Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cody Enrriquez, Petitioner v. Florida

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CODY ENRRIQUEZ, PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

Paul Edward Petillo

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355-7600

ppetillo@pd15.state.fl.us

appeals@pd15.org

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CODY ENRRIQUEZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-694

[May 10, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.

Lucie County; William L. Roby, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562020CF001501A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Elijah Giuliano, Assistant

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine

Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Cody Enrriquez (“the defendant”) appeals his convictions for sexual

battery and lewd or lascivious molestation and the related sentences,

raising numerous issues on appeal. With respect to his argument that he

was entitled to a twelve-person jury, we affirm. See Guzman v. State, 350

So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev. pending, No. SC22-1597. We

reverse and remand for the trial court to correct his sentences with respect

to certain costs and fees that were imposed, as discussed below.

Otherwise, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences without

further discussion, finding his arguments lack merit or were not preserved.

We accept the state’s concession of error as to three sentencing matters.

The trial court erred in imposing $200 for costs of prosecution where the

prosecution costs were not shown to exceed $100, the state did not request

additional prosecution costs, and the imposition of $200 in the written

sentence conflicted with the trial court’s oral pronouncement of $100 in

prosecution costs. See Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007)

(“When the written document results in a sentence that is more severe

than the sentence announced in court, this Court has considered it a

potential violation of the constitutional protection against double

jeopardy.”); Bartolone v. State, 327 So. 3d 331, 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)

(“[R]eversal of a cost of prosecution above the statutory minimum is

warranted where . . . the State never provided notice of intent to seek a

higher amount, and no separate hearing was convened to provide the State

with an opportunity to submit sufficient proof of higher costs.”); Bevans v.

State, 291 So. 3d 591, 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (holding trial court erred

in imposing prosecution costs greater than $100 where there was no

showing of sufficient proof of higher costs incurred).

The trial court also erred in imposing costs of investigation. See

Jackson v. State, 137 So. 3d 470, 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (recognizing

that trial court cannot impose investigation costs without evidence of the

amount of the costs); Gilchrist v. State, 938 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA

2006) (holding trial court erred in sua sponte imposing investigation costs

without notice and proof of the costs incurred).

Finally, the trial court erred in imposing the domestic violence

surcharge on count II, as section 938.08, Florida Statutes (2020), does not

encompass convictions under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (2020). On

remand, the trial court shall reduce the costs of prosecution to $100 and

strike the domestic violence surcharge on count II and the costs of

investigation. 1

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., WARNER and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

*

*

*

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

The state does not seek to present further evidence on remand for costs of

prosecution and investigation and instead agrees that on remand, the costs of

prosecution should be reduced to $100, and the investigative costs should be

stricken.

1

2

Supreme Court of Florida

RECEIVED 08/04/2023 2:35 pm

Fourth District Court Of Appeal

FRIDAY, AUGUST 4, 2023

Cody Enrriquez,

Petitioner(s)

v.

SC2023-0765

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

4D22-0694;

562020CF001501A

State of Florida,

Respondent(s)

Upon review of the response to this Court’s order to show

cause dated June 13, 2023, the Court has determined that it

should decline to accept jurisdiction in this case. See Guzman v.

State, No. SC2022-1597 (Fla. order issued June 6, 2023). The

petition for discretionary review is, therefore, denied.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court. See

Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d)(2).

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ.,

concur.

A True Copy

Test:

SC2023-0765 8/4/2023

SC2023-0765 8/4/2023

CASE NO.: SC2023-0765

Page Two

LC

Served:

4DCA CLERK

ST. LUCIE CLERK

CHRISTINE C. GERAGHTY

JEANINE M. GERMANOWICZ

HON. WILLIAM LOY ROBY

departed below it, given an appropriate motion. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at

103. No distinction can be drawn between Alleyne and Bean: Alleyne

establishes that, whether or not a trial court has some discretion to

depart below a minimum penalty, any fact increasing that minimum

penalty must, constitutionally, be found by a jury. Accordingly, as

the victim injury points increased Enrriquez’s LPS, they had to be

found by a jury, and Enrriquez is entitled to a de novo resentencing

with a corrected scoresheet, including only 40 contact points.

Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103.

