for the defendant's vehicle as a place

where evidence of first degree murder was believed to be

concealed. This evidence included firearms, ammunition,

and like component parts; knives, swords, or other cutting

instruments; items containing blood or other evidence of

bodily fluids; items containing hair or fiber evidence; cellular

telephones or other electronic devices used to communicate

with others; computers, hard drives, or other electronic

devices with internet capabilities; and “[a]ny other evidence

indicative to the crimes of First Degree Murder.” The

application included the following information to establish

probable cause for issuance of the search warrant:

On the afternoon of Tuesday November 29 th , 2016[,]

EBRSO Homicide Detectives began assisting members of

the Knox County (TN) Sheriff's Office with an ongoing

homicide investigation that occurred in their jurisdiction.

On Monday[,] November 28 th , 2016[,] at approximately

1225 hours, Deputies with the Knox County (TN) Sheriff's

Office responded to a residence in their jurisdiction

concerning a welfare check on the residents. The welfare

check was requested after a female resident failed to show

up for work that date. Upon their arrival, Knox County

Deputies located the lifeless bodies of a male and female

inside the residence with obvious injuries. During the

course of their investigation, Knox County (TN) Detectives

obtained an Arrest Warrant charging Joel Michael Guy

Jr., W/M 03-13-1888 [sic] (ACCUSED) with First Degree

Murder. Video surveillance footage confirmed that the

Accused utilized a 2006 Hyundai Sonata, 4-doors, blue

in color, bearing Louisiana license plate EZIJ752, VIN:

5NPEU46F06H013209, while traveling in Knox County,

TN at the time of the homicide.

On Tuesday[,] November 29 th , 2016[,] at approximately

1600 hours, the Accused was taken into custody outside of

his residence, which is located at 5075 Nicholson Drive,

Apt A-202[,] Baton Rouge, LA 70820, without incident.

The previously described vehicle was also located parked

near the Accused apartment.

The previously described vehicle will be towed from its

current location to the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's

Office Crime Scene Garage ... in order for the Search

Warrant to be executed and any evidence collected from

within.

*664 After obtaining the search warrants, Lieutenant

Henning had a SWAT team clear the defendant's apartment

to ensure no one else was inside the apartment and to

“maintain[ ] security on the apartment.” When Lieutenant

Henning arrived, he conducted a search of the apartment,

which he described as “very dirty” and “very unkept.” He

noted that the sofa was actually situated near the door such

that it appeared that the door had been barricaded at one

point. In the kitchen, he saw large bottles of peroxide on the

counter, a bottle of Liquid Fire in the trash can, and packaging

for a large knife. Officers found a 12-gauge shotgun on

top of the bed in the primary bedroom. Officers also found

ammunition for the shotgun and ammunition for a handgun. In

a dresser, Lieutenant Henning found letters addressed to Mrs.

Guy inside of Ziploc bags and “numerous electronics and

different things like that.” A computer monitor in the bedroom

showed a recent search for “a helium hood,” which can be

used to commit suicide by asphyxiation. Officers also found

receipts from Lowe's and Dan Boudreaux's Ace Hardware in

Louisiana. The receipt for Ace Hardware showed purchases

of muriatic acid, clear drain liquid fire, and four containers of

sewer line cleaner.

Pursuant to a search warrant for the defendant's vehicle, the

vehicle was towed to the crime scene garage for processing.

In the trunk of the vehicle, officers found five-gallon gasoline

cans, a mixing bowl, other kitchen appliances, and a meat

grinder. The evidence collected from both the apartment and

the vehicle were turned over to KCSO.

During cross-examination, Lieutenant Henning testified that

Detective McCord arrived in Baton Rouge prior to the

execution of the search warrant and met the lieutenant at his

office. Lieutenant Henning discussed the application for the

search warrant with Detective McCord over the telephone

before presenting it to the magistrate. He said that he did

not include details of the homicides in his affidavit for the

search warrants because an arrest warrant for the defendant

had already been issued in Knox County, “[s]o we didn't feel

it was our place in Louisiana to discuss the facts of a homicide

that occurred in another state.”

18a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

KCSO Detective Steven Ballard testified that on the Monday

morning after Thanksgiving of 2016, he responded to the

Goldenview Lane residence to conduct a welfare check on

Mrs. Guy. He rang the doorbell at the front door, and after no

one responded, he walked to the side of the residence where

he saw a fence around the backyard with a locked gate. He did

not enter the backyard because “[b]eing alone, it would have

been an officer safety issue.” He saw two vehicles parked in

the driveway and an interior light on in the foyer. He was at

the residence for five to 10 minutes and did not speak to any

neighbors at that time. He verbally reported the results of the

welfare check to dispatch.

Later that day, Detective McCord told Detective Ballard that

he had additional information and was going to the victims’

residence, and Detective Ballard agreed to accompany him.

Detective Ballard wore a body camera and activated the

camera during his first and second visit to the residence.

His second visit to the residence was approximately one

to two hours after his first visit, and Officer Gerrit Graves

and Officer Benji Gresham were also present. During the

second visit, Detective McCord went to a neighbor's house

to ask the neighbor when she had last seen the victims. The

neighbor told him that the victims and their son were there

on Thanksgiving and that she had seen them moving a boat

and a trailer on Friday. *665 Another neighbor told him

that she had seen the foyer light on inside the residence at

approximately 6:30 a.m. that morning.

Detective McCord and Detective Ballard climbed over the

fence and entered the backyard, and Detective McCord

looked through a hole in the back door where the doorknob

was missing. Detective Ballard did not recall Detective

McCord's saying that he felt or smelled anything while

looking through the hole. Detective McCord then looked

through one of the windows. Detective Ballard checked the

doggie door and found that the inner door would not open.

Detective Ballard can be heard on the recording saying, “I'm

going to back off for a minute,” at which point he turned off

his body camera.

At some point, Detective Ballard reactivated his body camera,

and the garage door can be seen opening in the video

recording. He said that he was not aware of any plan to enter

the house until after the garage door was opened. He said that

once the garage door opened, he felt heat “coming out of the

garage.” Detective McCord knocked on the door leading from

the garage to the house and then “just pushed open” the door.

Detective Ballard said, “I don't know how you explain it,”

but “the odor was so strong my forehead was burning when

we entered the residence.” He said that the heat became more

intense as he continued further into the house. After seeing

the scene in the upstairs of the house, the officers exited the

house to discuss the next steps. Detective McCord re-entered

the house to secure weapons that the officers observed while

inside the house. Detective Ballard remained at the side of the

house to help secure the perimeter and did not re-enter the

house.

During cross-examination, Detective Ballard said that during

his first visit to the residence, he did not look inside

through a window. He said that when he and Detective

McCord later entered the house through the garage, he

believed an emergency situation was at hand. During redirect

examination, Detective Ballard said that after initially going

upstairs and seeing the scene, the officers “left without

completely clearing the upstairs.”

KCSO Officer Gerrit Graves testified that he responded to

the Goldenview Lane residence on November 28, 2016, to

assist with a welfare check. He said that officers spoke with

neighbors and looked around the outside of the residence

before making the decision to enter the house. He entered

the house with other officers and, after exiting, helped set

up a perimeter around the property. He acknowledged that

after the four officers exited the house, there was a period of

time during which no law enforcement officers were inside.

He said that the officers heard noises upstairs and were

unsure whether someone was still in the house. Officer Graves

re-entered the house with Detective McCord to secure the

firearms that were on the dining room table. Officer Graves

said that at that time, the noise from upstairs sounded like a

dog. Officer Graves pointed out to Detective McCord the heat

emanating from the oven as they walked through the kitchen.

Officer Graves stated that the officers did not do anything in

the house other than retrieve the weapons from the table.

