Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Carlos Gilbert Arellano-Ramirez, Petitioner v. Florida

Supreme Court briefSep 8, 2023

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ, PETITIONER

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

Benjamin Hunter Eisenberg

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355-7600

beisenberg@pd15.state.fl.us

appeals@pd15.org

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ,

Appellant,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-110

[March 8, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.

Lucie County; Robert L. Pegg, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562016CF003434A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

GROSS, CONNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

RECEIVED 06/13/2023 3:51 pm __ Fourth District Court Of Appeal

Supreme Court of Florida

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2023

Carlos Gilbert Arellano- $C2023-0349

Ramirez, Lower Tribunal No(s).:

Petitioner/(s) 4D22-110;

Vv. 5620 1L6CFO03434AXXKXXX

State of Florida,

Respondent(s)

This case is hereby dismissed. This Court lacks jurisdiction to

review an unelaborated decision from a district court of appeal that

is issued without opinion or explanation or that merely cites to an

authority that is not a case pending review in, or reversed or

quashed by, this Court. See Wheeler v. State, 296 So. 3d 895 (Fla.

2020); Wells v. State, 132 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 2014); Jackson v. State,

926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006); Gandy v. State, 846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.

2003); Stallworth v. Moore, 8277 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002); Harrison v.

Hyster Co., 515 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1987); Dodi Publ’g Co. v. Editorial

Am. S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980); Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d

1356 (Fla. 1980).

No motion for rehearing or reinstatement will be entertained

by the Court.

A True Copy

Test:

D0 249 6/13/2023

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court

SC2023-0349 6/13/2023

CASE NO.: SC2023-0349

Page Two

LC

Served:

HEIDI L. BETTENDORF

BENJAMIN EISENBERG

HON. MICHELLE R. MILLER

HON. ROBERT LEE PEGG

HON. LONN WEISSBLUM

ARGUMENT

ISSUE I

APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A TWELVE-

PERSON JURY UNDER THE SIXTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND HE DID

NOT WAIVE THAT RIGHT

Appellant was convicted of felonies by a jury comprised of a

mere six people. He argues that the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments guarantee the right to a twelve-person jury when the

defendant is charged with a felony. The standard of review of

constitutional claims is de novo. See A.B. v. Florida Dept. of Children

& Family Services, 901 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

Although the United States Supreme Court held in Williams v.

Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970), that juries as small as six were

constitutionally permissible, Williams is impossible to square with

the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390

(2020), which concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s “trial by an

impartial jury” requirement encompasses what the term “meant at

the Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. at 1395.

Prior to 1970, subjecting Appellant to a trial with only six

jurors would have unquestionably violated his Sixth Amendment

22

rights. As the Supreme Court observed in Ramos, even William

Blackstone recognized that under the common law, “no person could

be found guilty of a serious crime unless ‘the truth of every

accusation ... should ... be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of

twelve of his equals and neighbors|.]” 140 S. Ct. at 1395. “A ‘verdict,

taken from eleven, was no verdict’ at all.” Id.

After the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a bevy of state

courts—ranging from Alabama to Missouri to New Hampshire—

interpreted it to require a twelve-person jury. See Miller, Comment,

Six of One Is Not A Dozen of the Other, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621, 643

n.133 (1998) (collecting cases from the late 1700s to the 1860s). In

1898, the U.S. Supreme Court added its voice to the chorus, noting

that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to be tried by

a twelve-person jury. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-350

(1898). As the Thompson Court explained, since the time of Magna

Carta, the word “jury” had been understood to mean a body of twelve

people. Id. Given that understanding had been accepted since 1215,

the Court reasoned, “[i]t must” have been “that the word jury” in the

Sixth Amendment was “placed in the constitution of the United

States with reference to [that] meaning affixed to [it].” Id. at 350.

