Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Natoya Cunningham, Petitioner v. Florida

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NATOYA CUNNINGHAM, PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

Paul Edward Petillo

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355-7600

ppetillo@pd15.state.fl.us

appeals@pd15.org

Cunningham v. State, 359 So.3d 815 (2023)

48 Fla. L. Weekly D823

359 So.3d 815 (Mem)

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Natoya CUNNINGHAM, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D22-1631

|

[April 19, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial

Circuit, Martin County; Robert R. Makemson, Judge; L.T.

Case No. 432019CF000487A.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Erika Follmer,

Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael

Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for

appellee.

*816 We affirm appellant's convictions and sentences

without discussion. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72

(Fla. 4th DCA 2022). However, we remand for correction

of scrivener's errors in the scoresheet and judgment. The

scoresheet lists section 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, as

the primary offense and the judgment states that appellant was

convicted under section 784.045(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes.

Both appellant and the state agree that the scoresheet

and judgment should cite section 784.045(1)(a) without

referencing any specific subparagraph because the jury did

not make a finding as to whether the aggravated battery was

based on great bodily harm or the use of a deadly weapon.

Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall make these

corrections.

Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

Gross, Conner and Forst, JJ., concur.

All Citations

359 So.3d 815 (Mem), 48 Fla. L. Weekly D823

Opinion

Per Curiam.

End of Document

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

1

ARGUMENT

POINT I

CUNNINGHAM WAS ENTITLED TO A TWELVE-PERSON

JURY UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS, AND SHE DID NOT WAIVE THAT RIGHT

Cunningham, charged with two felonies each punishable by up

to fifteen-years imprisonment, was convicted by a jury comprised of

a mere six people. R. 155, 234; T. 152, 461-62. She argues that the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a twelveperson jury when the defendant is charged with a felony.

Cunningham acknowledges that this Court recently rejected

this argument in Guzman v. State, No. 4D22-0148, 477 Fla. L. Weekly

D___ (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 26, 2022). At that time of this writing, the

Guzman decision is not yet final and the window is still open in that

case for the appellant to move for rehearing and petition this Court’s

decision to the Florida Supreme Court. If this Court affirms in

Cunningham’s case, she requests that this Court cite to Guzman.

The standard of review of constitutional claims is de novo. See

A.B. v. Florida Dept. of Children & Family Services, 901 So. 2d 324,

326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

17

Although the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Florida, 399

U.S. 78, 86 (1970), that juries as small as six were constitutionally

permissible, Williams is impossible to square with the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), which

concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s “trial by an impartial jury”

requirement encompasses what the term “meant at the Sixth

Amendment’s adoption,” id. at 1395.

Prior to 1970, subjecting Cunningham to a trial with only six

jurors would have indisputably violated her Sixth Amendment rights.

As the Ramos Court observed, even Blackstone recognized that under

the common law, “no person could be found guilty of a serious crime

unless ‘the truth of every accusation … should … be confirmed by

the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors[.]” 140

S. Ct. at 1395. “A ‘verdict, taken from eleven, was no verdict’ at all.”

Id.

After the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a bevy of state

courts—ranging from Alabama to Missouri to New Hampshire—

interpreted it to require a twelve-person jury. See Miller, Comment,

Six of One Is Not A Dozen of the Other, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621, 643

n.133 (1998) (collecting cases from the late 1700s to the 1860s). In

18

1898, the U.S. Supreme Court added its voice to the chorus, noting

that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to be tried by

a twelve-person jury. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-350

(1898). As the Thompson Court explained, since the time of Magna

Carta, the word “jury” had been understood to mean a body of twelve

people. Id. Given that understanding had been accepted since 1215,

the Court reasoned, “[i]t must” have been “that the word ‘jury’” in the

Sixth Amendment was “placed in the constitution of the United

States with reference to [that] meaning affixed to [it].” Id. at 350.

