Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Fitzroy C. Morton, Petitioner v. Florida

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FitzRoy C. MORTON, PETITIONER

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

Benjamin Hunter Eisenberg

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 855-7600

beisenberg@pd15.state.fl.us

appeals@pd15.org

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

FITZROY C. MORTON,

Appellant,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-3271

[May 17, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; Bernard I. Bober, Judge; L.T. Case _ No.

062019CF009731A888 10.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

RECEIVED 06/13/2023 4:31 pm Fourth District Court Of Appeal

Supreme Court of Florida

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2023

Fitzroy C. Morton, SC2023-0698

Petitioner(s) Lower Tribunal No(s).:

V. 4D21-3271;

062019CF009731A88810

State of Florida,

Respondent(s)

This case is hereby dismissed. This Court lacks jurisdiction to

review an unelaborated decision from a district court of appeal that

is issued without opinion or explanation or that merely cites to an

authority that is not a case pending review in, or reversed or

quashed by, this Court. See Wheeler v. State, 296 So. 3d 895 (Fla.

2020); Wells v. State, 132 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 2014); Jackson v. State,

926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006); Gandy v. State, 846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.

2003); Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002); Harrison v.

Hyster Co., 515 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1987); Dodi Publ’g Co. v. Editorial

Am. S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980); Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d

1356 (Fla. 1980).

No motion for rehearing or reinstatement will be entertained

by the Court.

A True Copy

Test:

SLOP DH 6/13/2023

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court

SC2023-0698 6/13/2023

CASE NO.: SC2023-0698

Page Two

KS

Served:

HEIDI BETTENDORF

HON. BERNARD ISAAC BOBER

BENJAMIN EISENBERG

HON. BRENDA D. FORMAN

HON. LONN WEISSBLUM

ISSUE III

APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A TWELVE-

PERSON JURY UNDER THE SIXTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND HE DID

NOT WAIVE THAT RIGHT

Appellant was convicted of felonies by a jury comprised of a

mere six people. In particular, the charges Appellant faced carried a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. He argues

that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right toa

twelve-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony.

Appellant notes that this Court recently decided Guzman v.

State, 4D22-0148, 2022 WL 14688085 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 26, 2022),

which rejected a defendant’s argument “that his convictions by a sixperson jury violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.” Id. at *1. The majority opinion in

Guzman found this Court was bound by the United States Supreme

Court’s holding in Williams that six-person juries are constitutionally

permissible until the high court expressly revisited that holding. Id.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Gross “explain[ed] that [the

defendant’s] legal argument on jury composition present[ed] a classic

example of how the law navigates the shifting sands of constitutional

37

analysis.” Id. at *2 (Gross, J., concurring). Although disagreeing with

the defendant that Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), had

overturned Williams, Judge Gross wrote that, “if applied to the issue

of jury size, the originalist analysis in Ramos would undercut

Williams’s functionalist underpinnings.” Jd. at *5 (Gross, J,

concurring). “At a minimum, Ramos... suggests that Williams was

wrongly decided.” (Gross, J., concurring). Furthermore, the

defendant “has a credible argument that the original public meaning

of the Sixth Amendment right to a ‘trial by an impartial jury’ included

the right to a 12-person jury. Id. (Gross, J., concurring).

Appellate attorneys have the obligation to “zealously assert{] the

client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.” R.

Regulating Fla. Bar prmbl. As part of this obligation, “[clounsel has

the responsibility to make such [arguments] as may be necessary to

keep the defendant’s case in an appellate ‘pipeline.” Sandoval v.

State, 884 So. 2d 214, 217 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Therefore,

although acknowledging this Court is bound by Guzman, Appellant

seeks to preserve this argument for further review.

On the merits, although the United States Supreme Court held

in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970), that juries as small as

38

six were constitutionally permissible, Williams is impossible to

square with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140

S. Ct. 1390 (2020), which concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s

“trial by an impartial jury” requirement encompasses what the term

“meant at the Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. at 1395.

