Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pietro Pasquale Antonio Sgromo, Petitioner v. Timothy Ryan, Judge, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 12, 2024

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IN THE

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED StATE

PIETRO PASQUALE ANTONIO SGROMO

(a/k/a PETER ANTHONY SGROMO)

- PETITIONER

vs.

BESTWAY INFLATABLES &

MATERIALS CORP.,

BESTWAY(HONG KONG)

INTERNATIONAL LTD.,

BESTWAY (USA), INC.,

EUREKA INVENTIONS LLC,

LEONARD GREGORY SCOTT.

- RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

SUPREME COURT - STATE OF ARIZONA

i

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I

Pietro Pasquale Antonio (Peter Anthony) Sgromo

184 North Hill Street

Thunder Bay, Ontario CANADA P7A-5V9

(807) 345-5944

RECEIVED

JAN 2 4 2024

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT 5"*

4

3

siSi

r

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Does public policy strongly favor settlement of disputes without litigation; or

do Courts have discretion to not enforce settlement agreements?

2.

Is the purpose of rescission to restore both parties to their former position

as far as possible' and 'to bring about substantial justice by adjusting the equities between

the parties; or may one party keep the consideration it received under the rescinded

agreement?

Is it an abuse of discretion for a court to not enter a default judgment against

3.

a party who has made an appearance; filed no response; and has neither a meritorious

defense nor excusable neglect, nonetheless?

4.

Does the present case, present a defense for the non-payment of wages?

Does a court have discretion to deny Petitioner his Statutory Right to

5.

Attorney Fees?

6.

Does Arizona jurisprudence favor summary judgment?

7.

Do the Appellate Courts have discretion to hear a Petition for Special

Review in an interlocutory decision?

LIST OF PARTIES

[X ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

RELATED CASES

U.S. Supreme Court Case No.'s:

No. 23-6290; 23-6291

9th Cir. Case No.s:

17-17117; 18-16603; 18-16762; 20-15821 22-15199;

18-16228; 18-17040; 19-15709; 19-15797.

Dist. Ct. Case No.s:

4:19-CV-08170-HSG; 4:17-CV-00205-HSG;

15-CV-701-JSW

JAMS Case No.:

1100080798

Superior Ct. ON CANADA:

2017 ONSC 2524, COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-0529-FW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

7

CONCLUSION

19

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 - Decision from Arizona Supreme Court

APPENDIX 2 - Decision from Arizona of Appeals Div. 1

APPENDIX 3 - ORDERS from Arizona Superior Court - Maricopa County

APPENDIX 4 - Proof of Service

APPENDIX 5 - Letters from Respondents’ Counsel Acknowledging Action

APPENDIX 6 - Scott - Sgromo Residential Tenancy Lease Agreement (the “LTA”)

APPENDIX 7 - WEM Purcahse of ‘440 Patent License Agreement

APPENDIX 8 - Respondent Slide Intellectual Property & Patent

APPENDIX 9 - WEM - Eureka Oral Non-Exclusive ‘440 Patent License Agreement

APPENDIX 10 - Eureka - Bestway Non- Exclusive ‘440 Patent License

APPENDIX 11 - Bestway to Eureka acknowledgement of Lack of Standing

APPENDIX 12 - Petitioner investment into Eureka

APPENDIX 13 - Dismissal of Eureka - Bestway Action “with prejudice”

APPENDIX 14 - Eureka - Bestway Rescindment of ‘298 & ‘440 Patent Licenses

APPENDIX 15 - Sgromo - Bestway Settlement License Agreement

APPENDIX 16 - Royalties to ‘440 Patent License

APPENDIX 17 - Royalties to ‘298 Patent License

APPENDIX 18 - Scott False Criminal Allegations

APPENDIX 19 - Petitioner’s Attorney Fees

Table Of Authorities

Case

Page(s)

Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.,

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 515, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454