23

The Supreme Court continued to cite the basic principle that

the Sixth Amendment requires a twelve-person jury in criminal cases

for seventy more years. For example, in 1900, the Court explained

that “there [could] be no doubt” “[t]hat a jury composed, as at

common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment

to the Federal Constitution.” Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586

(1900). Thirty years later, the Court reiterated that it was “not open

to question” that “the phrase ‘trial by jury” in the Constitution

incorporated juries’ “essential elements” as “they were recognized in

this country and England,” including the requirement that they

“consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.” Patton v. United States,

281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). And as recently as 1968, the Court

remarked that “by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in

criminal cases had been in existence for several centuries and carried

impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta,” such as the

24

necessary inclusion of twelve members. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 145, 151-152 (1968).4

In 1970, however, the Williams Court overruled this line of

precedent in a decision that Justice Harlan described as “stripping

off the livery of history from the jury trial” and ignoring both “the

intent of the Framers” and the Court’s long held understanding that

constitutional “provisions are framed in the language of the English

common law |] and ... read in the light of its history.” Baldwin v. New

York, 399 U.S. 117, 122-123 (1970) (citation omitted) (Harlan, J.,

concurring in the result in Williams). Indeed, Williams recognized that

the Framers “may well” have had “the usual expectation” in drafting

the Sixth Amendment “that the jury would consist of 12” members.

Williams, 399 U.S. at 98-99. But Williams concluded that such

“purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. Id. at 99.

Rather, the Court focused on the “function” that the jury plays in the

4 See also, e.g., Capital Traction Co v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899)

(“Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term at the

common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial

by a jury of 12 men” but also contains other requirements);

Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905) (“The

constitutional requirement that ‘the trial of all crimes, except in cases

of impeachment, shall be by jury,’ means, as this court has adjudged,

a trial by the historical, common-law jury of twelve persons’).

25

Constitution, concluding that the “essential feature” of a jury is it

leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”

and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community

participation and [with] shared responsibility.” Id. at 100-01.

According to the Williams Court, both “currently available evidence

[and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily be

performed with six jurors as with twelve. Id. at 101-102 & n.48; cf.

Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging that

Williams and its progeny “departed from the strictly historical

requirements of jury trial”).

Williams’s ruling that the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated

to the States by the Fourteenth) permits a six-person jury cannot

stand in light of Ramos. There, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of

a serious offense. In reaching that conclusion, the Ramos Court

overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a decision that

it faulted for “subject[ing] the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury

verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” 140 S. Ct. at 1401-1402.

That reasoning undermines Williams as well. Ramos rejected

the same kind of “cost-benefit analysis” the Court undertook in

26

Williams, observing that it is not the Court’s role to “distinguish

between the historic features of common law jury trials that (we

think) serve ‘important enough functions to migrate silently into the

Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.” 140 S. Ct. at 1400-01.

Ultimately, the Ramos Court explained, the question is whether “at

the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by jury

included” the particular feature at issue. Id. at 1402. As the history

summarized above establishes, there can be no serious doubt that

the common understanding of the jury trial during the Revolutionary

War era was that twelve jurors were required—“a verdict, taken from

eleven, was no verdict at all.” See 140 S. Ct. at 1395 (quotation marks

omitted).

Even setting aside Williams’s now-disfavored functionalist logic,

its ruling suffered from another significant flaw: it was based on

research that was out of date shortly after the opinion issued.

Specifically, the Williams Court “flou]nd little reason to think” that

the goals of the jury guarantee—including, among others, “to provide

a fair possibility for obtaining a representative[| cross-section of the

community”—“are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved

when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12.” Id. at 100.

27

The Court theorized that “in practice the difference between the 12-

man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the

community represented seems likely to be negligible.” Id. at 102.

In the time since Williams, that determination has proven

incorrect. Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much just eight years

later in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when it concluded

that the Sixth Amendment barred the use of a five-person jury.

Although Ballew did not overturn Williams, the Ballew Court

observed that empirical studies conducted in the handful of

intervening years highlighted several problems with Williams’

assumptions. For example, Ballew noted that more recent research

showed that (1) “smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group

deliberation,” id. at 233, (2) smaller juries may be less accurate and

cause “increasing inconsistency” in verdict results, id. at 234, (3) the

chance for hung juries decreases with smaller _ juries,

disproportionally harming the defendant, id. at 236; and (4)

decreasing jury sizes “foretell[] problems ... for the representation of

minority groups in the community,” undermining a jury’s likelihood

of being “truly representative of the community,” id. at 236-37.

Moreover, the Ballew Court “admit[ted]” that it “d[id] not pretend to

28

discern a clear line between six members and five,” effectively

acknowledging that the studies it relied on also cast doubt on the

effectiveness of the six-member jury. Id. at 239; see also id. at 245-

46 (Powell, J.) (agreeing that five-member juries are unconstitutional,

while acknowledging that “the line between five- and six-member

juries is difficult to justify”).

