Opposition Brief — Gerald F. Lackey, in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner v. Damian Stinnie, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 28, 2024

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No. 23-621

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

GERALD F. LACKEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE

COMMISSIONER OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF

MOTOR VEHICLES,

Petitioner,

DAMIAN STINNIE, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Jonathan T. Blank

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

323 Second Street SE

Suite 700

Charlottesville, VA 22902

(434) 977-2509

Matthew A. Fitzgerald

Counsel of Record

John J. Woolard

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

800 East Canal Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 775-4716

mfitzgerald

@mcguirewoods.com

(Additional counsel on inside cover)

Angela A. Ciolfi

LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER

1000 Preston Avenue

Suite A

Charlottesville, VA 22903

(434) 529-1810

Patrick Levy-Lavelle

LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER

626 East Broad Street

Suite 200

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 643-1086

Counsel for Respondents Damian Stinnie, Melissa

Adams, Adrainne Johnson, Williest Bandy, and

Brianna Morgan

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Fourth Circuit, in line with every

other circuit, correctly held that Respondents can be

“prevailing parties” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on

winning a preliminary injunction that awarded them

meaningful relief from an unconstitutional law that

the legislature later repealed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iv

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 3

Legal Background ............................................... 3

II.

Factual and Procedural Background ................. 4

Va. Code § 46.2-395 punished those

unable to pay court debt without

procedural due process. .............................. 4

Respondents sued to defend their

constitutional rights and won an

injunction. ................................................... 5

The General Assembly repealed

§ 46.2-395. ................................................... 8

The Fourth Circuit determined that

Respondents were prevailing parties

under § 1988. ............................................ 10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ................. 13

There is no circuit split warranting further

review. ............................................................... 13

The circuits are aligned over when a

preliminary injunction may be “some

relief on the merits.” ................................. 15

No dispute among the circuits exists

over what is an “enduring” change in

the parties’ legal relationship. ................. 17

iii

II.

The alleged circuit splits are irrelevant

because the Commissioner asks this

Court to overturn all the circuits. ............ 20

This case is a poor vehicle. ............................... 21

Respondents would prevail in any

circuit. ....................................................... 21

This case is not final. ................................ 24

III. The Fourth Circuit was right. .......................... 25

The Fourth Circuit implemented this

Court’s precedent. ..................................... 25

The Commissioner’s proposed

bright-line rule would prompt bad

behavior by the government. ................... 27

IV. The question presented is often and recently

denied. ............................................................... 29

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Hopkins, Minn.,

511 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2008) ............................... 18

Buckhannon Bd. & Care, Inc. v. W.V.

Dep’t of Health & Home Res.,

532 U.S. 598 (2001) ........................................26, 29

City of Riverside v. Rivera,

477 U.S. 561 (1986) ............................................... 3

Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups,

554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009) ........................... 14

Conway v. McQueary,

562 U.S. 1137 (2011) ........................................... 30

CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC,

578 U.S. 419 (2016) ......................................... 3, 25

Davis v. Abbott,

136 S. Ct. 534 (2015) ........................................... 30

Dearmore v. City of Garland,

519 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2008) .................... 14, 19-20

Dupuy v. Samuels,

423 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2005) ..........................14, 18

Farrar v. Hobby,

506 U.S. 103 (1992) ............................................... 4

Haley v. Pataki,

106 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1997)............................ 14-15

Hargett v. Tennessee Conf. of the NAACP,

143 S. Ct. 2609 (2023) ......................................... 29

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983) ......................................... 3, 25

Hewitt v. Helms,

482 U.S. 755 (1987) ......................................... 3, 15

Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma,

717 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2013) .......................... 14-15

Kansas Jud. Watch v. Stout,

653 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2011) ...................... 14-16

King v. Kan. Jud. Watch,

565 U.S. 1246 (2012) ........................................... 30

Lefemine v. Wideman,

568 U.S. 1 (2012) ............................................. 4, 25

Live Gold Operations, Inc. v. Dow,

565 U.S. 977 (2011) ............................................. 30

Mercer v. Duke Univ.,

401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005) ............................... 25

N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson,

433 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 2006) ............................. 19

Pa. v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,

478 U.S. 546 (1986) ............................................... 3

People Against Police Violence v. Pittsburgh,

520 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008).................. 2, 14, 16-17

Planned Parenthood S.W. Ohio Region v. Dewine,

931 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2019) ..........................14, 18

Roberts v. Neace,

65 F.4th 280 (6th Cir. 2023)............................ 2, 28

Rogers Grp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville,

683 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2012) .......................... 14-15

Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep.

Sch. Dist.,

489 U.S. 782 (1989) ................................ 3-4, 19, 22

Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns,

400 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ............................. 14

Singer Mgt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram,

650 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2011)...................... 16-17, 23

Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero,

282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002) ............................... 11

Sole v. Wyner,

551 U.S. 74 (2007) .............................. 17-18, 22, 25

Stinnie v. Holcomb,

355 F. Supp. 3d 514

(W.D. Va. 2018) ................................... 1, 5-7, 22-23

Stinnie v. Holcomb,

396 F. Supp. 3d 653 (W.D. Va. 2019).................... 9

Stinnie v. Holcomb,

No. 3:16-CV-00044, 2021 WL 2292807

(W.D. Va. June 4, 2021) ...................................... 11

vii

Stinnie v. Holcomb,

734 F. App’x 858 (4th Cir. 2018) ......................... 24

Stinnie v. Holcomb,

37 F.4th 977 (4th Cir. 2022).....................11, 24, 27

Stinnie v. Holcomb,

77 F.4th 200

(4th Cir. 2023) ......... 11-12, 14-15, 17-18, 22, 24-25

Veasey v. Wilkins,

158 F. Supp. 3d 466 (E.D.N.C. 2016).................. 28

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7 (2008) ................................................... 6