IV.

ENRRIQUEZ WAS ENTITLED TO A 12-PERSON

JURY UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS AND DID NOT WAIVE THAT RIGHT

Enrriquez, charged with felony offenses, was convicted by a jury

of only six people. T409. He argues that the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments guarantee the right to a twelve-person jury when the

defendant is charged with a felony. The standard of review of

constitutional claims is de novo. See A.B. v. Florida Dept. of Children

& Family Services, 901 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

Although the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Florida, 399

U.S. 78, 86 (1970) that juries as small as six were constitutionally

permissible, Williams is impossible to square with the Supreme

39

Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), which

concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s “trial by an impartial jury”

requirement encompasses what the term “meant at the Sixth

Amendment’s adoption,” id. at 1395.

Prior to 1970, subjecting Enrriquez to a trial with only six jurors

would have indisputably violated his Sixth Amendment rights. As

Ramos observed, Blackstone recognized that under the common law,

“no person could be found guilty of a serious crime unless ‘the truth

of every accusation … should … be confirmed by the unanimous

suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors[.]” 140 S. Ct. at 1395.

“A ‘verdict, taken from eleven, was no verdict’ at all.” Id.

After the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a bevy of state

courts—ranging from Alabama to Missouri to New Hampshire—

interpreted it to require a twelve-person jury. See Miller, Comment,

Six of One Is Not A Dozen of the Other, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621, 643

n.133 (1998) (collecting cases from the late 1700s to the 1860s). In

1898, the U.S. Supreme Court added its voice to the chorus, noting

that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to be tried by

a twelve-person jury. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-350

(1898). As the Thompson Court explained, since the time of Magna

40

Carta, the word “jury” had been understood to mean a body of twelve

people. Id. Given that understanding had been accepted since 1215,

the Court reasoned, “[i]t must” have been “that the word ‘jury’” in the

Sixth Amendment was “placed in the constitution of the United

States with reference to [that] meaning affixed to [it].” Id. at 350.

The Supreme Court continued to cite the basic principle that

the Sixth Amendment requires a twelve-person jury in criminal cases

for seventy more years. For example, in 1900, the Court explained

that “there [could] be no doubt” “[t]hat a jury composed, as at

common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment

to the Federal Constitution.” Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586

(1900). Thirty years later, the Court reiterated that it was “not open

to question” that “the phrase ‘trial by jury’” in the Constitution

incorporated juries’ “essential elements” as “they were recognized in

this country and England,” including the requirement that they

“consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.” Patton v. United States,

281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). And as recently as 1968, the Court

remarked that “by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in

criminal cases had been in existence for several centuries and carried

impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta,” such as the

41

necessary inclusion of twelve members. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 145, 151-152 (1968).4

In 1970, however, the Williams Court overruled this line of

precedent in a decision that Justice Harlan described as “stripping

off the livery of history from the jury trial” and ignoring both “the

intent of the Framers” and the Court’s long held understanding that

constitutional “provisions are framed in the language of the English

common law [] and … read in the light of its history.” Baldwin v. New

York, 399 U.S. 117, 122-123 (1970) (citation omitted) (Harlan, J.,

concurring in the result in Williams). Indeed, Williams recognized that

the Framers “may well” have had “the usual expectation” in drafting

the Sixth Amendment “that the jury would consist of 12” members.

Williams, 399 U.S. at 98-99. But Williams concluded that such

“purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. Id. at 99.

Rather, the Court focused on the “function” that the jury plays in the

4 See also, e.g., Capital Traction Co v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899)

(“‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term at the

common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial

by a jury of 12 men” but also contains other requirements);

Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905) (“The

constitutional requirement that ‘the trial of all crimes, except in cases

of impeachment, shall be by jury,’ means, as this court has adjudged,

a trial by the historical, common-law jury of twelve persons”).

42

Constitution, concluding that the “essential feature” of a jury is it

leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”

and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community

participation and [with] shared responsibility.” Id. at 100-01.

According to the Williams Court, both “currently available evidence

[and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily be

performed with six jurors as with twelve. Id. at 101-102 & n.48; cf.

Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging that

Williams and its progeny “departed from the strictly historical

requirements of jury trial”).

