Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David Phillip Ryan, Petitioner v. Florida
Supreme Court briefMar 12, 2024
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No. 24-
DAVID PHILLIP RYAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Third District Court of Appeal of Florida
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CARLOS J. MARTINEZ
Public Defender
MARIA LAUREDO
Chief Assistant Public Defender
Counsel of Record
ANDREW STANTON
NICHOLAS LYNCH
Assistant Public Defenders
1320 NW 14th Street
Miami, Florida 33125
(305) 545-1961
appellatedefender@pdmiami.com
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments is a 12-person jury?
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented......................................................................... i
Table of Authorities ...................................................................... iii
Opinions Below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes ........................................ 2
Statement ....................................................................................... 3
Reasons for Granting the Petition ................................................ 5
I.
The Court Should Overrule Williams v. Florida. ............... 5
A.
Williams lacked any grounding in constitutional
B.
Williams was based on a functionalist method of
C.
Williams was based on erroneous factual
assumptions and overlooked significant negative
consequences........................................................... 12
text, history or precedent. To the contrary, it made a
break with the history of an ancient fundamental
right that is deeply rooted in our history and
tradition. ................................................................... 6
interpreting the Sixth Amendment that this Court
later disavowed. ........................................................ 8
Conclusion .................................................................................... 13
Appendix A: Decision of the Third District Court of Appeal of
Florida, dated December 13, 2023 .............................................. 1a
Appendix B: David Ryan’s appellate brief .................................. 7a
Appendix C: Circuit Court judgment dated March 13, 2023 ... 52a
Appendix D: Excerpt of the trial transcript.............................. 56a
Appendix E: Ryan’s motion in the Circuit Court...................... 59a
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972) .............................................................. 9, 10
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000) .............................................................. 9, 10
Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978) .................................................................. 12
Brown v. State,
359 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) ........................................... 4
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1 (1899) ........................................................................ 7
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) .................................................................... 10
Gibson v. State,
16 Fla. 291 (1877) ................................................................... 6, 7
Giles v. California,
554 U.S. 353 (2008) .................................................................. 10
Gonzalez v. State,
982 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) .............................................. 4
Guzman v. State,
350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)....................................... 4, 11
Jimenez v. State,
167 So. 3d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) ............................................ 4
Khorrami v. Arizona,
143 S. Ct. 22 (2022) ............................................................ 12, 13
iii
Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U.S. 581 (1900) .................................................................... 7
Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930) .................................................................... 8
Phillips v. State,
316 So. 3d 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) ..................................... 4, 11
Ramos v. Louisiana,
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) ...................................................... 6, 9, 11
Ryan v. State,
3D23-0589, 2023 WL 8608723 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 13, 2023) .... 1
Simpson v. State,
368 So. 3d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)........................................... 4
Thompson v. Utah,
170 U.S. 343 (1898) .................................................................... 6
Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) ................................ 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. VI ................................................................... 6
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 .......................................................... 6
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ........................................................................ 1
Section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2019)...................................... 3
Section 913.10, Florida Statutes (1970).................................... 2, 7
iv
Other Authorities
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343
(1769) .......................................................................................... 6
S. Diamond, et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size
and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. Empirical Legal Studies
425 (2009).................................................................................. 12
Friedman, Trial by Jury: Criteria for Convictions, Jury Size and
Type I and Type II Errors, 26-2 Am. Stat. 21 (Apr. 1972) ...... 12
R. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not A Dozen of the Other: A
Reexamination of Williams v. Florida and the Size of State
Criminal Juries, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621 (1998) ........................ 5
M. Saks & M. Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury
Size, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 451 (1997) ................................. 13
v
OPINIONS BELOW
Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal filed its opinion
affirming David Ryan’s conviction and sentence on December 13,
2023. App. 1a-6a. The opinion is reported at Ryan v. State,
3D23-0589, 2023 WL 8608723 D2342 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 13, 2023).
The trial court, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida,
entered judgment under docket number F21-20316 on March 14,
2023. App. 52a-55a. The judgment is unreported.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal affirmed Ryan’s
conviction and sentence on December 13, 2023. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 913.10, Florida Statutes provides: “Number of
jurors.—Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all capital
cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other
criminal cases.”
2
STATEMENT
Accused of serious offenses, David Ryan maintained his
innocence and demanded a jury trial. On March 6, 2023, he moved
the trial judge to empanel a 12-person jury. App. 60a-63a. Ryan’s
written motion argued that, from the time of the Magna Carta to
the adoption of the Constitution, the concept of a trial by jury
meant the unanimous verdict of twelve people. App. 60a-63a. He
argued that the Founders enshrined this right in the constitution,
and that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments entitled him to
a jury of twelve peers. App. 60a-63a. Ryan acknowledged that this
Court held otherwise in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
App. 60a-63a. But, he argued, Williams is wrong. App. 60a-63a.