Post-Ballew research has further undermined Williams.

Current empirical evidence indicates that “reducing jury size

inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority group

members on the jury.” Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the

Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. of Empirical Legal

Stud. 425, 427 (Sept. 2009); see also Higginbotham et al., Better by

the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury, 104

Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020) (“Larger juries are also more

inclusive and more representative of the community. ... In reality,

cutting the size of the jury dramatically increases the chance of

excluding minorities.”). Because “the 12-member jury produces

significantly greater heterogeneity than does the six-member jury,”

Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury, supra, at 449, it

increases “the opportunity for meaningful and appropriate

29

representation” and helps ensure that juries “represent adequately a

cross-section of the community.” Ballew, 435 U.S. at 237.

Other important considerations also weigh in favor of the

twelve-member jury. For instance, studies indicate that twelvemember juries deliberate longer, recall evidence better, and rely less

on irrelevant factors during deliberation. See Smith & Saks, The Case

for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury, 60 Fla. L.

Rev. 441, 465 (2008). Minority views are also more likely to be

thoroughly expressed in a larger jury, as “having a large minority

helps make the minority subgroup more influential,” and,

unsurprisingly, “the chance of minority members having allies is

greater on a twelve-person jury.” Id. at 466. Finally, larger juries

deliver more predictable results. In the civil context, for example,

“(slix-person juries are four times more likely to return extremely

high or low damage awards compared to the average.” Higginbotham

et al., Better by the Dozen, supra, at 52.

Appellant recognizes that the state constitution provides:

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall

be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications

and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed

by law.

30

Art. 1, § 22, Fla. Const. And he recognizes that section 913.10, Florida

Statutes, provides for six jurors except in capital cases. See also Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.270.

But Florida’s provision for a jury of six stems from the dawn of

the Jim Crow era, one month after federal troops were withdrawn

from the state. The historical background is as follows:

In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was amended

to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of causes in any

court may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell,

34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903).

The common law rule of ajury of twelve was still kept in Florida

while federal troops remained in the state. There was no provision for

a jury of less than twelve until the Legislature enacted a provision

specifying a jury of six in Chapter 3010, section 6. See Gibson v.

State, 16 Fla. 291, 297-98 (1877) (quoting and discussing Chapter

3010, section 6, Laws of Florida (1877)); Florida Fertilizer, 34 So. 15

241 (noting that previously all juries had twelve members).

The Legislature enacted chapter 3010 with the jury-of-six

provision on February 17, 1877. Gibson, 16 Fla. 294. This was less

than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn from

31

Florida in January 1877. See Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and

Renewal, 1865-1877, in The History of Florida 273 (Michael Gannon,

ed., first paperback edition 2018) (“there were [no federal troops” in

Florida after 23 January 1877”).

The jury-of-six thus first saw light at the birth of the Jim Crow

era as former Confederates regained power in southern states and

state prosecutors made a concerted effort to prevent blacks from

serving on jurors.

On its face the 1868 constitution extended the franchise to

black men. But the historical context shows that that it was part of

the overall resistance to Reconstruction efforts to protect the rights

of black citizens. The constitution was the product of a remarkable

series of events including a coup in which leaders of the white

southern (or native) faction took possession of the assembly hall in

the middle of the night, excluding Radical Republican delegates from

the proceedings. See Richard L. Hume, Membership of the Florida

Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican

Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q. 1, 5-6

(1972); Shofner at 266. A reconciliation was effected as the “outside”

32

whites “united with the majority of the body’s native whites to frame

a constitution designed to continue white dominance.” Hume at 15.

The racist purpose of the resulting constitution was spelled out

by Harrison Reed, a leader of the prevailing faction and the first

governor elected under the 1868 constitution, who wrote to Senator

Yulee that the new constitution was constructed to bar blacks from

legislative office:

Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will

be appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro

legislature.

Hume, 15-16. See also Shofner 266.

In Ramos, Justice Gorsuch noted that the Louisiana nonunanimity rule arose from Jim Crow era efforts to enforce white

supremacy. Id. at 1394; see also id. at 1417 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (non-unanimity was enacted “as one pillar of a

comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures

against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service.”).

