Reply Brief — Andrew Sposato, Petitioner v. Florida

No. 23-5575

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ANDREW SPOSATO,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH DISTRICT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

BENJAMIN HUNTER

EISENBERG

Assistant Public

Defender

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC

DEFENDER

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 663-6000

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

THOMAS G. SPRANKLING

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2600 El Camino Real

ALEX W. MILLER

Suite 400

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Palo Alto, CA 94306

HALE AND DORR LLP

LEAH FUGERE*

7 World Trade Center

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

250 Greenwich Street

HALE AND DORR LLP

New York, NY 10007

350 S. Grand Avenue

Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90071

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... ii

ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 2

I.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION................................. 2

II. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE WILLIAMS ............ 5

A. Egregiously Wrong............................................... 6

B. Significant Negative Consequences ................... 9

C. Reliance ................................................................ 10

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) ................... 5

Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) ............................. 8

Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Mihas, 280

U.S. 102 (1929) ...........................................................3-4

Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) ............................ 9

DeBiasi v. Snaith, 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1999) ...................................................................... 5

Gotthilf v. Sills, 375 U.S. 79 (1963) ................................... 5

Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 2022) ...................................................................... 3

Guzman v. State, 2023 WL 3830251 (Fla. June 6,

2023) ............................................................................... 3

Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business &

Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136

(1994) .............................................................................. 4

Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981) ......................... 3

Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S.Ct. 22 (2022)...........1, 6, 9-10

KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18 (2011) ....................... 4

Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ............. 5

Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) ...................................... 4

Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389

U.S. 235 (1967) .......................................................1, 4-5

Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020) .... 1-2, 7, 10-11

Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)..................... 10

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Whitaker

v.

Jacksonville

Expressway

Authority, 131 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1961) ............................................................................... 4

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ................. 2, 6, 10

DOCKETED CASES

Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (U.S.) ......................... 11

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

28 U.S.C. § 1257 ................................................................... 2

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Bar Association, Principles for Juries

and Jury Trials (2005), https://www.

uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/aba_principles

_for_juries_and_jury_trials_2005.pdf ................. 8, 10

Fay, Nicolas, et al., Group Discussion as

Interactive Dialogue or as Serial

Monologue: The Influence of Group Size,

11 Psychol. Sci. 481 (2000) ........................................... 8

Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator, FY 2021-22 Statistical Reference Guide

(2023), https://tinyurl.com/22tn3z32......................... 11

Guerra, Alice, et al., Accuracy of Verdicts, 28

Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221 (2020) ................................... 8

Kogan, Gerald & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, 18 Nova L. Rev. 1151 (1994) ............... 3

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Mukhopadhaya, Koushik, Jury Size and the

Free Rider Problem, 19 J. L. Econ. & Org.

24 (2003) ......................................................................... 8

Parisi, Francesco & Barbara Luppi, Jury Size

and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 J. Legal

Stud. 399 (2013) ............................................................. 8

Rose, Mary R., et al., Jury Pool Underrepresentation in the Modern Era: Evidence from

Federal Courts, 15 J. Empirical Legal Stud.

2 (2018) ........................................................................... 8

Saks, Michael J. & Molly Weighner Marti, A

Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size,

21 Law & Hum. Behav. 451 (1997) ............................. 8

Waller, Bridget M, et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry

Men: Managing Conversational Group Size

Increases Perceived Contribution by

Decision Makers, 14 Grp. Processes &

Intergrp. Rels. 835 (2011)............................................ 8

The Sixth Amendment’s “promise of a jury trial” is

“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1395, 1397 (2020). The

scope of that right is controlled by “what the term ‘trial

by an impartial jury’ … meant at the time of the Sixth

Amendment’s adoption.” Id. at 1395. Tellingly, Florida

does not dispute that “a mountain of evidence suggests

that, both at the time of the Amendment’s adoption and

for most of our Nation’s history, the right to a trial by

jury for serious criminal offenses meant a trial before 12

members of the community.” Khorrami v. Arizona, 143

S.Ct. 22, 23 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). To the contrary, Florida acknowledges that the common law did

impose a “12-person requirement.” Opp.9.

