Reply Brief — John A. Crane, Petitioner v. Florida

No. 23-5455

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN A. CRANE,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH DISTRICT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

PAUL EDWARD PETILLO

Assistant Public

Defender

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC

DEFENDER

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 663-6000

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

THOMAS G. SPRANKLING

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

ALEX W. MILLER

2600 El Camino Real

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Suite 400

HALE AND DORR LLP

Palo Alto, CA 94306

7 World Trade Center

LEAH FUGERE*

250 Greenwich Street

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

New York, NY 10007

HALE AND DORR LLP

350 S. Grand Avenue

Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90071

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... ii

ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 2

I.

BOTH OF FLORIDA’S VEHICLE ARGUMENTS

HAVE BEEN REJECTED ............................................... 2

A. Jurisdiction ............................................................. 2

B. Harmless Error ..................................................... 5

II. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE WILLIAMS ............ 6

A. Egregiously Wrong............................................... 7

B. Significant Negative Consequences ................. 10

C. Reliance ................................................................ 11

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) ................... 6

Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) ............................. 8

Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Mihas, 280

U.S. 102 (1929) .............................................................. 4

Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) .......................... 10

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) ......................... 6

DeBiasi v. Snaith, 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1999) ...................................................................... 5

Gotthilf v. Sills, 375 U.S. 79 (1963) ................................... 5

Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 2022) ...................................................................... 3

Guzman v. State, 2023 WL 3830251 (Fla. June 6,

2023) ............................................................................... 3

Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business &

Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136

(1994) .............................................................................. 4

Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981) ......................... 3

Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S.Ct. 22 (2022)...........1, 7, 9-10

Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ............. 5

Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) ...................................... 4

Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389

U.S. 235 (1967) .......................................................... 1, 5

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) .......................... 6

Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020) ...... 1-2, 7-8, 11

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)..................... 10

United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273 (4th Cir.

2003) ............................................................................... 6

Whitaker

v.

Jacksonville

Expressway

Authority, 131 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1961) ............................................................................... 4

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ................. 2, 7, 10

DOCKETED CASES

Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (U.S.) ......................... 11

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

28 U.S.C. § 1257 ............................................................... 2, 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Bar Association, Principles for Juries

and Jury Trials (2005), https://www.

uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/aba_principles

_for_juries_and_jury_trials_2005.pdf ................. 8, 10

Fay, Nicolas, et al., Group Discussion as

Interactive Dialogue or as Serial

Monologue: The Influence of Group Size, 11

Psychol. Sci. 481 (2000) ................................................ 9

Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator, FY 2021-22 Statistical Reference Guide

(2023), https://tinyurl.com/22tn3z32......................... 11

Guerra, Alice, et al., Accuracy of Verdicts, 28

Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221 (2020) ................................... 9

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Kogan, Gerald & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, 18 Nova L. Rev. 1151 (1994) ............... 3

Mukhopadhaya, Koushik, Jury Size and the

Free Rider Problem, 19 J. L. Econ. & Org.

24 (2003) ......................................................................... 9

Parisi, Francesco & Barbara Luppi, Jury Size

and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 J. Legal

Stud. 399 (2013) ............................................................. 9

Rose, Mary R., et al., Jury Pool Underrepresentation in the Modern Era: Evidence from

Federal Courts, 15 J. Empirical Legal Stud.

2 (2018) ........................................................................... 9

Saks, Michael J. & Molly Weighner Marti, A

Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size,

21 Law & Hum. Behav. 451 (1997) ............................. 8

Waller, Bridget M, et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry

Men: Managing Conversational Group Size

Increases Perceived Contribution by

Decision Makers, 14 Grp. Processes &

Intergrp. Rels. 835 (2011)............................................ 9

The Sixth Amendment’s “promise of a jury trial” is

“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020). The scope

of that right is controlled by “what the term ‘trial by an

impartial jury’ … meant at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. Tellingly, Florida does not dispute

that “a mountain of evidence suggests that, both at the

time of the Amendment’s adoption and for most of our

Nation’s history, the right to a trial by jury for serious

criminal offenses meant a trial before 12 members of the

community.” Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S.Ct. 22, 23

(2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). To the contrary, Florida

acknowledges the common law did impose a “12-person

jury requirement.” Opp.8-9.