Williams’s ruling that the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated to

the States by the Fourteenth) permits a six-person jury cannot stand

in light of Ramos. There, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of

a serious offense. In reaching that conclusion, the Ramos Court

overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a decision that

it faulted for “subject[ing] the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury

verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” 140 S. Ct. at 1401-1402.

That reasoning undermines Williams as well. Ramos rejected

the same kind of “cost-benefit analysis” the Court undertook in

43

Williams, observing that it is not the Court’s role to “distinguish

between the historic features of common law jury trials that (we

think) serve ‘important enough functions to migrate silently into the

Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.’” 140 S. Ct. at 1400-01.

Ultimately, the Ramos Court explained, the question is whether “at

the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by jury

included” the particular feature at issue. Id. at 1402. As the history

summarized above establishes, there can be no doubt that the

common understanding during the Revolutionary War era was that

twelve jurors were required—“a verdict, taken from eleven, was no

verdict at all.” See 140 S. Ct. at 1395 (quotation marks omitted).

Even setting aside Williams’s now-disfavored functionalist logic,

its ruling suffered from another significant flaw: it was based on

research that was out of date shortly after the opinion issued.

Specifically, the Williams Court “f[ou]nd little reason to think” that

the goals of the jury guarantee—including, among others, “to provide

a fair possibility for obtaining a representative[] cross-section of the

community”—“are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved

when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12.” Id. at 100.

The Court theorized that “in practice the difference between the 1244

man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the

community represented seems likely to be negligible.” Id. at 102.

In the time since Williams, that determination has proven

incorrect. Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much just eight years

later in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when it concluded

that the Sixth Amendment barred the use of a five-person jury.

Although Ballew did not overturn Williams, the Ballew Court

observed that empirical studies conducted in the handful of

intervening years highlighted several problems with Williams’

assumptions. For example, Ballew noted that more recent research

showed that (1) “smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group

deliberation,” id. at 233, (2) smaller juries may be less accurate and

cause “increasing inconsistency” in verdict results, id. at 234, (3) the

chance

for

hung

juries

decreases

with

smaller

juries,

disproportionally harming the defendant, id. at 236; and (4)

decreasing jury sizes “foretell[] problems … for the representation of

minority groups in the community,” undermining a jury’s likelihood

of being “truly representative of the community,” id. at 236-37.

Moreover, the Ballew Court “admit[ted]” that it “d[id] not pretend to

discern a clear line between six members and five,” effectively

45

acknowledging that the studies it relied on also cast doubt on the

effectiveness of the six-member jury. Id. at 239; see also id. at 24546 (Powell, J.) (agreeing that five-member juries are unconstitutional,

while acknowledging that “the line between five and six-member

juries is difficult to justify”).

Post-Ballew

research

has

further

undermined

Williams.

Current empirical evidence indicates that “reducing jury size

inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority group

members on the jury.” Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the

Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. of Empirical Legal

Stud. 425, 427 (Sept. 2009); see also Higginbotham et al., Better by

the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury, 104

Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020) (“Larger juries are also more

inclusive and more representative of the community. … In reality,

cutting the size of the jury dramatically increases the chance of

excluding minorities.”). Because “the 12-member jury produces

significantly greater heterogeneity than does the six-member jury,”

Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury, supra, at 449, it

increases

“the

opportunity

for

meaningful

and

appropriate

representation” and helps ensure that juries “represent adequately a

46

cross-section of the community.” Ballew, 435 U.S. at 237.

Other important considerations also weigh in favor of the

twelve-member jury. For instance, studies indicate that twelvemember juries deliberate longer, recall evidence better, and rely less

on irrelevant factors during deliberation. See Smith & Saks, The Case

for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury, 60 Fla. L.

Rev. 441, 465 (2008). Minority views are also more likely to be

thoroughly expressed in a larger jury, as “having a large minority

helps

make

the

minority

subgroup

more

influential,”

and,

unsurprisingly, “the chance of minority members having allies is

greater on a twelve-person jury.” Id. at 466. Finally, larger juries

deliver more predictable results. In the civil context, for example,

“[s]ix-person juries are four times more likely to return extremely

high or low damage awards compared to the average.” Higginbotham

et al., Better by the Dozen, supra, at 52.

