Reply Brief — PrimeSource Building Products, Inc., Petitioner v. United States, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 11, 2023
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No. 23-69
IN THE
PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
Jeffrey S. Grimson
Kristin H. Mowry
Jill A. Cramer
Sarah M. Wyss
Bryan P. Cenko
MOWRY & GRIMSON,
PLLC
5335 Wisconsin Ave.,
NW
Suite 810
Washington, DC 20015
Kevin K. Russell
Counsel of Record
GOLDSTEIN, RUSSELL &
WOOFTER LLC
1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 240-8433
kr@goldsteinrussell.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER ................... 1
I.
The Court Should Grant Certiorari To Decide
How Separation-Of-Powers Principles Apply To
The Interpretation Of Statutes Delegating Vast
Legislative Powers To The Executive. ................ 2
II.
The Government’s Defense Of The Decision
Below Confirms The Need For Review. .............. 7
III. The Court Should At Least Hold The Petition
For Loper. ........................................................... 11
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 13
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) .................................................. 6
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976)................................ 2
Gonzalez v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) .................................................. 6
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
No. 22-451 .................................................... 1, 11, 12
Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States,
762 F.2d 85 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............ 1, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803) .................................................... 11
Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United States,
No. 23A237 ............................................................... 2
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
575 U.S. 92 (2015) .................................................... 9
Tanzin v. Tanvir,
141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) ................................................ 6
United States v. O’Brien,
560 U.S. 218 (2010) ................................................ 10
W. Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) .......................................... 3, 6
Yang v. United States,
No. 02-136 .............................................................. 11
Statutes
19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii)......................................... 8
iii
19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(3)(A)(ii)(II) ................................... 8
19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(B) ............................................. 8
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
As the petition explained, the Trade Expansion
Act transfers Congress’s legislative power over tariffs
to the President, to exercise as he sees fit, whenever
he declares that imports threaten “national security,”
subject only to certain procedural requirements
intended to ensure that the President acts on the basis
of current information and informed advice. The
United States acknowledges that the President did not
undergo that deliberative statutory process before
imposing significant tariffs on steel derivatives. And
it also acknowledges that the Federal Circuit upheld
the President’s decision to forgo that process by
applying its Maple Leaf standard of review, which
requires courts to accept the President’s construction
of statutory limits on his delegated power, absent a
“‘clear misconstruction of the governing statute.’” BIO
16 (quoting Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762
F.2d 85, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Instead, consistent with
its defense of Chevron deference in Loper Bright
Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, the Government
insists that allowing the Executive to exercise both
Congress’s legislative powers and the judiciary’s
interpretive responsibilities in this way is fully
consistent with our constitutional structure. BIO 1015.
If this Court is uncomfortable with that position,
this case presents a clear opportunity to do something
about it. Contrary to the Government’s arguments
(BIO 10-14), the Court need not declare the Trade
Expansion Act unconstitutional or overrule any of its
prior precedents to take an important step toward
restoring the constitutional balance. The Court need
2
only grant the petition and hold that judges (rather
than Presidents) are charged with construing the
statutory limits on delegations of vast legislative
powers to the Executive and that courts should
construe ambiguity in such limitations in favor of
constraining the delegation. The Court should then
apply those principles here and reverse the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the Trade Expansion Act. 1
I.
The Court Should Grant Certiorari To
Decide How Separation-Of-Powers
Principles Apply To The Interpretation Of
Statutes Delegating Vast Legislative
Powers To The Executive.
1. The opposition spends much of its time
defending the Act from a constitutional non-delegation
challenge petitioner does not make. BIO 10-14. Nor
does petitioner argue that the Act must be construed
“narrowly in order to avoid a violation of the
nondelegation doctrine,” id. 10, or that the Court
should overrule Federal Energy Administration v.
Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976), contra BIO
12-14. Instead, petitioner argues that even when
Congress does not exceed the constitutional limits on
delegation, separation-of-powers principles still
preclude courts from deferring to the Executive’s
interpretation of the limits on that delegation and
require resolving ambiguities in those limits in favor
of constraining the delegation. See Pet. 20-25.
The Court may wish to hold this petition for consideration
with the forthcoming petition in Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United
States, No. 23A237, which was consolidated with this case below.