Florida seeks to distract from the fundamental right

at stake by raising meritless vehicle issues and highlighting the one-time cost of correcting the Williams error. As to the former, Florida argues Mr. Crane failed

to exhaust his options for state court review because he

did not ask the Florida Court of Appeal to certify the

question presented to the Florida Supreme Court. But

Mr. Crane properly petitioned the Florida Supreme

Court for review, and this Court already rejected Florida’s certification argument nearly sixty years ago. See

Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 237 & n.1

(1967). Florida’s suggestion that this Court should sub

silentio overrule Nash based on a ministerial change to

the state Rules of Appellate Procedure is meritless. Indeed, this Court granted review of several Florida Court

of Appeal decisions even after the tweak to Florida’s

rules. Similarly, Florida’s harmless error argument ignores that (1) every Circuit to consider the issue has held

that failure to provide a 12-member jury is structural

2

error and, regardless, (2) harmlessness is most properly

addressed on remand.1

As to Florida’s latter argument—i.e., that overruling Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), would require a slice of cases to be retried in a half-dozen

States—this is the “usual” consequence of adopting a

“new rule[] of criminal procedure,” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at

1406. This Court vacated “nearly 800 decisions” following Booker v. United States and “[s]imilar consequences

likely followed” other landmark rulings. Id. Here,

nearly 50 million Americans are currently being denied

their right to a 12-person jury in nearly all circumstances. “[T]he competing interests” of a handful of

States cannot outweigh “the reliance the American people place in their constitutionally protected liberties.”

Id. at 1408 (plurality op.).

ARGUMENT

I.

BOTH OF FLORIDA’S VEHICLE ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN

REJECTED

A. Jurisdiction

Mr. Crane obtained a decision from the “highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had,” 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a), because he unsuccessfully petitioned

the Florida Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeal’s decision affirming his conviction at a time when

Florida’s high court had jurisdiction, Pet.App.2.

Specifically, the Florida Court of Appeal summarily

affirmed Mr. Crane’s conviction in a per curiam order.

1

This Court called for a response in other cases raising the

same question presented. See Nos. 23-5171, 23-5173, 23-5567, 235570, 23-5575, 23-5579. This case should at least be held pending

resolution of those petitions.

3

Pet.App.1. The decision read in full: “Affirmed. See

Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022),

rev. pending, No. SC22-1597.” Pet.App.1. Guzman presented the 12-member jury question. Guzman v. State,

350 So. 3d 72, 73-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022). When the

Court of Appeal “cites as controlling authority a decision

… pending review in” the Florida Supreme Court, the

latter has discretionary jurisdiction to take up the case.

Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981). That is the

situation here—the Court of Appeal cited Guzman,

which was then properly pending in the Florida Supreme Court. Pet.App.1; see also Guzman v. State, 2023

WL 3830251, at *1 (Fla. June 6, 2023); Kogan & Waters,

The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme

Court, 18 Nova L. Rev. 1151, 1155 n.9 (1994) (“A case is

pending if it has been properly filed and is awaiting review.”). Mr. Crane thus could—and did—invoke the

Florida Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by filing a petition

for review. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 420; Pet.App.1-2. Under

these circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court dismissing Mr. Crane’s petition after denying review in

Guzman is not an indication the Court lacked jurisdiction when Mr. Crane filed his petition for review.2

Florida’s contention (Opp.5-6) that Mr. Crane should

have instead sought certification in the Court of Appeal

because “the Florida Supreme Court generally lacks jurisdiction ... to review summary decisions” simply ignores the Jollie rule. Here, the Florida Supreme Court

did have jurisdiction when Mr. Crane petitioned for review because Guzman was pending, then declined to

take up the question presented in both cases. There is

2

Guzman is also pending before this Court. See No. 23-5173.

Florida does not dispute that this Court has jurisdiction to consider

Guzman.

4

no requirement to avail oneself of more than one path to

review so long as the higher court would have jurisdiction under the path the litigant did take. E.g., Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Mihas, 280 U.S. 102, 104 (1929).

“[I]t would be unreasonable to require an application to

the Appellate Court for a certificate of importance and

appeal when Supreme Court” had already denied a petition for review of the same question. Id. That is precisely what Florida demands here.

