Reply Brief — PrimeSource Building Products, Inc., Petitioner v. United States, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 11, 2023

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No. 23-69

IN THE

PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

Jeffrey S. Grimson

Kristin H. Mowry

Jill A. Cramer

Sarah M. Wyss

Bryan P. Cenko

MOWRY & GRIMSON,

PLLC

5335 Wisconsin Ave.,

NW

Suite 810

Washington, DC 20015

Kevin K. Russell

Counsel of Record

GOLDSTEIN, RUSSELL &

WOOFTER LLC

1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Suite 200

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 240-8433

kr@goldsteinrussell.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER ................... 1

I.

The Court Should Grant Certiorari To Decide

How Separation-Of-Powers Principles Apply To

The Interpretation Of Statutes Delegating Vast

Legislative Powers To The Executive. ................ 2

II.

The Government’s Defense Of The Decision

Below Confirms The Need For Review. .............. 7

III. The Court Should At Least Hold The Petition

For Loper. ........................................................... 11

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) .................................................. 6

Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin

SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976)................................ 2

Gonzalez v. Oregon,

546 U.S. 243 (2006) .................................................. 6

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

No. 22-451 .................................................... 1, 11, 12

Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States,

762 F.2d 85 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............ 1, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) .................................................... 11

Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United States,

No. 23A237 ............................................................... 2

Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,

575 U.S. 92 (2015) .................................................... 9

Tanzin v. Tanvir,

141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) ................................................ 6

United States v. O’Brien,

560 U.S. 218 (2010) ................................................ 10

W. Virginia v. EPA,

142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) .......................................... 3, 6

Yang v. United States,

No. 02-136 .............................................................. 11

Statutes

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii)......................................... 8

iii

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(3)(A)(ii)(II) ................................... 8

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(B) ............................................. 8

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

As the petition explained, the Trade Expansion

Act transfers Congress’s legislative power over tariffs

to the President, to exercise as he sees fit, whenever

he declares that imports threaten “national security,”

subject only to certain procedural requirements

intended to ensure that the President acts on the basis

of current information and informed advice. The

United States acknowledges that the President did not

undergo that deliberative statutory process before

imposing significant tariffs on steel derivatives. And

it also acknowledges that the Federal Circuit upheld

the President’s decision to forgo that process by

applying its Maple Leaf standard of review, which

requires courts to accept the President’s construction

of statutory limits on his delegated power, absent a

“‘clear misconstruction of the governing statute.’” BIO

16 (quoting Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762

F.2d 85, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Instead, consistent with

its defense of Chevron deference in Loper Bright

Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, the Government

insists that allowing the Executive to exercise both

Congress’s legislative powers and the judiciary’s

interpretive responsibilities in this way is fully

consistent with our constitutional structure. BIO 1015.

If this Court is uncomfortable with that position,

this case presents a clear opportunity to do something

about it. Contrary to the Government’s arguments

(BIO 10-14), the Court need not declare the Trade

Expansion Act unconstitutional or overrule any of its

prior precedents to take an important step toward

restoring the constitutional balance. The Court need

2

only grant the petition and hold that judges (rather

than Presidents) are charged with construing the

statutory limits on delegations of vast legislative

powers to the Executive and that courts should

construe ambiguity in such limitations in favor of

constraining the delegation. The Court should then

apply those principles here and reverse the Federal

Circuit’s interpretation of the Trade Expansion Act. 1

I.

The Court Should Grant Certiorari To

Decide How Separation-Of-Powers

Principles Apply To The Interpretation Of

Statutes Delegating Vast Legislative

Powers To The Executive.

1. The opposition spends much of its time

defending the Act from a constitutional non-delegation

challenge petitioner does not make. BIO 10-14. Nor

does petitioner argue that the Act must be construed

“narrowly in order to avoid a violation of the

nondelegation doctrine,” id. 10, or that the Court

should overrule Federal Energy Administration v.

Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976), contra BIO

12-14. Instead, petitioner argues that even when

Congress does not exceed the constitutional limits on

delegation, separation-of-powers principles still

preclude courts from deferring to the Executive’s

interpretation of the limits on that delegation and

require resolving ambiguities in those limits in favor

of constraining the delegation. See Pet. 20-25.

The Court may wish to hold this petition for consideration

with the forthcoming petition in Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United

States, No. 23A237, which was consolidated with this case below.