The Supreme Court continued to cite the basic principle that

the Sixth Amendment requires a twelve-person jury in criminal cases

for seventy more years. For example, in 1900, the Court explained

that “there [could] be no doubt” “[t]hat a jury composed, as at

common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment

to the Federal Constitution.” Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586

(1900). Thirty years later, the Court reiterated that it was “not open

to question” that “the phrase ‘trial by jury’” in the Constitution

incorporated juries’ “essential elements” as “they were recognized in

this country and England,” including the requirement that they

“consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.” Patton v. United States,

19

281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). And as recently as 1968, the Court

remarked that “by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in

criminal cases had been in existence for several centuries and carried

impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta,” such as the

necessary inclusion of twelve members. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 145, 151-152 (1968).1

In 1970, however, the Williams Court overruled this line of

precedent in a decision that Justice Harlan described as “stripping

off the livery of history from the jury trial” and ignoring both “the

intent of the Framers” and the Court’s long held understanding that

constitutional “provisions are framed in the language of the English

common law [] and … read in the light of its history.” Baldwin v. New

York, 399 U.S. 117, 122-123 (1970) (citation omitted) (Harlan, J.,

concurring in the result in Williams). Indeed, Williams recognized that

the Framers “may well” have had “the usual expectation” in drafting

1 See also, e.g., Capital Traction Co v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899)

(“‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term at the

common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial

by a jury of 12 men” but also contains other requirements); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905) (“The constitutional

requirement that ‘the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,’ means, as this court has adjudged, a trial by

the historical, common-law jury of twelve persons”).

20

the Sixth Amendment “that the jury would consist of 12” members.

Williams, 399 U.S. at 98-99. But Williams concluded that such

“purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. Id. at 99.

Rather, the Court focused on the “function” that the jury plays in the

Constitution, concluding that the “essential feature” of a jury is it

leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”

and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community

participation and [with] shared responsibility.” Id. at 100-01.

According to the Williams Court, both “currently available evidence

[and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily be

performed with six jurors as with twelve. Id. at 101-102 & n.48; cf.

Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging that

Williams and its progeny “departed from the strictly historical

requirements of jury trial”).

Williams’s ruling that the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated to

the States by the Fourteenth) permits a six-person jury cannot stand

in light of Ramos. There, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of

a serious offense. In reaching that conclusion, the Ramos Court

overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a decision that

21

it faulted for “subject[ing] the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury

verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” 140 S. Ct. at 1401-1402.

That reasoning undermines Williams as well. Ramos rejected

the same kind of “cost-benefit analysis” the Court undertook in

Williams, observing that it is not the Court’s role to “distinguish

between the historic features of common law jury trials that (we

think) serve ‘important enough functions to migrate silently into the

Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.’” 140 S. Ct. at 1400-01.

Ultimately, the Ramos Court explained, the question is whether “at

the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by jury

included” the particular feature at issue. Id. at 1402. As the history

summarized above establishes, there can be no serious doubt that

the common understanding of the jury trial during the Revolutionary

War era was that twelve jurors were required—“a verdict, taken from

eleven, was no verdict at all.” See id. at 1395 (quotation marks

omitted).

Even setting aside Williams’s now-disfavored functionalist logic,

its ruling suffered from another significant flaw: it was based on

research that was out of date shortly after the opinion issued.

Specifically, the Williams Court “f[ou]nd little reason to think” that

22

the goals of the jury guarantee—including, among others, “to provide

a fair possibility for obtaining a representative[] cross-section of the

community”—“are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved

when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12.” 399 U.S. at

100. The Court theorized that “in practice the difference between the

12-man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the

community represented seems likely to be negligible.” Id. at 102.

In the time since Williams, that determination has proven

incorrect. Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much just eight years

later in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when it concluded

that the Sixth Amendment barred the use of a five-person jury.

Although Ballew did not overturn Williams, the Ballew Court

observed that empirical studies conducted in the handful of

intervening years highlighted several problems with Williams’

assumptions. For example, Ballew noted that more recent research

showed that (1) “smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group

deliberation,” id. at 233, (2) smaller juries may be less accurate and

cause “increasing inconsistency” in verdict results, id. at 234, (3) the

chance

for

hung

juries

decreases

with

smaller

juries,

disproportionally harming the defendant, id. at 236; and (4)

23

decreasing jury sizes “foretell[] problems … for the representation of

minority groups in the community,” undermining a jury’s likelihood

of being “truly representative of the community,” id. at 236-37.

Moreover, the Ballew Court “admit[ted]” that it “d[id] not pretend to

discern a clear line between six members and five,” effectively

acknowledging that the studies it relied on also cast doubt on the

effectiveness of the six-member jury. Id. at 239; see also id. at 24546 (Powell, J.) (agreeing that five-member juries are unconstitutional,

while acknowledging that “the line between five- and six-member

juries is difficult to justify”).

Post-Ballew

research

has

further

undermined

Williams.