After the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a bevy of state courts

interpreted it to require a twelve-person jury. See Miller, Comment,

Six of One Is Not A Dozen of the Other, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621, 643

n.133 (1998) (collecting cases from the late 1700s to the 1860s). In

1898, the United States Supreme Court added its voice to the chorus,

noting that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to be

tried by a twelve-person jury. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 348, 349-

350 (1898). The Supreme Court continued to cite the basic principle

that the Sixth Amendment requires a twelve-person jury in criminal

cases for seventy more years. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,

586 (1900); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); Duncan

v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-152 (1968).

In 1970, however, the Williams Court overruled this line of

precedent in a decision that Justice Harlan described as “stripping

off the livery of history from the jury trial” and ignoring both “the

39

intent of the Framers” and the Court’s long held understanding that

constitutional “provisions are framed in the language of the English

common law [] and ... read in the light of its history.” Baldwin v. New

York, 399 U.S. 117, 122-123 (1970) (citation omitted) (Harlan, J.,

concurring in the result in Williams). Indeed, Williams recognized that

the Framers “may well” have had “the usual expectation” in drafting

the Sixth Amendment “that the jury would consist of 12” members.

Williams, 399 U.S. at 98-99. But Williams concluded that such

“purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. Id. at 99.

Rather, the Court focused on the “function” that the jury plays in the

Constitution, concluding that the “essential feature” of a jury is it

leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”

and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community

participation and [with] shared responsibility.” Id. at 100-01.

According to the Williams Court, both “currently available evidence

[and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily be

performed with six jurors as with twelve. Jd. at 101-102 &n.48.

Williams’s ruling that the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated

to the States by the Fourteenth) permits a six-person jury cannot

stand in light of Ramos. There, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

40

Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of

a serious offense. In reaching that conclusion, the Ramos Court

overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a decision that

it faulted for “subject[ing] the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury

verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” 140 S. Ct. at 1401-1402.

That reasoning undermines Williams as well. Ramos rejected

the same kind of “cost-benefit analysis” the Court undertook in

Williams, observing that it is not the Court’s role to “distinguish

between the historic features of common law jury trials that (we

think) serve ‘important enough functions to migrate silently into the

Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.” 140 S. Ct. at 1400-01.

Ultimately, the Ramos Court explained, the question is whether “at

the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by jury

included” the particular feature at issue. Id. at 1402. As the history

summarized above establishes, there can be no serious doubt that

the common understanding of the jury trial during the Revolutionary

War era was that twelve jurors were required. See 140 S. Ct. at 1395.

Even setting aside Williams’s now-disfavored functionalist logic,

its ruling suffered from another significant flaw: it was based on

research that was out of date shortly after the opinion issued.

41

Specifically, the Williams Court “flou]nd little reason to think” that

the goals of the jury guarantee—including, among others, “to provide

a fair possibility for obtaining a representative[] cross-section of the

community”’—“are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved

when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12.” Id. at 100.

The Court theorized that “in practice the difference between the 12-

man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the

community represented seems likely to be negligible.” Id. at 102.

In the time since Williams, that determination has proven

incorrect. Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much just eight years

later in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when it concluded

that the Sixth Amendment barred the use of a five-person jury.

Although Ballew did not overturn Williams, the Ballew Court

observed that empirical studies conducted in the handful of

intervening years highlighted several problems with Williams’

assumptions. Moreover, the Ballew Court “admit[ted]” that it “d[id]

not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and five,”

effectively acknowledging that the studies it relied on also cast doubt

on the effectiveness of the six-member jury. Id. at 239.

42

Post-Ballew research has further undermined Williams.

Current empirical evidence indicates that “reducing jury size

inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority group

members on the jury.” Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the

Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. of Empirical Legal

Stud. 425, 427 (Sept. 2009); see also Higginbotham et al., Better by

the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury, 104

Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020). Because “the 12-member jury

produces significantly greater heterogeneity than does the S1xmember jury,” Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury, supra,

at 449, it increases “the opportunity for meaningful and appropriate

representation” and helps ensure that juries “represent adequately a

cross-section of the community.” Ballew, 435 U.S. at 237.

Appellant recognizes that the state constitution provides:

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall

be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications

and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed

by law.

