Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pietro Pasquale Antonio Sgromo, Petitioner v. Timothy Ryan, Judge, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 12, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
&\
m%
9
No.
\
p
FILED
JAN 1 2 2024
DFFICE-QF THE CLERK
RWPRgMS Q®Ugr, giS_.j
1
IN THE
i$kJga i
raws
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED StATE
PIETRO PASQUALE ANTONIO SGROMO
(a/k/a PETER ANTHONY SGROMO)
- PETITIONER
vs.
BESTWAY INFLATABLES &
MATERIALS CORP.,
BESTWAY(HONG KONG)
INTERNATIONAL LTD.,
BESTWAY (USA), INC.,
EUREKA INVENTIONS LLC,
LEONARD GREGORY SCOTT.
- RESPONDENT(S)
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
SUPREME COURT - STATE OF ARIZONA
i
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
I
Pietro Pasquale Antonio (Peter Anthony) Sgromo
184 North Hill Street
Thunder Bay, Ontario CANADA P7A-5V9
(807) 345-5944
RECEIVED
JAN 2 4 2024
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT 5"*
4
3
siSi
r
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Does public policy strongly favor settlement of disputes without litigation; or
do Courts have discretion to not enforce settlement agreements?
2.
Is the purpose of rescission to restore both parties to their former position
as far as possible' and 'to bring about substantial justice by adjusting the equities between
the parties; or may one party keep the consideration it received under the rescinded
agreement?
Is it an abuse of discretion for a court to not enter a default judgment against
3.
a party who has made an appearance; filed no response; and has neither a meritorious
defense nor excusable neglect, nonetheless?
4.
Does the present case, present a defense for the non-payment of wages?
Does a court have discretion to deny Petitioner his Statutory Right to
5.
Attorney Fees?
6.
Does Arizona jurisprudence favor summary judgment?
7.
Do the Appellate Courts have discretion to hear a Petition for Special
Review in an interlocutory decision?
LIST OF PARTIES
[X ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
A list of
all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this
petition is as follows:
RELATED CASES
U.S. Supreme Court Case No.'s:
No. 23-6290; 23-6291
9th Cir. Case No.s:
17-17117; 18-16603; 18-16762; 20-15821 22-15199;
18-16228; 18-17040; 19-15709; 19-15797.
Dist. Ct. Case No.s:
4:19-CV-08170-HSG; 4:17-CV-00205-HSG;
15-CV-701-JSW
JAMS Case No.:
1100080798
Superior Ct. ON CANADA:
2017 ONSC 2524, COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-0529-FW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS BELOW
1
JURISDICTION
1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
7
CONCLUSION
19
INDEX TO APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 - Decision from Arizona Supreme Court
APPENDIX 2 - Decision from Arizona of Appeals Div. 1
APPENDIX 3 - ORDERS from Arizona Superior Court - Maricopa County
APPENDIX 4 - Proof of Service
APPENDIX 5 - Letters from Respondents’ Counsel Acknowledging Action
APPENDIX 6 - Scott - Sgromo Residential Tenancy Lease Agreement (the “LTA”)
APPENDIX 7 - WEM Purcahse of ‘440 Patent License Agreement
APPENDIX 8 - Respondent Slide Intellectual Property & Patent
APPENDIX 9 - WEM - Eureka Oral Non-Exclusive ‘440 Patent License Agreement
APPENDIX 10 - Eureka - Bestway Non- Exclusive ‘440 Patent License
APPENDIX 11 - Bestway to Eureka acknowledgement of Lack of Standing
APPENDIX 12 - Petitioner investment into Eureka
APPENDIX 13 - Dismissal of Eureka - Bestway Action “with prejudice”
APPENDIX 14 - Eureka - Bestway Rescindment of ‘298 & ‘440 Patent Licenses
APPENDIX 15 - Sgromo - Bestway Settlement License Agreement
APPENDIX 16 - Royalties to ‘440 Patent License
APPENDIX 17 - Royalties to ‘298 Patent License
APPENDIX 18 - Scott False Criminal Allegations
APPENDIX 19 - Petitioner’s Attorney Fees
Table Of Authorities
Case
Page(s)
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.,
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 515, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454