The history of Florida’s jury of six arises from the same historical

context.

In view of the foregoing, a jury of six at a criminal trial for any

felony offense, particularly a crime punishable by up to life

33

imprisonment, is unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Finally, Appellant did not waive his Sixth Amendment right toa

twelve-person jury. A defendant may waive his right to a

constitutional jury, but the “express and intelligent consent of the

defendant” is required. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312.

In Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2008), for example,

Johnson was charged with felony DUI, which is committing DUI with

three prior DUI convictions. Johnson, 994 So. 2d at 962. After a jury

found Johnson guilty of the base offense of DUI, the trial court, by

stipulation, became the factfinder as to the prior DUI convictions.

The trial court found that Johnson had the requisite prior convictions

and adjudicated him guilty of felony DUI.

Johnson appealed, and this Court affirmed, holding that

Johnson’s counsel’s stipulation that the trial court act as factfinder

was a valid waiver of Johnson’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury

decide the prior-convictions element. Johnson v. State, 944 So. 2d

474, 476-77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Johnson sought review in the Florida Supreme Court. The

supreme court held that defense counsel’s stipulation was

34

insufficient, that Johnson’s personal waiver of his jury-trial right was

required. Johnson, 994 So. 2d at 963. “Further, a defendant’s silence

does not establish a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial.” Id. Thus,

Johnson could raise this issue for the first time on appeal: “[B]ecause

a defendant’s silence clearly does not constitute a valid waiver, it

logically follows that defendants are not required to break their

silence (through either a request for a jury trial or an objection to the

bench trial) to preserve appellate review of this claim. Here, just as

Johnson’s silence was insufficient to waive his right to a jury trial,

his silence was insufficient to waive appellate review of this claim.”

Id. at 964 (citation omitted).

As in Johnson, Appellant’s failure to raise this issue in the lower

court “does not constitute a waiver of appellate review on this claim.”

Id.

The Third District’s decision in Jimenez v. State, 167 So. 3d 497

(Fla. 3d DCA 2015), rev. denied, 192 So. 3d 38 (Fla. 2015), supports

Appellant’s argument. Jimenez was tried by ajury of six people when

he should have been tried by a jury of twelve people (he was charged

with first-degree murder, a capital offense). This violated section

913.10, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

35

3.270. This was not fundamental error, the Third District said,

because the “right to a jury of twelve persons is not of constitutional

dimension. Rather, it is a right provided by state statute and in the

corresponding Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure.” Jimenez, 167 So.

3d at 499 (citations omitted). The court continued: “Jimenez was not

denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury. Rather, he was

provided with a trial by jury, but consisting of six rather than twelve

persons. While this failed to comply with the statutory requirement,

it was not fundamental error such that it could have been raised for

the first time on appeal.” Id. (citations omitted).

Jimenez was issued before Ramos effectively overruled Williams.

Appellant’s argument is that a jury of twelve persons is of

“constitutional dimension.” Jimenez implies that if it is an issue of

“constitutional dimension,” then it may be raised for the first time on

appeal.

This Court should reverse the judgment and sentence and

remand for a new trial with a twelve-person jury, as required by the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

36

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR ST LUCIE COUNTY, FLORIDA

Modified °

Resentence

Amended

Corrected

Mitigated

Community Control Violator

Probation Violator

Pll i dtl

Case Number: 562016CF003434AXXXXX

STATE OF FLORIDA

-vs- . Sexual Predator

CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ — Sex Offender

Defendant a Minor Victim

Sentenced in Absentia

The Defendant, CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO- RAMIREZ being sersonally before this

Court represented by AttorneyADRIENNE M BUCCHI, the Attorney of record, and the State

represented by BRANDON ALEXANDER EDISON WHITE, and having:

x been tried and found quilty by Jury of the following crime(s),

entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s).

entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crime(s)

"Admitted Violation of Probation

Found Guilty of Violation of Probation

Admitted a Violation of Community Control

Found Guilty of Violation of Community Control

Offense Statute Level / OBTS

Count Crime Number(s). Degree Number

1 BURGLARY OF A DWELLING 810.02 F-2 5601226235

2 FIRST DEGREE PETIT THEFT 812.014 M-1 5601226235

3 STALKING 784.048(2) M-1 5601226235

4 BURGLARY OF A DWELLING WHILE ARMED 810.02 F-1-PB 5601226235

5 POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS 810.06 F-3 5601227160

6 RESISTING OFFICER WITHOUT VIOLENCE 843.02 M-1 5601226236

X

and being a qualified offender pursuant to Florida Statute 943.325 - defendant shall be required to submit