Enrriquez recognizes that the state constitution provides:

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of

trial by jury shall be secure to all and

remain inviolate. The qualifications and

the number of jurors, not fewer than six,

shall be fixed by law.

Art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. And he recognizes that section 913.10, Florida

47

Statutes, provides for six jurors except in capital cases. See also Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.270.

But Florida’s provision for a jury of six stems from the dawn of

the Jim Crow era, one month after federal troops were withdrawn

from the state. The historical background is as follows:

In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was amended

to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of causes in any

court may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell,

34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903).

The common law rule of a jury of twelve was still kept in Florida

while federal troops remained in the state. There was no provision for

a jury of less than twelve until the Legislature enacted a provision

specifying a jury of six in Chapter 3010, section 6. See Gibson v.

State, 16 Fla. 291, 297–98 (1877) (quoting and discussing Chapter

3010, section 6, Laws of Florida (1877)); Florida Fertilizer, 21 34 So.

15 241 (noting that previously all juries had twelve members).

The Legislature enacted chapter 3010 with the jury-of-six

provision on February 17, 1877. Gibson, 16 Fla. 294. This was less

than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn from

Florida in January 1877. See Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and

48

Renewal, 1865-1877, in The History of Florida 273 (Michael Gannon,

ed., first paperback edition 2018) (“there were [no federal troops” in

Florida after 23 January 1877”).

The jury-of-six thus first saw light at the birth of the Jim Crow

era as former Confederates regained power in southern states and

state prosecutors made a concerted effort to prevent blacks from

serving on jurors. On its face the 1868 constitution extended the

franchise to black men. But the historical context shows that that it

was part of the overall resistance to Reconstruction efforts to protect

the rights of black citizens. The constitution was the product of a

remarkable series of events including a coup in which leaders of the

white southern (or native) faction took possession of the assembly

hall in the middle of the night, excluding Radical Republican

delegates from the proceedings. See Richard L. Hume, Membership of

the Florida Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of

Republican Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q.

1, 5-6 (1972); Shofner at 266. A reconciliation was effected as the

“outside” whites “united with the majority of the body’s native whites

to frame a constitution designed to continue white dominance.”

Hume at 15.

49

The racist purpose of the resulting constitution was spelled out

by Harrison Reed, a leader of the prevailing faction and the first

governor elected under the 1868 constitution, who wrote to Senator

Yulee that the new constitution was constructed to bar blacks from

legislative office: “Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State

officers will be appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro

legislature.” Hume, 15-16. See also Shofner 266.

In

Ramos,

Justice

Gorsuch

noted

that

the

Louisiana

nonunanimity rule arose from Jim Crow era efforts to enforce white

supremacy. Id. at 1394; see also id. at 1417 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (non-unanimity was enacted “as one pillar of a

comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures

against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service.”).

The history of Florida’s jury of six arises from the same historical

context.

In view of the foregoing, a jury of six at a criminal trial for a

crime punishable by up to life imprisonment is unconstitutional

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution. Finally, Enrriquez did not waive his Sixth Amendment

right to a twelve-person jury. A defendant may waive his right to a

50

constitutional jury, but the “express and intelligent consent of the

defendant” is required. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. See also Johnson v.

State, 994 So. 2d 960, 964 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he State contends that

Johnson waived appellate review of this claim when he failed to

request a jury trial or object to the bench trial during the second

phase of the felony DUI proceeding. We disagree. . . . Johnson’s

general silence . . . did not constitute a valid waiver.”). This Court

should reverse the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial

with a twelve-person jury, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States constitution.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT REVERSIBLY ERRED BY

ALLOWING DETECTIVE FRAGA TO TESTIFY,

OVER OBJECTION, THAT SHE DOUBTED

ENRRIQUEZ’S VERSION OF THE EVENTS

“Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion

of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.” § 90.403, Fla. Stat. Thus, “a witness's opinion as to the

guilt or innocence of the accused is not admissible ... on the grounds

that its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair

prejudice to the defendant.” Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074, 1079

51

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ vs. STATE OF FLORIDA

LT. CASE NO: 2020CF001501 A

HT. CASE NO: 22-0694

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE NINETEENTH nJDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR ST LUCIE COUNTY, FLORIDA