Regardless, this Court rejected in Nash the certification argument Florida now presses, and has granted

certiorari to the Florida Court of Appeal under similar

circumstances. E.g., 389 U.S. at 237 n.1 (seeking certification not required); Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. &

Prof’l Regul., 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (granting certiorari when the “Court of Appeal ... affirmed the Board’s

final order per curiam without opinion,” leaving “no

right of review in the Florida Supreme Court”). As the

Florida case Nash cited explains, “[i]nherent in every

decision rendered by a District Court of Appeal is the

implication, unless otherwise stated or contrary action

taken, that it does not pass upon a question of great public interest.” Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway

Auth., 131 So. 2d 22, 23-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). In

other words, Florida law makes requesting certification

akin to requesting rehearing. And “finality is not deferred by the existence of a latent power in the rendering court to reopen or revise its judgment” because

“[s]uch latent powers of state courts over their judgments are too variable and indeterminate to serve as

tests of [this Court’s] jurisdiction.” Market St. Ry. Co.

v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548, 551-552 (1945).

Florida tries to circumvent Nash because Florida’s

Supreme Court later made a minor amendment to its appellate rules that codified a litigant’s ability to “move for

5

certification.” Opp.6 n.2. But Nash recognized litigants

could already “file a suggestion” that certification was

appropriate, 389 U.S. at 327 n.1, and Florida points to

nothing suggesting such a ministerial change had substantive implications. Instead, “the purpose of the new

language ... was not to provide for a different type of reconsideration, but rather to permit a party to move for

certification without being first required to move for rehearing.” DeBiasi v. Snaith, 732 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1999). The Florida Supreme Court accordingly

had no occasion to reconsider the principle underlying

Nash—i.e., a certification request is akin to requesting

rehearing.

Florida’s authority is not to the contrary. The two

cases Florida cites involve other States and predated

Nash (meaning the Nash Court necessarily considered

them). Gotthilf v. Sills turned on the peculiarities of

New York’s procedure for certifying interlocutory appeals of nonfinal orders, and—unlike here—the state

high court did not have direct jurisdiction over the petitioner’s request for review. 375 U.S. 79, 80 (1963). Because Section 1257 accounts for “the structure of [the

relevant state’s] judicial system” and “the particularized

provisions of [that state’s] laws,” Local 174 v. Lucas

Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 98 (1962), Gotthilf’s analysis of

New York law says nothing about Florida’s. Similarly,

Gorman dealt with a Missouri law that “expressly conferred the right to an en banc rehearing by the Supreme

Court of Missouri.” Local 174, 369 U.S. at 99. Here,

there was no rehearing “as a matter of right.” Id.

B. Harmless Error

Florida contends (Opp.20-23) that Mr. Crane would

not benefit from a decision overruling Williams, but because the magnitude of the constitutional error was

6

necessarily “not addressed by the Court of Appeals,” the

proper course would be to grant the petition and allow

the court below to consider harmlessness on remand.

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005).

Regardless, federal courts roundly reject Florida’s

position, holding that “depriving a defendant of the verdict of twelve” is structural error requiring automatic

reversal. United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 281

(4th Cir. 2003). A court “simply cannot know what affect” adding one more juror “might have had on jury deliberations” without diverting into “pure speculation.”

Id. at 281-282.

Florida asserts (Opp.21-22) that conviction by 50%

of the constitutionally required 12 is analogous to the instructional error in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7

(1999). But Neder emphasized the flawed instruction

neither implicated a “‘defect affecting the framework in

which the trial proceeds,’” nor “‘vitiate[d] all the jury’s

findings.’” Id. at 8-13. Not so here. Florida does not

even attempt to explain how a court could account for

the views of a half-dozen unknown individuals, all of

whom must agree with the existing six for Mr. Crane’s

conviction to stand.

II. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE WILLIAMS

“[S]tare decisis is at its nadir” in cases “concerning

[criminal] procedur[e] rules that implicate fundamental

constitutional protection.” Alleyne v. United States, 570

U.S. 99, 116 n.5 (2013). Here, every factor this Court

considers when evaluating precedent favors overruling

Williams.