1
3
The Government acknowledges that separationof-powers principles have a role to play in the
interpretation of statutes even when a narrow
construction would not otherwise be required by
constitutional avoidance principles. BIO 14. It
admits, for example, that when “determining the
substantive scope of the power that a statutory
provision has granted to the Executive Branch,” this
Court has applied a separation-of-powers presumption
against construing the law to provide ‘[e]xtraordinary
grants of regulatory authority.’” ibid. (quoting W.
Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2608-09 (2022)). This
case involves a somewhat different interpretive
question, one about the meaning of statutory limits on
an expansive delegation of legislative power. But in
the end, “the scope of the substantive power that a
statutory provision has granted to the Executive
Branch,” BIO 14, is a product of both the statutory
language affirmatively granting that power and the
text placing limits on its exercise. A court concerned
about the Executive exercising more legislative power
than Congress intended must construe both kinds of
provisions with restraint.
The Government’s brief itself makes the case for
petitioner’s interpretive rule. It emphasizes that in its
present form, the non-delegation doctrine places
almost no meaningful limit on Congress’s ability to
bestow naked legislative power on the Executive
Branch. See BIO 12-13 (giving examples of cases
upholding statues requiring President to make laws
that are “fair and equitable” or consistent with the
“public interest” or “national security”) (citations
omitted). Until that interpretation of the Constitution
4
is changed, the only real limits on such delegations
must come from Congress. And yet, the Federal
Circuit’s Maple Leaf standard of review has the
necessary effect of watering down those limitations
and expanding the delegation by deferring to the
Executive’s interpretation of the limits on its own
powers absent “a ‘clear misconstruction of the
governing statute.’” BIO 16 (quoting Maple Leaf, 762
F.2d at 89). Indeed, the United States stresses that
the Federal Circuit’s Maple Leaf doctrine provides a
“‘very limited’ scope of judicial review” that treats the
President’s decisions—including how to comply with
the Act’s limitations on his authority—as “‘highly
discretionary.’” Ibid.
Accordingly, the Government’s observation (BIO
14-15) that this Court has not yet applied the majorquestions doctrine to construe the statutory limits on
a delegation of vast legislative powers is a reason to
grant review, not deny it. Unless this Court does so,
the Federal Circuit will continue to apply its Maple
Leaf rule to construe ambiguous limitations in favor of
expanding legislative delegations.
2. The Government’s attempts to defend the
Maple Leaf standard on the merits are unconvincing.
First, it says the only question in this case is
whether the President, having already imposed tariffs
on steel mill products, can extend those tariffs to new
products “at a later date in light of new information.”
BIO 15. Deferring to the President’s view on that
question, the opposition claims, “cannot reasonably be
described as ‘delegating vast legislative power to the
Executive.’” Ibid. (quoting Pet. 3). That response
5
misses the point. Special scrutiny is required because
the Act’s procedural prerequisites are the only
meaningful limit on what is otherwise a nearly
unfettered delegation of the entirety of Congress’s
constitutional power and obligation to set tariffs and
regulate international trade in this context. It is an
odd conception of separation of powers to require
careful scrutiny of whether Congress intended the
Executive to wield extraordinary legislative powers
yet exercise no special care in ensuring the Executive
adheres to the statutory limits on exercising those vast
and unusual powers.
The argument also fails on its own terms. Even if
the United States views the Act’s procedural
requirements as of only minor importance, Congress
plainly thought otherwise. As the petition explained,
the point of the statutory process is to ensure that the
President acts on the basis of timely data, informed
advice from relevant officials (including those in the
Department of Defense), and public input. Pet. 4.
That attempt to replicate at least some part of the
deliberative process the Constitution usually requires
for enacting law is undeniably important. See id. 2425.
The time constraints also ensure that the
President’s actions maintain a relationship to the
threat identified through that process—unlike in this
case, where the President imposed new tariffs on new
products never identified in the investigation required
by statute, years after the initial process.
The United States also suggests that the Maple
Leaf standard is appropriate in light of the “highly
discretionary” decisions the Act authorizes the
President to make. BIO 16. But petitioner does not
6
challenge any discretionary decision, only the
President’s compliance with the Act’s procedural
prerequisites, which even the Government cannot
claim are discretionary. The case thus presents a
straight-forward question of law (not discretion) that
falls within the judicial (not executive) power.