Current empirical evidence indicates that “reducing jury size

inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority group

members on the jury.” Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the

Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. of Empirical Legal

Stud. 425, 427 (Sept. 2009); see also Higginbotham et al., Better by

the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury, 104

Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020) (“Larger juries are also more

inclusive and more representative of the community. … In reality,

cutting the size of the jury dramatically increases the chance of

24

excluding minorities.”). Because “the 12-member jury produces

significantly greater heterogeneity than does the six-member jury,”

Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury, supra, at 449, it

increases

“the

opportunity

for

meaningful

and

appropriate

representation” and helps ensure that juries “represent adequately a

cross-section of the community.” Ballew, 435 U.S. at 237.

Other important considerations also weigh in favor of the

twelve-member jury. For instance, studies indicate that twelvemember juries deliberate longer, recall evidence better, and rely less

on irrelevant factors during deliberation. See Smith & Saks, The Case

for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury, 60 Fla. L.

Rev. 441, 465 (2008). Minority views are also more likely to be

thoroughly expressed in a larger jury, as “having a large minority

helps

make

the

minority

subgroup

more

influential,”

and,

unsurprisingly, “the chance of minority members having allies is

greater on a twelve-person jury.” Id. at 466. Finally, larger juries

deliver more predictable results. In the civil context, for example,

“[s]ix-person juries are four times more likely to return extremely

high or low damage awards compared to the average.” Higginbotham

et al., Better by the Dozen, supra, at 52.

25

Cunningham recognizes that the state constitution provides:

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall

be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications

and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed

by law.

Art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. And she recognizes that section 913.10,

Florida Statutes, provides for six jurors except in capital cases. See

also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.270.

But Florida’s provision for a jury of six stems from the dawn of

the Jim Crow era, one month after federal troops were withdrawn

from the state. The historical background is as follows:

In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was amended

to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of causes in any

court may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell,

34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903).

The common law rule of a jury of twelve was still kept in Florida

while federal troops remained in the state. There was no provision for

a jury of less than twelve until the Legislature enacted a provision

specifying a jury of six in Chapter 3010, section 6. See Gibson v.

State, 16 Fla. 291, 297-98 (1877) (quoting and discussing Ch. 3010,

26

§ 6, Laws of Fla. (1877)); Florida Fertilizer, 34 So. at 241 (noting that

previously all juries had twelve members).

The Legislature enacted chapter 3010 with the jury-of-six

provision on February 17, 1877. Gibson, 16 Fla. 294. This was less

than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn from

Florida in January 1877. See Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and

Renewal, 1865-1877, in The History of Florida 273 (Michael Gannon,

ed., first paperback edition 2018) (“there were [no federal troops” in

Florida after 23 January 1877”).

The jury-of-six thus first saw light at the birth of the Jim Crow

era as former Confederates regained power in southern states and

state prosecutors made a concerted effort to prevent blacks from

serving on jurors.

On its face the 1868 constitution extended the franchise to

black men. But the historical context shows that that it was part of

the overall resistance to Reconstruction efforts to protect the rights

of black citizens. The constitution was the product of a remarkable

series of events including a coup in which leaders of the white

southern (or native) faction took possession of the assembly hall in

the middle of the night, excluding Radical Republican delegates from

27

the proceedings. See Richard L. Hume, Membership of the Florida

Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican

Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q. 1, 5-6

(1972); Shofner at 266. A reconciliation was effected as the “outside”

whites “united with the majority of the body’s native whites to frame

a constitution designed to continue white dominance.” Hume at 15.

The racist purpose of the resulting constitution was spelled out

by Harrison Reed, a leader of the prevailing faction and the first

governor elected under the 1868 constitution, who wrote to Senator

Yulee that the new constitution was constructed to bar blacks from

legislative office:

Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will

be appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro

legislature.

Hume at 15-16. See also Shofner at 266.

In Ramos, Justice Gorsuch noted that the Louisiana nonunanimity rule arose from Jim Crow era efforts to enforce white

supremacy. 140 S.Ct. at 1394; see also id. at 1417 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (non-unanimity was enacted “as one pillar of a

comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures

against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service.”).

28

The history of Florida’s jury of six arises from the same historical

context.

In view of the foregoing, a jury of six at a criminal trial for a

crime punishable by up to life imprisonment is unconstitutional

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution.

Finally, Cunningham did not waive her Sixth Amendment right

to a twelve-person jury. A defendant may waive his or her right to a

constitutional jury, but the “express and intelligent consent of the

defendant” is required. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. See also Johnson v.