1

3

The Government acknowledges that separationof-powers principles have a role to play in the

interpretation of statutes even when a narrow

construction would not otherwise be required by

constitutional avoidance principles. BIO 14. It

admits, for example, that when “determining the

substantive scope of the power that a statutory

provision has granted to the Executive Branch,” this

Court has applied a separation-of-powers presumption

against construing the law to provide ‘[e]xtraordinary

grants of regulatory authority.’” ibid. (quoting W.

Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2608-09 (2022)). This

case involves a somewhat different interpretive

question, one about the meaning of statutory limits on

an expansive delegation of legislative power. But in

the end, “the scope of the substantive power that a

statutory provision has granted to the Executive

Branch,” BIO 14, is a product of both the statutory

language affirmatively granting that power and the

text placing limits on its exercise. A court concerned

about the Executive exercising more legislative power

than Congress intended must construe both kinds of

provisions with restraint.

The Government’s brief itself makes the case for

petitioner’s interpretive rule. It emphasizes that in its

present form, the non-delegation doctrine places

almost no meaningful limit on Congress’s ability to

bestow naked legislative power on the Executive

Branch. See BIO 12-13 (giving examples of cases

upholding statues requiring President to make laws

that are “fair and equitable” or consistent with the

“public interest” or “national security”) (citations

omitted). Until that interpretation of the Constitution

4

is changed, the only real limits on such delegations

must come from Congress. And yet, the Federal

Circuit’s Maple Leaf standard of review has the

necessary effect of watering down those limitations

and expanding the delegation by deferring to the

Executive’s interpretation of the limits on its own

powers absent “a ‘clear misconstruction of the

governing statute.’” BIO 16 (quoting Maple Leaf, 762

F.2d at 89). Indeed, the United States stresses that

the Federal Circuit’s Maple Leaf doctrine provides a

“‘very limited’ scope of judicial review” that treats the

President’s decisions—including how to comply with

the Act’s limitations on his authority—as “‘highly

discretionary.’” Ibid.

Accordingly, the Government’s observation (BIO

14-15) that this Court has not yet applied the majorquestions doctrine to construe the statutory limits on

a delegation of vast legislative powers is a reason to

grant review, not deny it. Unless this Court does so,

the Federal Circuit will continue to apply its Maple

Leaf rule to construe ambiguous limitations in favor of

expanding legislative delegations.

2. The Government’s attempts to defend the

Maple Leaf standard on the merits are unconvincing.

First, it says the only question in this case is

whether the President, having already imposed tariffs

on steel mill products, can extend those tariffs to new

products “at a later date in light of new information.”

BIO 15. Deferring to the President’s view on that

question, the opposition claims, “cannot reasonably be

described as ‘delegating vast legislative power to the

Executive.’” Ibid. (quoting Pet. 3). That response

5

misses the point. Special scrutiny is required because

the Act’s procedural prerequisites are the only

meaningful limit on what is otherwise a nearly

unfettered delegation of the entirety of Congress’s

constitutional power and obligation to set tariffs and

regulate international trade in this context. It is an

odd conception of separation of powers to require

careful scrutiny of whether Congress intended the

Executive to wield extraordinary legislative powers

yet exercise no special care in ensuring the Executive

adheres to the statutory limits on exercising those vast

and unusual powers.

The argument also fails on its own terms. Even if

the United States views the Act’s procedural

requirements as of only minor importance, Congress

plainly thought otherwise. As the petition explained,

the point of the statutory process is to ensure that the

President acts on the basis of timely data, informed

advice from relevant officials (including those in the

Department of Defense), and public input. Pet. 4.

That attempt to replicate at least some part of the

deliberative process the Constitution usually requires

for enacting law is undeniably important. See id. 2425.

The time constraints also ensure that the

President’s actions maintain a relationship to the

threat identified through that process—unlike in this

case, where the President imposed new tariffs on new

products never identified in the investigation required

by statute, years after the initial process.

The United States also suggests that the Maple

Leaf standard is appropriate in light of the “highly

discretionary” decisions the Act authorizes the

President to make. BIO 16. But petitioner does not

6

challenge any discretionary decision, only the

President’s compliance with the Act’s procedural

prerequisites, which even the Government cannot

claim are discretionary. The case thus presents a

straight-forward question of law (not discretion) that

falls within the judicial (not executive) power.