Arizona v. Manypenny,
451 U.S. 232 (1981)................................................................
Baker v. Bradley,
231 Ariz. 475, 296 P.3d 1011 (App.2013)..............................
Clark v. Ellsworth,
66 Ariz. 119(1947)...................................................... ..........
Compton v. National Metals Co.,
10 Ariz. App. 366, 459 P.2d 93 (1969)...................................
Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc.,
29 Cal.App.5th 1,9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)................................
Garza v. Swift Transp. Co.,
222 Ariz. 281 213 P.3d 1008 (2009)......................................
Grant v. Ariz. Public Bern Co.,
133 Ariz. 434, 652 P.2d 507, 528-29 (1982)..........................
Hall Family Props., Ltd. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp.,
185 Ariz. 382, 386, 916 P.2d 1098 (App.1995)......................
HCZ Const., Inc. v. First Franklin Financial Corp.,
199 Ariz. 361,364, 18P.3d 155 (App. 2001).........................
In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in Gila River System and Source,
212 Ariz. 64, 127 P.3d 882, 890 (2006).......................
Kline v. Kline,
221 Ariz. 564, 212 P.3d 902 (App. 2009).....................................
Marsh v. Riskas,
73 Ariz. 7, 236 P.2d 746 (1951)73 Ariz., 236 P.2d......................
Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman,
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811,821, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115
Orme School v. Reeves,
166 Ariz. 301 (Ariz. 1990).............................................................
Porter v. Ploughe,
77 Ariz. 33 (1954).................................................. .......................
Reed v. McLaws,
56 Ariz. 556, 110 P.2d 222 (1941)..............................................
Runyan v. Pac. Air Indus.,
(1970) 2Cal.3d 304......................................................................
Ex Parte Russell,
80 U.S. 664(1871)........................................................................
Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Property Mgmt., Inc.,
178 Ariz. 425 (App. 1994).............................................................
Schade v. Diethrich,
158 Ariz. 1 (Ariz. 1988)...........................................................
18
8
7
14
19
18-19
7
9
7
8-9
16
10
9
18
19
14
13
13
10
14
15
Shemaitis v. Superior Court,
114 Ariz. 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)............................................
State v. Bayardi,
230 Ariz. 195, 197, 281 P.3d 1063 (App.2012).........................
State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court,
112 Ariz. 123, 538 P.2d 397 (1975).............................................
State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest),
128 Ariz. 216, 624 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1981)..............................
State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens,
79 Ariz. 298, 300, 288 P.2d 1077 (1955)..................................
State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court,
95 Ariz. 319, 390 P.2d 109 (1964)...............................................
State v. Wise,
137 Ariz. 468 671 P.2d 909, 911 n. 3 (1983)...............................
Stewart Lamle, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Mattel, Inc., Defendant-appellee,
394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).................................................
Tarnoff v. Jones,
17 Ariz. App. 240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).........................................
Timeless Glob., LLC v. Olson,
No. 1 CA-CV 15-0005 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 5, 2016)................
United Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court,
134 Ariz. 43, 653 P.2d 691 (1982)................................................
Yslas v. Sterling Mobile Servs.,
No. 1 CA-CV 20-0179 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 1,2020)...................
Statutes
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).....................................................
Ariz R. Spe. Act. 3, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)
Ariz R. Spe. Act. 4, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.21............................................
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956)...........................
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(1).......................................
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(4).......................................
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-350(7)............................................
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-353(A)............................................
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-355(A)............................................
Ariz. Rule 55(b)(1).............................................................
Cal. Civ. Code, §1542.......................................................
Cal. Civ. Code, §1688......................................................
Cal. Civ. Code, §1689, subd.(a)......................................
Cal. Civ. Code, § 3300......................................................
California Statute of Frauds, Cal. Civ.Code §1624(a) (1).
Treatise
Bouma Parker, Summary Judgment in Arizona: A Call for a New Standard,
ARIZ. ATT'Y. 24 (March 1990)................................................ ................
10
7
8, 9
9
9
8, 9
8
11-12
10
13
11
15
PAGE(S)
17
7,9
9
7
8
7
8
14
14
17
17
14
13
13
18
11
Page(s)
19
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.
OPINIONS BELOW
For cases from state courts:
The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at
Appendix 1____ to the petition and is
[ ] reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[X] is unpublished.
The opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Div. 1
appears at Appendix 2
to the petition and is
court
[ ] reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ % is unpublished.
The opinion of the Superior Court of Arizona — Maricopa County
appears at Appendix
3
to the petition and is
court
; or,
[ ] reported at
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
is unpublished.
JURISDICTION
[X| For cases from state courts:
The date on which the highest state court decided my case was November 8, 2023.
