Opposition Brief — Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al., Petitioners v. Food and Drug Administration, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 7, 2023
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No. 23-395
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
Cross-Petitioners,
v.
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
Cross-Respondents,
and
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
Cross-Petitioners,
v.
DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,
Cross-Respondent.
On Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR
DANCO LABORATORIES, LLC
PHILIP KATZ
LYNN W. MEHLER
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
EVA M. SCHIFINI
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 1400
Los Angeles, CA 90067
JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH
Counsel of Record
CATHERINE E. STETSON
MARLAN GOLDEN
DANA A. RAPHAEL
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com
Counsel for Danco Laboratories, LLC
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
More than 23 years ago, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved Danco’s drug
Mifeprex, in combination with another FDA-approved
drug misoprostol, for termination of early pregnancy.
The six-year statute of limitations to challenge that
approval came and went. Then, in November 2022,
anti-abortion doctors and associations of anti-abortion
doctors—none of whom prescribe Mifeprex—filed an
untimely challenge to FDA’s September 2000
approval of Mifeprex. As relevant here, they argued
that FDA was not authorized to impose use
restrictions in 2000 under a set of regulations known
as Subpart H. The Fifth Circuit held this challenge
was time-barred. The questions presented are:
1. Whether this Court should adopt the D.C.
Circuit’s judge-made “reopening” doctrine and find
that FDA’s lifting of certain Mifeprex use restrictions
in response to post-approval clinical data and realworld drug experience restarted the statute of
limitations for challenging the drug’s 2000 approval.
2. Whether Mifeprex’s 2000 approval can be
preliminarily enjoined in 2023 based on FDA’s use of
Subpart H to initially impose use restrictions.
(i)
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Cross-Petitioners are Alliance for Hippocratic
Medicine; American Association of Pro-Life
Obstetricians & Gynecologists; American College of
Pediatricians;
Christian
Medical
&
Dental
Associations; Shaun Jester, D.O.; Regina Frost-Clark,
M.D.; Tyler Johnson, D.O.; and George Delgado, M.D.
They were plaintiffs in the District Court and
appellees in the Court of Appeals.
Cross-Respondents are Danco Laboratories, LLC,
who was an intervenor in the District Court and an
appellant in the Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA); Robert M. Califf,
M.D., in his official capacity as Commissioner of Food
and Drugs; Janet Woodcock, M.D., in her official
capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Food and Drugs;
Patrizia Cavazzoni, M.D., in her official capacity as
Director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research; the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS); and Xavier Becerra, in his official
capacity as Secretary of HHS, who were defendants in
the District Court and appellants in the Court of
Appeals.
iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Danco
Laboratories, LLC hereby states that it is a whollyowned subsidiary of Danco Investors Group, LP. No
publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of the
stock of either entity.
iv
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Supreme Court of the United States:
Danco Laboratories, LLC v. Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine, et al., No. 23-236 (Sept. 12,
2023) (petition for a writ of certiorari)
U.S. Food & Drug Administration, et al. v.
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.,
No. 23-235 (Sept. 12, 2023) (petition for a writ of
certiorari)
Danco Laboratories, LLC v. Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine, et al., No. 22A901 (Apr. 21,
2023) (granting application for stay)
U.S. Food & Drug Administration, et al. v.
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.,
No. 22A902 (Apr. 21, 2023) (granting application
for stay)
United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. v. U.S.
Food & Drug Administration, et al., No. 23-10362
(Aug. 16, 2023) (opinion)
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. v. U.S.
Food & Drug Administration, et al., No. 23-10362
(Apr. 12, 2023) (partially granting and partially
denying stay pending appeal)
United States District Court (N.D. Tex.):
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. v. U.S.
Food & Drug Administration et al., No. 2:22-cv223 (Apr. 7, 2023) (opinion)
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......... iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS ..................................... iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 3
A. Factual Background ........................................ 3
B. Procedural History .......................................... 7
REASONS FOR DENYING THE
CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION .................... 9
I.
REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED OF A
DOCTRINE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT
ADOPT AND THAT IT FOUND WOULD
NOT MAKE PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGE
TIMELY IN ANY EVENT................................... 9
A. Whether The “Reopening” Doctrine Is A
Valid Exception To The Statute Of
Limitations Does Not Warrant Review ......... 10
B. Even If “Reopening” Could Theoretically
Restart A Limitations Period, The Fifth
Circuit Correctly Found It Inapplicable
Here ................................................................. 15
1. Express Reopening Is Inapplicable To
The Facts Here ............................................. 15
2. Constructive Reopening Is Inapplicable
To The Facts Here........................................ 19
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW
AN ACADEMIC QUESTION ABOUT
THE SCOPE OF A SUPERSEDED
REGULATION THAT HAS NOT
GOVERNED MIFEPREX’S USE
RESTRICTIONS SINCE 2008 .......................... 23
A. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Argument Was Not
Addressed Below And There Is No Circuit
Split.................................................................... 24
B. Subpart H Does Not Govern Mifeprex’s Use
Restrictions Today............................................. 25
C. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Arguments Are
Wrong On The Merits ....................................... 26
D. Plaintiffs’ Argument That FDA Must Match
The Terms Of A Drug’s Approval Exactly To
The Protocol Of A Supporting Clinical Trial
Is Outside The Questions Presented And
Wrong................................................................. 30
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 33
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES:
American Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA,
588 F.3d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ............................. 18
Biden v. Texas,
142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022) ....................................... 9, 12
Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc.,
139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (per curiam) ...................... 25
Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC,
460 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ................................. 18
Environmental Def. v. EPA,
467 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ............................. 10
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) ........................................... 31
Growth Energy v. EPA,
5 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ................................ 11, 16
Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department
of Interior,
88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ......................... 20, 22
Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ........................................... 27
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) ................................................. 33
National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Interior,
134 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ............................. 20
National Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners
v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
158 F.3d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ....................10, 11, 17
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
National Biodiesel Bd. v. EPA,
843 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............10, 11, 19, 20
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA,
571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ...... 10, 11, 20, 22, 23
North Dakota Retail Ass’n v. Board of Governors, FRS,
55 F.4th 634 (8th Cir. 2022), cert. granted sub nom.
Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, No. 22-1008
(U.S. Sept. 29, 2023) ........................................ 13, 14
Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Department of
Homeland Sec.,
983 F.3d 671 (4th Cir. 2020) ................................. 12
Public Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. EPA,
77 F.4th 899 (D.C. Cir. 2023) .......................... 10, 17
Sierra Club v. EPA,
551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ...... 11, 12, 19, 20, 21
Texas v. Biden,
20 F.4th 928 (5th Cir. 2021),
rev’d, 142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022) ................................. 12
Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Env’t Quality, Div. of
Air Quality v. EPA,
750 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................. 12
Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519 (1992) ............................................... 30
Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
566 U.S. 189 (2012) ......................................... 24, 33
STATUTES:
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) ......................................................... 5
21 U.S.C. § 355 ........................................................... 3
21 U.S.C. § 355(c) ..................................................... 31
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) ............................................... 26, 31
21 U.S.C. § 355-1 ...................................................... 26
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1) ............................................... 4
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(4)(A) ........................................ 20
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) ........................................... 5, 7, 14
Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007,
Pub. L. 110-85, Title IX, 121 Stat. 823 ................... 4
§ 909(a) ..................................................................... 5
§ 909(b)(1) .......................................................... 4, 25
§ 909(b)(3) ................................................................ 4
REGULATIONS:
21 C.F.R. § 314.70 .................................................... 20
21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) .............................................. 31
21 C.F.R. § 314.500 .................................................. 26
21 C.F.R. § 314.510 .................................................... 4
21 C.F.R. § 314.520 .............................................. 4, 26
Identification of Drug and Biological Products,
73 Fed. Reg. 16,313 (Mar. 27, 2008) ....................... 5
New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug
Product Regulations,
57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992) ...................... 27
RULES:
Sup. Ct. R. 10............................................................ 25
Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a) .................................................... 30
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language, Therapeutic (5th ed. 2022)
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?
q=therapeutic (last visited Nov. 7, 2023) ............. 28
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch.,
Approval Package for: Application Number
020687Orig1s025 (Jan. 3, 2023) ............................. 7
FDA, CY 2022 New Drug Application (NDA) &
Biologic License Application (BLA) Efficacy
Supplement Calendar Year Approvals as of
December 31, 2022,
https://www.fda.gov/media/165825/download?
attachment............................................................. 22
FDA, CY 2021 New Drug Application (NDA) &
Biologic License Application (BLA) Efficacy
Supplement Calendar Year Approvals as of
December 31, 2021,
https://www.fda.gov/media/158154/download?a
ttachment............................................................... 22
FDA, Guidance for Industry, Expedited Programs
for Serious Conditions—Drugs and Biologics
(May 2014)
https://www.fda.gov/media/86377/download ........ 27
FDA, Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse
Events Summary Through 12/31/2022,
https://www.fda.gov/media/164331/download ...... 32
GAO, GAO-08-751, FDA: Approval and
Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex (Aug. 2008) ......... 27
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Therapeutic,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/therapeutic (last
visited Nov. 7, 2023) .............................................. 28
Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court
Practice § 6.26.(B) (11th ed. 2019) ........................ 24
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-395
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
Cross-Petitioners,
v.
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
Cross-Respondents,
and
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
Cross-Petitioners,
v.
DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,
Cross-Respondent.
On Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR
DANCO LABORATORIES, LLC
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs’ conditional cross-petition starts by
asking this Court to adopt a new legal doctrine to
excuse their failure to timely file suit—an issue
presenting no conflict with this Court’s precedent,
involving no circuit split, and that the court below
found was inapplicable to the facts here. Plaintiffs
next ask this Court to address an obsolete regulatory
mechanism FDA once used to implement use
(1)
2
restrictions on approved drugs—prior to 2008—even
though that regulation does not govern Mifeprex’s use
restrictions today, or the use restrictions of any other
drug either. In any event, that mechanism was
properly used. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’
requests.
The Fifth Circuit correctly held that Plaintiffs’
challenge to FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex was
untimely; Plaintiffs filed suit after the statute of
limitations expired. So Plaintiffs are left to argue that
this Court should grant certiorari to recognize—for
the first time—the “reopening” doctrine, a judge-made
exception to the statute of limitations created by the
D.C. Circuit. And because the Fifth Circuit held that
this doctrine would be inapplicable even if it could
validly excuse a failure to timely file suit, Plaintiffs
also ask this Court to find that the Fifth Circuit’s factbound analysis of that issue was wrong.
Equally uncertworthy, this Court should not opine
on a purely academic question that the Fifth Circuit
did not address: whether FDA acted within its
regulatory authority when it imposed use restrictions
under regulations known as Subpart H at the time it
initially approved Mifeprex. The answer to that
question is yes. But neither the question nor the
answer matter one whit, because FDA’s use of its
Subpart H regulatory authority to require Mifeprex
use restrictions was superseded by Congress in 2008.
When Congress gave FDA statutory authority to
impose use restrictions in the form of a Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), all
drugs with Subpart H use restrictions transitioned to
a REMS. The use restrictions for Mifeprex have been
3
under FDA’s REMS authority for the past fifteen
years, and remain so today.
Indeed, it is truly difficult to come up with a less
certworthy question than whether FDA in 2000
properly applied a long-since-superseded regulation—
unless, perhaps, it is the question whether the Fifth
Circuit erred in finding the D.C. Circuit’s “reopening”
doctrine inapplicable to revive Plaintiffs’ long-expired
claims.
The questions presented in Plaintiffs’ crosspetition are not intertwined with the questions
presented in Danco’s or FDA’s petitions. Those
petitions ask this Court to address Article III standing
and FDA’s 2016 and 2021 administrative actions with
respect to Mifeprex—questions far removed from the
validity of the “reopening” doctrine and FDA’s
obsolete interpretation of Subpart H. As Danco’s
certiorari petition detailed, the Fifth Circuit’s
approach conflicts with this Court’s precedents and
creates multiple circuit splits. The cross-petition
offers nothing remotely similar.
Danco is unaware of any case in which this Court
granted a conditional cross-petition raising separate,
distinct issues involving a separate, distinct agency
action. The conditional cross-petition should be
denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
1. FDA approved Mifeprex in 2000 as safe and
effective for use in combination with misoprostol to
terminate intrauterine pregnancy through 49 days
gestation. ROA.600; see 21 U.S.C. § 355.
4
The New Drug Application (NDA) for Mifeprex,
submitted in 1996, presented extensive data on the
drug’s safety and efficacy, including data from
multiple clinical trials with thousands of participants
showing that mifepristone was effective for 92.1% to
95.5% of women, meaning further intervention to
terminate the pregnancy was not required. ROA.642647, ROA.591-598.
FDA imposed certain use restrictions with
Mifeprex’s approval, including that the drug would be
dispensed by a doctor in-person and that there would
be an in-person follow-up appointment. FDA included
these restrictions under its Subpart H authority,
which—in separate provisions—sets out a mechanism
for imposing use restrictions and a pathway for
accelerating approval of certain new drugs. 21 C.F.R.
§§ 314.520, 314.510; see ROA.596; ROA.600-601. FDA
relied on Subpart H only for its use-restriction
authority; the Mifeprex NDA was not accelerated, and
in fact took more than four and a half years to
approve.
2. In 2007, Congress amended the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to authorize FDA to impose
certain restrictions on drugs in the form of a Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) when the
agency concluded use restrictions were necessary “to
ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks
of the drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1). Congress
“deemed” drugs previously approved with use
restrictions under Subpart H to have a REMS in effect
while the drugs’ sponsors supplemented their
approved NDAs to include a REMS. See Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub.
L. 110-85, Title IX, § 909(b)(1), (3), 121 Stat. 823, 950-
5
951 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331 note); Identification of
Drug and Biological Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,313
(Mar. 27, 2008). The amendment took effect 180 days
after its enactment. § 909(a), 121 Stat. at 950. In
accordance with the amendment, Danco submitted a
supplemental New Drug Application (sNDA) for the
Mifeprex REMS, which FDA approved in 2011.