Art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. And he recognizes that section 913.10, Florida

Statutes, provides for six jurors except in capital cases. See also Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.270.

43

But Florida’s provision for a jury of six stems from the dawn of

the Jim Crow era, one month after federal troops were withdrawn

from the state. In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was

amended to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of causes

in any court may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v.

Boswell, 34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903).The common law rule of a jury

of twelve was still kept in Florida while federal troops remained in the

state. There was no provision for a jury of less than twelve until the

Legislature enacted.a provision specifying a jury of six in Chapter

3010, section 6. See Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 297-98 (1877);

Florida Fertilizer, 34 So. 15 241.

The Legislature enacted chapter 3010 with the jury-of-six

provision on February 17, 1877. Gibson, 16 Fla. 294. This was less

than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn from

Florida in January 1877. See Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and

Renewal, 1865-1877, in The History of Florida 273 (Michael Gannon,

ed., first paperback edition 2018). The jury-of-six thus first saw light

at the birth of the Jim Crow era as former Confederates regained

power in southern states and state prosecutors made a concerted

effort to prevent blacks from serving on jurors.

44

In Ramos, Justice Gorsuch noted that the Louisiana nonunanimity rule arose from Jim Crow era efforts to enforce white

supremacy. Id. at 1394; see also id. at 1417 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (non-unanimity was enacted “as one pillar of a

comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures

against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service.”).

The history of Florida’s jury of six arises from the same historical

context.

In view of the foregoing, a jury of six at a criminal trial for any

felony offense, particularly a crime punishable by up to life

imprisonment, is unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, this Court

should reverse and remand for a new trial.

45

Instr# 117759194 , Page 1 of 4, RKecoraea Lli/45/4VU4Z1 al YO-9D Fin

Broward County Commission

UCN: 062019CF009731A88810

#4 FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL Brenda D. Forman, CLERK 11/16/2021 11:24:52 AM.****

17" JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY

DIVISION: pivision: ___& \A/_

CRIMINAL

JUDGMENT

THE STATE OF FLORIDA VS. CASE NUMBER

DEFENDANT Wyte z@cOou ChactesS COGMHOn VAR Alcr 1 QR

Probation Violator at

State Attorney _@nataognm S.C. Cost WO

Court Reporter A. ( Aneae \\

The Defendant, Woryz COv\ CXRAAMES CODE) _ being personally before this Court represented by

eC. — SOX , his attorney of record, and having:

rT

(Check appljcable provision)

4 Been tried and found guilty of the following crime(s)

O Entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s)

© Entered a plea of nolo contendre to the following crime(s)

COUNT CRIME OFFENSE STATUTE DEGREE OF ADD’L MONIES

NUMBER(S) CRIME IMPOSED

= Res pass BQ. OB _SPECAM)

-2)\_ Palise. Tenecsaqment+ 1271.020) S'F

ca)

and no cause having been shown why the Defendant should not be adjudicated guilty, IT Is ORDERED THAT the Defendant is

hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the above crime(s).

The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the sum of Fifty dollars ($50.00) pursuant to F.S. 938.03 (Crimes Comp. Trust Fund).

The Defendant is further ordered to pay the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) as court costs pursuant to F.S. 938.03(1) and 938.15

Fines imposed as part of a sentence pursuant to F.S. 777.083(1) are to be recorded on the Sentence page(s).

(Check if applicable)

Stayed & Withheld () The court hereby stays and withholds the imposition of sentence as to couni(s)

Imposition of Sentence and places the Defendant on probation for a period of under the

supervision of the Department of Corrections (conditions of probation set forth in a separate order)

Sentence Deferred () The court hereby defers imposition of sentence until

Until Later Date (Date)

(Wf Pay $225.00 Trust Fund pursuant to F.S. 938.05(1 )(a)

Count(s) (oO _Gay)monras BROWARD COUNTY JAIL W/CREDIT Lo © DAYS TIME

SERVED.

The Defendant in open court was advised of his right to appeal from this Judgment by filing notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court within thirty

days following the date sentence 1s imposed or probation is ordered pursuant to this adjudication. The Defendant was also advised of his right to the

assistance of counsel in taking said appeal at the expense of the State upon showing indigence.