1
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix
[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:
_______________________ , and a copy of the order denying rehearing
appears at Appendix
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
(date)in
(date) on
to and including _____
Application No. __ A
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
(date) in
(date) on
to and including_____
Application No. __ A
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).
Pape 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)
Ariz R. Spe. Act. 3, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)
Ariz R. Spe. Act. 4, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.21
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(1)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2101 (A)(4)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-350(7)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-353(A)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-355(A)
Ariz. Rule 55(b)(1)
Cal. Civ. Code, §1542
Cal. Civ. Code, §1688
Cal. Civ. Code, §1689, subd.(a)
Cal. Civ. Code, § 3300
California Statute of Frauds, Cal. Civ.Code §1624(a) (1)
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants, Eureka Inventions LLC (“Eureka”); Leonard Gregory Scott (“Scott”)
(collectively “Respondents”) failed to file an answer after the service of a summons and
complaint was personally served on October 6, 2022 and, November 14, 2022,
respectively in Case No.: CV 2022-011044, P.P.A.SGROMO v. BESTWAY USA INC., et
a!., in the Arizona Superior Court- Maricopa County. Appx.4. Plaintiff served his
Application and Affidavit for default against Eureka on November 21,2022; against Scott
on January 09, 2023— which constitute the official Entry of Default, and mailed, via
USPS, a copy to Eureka’s sole managing member, Leonard Gregory Scott at 637 Noe
St., San Francisco, CA 94114 (Eureka’s business address and Scott’s personal
residence). Id. Plaintiff also served Eureka’s attorney of record Thomas Moore, at
HAYNES BOONE, 525 University Avenue, Suite 400, Palo Alto, CA 94301 via USPS. Id.
Eureka and Scott failed to respond within the ten-day grace period. Service was
effectuated on Scott and Eureka as attorney of record Mr. Thomas Moore, acknowledged
the complaint in an effort to thwart Plaintiff’s efforts to subpoena bank records on
November 29, 2022 (“Maricopa Superior Court Case No. CV2022-011044... I represent
L. Gregory Scott, a California resident as well as his limited liability company, Eureka
Inventions, LLC (“Eureka”)”). Appx.5. However, both Wells Fargo and Comerica rejected
and provided the statements.
-3-
On or about January 10, 2023 Petitioner filed Application/Affidavit for Default in
paper form to the Clerk of the Court as per the Rules. However, on January 13, 2023
Petitioner received an. ORDER that “IT IS ORDERED that all documents necessary to
support the entry of a default judgment must be e-filed.” Appx.3. Petitioner e-field the
documents on April 18, 2023. Petitioner then received an ORDER from the court that “IT
IS ORDERED the Court shall take no action until a complete default packet, is received
in paper form.” Id. On May 30, 2023 Petitioner filed his “RULE 55(B)(1) MOTION FOR
DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR SUM CERTAIN” in paper form which the Court docketed on
June 1, 2023. Appx.6. It had been five (5) months and Commissioner Richard Albrecht
had yet to enter a JUDGMENT for Default. Petitioner moved the Arizona Court of Appeals,
Div. 1 vis-a-vis his Petition for Special Action for Commissioner Albrecht to enter the
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ORDER. However, the Appeals Court “ORDERED, in the
exercise of its discretion, . . . Declining] to accept jurisdiction of the special action.”
Appx.2. The Petitioner timely filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona but the
Court “DENIED.. . Petitioners]. . . Second . .. DENIED ... [his] Request for Attorneys'
Fees [and] FURTHER ORDERED: Request for Attorneys' Fees (Real Parties Bestway,
et al.) = GRANTED.” Appx.1. Petitioner seeks a Writ of Certiorari before this Court to
review the refusal of the Arizona Courts to hear the Petition and granting attorneys fees
when the Agreement between the parties expressly forbids such special damages.
-4-
Sgromo and Scott had a romantic relationship that did not end well. Their
relationship was governed by the Living Together Agreement (“LTA”) which specifies the
rights of each party to the ownership of their separate property. Appx.6. When things were
well however, they created Eureka where Scott would be the sole managing member and
Sgromo would serve as a consultant and its sole investor. Sgromo then granted Eureka
an oral non-exclusive license to the ‘440 Patent owned by his Canadian Corporation,
Wide Eyes Marketing Ltd. (“WEM”) (Appx.7), and his ramped water slide invention which
would eventually receive patent protection (the “’298 Patent”) (Appx.8); in exchange for a
royalty (Appx.9) (Eureka Attorney: “[w]e can put the patent in Greg[ Scottj’s name, and
he can do an exclusive license to the lie. Make sense?” This did not make any sense to
Sgromo who replied, “[n]o. Let’s just go with paying me a royalty.”). As a consultant,
Sgromo brought to the business two (2) additional license agreements with Bestway for
the ‘440 Patent (Appx.10) and his ‘298 Patent (Appx.11) (collectively the “Subject
Licenses”) to expand Bestway’s licensed territory beyond the United States to the rest of
world. There is no dispute that Sgromo served as a consultant to Eureka. Scott declared
under penalty of perjury that Sgromo was indeed performing consulting work for him and
Eureka. Appx.13, ScottDecI, fl2 (“Mr. Sgromo was as a consultant for Eureka.)