Arizona v. Manypenny,

451 U.S. 232 (1981)................................................................

Baker v. Bradley,

231 Ariz. 475, 296 P.3d 1011 (App.2013)..............................

Clark v. Ellsworth,

66 Ariz. 119(1947)...................................................... ..........

Compton v. National Metals Co.,

10 Ariz. App. 366, 459 P.2d 93 (1969)...................................

Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc.,

29 Cal.App.5th 1,9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)................................

Garza v. Swift Transp. Co.,

222 Ariz. 281 213 P.3d 1008 (2009)......................................

Grant v. Ariz. Public Bern Co.,

133 Ariz. 434, 652 P.2d 507, 528-29 (1982)..........................

Hall Family Props., Ltd. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp.,

185 Ariz. 382, 386, 916 P.2d 1098 (App.1995)......................

HCZ Const., Inc. v. First Franklin Financial Corp.,

199 Ariz. 361,364, 18P.3d 155 (App. 2001).........................

In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use

Water in Gila River System and Source,

212 Ariz. 64, 127 P.3d 882, 890 (2006).......................

Kline v. Kline,

221 Ariz. 564, 212 P.3d 902 (App. 2009).....................................

Marsh v. Riskas,

73 Ariz. 7, 236 P.2d 746 (1951)73 Ariz., 236 P.2d......................

Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman,

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811,821, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115

Orme School v. Reeves,

166 Ariz. 301 (Ariz. 1990).............................................................

Porter v. Ploughe,

77 Ariz. 33 (1954).................................................. .......................

Reed v. McLaws,

56 Ariz. 556, 110 P.2d 222 (1941)..............................................

Runyan v. Pac. Air Indus.,

(1970) 2Cal.3d 304......................................................................

Ex Parte Russell,

80 U.S. 664(1871)........................................................................

Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Property Mgmt., Inc.,

178 Ariz. 425 (App. 1994).............................................................

Schade v. Diethrich,

158 Ariz. 1 (Ariz. 1988)...........................................................

18

8

7

14

19

18-19

7

9

7

8-9

16

10

9

18

19

14

13

13

10

14

15

Shemaitis v. Superior Court,

114 Ariz. 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)............................................

State v. Bayardi,

230 Ariz. 195, 197, 281 P.3d 1063 (App.2012).........................

State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court,

112 Ariz. 123, 538 P.2d 397 (1975).............................................

State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest),

128 Ariz. 216, 624 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1981)..............................

State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens,

79 Ariz. 298, 300, 288 P.2d 1077 (1955)..................................

State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court,

95 Ariz. 319, 390 P.2d 109 (1964)...............................................

State v. Wise,

137 Ariz. 468 671 P.2d 909, 911 n. 3 (1983)...............................

Stewart Lamle, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Mattel, Inc., Defendant-appellee,

394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).................................................

Tarnoff v. Jones,

17 Ariz. App. 240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).........................................

Timeless Glob., LLC v. Olson,

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0005 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 5, 2016)................

United Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court,

134 Ariz. 43, 653 P.2d 691 (1982)................................................

Yslas v. Sterling Mobile Servs.,

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0179 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 1,2020)...................

Statutes

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).....................................................

Ariz R. Spe. Act. 3, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)

Ariz R. Spe. Act. 4, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.21............................................

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956)...........................

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(1).......................................

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(4).......................................

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-350(7)............................................

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-353(A)............................................

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-355(A)............................................

Ariz. Rule 55(b)(1).............................................................

Cal. Civ. Code, §1542.......................................................

Cal. Civ. Code, §1688......................................................

Cal. Civ. Code, §1689, subd.(a)......................................

Cal. Civ. Code, § 3300......................................................

California Statute of Frauds, Cal. Civ.Code §1624(a) (1).

Treatise

Bouma Parker, Summary Judgment in Arizona: A Call for a New Standard,

ARIZ. ATT'Y. 24 (March 1990)................................................ ................

10

7

8, 9

9

9

8, 9

8

11-12

10

13

11

15

PAGE(S)

17

7,9

9

7

8

7

8

14

14

17

17

14

13

13

18

11

Page(s)

19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix 1____ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[X] is unpublished.

The opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Div. 1

appears at Appendix 2

to the petition and is

court

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ % is unpublished.

The opinion of the Superior Court of Arizona — Maricopa County

appears at Appendix

3

to the petition and is

court

; or,

[ ] reported at

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[X| For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was November 8, 2023.