7

A. Egregiously Wrong

Florida’s chief defense of Williams rests on sleight

of hand. Florida notes Williams “devoted 13 pages to

the history and development of the common-law jury

and the Sixth Amendment” but concluded “the word

‘jury’ in the Sixth Amendment did not codify” the 12person requirement. Opp.8. To be clear, Williams came

to that conclusion not because of the history but in spite

of it. Williams rejected a test governed by “purely historical considerations” in favor of a functionalist approach, all while acknowledging the historical record is

clear that “the size of the jury at common law [was] fixed

generally at 12.” 399 U.S. at 89, 99; accord Khorrami,

143 S.Ct. at 23-24 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (summarizing

history). Had Williams applied the Ramos test, it could

not have reached the same result.

Florida’s remaining attempts to defend Williams

are similarly unavailing.

First, Florida argues that the Sixth Amendment did

not “codif[y]” all common-law jury practices. Opp.9. Ramos, however, rejected this approach when it refused to

distinguish between “the historic features of common

law jury trial that (we think) serve ‘important enough’

functions to migrate silently into the Sixth Amendment

and those that don’t.” 140 S.Ct. at 1400-1401. Instead,

the question is simply what “the right to trial by jury

included” “at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. at 1402.3

3

Florida’s suggestion (Opp.9-10) that the Ramos test requires

“that a jury consist only of male landowners hailing from a particular county” was again rejected in Ramos itself. 140 S.Ct. at 1402

n.47 (“further constitutional amendments … prohibit [such] invidious discrimination”).

8

Florida relatedly relies on the “drafting history” of

the Sixth Amendment. Opp.10-12. But Ramos explained that the “snippet of drafting history” Williams

and Florida cite “could just as easily support the opposite inference”—i.e., certain omitted language was unnecessary “surplusage.” 140 S.Ct. at 1400. In any event,

this argument “proves too much” because ignoring common-law history would “leave the right to a ‘trial by jury’

devoid of meaning.” Id.

Second, Florida distinguishes Ramos because it

overruled “a uniquely fractured decision,” while Williams garnered “a solid majority.” Opp.12. But this distinction does nothing to square Ramos’s six-vote holding

with Williams. Indeed, Ramos explained that to the extent Apodaca established binding precedent, it should

be overruled. 140 S.Ct. at 1404-1405.

Third, Florida defends Williams’s functionalist

logic, including by noting it was not overruled by Ballew.

Opp.13-18. But Ballew refused to extend Williams’s

logic to 5-member juries precisely because Williams’s

foundations had been undermined. Ballew v. Georgia,

435 U.S. 223, 232-237 (1978); see also Pet.7-8.

Post-Ballew studies have repeatedly proved the

Ballew Court right. Twelve-person juries share more

ideas and challenges to conclusions during longer,

higher-quality deliberations. E.g., Saks & Marti, A

Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 Law &

Hum. Behav. 451, 458-459 (1997) (considering 17 studies); see generally ABA, Principles for Juries and Jury

Trials, Principle 3 cmt., at 17-21 (2005) (endorsing 12member-jury rule). A smaller jury also decreases the

probability that members of minority groups (be they

racial, religious, political, or socio-economic) will serve.

9

See, e.g., Rose et al., Jury Pool Underrepresentation in

the Modern Era, 15 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 2 (2018).

Florida’s contrary “scholarship” is inapposite. One

article did not study six-person juries—it considered

whether breaking a 12-member jury into four-person

discussion groups would promote deliberation. Waller

et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry Men, 14 Grp. Processes &

Intergrp. Rels. 835, 839 (2011). The others studied (1)

unconstitutional five-member groups, Fay et al., Group

Discussion as Interactive Dialogue or as Serial Monologue, 11 Psychol. Sci. 481, 481 (2000) or (2) mathematical

models (as opposed to testing actual people/juries),

Mukhopadhaya, Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem,

19 J. L. Econ. & Org. 24, 27-43 (2003); Parisi & Luppi,

Jury Size and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 J. Legal Stud.

399, 408 (2013); Guerra et al., Accuracy of Verdicts, 28

Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221, 232 (2020). And while Florida

cites (Opp.15-17) conviction rates across States, it neither identifies scholarship interpreting those numbers

nor attempts to control for divergent features and practices of state law (e.g., frequency of guilty pleas).