-5-
As the sole investor, Sgromo injected capital into Eureka to cover expenses to
perform the necessary work under the Subject Licenses. The table below summarizes
the capital injections made by Sgromo:
Table 1
Date
Amount
06/25/2013
08/04/2013
12/03/2013
04/02/2015
$ 3,100.00
$16,500.00
$39,209.00
$ 1,000.00
$59,809.00
TOTAL:
Reference
Appx.9, Friday, June 21,2013 12:38 PM entry
Appx.12, August 1, 2013 statement.
Appx.12, December 1,2013 statement.
Apx.12, April 1,2015 statement.
A dispute arose between Eureka and Bestway, and Eureka filed on February 2015
an action in Nor Cal Dist. Court- Oakland in Case No.: 15-CV-701-JSW, Eureka v.
Bestway. Bestway filed a counter-claim upon which Eureka defaulted and the parties
dismissed their claims against each other “with prejudice.” Appx.13. Additionally the
Parties entered into a Settlement Agreement whereby they rescinded the Subject
Licenses. Appx.14, §§11(a)(b). Petitioner and Bestway also rescinded the Subject
Licenses in a separate Settlement Agreement. Appx.15, §§8(a)(b).
Scott has not paid Sgromo a reasonable salary for his work nor the royalties he
promised to pay. According to Bestway’s own records, Scott and Eureka have collected
and converted
$148,769.40 under the ‘440 Patent Subject License (Appx.16) and
$510,761.53 under the ‘440 Patent Subject License (Appx.17). Scott had accused
Sgromo of domestic violence and of drug abuse - and declared he was holding Sgromo’s
royalty payments until he was “clean sane, and sober for a significant period of time.”
Appx.18. This all was proven false in a court of law. Id. And Scott certainly did not return
the royalties to Petitioner as he had promised.
-6-
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
ARIZ R. SPE. ACT. 3
“The court of appeals shall have: 1|. .
[j]urisdiction to hear and determine
petitions for special actions brought pursuant to the rules of procedure for special actions,
without regard to its appellate jurisdiction.” [emphasis added] Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12120.21. And “[t]he only questions that may be raised in a special action are:
1. Whether the defendant has failed to exercise discretion which he has a duty
to exercise; or to perform a duty required by law as to which he has no
discretion; or
2. Whether the defendant has proceeded or is threatening to proceed without
or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority; or
3. Whether a determination was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion.” Ariz. R. P. Spe. Act. 3
The first and third questions exist in the present case. The Trial Court failed to
perform a duty required by law when it failed to adjudicate the Clerk’s Entry of Default.
The Court of Appeals Div. 1 abused its discretion when it “in the exercise of its discretion,
decline[d] to accept jurisdiction over this special action” (Appx.2) as did the Supreme
Court of Arizona when it DENIED the Petition for Review (Appx.1).
The Arizona Court of Appeal’s “appellate jurisdiction is purely statutory.” State v.
Bayardi, 230 Ariz. 195, 197, 281 P.3d 1063, 1065 (App.2012) (citing Ariz. Const, art. 6, §
9 and Hall Family Props., Ltd. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp., 185 Ariz. 382, 386, 916 P.2d 1098,
1102 (App.1995)). “Generally, th[e Appellate Cjourt's jurisdiction is limited to appeals from
final judgments which dispose of all claims and parties” (Baker v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 475
4791J9, 296 P.3d 1011, 1015 (App.2013) citing Garza v. Swift Transp. Co., 222 Ariz. 281,
284, 213 P.3d 1008, 1011 (2009) and Ariz.Rev.Stat. §12-2101 (A)(1)).