1

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

_______________________ , and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

(date)in

(date) on

to and including _____

Application No. __ A

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

(date) in

(date) on

to and including_____

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

Pape 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)

Ariz R. Spe. Act. 3, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)

Ariz R. Spe. Act. 4, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.21

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(1)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(4)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-350(7)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-353(A)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-355(A)

Ariz. Rule 55(b)(1)

Cal. Civ. Code, §1542

Cal. Civ. Code, §1688

Cal. Civ. Code, §1689, subd.(a)

Cal. Civ. Code, § 3300

California Statute of Frauds, Cal. Civ.Code §1624(a) (1)

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendants, Eureka Inventions LLC (“Eureka”); Leonard Gregory Scott (“Scott”)

(collectively “Respondents”) failed to file an answer after the service of a summons and

complaint was personally served on October 6, 2022 and, November 14, 2022,

respectively in Case No.: CV 2022-011044, P.P.A.SGROMO v. BESTWAY USA INC., et

a!., in the Arizona Superior Court- Maricopa County. Appx.4. Plaintiff served his

Application and Affidavit for default against Eureka on November 21,2022; against Scott

on January 09, 2023— which constitute the official Entry of Default, and mailed, via

USPS, a copy to Eureka’s sole managing member, Leonard Gregory Scott at 637 Noe

St., San Francisco, CA 94114 (Eureka’s business address and Scott’s personal

residence). Id. Plaintiff also served Eureka’s attorney of record Thomas Moore, at

HAYNES BOONE, 525 University Avenue, Suite 400, Palo Alto, CA 94301 via USPS. Id.

Eureka and Scott failed to respond within the ten-day grace period. Service was

effectuated on Scott and Eureka as attorney of record Mr. Thomas Moore, acknowledged

the complaint in an effort to thwart Plaintiff’s efforts to subpoena bank records on

November 29, 2022 (“Maricopa Superior Court Case No. CV2022-011044... I represent

L. Gregory Scott, a California resident as well as his limited liability company, Eureka

Inventions, LLC (“Eureka”)”). Appx.5. However, both Wells Fargo and Comerica rejected

and provided the statements.

-3-

On or about January 10, 2023 Petitioner filed Application/Affidavit for Default in

paper form to the Clerk of the Court as per the Rules. However, on January 13, 2023

Petitioner received an. ORDER that “IT IS ORDERED that all documents necessary to

support the entry of a default judgment must be e-filed.” Appx.3. Petitioner e-field the

documents on April 18, 2023. Petitioner then received an ORDER from the court that “IT

IS ORDERED the Court shall take no action until a complete default packet, is received

in paper form.” Id. On May 30, 2023 Petitioner filed his “RULE 55(B)(1) MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR SUM CERTAIN” in paper form which the Court docketed on

June 1, 2023. Appx.6. It had been five (5) months and Commissioner Richard Albrecht

had yet to enter a JUDGMENT for Default. Petitioner moved the Arizona Court of Appeals,

Div. 1 vis-a-vis his Petition for Special Action for Commissioner Albrecht to enter the

DEFAULT JUDGMENT ORDER. However, the Appeals Court “ORDERED, in the

exercise of its discretion, . . . Declining] to accept jurisdiction of the special action.”

Appx.2. The Petitioner timely filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona but the

Court “DENIED.. . Petitioners]. . . Second . .. DENIED ... [his] Request for Attorneys'

Fees [and] FURTHER ORDERED: Request for Attorneys' Fees (Real Parties Bestway,

et al.) = GRANTED.” Appx.1. Petitioner seeks a Writ of Certiorari before this Court to

review the refusal of the Arizona Courts to hear the Petition and granting attorneys fees

when the Agreement between the parties expressly forbids such special damages.

-4-

Sgromo and Scott had a romantic relationship that did not end well. Their

relationship was governed by the Living Together Agreement (“LTA”) which specifies the

rights of each party to the ownership of their separate property. Appx.6. When things were

well however, they created Eureka where Scott would be the sole managing member and

Sgromo would serve as a consultant and its sole investor. Sgromo then granted Eureka

an oral non-exclusive license to the ‘440 Patent owned by his Canadian Corporation,

Wide Eyes Marketing Ltd. (“WEM”) (Appx.7), and his ramped water slide invention which

would eventually receive patent protection (the “’298 Patent”) (Appx.8); in exchange for a

royalty (Appx.9) (Eureka Attorney: “[w]e can put the patent in Greg[ Scottj’s name, and

he can do an exclusive license to the lie. Make sense?” This did not make any sense to

Sgromo who replied, “[n]o. Let’s just go with paying me a royalty.”). As a consultant,

Sgromo brought to the business two (2) additional license agreements with Bestway for

the ‘440 Patent (Appx.10) and his ‘298 Patent (Appx.11) (collectively the “Subject

Licenses”) to expand Bestway’s licensed territory beyond the United States to the rest of

world. There is no dispute that Sgromo served as a consultant to Eureka. Scott declared

under penalty of perjury that Sgromo was indeed performing consulting work for him and

Eureka. Appx.13, ScottDecI, fl2 (“Mr. Sgromo was as a consultant for Eureka.)