State, 994 So. 2d 960, 964 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he State contends that

Johnson waived appellate review of this claim when he failed to

request a jury trial or object to the bench trial during the second

phase of the felony DUI proceeding. We disagree. . . . Johnson’s

general silence . . . did not constitute a valid waiver.”).

This Court should reverse the judgment and sentence and

remand for a new trial with a twelve-person jury, as required by the

Sixth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments

Constitution.

29

to

the

United

States

Cunningham understands that this Court has disagreed with

this argument in its recent decision in Guzman, 477 Fla. L. Weekly

D___. However, Cunningham maintains her argument that her Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated. This Court’s

decision in Guzman is not yet final, and the defendant in that case

may still move for rehearing and petition that decision to the Florida

Supreme Court. Cunningham requests that if this Court affirms, that

this Court cite to Guzman, such that this case would be in the

Guzman appellate pipeline and allow Cunningham to seek further

review of her convictions and sentences. See Jollie v. State, 405 So.

2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981); Harry Lee Anstead, Gerald Kogan, Thomas

D. Hall & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court of Florida, 29 Nova L. Rev. 431, 513 (2005).

30

Recorded in Martin County, FL 6/7/2022 4:11 PM

Carolyn Timmaon, Clerk of the Circuit Court & Comptroller

CFN#2964420 BK 3317 PG 2855 PAGE 1 of 11

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MARTIN COUNTY FLORIDA

UCN: 432019CF000487CFAXMX

Case Number: 19000487CFAXMX

OBTS#: 4302096370

STATE OF FLOR.IDA

vs.

NATOYA CUNNINGHAM

Defendant.

Judgment

• PROBATION VIOLATOR

• COMMUNITY CONTROL VIOLATOR

• MODIFICATION

• RESENTENCE

• RETRIAL

• AMENDED

The defendant, NATOYA CUNNINGHAM, being personally before the court represented by

JEFFREY A SMITH, the attorney of record and the state represented by MARCUS JOHNSON

and having

·

been tried and found guilty by jury/by court of the following crime(s):

CNT# Statute

2

Statute Description

Level/Degree

784.045(lal)

AGGRAVATED BATTERY

914.23

RETALIATION GAINST WITNESS, VICTIM OR

INFORMANT-BODILY INJURY

Felony/SECOND

DEGREE

Felony/SECOND

DEGREE

• The _ PROBATION _ COMMUNITY CONTROL previously ordered in this case is

revoked.

• PRIOR ADJUDICATION on - - - - -- - 0 It is ordered that the defendant is hereby Guilty of the above crime(s).

• It is ordered that the defendant is hereby Adjudication Withheld of the above crime(s).

121 and being a qualified offender pursuant to s. 943.325, the defendant shall be required to

submit DNA samples as required by law.

DONE and ORDERED at Martin County, Florida this Thursday, June 2, 2022.

.

CIRCUIT JUDESHER.wooD BAUER JR

;o :OJ WV 2- ~mr llPl

-~

Page

_l _of J1__

406

CFN#2964420 BK 3317 PG 2856 PAGE 2 of 11

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MARTIN COUNTY FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

UCN: 432019CF000487CFAXMX

Case Number: 19000487CFAXMX

vs.

NATOYA CUNNINGHAM

Defendant.

Charges/Costs/Fees

The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the following sums:

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

FEL CASE PD 50

FEL CASE COST NO FINE

BOCC ORD 642 $65

FEL CASE PD ATTY FEES

STATE ATTY PROSECUTION CS

FEL CASE RAPE TF

FEL CASE DOM VIO TR FD

STATE ATTY PROSECUTION CS

RESTITUTION

50.00

415.00

65.00

1,250.00

100.00

151.00

201.00

123.95

5,146.37

07/29/2019

06/02/2022

06/02/2022

06/02/2022

06/02/2022

06/02/2022

06/02/2022

06/02/2022

06/02/2022

OTHER

Total Assessed at Judgment: $7,502.32

$7,502.32

Total Assessment balance:

DONE and ORDERED at Martin County, Florida this 2n~ day of June, 2022.

f2

~4-' .

L _II_

of

407

.·

GSHERWOOD BAUER JR

Fee Distribution ofFEL CASE COST NO FINE, Assessed on Felony Charge(s) :

$225 per s.938.05, F.S.

$3 per s.938:01, F.S.

·

$20 per s.938.06, F.S.

$2 per s.938.15, F.S.

$50 per s.938.03, F.S.

$65 per s.939.185, F.S.

$50 per s.775.083, F.S.

Page

.