-7-
Under Arizona jurisprudence, the Petitioner is authorized to seek review, when as
here, his claim is that the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction and has abused its
discretion. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956). A Petition for Review has been
routinely granted in numerous instances. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 239-40
(1981); see also, State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P.2d 397
(1975) (Arizona courts have held that although the certiorari statute speaks of review to
determine whether the lower court lacked jurisdiction, the statute also permits review to
determine whether a lower court abused its discretion); State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior
Court, 95 Ariz. 319, 390 P.2d 109 (1964) (“a writ of certiorari may be used to review abuse
of discretion”). Section 12-2001 reads:
“[t]he writ of certiorari may be granted by the supreme and superior courts
or by any judge thereof, in all cases when an inferior tribunal, board or
officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there
is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.”
And Under A.R.S. §12-2101(A)(4)“[t]he court of appeals shall have: . . . [jurisdiction to hear and determine
petitions for special actions brought pursuant to the rules of procedure for
special actions, without regard to its appellate jurisdiction.” [emphasis
added].
“It is clear that words and phrases in statutes shall be given their ordinary meaning
unless it appears from context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.” State v.
Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470 n. 3, 671 P.2d 909, 911 n. 3 (1983) [citation omitted]. “The
ordinary meaning of 'shall' in [A.R.S. § 12-2101 (A)(4)], is to impose a mandatory
provision.” HCZ Const., Inc. v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 199 Ariz. 361,364, 18 P.3d
-8-
155, 158 (App. 2001). Therefore, a writ of certiorari may be obtained by, where as here
the filing of a Petition for Special Action, pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of Procedure for
Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973). The certiorari provision itself
speaks of review to determine whether the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction, but
as consistently construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, the statute also authorizes
review for abuse of discretion. State ex ret. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party
in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 222, 624 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1981); State ex rel. Dawson v.
Superior Court; State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court,-, State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens,
79 Ariz. 298, 300, 288 P.2d 1077, 1078 (1955). See Rule 3, Rules of Procedure for
Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973).
“An abuse of discretion exists when the record, viewed in the light most favorable
to upholding the trial court's decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the
decision. An abuse of discretion also occurs "[wjhere there has been an error of law
committed in the process of reaching [a] discretionary conclusion."” Grant v. Ariz. Public
Bern Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 455-56, 652 P.2d 507, 528-29 (1982) [internal citations omitted].
It is an abuse of discretion, to open or vacate a judgment where the moving party shows
no legal ground therefor or offers no excuse for his own negligence or default.'” Marsh v.
Riskas, 73 Ariz. 7, 236 P.2d 746 (1951)73 Ariz. at 11,236 P.2d at 749.
-9-
This Court has ruled that “[w]here a court declines to hear a case or motion,
alleging its own incompetency to do so, or that of the party to be heard, mandamus is the
proper remedy.” Ex Parte Russell, 80 U.S. 664, 670 (1871). The Appellate Courts here
had no discretion to deny the Appellant’s Petition for a Special Action and review thereof.
The Delay was Inexcusable
In Arizona, a defendant in a civil case has 20 days to file an answer after the
service of a summons and complaint. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). Once the defendant is
served with a copy of the complaint, he can respond or do nothing. If he opts for the latter
course, the defendant knows that greater relief than that prayed for or relief different in
kind will not be entered against him. Tarnoffv. Jones, 17 Ariz. App. 240, 244-45 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972. Notwithstanding, a party appears when he “take[s] any action, other than
objecting to personal jurisdiction, that recognizes the case is pending in court.” Kline v.
Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 569,1j18, 212 P.3d 902 (App. 2009).
In the present case “[w]e are left with a record in which the delays are not explained
and therefore we have no basis on which to say the delay was excusable. Mere passage
of time does not constitute excusable neglect ” Shemaitis v. Superior Court, 114 Ariz.
288, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). Respondents acknowledged the Complaint in their letters
to the respective banks in an attempt to thwart the subpoena for the bank records. Appx.5.
Further, Respondents agreed to have the dispute over the settlement agreements
adjudicated in Arizona because the Petitioner’s Settlement Agreement with Bestway was
incorporated by reference into the Respondent’s Settlement Agreement with Bestway.
Appx.14, §(4)(b)(ii), (“[t]he parties have agreed that no future royalties are required for the
-10-
Optioned Products, as Bestway has reached agreement with Peter Sgromo regarding
these products”). The Petitioner’s Settlement Agreement prescribes Arizona Law and
mediation to occur in Arizona. Appx.15, §5(a); see also Id., §18.01 (“[t]he validity,
construction, and performance of this Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and
governed by the laws of the State of Arizona without regard to principles of conflicts of
law”). It is therefore established Respondents submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arizona
Court and made an appearance.