-5-

As the sole investor, Sgromo injected capital into Eureka to cover expenses to

perform the necessary work under the Subject Licenses. The table below summarizes

the capital injections made by Sgromo:

Table 1

Date

Amount

06/25/2013

08/04/2013

12/03/2013

04/02/2015

$ 3,100.00

$16,500.00

$39,209.00

$ 1,000.00

$59,809.00

TOTAL:

Reference

Appx.9, Friday, June 21,2013 12:38 PM entry

Appx.12, August 1, 2013 statement.

Appx.12, December 1,2013 statement.

Apx.12, April 1,2015 statement.

A dispute arose between Eureka and Bestway, and Eureka filed on February 2015

an action in Nor Cal Dist. Court- Oakland in Case No.: 15-CV-701-JSW, Eureka v.

Bestway. Bestway filed a counter-claim upon which Eureka defaulted and the parties

dismissed their claims against each other “with prejudice.” Appx.13. Additionally the

Parties entered into a Settlement Agreement whereby they rescinded the Subject

Licenses. Appx.14, §§11(a)(b). Petitioner and Bestway also rescinded the Subject

Licenses in a separate Settlement Agreement. Appx.15, §§8(a)(b).

Scott has not paid Sgromo a reasonable salary for his work nor the royalties he

promised to pay. According to Bestway’s own records, Scott and Eureka have collected

and converted

$148,769.40 under the ‘440 Patent Subject License (Appx.16) and

$510,761.53 under the ‘440 Patent Subject License (Appx.17). Scott had accused

Sgromo of domestic violence and of drug abuse - and declared he was holding Sgromo’s

royalty payments until he was “clean sane, and sober for a significant period of time.”

Appx.18. This all was proven false in a court of law. Id. And Scott certainly did not return

the royalties to Petitioner as he had promised.

-6-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

ARIZ R. SPE. ACT. 3

“The court of appeals shall have: 1|. .

[j]urisdiction to hear and determine

petitions for special actions brought pursuant to the rules of procedure for special actions,

without regard to its appellate jurisdiction.” [emphasis added] Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12120.21. And “[t]he only questions that may be raised in a special action are:

1. Whether the defendant has failed to exercise discretion which he has a duty

to exercise; or to perform a duty required by law as to which he has no

discretion; or

2. Whether the defendant has proceeded or is threatening to proceed without

or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority; or

3. Whether a determination was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of

discretion.” Ariz. R. P. Spe. Act. 3

The first and third questions exist in the present case. The Trial Court failed to

perform a duty required by law when it failed to adjudicate the Clerk’s Entry of Default.

The Court of Appeals Div. 1 abused its discretion when it “in the exercise of its discretion,

decline[d] to accept jurisdiction over this special action” (Appx.2) as did the Supreme

Court of Arizona when it DENIED the Petition for Review (Appx.1).

The Arizona Court of Appeal’s “appellate jurisdiction is purely statutory.” State v.

Bayardi, 230 Ariz. 195, 197, 281 P.3d 1063, 1065 (App.2012) (citing Ariz. Const, art. 6, §

9 and Hall Family Props., Ltd. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp., 185 Ariz. 382, 386, 916 P.2d 1098,

1102 (App.1995)). “Generally, th[e Appellate Cjourt's jurisdiction is limited to appeals from

final judgments which dispose of all claims and parties” (Baker v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 475

4791J9, 296 P.3d 1011, 1015 (App.2013) citing Garza v. Swift Transp. Co., 222 Ariz. 281,

284, 213 P.3d 1008, 1011 (2009) and Ariz.Rev.Stat. §12-2101 (A)(1)).

-7-

Under Arizona jurisprudence, the Petitioner is authorized to seek review, when as

here, his claim is that the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction and has abused its

discretion. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956). A Petition for Review has been

routinely granted in numerous instances. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 239-40

(1981); see also, State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P.2d 397

(1975) (Arizona courts have held that although the certiorari statute speaks of review to

determine whether the lower court lacked jurisdiction, the statute also permits review to

determine whether a lower court abused its discretion); State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior

Court, 95 Ariz. 319, 390 P.2d 109 (1964) (“a writ of certiorari may be used to review abuse

of discretion”). Section 12-2001 reads:

“[t]he writ of certiorari may be granted by the supreme and superior courts

or by any judge thereof, in all cases when an inferior tribunal, board or

officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there

is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy and adequate

remedy.”