Yost v. Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio

Region,

141 S. Ct. 189 (2020) ........................................... 30

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1988 .......... 1-3, 5, 10, 12-13, 16, 21, 25-28

Va. Code § 46.2-395 .................... 1, 4-11, 19, 22-23, 26

Other Authorities

Matthew Chaney, Virginia License

Suspension Law Faces New Challenges,

Va. Law. Wkly. (Jan. 9, 2019) ....................8, 19, 23

Office of Virginia Governor, Gov. Northam

Announces Budget Amendment to

Eliminate Driver’s License Suspensions

for Nonpayment of Court Fines and Costs

(Mar. 26, 2019),

http://bit.ly/GovNorthamBudget........................... 8

viii

Virginia Legis. Info. Sys., Va. HB 1700,

Governor’s Recommendation, 2019 Sess. ............. 8

Virginia Legis. Info. Sys., Va. SB 1, 2020 Sess. ........ 9

INTRODUCTION

A Virginia statute penalized Respondents by

automatically suspending their driver’s licenses

without affording them notice and an opportunity to

be heard. Respondents challenged the law. The

district court readily identified the procedural due

process problem. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 355 F. Supp. 3d

514, 529 (W.D. Va. 2018) (“Plaintiffs are likely to show

§ 46.2-395 does not provide any hearing, much less

one that satisfies due process.”). The district court

then entered a preliminary injunction against the law.

That act opened the door to Respondents receiving

their driver’s licenses (and livelihoods) back.

In the wake of the injunction, the Commissioner of

the Department of Motor Vehicles advised the

General Assembly to repeal the law. With the

Governor’s support, across two legislative sessions, it

did so. Today the offending law no longer exists.

The question is whether Respondents “prevailed”

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The answer, as a matter of

common sense and under the law of every federal

circuit, is yes.

The Commissioner contends that at least two

circuit splits exist on this point. But the supposed

splits are simply different courts using varying words

to describe the same general rule—that a preliminary

injunction winner who secures meaningful relief in an

order weighing the merits of the constitutional issue

“prevails” when the government chooses to moot the

case before further proceedings.

The various

formulations are no meaningful clash of visions. In

fact, this case would come out the same way in every

circuit.

Even more importantly, the Commissioner’s

position does not agree with any circuit. In his view,

no mooted case can ever have a prevailing party, even

if, as here, the preliminary injunction changed the

parties’ positions and the mootness then arose from

what amounts to a government surrender.

The Commissioner’s view garbles the everyday

meaning of “prevail” and “prevailing party.” It also

punishes litigants who take on the most odious laws—

the ones that are readily disposed of once people focus

on them. Such is the case here, where after the

Plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction against the

offending law, the Virginia General Assembly

repealed it by a combined vote of 113 to 26.

This case was about procedural due process. Other

similar cases have vindicated freedoms of speech,

association, and religion. E.g., People Against Police

Violence v. Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir.

2008) (“PAPV”) (affirming attorney’s fees for

challengers who won a preliminary injunction against

a series of ordinances disfavoring public marches and

protests, and then the city revised its ordinance to

correct the constitutional problems); Roberts v. Neace,

65 F.4th 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2023) (Sutton, C.J.)

(affirming fees for churchgoers threatened with

prosecution for attending Easter Sunday church in

2020, who had won a preliminary injunction, after

which the government eliminated the offending ban).

The Commissioner’s proposed bite out of § 1988

would erase the fees in all of these cases. No circuit

accepts this view. This Court has denied certiorari

repeatedly and recently on this same question. E.g.,

Hargett v. Tennessee State Conf. of the NAACP, No.

22-773 (cert. denied June 12, 2023). This Court

should deny the Petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Legal Background

“Section 1988 was enacted to [e]nsure that private

citizens have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate

their rights protected by the Civil Rights Acts.” Pa. v.

Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.

546, 559 (1986). “Congress enacted § 1988 specifically

because it found that the private market for legal

services failed to provide many victims of civil rights

violations with effective access to the judicial process.”

City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986).

“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that in federal civil

rights actions ‘the court, in its discretion, may allow

the prevailing party, other than the United States, a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.’”

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 426 (1983). A

“prevailing party” need only “receive at least some

relief on the merits.” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,

760 (1987). In determining whether the relief granted

confers prevailing party status, “[t]he touchstone of

the prevailing party inquiry must be the material

alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a

manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee

statute.” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep.

Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989), quoted in CRST

Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419, 422

(2016).

“A plaintiff ‘prevails,’ . . . ‘when actual relief on the

merits of his claim materially alters the legal

relationship between the parties by modifying the

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits

the plaintiff.’” Lefemine v. Wideman, 568 U.S. 1, 4

(2012). “[A]n injunction or declaratory judgment, like

a damages award, will usually satisfy that test.” Id.

And “the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the

magnitude of the relief obtained.” Farrar v. Hobby,

506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992); Texas State Teachers Ass’n,

489 U.S. at 791–92 (“If the plaintiff has succeeded on

‘any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d]

some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,’

the plaintiff has crossed the threshold to a fee award

of some kind.” (emphases added)).

II.

Factual and Procedural Background

Va. Code § 46.2-395 punished those

unable to pay court debt without

procedural due process.

For years, the Commonwealth of Virginia

automatically suspended driver’s licenses for failure

to pay court debt.

See Va. Code § 46.2-395.

Suspension occurred without a hearing or any inquiry

into the reasons for nonpayment or financial

circumstances. Va. Code § 46.2-395.