ROA.672-675.
Since this statutory amendment,
Mifeprex’s use restrictions have been governed by
FDA’s REMS authority—not by Subpart H, which is
no longer the basis for any drug’s use restrictions.
3. Some
of
the
Plaintiffs—self-described
organizations that “have consistently opposed
abortion and continue to do so”—filed a citizen
petition in 2002 with FDA asserting that Mifeprex
was improperly approved under Subpart H and not
safe and effective as approved.
ROA.355; see
ROA.353-444. Plaintiffs never sought to compel FDA
to act on the petition. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). FDA
ultimately denied the petition in March 2016,
meticulously documenting and reaffirming that
Mifeprex is safe and effective for its approved use and
explaining why the agency initially relied on Subpart
H in setting use restrictions. ROA.635-667. Plaintiffs
had six years to sue after this denial of their citizen
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
4. FDA also took a number of other actions related
to mifepristone that are not part of the conditional
cross-petition. In March 2016, FDA approved an
sNDA that Danco had submitted with an extensive
scientific record seeking to amend Mifeprex’s labeling
and to modify its REMS based on data post-dating the
2000 approval.
The sNDA changed the dosing
regimen, altered the mode of administration for
6
misoprostol, extended the approved gestational age
from 49 to 70 days, allowed at-home administration of
misoprostol, authorized flexibility in how follow-up
care occurs, changed references from “physician” to
“health care provider” reflecting that certain nonphysicians are authorized to prescribe drugs by state
law, and modified the prescriber reporting
requirements for certain adverse events. ROA.689696; ROA.2142-2337. In 2019, some Plaintiffs filed a
citizen petition challenging these changes.
Also in 2019, FDA approved a generic version of
mifepristone. ROA.768-773.1
In April 2021, FDA determined that it would
temporarily exercise enforcement discretion during
the COVID-19 public health emergency as to whether
mifepristone must be dispensed in person. ROA.786788.
In December 2021, FDA denied the 2019 citizen
petition challenging the 2016 changes. ROA.802-842;
see ROA.740-766. The petition had urged FDA to
“(I) restore and strengthen elements of the Mifeprex
regimen and prescriber requirements approved in
2000, and (II) retain the Mifeprex [REMS], and
continue limiting the dispensing of Mifeprex to
patients in clinics, medical offices, and hospitals, by or
under the supervision of a certified prescriber.”
ROA.741. In denying the petition, FDA reiterated its
view from April 2021 that “mifepristone may be safely
1
Danco, the manufacturer of Mifeprex, did not intervene as to
Count Four, which is Plaintiffs’ challenge to FDA’s approval of
generic mifepristone. See ROA.2000; ROA.179. That is why
Danco “did not respond to” Plaintiffs’ “challenge to the 2019
Generic Approval in the district court proceedings.” Cross-Pet.
33 n.1.
7
used without in person dispensing” and directed
Danco to propose modifications to the mifepristone
REMS effectuating that change. ROA.829.
In January 2023, FDA approved Danco’s
application to modify the mifepristone REMS,
including removing mandatory in-person dispensing
of the drug. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch.,
Approval
Package
for:
Application
Number
020687Orig1s025
(Jan.
3,
2023),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/
2023/020687Orig1s025.pdf. Although Plaintiffs had
already filed suit and sought a preliminary injunction
at this time, they did not amend their complaint or
otherwise challenge FDA’s approval of the 2023
REMS modification. No documents pertaining to that
approval are in the record.
B. Procedural History
1. After FDA denied Plaintiffs’ citizen petition
challenging the approval of Mifeprex in March 2016,
Plaintiffs had six years to file suit challenging that
denial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). But March 2022 came
and went.
Eight months after the statute of limitations
expired, Plaintiffs filed suit challenging FDA’s 2000
approval of Mifeprex. They “admit[ted] that they did
not raise a claim as to FDA’s denial of their 2002
citizen petition within six years, as required for civil
actions
filed
against
the
United
States.”
Danco.Pet.App. 46a. Instead, they argued that their
challenge to the 2000 approval was timely under a
judge-made exception to the statute of limitations
called the “reopening doctrine.”
ROA.173-174.
According to Plaintiffs, in taking subsequent actions
related to mifepristone, FDA had “reopened” its 2000
8
decision to approve Mifeprex. See ROA.173-174;
ROA.3333; ROA.3341-3344; ROA.4460-4461.
The District Court excused Plaintiffs’ failure to
meet the six-year statute of limitations and held that
FDA must have reopened its 2000 approval. In the
court’s view, the 2016 changes “significantly
departed” from the original approval; the court also
noted that FDA referenced conducting a “full review”
of the mifepristone REMS in 2021 in its citizen
petition denial, which the court thought must mean
FDA had “necessarily consider[ed] the possibility that
[mifepristone] is too dangerous to be on the market.”