JUDGE

I hereby certify that a true Word d copy of the above and foregoing was served on the State Attorney by: aya delivery ( ) U.S. mail and to

ha 2_\

the Defense Attorney by: ( nd delivery ( ) US. mail this \Lo day of way 20

Deputy Clerk

ICC 112-65 JUDGMENT en 7-2-08

Instr# ll//by¥1y¥4 , Page 4 OL 4, Bna OL VOCUlleLIL

UCN: 062019CF009731A88810

##*# FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL Brenda D. Forman, CLERK 11/16/2021 11:24:52 AM.****

Morejur, Fir2rs Y

DIVISION: [ ] ADJUDICATION WITHHELD CASE NUMBER

CRIMINAL wh ADJUDICATED GUILTY ~<E+0

IAATALI co

FINGERPRINTS OF DEFENDANT

1.R. THUMB 2. R. INDEX 3.R. MIDDLE 4.R. RING 5.R. LITTLE

Fingerprints taken by:

Lf. L, lig (lice / SA CHA Court Deputy

Name & Title

DONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at Broward County, Florida this | W day of Nol 2-26.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and foregoing fingerprints are of the Defendant

Fi tZrOy

moctan , and that they were placed thereon by said defendant in my

presence

in Open court this date. OA ON

JUDGE

ICC 112-57 FINGERPRINTS OF DEFENDANT

157

LO

A

*#** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL Brenda D. Forman, CLERK 11/16/2021 11:24:52 AM.****

DN: 06201 ochades Ged

=

id 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County

DIVISION: SENTENCE

Gremniiat as to Count FZ 2

THE STATE OF FLORIDA VS. CASE NUMBER

DEFENDANT Trr2co.y C\loocesS IASI S31 CF aigg

Moacr+an

The Defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by his attorney, Py. Sorp

and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be

heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why he sentenced as provided by law,

and cause shown,

Gly W and the Court having on al 2) | 2) deferred imposition of sentence until

this date.

[] and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on the defendant now

resentences the defendant.

(1 and the Court having placed the Defendant on Probation/Community Control and having

subsequently revoked the Defendant’s Probation/Community Control.

IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT that:

The Defendant pay a fine of $ , pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus

$ as the 5% surcharge required by section 938.04, Florida Statutes.

The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

0

The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida.

CO The Defendant is hereby sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with F.S. 958.04.

TO BE IMPRISONED (check one: unmarked sections are inapplicable)

For a term of Natural Life.

C]

A For a term of. DB {SCAG ESP

CJ

Said SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of. subject to conditions set

forth in this Order.

If ee _ Followed by a period of on Probation/Community Control

a. ~~ oO under the supervision of the Department of Correction according to the terms and

conditions of supervision set forth in separate order entered herein.

However, after serving a period of

| imprisonment in

the balance of such sentence shall be suspended and the defendant shall be placed on

Probation/Community Control for a period of

under supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and

conditions of the Probation/ Community Control set forth in a separate order entered herein.

| HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct ee the above and foregoing was served on the State Attorney by: if Hand delivery

[ ] U.S. Mail and to the Defense Attorney by: [\ Hand delivery [ ] U.S. Mail this_\ YO _ day of (NOS, 20-221.

112-82 SENTENCE PG 1 REVISED 9/23/10 148

*#** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL Brenda D. Forman, CLERK 11/16/2021 11:24:52 AM.****

DIVISION: SENTENCE UCN: )62019CFOOTASFSNUMBER

CRIMINAL (AS TO COUNT 2»)

[Qo 4 LAILCF (C

In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before the defendant

begins service of the supervision term.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count 2 )

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed:

MANDATORY/MINIMUM PROVISIONS:

BATTERY ON THE

ELDERLY [__] It is further ordered that the three (3) year mandatory minimum imprisonment provisions of

FS. 784.08(1) are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court.

DRUG TRAFFICKING C_] It is further ordered that the mandatory minimum imprisonment provisions of

Florida Statute 893.135(1) are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court.