Quoting Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493

(2020), the Government also insists (BIO 15) that this

Court is “not at liberty” to “manufacture a new

presumption now and retroactively impose it on a

Congress that acted [35] years ago.” But Tanzin—

which rejected the Government’s request for “a new

policy-based presumption against damages against

individual officials,” ibid.—has no application to rules

of construction founded in the constitutional order

rather than the Government’s policy preferences. For

example, this Court has never considered the date of

enactment in applying the major questions doctrine.

See, e.g., W. Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2609

(explaining that the major questions doctrine

“developed over a series of significant cases” starting

in 1994); id. at 2599, 2609 (applying doctrine to

construe a provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments

of 1970); Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250, 267

(2006) (applying doctrine to Controlled Substances Act

of 1970); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120, 146 (2000) (same for Food and Drug Act

of 1938).

Finally, nothing in the Government’s nondelegation arguments supports a contrary conclusion.

Even if it “would be ‘unreasonable and impracticable

to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules,’ beyond

those set out in Section 232, to constrain the

7

President’s power,” BIO 14 (citation omitted), it is

eminently reasonable and practicable for courts to take

a conservative approach to enforcing the rules

Congress has prescribed. And even if Congress has

greater leeway to provide broad delegations of

legislative power in the foreign-relations context, see

id. 13, that has no bearing on Congress’s authority to

impose limits on that delegation or the courts’

obligation to ensure those limits are respected.

II. The Government’s Defense Of The Decision

Below Confirms The Need For Review.

The Government’s defense of the decision below

only highlights how squarely this case presents the

question of the appropriate standard of review and the

damage the Maple Leaf standard inflicts on separation

of powers.

What little the opposition has to say about the

statutory language is unconvincing. The Government

acknowledges that the statute requires the President

to determine the “action” he will take within 90 days

of receiving a report from the Secretary of Commerce.

BIO 2-3. And it does not deny that in his initial 90day order here, the President took no action against

steel derivatives, whose impact on national security

had not been the subject of any investigation or

recommendation by the Secretary. Compare Pet. 8-10

with BIO 3-5. The opposition’s only textual argument

about why the President’s initial “action” nonetheless

included tariffs on steel derivatives is that the word

“action” includes “a course of acts, not just a single

act.” BIO 7. No doubt. But that just raises the

question whether the decision to impose tariffs on

8

steel derivatives was part of the “course of acts” the

President decided upon within 90 days of receiving the

report. It clearly was not—the order never mentioned

derivatives, much less included actions regarding

them as part of the “course of acts” the President

determined to take.

The Government responds that the statute does

not require the President to select the specific “course

of acts” he will impose, only that he “determine the

general character of his plan.” BIO 9. But the Act

requires the President to declare the “nature and

duration” of the “action” and to “implement” the action

within 15 days. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii), (B). He

can do none of those things if he hasn’t even decided

yet which imports will be the subject of his actions.

Nor can the President determine whether his “action”

will “adjust imports . . . so that such imports will not

threaten to impair national security,” id.

§ 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii), without having decided which

imports will be subject to what measures.

Moreover, the Government offers no response to

the statute’s specific provision of one (and only one)

circumstance in which the President can select “other

actions” or “additional actions” outside the 90-day

period based on changed circumstances. 19 U.S.C.

§ 1862(c)(3)(A)(ii)(II). As the petition explained, the

provision and those phrases make no sense if the

statute already allowed the President to take

additional or other steps in response to a failed

negotiation. Pet. 27-28. Nor does the Government

attempt to explain why Congress would have required

the President to report the reasons for imposing other

or additional actions in response to a failed

9

negotiation, but not when he acts in response to

perceived “circumvention” of the original order. BIO

6.

Instead of answering those textual points, the

Government pivots to a variety of unconvincing

arguments from purpose, policy, and legislative

history. It says, for example, that in “general, the

power to take regulatory action carries with it the

power to amend that action” and that it would be

unreasonable to read the statute to “foreclose the

President from responding to changed circumstances

or new information.” BIO 7. But no one is arguing

that the President is precluded from changing his

chosen action; petitioner simply argues that Congress

required the President to take the same care, and

undergo the same procedures, to select a new action as

he did to take the initial action. There’s nothing

unusual about that. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers

Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 95 (2015) (APA “mandate[s] that

agencies use the same procedures when they amend or

repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule in the first

instance”).

For similar reasons, the Government’s better-latethan-never argument (BIO 9-10) misses the point that

the problem here isn’t simply timing, but the

President’s failure to make his proposed changes

through the deliberative process Congress required.