Danco.Pet.App. 191a-192a. The District Court went
on to find that FDA exceeded its authority in using
Subpart H to impose use restrictions in 2000 and, on
that basis, “stayed” the 2000 approval “and all
subsequent challenged actions” from taking effect. Id.
at 213a-225a, 249a.
2. Danco and the Government appealed and
sought an emergency stay of the District Court’s
order. A stay panel of the Fifth Circuit granted relief
as to the 2000 approval, concluding that Plaintiffs’
challenge was likely untimely. Id. at 140a-149a. The
court found that the reopening doctrine was
inapplicable because nothing indicated that FDA had
“substantively reconsider[ed]” its 2000 approval of
Mifeprex at a later date or “significantly alter[ed] the
stakes of judicial review” in an unanticipated way. Id.
at 144a-149a.
The stay panel left in place the District Court’s
injunction of the 2016 changes to the Mifeprex REMS
and the 2021 non-enforcement decision. Id. at 163a.
This Court stayed the District Court’s ruling pending
resolution of any certiorari petition. Id. at 111a.
9
3. A merits panel of the Fifth Circuit likewise held
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2000 approval was
untimely. Id. at 52a. The panel did not address
“whether the reopening doctrine is a legitimate
exception to a statute of limitations” because it
“ultimately conclude[d] that the doctrine does not
apply here.” Id. at 47a n.6. It noted, however, that
this Court has “cast some doubt on whether the
reopening doctrine is a legitimate exception to a
statute of limitations.” Id. (citing Biden v. Texas, 142
S. Ct. 2528, 2545 n.8 (2022)). Because it held the
challenge untimely, the panel majority did not
address the merits of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2000
approval.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary
injunction as to the later FDA actions. That decision
is the subject of pending petitions for certiorari from
Danco and the Government. See Nos. 23-236, 23-235.
In a partial dissent, Judge Ho explained that he
would have found that FDA’s actions in 2016 and 2021
were a “constructive reopening” of the 2000 approval.
Danco.Pet.App. 86a. Judge Ho also disagreed that
Subpart H authorized FDA to impose use restrictions
on Mifeprex at the time it was approved. Id. at 98a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE CONDITIONAL
CROSS-PETITION
I. REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED OF A
DOCTRINE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT
ADOPT AND THAT IT FOUND WOULD NOT
MAKE PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGE TIMELY
IN ANY EVENT.
Plaintiffs asked the Fifth Circuit to apply the D.C.
Circuit’s “reopening” doctrine to find timely their
10
challenge to Mifeprex’s 2000 approval. The Fifth
Circuit declined to do so. The merits panel explained
that it need not reach whether the reopening doctrine
“is good law in this circuit,” because it would not apply
on the facts here. Danco.Pet.App. 47a n.6. The Court
should deny Plaintiffs’ request for review of this issue.
A. Whether The “Reopening” Doctrine Is A
Valid Exception To The Statute Of
Limitations Does Not Warrant Review.
1. The “reopening” doctrine was created by the
D.C. Circuit as “an exception to statutory limits on the
time for seeking review of an agency decision.”
Environmental Def. v. EPA, 467 F.3d 1329, 1333 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Despite recognizing that
“statutory time limits reflect Congress’s express
preference for regulatory finality,” Public Emps. for
Env’t Resp. v. EPA, 77 F.4th 899, 915 (D.C. Cir. 2023),
the D.C. Circuit’s “reopener doctrine allows an
otherwise untimely challenge to proceed” if the agency
later “reexamine[s] its former choice” in that rule,
National Biodiesel Bd. v. EPA, 843 F.3d 1010, 1017
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As the D.C. Circuit
sees it, the period for judicial review of the original
rule “runs anew” from the date of reopening. National
Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners v. Surface Transp.
Bd., 158 F.3d 135, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
In what the D.C. Circuit calls “express” reopening,
an agency “literal[ly]” reopens a previous decision.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245,
1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This can happen when “an
agency conducts a rulemaking or adopts a policy on an
issue at one time, and then in a later rulemaking
restates the policy or otherwise addresses the issue
again without altering the original decision.”
11
National Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners, 158
F.3d at 141. For it to apply, the agency must
“undertake[ ] a serious, substantive reconsideration of
the existing rule.” Growth Energy v. EPA, 5 F.4th 1,
21 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation and brackets omitted).