Modified

Resentence

Amended

Corrected

Mitigated

Community Control Violator

Probation Violator

Case Number:

562020CF001501AXXXXX

STATE OF FLORIDA

- VS -

Sexual Predator

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ

Sex Offender

Defendant

Minor Victim

Sentenced in Absentia

The Defendant, CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ being personally before this Court represented

by AttorneyJOHN BERNARD CLEARY JR., the Attorney of record, and the State represented by

ROBERT E STONE JR, and having:

x been tried and found guilty by Jury of the (oflowinq crime<s},

entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s).

entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crime(s)

Admitted Violation of Probation

Found Guilty of Violation of Probation

Admitted a Violation of Community Control

Found Guilty of Violation of Community Control

Count

Offense Statute

Number{s)

Crime

Level/

OBTS

Degree

Number

1

SEXUAL BATTERY OF A VICTIM 12 YEARS OF AGE

OR OLDER BUT LESS THAN 18 YEARS OF AGE BY A

PERPETRATOR 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER

794.011{5A)

F-1

5601258871

2

LEWD OR LASCIVIOUS MOLESTATION-OFFENDER

OVER 18, VICTIM 12 TO 16

800.04{5C2)

F-2

5601258871

x

and no cause being shown why the defendant should not be adjudjcated guilty. JI 1s ORDERED THAT

the defendant is hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the above crime(s), ; AS TO COUNT(s) 1. 2

and being a qualified offender pursuant to Florida Statute 943.325 - defendant shall be required to submit DNA

samples as required by law

and good cause being shown; IT IS ORDERED THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITHHELD.

kb/de

DOC

Page 1 of 1

LC&

St. Lucie County File Date: 03/07/2022 09:04 AM

166

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ vs. STATE OF FLORIDA

LT. CASE NO: 2020CF001501 A

HT. CASE NO: 22-0694

2020CF001501 A

CASE NUMBER

The Defendant in open Court was advised of the right to appeal from this Sentence by filing notice of appeal

within 30 days from this date with the Clerk of this Court and the Defendant's right to the a istance of counsel in

taking the appeal at the expense of the State on showing of indigency.

l..)

------------;~-----Circuit Judge WILLIAM L ROBY

1. Right Thumb

2. Right Index

3. Right Middle

4. Right Ring

5. Right Little

6. Left Thumb

7. Left Index

8. Left Middle

9. Left Ring

10. Left Little

I HEARBY CERTIFY that the above and forgoing fingerprints are the fingerprints of the Defendant _ _ _ __

_C_O_D_Y_S_H_A_N_E_E_N_R_R_I_O_U_E_Z_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and that they were placed thereon by said Defendant in my

presence in open Court this date.

DONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at St. Lucie County, Florida, on

Nunc Pro Tune To:

St. Lucie County File Date: 03/07/2022 09:04 AM

167

Monday, February 21 , 2022

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ vs. STATE OF FLORIDA

LT. CASE NO: 2020CF001501 A

HT. CASE NO: 22-0694

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Resentenced

Modified

Amended

Mitigated

Corrected

Defendant

Case Number

562020CF001501AXXXXX

OBTS Number

5601258871

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ

(As to Count I )

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the Defendant's Attorney ofrecord JOHN

BERNARD CLEARY JR. and having been adjudicated guilty, and the Court having given the Defendant an

opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the Defense should

not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown

_ and the Court having on _ _ deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

_

and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on _ _ now resentence the Defendant.

_

and the Court having placed the Defendant on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and having subsequently

revoked the Defendant's _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

It Is The Sentence Of Court that:

_ The defendant pay a fine of ___ pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus ___ as the 5% surcharge

required on 938.04, Florida Statutes.

X The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

_ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of St. Lucie County Florida.

_ The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable.):

For a term of Natural Life.

_ For a term of Natural Life with a 25 year mandatory minimum

_.X_For a term of 15.00 YEAR(S)

~ The SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of~=- subject to conditions set forth in this Order.

If 'split' sentence complete the

appropriate Paragraph.

_

Followed by a period of _ _ on Community Control under the supervision of

the Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as

set forth in a separate order.