DNA samples as required by law

and good cause being shown; IT IS ORDERED THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITHHELD.

db/kb/dc/doc Page 1 of 2

\

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

The Defendant in open Court was advised of the right to appeal from this Sentence by filing notice of appeal

within 30 days from this date with the Clerk of this Court and the Defendant's right to the a

taking the appeal at the expense of the State on showing of indig

CASE NUMBER

2016CF003434 A

crea Judjé ROBERTLPEGS” C7 [/

-

FINGERPRINTS OF DEFENDANT __

1. Right Thumb

2. Right Index

3. Right Middle

4. Right Ring

5. Right Little

Me

er

dirs

9. Left Ring

6. Left Thumb

Fingerprints taken by:

!

Name}

| HEARBY CERTIFY that the above and forgoing fingerprints are the fingerprints of the Defendant

CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ

presence in open Court this date.

DONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at St. Lucie County, Florida, on

Nunc Pro Tunc To:

and that they were placed thereon by said Defendant in my

Thursday, January 6, 2022

Cingult Judge ROBERT L PEGS~

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

_ Resentenced

Modified Case Number 562016CF003434AXXXXX

Amended

__ Mitigated OBTS Number 5601226235

_____ Corrected

Defendant CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ

(As to Count 1 )

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the Defendant’s Attorney of record ADRIENNE

M BUCCHI and having been adjudicated guilty, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and

to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show catise why the Defense should not be sentenced as provided by law,

and no cause being shown ;

___ and the Court having on deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

___ and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on now resentence the Defendant.

___and the Court having placed the Defendant on and having subsequently

revoked the Defendant’s

It Is The Sentence Of Court that:

___ The defendant pay a fine of

required on 938.04, Florida Statutes.

X_ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

___ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of St. Lucie County Florida.

___ The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus as the 5% surcharge

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable.):

For a term of Natural Life.

__ For aterm of Natural Life with a 25 year mandatory minimum

X_For aterm of 15.00 YEAR(S)

___ The SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of subject to conditions set forth in this Order.

If ‘split’ sentence complete the __ Followed by a period of on Community Control under the supervision of the

appropriate Paragraph. Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth

in a separate order.

___ Followed by a period of probation under the supervision of the Department

of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth in a

separate order.

___ However, after serving a period of imprisonment in PRISON, the balance of the

sentence will be suspended and the Defendant will be on Probation/Community Control

under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and

conditions of Probation/Community Control as set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional, split sentences, all incarceration portions shail be satisfied

before the Defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

Page i of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

562016CF003434AXXXXX

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count 1)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed

Mandatory/ Minimum Provisions:

Firearm

Drug Trafficking

Law Enforcement

Controlled Substance

Within 1,000 Feet

Habitual Felony Offender

Habitual Violent Felony

Violent Career Criminal

Capital Offense

Prison Releasee

Sexual Predator

Other Provisions:

Jail Credit

Credit for Time Served

in Resentencing After

Violation of Probation or

Community Control

Consecutive/ Concurrent

of School

[> |

x

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 893.135, Florida Statutes, is

hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court, and that the Defendant pay a fine of $___, pursuant to section

893.135, Florida Statutes, plus$___ as a 5% surcharge.

It is further ordered that the minimum mandatory imprisonment provision of section 784.07, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the 3 year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(1)(c), Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence in this count.

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4){a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings

by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

extended term in accordance with the provisions of sections 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum

term of year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court are set forth

in a separate order as stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal and has been sentenced to an extended term in

accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(d), Florida Statutes, A minimum of

prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court as set forth in a separate order or stated on

the record in open court. (For crimes committed on or after May 24, 1997.)

must be served

It is further that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with provisions of section

775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (For first degree murder committed prior to May 25, 1994, and for any other capital

felony committed prior to October {, 1995.)

Defendant is adjudged a prison releasee reoffender in accordance with the provision of section 775.082(9), FL Statutes.