CONTROLLED

SUBSTANCE WITHIN [__] It is further ordered that the three (3) year minimum imprisonment provision of Florida

1000 FEET OF SCHOOL Statute 893.13(1)(e)1, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court.

HABITUAL FELONY

OFFENDER at The defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an

extended term in this sentence in accordance to the provisions of Florida Statute 775.084(4).

The requisite findings by the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in

open court.

ITE, VIGLENE [__] The defendant is adj udicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

OFFENDER extended term in this sentence in accordance to the provision of Florida Statute 775.084(4).

A minimum term of year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite

findings by the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

PROTECTION ACT [__] _ Itis further ordered that the Defendant shall serve a minimum of years before

release in accordance with Florida Statute 775.0823.

CAPITAL OFFENSE a) It is further ordered that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with

the provisions of Florida Statute 775.082(1).

VIOLENT CAREER

CRIMINAL [] The defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal offender and has been sentenced to a

term in accordance with the provision of Florida Statute 775,084({4)(c), A minimum term of

year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings by the court are

set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

PRISON RELEASEE

REOFFENDER []_ The defendant is sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender and must serve a term of impris-

onment of_________ years in accordance with the provisions of Florida Statute

775 .082(8)(a)2.

| HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the abovp“and foregoing was served on the State Attorney by:Wfland delivery

[ ] U.S. Mail and to the Defense Attorney by: Wand delivery [ ] U.S. Mail this}{g) — day of SIO , 2024.

112-83 SENTENCE BATTERY 149

*#*# FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL Brenda D. Forman, CLERK 11/16/2021 11:24:52 AM.****

UCN: 062019CF009731A88810

DIVISION: SENTENCE CASE NUMBER

CRIMINAL (AS TO COUNT )

19 _9IBICF io

OTHER PROVISIONS It is further ordered that the year mandatory minimum imprisonment

FIREARM/DESTRUCTIVE [ ] provision of Florida Statute 775.087(2) and (3) is hereby imposed for the sentence

DEVICE specified in this count

THREE-TIME VIOLENT FELONY

OFFENDER

SHORT-BARRELED RIFLE,

SHOTGUN, MACHINE GUN

CONTINUING CRIMINAL

ENTERPRISE

RETENTION OF

JURISDICTION

JAIL CREDIT

PRISON CREDIT

CONSECUTIVE

CONCURRENT AS TO

OTHER COUNTS

CONSECUTIVE

CONCURRENT AS TO

OTHER CONVICTIONS

PSI ORDERED

The Defendant in Open Court was advised of his right to appeal from this Sentence by filling notice of appeal within thirty days from this

date with the Clerk of this Court, and the Defendant’s right to assistance of counsel in taking said appeal at the expense of the State upon

showing of indigence.

In imposing the above sentence, the court further recommends

YES M wo |

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, is hereby ordered and directed

to deliver the Defendant to the Department of Corrections at the facility designated by the Department together with a copy of this

Judgment and Sentence and any other documents specified by Florida Statutes.

The Defendant is adjudicated a three-time violent felony offender and has been sentenced

to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of Florida Statute 775.084. The

requisite findings by the court are set forth in a separate order or as stated on the record

in open court.

It is further ordered that the five-year minimum provisions of Florida Statute 790.22(2)

are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the 25 year mandatory minimum sentence

provisions of Florida Statute 893.20 are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this

count.

The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to Florida Statutes 947.16 (3).

B35

It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of,

days as credit for time incarcerated prior to imposition of this sentence.

It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed credit for all time previously served on

this count in the Department of Corrections prior to re-sentencing.

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed by this court shall run

consecutive to concurrent with (check one) the sentence set forth in

count of this case.

It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed for the courts

specified in this order shall run

consecutive to concurrent with (check one) the following:

Any active sentence being served.

Specific Sentences:

DONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at Broward County, Florida, this___|lp atv) al _2).

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the Alt and foregoing was served on the State Attorney by: [

JUDGE

and Delivery

Hand Delivery [ ] U.S. Mail this__j(aQ _ day of. ,20_24.

{ ] Lh Attorney by:

ICC 112-78 Criminal Senta” 9 '

150