This strain of reopening does not apply when an
agency “merely responds to an unsolicited comment
by reaffirming its prior position,” or “respond[s] to a
comment that addresses a settled aspect of some
matter.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019, 1024
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
In a few cases, the D.C. Circuit has applied a
different strain of the reopening doctrine for rules it
describes as having been “constructively”—but “not
actually”—reopened. Natural Res. Def. Council, 571
F.3d at 1266 (citation omitted). This doctrinal strain
requires an agency to promulgate a new rule effecting
such a “sea change” to “the basic regulatory scheme”
that it “significantly alters the stakes” of seeking
judicial review of the earlier rule in a way the plaintiff
could not have anticipated at the time of the earlier
rule. National Biodiesel Bd., 843 F.3d at 1017
(citations omitted). The facts must show that the
original rule was not “worth challenging” for the
plaintiff, but the “completely changed” regulatory
context is. Sierra Club, 551 F.3d at 1025-26 (citations
and emphasis omitted). The D.C. Circuit has made
clear its view that an agency’s “elimination” of a “more
stringent requirement” “in favor of an alternative”
does “not work such a sea change” to the original rule.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at 1266.
2. Relying exclusively on D.C. Circuit caselaw,
Plaintiffs contend that the Fifth Circuit erred in its
analysis of the reopening doctrine. See Cross-Pet. 16-
12
23. But Plaintiffs identify no conflict between the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis and this Court’s precedents,
and no disagreement among the courts of appeals
concerning the legal standard.
Indeed, as the panel below noted, the Fifth Circuit
has yet to decide “whether the reopening doctrine is a
legitimate exception to a statute of limitations.”
Danco.Pet.App. 47a n.6. The panel did “not address
that threshold question” because it “ultimately
conclude[d] that the doctrine does not apply here.” Id.
No other Fifth Circuit case has ruled on the doctrine’s
validity, either.
The Fifth Circuit previously
analogized to the reopening doctrine in analyzing
when agency action becomes final in Texas v. Biden,
20 F.4th 928, 951-955 (5th Cir. 2021), rev’d, 142 S. Ct.
2528 (2022), but no party defended that analogy in
this Court, which noted that the doctrine appeared
“inapposite” to the finality question at issue, 142 S.
Ct. at 2545 n.8.
Plaintiffs also do not argue that the legal standard
the panel applied diverged from the D.C. Circuit’s
standard.2 While Plaintiffs say (at 22) that this case
is “on all fours” factually with Sierra Club v. EPA, 551
F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008)—which is wrong, see infra
2
Danco has not identified any other circuit that has applied the
D.C. Circuit’s reopening doctrine to excuse an untimely claim.
See, e.g., Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Department of
Homeland Sec., 983 F.3d 671, 682 n.5 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Even
assuming this Court would adopt the doctrine—an issue we need
not reach today—we agree with the district court that it would
not apply here.”); Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Env’t Quality, Div. of
Air Quality v. EPA, 750 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We
need not decide here whether to adopt the doctrine. Even if we
were to do so, it would not apply.”). Plaintiffs have not identified
any such circuit either.
13
pp. 20-22—they notably never contend that the Fifth
Circuit applied a different legal standard. Plaintiffs
instead complain (at 23) that the panel’s assessment
of the facts was “simply untrue.” This sort of factbound application does not merit review.
3. Plaintiffs also do not argue that the validity of
the reopening doctrine is an important federal
question. Instead, Plaintiffs suggest in a single
sentence that this issue has “greater importance”
because of a petition the Court granted in another
case to resolve a clear circuit split related to when a
claim accrues under the Administrative Procedure
Act. See Cross-Pet. 18 (citing Corner Post, Inc. v.
Board of Governors, FRS, No. 22-1008).
Since Plaintiffs offer no further explanation,
Danco will. The plaintiffs in Corner Post made two
arguments in asserting their challenge to the rule at
issue was timely despite the APA’s six-year statute of
limitations. First, they argued that a “clarification” of
the 2011 rule by the agency in 2015 “renewed the
statute of limitations under the D.C. Circuit’s
reopening doctrine.” North Dakota Retail Ass’n v.
Board of Governors, FRS, 55 F.4th 634, 638 (8th Cir.
2022). The Eighth Circuit rejected that argument. It
explained that “[t]his court has not adopted or even
referenced the D.C. Circuit’s reopening doctrine,”
which it concluded would not apply “[e]ven if the
reopening doctrine has any validity,” because the
agency’s clarification was “not a ‘later rulemaking’
and did not ‘actually reconsider the rule.’ ” Id. at 639
(citation omitted). Second, the plaintiffs argued that
for one plaintiff (Corner Post), the challenge to the
2011 rule “first accrued when Corner Post opened in
2018” and became subject to the rule, “rather than
14
when [the rule] was published in 2011,” so the statute
of limitations did not begin to run until 2018. Id. The
Eighth Circuit rejected that theory too. Id.
Corner Post sought and was granted certiorari
only on the second theory—whether an APA claim
“first accrues” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an
agency issues a rule or when the rule first harms an
individual plaintiff. See Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of
Governors, FRS, No. 22-1008 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2023).