During cross-examination, Officer Graves said that he

responded only to the second welfare visit to the residence. He

said that he peered through the window at the front door and

saw groceries scattered on the floor inside the door, which he

considered troubling. He said that when he entered the house,

he noted that it was “extremely hot” and that he “said out loud,

I've entered the gates of hell.” He said that officers confirmed

with neighbors before entering the house that the vehicles

in *666 the driveway belonged to the victims, leading the

officers to believe that the victims were inside the house.

19a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

The recordings from the body cameras of both Detective

Ballard and Officer Graves were entered as exhibits during

the suppression hearing. The recording of Detective Ballard's

initial visit to the Goldenview Lane residence showed him

approaching the residence, which had a “For Sale” sign in

the front yard and vehicles parked in the driveway. Detective

Ballard walked up to the front door, which was a glass door

with a wooden door behind it. A decorative window was in the

middle of the wooden front door. Detective Ballard knocked,

but no one responded. He walked to the fence on the side of

the yard, saw the dog house in the backyard, and whistled.

When he did not receive a response, he returned to the front

door before leaving the area.

The next recording showed Detective Ballard returning to the

Goldenview Lane residence with other officers. He and the

officers approached a neighbor who lived beside the victims

and asked her about the victims. She could not recall whether

she saw the victims the previous day but said she saw them on

Thanksgiving with their son. She confirmed that the vehicles

in the driveway belonged to the victims and that they did not

own any other vehicles. She stated that the victims were in the

process of moving, that they had to be out of their house by

December 13th, and that they had a large dog that was loud.

She suggested that the officers speak to the neighbors who

lived across the street from the victims. Detective Ballard and

other officers walked across the street and spoke to a neighbor

who reported seeing a light on upstairs inside the victims’

residence at 6:30 a.m. that morning.

The recording from Detective Ballard's body camera showed

the officers approaching the front door of the victims’

residence. One of the officers looked inside the residence

through the decorative window on the front door. The

neighbor who lived next to the victims approached the officers

and reported seeing a light on inside the victims’ residence

at 6:00 a.m. that morning. She stated that she assumed Mrs.

Guy was preparing to go to work. The recording showed

Detective McCord and Detective Ballard climbing over the

fence into the backyard while discussing information that they

learned from the victims’ neighbors and the realtor. Detective

McCord walked onto a deck, approached the back door, and

looked through a hole in the door where the doorknob was

missing. He tried looking through a window near the back

door, and Detective Ballard determined that a nearby pet door

was locked. The officers returned to the front of the residence

where an officer opened one of the vehicles, retrieved a garage

door opener, and used it to open the garage door.

Detective McCord knocked on the door in the garage leading

inside the house and announced the officers’ presence. A dog

could be heard barking from inside the house. The officers

entered the residence and walked through the downstairs

area while Detective McCord continued to announce their

presence. As they started walking upstairs, Detective McCord

saw blood on the wall and instructed the officers to put on

gloves. The officers began clearing the rooms upstairs, and

Detective Ballard cleared the bedroom where the defendant

acknowledged he had stayed. Detective McCord instructed

the officers to back out of the house, and the officers exited

through the garage.

In addition to the recording from Detective Ballard's body

camera, the recordings from Officer Graves's body camera

showed him speaking to the neighbors who lived across the

street from the victims. One of *667 the neighbors stated

that it was unusual that both of the victims’ vehicles were

parked in the driveway because Mrs. Guy was generally at

work during this time of the day. The officers obtained the

telephone number of one of the victims from the neighbor, and

an officer announced that he had been calling the victims but

that his calls went to voicemail. An officer looked inside the

victims’ residence through the decorative window in the front

door and reported his observations. When Officer Graves

entered the victims’ home with the other officers, he made

a comment about how hot it was inside the home. After

the officers’ initial entry, Officer Graves and another officer

reentered the home and retrieved the guns found in the dining

area downstairs.

In its written order entered on November 5, 2019, denying

the defendant's motions to suppress evidence found within

the Goldenview Lane residence, the trial court found that the

defendant had standing to challenge the evidence found in

the bedroom in which the defendant had stayed but lacked

standing to challenge evidence found throughout the rest of

the house. The court also found that exigent circumstances

justified the warrantless search of the house, including the

search of the bedroom designated for the defendant's use.

The trial court noted that the nature of the crime scene

and the fact that the victims’ “body parts were in multiple

locations throughout the house” in caustic solutions imposed

on the officers “not only the right but the duty to identify,

secure and save any and all evidence as soon as possible.”

The trial court also denied the defendant's other motions to

suppress and granted permission for the defendant to pursue

an interlocutory appeal.

20a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

After this court denied the defendant's interlocutory appeal,

the trial court entered supplemental orders addressing the

defendant's suppression motions. In its supplemental orders,

the trial court amended its prior conclusion regarding standing

and concluded that the defendant had standing to challenge

the search of the entire house due to his status as an

overnight guest. The court determined, however, that the

officers’ initial entry into the house was justified by exigent

circumstances and the community caretaking exception and

that the subsequent entries constituted a continuation of the

original lawful entry. The trial court found that the officers

“clearly had a legitimate concern that someone in the house

could have been injured and likely deceased” and that “[t]he

totality of the circumstances pointed to a strong possibility

that a person or persons were in need of immediate aid. To

wait for a search warrant could have jeopardized lives and

would have been unreasonable.”

The trial court concluded that the backpack was in plain view

during the initial search of the residence and was properly

“seized as evidence that the defendant had been in the home

around the time that the crimes occurred.” Having concluded

that the backpack was properly seized, the trial court

concluded that the backpack and its contents were properly

searched pursuant to “a valid inventory search.” The trial

court stated that although evidence of the KCSO's specific

policy regarding inventory searches was not presented at the

suppression hearing, the examination of the contents of the

notebook did not exceed the scope of the inventory search.

The trial court found that it was reasonable for the officers

to look at the books inside the backpack to help determine

the ownership *668 of the property and whether valuable

property was inside the books and notebooks.

The trial court concluded that the affidavit in support of

the search warrant for the defendant's vehicle established

probable cause and the necessary nexus between the

offenses and the defendant's vehicle. However, the trial

court concluded that the affidavit supporting the search

warrant for the defendant's apartment failed to establish

probable cause in that the affidavit failed to establish a nexus

between the offenses that occurred in Knox County and the

defendant's apartment in Baton Rouge. The trial court found

that “[i]nevitable discovery does not save the evidence from

suppression,” that because the defendant was arrested outside

of his apartment, it was unnecessary for the officers to enter

the apartment, and that “[i]t was not inevitable that law

enforcement would have ever entered the residence for any

lawful purpose without a warrant.”

21a

On August 3, 2020, the defendant filed a motion seeking

clarification from the trial court regarding the admissibility

of the surveillance videos from retailers obtained as

a result of the officers’ seizure of receipts from the

defendant's apartment. The defendant also filed a motion to

reconsider, challenging the trial court's findings upholding the

constitutionality of the officers’ entry into the Goldenview

Lane residence and the seizure and search of the backpack.

The defendant also argued that the seizure of the Walmart

receipt and the knife found in the upstairs bathroom located

off the hallway did not fall within the plain view doctrine.

The trial court subsequently entered an order denying the

defendant's motion to reconsider. The trial court also entered

an order finding that the videos from retailers showing the

defendant purchasing items found in the Goldenview Lane

residence or his vehicle were not fruits of the poisonous tree

deriving from the unconstitutional search of the defendant's

apartment. The trial court determined that discovery of the

surveillance videos was inevitable.