The trial judge denied Ryan’s motion. App. 57a. A 6-person
jury then convicted him of resisting an officer without violence
and trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance.
App. 70a.
Both
crimes
are
punishable
by
one
year
of
incarceration. § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2019).
Ryan appealed. App. 8a. He argued—among other things—
that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to empanel a 12person jury. App. 28a-50a. Florida’s Third District Court of
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Appeal affirmed and wrote an opinion to address one of Ryan’s
challenges to his sentence. App. 2a-6a.
The Third District Court of Appeal addressed the pertinent
argument in a footnote, writing:
As to the first issue (denial of a motion to empanel a
twelve-person jury), Ryan candidly concedes that we
are bound by our precedent to affirm. See Jimenez v.
State, 167 So. 3d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). See also
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26
L.Ed.2d 446 (1970); Simpson v. State, 368 So. 3d 513
(Fla. 5th DCA 2023); Brown v. State, 359 So. 3d 408
(Fla. 1st DCA 2023); Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72
(Fla. 4th DCA 2022); Phillips v. State, 316 So. 3d 779
(Fla. 1st DCA 2021); Gonzalez v. State, 982 So. 2d 77
(Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We note, however, that this
issue is currently pending on a petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See
Guzman v. Florida, No. 23-5173 (Docketed July 17,
2023); Cunningham v. Florida, No. 23-5171
(Docketed July 21, 2023).
App. 6a.
This petition follows.
4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
The Court Should Overrule Williams v. Florida.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), this Court held
that Florida’s use of 6-person juries to try serious offenses does
not violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because “the
12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of ‘trial by jury.’”
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). To reach this result,
the Court overturned nearly eight hundred years of settled
jurisprudence recognizing that a “jury” means a jury of 12
members. See R. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not A Dozen of
the Other: A Reexamination of Williams v. Florida and the Size
of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621 (1998).
Williams is an egregiously wrong decision. It ignored law and
history in favor of a functionalist analysis of the Sixth
Amendment that the Court later eschewed. Social science has
also disproven some of the Court’s key factual assumptions in
Williams. And the decision has been deeply damaging by enabling
a Jim Crow-era jury law to persist into the present day and
thwart the participation of Black jurors.
This case presents an opportunity to correct the error.
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A. Williams lacked any grounding in constitutional text,
history or precedent. To the contrary, it made a break with
the history of an ancient fundamental right that is deeply
rooted in our history and tradition.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees “the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
From the time of the Magna Carta to the adoption of the
Constitution, the concept of a trial by jury meant the unanimous
verdict of twelve people. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390,
1396 (2020) (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 343 (1769)); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349
(1898). “[T]he jury referred to in the original Constitution and in
the Sixth Amendment is a jury constituted, as it was at common
law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less.” Thompson, 170
U.S. at 350 (1898).
Florida replaced most 12-person juries with 6-person juries
during the Jim Crow era. In 1877, the Florida Supreme Court
acknowledged that historically the “right to trial by jury” meant
“a jury, according to the common law, to be composed of twelve
persons.” Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 300 (1877). But in 1875,
Florida amended its constitution to provide: “The number of
6
jurors for the trial of causes in any court may be fixed by law.” Id.
In 1877, the Florida legislature enacted chapter 3010, providing:
“[t]welve men shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and
six men shall constitute a jury to try all other offenses prosecuted
by indictment.” Ch. 3010, § 6, Laws of Fla. (1877). In light of the
amendment and legislation, the court held that a 6-person jury
did not violate the state constitution. Gibson, 16 Fla. at 300.
Almost a century and a half later, Florida’s law restricting the
size of juries remains in effect. The current version of the statute
provides: “Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all capital
cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other
criminal cases.” § 913.10, Fla. Stat. (1970).
Meanwhile, this Court continued to hold that the jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is a jury of twelve. After
Thompson, the Court went on to reaffirm this principal time and
again. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899) (trial
by jury “in the primary and usual sense of the term at the common
law and in the American constitutions, is. . . a trial by a jury of
twelve”); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900) (“That a jury
composed, as at common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the
Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, there can be no
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doubt.”). In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292 (1930), the
Court wrote: “To uphold the voluntary reduction of a jury from
twelve to eleven upon the ground that the reduction—though it
destroys the jury of the Constitution—is only a slight reduction,
is not to interpret that instrument, but to disregard it.”
But the Court abruptly abandoned this precedent in 1970
when it approved the use of a 6-person jury in Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court admitted that when the
Constitution was adopted, “[i]t may well be that the usual
expectation was that the jury would consist of 12.” Id. at 98. It
nevertheless determined that requirement that a jury would be
composed of twelve people is “a historical accident” devoid of
significance, “except to mystics.” Id. at 102.
B. Williams was based on a functionalist method of
interpreting the Sixth Amendment that this Court later
disavowed.