The answer to that question has no relevance here,
and Plaintiffs never made a claim-accrual argument
akin to Corner Post below. Claim accrual concerns
whether a lawsuit is timely in the first instance—not
whether there are valid excuses for failing to timely
assert a claim.3
4. Even if the validity of the reopening doctrine
were a question worthy of this Court’s review, this
case is a poor vehicle to address it. Because the Fifth
Circuit did “not address [the] threshold question”
whether to adopt the reopening doctrine,
Danco.Pet.App. 47a n.6, this Court thus lacks the
Fifth Circuit’s considered views on the validity of the
reopening doctrine. If the Court is inclined to address
3
To the extent Plaintiffs suggest (at 18) that Corner Post might
be relevant here because one Plaintiff was supposedly injured
“just last year,” that argument is both forfeited and unsupported
by the record. Plaintiffs never pressed this argument below,
ROA.153-166, and three sentences in a conditional cross-petition
hardly suffices to raise it for this Court’s review. Nor is it
supported by the record. Plaintiff Shaun Jester—the Plaintiff
identified by the cross-petition—made no such claim. See
ROA.955-962. He received his medical license in 1999, has been
a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist since 2007, and
offered one undated example of treating a patient who had
experienced an adverse event after a medication abortion.
ROA.957; ROA.959.
15
the “reopening” doctrine at some point, it should grant
review of a decision that has adopted and applied the
doctrine. This case checks none of those boxes. Even
the District Court admitted that there was no
precedent for applying the doctrine “in the precise
context of FDA’s approval of an NDA.”
Danco.Pet.App. 192a n.18.
B. Even If “Reopening” Could Theoretically
Restart A Limitations Period, The Fifth
Circuit Correctly Found It Inapplicable
Here.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to correct a purported
error in how the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the
facts here demonstrate the D.C. Circuit’s reopening
doctrine applies. That is not the province of this
Court, and there are no errors to be corrected.
Plaintiffs’ contention that three subsequent FDA
actions involving mifepristone “reopened” FDA’s
initial approval of the drug is plainly wrong. The Fifth
Circuit’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ meritless, fact-bound
arguments does not warrant further review.
1. Express Reopening Is Inapplicable To
The Facts Here.
Plaintiffs identify two actions they say “expressly”
reopened FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex: (1) FDA’s
March 2016 approval of Danco’s sNDA requesting to
amend certain aspects of Mifeprex’s approval,
including its indication, dosing regimen, and REMS,
and (2) FDA’s December 2021 denial of Plaintiffs’
citizen petition (filed in 2019) contesting the 2016
changes. See Cross-Pet. 19. Neither fits the bill.
For starters, FDA’s approval of the sNDA making
changes to the label and REMS in 2016 cannot
16
support application of the reopening doctrine for a
simple reason: Plaintiffs waited more than 6 years
from that sNDA approval to file suit. Thus, even if
FDA’s actions in March 2016 somehow reopened
FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex, the six-year statute
of limitations would have run in March 2022.
Plaintiffs sued in November 2022. Therefore, “even
assuming such a * * * reopening occurred, the
challenge is still untimely.” Growth Energy, 5 F.4th
at 26.
Plaintiffs’ delay aside, nothing in the existing
record shows that FDA’s 2016 sNDA approval
“expressly” reopened FDA’s 2000 decision to approve
the drug as safe and effective.4 Plaintiffs never assert
FDA “explicitly” said it had “undertaken a serious,
substantive reconsideration” of its 2000 Mifeprex
approval decision. Growth Energy, 5 F.4th at 21
(citations and brackets omitted). They say that FDA
did so silently, because it also denied their citizen
petition challenging the 2000 approval at the same
time. Cross-Pet. 20 But as the Fifth Circuit
explained, this “context” assertion is “really just an
end-run around the fact that [Plaintiffs] were too late
to challenge FDA’s denial of their [2002] citizen
petition.” Danco.Pet.App. 48a; see also id. at 144a
(same conclusion by stay panel).
It does not show that FDA “actually reconsidered”
whether it should have approved mifepristone in the
first place. Growth Energy, 5 F.4th at 21 (citation
omitted). Action on separate pending matters at the
4
Plaintiffs’ assertion that FDA’s 2016 sNDA approval
“chang[ed] the safeguards essential to th[e] original approval,”
Cross-Pet. 19, is an argument about constructive reopening and
addressed infra pp. 19-23.
17
same time is not a valid basis to infer otherwise. See
National Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners, 158
F.3d at 142 (“[A]nything less than a direct
relationship between the two rules would be too lax a
standard for triggering the reopening doctrine.”).