At trial, the defendant challenged the trial court's finding

that the store surveillance videos obtained after officers

discovered the receipts while searching the defendant's

apartment were admissible because they would have been

inevitably discovered. During a hearing outside the jury's

presence, Special Agent King testified that following the

defendant's arrest, he went to stores in the area of Baton Rouge

and Gonzales, Louisiana, and obtained video recordings of

the defendant's purchasing items inside the stores. Special

Agent King stated that he had extensive experience in

tracking products and obtaining videos from retailers of

purchases. He explained,

[T]here's so many ways to locate and

identify specific videos or specific

items. It's not that difficult anymore,

especially with the systems that all

these retailers have, because they track

inventory and where it's placed in the

stores. With a little legwork, you can

get to pretty much whatever you want.

Special Agent King testified that he had experience in

tracking products using barcodes. He stated that he always

began by visiting the larger stores and asking whether the

product was sold in their stores. He said that most of the stores

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

have employees who can use a product's barcode to determine

whether the product was sold in their store and the number

of the particular product that was sold during a specific time

frame. Once they obtain that information, they can review the

surveillance videos recorded during that time frame and in the

area where the product was displayed. Special Agent King

stated that “with a little work, going from store *669 to store,

you can get what you want with a barcode.” He acknowledged

that the presence of a bag at the scene identifying the name of

a store would make the task “a lot easier” because he would

begin his search at that store.

During cross-examination, Special Agent King testified that

although he performed some searches based on barcodes in

the defendant's case, the receipts obtained listed the store

locations and the items purchased. He stated that had he only

had the product's barcodes, he would have begun his search

by visiting the large chain retailers closest to the defendant's

apartment. He said that four Walmart stores, two or three

Lowe's stores, and two Home Depot stores were located in

the area.

Special Agent Coleman testified that on December 1, 2016,

he went to Ace Hardware in Napoleonville, Louisiana, and

spoke to the owner, Dan Boudreaux, who provided him

with surveillance video of the defendant's purchasing items.

During cross-examination, Special Agent Coleman testified

that before going to Ace Hardware, he obtained information

from a supervisor regarding the category of products or

chemicals purchased, but he did not recall whether the

supervisor informed him of the date and time of the purchase.

One of the employees researched the information on a

computer and was able to find a surveillance video of the

purchase.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied

the defendant's request to suppress the surveillance videos,

finding that the officers would have inevitably discovered

the videos. The trial court noted that in addition to the

receipts found in the defendant's apartment, the officers

had the products themselves, which were discovered in the

Goldenview residence, a note found in the suitcase at the

residence that included the address for the Ace Hardware,

and information that the defendant attempted to purchase a

firearm at an Academy Sports. The trial court noted that the

officers did not visit the stores in Louisiana until officers had

developed the defendant as a suspect and determined where

he lived. The trial court noted testimony that the officers

would have started their search at the large retail stores near

the area in which the defendant lived and found that the

defendant purchased most of the products in these stores. The

trial court found that although the receipts saved the officers

“a lot of time” and assisted them in locating the recordings

quicker, the officers would have located the surveillance

videos regardless.

A trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress

are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates

against them. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn.

2000); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996).

Thus, questions of credibility, the weight and value of the

evidence, and the resolution of conflicting evidence are

matters entrusted to the trial judge, and this court must uphold

a trial court's findings of fact unless the evidence in the record

preponderates against them. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23; see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The application of the law to the facts,

however, is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Keith, 978

S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998).

Both the state and federal constitutions offer protection from

unreasonable searches and seizures; the general rule is that

a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable

and any evidence discovered is subject to suppression. See

U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....”);

Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7 (“That the people shall be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and possessions, *670 from

unreasonable searches and seizures ....”). “[T]he most basic

constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted

outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge

or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and

well delineated exceptions.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)

(alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)); see

also State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1997).

“The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and there

must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the

exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’ ”

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (quoting Jones v.

United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d

1514 (1958), and McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,

456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948)). “We are not dealing

with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves

a high function.” McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455, 69 S.Ct.

191. Thus, a trial court necessarily indulges the presumption

22a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

that a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable, and

the burden is on the State to demonstrate that one of the

exceptions to the warrant requirement applied at the time of

the search or seizure. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569

U.S. 141, 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013)

(“Our cases have held that a warrantless search of the

person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized

exception.”). The generally recognized exceptions to the

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement include “search

incident to arrest, plain view, stop and frisk, hot pursuit, search

under exigent circumstances, and ... consent to search.” State

v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005) (citations omitted).

A. Search of the Goldenview Lane Residence

The defendant argues that the warrantless search of the

Goldenview Lane residence was not supported by exigent

circumstances or any other exception to the warrant

requirement. The defendant argues that even if the officers’

entry into the house was supported by exigent circumstances,

they nonetheless lacked probable cause to search the house.

Finally, the defendant argues that even if the officers’ entry

into the house was constitutional, their subsequent seizure of

the backpack from an upstairs bedroom and the knife and

Walmart receipt from an upstairs bathroom did not fall within

the plain view doctrine and was, therefore, unconstitutional.

The State argues that the defendant lacked standing 2 to

contest the search of the house and, alternatively, that exigent

circumstances justified the entry into and search of the house.

The State also argues that the backpack, the knife, and the

Walmart receipt were properly seized under the plain view

doctrine. Relying upon the factors set forth in State v. Talley,

307 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tenn. 2010), the defendant asserts

that he had standing due to “his long-term connections” to

the Goldenview Lane residence. He also asserts that he had

standing as an overnight guest.

expectation of privacy in the place or thing to be searched.”

State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 520-21 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2003); see Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. 507; see also

State v. Prier, 725 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Tenn. 1987) (stating that

Tennessee affords no greater protection than Katz's principle

of what a person knowingly exposes to the public). To

properly evaluate the issue under both our state and federal

constitutions, we must determine “(1) whether the individual

had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and [if so] (2)

whether society is willing to view the individual's subjective

expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the

circumstances.” State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tenn.

2001) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99

S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d

833, 839 (Tenn. 2001)). The second part of this inquiry

focuses on “whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the

individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is ‘justifiable’

under the circumstances.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct.

2577 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. 507).

Our supreme court has identified factors courts should

consider when determining whether a personal privacy

interest exists, including:

(1) [whether the defendant owns the

property seized]; (2) whether the

defendant has a possessory interest

in the thing seized; (3) whether the

defendant has a possessory interest in

the place searched; (4) whether he has

the right to exclude others from that

place; (5) whether he has exhibited a

subjective expectation that the place

would remain free from governmental

invasion; (6) whether he took normal

precautions to maintain his privacy;

and (7) whether he was legitimately on

the premises.

*671 1. Standing

The “rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal

rights, and ... they may be enforced by the exclusion of

evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection

was infringed by the search and seizure.” Talley, 307 S.W.3d

at 730 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,

389, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968)) (alteration in

Talley). Therefore, “[i]n order to challenge the reasonableness

of a search or seizure, the defendant must have a legitimate

Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 731 (quoting State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d

833, 841 (Tenn. 2001)) (alteration in Ross). Our supreme

court has recognized that this “totality of the circumstances

test is best-suited for determining the reasonableness of an

expectation of privacy.” Id. at 734. “A defendant has the initial

burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy, and

the failure to do so is dispositive in favor of the state.” Id. at

23a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

730 (citing State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1991)).

The evidence established that at the time of the offenses, the

defendant was a 28-year-old college student who resided in

Louisiana, more than 600 miles away from the Goldenview

Lane residence. He did not own or reside in the Goldenview

Lane residence, and he had never resided in the home.

Although the victims who owned the home were the

defendant's parents, this relationship is not, “in itself, enough

to make that home a Fourth Amendment sanctuary for

an adult child not living there.” State v. Francisco, 107

Wash.App. 247, 26 P.3d 1008, 1011 (2001); see State v.