Respondents are indigent Virginia residents

whose driver’s licenses were automatically suspended

by the Commissioner for failure to pay court debt that

they could not afford. Those suspensions deprived

drivers of transportation necessary to get to and from

work, keep medical appointments, care for ill or

disabled family members, and, paradoxically, to meet

their financial obligations to the courts. See, e.g., 4th

Cir. No. 21-1756, ECF No. 20, JA226–70 (hereinafter

JA) (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 31, 33, 39, 109, 151, 152,

168).

Respondents were unable, not unwilling, to pay

their court debt. Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 520–23.

The district court noted the many struggles

Respondents have endured that have adversely

affected their ability to pay their court debt, such as

serious illness, unemployment, and incarceration. See

id. Despite Respondents’ inability to pay, none of

them were asked about their financial circumstances

before license suspension or were otherwise provided

due process. See id.

Respondents sued to defend their

constitutional rights and won an

injunction.

Respondents filed suit against the Commissioner

of the DMV. JA27–172. They alleged that § 46.2-395

violated due process by denying them a property

interest without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

Respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief,

as well as attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988. JA79–80.

Eventually Respondents filed a Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, asking the district court to:

(1) enjoin the Commissioner from enforcing § 46.2-395

against Respondents; (2) remove any current

suspensions of Respondents’ driver’s licenses imposed

under § 46.2-395; and (3) enjoin the Commissioner

from charging a fee to reinstate Respondents’ licenses

if no other restrictions on their licenses existed.

JA297.

Following briefing by the parties and a hearing

involving several hours of testimony, including expert

evidence, the district court granted a preliminary

injunction. The court relieved Respondents of the

burdens of § 46.2-395. Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at

527–32.

The district court noted that “[t]o obtain a

preliminary injunction, the moving party must

establish ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.’” Id. (citing Winter v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

The district court then concluded that

Respondents were likely to succeed on their

procedural due process claim. See id. at 527–28. In

so ruling, the district court scrutinized the notice and

hearing components of procedural due process. See id.

at 528–31. The district court recognized that § 46.2395 failed the hearing requirement of procedural due

process. Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 529 (“Plaintiffs

are likely to show § 46.2-395 does not provide any

hearing, much less one that satisfies due process.”);

id. at 529–30 (“The Court determines that Plaintiffs

are likely to succeed because the procedures in place

are not sufficient to protect against the erroneous

deprivation of the property interest involved. Indeed,

§ 46.2-395, on its face, provides no procedural hearing

at all.”). The district court also determined that the

rest of the Winter factors (“irreparable harm, the

balance of equities, and the public interest”) all

counseled in Respondents’ favor. Id. at 532.

Granting the injunction, the district court ordered

that: (1) the Commissioner was “preliminarily

enjoined from enforcing . . . § 46.2-395 against

Plaintiffs unless or until the Commissioner or another

entity provide[d] a hearing regarding license

suspension and provide[d] adequate notice thereof”;

(2) the Commissioner shall “remove any current

suspensions of the Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses imposed

under . . . § 46.2-395”; and (3) the Commissioner was

“enjoined from charging a fee to reinstate Plaintiffs’

driver’s licenses if there [were] no other restrictions

on their licenses.” JA843.

The Commissioner did not appeal the preliminary

injunction. Then litigation proceeded as to class

certification briefing, fact and expert discovery, and

motions for summary judgment. JA17–23. Five

weeks before the case was scheduled to go to trial in

August 2019, the district court stayed the case at the

request of the Commissioner and over Respondents’

objection, pending the 2020 session of Virginia’s

General Assembly. JA15–23; JA955.

The General Assembly repealed § 46.2395.

The entry of the preliminary injunction led the

General Assembly to focus on this problem. Less than

a month after the injunction, Senator William M.

Stanley, who sponsored legislation to repeal § 46.2395, remarked: “[W]ith the preliminary injunction

being granted . . . I hope the House of Delegates will

join the Senate in fixing this problem.”1

Governor Northam also proposed a Budget

Amendment to provide temporary relief to individuals

whose driver’s licenses had been automatically

suspended for failure to pay court debt.2 The General

Assembly passed the Budget Amendment, which

suspended the operation of § 46.2-395 from July 1,

2019, to June 30, 2020 (one budget cycle). It also

waived associated reinstatement fees for driver’s

licenses otherwise eligible for reinstatement.

Shortly after the Budget Amendment suspended

§ 46.2-395, the district court stayed this case and

1 Matthew Chaney, Virginia License Suspension Law Faces New

Va.

Law.

Wkly.

(Jan.

2019),

Challenges,

https://valawyersweekly.com/2019/01/09/va-license-suspensionlaw-faces-new-challenges/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2024).

2 Office of Virginia Governor, Gov. Northam Announces Budget

Amendment to Eliminate Driver’s License Suspensions for

Nonpayment of Court Fines and Costs (Mar. 26, 2019),

http://bit.ly/GovNorthamBudget (last visited Feb. 27, 2024); see

also Virginia Legis. Info. Sys., Va. HB 1700, Governor’s

Recommendation,

2019

Sess.,

http://lis.virginia.gov/cgibin/legp604.exe?191+amd+HB1700AG (last visited Feb. 27,

2024).

canceled the scheduled trial. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 396

F. Supp. 3d 653, 661 (W.D. Va. 2019).

Then, during its 2020 regular session, the General

Assembly considered legislation to permanently

eliminate the statute’s unconstitutional mandate.3 In

January 2020, the Commissioner sent a letter to

Senator Stanley advising how to repeal § 46.2-395

effectively. JA968–1000. The Commissioner also

recognized the direct impact this case was having on

the legislative process:

As you are aware DMV is currently a

party to the Stinnie v. Holcomb case, in

which the issue under consideration is

driver’s license suspensions for failure to

pay court fines and costs pursuant to

§ 46.2-395. On June 28, 2019, the Court

stayed the litigation until after the close

of the 2020 General Assembly Session to

allow the legislature to repeal § 46.2-395.