To justify the break with history in Williams, the Court used
a functionalist approach that considered the purpose that juries
serve: "to prevent oppression by the Government.” Id. at 100. The
Court concluded that this essential function could be met by juries
with as few as six members. Id. 98-100. The Court reasoned: “the
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number should probably be large enough to promote group
deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to
provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representatives crosssection of the community.” Id. at 100. It believed six jurors
sufficed. Id. at 98-100. The Court cited studies it believed showed
that the size of a jury did not affect the results of its deliberations.
Id. at 100 n.49.
Two years later, the Court relied on Williams to dispense with
the requirement that a jury be unanimous:
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893,
26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), we had occasion to consider a
related issue: whether the Sixth Amendment’s right
to trial by jury requires that all juries consist of 12
men. After considering the history of the 12-man
requirement and the functions it performs in
contemporary society, we concluded that it was not
of constitutional stature. We reach the same
conclusion today with regard to the requirement of
unanimity.
See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (plurality
opinion).
Apodaca simply “built on the analysis in Williams.” See
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1433 (Alito, J., dissenting). Following
Williams, the court held that the proper inquiry “must focus upon
9
the function served by the jury in contemporary society.” Apodoca,
406 U.S. at 410.
But in later cases the Court eschewed the functional method
of interpreting Sixth Amendment rights and replaced it with a
historical method. For example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), the Court analyzed the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury by consulting the “practice at
common law.” Id. at 480. In Blakely v. Washington, the Court
turned to “the Framer’s paradigm for criminal justice” to
determine whether the Sixth Amendment prohibits judges—
rather than juries—from finding facts that increase the
maximum sentence for a crime. Id. at 313. Likewise, in Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Court consulted “the
historical record” to ascertain and revive the Framers’
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 56-60. In
another Confrontation Clause case, Giles v. California, 554 U.S.
353, 375 (2008), the Court wrote: “It is not the role of courts to
extrapolate from the words of the Sixth Amendment to the values
behind it, and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent
they serve (in the courts’ views) those underlying values.”
10
Most recently, in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020),
the Court returned to the original meaning of the right to jury
trial, repudiating Apodaca. The Court explained that Apodaca
erred by “subject[ing] the Constitution’s jury trial right to an
incomplete functionalist analysis of its own creation” rather than
“grappling with the historical meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s
jury trial right.” 140 S. Ct. at 1405.
So too in Williams. If the functionalist analysis no longer
supports a rejection of the original meaning of “jury” as to
unanimity, it cannot support it as to number either. “At a
minimum, Ramos—which relied on the original meaning of the
Sixth Amendment rather than an analysis of the jury’s role in
contemporary society—suggests that Williams was wrongly
decided.” Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)
(Gross, J., concurring), review denied, SC2022-1597, 2023 WL
3830251 (Fla. June 6, 2023); see also Phillips v. State, 316 So. 3d
779 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (Makar, J., concurring), review denied,
SC21-788, 2021 WL 3077438 (Fla. July 21, 2021), and cert. denied
sub nom. Phillips v. Florida, 211 L. Ed. 2d 406 (2021).
11
C. Williams was based on erroneous factual assumptions and
overlooked significant negative consequences.
Even if Williams’ functionalist approach survived Ramos, it
would fail its own test. Research shows that 6-person juries are
far less likely than 12-person juries to achieve a fair cross-section
of the community. One study found that 28.1 percent of the sixmember juries did not have any Black jurors, whereas 97.9
percent of the 12-member juries had at least one Black member).
See Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. 22, 23-27 (2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing S. Diamond, et al.,
Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory
Challenge, 6 J. Empirical Legal Studies 425, 442 (2009)).
Florida’s use of 6-person juries also undermines the reliability
of verdicts. In Ballew, the Court cited a statistical study
suggesting that smaller juries are more likely to convict innocent
people. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 234 n.16 (citing Friedman, Trial by
Jury: Criteria for Convictions, Jury Size and Type I and Type II
Errors, 26-2 Am. Stat. 21 (Apr. 1972)). More recent empirical data
demonstrate that “12-member juries deliberate longer, recall
information better, and pay greater attention to dissenting
voices.” See Khorrami, 143 S. Ct. at 23-27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
12
from denial of certiorari) (citing M. Saks & M. Marti, A Meta-
Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 451,
455–466 (1997)).
In short, research has shown that Williams flunks its own
test. We now know that 6-person juries are not functionally
equivalent to 12-person juries.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the writ and overrule Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Respectfully submitted,
CARLOS J. MARTINEZ
Public Defender
MARIA LAUREDO
Chief Assistant Public Defender
Counsel of Record
ANDREW STANTON
Assistant Public Defender
NICHOLAS LYNCH
Assistant Public Defender
Office of the Public Defender
1320 NW 14th Street
Miami, Florida 33125
(305) 545-1961
appellatedefender@pdmiami.com
March 12, 2024.
13
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