Finally, Florida argues there is nothing “nefarious”

about the fact that Florida law changed the minimum

jury size from 12 to six a few weeks after federal troops

left following Reconstruction. Opp.17-18. But at least

some States “restricted the size of juries … to suppress

minority voices in public affairs,” Khorrami, 143 S.Ct. at

27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), and Florida identifies no

reason the racist political forces that held sway in late

19th century Florida were any different. It responds

that the State “retained 12-person juries in capital

cases.” Opp.18. But that 12-member juries are warranted in cases where the defendant faces death only

supports that 12-member juries are more rights-protective than six-person juries.

10

B. Significant Negative Consequences

Williams has had negative jurisprudential consequences. A split Ballew Court struggled to apply the

functionalist approach, with members acknowledging

that the six-member line had little justification. Pet.7-8.

And Ramos necessarily rejected Williams’s approach.

The cases Florida cites (Opp.12) as “reaffirming” Williams mention the decision only in passing or rely on the

reasoning Ramos rejected.4

Williams has also had real-world consequences, as a

“drop in jury size” poses a threat to the “representativeness” of the jury and the “reliability” of the verdict.

ABA, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, Principle 3

cmt., at 19-20. “[T]hat smaller panels tend to skew jury

composition and impair the right to a fair trial … is a sad

truth borne out by hard experience.” Khorrami, 143

S.Ct. at 27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Florida does not

dispute a 12-member jury will sweep in a broader crosssection of the community, arguing only that the “faircross-section requirement applies” to the jury pool, not

the jury itself. Opp.18 n.15. But the available evidence

establishes that 12-member juries at least increase the

odds that jurors will embody the cross-section of humanity in the venire—an outcome Williams wrongly dismissed as “unrealistic,” 399 U.S. at 102.

4

Interpreting the Sixth Amendment does not require a change

in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The latter’s reference to

“Suits at common law”—which “is not directed to jury characteristics, such as size, but rather the kind of cases for which jury trial is

preserved,” Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973)—could preclude adopting attributes of the common-law jury. And the Sixth

Amendment should be more protective: It protects “liberty” rather

than “property.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632 (2003).

11

C. Reliance

Florida argues the reliance here “far outstrip[s]”

that in Ramos (Opp.19), but asserts the same interest:

re-trying a discrete number of non-final felony convictions. Almost any new rule of criminal procedure will

“affect[] significant numbers of pending cases across the

whole country.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1406.

Florida also contends the number of convictions affected distinguishes this case from Ramos. Opp.19. To

be clear, this case would affect only those felony proceedings where a trial has been held and the case is not yet

final on appeal—a number that is currently historically

low due to the COVID-19 pandemic.5 While Florida

claims without support (Opp.19) that it would have to

conduct “several thousand” retrials, this Court granted

certiorari in Ramos despite Louisiana’s argument that

requiring jury unanimity “could ... upset” “[t]housands

of final convictions.” Opp.4, Ramos, No. 18-5924 (U.S.).

Moreover, this Court vacated “nearly 800 decisions” following Booker and “similar consequences likely followed” Crawford and Gant. Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1406.

Ultimately, Florida ignores “the most important”

“reliance interest” of all—that “of the American people”

“in the preservation of our constitutionally promised liberties.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1408 (plurality op.). Nearly

50 million Americans are currently denied a right the

Framers intended all to enjoy, even while Florida recognizes that a 12-member jury is so important and fundamental that it is a necessary safeguard in death-penalty

cases. This Court alone has authority to step in and protect the rights of those millions. It should do so.

5

E.g., Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator,

FY2021-22 Statistical Reference Guide 3-20 to 3-22 (2023), https://

tinyurl.com/22tn3z32.

12

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted or held. See supra

n.1.

Respectfully submitted.

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

PAUL EDWARD PETILLO

Assistant Public

Defender

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC

DEFENDER

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 663-6000

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

THOMAS G. SPRANKLING

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

ALEX W. MILLER

2600 El Camino Real

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Suite 400

HALE AND DORR LLP

Palo Alto, CA 94306

7 World Trade Center

LEAH FUGERE*

250 Greenwich Street

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

New York, NY 10007

HALE AND DORR LLP

350 S. Grand Avenue

Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90071

* Not admitted in California. Admitted to practice

in Colorado. Supervised by

members of the firm who

are members of the California bar.

OCTOBER 2023