An emergency enactment clause is

needed to demonstrate to the Court that

matters at issue in the Stinnie v.

Holcomb litigation have been addressed

by the General Assembly. This should

result in the pending litigation being

dismissed, relieving the Department

from continuing to incur costly legal fees.

JA968–69 (emphases added). The Commissioner even

went so far as to “offer a substitute” bill that had all

of his recommended changes. JA969–1000. The

See Virginia Legis. Info. Sys., Va. SB 1, 2020 Sess.,

https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?ses=201&typ=bil&

val=sb1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2024).

Commissioner was calling for a repeal to stem his

losses here from continuing to defend a law the

district court had already concluded likely violated

procedural due process.

The General Assembly repealed § 46.2-395 on

February 26, 2020, with an overwhelming majority.

Governor Northam signed the repeal, and it took

effect on July 1, 2020. The new law also required the

Commissioner to reinstate driving privileges

suspended due to § 46.2-395.

The Fourth Circuit determined that

Respondents were prevailing parties

under § 1988.

In light of the action taken by the General

Assembly, on May 7, 2020, the parties stipulated that

this action was moot. JA1010–13. The preliminary

injunction that relieved Respondents from § 46.2-395

remained in effect as a source of continuing relief to

Respondents from December 2018 through the

mooting of this case in 2020.

After the case became moot, the district court

retained jurisdiction to determine Respondents’

entitlement to attorney’s fees and entered an order

bifurcating the briefing on Respondents’ Fee Petition.

JA1017–18. Under the briefing schedule entered by

the district court, the parties first briefed the

“prevailing party” issue. Id. The amount and

reasonableness of any fees to be awarded were

reserved for a later round of briefing. Id.

The district court denied the fee petition based on

then-existing Fourth Circuit precedent in Smyth ex

rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002).

Stinnie v. Holcomb, No. 3:16-CV-00044, 2021 WL

2292807 (W.D. Va. June 4, 2021). Under Smyth, a

preliminary injunction victory in a case that is later

mooted could never make a party a “prevailing party.”

Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277.

Respondents appealed. A three-judge panel of the

Fourth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Smyth

remained binding authority. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 37

F.4th 977, 982–83 (4th Cir. 2022). But Judge Harris

noted that the court “may wish” to reconsider Smyth.

Id. at 983 (Harris, J., concurring). She noted that the

rule in Smyth was “a complete outlier” among the

other circuits. Id. at 984. Without Smyth’s categorical

bar, she wrote, “plaintiffs would almost certainly

qualify as prevailing parties[.]” Id. at 985. But

Smyth’s rule “allow[ed] defendants to game the

system.” Id.

The Fourth Circuit took the case en banc and

rejected Smyth. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 77 F.4th 200, 203

(4th Cir. 2023). The court overruled Smyth as an

“outlier” and observed that “[e]very other circuit to

consider the issue has held that a preliminary

injunction may confer prevailing party status in

appropriate circumstances.” Id. The Fourth Circuit

held that “the plaintiffs here ‘prevailed’ in every sense

needed to make them eligible for a fee award[.]” Id.

The Fourth Circuit stated:

This case illustrates the point. The

plaintiffs here secured a preliminary

injunction based on a “clear showing”

that Va. Code § 46.2-395 was likely

unconstitutional. . . . And after years of

“long, contentious, and no doubt costly”

litigation, the plaintiffs were eager to

proceed to summary judgment. . . . But

over the plaintiffs’ protests, the

Commissioner secured a stay so that

the General Assembly could repeal the

statute and moot the case . . . .

Moreover, the Commissioner provided

significant input on how to structure

the repeal – including a draft bill – so

that it would “result in the pending

litigation being dismissed, relieving”

the government’s obligation to “incur

costly legal fees.” J.A. 968–69. And

because Virginia is in the Fourth

Circuit and not anywhere else in the

country, the Commonwealth could rest

assured that this eleventh-hour

capitulation would insulate it from a

fee

award.

this

case

unfortunately demonstrates, instead of

opening the courthouse doors to

meritorious civil rights claimants,

Smyth’s rule gives the government the

key, allowing it to lock out civil rights

plaintiffs whenever their success seems

imminent. This cannot have been

Congress’s intent in passing § 1988.

Id. at 210.

The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the

district court for further proceedings on the

reasonableness of the fee to which Respondents are

entitled. Those proceedings remain pending today.

The district court, which will exercise broad discretion

over the amount of fees Respondents should receive,

has made no conclusion on that point, preferring to

await the outcome of this certiorari petition.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

No part of the Petition satisfies the criteria

warranting review by this Court. First, there is no

circuit split requiring this Court’s resolution, and the

Commissioner disagrees with all circuits anyway.

Second, this case is a poor vehicle to address the

question presented, even if such split did exist.

Respondents would qualify as the prevailing party

under any circuit’s particular articulation of the rule

and the case is not final—no fee award has yet been

made. Third, the en banc Fourth Circuit reached the

right result.

The Fourth Circuit faithfully

implemented this Court’s prevailing party precedent,

and the Commissioner’s policy-based arguments

would undermine the statutory scheme set up in §

1988. Fourth, the question presented is often and

recently denied.

There is no circuit split warranting

further review.

There are two problems with the Commissioner’s

arguments about circuit splits. Pet. 13–23. First, the

claimed splits are not real. Second, the supposed

splits are irrelevant to the Petition: the Commissioner

contends that every circuit is wrong.

On the core question presented here, there is no

split. Eleven circuits have held that a preliminary

injunction on the merits can attain prevailing-party

status, even where the case is later rendered moot.

Haley v. Pataki, 106 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 1997);

PAPV, 520 F.3d at 233–34; Stinnie, 77 F.4th at 203;

Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 526 (5th

Cir. 2008); Planned Parenthood S.W. Ohio Region v.