CFN#2964420 BK 3317 PG 2857 PAGE 3 of 11

STATE OF FLORIDA

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MARTIN COUNTY FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA

vs.

NATOYA CUNNINGHAM

Defendant.

UCN: 432019CF000487CFAXMX

Case Number: 19000487CFAXMX

Sentence

(As to Count l..Ji_)

The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendants' attorney of

record, JEFFREY A SMITH, and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the court having

given the defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and

to show cause why the defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being

shown.

(Check applicable provision)

0 and the court having on deferred imposition of sentence until this

date 06/02/2022.

0 and the court having previously entered a judgment in this case on _ _ _ __ __

resentences the defendant

now

D and the court having placed the defendant on probation/community control and having

subsequently revoked the defendant's probation/community control

IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT that:

121 The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the PRISON.

• The defendant pay a fine pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus a 5% surcharge

pursuant to section 950.25 Florida Statutes, as indicated on the Fine/Costs/Fee Page.

0 The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04,

Florida Statutes.

TO BE IMPRISONED:

121 For a term of 8.00 years

In the event the defendant is ordered.to serve additional split sentences, all incarcerations portions

shall be satisfied before the defendant begins service to the supervision terms.

Page

3 ofl(_

408

CFN#2964420 BK 3317 PG 2858 PAGE 4 of 11

UCN: 432019CF000487CFAxMX

Case Number: 19000487CFAXMX

STATE OF FLORIDA

vs.

NATOYA CUNNINGHAM

Defendant.

Retention of 947. 16(3),

Florida Jurisdiction

Jail Credit

Credit for Time Served

in Resentencing after

Violation of Probation or

Community Control

Other Provisions:

_ _ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section Statutes

(I 983).

.

_L_ It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of 1-Jdays

credit for time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.

It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed· _ _____ days time

served between date of arrest as a violator following ·release from prison to the

date of · resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply .original j ail ·

time credit and shall compute and apply original jail time credit and shall

compute and apply original jail time credit and ·shall compute and apply credit

for time served and unforfeited gain time previou.s ly awarded on case/count

(Offenses committed before October I, 1989)

_ _It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed _ _ _ _ days time served

between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison .to the date of

resentencing. The Departinent of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit

and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case/count

(Offenses committed between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

_ _.The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above

case/count forfeited under section 948.06(6).

_ _ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above

case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of .

Corrections under section 944.28(1).

It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed _ _ _ _days time

· served between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the

date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail

time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to

section 921.0017. Florida Statutes, on case/count------~· (Offenses

committed on or after January I, 1994)

·

Consecutive/Concurrent

_ _ It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count _ _ shall run

(CHECK ONE) _ _Consecutive to

Concurrent with the sentence

Set for in count _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ of this case.

Page

4 oril_

4 09

CFN#2964420 BK 3317 PG 2859 PAGE 5 of 11

UCN: 432019CF000487CFAXMX

Case Number: 19000487CFAXMX

As to Other Counts

/

· Consecutive/Concurrent

.As to Other Convictions

_ _ It ·is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed for the

All Counts concurrent with each other. ·

·

·c ounts specified in this order shall run (CHECK ONE}

_ _Consecutive to

Concurrent with the sentence

- - ~ any active sentence being served.

--~

·. specific sentences: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Page

,5 o f ~

410

·

CFN#2964420 BK 3317 PG 2860 PAGE 6 of 11

UCN: 432019CF000487CFAXMX

Case Number: 19000487CFAXMX

STATE OF FLORIDA

vs.

NATOYA CUNNINGHAM

Defendant.

Other Provisions (continued)

In the Event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Martin

County, Florida is hereby ordered and directed to deliver the defendant to the Department of

Corrections at the facility designated by the department together with a copy of this judgment

and sentence and any other documents specified by Florida Statute.

The defendant.in open court was advised of the right to appeal from this sentence by filing

notice of appeal within 30 days from this date with the clerk of this court and the defendants

right to be assistance of counsel in taking the appeal at the expense of the State on showing of

indigency.

In imposing the above sentence, the court further recommends/orders:

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

RESTITUTION IS ORDERED

ALL COSTS & RESTITUTION

PROSECUTION

TO

A

<:::NIL LIEN EXCEPT COST OF

DONE and ORDERED at Martin County, Florida this i ~ of June, 2022~

~,,_

SHERWOOD BAUER JR

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I HEREBY CERTIF~ true and correct c9py of td~oing has!een furnished by ·us

Mail/Courthouse B o e ; to the Defense Counsel thi

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