Florida instead seeks to distract from the fundamental right at stake by raising a novel vehicle issue and

highlighting the one-time cost of correcting the Williams error. As to the former, Florida argues Mr. Sposato failed to exhaust his options for state court review

because he did not ask the Florida Court of Appeal to

certify the question presented to the Florida Supreme

Court. But Mr. Sposato properly petitioned the Florida

Supreme Court for review, and this Court already rejected Florida’s certification argument nearly sixty

years ago. See Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S.

235, 237 & n.1 (1967). Florida’s suggestion that this

Court should sub silentio overrule Nash based on a ministerial change to the state Rules of Appellate Procedure

is meritless. Indeed, this Court granted review of several Florida Court of Appeal decisions even after the

tweak to Florida’s rules.1

1

This Court has called for a response in a half-dozen other

cases raising the same question presented. See Nos. 23-5171, 23-

2

As to Florida’s latter argument—i.e., that overruling Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), would require a slice of cases to be retried in a half-dozen

States—this is the “usual” consequence of adopting a

“new rule of criminal procedure,” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at

1407. This Court vacated “nearly 800 decisions” following Booker v. United States and “[s]imilar consequences

likely followed” other landmark rulings. Id. at 1406.

Here, nearly 50 million Americans are currently being

denied their right to a 12-person jury in nearly all circumstances. “[T]he competing interests” of a handful of

States cannot outweigh “the reliance the American people place in their constitutionally protected liberties.”

Id. at 1408 (plurality op.).

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Mr. Sposato obtained a decision from the “highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had,” 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a), because he unsuccessfully petitioned

the Florida Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeal’s decision affirming his conviction at a time when

Florida’s high court had jurisdiction over his petition.

Specifically, the Florida Court of Appeal summarily

affirmed Mr. Sposato’s conviction in a per curiam order.

Pet.App.1. The decision read in relevant part: “Affirmed. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2022), rev. pending, No. SC22-1597.” Pet.App.1.

Guzman presented the same 12-member jury question

as this case. Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72, 73-74 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 2022). And when the Court of Appeal

5173, 23-5455, 23-5567, 23-5570, 23-5579. This case should at least be

held pending resolution of those other petitions.

3

“cites as controlling authority a decision … pending review in” the Florida Supreme Court, the court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to take up the case.

Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981). That is the

situation here—the Court of Appeal cited Guzman,

which was then properly pending in the Florida Supreme Court. Pet.App.1; see also Guzman v. State, 2023

WL 3830251, at *1 (Fla. June 6, 2023); Kogan & Waters,

The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme

Court, 18 Nova L. Rev. 1151, 1155 n.9 (1994) (“A case is

pending if it has been properly filed and is awaiting review.”). Mr. Sposato thus could—and did—invoke the

Florida Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by filing a petition

for review. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 420; Pet.App.1-2. Under

these circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court dismissing Mr. Sposato’s petition after denying review in

Guzman is not an indication the Court lacked jurisdiction when Mr. Sposato actually filed his petition for review.2

Florida’s contention (Opp.5-7) that Mr. Sposato

should have instead sought certification in the Court of

Appeal because “the Florida Supreme Court generally

lacks jurisdiction ... to review summary decisions”

simply ignores the Jollie rule. Here, the Florida Supreme Court did have jurisdiction when Mr. Sposato petitioned for review because Guzman was pending, then

declined to take up the question presented in both cases.

This Court has held there is no requirement for a litigant

to avail itself of more than one path to review so long as

the higher court would have jurisdiction under the path

the litigant did take. E.g., Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v.

2

Guzman is also pending before this Court. See U.S. No. 235173. Florida does not dispute that the Florida Supreme Court had

(and that this Court has) jurisdiction to consider Guzman.

4

Mihas, 280 U.S. 102, 104 (1929). “[I]t would be unreasonable to require an application to the Appellate Court

for a certificate of importance and appeal when Supreme

Court” had already denied a petition for review of the

same question. Id. That is precisely what Florida demands here.