Dewine, 931 F.3d 530, 542 (6th Cir. 2019); Dupuy v.

Samuels, 423 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2005); Rogers

Grp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 683 F.3d 903, 910–11

(8th Cir. 2012); Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma,

717 F.3d 712, 717–18 (9th Cir. 2013); Kansas Jud.

Watch v. Stout, 653 F.3d 1230, 1238, 1240–41 (10th

Cir. 2011); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554

F.3d 1340, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2009); Select Milk

Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 942 (D.C.

Cir. 2005).

Courts have recognized the uniformity of the

different circuits, though they may use different

words. See PAPV, 520 F.3d at 232–33 (“[N]early every

Court of Appeals to have addressed the issue has held

that relief obtained via a preliminary injunction can,

under appropriate circumstances, render a party

‘prevailing.’” (citing, at the time, six different circuits);

Dupuy, 423 F.3d at 723 n.4 (“Our circuit’s law on the

mootness issue is hardly an outlier among the federal

circuit courts. . . . [S]everal of our sister circuits have

held that attorneys’ fees may be awarded after a party

has obtained a preliminary injunction and the case

subsequently has become moot.”); Higher Taste, Inc.,

717 F.3d at 717 (“Other circuits have applied the same

reasoning when the plaintiff wins a preliminary

injunction and the case is subsequently rendered moot

by the defendant’s own actions.”); Kansas Jud. Watch,

653 F.3d at 1237, 1239 (citing positively the 3d, 7th,

9th and D.C. Circuits).

Indeed, the sole outlier was the Fourth Circuit—

until this case, when the en banc court brought itself

into line with all the others. “We believe this

straightforward approach is not only faithful to

Supreme Court guidance but also reflective of the

broad consensus in our sister circuits.” Stinnie, 77

F.4th at 216.

The circuits are aligned over when a

preliminary injunction may be “some

relief on the merits.”

A prevailing party need only “receive at least some

relief on the merits.” Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760. The

Commissioner claims a split regarding whether a

likelihood-of-success ruling on a preliminary

injunction can qualify. Pet. 15. There is no split.

To start, the Commissioner concedes that all but

the Third Circuit are in alignment on this question.

Pet. 14. For example, the Second Circuit had “little

trouble finding that the district court based the

preliminary injunction on the merits of plaintiffs’

Contract Clause claim.” Haley, 106 F.3d at 483. And

in Rogers Group, the Eighth Circuit noted how the

district court “engaged in a thorough analysis of the

probability that Rogers Group would succeed on the

merits of its claim[.]” Rogers Grp., 683 F.3d at 910.

The Ninth Circuit also requires merit-based

preliminary injunctions, not ones that are “hasty and

abbreviated.” Higher Taste, Inc., 717 F.3d at 716. The

Tenth Circuit requires the district court to have

completed “a serious examination” of a plaintiff’s case.

Kansas Jud. Watch, 653 F.3d at 1238.

The Third Circuit does not differ in any

meaningful way from these precedents. The Third

Circuit holds, along with its sister circuits, “that relief

obtained via a preliminary injunction can, under

appropriate

circumstances,

render

party

‘prevailing.’” PAPV, 520 F.3d at 232–33; see also

Singer Mgt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d

223, 230 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (accepting the

“‘well-supported legal proposition’ that, in some cases,

interim injunctive relief may be sufficient to warrant

attorney’s fees.”).

Still, the Commissioner contends that the Third

Circuit will only grant a preliminary injunction when

the “court actually decides the merits.” Pet. 15 (citing

Singer, 650 F.3d at 230). But that strong-sounding

language is just another way to express that the Third

Circuit, like all the others, focuses closely on what the

preliminary injunction says about the merits. PAPV,

520 F.3d at 232–33 (announcing that “we agree” with

the other circuits on this point); Singer, 650 F.3d at

230 (assessing whether a TRO was “merits-based”).

The Third Circuit’s actual practice proves the

point. In PAPV, the plaintiffs were prevailing parties

entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988 when they won

a preliminary injunction that remained until the

government amended the offending law to correct the

“alleged constitutional infirmities.” 520 F.3d at 228.

In granting the injunction, the district court evaluated

the merits of the case. See id. at 233 (“the trial court,

based upon a finding of a likelihood of plaintiffs’

success on the merits, entered a judicially enforceable

order granting plaintiffs virtually all the relief they

sought, thereby materially altering the legal

relationship between the parties”).

That attorney’s fees were proper in PAPV shows

that the Third Circuit’s rule is not so different from

the other circuits. All circuits distinguish between

injunctions that merely maintain the status quo and

those merits-based injunctions that alter the legal

relationship between the parties. Id. at 233. Even the

Third Circuit’s firm assertion that a preliminary

injunction must be a merits determination is hardly

different from, say, the Fourth Circuit in this case.

Compare Singer, 650 F.3d at 229–30 (requiring a

“merits-based determination at the injunction stage”);

with Stinnie, 77 F.4th at 216 (requiring a preliminary

injunction to have provided “concrete, irreversible

relief on the merits of her claim by materially altering

the parties’ legal relationship”).

No dispute among the circuits exists

over what is an “enduring” change in

the parties’ legal relationship.

Just as there is no real dispute over what “some

relief on the merits” may mean, so too the circuits

generally agree on what is an “enduring” change in

the parties’ legal relationship. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S.

74, 86 (2007) (requiring a prevailing party to secure

an “enduring change [in] the legal relationship

between herself and the [defendant]”).