_

Followed by a period of _ _ probation under the supervision of the

Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set

forth in a separate order.

_

However, after serving a period of imprisonment in PRISON, the balance of the

sentence will be suspended and the Defendant will be on Probation/Community

Control under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms

and conditions of Probation/Community Control as set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional, split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied

before the Defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

Page 1 of 5

St. Lucie County File Date: 03/07/2022 09:04 AM

168

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ vs. STATE OF FLORIDA

LT. CASE NO: 2020CF001501 A

HT. CASE NO: 22-0694

562020CF00 150 IAXXXXX

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count I)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed

Mandatory/ Minimum Provisions:

Firearm

It is further ordered that the ____ minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Drug Trafficking

It is further ordered that the ____ minimum imprisonment provisions of section 893. 135, Florida Statutes,

is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court, and that the Defendant pay a fine of$__, pursuant

to section 893.135, Florida Statutes, plus$_ as a 5% surcharge.

Law Enforcement

It is further ordered that the _ _ __ minimum mandatory imprisonment provision of section 784.07,

Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Controlled Substance

Within 1,000 Feet ofSchool -

It is further ordered that the 3 year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893. 13(1)(c), Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence in this count.

Habitual Felony Offender

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings

by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

Habitual Violent Felony

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

extended term in accordance with the provisions of sections 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum

term of ____ year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court are set forth

in a separate order as stated on the record in open court.

Violent Career Criminal

The Defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal and has been sentenced to an extended term in

accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(d), Florida Statutes, A minimum of ____ must be

served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court as set forth in a separate order or stated on

the record in open court. (For crimes committed on or after May 24, 1997.)

Capital Offense

It is further that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with provisions of section

775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (For first degree murder committed prior to May 25, 1994, and for any other

capital felony committed prior to October I , 1995.)

Prison Releasee

Defendant is adjudged a prison releasee reoffender in accordance with the provision of section 775.082(9), FL

Statutes.

Sexual Predator

Defendant is adjudged a sexual predator in accordance with provision of section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

Other Provisions:

Jail Credit

Credit for Time Served

in Resentencing After

Violation ofProbation or

Community Control

X

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a total of 613 DAWS}

as credit for time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence

It is further ordered that the Defendant be· allowed _ _ days time served between date of arrest

as a violator following Release from prison to the date ofresentencing. The Department of Corrections

shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain time

previously awarded on case/count _ _ _ _ (Offenses committed before October I, 1989)

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed _ _ days time served between date or arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Correction shall apply original

jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case'count

(Offenses committed between October I, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948 .06( 6), Florida Statutes.

The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may

be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)), Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed

time served between date of arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original

jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida

Statutes, on case/ count . (Offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994)

Consecutive/ Concurrent

As To Other Counts

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run _ _ with the sentence set forth in count

of this case.

Page 2 of 5

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169

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ vs. STATE OF FLORIDA

LT. CASE NO: 2020CF001501 A

HT. CASE NO: 22-0694

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Re sentenced

Modified

Amended

Mitigated

Corrected

Defendant

Case Number

562020CF001501AXXXXX

OBTS Number

5601258871

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ

(As to Count 2 )

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the Defendant's Attorney ofrecord JOHN

BERNARD CLEARY JR. and having been adjudicated guilty, and the Court having given the Defendant an

opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the Defense should

not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown

_ and the Court having on _ _ deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

_

and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on _ _ now resentence the Defendant.

_

and the Court having placed the Defendant on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and having subsequently

revoked the Defendant's _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

It Is The Sentence Of Court that:

~ The defendant pay a fine o f = pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, p l u s = as the 5% surcharge

required on 938.04, Florida Statutes.

X The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

~ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of St. Lucie County Florida.

_ The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable.):

For a term of Natural Life.

For a term of Natural Life with a 25 year mandatory minimum

X For a term of 15 00 YEAR<S}

~ The SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of

subject to conditions set forth in this Order.

_

If 'split' sentence complete the

appropriate Paragraph.

_

Followed by a period of _ _ on Community Control under the supervision of

the Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as

set forth in a separate order.

_

Followed by a period of _ _ probation under the supervision of the

Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set

forth in a separate order.