Defendant is adjudged a sexual predator in accordance with provision of section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a total of 0 DAY(S)

as credit for time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed days time served between date of arrest

as a violator following Release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections

shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain time

previously awarded on case/count (Offenses committed before October 1, 1989)

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed days time served between date or arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Correction shall apply original jail time

credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case/count

(Offenses committed between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes.

. The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject

to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)), Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed time served between date of arrest as a violator following

release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and

shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes, on case/ count .

(Offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994)

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run CONSECUTIVE with the sentence set.

forth in count 4 of this case,

Page 2 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

_. Resentenced

____. Modified Case Number 562016CF003434AXXXXX

Amended

____ Mitigated OBTS Number 5601226235

____ Corrected

Defendant CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ

(As to Count 2 )

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the Defendant’s Attorney of record ADRIENNE

M BUCCHI and having been adjudicated guilty, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and

to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the Defense should not be sentenced as provided by law,

and no cause being shown

___ and the Court having on deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

____ and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on now resentence the Defendant.

____ and the Court having placed the Defendant on and having subsequently

revoked the Defendant’s

It Is The Sentence Of Court that:

___ The defendant pay a fine of

required on 938.04, Florida Statutes.

___ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

X_The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of St. Lucie County Florida.

___ The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus as the 5% surcharge

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable.):

For a term of Natural Life.

For a term of Natural Life with a 25 year mandatory minimum

X_Foraterm of 1.00 YEAR(S)

__ The SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of

subject to conditions set forth in this Order.

If ‘split’? sentence complete the ___—- Followed by a period of on Community Control under the supervision of the

appropriate Paragraph. Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth

in a separate order.

__ Followed by a period of probation under the supervision of the Department

of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth in a

separate order.

__. However, after serving a period of imprisonment in CNTY JAIL, the balance of the

sentence will be suspended and the Defendant will be on Probation/Community Control

under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and

conditions of Probation/Community Control as set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional, split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied

before the Defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

Page 3 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

562016CF003434AXXXXKX

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count 2)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed

Mandatory/ Minimum Provisions:

Firearm

Drug Trafficking

Law Enforcement

Controlled Substance

Within 1,000 Feet

Habitual Felony Offender

Habitual Violent Felony

Violent Career Criminal

Capital Offense

Prison Releasee

Sexual Predator

Other Provisions:

Jail Credit

Credit for Time Served

in Resentencing After

Violation of Probation or

Community Control

Consecutive/ Concurrent

bn TL Nahe wee Meee

of School

“=== hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court, and that the Defendant pay a fine of $__, pursuant to section

893,135, Florida Statutes, plus $__as a 5% surcharge.

It is further ordered that the minimum mandatory imprisonment provision of section 784.07, Florida

~———~ Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the 3 year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(1)(c), Florida

—— Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence in this count.

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

“=== term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings

by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

=== extended term in accordance with the provisions of sections 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum

term of year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court are set forth

in a separate order as stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal and has been sentenced to an extended term in

—— accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(d), Florida Statutes, A minimum of must be served

prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court as set forth in a separate order or stated on

the record in open court. (For crimes committed on or after May 24, 1997.)

It is further that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with provisions of section

seme =775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (For first degree murder committed prior to May 25, 1994, and for any other capital

felony committed prior to October 1, 1995.)

Defendant is adjudged a prison releasee reoffender in accordance with the provision of section 775.082(9), FL Statutes.

Defendant is adjudged a sexual predator in accordance with provision of section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

X itis further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a total of 1,789 DAY(S)

=== _as credit for time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed _____ days time served between date of arrest

as a violator following Release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections

shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain time

previously awarded on case/count (Offenses committed before October 1, 1989)

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed days time served between date or arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Correction shall apply original jail time

credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case/count

(Offenses committed between October |, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

. The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes.

_ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject

to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)), Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed time served between date of arrest as a violator following

x

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 893.135, Florida Statutes, is

release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and

shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes, on case/ count .

(Offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994)

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run CONCURRENT with the sentence set

forth in count 4_ of this case.