Regardless, this Court rejected in Nash the certification argument Florida now presses, and has granted

certiorari to the Florida Court of Appeal under similar

circumstances. E.g., 389 U.S. at 237 n.1 (seeking certification not required); Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. &

Prof’l Regul., 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (granting certiorari when the “Court of Appeal ... affirmed the Board’s

final order per curiam without opinion,” leaving “no

right of review in the Florida Supreme Court”); KPMG

LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18, 22 (2011) (per curiam) (similar). As the Florida case Nash cited explains, “[i]nherent

in every decision rendered by a District Court of Appeal

is the implication, unless otherwise stated or contrary

action taken, that it does not pass upon a question of

great public interest.” Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 131 So. 2d 22, 23-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1961). In other words, under Florida law, a request for

certification is akin to a request for rehearing. And “finality is not deferred by the existence of a latent power

in the rendering court to reopen or revise its judgment”

because “[s]uch latent powers of state courts over their

judgments are too variable and indeterminate to serve

as tests of [this Court’s] jurisdiction.” Market St. Ry.

Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548, 551-552 (1945).

Florida tries to circumvent Nash because Florida’s

Supreme Court later made a minor amendment to its appellate rules that codified a litigant’s ability to “move for

certification.” Opp.7 n.3. But Nash recognized litigants

could already “file a suggestion” that certification was

5

appropriate, 389 U.S. at 327 n.1, and Florida points to

nothing suggesting the State intended such a ministerial

change to have substantive implications. Instead, “the

purpose of the new language ... was not to provide for a

different type of reconsideration, but rather to permit a

party to move for certification without being first required to move for rehearing.” DeBiasi v. Snaith, 732

So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The Florida Supreme Court accordingly had no occasion to reconsider

the principle that underlay the Nash ruling—i.e., a certification request is akin to a request for rehearing.

Florida’s authority is not to the contrary. The two

cases Florida cites both involve other States and predated Nash (meaning the Nash Court necessarily took

them into consideration). Gotthilf v. Sills turned on the

peculiarities of New York’s procedure for certifying interlocutory appeals of nonfinal orders, and—unlike

here—the state high court did not have direct jurisdiction over the petitioner’s request for review. 375 U.S.

79, 80 (1963). Because Section 1257 accounts for “the

structure of [the relevant state’s] judicial system” and

“the particularized provisions of [that state’s] laws,” Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 98 (1962),

Gotthilf’s analysis of New York law says nothing about

Florida law. Similarly, Gorman dealt with a Missouri

law that “expressly conferred the right to an en banc rehearing by the Supreme Court of Missouri.” Local 174,

369 U.S. at 99. Here, there was no rehearing “as a matter of right.” Id.

II. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE WILLIAMS

“[T]he force of stare decisis is at its nadir” in cases

“concerning [criminal] procedur[e] rules that implicate

fundamental constitutional protection.” Alleyne v.

United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 n.5 (2013). Here, every

6

factor this Court considers when evaluating precedent

favors overruling Williams. That decision is egregiously wrong both because of its inconsistency with history and Ramos and because the empirical studies it relied upon were almost immediately undermined. Pet.49. Williams has had significant negative consequences,

both in creating confusion in the case law and in permitting the use of six-member juries (which are less likely

to be representative and reliable than 12-member bodies). Pet.8-9. And overruling Williams affects only limited reliance interests—i.e., it necessitates retrials of a

finite number of pending cases.

A. Egregiously Wrong

Florida’s chief defense of Williams rests on sleight

of hand. Florida notes Williams “devoted 13 pages to

the history and development of the common-law jury

and the Sixth Amendment” but concluded “the word

‘jury’ in the Sixth Amendment did not codify” the 12person requirement. Opp.9. To be clear, Williams came

to that conclusion not because of the history but in spite

of it. Williams rejected a test governed by “purely historical considerations” in favor of a functionalist approach, all while acknowledging the historical record is

clear that “the size of the jury at common law [was] fixed

generally at 12.” 399 U.S. at 89, 99; accord Khorrami,

143 S.Ct. at 23-24 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (summarizing

historical evidence). Had Williams applied the proper,

history-focused test laid out in Ramos, it could not have

reached the same result.

Florida’s remaining attempts to defend Williams

are similarly unavailing.

