Reply Brief — Jose Luis Guzman, Petitioner v. Florida

No. 23-5173

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JOSE LUIS GUZMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH DISTRICT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

PAUL EDWARD PETILLO

Assistant Public

Defender

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC

DEFENDER

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 663-6000

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

THOMAS G. SPRANKLING

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

ALEX W. MILLER

2600 El Camino Real

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Suite 400

HALE AND DORR LLP

Palo Alto, CA 94306

7 World Trade Center

LEAH FUGERE*

250 Greenwich Street

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

New York, NY 10007

HALE AND DORR LLP

350 S. Grand Avenue

Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90071

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... ii

ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 2

I.

FLORIDA’S HARMLESS ERROR ARGUMENT

HAS BEEN UNIVERSALLY REJECTED BY

THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS ................................... 2

II. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE WILLIAMS ............ 4

A. Egregiously Wrong............................................... 4

B. Significant Negative Consequences ................... 8

C. Reliance ................................................................ 10

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) ................... 4

Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) ......................... 7, 9

Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) ............................ 9

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) ......................... 2

Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S.Ct. 22 (2022).......... 1, 6, 8, 10

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018) ..................... 2

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ........................ 3

Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390

(2020) .................................................... 1-2, 5-6, 8, 10-11

Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)....................... 9

United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273 (4th Cir.

2003) ........................................................................... 1, 3

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) ................. 9

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998)................. 4

Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017) ................ 3

Webster v. United States, 667 F.3d 826 (7th Cir.

2011) ............................................................................... 3

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ................. 2, 5, 10

DOCKETED CASES

Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (U.S.)........................ 11

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Bar Association, Principles for Juries

and Jury Trials (2005), https://www.

uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/aba_princip

les_for_juries_and_jury_trials_2005.pdf .............. 7, 9

Anwar, Shamena, et al., The Impact of Jury

Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. Econ.

1017 (2012) ..................................................................... 9

2 Collected Works of James Wilson (2007 ed.),

tinyurl.com/46s6rx9p ................................................... 6

Diamond, Shari Seidman, et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. Empirical Legal

Studies 425 (Sept. 2009)............................................... 9

Fay, Nicolas, et al., Group Discussion as

Interactive Dialogue or as Serial

Monologue, 11 Psych. Sci. 481 (2000) ........................ 7

Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator, FY2021-22 Statistical Reference Guide

(2023), https://tinyurl.com/22tn3z32......................... 11

Guerra, Alice, et al., Accuracy of Verdicts, 28

Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221 (2020) ................................... 8

Horowitz, Irwin A. & Kenneth S. Bordens, The

Effects of Jury Size, Evidence Complexity,

and Note Taking on Jury Process and Performance in a Civil Trial, 87 J. Applied

Pysch. 121 (2002) .......................................................... 7

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Parisi, Francesco & Barbara Luppi, Jury Size

and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 J. Legal

Stud. 399 (2013) ............................................................. 7

Mukhopadhaya, Koushik, Jury Size and the

Free Rider Problem, 19 J. L. Econ. & Org.

24 (2003) ......................................................................... 7

Rose, Mary R., et al., Jury Pool

Underrepresentation in the Modern Era:

Evidence from Federal Courts, 15 J.

Empirical Legal Stud. 2 (2018) ................................... 7

Saks, Michael J. & Molly Weighner Marti, A

Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size,

21 Law & Hum. Behav. 451 (1997) ............................. 7

Waller, Bridget M, et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry

Men, 14 Grp. Processes & Intergrp. Rels.

835 (2011) ....................................................................... 7

The Sixth Amendment’s “promise of a jury trial” is

“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020). The scope

of that right is controlled by “what the term ‘trial by an

impartial jury’ … meant at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. Tellingly, Florida does not dispute

that “a mountain of evidence suggests that, both at the

time of the Amendment’s adoption and for most of our

Nation’s history, the right to a trial by jury for serious

criminal offenses meant a trial before 12 members of the

community.” Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S.Ct. 22, 23

(2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). To the contrary, Florida

acknowledges that the common law did impose a “12person requirement.” Opp.6-7.