Rodriguez, 59 N.E.3d 619, 624 (Ohio App. 2016) (“There

is no assumed expectation of privacy simply because of the

familial relationship.”). The defendant failed to establish that

he had “long-term connections” to the Goldenview Lane

residence in support of his contention of a *672 reasonable

expectation of privacy in the home. The victims did not

move into the Goldenview Lane residence until 2007 after

the defendant graduated high school and began attending

college. Prior to moving to Knoxville, the victims moved

out of their home in Louisiana where the defendant had

previously resided with them and moved to South Carolina,

where they lived for approximately one year. The defendant

only visited the victims at the Goldenview Lane residence

sporadically through the years on holidays and birthdays.

Prior to Thanksgiving of 2016, the defendant had not been

in the home since March 2016. He identified only a few

items that he claimed belonged to him and were regularly

stored in the home, including old college books and tokens

from his childhood. He was not present when the officers

entered the home, had not stayed overnight in the home on the

night prior to the officers’ entry, and had, instead, chosen to

return to his apartment in Louisiana. Although the defendant

testified that he possessed a key and a garage door opener to

the Goldenview Lane residence, “possessing a key, in and of

itself, does not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.”

Rodriguez, 59 N.E.3d at 624. Because he rarely visited the

victims, he rarely used the key, and he did not establish that

he had the right to exclude others from the home. Although

the defendant claims that he had an expectation of privacy in

the home independent of any claims as an overnight guest,

we conclude that the defendant failed to establish that his

claimed expectation, when viewed objectively, is reasonable

or justifiable under the totality of the circumstances.

The defendant also asserts that he was an overnight guest

and, therefore, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

Goldenview Lane residence. To be sure, “[t]he fact that a

person is an overnight guest in a residence ... standing alone,

is sufficient to clothe the guest with a legitimate expectation

of privacy in the premises sufficient to challenge the search

and any resulting seizure.” State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949,

958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495

U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990)). In reaching

this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court reasoned:

To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation

of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the

everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying

overnight in another's home is a longstanding social custom

that serves functions recognized as valuable by society....

We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many times

in our lives. From either perspective, we think that society

recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation

of privacy in his host's home.

From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter

in another's home precisely because it provides him with

privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not

be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host

allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we

are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or

the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that,

although we may spend all day in public places, when

we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another

private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the

home of a friend. Society expects at least as much privacy

in these places as in a telephone booth—“a temporarily

private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of

freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable[.]”

That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the

house is not inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate

*673 expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with

the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house

and his privacy with his guest. It is unlikely that the guest

will be confined to a restricted area of the house; and when

the host is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure

of control over the premises.... [H]osts will more likely

than not respect the privacy interest of their guests, who are

entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the

fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do

not have the legal authority to determine who may or may

not enter the household.

Olson, 495 U.S. at 98-99, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (internal citation

omitted).

24a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

A defendant's status as an overnight guest “must exist at the

time of the search.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure,

§ 11.3(b) fn. 102 (6th ed. 2020); see, e.g. State v. Cody, 248

Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18, 27 (Neb. 1995) (recognizing that

“in order to have a protected Fourth Amendment interest as

an overnight guest at searched premises, one must have been

such a guest at the time of the search”); State v. Corbin, 194

Ohio App.3d 720, 957 N.E.2d 849, 855 (2011) (discussing

cases and rejecting the defendant's claim of reasonable

expectation of privacy in a home because his status as an

overnight guest was terminated sometime prior to the search).

“Any other conclusions would result in an overnight guest's

having a permanently protected fourth amendment interest in

a place in which he or she once stayed, no mater how remote

in time.” State v. Cortis, 237 Neb. 97, 465 N.W.2d 132, 139

(1991); see Cody, 539 N.W.2d at 27. Because the defendant

had the burden of proving a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the home, he, likewise, had the burden of proving his status

as an overnight guest at the time of the officers’ entry into the

home. See Transou, 928 S.W.2d at 958 (recognizing that an

overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a

residence and concluding that the defendant “made no effort

to establish a reasonable expectation in the apartment” subject

to the search); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, at § 11.3(b) fn. 102 (stating

that the “defendant has the burden of proof as to the existence

of this [overnight-guest] status”).

The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established

that the defendant was an overnight guest in the days prior

to the victims’ murders. The State asserts that the defendant's

status as an overnight guest terminated prior to the officers’

entry into the Goldenview Lane residence. Specifically, the

State maintains that the defendant's status as an overnight

guest terminated once he attacked and killed the victims and

after the defendant's prolonged absence from the home.

The defendant asserts that the State failed to allege in the

trial court that his status as an overnight guest terminated as

a result of his killing the victims and that, therefore, the State

waived the issue. This court previously has held that the State

waived its argument that the defendant did not establish a

legitimate expectation of privacy by failing to raise the issue

in the trial court. See State v. White, 635 S.W.2d 396, 399-400

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). This court stated that “the State

has a duty to notify the defendant that it opposes his motion

on standing grounds, a result which reflects the traditional

polices of notice and fair play.” Id. at 399. When the State

fails to raise the issue of standing and, instead, challenges the

suppression motion on its merits, “the defendant is entitled to

infer that the State concedes his standing and need not offer

any evidence relevant to his expectation of privacy.” Id. at

399-400.

*674 In the instant case, however, the State filed a response

to the suppression motion arguing that the defendant lack

standing to challenge the officers’ entry and seizure of

evidence from the Goldenview Lane residence. Thus, the

defendant had notice that he would be required to present

evidence at the suppression hearing establishing a legitimate

expectation of privacy. We note that despite this notice, the

defendant filed a reply declining to specify the basis upon

which he was alleging a legitimate expectation of privacy,

which prevented the State from offering anything other than a

blanket challenge to standing prior to the suppression hearing.

Defense counsel declined to offer argument at the conclusion

of the suppression hearing and, instead, alleged that the

defendant was an overnight guest in a post-hearing pleading

filed almost two months following the hearing. Furthermore,

once the defendant alleged a legitimate expectation of privacy

as an overnight guest, he had the burden of proving his

status as an overnight guest at the time of the officers’ entry

into the residence and seizure of evidence. See Transou, 928

S.W.2d at 958; 2 Wayne R. LaFave, at § 11.3(b) fn. 102.

To establish that he was an overnight guest, the defendant

was required to present evidence that he was at the home

“with the permission of his host.” Olson, 495 U.S. at 99, 110

S.Ct. 1684; see State v. Crocco, 327 P.3d 1068, 1074 (N.M.

2014) (“In order for a court to conclude that Defendant had

a constitutional basis for objecting to the search of another

person's house, there must be evidence that Defendant was a

guest with permission to be there.”). Unlike White where the

State failed to make any challenge to the defendant's standing,

the State in the instant case raised the issue of standing prior

to the suppression hearing; therefore, the defendant was on

notice that he would be required to establish standing at the

suppression hearing, and the State's argument on appeal is

that the defendant failed to meet that burden. See White, 635

S.W.2d at 399-400. Accordingly, we will consider whether

the defendant met his burden of establishing that he was an

overnight guest who was present with the victims’ consent.

To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in a residence

as an overnight guest, a defendant must demonstrate that he

had permission to be there. See, e.g. United States v. Battle,

637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011); Crocco, 327 P.3d at 1074;

Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 223-24 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002); State v. Dorsey, 234 W.Va. 15, 762 S.E.2d 584, 593

25a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

(2014). Once that permission or consent has been revoked,

a defendant is no longer a “guest” who has a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the residence. See, e.g. Battle, 637

F.3d at 49; Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 225-26; Dorsey, 762

S.E.2d at 594; 2 Wayne LaFave, at § 11.3(b).

Courts have rejected a defendant's claim of a legitimate

expectation of privacy in a residence as an overnight guest

when the defendant procured or maintained access to the

residence through coercion or violent acts or threats. For

example, in Allen v. State, the Court of Appeals of Indiana

rejected a defendant's claim of a legitimate expectation

of privacy in a residence when he obtained control and

possession of the residence by killing the rightful owners.