And Under A.R.S. §12-2101(A)(4)“[t]he court of appeals shall have: . . . [jurisdiction to hear and determine

petitions for special actions brought pursuant to the rules of procedure for

special actions, without regard to its appellate jurisdiction.” [emphasis

added].

“It is clear that words and phrases in statutes shall be given their ordinary meaning

unless it appears from context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.” State v.

Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470 n. 3, 671 P.2d 909, 911 n. 3 (1983) [citation omitted]. “The

ordinary meaning of 'shall' in [A.R.S. § 12-2101 (A)(4)], is to impose a mandatory

provision.” HCZ Const., Inc. v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 199 Ariz. 361,364, 18 P.3d

-8-

155, 158 (App. 2001). Therefore, a writ of certiorari may be obtained by, where as here

the filing of a Petition for Special Action, pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of Procedure for

Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973). The certiorari provision itself

speaks of review to determine whether the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction, but

as consistently construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, the statute also authorizes

review for abuse of discretion. State ex ret. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party

in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 222, 624 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1981); State ex rel. Dawson v.

Superior Court; State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court,-, State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens,

79 Ariz. 298, 300, 288 P.2d 1077, 1078 (1955). See Rule 3, Rules of Procedure for

Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973).

“An abuse of discretion exists when the record, viewed in the light most favorable

to upholding the trial court's decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the

decision. An abuse of discretion also occurs "[wjhere there has been an error of law

committed in the process of reaching [a] discretionary conclusion."” Grant v. Ariz. Public

Bern Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 455-56, 652 P.2d 507, 528-29 (1982) [internal citations omitted].

It is an abuse of discretion, to open or vacate a judgment where the moving party shows

no legal ground therefor or offers no excuse for his own negligence or default.'” Marsh v.

Riskas, 73 Ariz. 7, 236 P.2d 746 (1951)73 Ariz. at 11,236 P.2d at 749.

-9-

This Court has ruled that “[w]here a court declines to hear a case or motion,

alleging its own incompetency to do so, or that of the party to be heard, mandamus is the

proper remedy.” Ex Parte Russell, 80 U.S. 664, 670 (1871). The Appellate Courts here

had no discretion to deny the Appellant’s Petition for a Special Action and review thereof.

The Delay was Inexcusable

In Arizona, a defendant in a civil case has 20 days to file an answer after the

service of a summons and complaint. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). Once the defendant is

served with a copy of the complaint, he can respond or do nothing. If he opts for the latter

course, the defendant knows that greater relief than that prayed for or relief different in

kind will not be entered against him. Tarnoffv. Jones, 17 Ariz. App. 240, 244-45 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1972. Notwithstanding, a party appears when he “take[s] any action, other than

objecting to personal jurisdiction, that recognizes the case is pending in court.” Kline v.

Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 569,1j18, 212 P.3d 902 (App. 2009).

In the present case “[w]e are left with a record in which the delays are not explained

and therefore we have no basis on which to say the delay was excusable. Mere passage

of time does not constitute excusable neglect ” Shemaitis v. Superior Court, 114 Ariz.

288, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). Respondents acknowledged the Complaint in their letters

to the respective banks in an attempt to thwart the subpoena for the bank records. Appx.5.

Further, Respondents agreed to have the dispute over the settlement agreements

adjudicated in Arizona because the Petitioner’s Settlement Agreement with Bestway was

incorporated by reference into the Respondent’s Settlement Agreement with Bestway.

Appx.14, §(4)(b)(ii), (“[t]he parties have agreed that no future royalties are required for the

-10-

Optioned Products, as Bestway has reached agreement with Peter Sgromo regarding

these products”). The Petitioner’s Settlement Agreement prescribes Arizona Law and

mediation to occur in Arizona. Appx.15, §5(a); see also Id., §18.01 (“[t]he validity,

construction, and performance of this Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and

governed by the laws of the State of Arizona without regard to principles of conflicts of

law”). It is therefore established Respondents submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arizona

Court and made an appearance.

Respondents have No Meritorious Defense

The law is well settled in Arizona that to invoke the court's discretion in setting

aside a default, the moving party must show that a meritorious defense exists. United

Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 43, 653 P.2d 691 (1982). There are

at least four (4) arguments to support the Respondents have no meritorious defense.