Florida instead seeks to distract from the fundamental right at stake by raising a baseless vehicle issue and

highlighting the one-time cost of correcting the Williams error. As to the former, Florida argues that convicting Mr. Guzman of a capital felony with only six jurors was harmless error. Every Circuit to consider the

issue, however, has held that failure to provide a 12member jury is structural error, automatically requiring

reversal. See, e.g., United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d

273, 281 (4th Cir. 2003). Regardless, this Court need not

reach that question, as it is most properly addressed on

remand in the first instance.1

1

This Court has called for a response in a half-dozen other

cases raising the same question presented, including several where

Florida does not even attempt to raise a harmless error argument.

See No. 23-5171 (battery and retaliation charges); No. 23-5570 (robbery and resisting arrest); No. 23-5579 (false imprisonment and

trespassing); No. 23-5575 (sexual battery); see also Nos. 23-5455, 235567 (raising harmless error). This case should at least be held

pending resolution of those other petitions.

2

As to Florida’s latter argument—that overruling

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), would require a

slice of cases to be retried in a half-dozen States—this is

the “usual” consequence of adopting a “new rule[] of

criminal procedure,” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1406. This

Court vacated “nearly 800 decisions” following Booker v.

United States and “[s]imilar consequences likely followed” other landmark Confrontation Clause and

Fourth Amendment rulings. Id. Here, nearly 50 million

Americans in the six affected States are currently being

denied their right to a 12-person jury in nearly all circumstances. “[T]he competing interests” of a handful of

States cannot outweigh “the reliance the American people place in their constitutionally protected liberties.”

Id. at 1408 (plurality op.).

ARGUMENT

I.

FLORIDA’S HARMLESS ERROR ARGUMENT HAS BEEN

UNIVERSALLY REJECTED BY THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL

Florida wrongly contends that any error in convicting Mr. Guzman with a jury of six rather than 12 was

harmless, such that he would not benefit from a decision

overruling Williams. Opp.18-21.

As an initial matter, this Court need not resolve that

question in order to grant review. Because the magnitude of the constitutional error was necessarily “not addressed by the Court of Appeals,” the proper course

would be to grant the petition and then allow the court

below to address the structural error issue in the first

instance on remand. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,

718 n.7 (2005); see McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500,

1517-1518 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (whether structural error applies should be decided on remand).

3

Regardless, federal courts have uniformly rejected

Florida’s position, holding that------even when a jury has

eleven members------“depriving a defendant of the verdict

of twelve” is structural error requiring automatic reversal. Curbelo, 343 F.3d at 281; accord Webster v. United

States, 667 F.3d 826, 833 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting

cases). This makes good sense, as a court “simply cannot

know what affect” adding one more juror “might have

had on jury deliberations” without diverting into “pure

speculation.” Curbelo, 343 F.3d at 281-282; accord

Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017) (effect

of replacing defendant’s existing attorney with one of

their choice is unquantifiable). That logic applies with

even greater force here, where Mr. Guzman was

wrongly deprived of six additional jurors. As in other

contexts where structural error applies, “the effects of

the error are simply too hard to measure.” Weaver, 582

U.S. at 295.

Florida nevertheless asserts (at 19-20) that conviction by 50% of the constitutionally required 12 is analogous to the instructional error in Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). Florida does not identify any court

that has adopted this argument and for good reason.

Neder emphasized that the flawed instruction did not

implicate a “‘defect affecting the framework in which the

trial proceeds’”; it was “simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. at 8-9. Because the error did not “‘vitiate

all the jury’s findings’” but only raised a question about

one element, it was thus susceptible to a harmless error

analysis. Id. at 10-13. Not so here. Florida does not even

attempt to explain how a court could account for the

views of a half-dozen unknown individuals, all of whom

would have to agree with the existing six in order for Mr.

Guzman’s conviction to stand. If anything, the available

4

evidence suggests the deliberative process is entirely

different when a larger jury is used. Infra pp. 7-8.2

II. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE WILLIAMS

“[T]he force of stare decisis is at its nadir” in cases

“concerning [criminal] procedur[e] rules that implicate

fundamental constitutional protection.” Alleyne v.