Allen v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

In State v. Dorsey, the Supreme Court of West Virginia held

that a defendant, who was initially an invited guest in the

home, did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

home at the time of the search when the defendant threatened

to kill the owner and used the owner's dependency on drugs

that the defendant was supplying to her to control the home

and carry out his drug operation. Dorsey, 762 S.E.2d at

594. The court concluded *675 that a defendant “who is

unwelcome in the dwelling of another, or who has procured

or maintained access to the dwelling through coercion, threats

of violence or exploitation, does not have an expectation of

privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.” Id.

Finally, in Commonwealth v. Mallory, the Appeals Court of

Massachusetts held that although the defendant initially was

an overnight guest, he no longer had a legitimate expectation

of privacy in the bedroom that he had occupied after he raped

the host's daughter and fled the residence. Commonwealth

v. Mallory, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 775 N.E.2d 764, 768

(2002). The court stated that the “ ‘very limited expectation

of privacy’ ” that the defendant had in the bedroom was

“dependent upon the relationship between the defendant and

his host” and that, as a result of the defendant's actions, the

relationship “disintegrated.” Id.

We likewise conclude that although the defendant initially

was an invited overnight guest in the victims’ home, his

relationship with the victims “disintegrated” once he attacked

and killed them, and the defendant no longer had their

permission to be in the Goldenview Lane residence and was

no longer a “guest” at the time of the officers’ entry. We

do not hold that the defendant lost his legitimate expectation

of privacy simply by engaging in illegal conduct. Rather,

the focus is on the effect of the defendant's illegal activity

on the relationship between the defendant and the host and

the defendant's status as a welcomed guest. We hold that

by attacking and killing the victims upon whose permission

he relied in claiming that he was an overnight guest, the

defendant no longer had a legitimate expectation of privacy

in the Goldenview Lane residence that society is willing to

recognize as reasonable at the time of the officers’ entry into

the residence.

Regardless of the effect of the defendant's violent actions

against the victims on his status as an overnight guest,

we further conclude that the defendant was no longer an

overnight guest at the time of the officers’ entry due to

his prolonged absence from the Goldenview Lane residence.

Some courts have recognized that although proof was

presented that the defendant occasionally stayed the night at

the residence that was searched, the defendant did not have

a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence when

the defendant failed to establish that he was an overnight

guest at the time of the search. See, e.g. Rankin v. State,

57 Ark. App. 125, 942 S.W.2d 867, 871 (1997) (holding

that the defendant who frequently stayed overnight at his

girlfriend's apartment and left prescriptions there did not have

a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment when he

was not an overnight guest when the search occurred); Alston

v. State, 159 Md.App. 253, 858 A.2d 1100, 1107-09 (2004)

(concluding that although the defendant was an occasional

overnight guest, he did not have an objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy in the apartment when he “did not

have the present status of an overnight guest” and entered the

apartment while fleeing the police), rev'd on other grounds,

433 Md. 275, 71 A.3d 13 (2013); Cortis, 465 N.W.2d at

139 (concluding that the defendant did not have a legitimate

expectation of privacy when he stayed at the home overnight

on prior occasions but was not an overnight guest at the time

of the search); Gouldsby v. State, 202 S.W.3d 329, 335 (Tex.

App. 2006) (holding that the defendant failed to establish

“standing” to contest the search of a residence when the owner

testified that the defendant frequently stayed at the residence

but did not testify that the defendant was an overnight guest

on the night of the search).

*676 In the present case, the defendant acknowledged that

he did not stay overnight at the Goldenview Lane residence on

the night prior to the officers’ entry, and he was not present at

the residence when the officers entered. Rather, the defendant

left on Sunday and drove more than 600 miles to his apartment

in Louisiana. Given the defendant's prolonged absence from

the home, he was no longer an overnight guest and did not

have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home that

26a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

society is willing to view as reasonable and justifiable under

the circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's

denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized

from the Goldenview Lane residence, albeit on different

grounds than those upon which the trial court relied.

2. Exigent Circumstances

Even if the defendant had standing to challenge the search

of the Goldenview Lane residence, we agree with the State

that the officers’ entrance into the residence was supported by

exigent circumstances. “Given the importance of the warrant

requirement in safeguarding against unreasonable searches

and seizures, a circumstance will be sufficiently exigent only

where the State has shown that the search is imperative.”

State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 723 (Tenn. 2008) (citing

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454-44, 91 S.Ct. 2022; State v. Hayes,

188 S.W.3d 505, 514 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Yeargan, 958

S.W.2d 626, 641 (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J., concurring)). Our

supreme court has provided the following non-exclusive list

of “frequently-arising situations that have been found to be

sufficiently exigent” to justify the warrantless search of a

residence: “(1) hot-pursuit, (2) the thwart escape, (3) the

prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, (4) in response

to an immediate risk of serious harm to the police officers or

others, and (5) to render emergency aid to an injured person

or to protect a person from imminent injury.” Meeks, 262

S.W.3d at 723 (citing Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S.

398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); Olson,

495 U.S. at 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684; United States v. Huffman,

461 F.3d 777, 782 (6th Cir. 2006); State v. Adams, 238

S.W.3d 313, 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)). Said differently,

“[e]xigent circumstances are those in which the urgent need

for immediate action becomes too compelling to impose upon

governmental actors the attendant delay that accompanies

obtaining a warrant.” Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 723.

“To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an

emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court

looks to the totality of the circumstances.” McNeely, 569

U.S. at 149, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (citing Brigham City, Utah, 547

U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943; Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S.

326, 331, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001); Richards

v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 391-96, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137

L.Ed.2d 615 (1997); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296,

93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973)). The Supreme Court

explained:

27a

We apply this “finely tuned approach” to Fourth

Amendment reasonableness in this context because the

police action at issue lacks “the traditional justification

that ... a warrant ... provides.” Atwater v. Lago Vista,

532 U.S. 318, 347 n.16, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d

549 (2001). Absent that established justification, “the factspecific nature of the reasonableness inquiry,” Ohio v.

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d

347 (1996), demands that we evaluate each case of alleged

exigency based “on its own facts and circumstances.” GoBart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51

S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931).

*677 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 150, 133 S.Ct. 1552. This

analysis focuses on the information known to the officer at

the time of the search and any reasonable inferences that may

be drawn therefrom. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 723-24.

The trial court concluded that the initial entry was “justified

under both exigent circumstances and community caretaking

doctrines,” that “[t]he officers clearly had a legitimate

concern that someone in the home could have been

injured and likely deceased,” and that “[t]he totality of the

circumstances pointed to a strong possibility that a person

or persons were in need of immediate aid.” Following the

issuance of the trial court's order, the United States Supreme

Court issued its opinion in Caniglia v. Strom, holding that

the fact that police are acting solely based on community

caretaking purposes is not sufficient, alone, to excuse the

requirement for a warrant for entry into a home. Caniglia

v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 141 S.Ct. 1596, 1599-1600, 209

L.Ed.2d 604 (2021). However, the Court's majority opinion

and the concurring opinions made clear that the holding

did not undermine settled law that “officers may enter

private property without a warrant when certain exigent

circumstances exist, including the need to ‘render emergency

assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant

from imminent injury.’ ” Id. at 1599 (quoting Kentucky

v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d

865 (2011)); see id. at 1600 (Roberts, C.J., with whom

Breyer, J., joins, concurring); id. at 1603-04 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring).

The defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient

evidence establishing exigent circumstances justifying the

officers’ warrantless entry into the Goldenview Lane

residence. The defendant asserts that the officers’ looking

through the window in the front door and entering the

backyard were unconstitutional searches or intrusions and

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

that the officers’ observations as a result of these searches or

intrusions cannot be considered in determining whether the

officers’ entry into the residence was supported by exigent

circumstances. The defendant also asserts that the trial court,

as a successor judge, improperly credited Detective McCord's

testimony regarding his observations at the back door of the

residence when the successor judge was not present for the

suppression hearing and was not in a position to evaluate

Detective McCord's credibility. The State responds that the

officers’ peering into the residence through the window on

the front door was not an unconstitutional search and that

consideration of the officers’ observations from the window

in determining the existence of exigent circumstances

was proper. The State also responds that the trial court's

consideration of the officers’ observations from the back

porch was based upon then prevailing law allowing officers

to intrude onto curtilage under the community caretaking

doctrine, and the State appears to concede that the officers’

observations from the back door should not be considered

in determining whether exigent circumstances existed. The

State argues that, regardless of the officers’ observations from

the back door, the evidence established exigent circumstances

justifying the officers’ warrantless entry into the residence.

We need not determine the constitutionality of the officers’

entry into the backyard of the residence because we conclude

that the State established exigent circumstances justifying the

officers’ entry into the residence notwithstanding the officers’

observations from the back door.

The defendant contends that the officers’ looking inside the

Goldenview Lane residence through the decorative window

in the front door was an unconstitutional *678 search. The

United States Supreme Court has recognized that not every

entry upon a curtilage is a search, stating that “ ‘the knocker on

the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt

an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers

and peddlers of all kinds.’ ” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1,

8, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (quoting Breard v.

Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 624, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233

(1951)). The Court explained,

This implicit license typically permits the visitor to

approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait

briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger

longer) leave.... Thus, a police officer not armed with a

warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely that is

“no more than any private citizen might do.”

Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469, 131 S.Ct.

1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011)). The so-called “knock-and-

talk” where an officer approaches the front door of a residence

in order to investigate a complaint or to conduct other official

business is not a “search” within the context of the Fourth

Amendment, “at least if the intrusion is conducted within

the scope of the implicit license recognized by the Supreme

Court in Jardines.” State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 70

(Tenn. 2017); see Cothran, 115 S.W.3d at 522. “Rather, only if

an officer's conduct in approaching a front door, ‘objectively

reveals a purpose to conduct a search,’ such as bringing a

drug-sniffing dog onto the front porch, will his approach

offend the Fourth Amendment.” Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at

70 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S.Ct. 1409).

When an officer is in an area permitted by the implicit license,

such as the front door, “it is not a Fourth Amendment search

for the police to see or hear or smell from that vantage point

that is happening inside the dwelling.” LaFave, at § 2.3(c)

(footnotes omitted). Courts have held that an officer's peering

through an unobstructed window on or by the front door

of a residence is not a search within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment. See, e.g. United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d

903, 908-09 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the defendant's claim

that the officer's viewing the dining room through a window

from the street, the walkway to the house, and the front

porch constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment); Taylor v. State, 120 N.E.3d 661, 666-67 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2019) (concluding that the officer's “reposition[ing]

his body” to look through a window located on the front

door did not violate the Fourth Amendment); State v. Brisban,

809 So.2d 923, 928-29 (La. 2002) (concluding that exigent

circumstances justified the officer's warrantless entry into the

home when the officer was lawfully on the front porch for

a legitimate purpose, looked through the screen door, and

saw the defendant's companion cutting crack cocaine); State

v. Poling, 207 W.Va. 299, 531 S.E.2d 678, 681-82 (2000)

(holding that the officer's observing marijuana plants through

an unobstructed front door window while at the front door to

serve a subpoena was not a search within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment).

We, likewise, conclude that the officers’ peering into the

Goldenview Lane residence through the unobstructed front

door window was not a search within the meaning of the

federal and state constitutions. The officers were lawfully

at the front door of the Goldenview Lane residence to

conduct a “welfare check” following two calls expressing

concern for Mrs. Guy. The officers, like any member of

the general public who approached the door in the same

manner, briefly observed items *679 inside the residence

28a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

that were clearly visible from the front door window. Because

the officers’ observations were not the result of a “search”

for constitutional purposes, we may consider the observations

in determining whether exigent circumstances warranted the

officers’ entry into the residence.

The defendant argues for the first time in his reply brief that

the officers’ “actions in loitering in the front yard ... exceeded

any implicit license to approach and knock.” The defendant

asserts that the “implicit license does not cover” the situation

where the “officers were not expecting the [victims] to answer

the door and merely waiting a short period of time for them

do to so; but, instead, were investigating to find out why

the [victims] were not there.” The defendant, however, did

not raise this issue in the trial court as part of his efforts to

seek to suppress evidence seized from the Goldenview Lane

residence. Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Tenn. R.

App. 3(e), 36(a).

The United States Supreme Court has held that exigent

circumstances justifying the warrantless entry into a home

include “ ‘the need to assist persons who are seriously

injured or threatened with such injury.’ ” Michigan v. Fisher,

558 U.S. 45, 47, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009)

(quoting Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct.

1943). Officers “ ‘may enter a home without a warrant to

render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to

protect an occupant from imminent injury.’ ” Id. (quoting

Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943). This

“ ‘emergency aid exception’ ” is not dependent upon “the

officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime

that they are investigating when the emergency arises.” Id.

(quoting Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 404-05, 126 S.Ct.

1943). Furthermore, invoking the emergency aid exception

does not require “ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, lifethreatening’ injury’ ” but only requires “ ‘an objectively

reasonable basis for believing’ ... that ‘a person within [the

house] is in need of immediate aid.’ ” Id. at 48-49, 130 S.Ct.

546 (quoting Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct.

1943; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408,

57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)).

In arguing that the evidence failed to establish exigent

circumstances, the defendant relies upon State v. Justin

Gibson, in which a panel of this court concluded that the

State failed to establish exigent circumstances under the

emergency aid exception to justify a warrantless entry into

a home when an officer arrived at an accident scene where

he located a vehicle in a ditch but did not locate the driver,

went to the address listed on the vehicle's registration located

approximately one-half mile away from the accident scene,

saw that the front door of the house was open, did not observe

any signs of forced entry, learned from a neighbor, who had

been watching the house and the owners’ pets while the

owners were out of town, that the front door was not open

when the neighbor had been inside the house earlier that day,

entered the house to check if someone involved in the accident

was injured inside the house or if a break-in had occurred, and

found the defendant, who was the owners’ son, passed out

in bed. State v. Justin Gibson, No. M2012-02363-CCA-R3CD, 2013 WL 5701650, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville,

Oct. 18, 2013). In concluding that the State failed to establish

exigent circumstances under the emergency aid exception,

this court relied on United States v. Brandwein, an unreported

federal district court opinion, which recognized that the cases

in which courts had concluded that exigent circumstances

existed “ ‘appear to share two common factors.’ *680 ” Id. at

*9 (quoting United States v. Brandwein, No. 11-4015-01/02CR-C-NKL, 2012 WL 7827660, at *7 (W.D. Mo. May

24, 2012)). “ ‘First, in all of the cases in which courts

found exigency, officers observed events obviously occurring

within the residence or building.’ ” Id. (quoting Brandwein,

2012 WL 7827660, at *7). “ ‘Second, courts have found

exigent circumstances exist when officers observed events

or evidence leading directly to a structure.’ ” Id. (quoting

Brandwein, 2012 WL 7827660, at *7). In concluding that the

evidence failed to establish exigent circumstances pursuant

to the emergency aid exception, this court reasoned, in part,

that “[t]here were no signs or sounds of distress coming

from inside the home nor evidence leading directly to the

structure.” Id.

To the extent that Justin Gibson stands for the proposition

that these are the only two instances establishing exigent

circumstances pursuant to the emergency aid exception, we,

respectfully, disagree. “Officers do not need ironclad proof of

‘a serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency

aid exception.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49, 130 S.Ct. 546.

Rather, officers need “ ‘an objectively reasonable basis for

believing’ that medical assistance was needed, or persons

were in danger.” Id. (quoting Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S.

at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct.