Firstly, there was an oral license agreement between Petitioner and Respondents

for the use of the ‘440 and ‘298 Patents. Appx.9 (Respondents- “it may be better to pay.

You a royalty instead of being a member [of the LLC]”; Petitioner- “[Ijet’s go with paying

me a royalty and not making me a member”). The oral ‘440 Patent license agreements

are enforceable because they were performed within one year. The oral licenses were

granted on June 21,2013 (Ibid.) and Petitioner signed the ‘440 Patent License Agreement

on Eureka’s behalf on August 20, 2013 (Appx.10) and the similarly signed the ‘298 Patent

License Agreement also on Eureka’s behalf on June 17, 2014. California Statute of

Frauds, Cal. Civ.Code §1624(a) (1); see also Stewart Lamle, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Mattel,

Inc., Defendant-appellee, 394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“the court concluded that (1)

-11 -

the conduct and circumstances of the parties created an implied right in Duval to use the

Patent with an implied promise to pay therefor; (2) Potash was not estopped to assert the

implied agreement, nor to maintain an action for compensation; (3) if Potash prevailed on

the other issues, it was entitled to an accounting to determine the amount due. Later the

court amended the judgment to provide that n* * * nothing contained in this judgment shall

be construed as determining whether or not the defendant has used * * * (the Anderson

Patent) * * * or whether or not the defense of invalidity of the Anderson * * * Patent * * *

or the question of non-infringement or non-use thereof is triable in this case.")

Secondly, the LTA expressly defines the rights and obligations of the parties and

states in relevant part:

1. “[w]e agree that all property owned by either of us as of the date of this

agreement, obtained during the agreement shall be considered the

separate property of each. Neither of us will have any claim to the

separate property of the other absent a written agreement transferring

ownership. This included but is not limited to personal income,... royalty

income,.. . business interests, legal settlements . . .”

2. “Greg [Scott] acknowledges that a significant portion of Pete[r Sgromoj’s

income comes from his business Wide Eyes Marketing Ltd. [“WEM”] (and

possibly other LLC names) and that he often conducts business from

home . . . Greg [Scott] acknowledges that this does not give him

ownership rights of any kind in Wide Eyes Marketing or any other LLC

Pete[r Sgromo] owns ..

3. Neither of us shall be liable or responsible for the individual debts incurred

by the other in [ ]/his own name or company name.”

U- - -U

39.

ENTIRE AGREEMENT: The foregoing constitutes the entire

Agreement between the parties and may be modified only in writing

signed by all the parties . . .” Ibid., at Appx.6.

- 12-

Thirdly, “[a] contract may be rescinded if all the parties thereto consent.” Cal. Civ.

Code, § 1689, subd.(a); see also Cal. Civ. Code, § 1688 (“[a] contract is extinguished by

its rescission.”) The purpose of rescission is “'to restore both parties to their former

position as far as possible' and 'to bring about substantial justice by adjusting the equities

between the parties' despite the fact that 'the status quo cannot be exactly reproduced.'”

[citations omitted]; see also Runyan v. Pac. Air Indus., (1970) 2 Cal.3d 304, 316; Reed v.

McLaws, 56 Ariz. 556, 562-63, 110 P.2d 222, 225 (1941) (stating that rescission annuls

the contract and places the parties in the position they would be in had there never been

a contract.); Timeless Glob., LLC v. Olson, No. 1 CA-CV 15-0005, at *8 (Ariz. Ct. App.

July 5, 2016), (“[t]he general rule is that a party seeking to rescind a contract must restore

or offer to restore to the other party that which he has received under the contract.” citing

Jennings v. Lee, 105 Ariz. 167, 171 (Ariz. 1969)).

All the parties in the present case agreed to rescind the Subject Licenses in their

respective Settlement Agreements:

“Release

(a) With the exception of any claim relating to any term and/or the

performance of this Agreement, Eureka and Bestway hereby

release each other from all actions, causes of action, suits, rights,

debts, sums of money, accounts, accountings, covenants,

contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, indemnities,

liabilities, damages, judgments, executions, claims, or demands

of every nature whatsoever, in law or equity or arbitration,

whether based on contract, tort, statutory or other legal or

equitable theory of recovery, whether known or unknown,

asserted or unasserted, which one may have against the other

arising at any time prior to the Effective Date, including all claims

that in any way relate to, arise from, or are in any manner

connected to the Subject Licenses.