United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 n.5 (2013). Here, every

factor this Court considers when evaluating precedent

favors overruling Williams. That decision is egregiously wrong both because of its inconsistency with history and Ramos and because the empirical studies it relied upon were almost immediately undermined. Pet.49. Williams has had significant negative consequences,

both in creating confusion in the case law and in permitting the use of six-member juries (which are less likely

to be representative and reliable than 12-member bodies). Pet.8-9. And overruling Williams affects only limited reliance interests—i.e., it necessitates retrials of a

finite number of pending cases.

A. Egregiously Wrong

Florida’s chief defense of Williams rests on sleight

of hand. Florida notes that Williams “devoted 13 pages

to the history and development of the common-law jury

and the Sixth Amendment” but concluded that “the

word ‘jury’ in the Sixth Amendment did not codify” the

12-person requirement. Opp.6-7. To be clear, Williams

2

Even if this Court were to consider harmlessness, review

would still be warranted in light of Mr. Guzman’s assertion of innocence. While Florida brushes aside Mr. Guzman’s trial testimony

that he was not guilty as “attempt[ing] to recant his confessions,”

Opp.3 n.2, “[a] fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is

that the jury is the lie detector.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.

303, 313 (1998).

5

came to that conclusion not because of the history but in

spite of it. Williams rejected a test governed by “purely

historical considerations” in favor of a functionalist approach, all while acknowledging that the historical record is clear that “the size of the jury at common law [was]

fixed generally at 12.” 399 U.S. at 89, 99; accord

Khorrami, 143 S.Ct. at 23-24 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)

(summarizing historical evidence). Had Williams applied the proper, history-focused test laid out in Ramos,

it could not have reached the same result.

Florida’s remaining attempts to defend Williams

are similarly unavailing.

First, Florida argues that not all common-law practices regarding the jury were “‘codified’” in the Sixth

Amendment. Opp.7. Ramos, however, rejected this approach when it refused to distinguish between “the historic features of common law jury trial that (we think)

serve ‘important enough’ functions to migrate silently

into the Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.” 140

S.Ct. at 1400-1401. Instead, the question is simply what

“the right to trial by jury included” “at the time of the

Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. at 1402.3

Florida relatedly relies on the “drafting history” of

the Sixth Amendment to limit the jury-trial right.

Opp.8-10. But as Florida concedes, Ramos explained

that the “snippet of drafting history” that Williams and

Florida rely upon “could just as easily support the opposite inference”—i.e., certain omitted language was

3

Florida’s suggestion (at 7-8) that the Ramos test requires

“that a jury consist only of male landowners hailing from a particular county” was again rejected in Ramos itself. 140 S.Ct. at 1402

n.47 (majority op.) (“further constitutional amendments … prohibit

[such] invidious discrimination”).

6

unnecessary “surplusage.” 140 S.Ct. at 1400; accord

Khorrami, 143 S.Ct. at 25 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In

any event, Ramos explained, this argument “proves too

much” because ignoring common-law history would

“leave the right to a ‘trial by jury’ devoid of meaning.”

140 S.Ct. at 1400.4

Second, Florida distinguishes Ramos because it

overruled “a uniquely fractured decision,” while Williams garnered “a solid majority.” Opp.10. But this distinction does nothing to explain why Ramos’s six-vote

holding can be squared with Williams. Indeed, Ramos

explained that to the extent Apodaca established binding precedent, it should be overruled. 140 S.Ct. at 14041405. Notably, the portion of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion

suggesting that Apodaca could be discarded because it

was a plurality opinion received just three votes. Id. at

1402-1404.

Third, Florida defends Williams’s functionalist

logic, including by noting that it was not overruled by

Ballew. Opp.12-17. But Ballew refused to extend Williams’s logic to 5-member juries precisely because Williams’s foundations had already been undermined by

scholarship showing (among other things) that “smaller

juries are less likely to foster effective group

4

Florida cites (at 9-10) a sentence fragment from James Wilson, which says nothing more than that a jury could be larger than

twelve. See 2 Collected Works of James Wilson 954 (2007 ed.) (“I

feel no peculiar predilection for the number twelve: a grand jury

consists of more, and its number is not precisely fixed.”),

tinyurl.com/46s6rx9p. Wilson later makes clear that twelve is the

bare minimum: “To the conviction of a crime, the undoubting and

unanimous sentiment of the twelve jurors is of indispensable necessity.” Id. at 985.