Respondents have No Meritorious Defense
The law is well settled in Arizona that to invoke the court's discretion in setting
aside a default, the moving party must show that a meritorious defense exists. United
Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 43, 653 P.2d 691 (1982). There are
at least four (4) arguments to support the Respondents have no meritorious defense.
Firstly, there was an oral license agreement between Petitioner and Respondents
for the use of the ‘440 and ‘298 Patents. Appx.9 (Respondents- “it may be better to pay.
You a royalty instead of being a member [of the LLC]”; Petitioner- “[Ijet’s go with paying
me a royalty and not making me a member”). The oral ‘440 Patent license agreements
are enforceable because they were performed within one year. The oral licenses were
granted on June 21,2013 (Ibid.) and Petitioner signed the ‘440 Patent License Agreement
on Eureka’s behalf on August 20, 2013 (Appx.10) and the similarly signed the ‘298 Patent
License Agreement also on Eureka’s behalf on June 17, 2014. California Statute of
Frauds, Cal. Civ.Code §1624(a) (1); see also Stewart Lamle, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Mattel,
Inc., Defendant-appellee, 394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“the court concluded that (1)
-11 -
the conduct and circumstances of the parties created an implied right in Duval to use the
Patent with an implied promise to pay therefor; (2) Potash was not estopped to assert the
implied agreement, nor to maintain an action for compensation; (3) if Potash prevailed on
the other issues, it was entitled to an accounting to determine the amount due. Later the
court amended the judgment to provide that n* * * nothing contained in this judgment shall
be construed as determining whether or not the defendant has used * * * (the Anderson
Patent) * * * or whether or not the defense of invalidity of the Anderson * * * Patent * * *
or the question of non-infringement or non-use thereof is triable in this case.")
Secondly, the LTA expressly defines the rights and obligations of the parties and
states in relevant part:
1. “[w]e agree that all property owned by either of us as of the date of this
agreement, obtained during the agreement shall be considered the
separate property of each. Neither of us will have any claim to the
separate property of the other absent a written agreement transferring
ownership. This included but is not limited to personal income,... royalty
income,.. . business interests, legal settlements . . .”
2. “Greg [Scott] acknowledges that a significant portion of Pete[r Sgromoj’s
income comes from his business Wide Eyes Marketing Ltd. [“WEM”] (and
possibly other LLC names) and that he often conducts business from
home . . . Greg [Scott] acknowledges that this does not give him
ownership rights of any kind in Wide Eyes Marketing or any other LLC
Pete[r Sgromo] owns ..
3. Neither of us shall be liable or responsible for the individual debts incurred
by the other in [ ]/his own name or company name.”
U- - -U
39.
ENTIRE AGREEMENT: The foregoing constitutes the entire
Agreement between the parties and may be modified only in writing
signed by all the parties . . .” Ibid., at Appx.6.
- 12-
Thirdly, “[a] contract may be rescinded if all the parties thereto consent.” Cal. Civ.
Code, § 1689, subd.(a); see also Cal. Civ. Code, § 1688 (“[a] contract is extinguished by
its rescission.”) The purpose of rescission is “'to restore both parties to their former
position as far as possible' and 'to bring about substantial justice by adjusting the equities
between the parties' despite the fact that 'the status quo cannot be exactly reproduced.'”
[citations omitted]; see also Runyan v. Pac. Air Indus., (1970) 2 Cal.3d 304, 316; Reed v.
McLaws, 56 Ariz. 556, 562-63, 110 P.2d 222, 225 (1941) (stating that rescission annuls
the contract and places the parties in the position they would be in had there never been
a contract.); Timeless Glob., LLC v. Olson, No. 1 CA-CV 15-0005, at *8 (Ariz. Ct. App.
July 5, 2016), (“[t]he general rule is that a party seeking to rescind a contract must restore
or offer to restore to the other party that which he has received under the contract.” citing
Jennings v. Lee, 105 Ariz. 167, 171 (Ariz. 1969)).
All the parties in the present case agreed to rescind the Subject Licenses in their
respective Settlement Agreements:
“Release
(a) With the exception of any claim relating to any term and/or the
performance of this Agreement, Eureka and Bestway hereby
release each other from all actions, causes of action, suits, rights,
debts, sums of money, accounts, accountings, covenants,
contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, indemnities,
liabilities, damages, judgments, executions, claims, or demands
of every nature whatsoever, in law or equity or arbitration,
whether based on contract, tort, statutory or other legal or
equitable theory of recovery, whether known or unknown,
asserted or unasserted, which one may have against the other
arising at any time prior to the Effective Date, including all claims
that in any way relate to, arise from, or are in any manner
connected to the Subject Licenses.