Page 4 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Resentenced

Modified Case Number 562016CF003434AXXXXX

Amended

T

Mitigated OBTS Number §601226235

Corrected

Defendant CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ

(As to Count 3 )

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the Defendant’s Attorney of record ADRIENNE

M BUCCHI and having been adjudicated guilty, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and

to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the Defense should not be sentenced as provided by law,

and no cause being shown

___ and the Court having on deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

___ and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on now resentence the Defendant.

____ and the Court having placed the Defendant on and having subsequently

revoked the Defendant’s

It Is The Sentence Of Court that:

___ The defendant pay a fine of pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus as the 5% surcharge

required on 938.04, Florida Statutes.

___ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

X_The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of St. Lucie County Florida,

___ The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable.):

__ Fora term of Natural Life.

For a term of Natural Life with a 25 year mandatory minimum

_X Fora term of _1.00 YEAR(S)

___ The SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of subject to conditions set forth in this Order.

If ‘split’ sentence complete the __—- Followed by a period of on Community Control under the supervision of the

appropriate Paragraph. Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth

in a separate order.

_._ Followed by a period of probation under the supervision of the Department

of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth in a

separate order.

____ However, after serving a period of imprisonment in CNTY JAIL, the balance of the

sentence will be suspended and the Defendant will be on Probation/Community Control

under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and

conditions of Probation/Community Control as set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional, split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied

before the Defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

Page 5 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

562016CF003434AXXXXKX

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count 3)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed

Mandatory/ Minimum Provisions:

Firearm

Drug Trafficking

Law Enforcement

Controlled Substance

Within 1,000 Feet of School

Habitual Felony Offender

Habitual Violent Felony

Violent Career Criminal

Capital Offense

Prison Releasee

Sexual Predator

Other Provisions:

Jail Credit

Credit for Time Served

in Resentencing After

Violation of Probation or

Community Control

Consecutive/ Concurrent

Wa TL Dal nee One ee

[ |

x

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 893.135, Florida Statutes, is

hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court, and that the Defendant pay a fine of $___, pursuant to section

893.135, Florida Statutes, plus $___ as a 5% surcharge.

It is further ordered that the minimum mandatory imprisonment provision of section 784.07, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the 3 year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(1)(c), Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence in this count.

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4){a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings

by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

extended term in accordance with the provisions of sections 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum

term of year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court are set forth

in a separate order as stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal and has been sentenced to an extended term in

accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(d), Florida Statutes, A minimum of must be served

prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court as set forth in a separate order or stated on

the record in open court. (For crimes committed on or after May 24, 1997.)

It is further that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with provisions of section

775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (For first degree murder committed prior to May 25, 1994, and for any other capital

felony committed prior to October 1, 1995.)

Defendant is adjudged a prison releasee reoffender in accordance with the provision of section 775.082(9), FL Statutes.

Defendant is adjudged a sexual predator in accordance with provision of section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a total of 1,789 DAY(S)

as credit for time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed days time served between date of arrest

as a violator following Release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections

shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain time

previously awarded on case/count _ ss (Offenses committed before October 1, 1989)

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed days time served between date or arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Correction shall apply original jail time

credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case/count

(Offenses committed between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes.

_ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject

to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)), Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed time served between date of arrest as a violator following

telease from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and

shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes, on case/ count .

(Offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994)

It is further ordered that the sentence Imposed for this count shall run CONCURRENT with the sentence set

forth in count 4 of this case,

Page 6 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

— Resentenced

~~ Modified Case Number 562016CFO03434AXXXXX

Amended

— N

___ Mitigated OBTS Number 5601226235

____ Corrected

Defendant CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ

(As to Count 4 )

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the Defendant’s Attorney of record ADRIENNE

M BUCCHI and having been adjudicated guilty, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and

to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the Defense should not be sentenced as provided by law,

and no cause being shown

___ and the Court having on deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

_.. and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on now resentence the Defendant.

___and the Court having placed the Defendant on and having subsequently

revoked the Defendant’s

It Is The Sentence Of Court that:

__.. The defendant pay a fine of pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus as the 5% surcharge

required on 938.04, Florida Statutes.

X_The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

__ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of St. Lucie County Florida.

__.. The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable.):

For a term of Natural Life.

For a term of Natural Life with a 25 year mandatory minimum

x For aterm of 25,00 YEAR(S)

___ The SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of subject to conditions set forth in this Order.

If ‘split’ sentence complete the ___—- Followed by a period of on Community Control under the supervision of the

appropriate Paragraph. Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth

in a separate order.