7

deliberation” and “may be less accurate.” Ballew v.

Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-237 (1978); see also Pet.7-8.

Post-Ballew studies have repeatedly proved the

Ballew Court right. Twelve-person juries deliberate

longer and share more facts, ideas, and challenges to conclusions during higher-quality deliberations. E.g., Saks

& Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21

Law & Hum. Behav. 451, 458-459 (1997) (considering 17

studies); Horowitz & Bordens, The Effects of Jury Size,

Evidence Complexity, and Note Taking on Jury Process

and Performance in a Civil Trial, 87 J. Applied Pysch.

121, 122 (2002) (“[P]rogressively smaller groups are less

likely to generate full and fair deliberation”); see generally ABA, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, Principle 3 cmt., at 17-21 (2005) (collecting studies and endorsing 12-member-jury rule). Empaneling a smaller

jury also decreases the probability that members of minority groups (be they racial, religious, political, or socioeconomic) will serve. See, e.g., Rose et al., Jury Pool Underrepresentation in the Modern Era, 15 J. Empirical

Legal Stud. 2 (2018) (12-member juries are more likely

to include racial minorities).

Florida’s contrary “scholarship” is inapposite. One

article did not study six-person juries—it considered

whether breaking a 12-member jury into four-person

discussion groups would promote more effective deliberations. Waller et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry Men, 14

Grp. Processes & Intergrp. Rels. 835, 839 (2011). The

others either studied (1) unconstitutional five-member

groups, Fay et al., Group Discussion as Interactive Dialogue or as Serial Monologue, 11 Psychol. Sci. 481, 481

(2000) or (2) mathematical models (as opposed to testing

actual people/juries), Mukhopadhaya, Jury Size and the

Free Rider Problem, 19 J. L. Econ. & Org. 24, 27-43

(2003); Parisi & Luppi, Jury Size and the Hung-Jury

8

Paradox, 42 J. Legal Stud. 399, 408 (2013); Guerra et al.,

Accuracy of Verdicts, 28 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221, 232

(2020). And while Florida cites (at 14-16) bare conviction

rates across different States, it neither identifies scholarship interpreting those numbers nor attempts to control for potentially divergent features and practices of

state law (e.g., frequency of guilty pleas).

Finally, Florida argues that there is nothing “nefarious” about the fact that Florida law changed the minimum jury size from 12 to six a few weeks after the departure of federal troops following Reconstruction.

Opp.16-17. But Florida does not dispute that at least

some States “restricted the size of juries … to suppress

minority voices in public affairs,” Khorrami, 143 S.Ct. at

27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), and identifies no reason to

think that the racist political forces that held sway in late

19th century Florida were any different. It responds

that “Florida … retained 12-person juries in capital

cases.” Opp.16. But that 12-member juries are warranted in cases where the defendant faces death only

supports that 12-member juries are more rights-protective than six-person juries.5

B. Significant Negative Consequences

Williams has had negative jurisprudential consequences. In Ballew, a split Court struggled to apply the

functionalist approach, with multiple members

5

In any event, Ramos stated that “a jurisdiction adopting a

nonunanimous rule … for benign reasons would still violate the

Sixth Amendment.” 140 S.Ct. at 1401 n.44; see also id. at 1426

(Alito, J., dissenting) (“the origins of the [state] rules have no bearing on the broad constitutional question”). And Florida does not

dispute that the Williams rule significantly increases the odds that

a jury will not have any members of a racial, religious, or political

minority.

9

acknowledging that the six-member line had little foundation in law or fact. 435 U.S. at 239 (stating that the

Court “d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line between

six members and five”); see also Pet.7-8. And, of course,

Ramos necessarily rejected Williams’s approach. Supra pp. 4-6. The cases Florida cites (at 11-12) as “reaffirming” Williams mention the decision only in passing

or rely on the reasoning Ramos rejected. E.g., United

States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 n.2 (1995) (relying on

both Williams and Apodaca to describe functionalist

test).6

Williams has also had negative, real-world consequences, as a “drop in jury size” poses a threat to both

the “representativeness” of the jury and the “reliability”

of the verdict. ABA, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, Principle 3 cmt., at 19-20; Diamond et al., Achieving

Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory

Challenge, 6 J. Empirical Legal Studies 425, 427 (Sept.