-13-
(b) The Parties hereto expressly acknowledge and agree that this
Agreement fully and finally releases and forever resolves all
claims referenced in subparagraph (a) above, including those
that are unknown, unanticipated or unsuspected or that may
hereafter arise as a result of the discovery of new and/or
additional facts, and the parties expressly waive all rights under
Section 1542 of the Civil Code of California, which the parties
acknowledge they have read and understood and which provides
as follows:
A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS
WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO
EXIST IN his favor at the time of executing the
RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE
MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE
DEBTOR. Appx.14, §§11(a)(b); see also Appx.15, §§8(a)(b).
Respondents are obligated to return all and any royalties they received under the
guise of the Subject Licenses.
Finally, under A.R.S. § 23-353(A), an employer who discharges an employee must
pay the wages due the employee within seven working days or the end of its regular pay
period, whichever is sooner. Wages are “nondiscretionary compensation due an
employee in return for labor or services ... for which the employee has a reasonable
expectation to be paid . . ..” A.R.S. 23-350(7). Sales commissions are wages under this
definition. Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Property Mgmt., Inc., 178 Ariz. 425, 427 (App.
1994). This includes commissions that are based on sales that the employee procured
before the employee was discharged, even though the employer received payment on
the sales after the employee was discharged. Clark v. Ellsworth, 66 Ariz. 119,122 (1947)
(holding that Arizona follows the “procuring cause” rule in determining when real estate
sale commission is earned); accord Porter v. Ploughe, 77 Ariz. 33, 35 (1954).
- 14 -
The royalty reports provided by Bestway, accurately detail the date the royalties
earned and Respondents were obligated to forward those payments to Petitioner within
seven days of receipt. Appx.12-13. Scott and Eureka do not dispute that Sgromo had
procured the sales that gave rise to the royalty-commissions in question (Yslas v. Sterling
Mobile Servs., No. 1 CA-CV 20-0179, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 1,2020))— and while an
employer cannot withhold wages for a reason not communicated to the employee
(Schade v. Diethrich, 158 Ariz. 1,12-13 (Ariz. 1988))— Scott fabricated false allegations,
seemingly to enact the business judgment rule. In an email to Eureka’s attorney Scott
confirmed Sgromo’s departure from Eureka and that he “should find a job” and the
rationale for withholding royalties was to “pay [Scott] back and then to pay off the [Eureka]
credit cards. Everything else will be held for Peter's benefit once it's [sic- he’s?] clean
sane, and sober for a significant period of time” and that “domestic violence and drug
abuse have consequences & [Sgromo] had used and abused people for quite sometime
and now he needs to grow up and face the music.” Appx.8. Scott asserted these wild
allegations throughout the domestic violence action but the court ordered numerous
random drug tests and all proved Scott’s allegations utterly false. Appx.18. And as such
the case was dropped. Ibid. As for paying Scott back any monies or having any
responsibility for business charges on Eureka’s corporate credit cards, the agreement
between Sgromo and Scott from the onset of their relationship was clear— “[n]either. . .
shall be liable or responsible for the individual debts incurred by the other in his own name
or company name” (Appx.6, §3) and Sgromo “often conduct business from home . . .
-15-
Greg [Scott] acknowledges this does not give him ownership rights of any kind in Wide
Eyes Marketing or any other LLC Pete[r Sgromo] owns” (Ibid. §2).
Respondents Agreed to Preclude any Future Claims to the Royalties as Part
of Settlement
As a general matter, many courts have recognized that even though a claim has
not been raised for purposes of claim preclusion, parties may nevertheless agree to
preclude it in a consent judgment. See, e.g., In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in Gila River System and Source, 212 Ariz. 64, 72,
24, 127 P.3d 882, 890
(2006).
In the present case, Scott raised the issue of intellectual property rights between
he, Eureka and Sgromo; had a full opportunity to litigate it; but chose to dismiss the case
“with prejudice.” Appx.13, see also Ibid., at ScottDecl.,
(“Eureka has worked diligently
to try and sort out the issues in this litigation and determine how to proceed, in light of Mr.