___ Followed by a period of probation under the supervision of the Department

of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth jn a

separate order.

__. However, after serving a period of imprisonment in PRISON, the balance of the

sentence will be suspended and the Defendant will be on Probation/Community Control

under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and

conditions of Probation/Community Control as set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional, split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied

before the Defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

Page 7 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

562016CF003434AXXXXX

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count 4)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed

Mandatory/ Minimum Provisions:

Firearm

Drug Trafficking

Law Enforcement

Controlled Substance

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087, Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provisions of section 893.135, Florida Statutes,

——— is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court, and that the Defendant pay a fine of $____, pursuant

to section 893.135, Florida Statutes, plus $__ as a 5% surcharge.

It is further ordered that the minimum mandatory imprisonment provision of section 784.07,

means Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

It is further ordered that the 3 year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893. 13(1)(c), Florida

Within 1,000 Feet af School ===™ Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence in this count.

Habitual Felony Offender

Habitual Violent Felony

Violent Career Criminal

Capital Offense

Prison Releasee

Sexual Predator

Other Provisions:

Jail Credit

Credit for Time Served

in Resentencing After

Violation of Probation or

Community Control

Consecutive/ Concurrent

As To Other Counts

I> |

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

—— term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings

by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

—— extended term in accordance with the provisions of sections 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum

term of year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court are set forth

in a separate order as stated on the record in open court.

The Defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal and has been sentenced to an extended term in

=== accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(d), Florida Statutes, Aminimum of __ must be

served prior to release. The requisite findings of the Court as set forth in a separate order or stated on

the record in open court. (For crimes committed on or after May 24, 1997.)

It is further that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with provisions of section

— 775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (For first degree murder committed prior to May 25, 1994, and for any other

capital felony committed prior to October 1, 1995.)

Defendant is adjudged a prison releasee reoffender in accordance with the provision of section 775.082(9), FL

———- Statutes.

Defendant is adjudged a sexual predator in accordance with provision of section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a tota) of 1,789 DAY(S)

it for time incar fore i this sente

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed days time served between date of arrest

as a violator following Release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections

shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain time

previously awarded on case/count (Offenses committed before October 1, 1989)

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed days time served between date or arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Correction shall apply original

jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case/count

(Offenses committed between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes.

The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may

be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)), Florida Statutes.

It is further ordered that the Defendant be allowed time served between date of arrest as a violator

following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original

jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida

Statutes, on case/ count . (Offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994)

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall] run with the sentence set forth in count

— of this case.

Page 8 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

Violation of Probation, Previously Adjudged Guilty

Violation of Community Control, Previously Adjudged Guilty

_. Resentenced

~ Modified Case Number 562016CF003434AXXXXX

_____ Amended

___ Mitigated OBTS Number 5601227160

_____ Corrected

Defendant CARLOS GILBERT ARELLANO-RAMIREZ

(As to Count § )

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the Defendant’s Attorney of record ADRIENNE

M BUCCHI and having been adjudicated guilty, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and

to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the Defense should not be sentenced as provided by law,

and no cause being shown

____ and the Court having on deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

____ and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on now resentence the Defendant.

___and the Court having placed the Defendant on and having subsequently

revoked the Defendant’s

It Is The Sentence Of Court that:

___ The defendant pay a fine of

required on 938.04, Florida Statutes.

pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus as the 5% surcharge

X_ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

___ The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of St. Lucie County Florida.

___ The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable.):

__ Fora term of Natural Life.

__ For aterm of Natural Life with a 25 year mandatory minimum

X_Foratermof 5.00 YEAR(S)

__ The SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED for a period of

subject to conditions set forth in this Order.

If ‘split’ sentence complete the ___— Followed by a period of on Community Control under the supervision of the

appropriate Paragraph. Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth

in a separate order.

__ Followed by a period of probation under the supervision of the Department

of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision as set forth in a

separate order.

___ However, after serving a period of imprisonment in PRISON, the balance of the

sentence will be suspended and the Defendant will be on Probation/Community Control

under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and

conditions of Probation/Community Control as set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional, split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied

before the Defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

Page 9 of 13

St. Lucie County File Date: 01/10/2022 04:54 PM

[OCR skipped on page(s) 31-43]

[Read from a scan; the first 30 pages.]

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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