To begin, this Court has already given the circuits

guidance that “[p]revailing party status . . . does not

attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that

is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the

final decision in the same case.” Sole, 551 U.S. at 83;

id. at 78 (“A plaintiff who achieves a transient victory

at the threshold of an action can gain no award under

that fee-shifting provision if, at the end of the

litigation, her initial success is undone and she leaves

the courthouse emptyhanded.”). It is clear that the

mooting of a case “does not represent the kind of

active, merits-based undoing the Supreme Court

referred to in Sole.” Planned Parenthood, 931 F.3d at

540.

The supposed split posited by the Commissioner is

just different cases with different facts.

The

Commissioner seems to differentiate between cases

that are mooted by the passage of time, see Dupuy, 423

F.3d 714, and cases that are mooted by the affirmative

act of a legislative body, Stinnie, 77 F.4th 200.

There is no meaningful difference between the two.

The Seventh Circuit sees no daylight between its

approach and the other circuits. Dupuy, 423 F.3d at

723 n.4 (“[S]everal of our sister circuits have held that

attorneys’ fees may be awarded after a party has

obtained a preliminary injunction and the case

subsequently has become moot. . . . we follow the

approach of the other circuits”).

The Commissioner also relies on Advantage Media

from the Eighth Circuit as support for this supposed

distinction. Pet. 20. But in Advantage Media, the

plaintiff first won a preliminary injunction and then

later lost the trial on the merits. Advantage Media,

L.L.C. v. City of Hopkins, Minn., 511 F.3d 833, 835

(8th Cir. 2008); id. at 838 (referring to the “adverse

jury verdict” plaintiff suffered). The Commissioner

omits that key fact. No party here contends, and no

circuit would find, that a party who loses the trial is

the prevailing party.

Nor does the Commissioner’s citation to Northern

Cheyenne Tribe support a different result. Pet. 20. In

that case, “the [trial] court granted only interim relief

that preserved the status quo until it could resolve the

merits of the Tribes’ claims.” N. Cheyenne Tribe v.

Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2006). No

circuit permits a mere status quo injunction to confer

prevailing party status. Northern Cheyenne Tribe is

far afield from the “material alteration” requirement

imposed by this Court’s precedent. See Tex. State

Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792–93.

Finally, the Commissioner contends the Fifth

Circuit takes a different tack from the rest of the

circuits in requiring the mooting event to be “actually

motivated by the preliminary injunction.” Pet. 23

(citing Dearmore, 519 F.3d at 526).

But that

argument fails.

As an initial matter, it stands to reason that often

the court’s granting of a preliminary injunction will be

the impetus for the law change. For instance, in this

case, Virginia Senator William Stanley stated that

“with the preliminary injunction being granted . . . I

hope the House of Delegates will join the Senate in

fixing this problem.”);4 JA968–1000 (letter from the

Commissioner advising how to repeal § 46.2-395

effectively). Thus, based on the case presented here it

is near impossible to assess if the Fifth Circuit’s

possibly different requirement actually leads to

4 See supra, n.1.

different outcomes in different circuits with any

frequency.

Possibly for that reason, the Fifth Circuit itself

sees no difference between itself and the other

circuits. Dearmore, 519 F.3d at 526 (“As a result, this

test does not signal any disagreement with the

approaches adopted by the other circuits, with the

exception of the Fourth Circuit.” [now corrected]).

The alleged circuit splits are irrelevant

because the Commissioner asks this

Court to overturn all the circuits.

The Commissioner’s arguments on the purported

circuit splits are a red herring. The Commissioner is

actually asking this Court to overturn every circuit’s

precedent and adopt a rule at odds with the

established practice across the nation. He wants a

rule where a preliminary injunction is categorically

insufficient to confer prevailing party status on a

litigant. See Pet. 26–32; id. at 29 (arguing that a

“definitive ruling on the merits” of the sort that would

be impossible for a preliminary injunction stage is

required).

The Commissioner does not and cannot point to

any circuit that he contends has the right rule. In his

view, they are all wrong.

Every circuit has created, through varying words,

similar standards that aim to identify plaintiffs who

truly “prevailed” in a meaningful way through a

preliminary injunction. And all seek likewise to

identify plaintiffs whose preliminary injunction does

not qualify as “prevailing” in a meaningful sense, and

exclude them from fees. It is easy to point to

variations in the language and analyses by the

different circuits, but they are agreeing on the core

point: a plaintiff who challenges a law as

unconstitutional, wins a preliminary injunction

stopping the law’s effect on them in an opinion that

evaluates the merits of the constitutional issue, and

then cows the government into capitulating by

changing the law before a true final judgment can be

made, has “prevailed.” This is true in the ordinary

sense of the words “prevailing party,” and it is true in

every circuit.

That includes people vindicating

religious and assembly rights in the Sixth Circuit,

freedom of speech in the Tenth Circuit, and in this

case, procedural due process rights.

The

Commissioner’s position would sweep away § 1988

fees in all of those cases.

II.

This case is a poor vehicle.

This case is also a poor vehicle for two different

reasons. First, this case would be resolved the same

way in every circuit. So even if the Third or Fifth

Circuits had outlying rules, this case would present

an odd and improper way to address them. Second,

this case is not over. The amount of fees to be awarded

remains entirely unknown—in fact, Respondents

have not yet even been able to ask for, or brief, their

full fee request.

Respondents would prevail in any

circuit.

Respondents meet the tests for prevailing party

status as set forth by every circuit that has addressed

the issue.

Respondents won a preliminary injunction. See

Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 532–33. That preliminary

injunction was on the merits. Stinnie, 77 F.4th at 204

(“In a comprehensive opinion, the court made detailed

findings of fact and conducted a robust assessment of

the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim before

concluding that it was likely to succeed on the

merits.”). Respondents’ win materially altered the

legal relationship between the parties. Id. at 211.

Before the preliminary injunction, Respondents

were harmed by the unconstitutional application of

§ 46.2-395. After the preliminary injunction, they

could not be.