_

However, after serving a period of imprisonment in PRISON, the balance of the

sentence will be suspended and the Defendant will be on Probation/Community

Control under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms

and conditions of Probation/Community Control as set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional, split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied

before the Defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

Page 3 of 5

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170

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ vs. STATE OF FLORIDA

LT. CASE NO: 2020CF001501 A

HT. CASE NO: 22-0694

562020CF00 150 I AX:XXXX

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count 2)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed

Mandatory/ Minimum Provisions:

X

Firearm

--

It is further ordered that the _ _ _ minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Drug Trafficking

It is further ordered that the _ _ _ minimum imprisonment provisions of section 893 .135, Florida Statutes, is

hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court, and that the Defendant pay a fine of$__, pursuant to section

893.135, Florida Statutes, plus$_ as a 5% surcharge.

law Enforcement

It is further ordered that the _ _ _ minimum mandatory imprisonment provision of section 784.07, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Controlled Substance

Within 1,000 Feet ofSchool

It is further ordered that the 3 year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(1 )(c}, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence in this count.

Habitual Felony Offender

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings

by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

Habitual Violent Felony

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

extended term in accordance with the provisions of sections 775 .084(4)(b}, Florida Statutes. A minimum

term of _ _ _ year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court are set forth

in a separate order as stated on the record in open court.

Violent Career Criminal

The Defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal and has been sentenced to an extended term in

accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(d), Florida Statutes, A minimum of _ _ _

prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court as set forth in a separate order or stated on

the record in open court. (For crimes committed on or after May 24, 1997 .)

must be served

Capital Offense

It is further that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with provisions of section

775.082( I), Florida Statutes. (For first degree murder committed prior to May 25, 1994, and for any other capital

felony committed prior to October I, 1995.)

Prison Releasee

Defendant is adjudged a prison releasee reoffender in accordance with the provision of section 775.082(9), FL Statutes.

Sexual Predator

Defendant is adjudged a sexual predator in accordance with provision of section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

Other Provisions:

Jail Credit

Credit for 7ime Served

in Resentencing After

Violation ofProbation or

Community Control

$... It

is further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a total of ZERO as credit for time incarcerated before

imposition of this sentence.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed _ _ days time served between date of arrest

as a violator following Release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections

shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain time

previously awarded on case/count _ _ _ _ (Offenses committed before October I, 1989)

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed _ _ days time served between date or arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date ofresentencing. The Department of Correction shall apply original jail time

credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case/count

(Offenses committed between October I, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes.

The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject

_

to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1 }}, Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed _ _ time served between date of arrest as a violator following

release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and

shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to section 921 .0017 , Florida Statutes, on case/ count .

(Offenses committed on or after January I, 1994)

Consecutive/ Concurrent

X It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run CONSECUTIVE with the sentence set

- - forth in count t of this case.

Page 4 of 5

St. Lucie County File Date: 03/07/2022 09:04 AM

171

CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ vs. STATE OF FLORIDA

LT. CASE NO: 2020CF001501 A

HT. CASE NO: 22-0694

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Resentenced

Modified

Amended

Mitigated

Corrected

Case Number: 562020CF00I501AXXXXX

Defendant: CODY SHANE ENRRIQUEZ

Other provisions, continued:

Consecutive/Concurrent

To Other Convictions

It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed for the counts

specified in this order will run

( check one) LJ Consecutive To LJ Concurrent To

Concurrent with the following:

(check one)

[_]

[_]

any active sentence being served.

specific sentences:

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of St. Lucie County, Florida, is

hereby ordered and directed to deliver the defendant to the Department of Corrections and the facility designated

by the department together with a copy of this Judgment and Sentence and any other documents specified by

Florida Statute.

The Defendant in open court was advised of the right to appeal from this Sentence by filing notice of appeal

within 30 days from this date with the Clerk of this Court and the Defendant's right to the assistance of counsel

in taking the appeal at the expense of the state upon a showing ofindigency.

In imposing the above sentence, the Court further recommends / orders

DONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at St. Lucie County, Florida, on February, 21 2022.

Nunc Pro Tune to:

OBY

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172