The Government argues that Presidents have

been modifying their actions under the Act without

undertaking new consultations since the 1950s. BIO

8. But as the opposition admits (id. 9), all of the cited

examples occurred before Congress amended the

10

statute to add the present 90-day requirement and the

related text discussed above. 2 The Government’s

insistence that the amendments be narrowly

construed depends on a serious mischaracterization of

United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010), which

requires clear evidence that Congress intended to alter

this Court’s interpretation of a statute, not that clear

evidence is required before a statute will be read to

impinge on the Executive’s aggrandized views of its

own authority. Compare id. at 231 with BIO 9.

The Government’s O’Brien argument does,

however, nicely demonstrate that this case starkly

presents the question whether separation-of-powers

principles allow courts to resolve statutory ambiguity

through interpretive standards that defer to the

Executive’s view of the limits on its own delegated

authority and thereby expand, rather than constrain,

already vast delegations of legislative power to the

Executive.

*

*

*

The Government provides no other reason to deny

the petition. It does not dispute that no other circuit

has jurisdiction to hear tariff cases, see Pet. 20 n.13, so

The Government also cites no evidence that even before the

amendment, any court approved the practice or that Congress

endorsed it. See ibid. (citing, instead, the Attorney General’s

unsurprising endorsement of the President’s claim to broad

authority). Moreover, as the petition explained, President Ford

obtained a new report prior to modifying the petroleum

restrictions that led to the Algonquin litigation. Pet. at 29, n.14.

Nor did the oil tariff modifications extend actions to derivatives,

which were included from the beginning. See ibid.

2

11

there is no point in waiting for a circuit conflict that

will never develop. The United States also does not

dispute that the question was adequately pressed and

passed upon below, see Pet. 31 n.15, and does not raise

any other vehicle objection.

III. The Court Should At Least Hold The

Petition For Loper.

The Government resists holding this case for

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, on

the ground that the Federal Circuit did not give the

Executive’s interpretation of the Trade Expansion Act

Chevron deference, but instead applied the Circuit’s

even more deferential Maple Leaf doctrine. BIO 1617. The question, however, is not whether the two

cases “involve precisely the same question,” but

whether the Court’s decision in Loper “could have a

bearing on the analysis of petitioner’s argument.” U.S.

BIO 7, Yang v. United States, No. 02-136 (explaining

standard for a hold). And here, the arguments leveled

against Chevron in Loper closely parallel petitioner’s

arguments against Maple Leaf in this case.

Loper’s principal contention is that “Chevron is at

odds with the basic division of labor in the first three

Articles of the Constitution.” Pet’r Br. at 23, Loper

Bright Enters v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (July 17, 2023).

Chevron allows the Executive to usurp the judiciary’s

Article III responsibility to “say what the law is.” Id.

at 24 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177

(1803)). It also contravenes Article I by allowing

agencies to resolve ambiguity in statutes in

furtherance of the Executive’s policy judgments. Id. at

26. Loper argues that “affirmatively delegating the

12

power to make legislative policy to the executive

branch” is not “consistent with our constitutional

scheme, let alone something to be encouraged or

facilitated via judicial deference.” Ibid. Deferring to

the Executive’s policy-based resolution of statutory

ambiguity is particularly problematic, Loper argues,

so long as the Court struggles to find “a workable test

for identifying impermissible delegations.” Id. 45.

None of these arguments turns on the differences

the Government identifies between Chevron and

Maple Leaf. See BIO 15-17. Excessive deference to the

Executive Branch’s interpretation of a statute is no

less damaging to the constitutional structure when

legislative and judicial responsibilities are handed

over to the President rather than the agencies he

oversees. Contra id. 16. Nor does it make any

difference whether that deference is accorded while

reviewing agency action under the APA or through

some other means of review. Contra ibid.

Accordingly, were this Court to agree with Loper’s

separation-of-powers arguments, its decision would

provide a significant basis for the Federal Circuit to

reconsider Maple Leaf.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey S. Grimson

Kristin H. Mowry

Jill A. Cramer

Sarah M. Wyss

Bryan P. Cenko

MOWRY & GRIMSON,

PLLC

5335 Wisconsin Ave.,

NW

Suite 810

Washington, DC 20015

October 11, 2023

Kevin K. Russell

Counsel of Record

GOLDSTEIN, RUSSELL &

WOOFTER LLC

1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Suite 200

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 240-8433

kr@goldsteinrussell.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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