The relief Respondents obtained

“material[ly] alter[ed] the legal relationship of the

parties[.]” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792–

93; see also Stinnie, 77 F.4th at 211. The preliminary

injunction restrained enforcement of the challenged

law against Respondents until the case was mooted by

legislative repeal.

Indeed, the Commissioner

managed to stave off trial long enough to persuade the

General Assembly to repeal the law, and to advise

them on how. Respondents’ relief thus was never

“reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final

decision in the same case.” Sole, 551 U.S. at 83.

Respondents are prevailing parties and would be in

every circuit.

First, even if the Third Circuit were using a

distinct rule, Respondents would prevail there, too. In

that circuit, even if some sort of “actual” decision on

the merits at a preliminary injunction—whatever that

may mean—were required, Respondents meet it.

According to the Third Circuit, the preliminary

injunction in PAPV was sufficient to confer prevailing

party status on the plaintiffs because the district court

found that the ordinance at issue was “facially

unconstitutional.” Singer, 650 F.3d at 229–30.

The district court made a nearly identical finding

here. In granting the preliminary injunction, the

district court noted that “the private interest at stake

plainly merits some pre-deprivation process” and

“§ 46.2-395, on its face, does not provide a meaningful

opportunity to be heard regarding license

suspension.”

Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 531

(emphases added). This is the same sort of meritsbased finding that the Third Circuit deemed sufficient

in Singer and PAPV.

Second, to the extent the Fifth Circuit differs,

Respondents would prevail there, too. If Respondents

needed to show a direct connection between the repeal

of the law and this lawsuit, they could do so.

Respondents’ win on the preliminary injunction led to

the General Assembly quickly passing a Budget

Amendment to provide relief to everyone subject to

§ 46.2-395, the Governor calling for repeal of the

statute, the Commissioner advising the General

Assembly on how to do it, and a leading legislator

expressing hope that the injunction would persuade

his colleagues to go ahead and “fix[] this problem.”5

The General Assembly then did fix the problem, in

part based on the Commissioner’s letter stating that

he would like to avoid paying to further defend the

law. Thus, as in many other cases, here there is a

clear connection between the injunction and the

government act that mooted the case.

5 See supra, n.1.

This case is not final.

Finally, this case is a poor vehicle because a key

issue remains: how much the district court will award

in fees. There is no indication how much the district

court will award Respondents as the prevailing

parties. Stinnie, 77 F.4th at 218 (remanding to the

district court for further proceedings, i.e., the

reasonableness inquiry). This case is not over.

As the Commissioner and his amici point out, the

amount of fees awarded can vary widely. Amicus Br.

6–9 (noting $800,000 in fees in a voter registration

case, $103,000 in fees in a First Amendment case, and

$17,000 in fees in an education rights case). The

Commissioner expresses concern that the amount of

fees in this case could be higher than those, Pet. 24,

but he certainly plans to argue that they should be far

lower. And while he vaguely complains about the

amount of fees being requested for appellate work

specifically, after all, this case has involved three

separate rounds of briefing and argument in the

Fourth Circuit. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 734 F. App’x 858

(4th Cir. 2018); 37 F.4th 977 (4th Cir. 2022); 77 F.4th

200 (4th Cir. 2023). Nor does the Commissioner say

what he paid to defend the case using the secondlargest law firm in the state, fighting this case now for

over five years.

The point is, significant discretion by the district

court—and just how financially aggrieved the

Commissioner really is—remains open. During that

phase of the case, settlement negotiations are common

and often succeed. Otherwise, once the district court

rules, that decision still will be subject to abuse of

discretion review in the Court of Appeals. Mercer v.

Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A

district court’s decision to grant or deny attorney’s fee

under section 1988 is reviewed for abuse of

discretion.”).

III.

The Fourth Circuit was right.

The Fourth Circuit implemented this

Court’s precedent.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision is grounded in

precedent from this Court. The “Supreme Court’s

‘generous formulation’ for prevailing party status,

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, is satisfied

when a plaintiff obtains a preliminary injunction that

(a) provides her with concrete, irreversible relief on

the merits of her claim by materially altering the

parties’ legal relationship, and (b) becomes moot

before final judgment such that the injunction cannot

be ‘reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone’ by a later

decision.” Stinnie, 77 F.4th at 216.

This holding aligns with this Court’s precedent.

See CRST, 578 U.S. at 422 (“The Court has explained

that, when a plaintiff secures an ‘enforceable

judgmen[t] on the merits’ or a ‘court-ordered consent

decre[e],’ that plaintiff is the prevailing party because

he has received a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the

legal relationship of the parties.’”); Lefemine, 568 U.S.

at 4–5; Sole, 551 U.S. at 74.

All the necessary elements are present here. See

Stinnie, 77 F.4th at 216 (“Because the plaintiffs here

satisfy these baseline criteria, they cross the

‘statutory threshold,’ id., to qualify as prevailing

parties whom ‘the court, in its discretion, may allow .

. . a reasonable attorney’s fee,’ 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).”).

The preliminary injunction hearing was meritsbased, as shown by the district court’s own extensive

decision—one reached after a full evidentiary hearing

involving exhibits and live testimony from six

witnesses (some of whom were experts). See District

Court ECF No. 113 (188-page transcript from

preliminary injunction hearing); JA820–42 (district

court memorandum opinion).

The preliminary

injunction changed the legal relationship between the

parties, as it immediately shielded Respondents from

the unconstitutional application of Virginia Code

§ 46.2-395. The relief was concrete. And the relief

was enduring. After the preliminary injunction, the

Commissioner did everything in his power to stop

Respondents from having a trial and lobbied the

General Assembly for reform.

Because Respondents’ claim fits within this

Court’s precedent, the Commissioner seeks to recast

Respondents’ position as relying on the Buckhannonforbidden “catalyst theory.”