-13-

(b) The Parties hereto expressly acknowledge and agree that this

Agreement fully and finally releases and forever resolves all

claims referenced in subparagraph (a) above, including those

that are unknown, unanticipated or unsuspected or that may

hereafter arise as a result of the discovery of new and/or

additional facts, and the parties expressly waive all rights under

Section 1542 of the Civil Code of California, which the parties

acknowledge they have read and understood and which provides

as follows:

A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS

WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO

EXIST IN his favor at the time of executing the

RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE

MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE

DEBTOR. Appx.14, §§11(a)(b); see also Appx.15, §§8(a)(b).

Respondents are obligated to return all and any royalties they received under the

guise of the Subject Licenses.

Finally, under A.R.S. § 23-353(A), an employer who discharges an employee must

pay the wages due the employee within seven working days or the end of its regular pay

period, whichever is sooner. Wages are “nondiscretionary compensation due an

employee in return for labor or services ... for which the employee has a reasonable

expectation to be paid . . ..” A.R.S. 23-350(7). Sales commissions are wages under this

definition. Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Property Mgmt., Inc., 178 Ariz. 425, 427 (App.

1994). This includes commissions that are based on sales that the employee procured

before the employee was discharged, even though the employer received payment on

the sales after the employee was discharged. Clark v. Ellsworth, 66 Ariz. 119,122 (1947)

(holding that Arizona follows the “procuring cause” rule in determining when real estate

sale commission is earned); accord Porter v. Ploughe, 77 Ariz. 33, 35 (1954).

- 14 -

The royalty reports provided by Bestway, accurately detail the date the royalties

earned and Respondents were obligated to forward those payments to Petitioner within

seven days of receipt. Appx.12-13. Scott and Eureka do not dispute that Sgromo had

procured the sales that gave rise to the royalty-commissions in question (Yslas v. Sterling

Mobile Servs., No. 1 CA-CV 20-0179, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 1,2020))— and while an

employer cannot withhold wages for a reason not communicated to the employee

(Schade v. Diethrich, 158 Ariz. 1,12-13 (Ariz. 1988))— Scott fabricated false allegations,

seemingly to enact the business judgment rule. In an email to Eureka’s attorney Scott

confirmed Sgromo’s departure from Eureka and that he “should find a job” and the

rationale for withholding royalties was to “pay [Scott] back and then to pay off the [Eureka]

credit cards. Everything else will be held for Peter's benefit once it's [sic- he’s?] clean

sane, and sober for a significant period of time” and that “domestic violence and drug

abuse have consequences & [Sgromo] had used and abused people for quite sometime

and now he needs to grow up and face the music.” Appx.8. Scott asserted these wild

allegations throughout the domestic violence action but the court ordered numerous

random drug tests and all proved Scott’s allegations utterly false. Appx.18. And as such

the case was dropped. Ibid. As for paying Scott back any monies or having any

responsibility for business charges on Eureka’s corporate credit cards, the agreement

between Sgromo and Scott from the onset of their relationship was clear— “[n]either. . .

shall be liable or responsible for the individual debts incurred by the other in his own name

or company name” (Appx.6, §3) and Sgromo “often conduct business from home . . .

-15-

Greg [Scott] acknowledges this does not give him ownership rights of any kind in Wide

Eyes Marketing or any other LLC Pete[r Sgromo] owns” (Ibid. §2).

Respondents Agreed to Preclude any Future Claims to the Royalties as Part

of Settlement

As a general matter, many courts have recognized that even though a claim has

not been raised for purposes of claim preclusion, parties may nevertheless agree to

preclude it in a consent judgment. See, e.g., In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to

Use Water in Gila River System and Source, 212 Ariz. 64, 72,

24, 127 P.3d 882, 890

(2006).

In the present case, Scott raised the issue of intellectual property rights between

he, Eureka and Sgromo; had a full opportunity to litigate it; but chose to dismiss the case

“with prejudice.” Appx.13, see also Ibid., at ScottDecl.,

(“Eureka has worked diligently

to try and sort out the issues in this litigation and determine how to proceed, in light of Mr.