Quoting Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493
(2020), the Government also insists (BIO 15) that this
Court is “not at liberty” to “manufacture a new
presumption now and retroactively impose it on a
Congress that acted [35] years ago.” But Tanzin—
which rejected the Government’s request for “a new
policy-based presumption against damages against
individual officials,” ibid.—has no application to rules
of construction founded in the constitutional order
rather than the Government’s policy preferences. For
example, this Court has never considered the date of
enactment in applying the major questions doctrine.
See, e.g., W. Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2609
(explaining that the major questions doctrine
“developed over a series of significant cases” starting
in 1994); id. at 2599, 2609 (applying doctrine to
construe a provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970); Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250, 267
(2006) (applying doctrine to Controlled Substances Act
of 1970); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 146 (2000) (same for Food and Drug Act
of 1938).
Finally, nothing in the Government’s nondelegation arguments supports a contrary conclusion.
Even if it “would be ‘unreasonable and impracticable
to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules,’ beyond
those set out in Section 232, to constrain the
7
President’s power,” BIO 14 (citation omitted), it is
eminently reasonable and practicable for courts to take
a conservative approach to enforcing the rules
Congress has prescribed. And even if Congress has
greater leeway to provide broad delegations of
legislative power in the foreign-relations context, see
id. 13, that has no bearing on Congress’s authority to
impose limits on that delegation or the courts’
obligation to ensure those limits are respected.
II. The Government’s Defense Of The Decision
Below Confirms The Need For Review.
The Government’s defense of the decision below
only highlights how squarely this case presents the
question of the appropriate standard of review and the
damage the Maple Leaf standard inflicts on separation
of powers.
What little the opposition has to say about the
statutory language is unconvincing. The Government
acknowledges that the statute requires the President
to determine the “action” he will take within 90 days
of receiving a report from the Secretary of Commerce.
BIO 2-3. And it does not deny that in his initial 90day order here, the President took no action against
steel derivatives, whose impact on national security
had not been the subject of any investigation or
recommendation by the Secretary. Compare Pet. 8-10
with BIO 3-5. The opposition’s only textual argument
about why the President’s initial “action” nonetheless
included tariffs on steel derivatives is that the word
“action” includes “a course of acts, not just a single
act.” BIO 7. No doubt. But that just raises the
question whether the decision to impose tariffs on
8
steel derivatives was part of the “course of acts” the
President decided upon within 90 days of receiving the
report. It clearly was not—the order never mentioned
derivatives, much less included actions regarding
them as part of the “course of acts” the President
determined to take.
The Government responds that the statute does
not require the President to select the specific “course
of acts” he will impose, only that he “determine the
general character of his plan.” BIO 9. But the Act
requires the President to declare the “nature and
duration” of the “action” and to “implement” the action
within 15 days. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii), (B). He
can do none of those things if he hasn’t even decided
yet which imports will be the subject of his actions.
Nor can the President determine whether his “action”
will “adjust imports . . . so that such imports will not
threaten to impair national security,” id.
§ 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii), without having decided which
imports will be subject to what measures.
Moreover, the Government offers no response to
the statute’s specific provision of one (and only one)
circumstance in which the President can select “other
actions” or “additional actions” outside the 90-day
period based on changed circumstances. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1862(c)(3)(A)(ii)(II). As the petition explained, the
provision and those phrases make no sense if the
statute already allowed the President to take
additional or other steps in response to a failed
negotiation. Pet. 27-28. Nor does the Government
attempt to explain why Congress would have required
the President to report the reasons for imposing other
or additional actions in response to a failed
9
negotiation, but not when he acts in response to
perceived “circumvention” of the original order. BIO
6.
Instead of answering those textual points, the
Government pivots to a variety of unconvincing
arguments from purpose, policy, and legislative
history. It says, for example, that in “general, the
power to take regulatory action carries with it the
power to amend that action” and that it would be
unreasonable to read the statute to “foreclose the
President from responding to changed circumstances
or new information.” BIO 7. But no one is arguing
that the President is precluded from changing his
chosen action; petitioner simply argues that Congress
required the President to take the same care, and
undergo the same procedures, to select a new action as
he did to take the initial action. There’s nothing
unusual about that. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 95 (2015) (APA “mandate[s] that
agencies use the same procedures when they amend or
repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule in the first
instance”).
For similar reasons, the Government’s better-latethan-never argument (BIO 9-10) misses the point that
the problem here isn’t simply timing, but the
President’s failure to make his proposed changes
through the deliberative process Congress required.