2408). We disagree that this determination is limited to the

officer's observations of the place to be searched. See Justin

Gibson, 2013 WL 5701650, at *10 (providing that “cases

which approve the warrantless entry into a home to render

emergency aid and assistance are, without exception, based

upon the officers’ observations of the place to be searched”).

29a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

Rather, “[t]he exigency of the circumstances is evaluated

based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the

governmental actor at the time of entry.” Meeks, 262 S.W.3d

at 723 (footnotes omitted).

As Justice Kavanaugh recently observed in his concurring

opinion in Caniglia v. Strom, “the Court's exigency

precedents, as I read them, permit warrantless entries when

police officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe

that there is a current, ongoing crisis for which it is reasonable

to act now.” Caniglia, 141 S.Ct. at 1604 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (citations omitted). He explained,

The officers do not need to show

that the harm has already occurred

or is mere moments away, because

knowing that will often be difficult if

not impossible in cases involving, for

example, a person who is currently

suicidal or an elderly person who has

been out of contact and may have

fallen. If someone is at risk of serious

harm and it is reasonable for officers

to intervene now, that is enough for the

officers to enter.

Id. Justice Kavanaugh provided the following example:

Suppose that an elderly man

is uncharacteristically absent from

Sunday church services and repeatedly

fails to answer his phone throughout

the day and night. A concerned relative

calls the police and asks the officers

to perform a wellness check. Two

officers drive to the man's home. They

knock but receive no response. May

the officers enter the home? Of course.

Id. Justice Kavanaugh concluded that the officers have an “

‘objectively reasonable basis’ for believing that an occupant

is ‘seriously injured or threatened with such injury’ ” and that

“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prevent the officers from

entering the home and checking on the man's well-being.”

30a

Id. (quoting Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 400, 126 S.Ct.

1943).

*681 We conclude that based on the totality of the

circumstances, the officers in the present case had “an

objectively reasonable basis” for believing that the victims

needed medical assistance or were otherwise in danger.

Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49, 130 S.Ct. 546. Mrs. Guy, without

explanation, failed to attend a pre-planned function that

morning, and her absence from work without calling was

unusual. Multiple attempts to contact the victims were

unsuccessful. Although the victims’ vehicles were parked in

the driveway and despite the fact that neighbors reported

seeing an interior light on upstairs that morning, no one

came to the front door when the officers knocked. A

neighbor reported that the presence of both of the victims’

vehicles in the driveway was unusual because Mrs. Guy

generally was at work during that time of day. The

absence of the realtor's lockbox from the front door and

the differences in discoloration between the doorknob and

the deadbolt were evidence that the locking mechanism

had been altered, and bags of groceries were lying on

the floor and were seemingly abandoned by the victims.

The defendant addresses each circumstance individually

and attempts to offer an innocent explanation for each

circumstance. Although each circumstance, when viewed

in isolation, may not justify the warrantless entry into

the residence, we conclude that these circumstances, when

viewed in their totality, established exigent circumstances

justifying the officers’ warrantless entry into the Goldenview

Lane residence.

The defendant also asserts that the officers lacked probable

cause justifying the warrantless entry into the Goldenview

Lane residence. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held

that “probable cause is not a necessary element” for the

application of the emergency aid exception under the Fourth

Amendment. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 726 n.31. Accordingly,

the defendant is not entitled to relief regarding this issue.

3. Seizure of the Backpack, a Knife, and a Walmart Receipt

The defendant asserts that even if the officers’ initial

warrantless entry into the Goldenview Lane residence was

constitutional, the subsequent seizure of his backpack from

an upstairs bedroom and a knife and Walmart receipt from

the upstairs bathroom was unconstitutional. The defendant

asserts that the items were not within the plain view of the

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

officers at the time of the initial entry. The State responds that

the evidence was within the officers’ plain view at the time

of the initial entry and that the subsequent entry of officers

and technicians who seized the evidence was a continuation

of the officers’ original entry. The State also responds that

regardless of whether the evidence was within the plain view

of the responding officers during the initial entry, the evidence

was properly seized as within the plain view of the officers

and technicians who subsequently entered the residence. We

conclude that even if the defendant had standing to challenge

the seizure of the evidence, the items were properly seized as

evidence within the plain view of the officers who initially

entered the residence.

Under certain circumstances, officers may seize evidence in

plain view without a warrant. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465,

91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); State v. Coulter, 67 S.W.3d 3, 43 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by State v.

Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 407 n.3 (Tenn. 2005). The plain

view doctrine applies when:

(1) the officer did not violate

constitutional mandates in arriving

at the location from which the

evidence could plainly be seen; (2)

the officer had a *682 lawful right

of access to the evidence; and (3)

the incriminating character of the

evidence was “immediately apparent,”

i.e., the officer possessed probable

cause to believe that the item in plain

view was evidence of a crime or

contraband.”

Coulter, 67 S.W.3d at 43 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson,

508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993);

Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 65-66, 113 S.Ct.

538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); Horton v. California, 496 U.S.

128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); Arizona

v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d

347 (1987)). An officer, who enters a home based upon

exigent circumstances, “may generally seize any apparently

incriminating items located on the premises in plain view”

and may “ ‘record by photography scenes presented to [his]

plain view.’ ” Id. (quoting Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707

(6th Cir. 1992)).

31a

The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that an officer,

who lawfully enters a home under exigent circumstances

and “encounter[s] evidence in plain view,” need not “obtain

a search warrant in order to examine that same evidence.”

State v. Hutchison, 482 S.W.3d 893, 919-20 (Tenn. 2016).

The court held that the subsequent reentry by an officer

or technician to process the evidence constituted a “mere

continuation” of the initial lawful entry into the home under

exigent circumstances and that “[t]herefore, evidence in plain

view in the home could be examined, photographed, seized

and processed by them without a search warrant.” Id. at 920.

In reaching this conclusion, our supreme court cited with

approval the reasoning of appellate courts in New Jersey and

Connecticut that:

“[W]hen a law enforcement officer enters private premises

in response to a call for help, and during the course of

responding to the emergency observes but does not take

into custody evidence in plain view, a subsequent entry

shortly thereafter, by detectives whose duty it is to process

evidence, constitutes a mere continuation of the original

entry .... This conclusion ... furthers the goal of effective

law enforcement, and promotes the rationale and purpose

of the plain view doctrine.”

Id. at 919 (quoting State v. O'Donnell, 408 N.J.Super. 177, 974

A.2d 420, 426 (2009), aff'd, 203 N.J. 160, 1 A.3d 604 (2010);

State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 528 A.2d 760, 764 (1987)).

In challenging the seizure of the backpack, the defendant

argues that the proof does not establish that the backpack

was seen by the officers during the initial entry or that the

incriminating character of the backpack was “immediately

apparent” by the officers who made the initial entry. In

denying the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court

found that the backpack was in plain view, that the officers

“had reason to believe that it belonged to the defendant/

missing house guest,” that the backpack was “properly seized

as evidence that the defendant had been in the home around

the time that the crimes occurred,” and that the backpack

“directly pointed to the defendant as the perpetrator of the

crime.” The backpack was recovered by the foot of the

bed in the guest bedroom; the backpack was visible on the

body camera recording of the officers’ initial entry into the

residence; and Detective McCord testified that the backpack

was in plain view. Thus, the proof established that the

backpack was within the officers’ plain view at the time of the

initial entry. Furthermore, prior to entering the residence, the

officers learned from a neighbor that the defendant had been

staying with the victims over the weekend. *683 Inside the

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

guest bedroom where the backpack was located was evidence

indicating that the bedroom had been recently occupied,

including an open suitcase on the floor that contained clothing

and a laptop that was open, running, and on the bed. Also

inside the guest bedroom was evidence related to the murder,

including the tops to the containers that held the body parts

and various items with reddish-brown staining. In light of the

information obtained from the neighbor and the other items

in the bedroom, the officers had probable cause to believe

that the backpack was evidence relevant to the identity of

either the perpetrator or the victims. The evidence does not

preponderate against the trial court's finding that the backpack

was properly seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine.