Sgromo’s departure and his claims relating to the ownership of intellectual property in this
case.”). Further, Scott consented to releasing “claims that in any way relate to, arise from
or are in any manner connected to the Subject Licenses . . . including those that are
unknown, unanticipated or unsuspected or that may hereafter arise as a result of the
discovery of new and/or additional facts, . . .” Appx.14, §§11(a)(b). Therefore, the
Interpleader Court had no discretion to adjudicate the Subject Licenses and certainly not
to bind Sgromo to them. The inquiry begins and ends there. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U.S., 195, 203 (1879) (“[t]he only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who
enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should
not go fifty.”) [citation omitted].
-16-
The Sum is Certain
Under Rule 55(b)(1), a plaintiff may apply for a default judgment by motion “[w]hen
the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by
computation be made certain,... if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear
. . .” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) [emphasis added]. In other words, Rule 55(b)(1) contains
two main requirements that must be met before a plaintiff can obtain a default judgment
by a motion. Rule 55(b)(1). In the present case, the sum is certain. Appx.10, at Friday,
June 21,2013 12:38 PM; Appx.16-17.
Petitioner is therefore entitled to treble damages under A.R.S. § 23- 355(A), which
provides that when an employer “fails to pay wages due” to an employee, that employee
“may recover... an amount that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages.” Employers
are permitted to withhold employee wages when they reasonably dispute in good faith
the amount of wages due, including any “set-off” the employer asserts against the
employee. A.R.S. § 23-352(3). In the present case Respondents asserted that Petitioner
owed money for a corporate credit card Eureka issued to Petitioner to perform the
consulting duties. Appx.18. The LTA is clear, “[n]either shall be liable or responsible for
the individual debts incurred by the other in his own name or company name.” Appx.6,
§3. When all else failed Respondents falsely accused Petitioner of domestic violence;
mental health issues and substance abuse. Appx.18. All this was proven false in a court
of law. The unpaid royalty wages are certain at $730,757.17 (Appx.16-17) in addition to
his initial investment of $59,809.00 (see table 1, above). Sgromo is therefore entitled to
treble damages of $2,371,698.51.
- 17-
Petitioner has a Statutory Right to Attorney Fees
An element of a breach of contract cause of action is damages proximately caused
by the defendant’s breach. Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811,
821,124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115.) The statutory measure of damages for breach
of contract is “the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to
result therefrom.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 3300. “Contract damages seek to approximate the
agreed-upon performance. ‘[I]n the law of contracts the theory is that the party injured by
breach should receive as nearly as possible the equivalent of the benefits of
performance.’” Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503,
515, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454.)
Detriment caused by Eureka’s breach of the Settlement Agreement would include
the attorney fees incurred by Petitioner in defending the arbitration Eureka (and Bestway)
misrepresented was Ordered by the Original Court. A benefit, and intended goal, of the
Settlement Agreement was for Petitioner to avoid incurring more attorney fees in the
Interpleader Action—hence, the Settlement Agreement required immediate dismissal
with prejudice of the Interpleader and in turn, the Arbitration Action. Had Eureka
dismissed the Interpleader Action with prejudice as required by the Settlement
Agreement, Petitioner would not have incurred attorney fees defending the Interpleader
and Arbitration Action from the date on which the Settlement Agreement was signed to
the date on which Eureka dismissed the Original Action. Thus, Petitioner’s attorney fees
incurred in the Arbitration Action within that time frame fall within the scope of statutory
-18-
breach of contract damages. Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc., 29
Cal.App.5th 1,9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). Eureka and Scott are therefore liable for Petitioner’s
attorney fees of $71,423.58. Appx.19.
CONCLUSION
The language in certain Arizona cases seems to call for a more liberal summary
judgment standard. See, e.g., Compton v. National Metals Co., 10 Ariz. App. 366, 459
P.2d 93 (1969) (summary judgment appropriate only where there is no "substantial
evidence" in opposition, i.e., the tendered evidence is too incredible to be accepted by
reasonable minds, or even if true, it is without legal probative force); see also Bouma
Parker, Summary Judgment in Arizona: A Call for a New Standard, ARIZ. ATT'Y. 24, 2425 (March 1990) (listing language of conflicting standards, and noting that some
discourage summary judgment and some would apply it more liberally); see also Orme
School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301,306 (Ariz. 1990).
Therefore, the writ should be granted.
Respecj
xftv Jv , 2024
Submitted,
Piets® Pasqi#le mitonio Sgromo
(a/k/a Peter Anthgliy Sgromo)
Petitioner— Pro per
-19-
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.