First, Florida argues that not all common-law practices regarding the jury were “‘codified’” in the Sixth

7

Amendment. Opp.10. Ramos, however, rejected this

approach when it refused to distinguish between “the

historic features of common law jury trial that (we think)

serve ‘important enough’ functions to migrate silently

into the Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.” 140

S.Ct. at 1400-1401. Instead, the question is simply what

“the right to trial by jury included” “at the time of the

Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. at 1402.3

Florida relatedly relies on the “drafting history” of

the Sixth Amendment to limit the jury-trial right.

Opp.10-12. But Ramos explained that the “snippet of

drafting history” Williams and Florida rely upon “could

just as easily support the opposite inference”—i.e., certain omitted language was unnecessary “surplusage.”

140 S.Ct. at 1400. In any event, this argument “proves

too much” because ignoring common-law history would

“leave the right to a ‘trial by jury’ devoid of meaning.”

Id.

Second, Florida distinguishes Ramos because it

overruled “a uniquely fractured decision,” while Williams garnered “a solid majority.” Opp.13. But this distinction does nothing to square Ramos’s six-vote holding

with Williams. Indeed, Ramos explained that to the extent Apodaca established binding precedent, it should

be overruled. 140 S.Ct. at 1404-1405.

Third, Florida defends Williams’s functionalist

logic, including by noting it was not overruled by Ballew.

Opp.13-19. But Ballew refused to extend Williams’s

logic to 5-member juries precisely because Williams’s

3

Florida’s suggestion (Opp.10) that the Ramos test requires

“that a jury consist only of male landowners hailing from a particular county” was again rejected in Ramos itself. 140 S.Ct. at 1402

n.47 (majority op.) (“further constitutional amendments … prohibit

[such] invidious discrimination”).

8

foundations had been undermined. Ballew v. Georgia,

435 U.S. 223, 232-237 (1978); see also Pet.7-8.

Post-Ballew studies have repeatedly proved the

Ballew Court right. Twelve-person juries deliberate

longer and share more facts, ideas, and challenges to conclusions during higher-quality deliberations. E.g., Saks

& Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21

Law & Hum. Behav. 451, 458-459 (1997) (considering 17

studies); see generally ABA, Principles for Juries and

Jury Trials, Principle 3 cmt., at 17-21 (2005) (collecting

studies and endorsing 12-member-jury rule). Empaneling a smaller jury also decreases the probability that

members of minority groups (be they racial, religious,

political, or socio-economic) will serve. See, e.g., Rose et

al., Jury Pool Underrepresentation in the Modern Era,

15 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 2 (2018).

Florida’s contrary “scholarship” is inapposite. One

article did not study six-person juries—it considered

whether breaking a 12-member jury into four-person

discussion groups would promote deliberation. Waller

et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry Men, 14 Grp. Processes &

Intergrp. Rels. 835, 839 (2011). The others studied (1)

unconstitutional five-member groups, Fay et al., Group

Discussion as Interactive Dialogue or as Serial Monologue, 11 Psychol. Sci. 481, 481 (2000) or (2) mathematical

models (as opposed to testing actual people/juries),

Mukhopadhaya, Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem,

19 J. L. Econ. & Org. 24, 27-43 (2003); Parisi & Luppi,

Jury Size and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 J. Legal Stud.

399, 408 (2013); Guerra et al., Accuracy of Verdicts, 28

Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221, 232 (2020). And while Florida

cites (Opp.17-18) bare conviction rates across different

States, it neither identifies scholarship interpreting

those numbers nor attempts to control for potentially

9

divergent features and practices of state law (e.g., frequency of guilty pleas).

Finally, Florida argues there is nothing “nefarious”

about the fact that Florida law changed the minimum

jury size from 12 to six a few weeks after federal troops

left following Reconstruction. Opp.19-20. But Florida

does not dispute that at least some States “restricted the

size of juries … to suppress minority voices in public affairs,” Khorrami, 143 S.Ct. at 27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), and identifies no reason the racist political forces

that held sway in late 19th century Florida were any different. It responds that “Florida … retained 12-person

juries in capital cases.” Opp.19. But that 12-member juries are warranted in cases where the defendant faces

death only supports that 12-member juries are more

rights-protective than six-person juries.