See Pet. 34.

The

“‘catalyst theory’ . . . posits that a plaintiff is a

‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result

because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change

in the defendant’s conduct.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care,

Inc. v. W.V. Dep’t of Health & Home Res., 532 U.S. 598,

601 (2001) (emphasis added). In Buckhannon, a

plaintiff sued and then the government promptly

changed its behavior and amended the at-issue laws.

See id. at 600–01.

The plaintiff never won a

preliminary injunction or any other judicial relief.

Because this case did involve judicial action and a

court ruling changing the legal relationship between

the parties, this is not a “catalyst theory” case.

The Commissioner’s proposed brightline rule would prompt bad behavior

by the government.

The Commissioner’s proposed rule would create all

the wrong incentives for government actors. A rule

that no preliminary injunction ever can make a

prevailing party “allows defendants to game the

system.”

Stinnie, 37 F.4th at 985 (Harris, J.,

concurring).

Under the Commissioner’s view, a government can

always do this: (1) pass an unconstitutional law,

depriving its citizens of their rights—whether that be

procedural due process, religious rights, Second

Amendment rights, whatever—; (2) vigorously defend

the offending law in expensive litigation through

losing a preliminary injunction that enjoins its

operation; (3) delay the merits trial while considering

changing the law; (4) change the law; and (5) then

categorically escape any attorney’s fees under § 1988.

The Commissioner’s position is that a plaintiff

does not “prevail” in a litigation war if the government

loses the first major battle and then surrenders. That

is just as silly as it sounds, and no circuit follows that

view of § 1988.

The Commissioner portrays the current legal

landscape

“unpredictable”

and

laments

“substantial financial burdens” from civil rights cases.

Pet. 23–25. But the Commissioner basically just

disagrees with the existence of § 1988.

After all, how much a district judge is going to

award in fees will always be unpredictable, yet subject

to appellate oversight. Further, Congress decided

that the financial burdens of § 1988 were worth it to

encourage people to stand up for their rights.

Section 1988 has been used effectively against all

types of unconstitutional government action. For

instance, just last year the Sixth Circuit affirmed a

$272,000 fee award for plaintiffs who had won a

preliminary injunction allowing them to go to church.

In 2020, Kentucky threatened to prosecute people who

attended church on Easter Sunday. The district court

entered a preliminary injunction, and shortly

thereafter the legislature effectively revoked the ban

on church gatherings.

With their preliminary

injunction, the plaintiffs had the right to attend

church, and then the legislature solved the problem.

The Sixth Circuit had little trouble affirming the

attorney’s fees. Roberts, 65 F.4th at 283 (Sutton, C.J.).

Section 1988 fees have also been won in the context

of preliminary injunctions made under the Second

Amendment against gun restrictions. E.g., Veasey v.

Wilkins, 158 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468 (E.D.N.C. 2016)

(awarding attorney’s fees under § 1988 based on a

preliminary injunction against a citizenship

requirement for a concealed carry permit, later

mooted by the legislature changing the law).

The Commissioner’s position that no preliminary

injunction later mooted by a legislative change ever

qualifies anyone as a “prevailing party” is an assault

on every circuit’s view of § 1988 and the normal

meaning of the word “prevail.”

If state governments are worried about large fee

awards under scenarios like this one, they have many

strategies to mitigate such awards. Most obviously,

they could voluntarily change unconstitutional laws

before a court rules against them.

Under

Buckhannon, there would be no attorney’s fees in that

situation. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598. They could also

negotiate with plaintiffs over potential fees in a

voluntary settlement (which of course could still

happen here).

Alternatively, a cost-conscious government could

cooperate with plaintiffs to efficiently litigate the

merits of the case, instead of engaging in scorchedearth litigation practice. When the government is

confident in its position, it can proceed to trial and

simply win. (The Commissioner here asked the

General Assembly to surrender but claims now that

he would have won had he been allowed to carry on

the fight that he petitioned to avoid).

Part of what makes the rule applied by every

circuit practical is that it is flexible. Judges make

decisions on a case-by-case basis about to what degree

a preliminary injunction victory is on the merits, and

also about what amount of fees are reasonable given

all the circumstances.

IV.

The question presented is often and

recently denied.

This Court has consistently and recently denied

petitions involving the same precedents and questions

presented. See, e.g., Hargett v. Tennessee Conf. of the

NAACP, 143 S. Ct. 2609 (2023) (No. 22-773); Yost v.

Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region, 141 S. Ct. 189

(2020) (No. 19-677); Davis v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 534

(2015) (No. 15-46); King v. Kan. Jud. Watch, 565 U.S.

1246 (2012) (No. 11-829); Live Gold Operations, Inc. v.

Dow, 565 U.S. 977 (2011) (No. 11-211); Conway v.

McQueary, 562 U.S. 1137 (2011) (No. 10-569).

Those appeals were denied when the Fourth

Circuit was an outlier, and now it is not. There is even

less reason for this Court to consider the question

now.

CONCLUSION

This Court should deny the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Matthew A. Fitzgerald

Counsel of Record

John J. Woolard

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

800 East Canal Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 775-4716

mfitzgerald

@mcguirewoods.com

Jonathan T. Blank

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

323 Second Street SE

Suite 700

Charlottesville, VA 22902

(434) 977-2509

Angela A. Ciolfi

LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER

1000 Preston Avenue

Suite A

Charlottesville, VA 22903

(434) 529-1810

Patrick Levy-Lavelle

LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER

626 East Broad Street

Suite 200

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 643-1086

Counsel for Respondents

Damian Stinnie, Melissa

Adams, Adrainne

Johnson, Williest Bandy,

and Brianna Morgan

FEBRUARY 28, 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.