The Government argues that Presidents have
been modifying their actions under the Act without
undertaking new consultations since the 1950s. BIO
8. But as the opposition admits (id. 9), all of the cited
examples occurred before Congress amended the
10
statute to add the present 90-day requirement and the
related text discussed above. 2 The Government’s
insistence that the amendments be narrowly
construed depends on a serious mischaracterization of
United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010), which
requires clear evidence that Congress intended to alter
this Court’s interpretation of a statute, not that clear
evidence is required before a statute will be read to
impinge on the Executive’s aggrandized views of its
own authority. Compare id. at 231 with BIO 9.
The Government’s O’Brien argument does,
however, nicely demonstrate that this case starkly
presents the question whether separation-of-powers
principles allow courts to resolve statutory ambiguity
through interpretive standards that defer to the
Executive’s view of the limits on its own delegated
authority and thereby expand, rather than constrain,
already vast delegations of legislative power to the
Executive.
*
*
*
The Government provides no other reason to deny
the petition. It does not dispute that no other circuit
has jurisdiction to hear tariff cases, see Pet. 20 n.13, so
The Government also cites no evidence that even before the
amendment, any court approved the practice or that Congress
endorsed it. See ibid. (citing, instead, the Attorney General’s
unsurprising endorsement of the President’s claim to broad
authority). Moreover, as the petition explained, President Ford
obtained a new report prior to modifying the petroleum
restrictions that led to the Algonquin litigation. Pet. at 29, n.14.
Nor did the oil tariff modifications extend actions to derivatives,
which were included from the beginning. See ibid.
2
11
there is no point in waiting for a circuit conflict that
will never develop. The United States also does not
dispute that the question was adequately pressed and
passed upon below, see Pet. 31 n.15, and does not raise
any other vehicle objection.
III. The Court Should At Least Hold The
Petition For Loper.
The Government resists holding this case for
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, on
the ground that the Federal Circuit did not give the
Executive’s interpretation of the Trade Expansion Act
Chevron deference, but instead applied the Circuit’s
even more deferential Maple Leaf doctrine. BIO 1617. The question, however, is not whether the two
cases “involve precisely the same question,” but
whether the Court’s decision in Loper “could have a
bearing on the analysis of petitioner’s argument.” U.S.
BIO 7, Yang v. United States, No. 02-136 (explaining
standard for a hold). And here, the arguments leveled
against Chevron in Loper closely parallel petitioner’s
arguments against Maple Leaf in this case.
Loper’s principal contention is that “Chevron is at
odds with the basic division of labor in the first three
Articles of the Constitution.” Pet’r Br. at 23, Loper
Bright Enters v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (July 17, 2023).
Chevron allows the Executive to usurp the judiciary’s
Article III responsibility to “say what the law is.” Id.
at 24 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803)). It also contravenes Article I by allowing
agencies to resolve ambiguity in statutes in
furtherance of the Executive’s policy judgments. Id. at
26. Loper argues that “affirmatively delegating the
12
power to make legislative policy to the executive
branch” is not “consistent with our constitutional
scheme, let alone something to be encouraged or
facilitated via judicial deference.” Ibid. Deferring to
the Executive’s policy-based resolution of statutory
ambiguity is particularly problematic, Loper argues,
so long as the Court struggles to find “a workable test
for identifying impermissible delegations.” Id. 45.
None of these arguments turns on the differences
the Government identifies between Chevron and
Maple Leaf. See BIO 15-17. Excessive deference to the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of a statute is no
less damaging to the constitutional structure when
legislative and judicial responsibilities are handed
over to the President rather than the agencies he
oversees. Contra id. 16. Nor does it make any
difference whether that deference is accorded while
reviewing agency action under the APA or through
some other means of review. Contra ibid.
Accordingly, were this Court to agree with Loper’s
separation-of-powers arguments, its decision would
provide a significant basis for the Federal Circuit to
reconsider Maple Leaf.
13
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Jeffrey S. Grimson
Kristin H. Mowry
Jill A. Cramer
Sarah M. Wyss
Bryan P. Cenko
MOWRY & GRIMSON,
PLLC
5335 Wisconsin Ave.,
NW
Suite 810
Washington, DC 20015
October 11, 2023
Kevin K. Russell
Counsel of Record
GOLDSTEIN, RUSSELL &
WOOFTER LLC
1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 240-8433
kr@goldsteinrussell.com
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