B. Significant Negative Consequences

Williams has had negative jurisprudential consequences. In Ballew, a split Court struggled to apply the

functionalist approach, with multiple members acknowledging that the six-member line had little foundation in

law or fact. Pet.7-8. And Ramos necessarily rejected

Williams’s approach. The cases Florida cites (Opp.13)

as “reaffirm[ing]” Williams mention the decision only in

passing or rely on the reasoning Ramos rejected.4

4

Florida’s suggestion (Opp.21) that interpreting the Sixth

Amendment requires a change in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is meritless. The Seventh Amendment’s reference to “Suits

at common law”—which “is not directed to jury characteristics, such

as size, but rather the kind of cases for which jury trial is preserved,” Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973)—could well

preclude adopting attributes of the common-law jury in that context. And the Sixth Amendment should be more protective: It

10

Williams has also had negative, real-world consequences, as a “drop in jury size” poses a threat to the

“representativeness” of the jury and the “reliability” of

the verdict. ABA, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, Principle 3 cmt., at 19-20; see also supra pp. 8-9.

“[T]hat smaller panels tend to skew jury composition

and impair the right to a fair trial … is a sad truth borne

out by hard experience.” Khorrami, 143 S.Ct. at 27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Florida’s response to the “reliability” concern is

based on inapposite studies. Supra pp. 8-9. And Florida

does not dispute a 12-member jury will sweep in a

broader cross-section of the community than a six-member body. It argues only that the “fair-cross-section requirement applies” to the jury pool, not the jury itself.

Opp.19 n.16. But the available evidence establishes that

the 12-member-jury requirement at least increases the

odds that jurors will embody the cross-section of humanity in the venire—an outcome Williams wrongly dismissed as “unrealistic,” 399 U.S. at 102.

C. Reliance

Florida argues the reliance interests here “far outstrip” those in Ramos (Opp.20), but the interest asserted

is the same: The need to re-try a discrete number of nonfinal felony convictions. Almost any new rule of criminal

procedure will “affect[] significant numbers of pending

cases across the whole country.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at

1406.

Florida also contends the number of convictions affected distinguishes this case from Ramos. Opp.20. To

protects “human liberty” rather than “property.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632 (2003).

11

be clear, this case would affect only those felony proceedings where a trial has been held and the case is not yet

final on appeal—a number that is currently historically

low due to the COVID-19 pandemic.5 While Florida

claims without support (Opp.20) that it would have to

conduct “several thousand” retrials, this Court granted

certiorari in Ramos despite Louisiana’s argument that

requiring jury unanimity “could ... upset” “[t]housands

of final convictions.” Opp.4, Ramos, No. 18-5924 (U.S.).

Moreover, this Court vacated “nearly 800 decisions” following Booker and “similar consequences likely followed

when Crawford v. Washington overturned prior interpretations of the Confrontation Clause or Arizona v.

Gant changed the law for searches incident to arrests.”

Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1406 (citations omitted).

In the end, Florida ignores “the most important”

“reliance interest” of all—that “of the American people”

“in the preservation of our constitutionally promised liberties.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1408 (plurality op.). Nearly

50 million Americans are currently denied a right the

Framers intended all to enjoy, even while Florida recognizes that a 12-member jury is so important and fundamental that it is a necessary safeguard in death-penalty

cases. This Court alone has authority to step in and protect the rights of those millions. It should do so.

5

E.g., Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator,

FY2021-22 Statistical Reference Guide 3-20 to 3-22 (2023), https://tinyurl.com/22tn3z32.

12

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted or held. See supra

n.1.

Respectfully submitted.

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

BENJAMIN HUNTER

EISENBERG

Assistant Public

Defender

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC

DEFENDER

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 663-6000

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

THOMAS G. SPRANKLING

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2600 El Camino Real

ALEX W. MILLER

Suite 400

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Palo Alto, CA 94306

HALE AND DORR LLP

LEAH FUGERE*

7 World Trade Center

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

250 Greenwich Street

HALE AND DORR LLP

New York, NY 10007

350 S. Grand Avenue

Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90071

* Not admitted in California. Admitted to practice

in Colorado. Supervised by

members of the firm who

are members of the California bar.

NOVEMBER 2023