With respect to the knife and the Walmart receipt, the

trial court made a general finding that all items seized

were within the officers’ plain view. The knife and the

Walmart bag containing the receipt were on the counter in

an upstairs bathroom. Photographs show that the Walmart

bag was partially open, and the receipt can be seen through

the opening. During the suppression hearing, Detective

McCord testified regarding all of the items seized from

the residence, including the knife and the Walmart receipt.

He then confirmed that he observed the items during his

initial sweep of the residence and that the items were in the

same condition by the time that the forensic investigators

entered the residence to photograph the scene. Thus, the State

established that officers observed the items in plain view

at the time of the initial entry. Given the blood and body

parts observed by the officers, the incriminating character

of the knife was “immediately apparent.” The Walmart bag

containing the receipt was next to the knife, a large blood

stain, a disposable glove, and a bottle of hydrogen peroxide.

The officers had probable cause to believe that the receipt

had evidentiary value in that the receipt could provide a

time and date on which some of the items observed by the

officers inside the residence were purchased and could assist

the officers in determining a timeline of the events. The

incriminating character of the Walmart receipt, therefore, was

“immediately apparent.” Accordingly, we conclude that the

seizure of the knife and the Walmart receipt was proper.

B. Search of the Backpack

The defendant challenges the trial court's finding that the

searches of his backpack and the notebook found within

it were proper inventory searches. The defendant does not

argue that once the backpack was seized, it was not subject

to an inventory search as a matter of law. Rather, he

asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence

establishing that a policy to subject seized evidence to an

inventory search existed and that the inventory search was

conducted in accordance with any such policy. In response,

the State does not argue that the defendant lacks standing

to challenge the inventory search but maintains that the

trial court properly determined that the searches of the

backpack and the notebook were within the scope of the law

enforcement agency's procedures for conducting an inventory

search.

Another exception to the warrant requirement is a lawful

inventory search. State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295

(Tenn. 1992). “Under this exception, it is constitutionally

permissible for police officers to inventory the contents of ...

lawfully [seized property] without a search warrant as long

as it is in accordance with routine administrative procedures.”

Id. (citing *684 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,

372, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). The purposes

of an inventory search must be “(1) to protect the property

of the owner, and (2) to protect officers from claims of

negligence or violation of civil rights in the event property

disappears or is damaged.” State v. Cabage, 649 S.W.2d 589,

592 (Tenn. 1983). In light of the purposes for which an

inventory search is conducted, “officers may properly open

unlocked containers ... when necessary to make a realistic and

meaningful inventory.” State v. Glenn, 649 S.W.2d 584, 589

(Tenn. 1983). Inventory searches have been upheld “ ‘where

it is clear that the procedure used is a valid inventory and is

not merely a pretext for a search, whether or not there is some

suspicion that contraband or other evidence may be found.’

” Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Ducker, 491 F.2d 1190,

1192 (5th Cir. 1974)).

The defendant relies upon Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,

110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), and United States

v. Alexander, 954 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2020), in arguing that

the evidence failed to establish that the forensic division

had a policy of conducting an inventory search of seized

items or that the searches of the backpack and the notebook

were conducted in accordance with such a policy. In Wells,

the United States Supreme Court held that the search of

a suitcase found in a vehicle was not a proper inventory

search due to the law enforcement agency's lack of a policy

regarding the opening of closed containers encountered

during an inventory search. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5, 110 S.Ct.

1632. The Court held that the opening of containers found

during inventory searches must be regulated by “standardized

32a

State v. Guy, 679 S.W.3d 632 (2023)

criteria” or “established routine,” reasoning that “an inventory

search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in

order to discover incriminating evidence.” Id. at 4, 110

S.Ct. 1632. The Court noted that “[t]he policy or practice

governing inventory searches should be designed to produce

an inventory” and that a police officer “must not be allowed

so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into ‘a

purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of

crime.’ ” Id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,

376, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (Blackmun,

J., concurring)). The Court stated that permissible policies

include policies permitting the opening of all containers,

policies prohibiting the opening of any containers, and

policies granting officers latitude “to determine whether a

particular container should or should not be opened in light

of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container

itself.” Id.

In Alexander, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit applied the reasoning in Wells and concluded

that the officer did not conduct a valid inventory search of

a vehicle when no proof was presented of a “departmentissued inventory search regulation,” the officer “testified only

to his own practice for conducting inventory searches,” and

he did not testify regarding standard procedures for how

inventory searches are performed. Alexander, 954 F.3d at 916.

The court noted that “[e]ven though there existed regulations

governing when inventory searches were permissible, there

were no established procedures that governed how the

inventory searches were to be conducted.” Id. (footnote

omitted) (emphasis in original). The court concluded that

absent “evidence of ‘standardized criteria’ or ‘established

routine’ governing the scope of the inventory searches,” the

searches were conducted by the officer with “ ‘uncanalized

discretion.’ ” Id. (quoting Wells, 495 U.S. at 4, 110 S.Ct.

1632).

The trial court found that once the officers seized the

backpack, they were justified in conducting an inventory

search of the items within the backpack. Although *685

the trial court noted that “the specific policy of the Knox

County Sheriff's Office regarding inventory searches has not

been presented to the court,” the trial court found that the

examination of the notebook did not exceed the scope of the

inventory search and that “[i]t is reasonable for the officers to

look at the books inside the backpack to help them determine

the ownership of the property and if there was valuable

property inside the books and notebooks.”

Unlike the prosecution in Wells, which failed to present

any evidence in the trial court that “the inventory search

was done in accordance with any standardized inventory

procedure,” see Wells, 495 U.S. at 5, 110 S.Ct. 1632

(Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original), and the

officer in Alexander, who testified only to his own practice

for conducting inventory searches, see Alexander, 954 F.3d

at 916, Detective McCord testified that it was “typical

procedure” for the forensics division to inventory seized

evidence after the evidence was taken to the “City County

Building.” Furthermore, at trial, Officer Sandlin testified

regarding her inventory search conducted at the property

unit of the Knox County Detention Facility of items seized

from the residence, including Mrs. Guy's purse, the bags

of groceries from the foyer, the Walmart bag from the

upstairs bathroom, and the backpack and the notebook inside

the backpack. See State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468,

473 (Tenn. 2012) (recognizing that when evaluating the

correctness of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,

appellate courts “may consider the entire record, including not

only the proof offered at the hearing, but also the evidence

adduced at trial”). Officer Sandlin's testimony demonstrates

that she employed consistent procedures in conducting each

search. Although an inventory log is not included in the

appellate record, Officer Sandlin memorialized the steps

taken in searching each container and the items through

photographs.

The defendant asserts that the State failed to present any

evidence that: “(a) the Sheriff's Department had any policy

authorizing the examination of books to determine ownership

and/or the presence of valuables; or (b) that a forensic

technician discovered the incriminating pages of the notebook

while actually determining ownership and/or the presence

of valuables.” Although the State did not present a written

policy relating to inventory searches, a written policy is not

required, and testimony may establish the policy for inventory

searches. See Alexander, 954 F.3d at 915; United States v.

Betterton, 417 F.3d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 2005). Furthermore,

a law enforcement agency's inventory policy need not

“address specifically the steps that an officer should take

upon encountering a closed container,” and law enforcement

agencies are not required to “promulgate policies which

specifically mention notebooks.” United States v. Andrews,

22 F.3d 1328, 1336 (5th Cir. 1994). Rather, “no manual can

reasonably be expected to spell out in detail the correct action

in light of the almost infinite array of objects an ag

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