2009) (“[R]educing jury size inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority group members on

the jury”); see also supra pp. 6-8. For example, the presence of even one Black juror eliminates the significant

gap in guilty verdicts as to Black and white defendants

reached by all-white juries. See Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. Econ.

6

Florida’s suggestion (at 18) that interpreting the Sixth

Amendment would require a change in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is meritless. The Seventh Amendment’s reference to

“Suits at common law”—which “is not directed to jury characteristics, such as size, but rather the kind of cases for which jury trial is

preserved,” Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973)—could well

preclude adopting attributes of the common-law jury in that context. And the Sixth Amendment should be more protective: It protects “human liberty” rather than “property.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632 (2003).

10

1017, 1019-1035 (2012); see also Khorrami, 143 S. Ct. at

26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). So the fact “that smaller

panels tend to skew jury composition and impair the

right to a fair trial … is a sad truth borne out by hard

experience.” Khorrami, 143 S.Ct. at 27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Florida’s response to the “reliability” concern is

based on inapposite studies. Supra pp. 7-8. And Florida

does not dispute that a 12-member jury will sweep in a

broader cross-section of the community than a six-member body. It argues only that the “fair-cross section-requirement applies” to the jury pool, not the jury itself.

Opp.16 n.16. But the available evidence establishes that

the 12-member-jury requirement at least increases the

odds that jurors will embody the cross-section of humanity in the venire—an outcome Williams wrongly dismissed as “unrealistic,” 399 U.S. at 102.

C. Reliance

Florida argues that the reliance interests here “far

outstrip” those in Ramos. Opp.17. To the contrary, the

chief reliance interest asserted is the same: The need to

re-try a discrete number of non-final felony convictions.

Almost any new rule of criminal procedure will “affect[]

significant numbers of pending cases across the whole

country.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1406.

Florida also contends that the number of convictions

affected distinguishes this case from Ramos. Opp.17. To

be clear, this case would affect only those felony proceedings where a trial has been held and the case is not yet

final on appeal—a number that is currently historically

11

low due to the COVID-19 pandemic.7 While Florida

claims (at 17) that it would have to conduct “several

thousand” retrials, Florida provides no source and this

Court granted certiorari in Ramos despite Louisiana’s

similar argument that requiring jury unanimity “could ...

upset” “[t]housands of final convictions.” Opp.4, Ramos,

No. 18-5924 (U.S.). Moreover, this Court vacated

“nearly 800 decisions” following Booker and a “similar

consequence[] likely followed when Crawford v. Washington overturned prior interpretations of the Confrontation Clause or Arizona v. Gant changed the law for

searches incident to arrests.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1406

(citations omitted).

In the end, Florida ignores “the most important”

“reliance interest” of all—that “of the American people”

“in the preservation of our constitutionally promised liberties.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1408 (plurality op.). Nearly

50 million Americans are currently denied a right the

Framers intended all to enjoy, even while Florida recognizes that a 12-member jury is so important and fundamental that it is a necessary safeguard in death-penalty

cases. This Court alone has authority to step in and protect the rights of those millions. It should do so.

7

E.g., Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator,

FY2021-22 Statistical Reference Guide 3-20 to 3-22 (2023), https://tinyurl.com/22tn3z32.

12

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted or held. See supra

n.1.

Respectfully submitted.

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

PAUL EDWARD PETILLO

Assistant Public

Defender

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC

DEFENDER

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 663-6000

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

THOMAS G. SPRANKLING

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

ALEX W. MILLER

2600 El Camino Real

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Suite 400

HALE AND DORR LLP

Palo Alto, CA 94306

7 World Trade Center

LEAH FUGERE*

250 Greenwich Street

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

New York, NY 10007

HALE AND DORR LLP

350 S. Grand Avenue

Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90071

* Not admitted in California. Admitted to practice

in Colorado. Supervised by

members of the firm who

are members of the California bar.

OCTOBER 2023