Sgromo’s departure and his claims relating to the ownership of intellectual property in this

case.”). Further, Scott consented to releasing “claims that in any way relate to, arise from

or are in any manner connected to the Subject Licenses . . . including those that are

unknown, unanticipated or unsuspected or that may hereafter arise as a result of the

discovery of new and/or additional facts, . . .” Appx.14, §§11(a)(b). Therefore, the

Interpleader Court had no discretion to adjudicate the Subject Licenses and certainly not

to bind Sgromo to them. The inquiry begins and ends there. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100

U.S., 195, 203 (1879) (“[t]he only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who

enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should

not go fifty.”) [citation omitted].

-16-

The Sum is Certain

Under Rule 55(b)(1), a plaintiff may apply for a default judgment by motion “[w]hen

the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by

computation be made certain,... if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear

. . .” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) [emphasis added]. In other words, Rule 55(b)(1) contains

two main requirements that must be met before a plaintiff can obtain a default judgment

by a motion. Rule 55(b)(1). In the present case, the sum is certain. Appx.10, at Friday,

June 21,2013 12:38 PM; Appx.16-17.

Petitioner is therefore entitled to treble damages under A.R.S. § 23- 355(A), which

provides that when an employer “fails to pay wages due” to an employee, that employee

“may recover... an amount that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages.” Employers

are permitted to withhold employee wages when they reasonably dispute in good faith

the amount of wages due, including any “set-off” the employer asserts against the

employee. A.R.S. § 23-352(3). In the present case Respondents asserted that Petitioner

owed money for a corporate credit card Eureka issued to Petitioner to perform the

consulting duties. Appx.18. The LTA is clear, “[n]either shall be liable or responsible for

the individual debts incurred by the other in his own name or company name.” Appx.6,

§3. When all else failed Respondents falsely accused Petitioner of domestic violence;

mental health issues and substance abuse. Appx.18. All this was proven false in a court

of law. The unpaid royalty wages are certain at $730,757.17 (Appx.16-17) in addition to

his initial investment of $59,809.00 (see table 1, above). Sgromo is therefore entitled to

treble damages of $2,371,698.51.

- 17-

Petitioner has a Statutory Right to Attorney Fees

An element of a breach of contract cause of action is damages proximately caused

by the defendant’s breach. Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811,

821,124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115.) The statutory measure of damages for breach

of contract is “the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment

proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to

result therefrom.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 3300. “Contract damages seek to approximate the

agreed-upon performance. ‘[I]n the law of contracts the theory is that the party injured by

breach should receive as nearly as possible the equivalent of the benefits of

performance.’” Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503,

515, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454.)

Detriment caused by Eureka’s breach of the Settlement Agreement would include

the attorney fees incurred by Petitioner in defending the arbitration Eureka (and Bestway)

misrepresented was Ordered by the Original Court. A benefit, and intended goal, of the

Settlement Agreement was for Petitioner to avoid incurring more attorney fees in the

Interpleader Action—hence, the Settlement Agreement required immediate dismissal

with prejudice of the Interpleader and in turn, the Arbitration Action. Had Eureka

dismissed the Interpleader Action with prejudice as required by the Settlement

Agreement, Petitioner would not have incurred attorney fees defending the Interpleader

and Arbitration Action from the date on which the Settlement Agreement was signed to

the date on which Eureka dismissed the Original Action. Thus, Petitioner’s attorney fees

incurred in the Arbitration Action within that time frame fall within the scope of statutory

-18-

breach of contract damages. Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc., 29

Cal.App.5th 1,9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). Eureka and Scott are therefore liable for Petitioner’s

attorney fees of $71,423.58. Appx.19.

CONCLUSION

The language in certain Arizona cases seems to call for a more liberal summary

judgment standard. See, e.g., Compton v. National Metals Co., 10 Ariz. App. 366, 459

P.2d 93 (1969) (summary judgment appropriate only where there is no "substantial

evidence" in opposition, i.e., the tendered evidence is too incredible to be accepted by

reasonable minds, or even if true, it is without legal probative force); see also Bouma

Parker, Summary Judgment in Arizona: A Call for a New Standard, ARIZ. ATT'Y. 24, 2425 (March 1990) (listing language of conflicting standards, and noting that some

discourage summary judgment and some would apply it more liberally); see also Orme

School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301,306 (Ariz. 1990).

Therefore, the writ should be granted.

Respecj

xftv Jv , 2024

Submitted,

Piets® Pasqi#le mitonio Sgromo

(a/k/a Peter Anthgliy Sgromo)

Petitioner— Pro per

-19-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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