“FDA took the restrictions imposed in 2000 as a given,
and considered only whether the [labeling and] REMS
amendments were safe and effective.” Danco.Pet.App.
48a.
FDA’s 2021 denial of Plaintiffs’ citizen petition is
also unhelpful for them. As the D.C. Circuit itself
confirmed a few months ago, the denial of a petition,
like Plaintiffs’ citizen petition, does not trigger the
reopening doctrine. The D.C. Circuit applies the
“reopening” doctrine only to “a voluntary and
affirmative agency action,” which “is the hallmark of
a reopening”—not to an agency action that is
“required or reactive.” Public Emps. for Env’t Resp.,
77 F.4th at 914 (finding reopening inapplicable).
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has never found that “an
agency reopened an issue by merely responding to a
petition * * * submitted by a third party.” Id. at 913.5
That is because “if a party were allowed to goad an
agency into a reply, and then sue on the grounds that
5
And while the D.C. Circuit recently speculated that an agency’s
“response to a petition” “could conceivably reopen an
administrative proceeding,” it emphasized that “the party
challenging the denial of such a petition must show that the
agency’s intention to initiate a reopening is clear from the
administrative record,” which “requires showing that the agency
did much more than merely take legally required steps to
respond to the petition.” Public Emps. for Env’t Resp., 77 F.4th
at 914 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Of
course, Plaintiffs never asserted that FDA’s supposed intention
to reopen the 2000 approval was “crystal clear” when FDA denied
their petition in 2021. Id.
18
the agency re-opened the issue, the agency’s thorough
answer would put it at risk of reopening, while a
taciturn response would put it at risk of being faulted
for acting without reasoned decisionmaking.”
American Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 588
F.3d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations, internal
quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). This Court
should not grant certiorari to address whether the
reopening doctrine applies in a context where even the
D.C. Circuit would not apply it.
Moreover, the petition that FDA denied in 2021
requested that FDA return to the use restrictions that
accompanied the 2000 approval—not that it rethink
that approval in the first place. See ROA.741.
Plaintiffs seize on FDA’s remark that the agency had
conducted a “full review” of the mifepristone REMS in
2021. Cross-Pet. 20 (quoting ROA.808). That gets
them nowhere. It is nonsensical that FDA’s review of
the use restrictions in the REMS as of 2021—which
are not the initial use restrictions—would reopen
FDA’s 2000 approval or the original use restrictions.
Cf. Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 38
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (by saying the agency had “review[ed]
the effectiveness of the rules,” agency did not
“reopen[ ] the question of its statutory authority to
adopt the rules in the first place”; “nothing in those
notices suggested that, in reviewing the ‘effectiveness’
of the rules, the [agency] intended to review their
statutory basis as well” (citation omitted)).
As the Fifth Circuit merits panel emphasized,
“FDA had no reason to reevaluate” the 2000 approval
of Mifeprex in the course of addressing Plaintiffs’ 2019
petition because Plaintiffs “did not actually ask FDA
to reconsider its approval of mifepristone” in that
19
petition; instead, they merely “requested that FDA
‘restore’ previous restrictions and ‘retain’ others
currently in place.” Danco.Pet.App. 50a (quoting
ROA.741).
2. Constructive Reopening Is
Inapplicable To The Facts Here.
Plaintiffs next ask this Court to review whether,
even if FDA did not expressly reopen its 2000 approval
of Mifeprex, FDA’s 2016 changes, 2021 petition
denial,
and
2021
non-enforcement
decision
“constructively” did so. Cross-Pet. 21. This argument
is just as fact-bound as Plaintiffs’ express-reopening
argument, and is poorly suited for certiorari review for
all the same reasons.
Plaintiffs’ argument is also based on a
misunderstanding of the “constructive” version of the
D.C. Circuit’s reopening doctrine. That court has
invoked “constructive reopening” to permit an
otherwise untimely challenge in less than a handful of
cases, and only in the rulemaking context.6
Even in the rulemaking context, moreover, the
D.C. Circuit has held that “ ‘constructive’ reopening”
occurs only when a new rule results in such a “sea
change” to “the basic regulatory scheme” that it
“significantly alters the stakes” of seeking judicial
review in a way that the plaintiffs could not have
“reasonably anticipated” when they chose not to
challenge that scheme in the first instance. National
Biodiesel Bd., 843 F.3d at 1017 (citations omitted);
6
And these cases, except for one, have “limited the constructive
reopening doctrine to cases involving regulated entities,” rather
than “challenges from third parties” like Plaintiffs. Sierra Club,
551 F.3d at 1029 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
20
accord Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of
Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1214-15, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying doctrine in rulemaking context); National
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Interior, 134 F.3d
1095, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same). An agency’s
“elimination” of a “more stringent requirement” “in
favor of an alternative” does “not work such a sea
change.” Natural Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at 1266.
This case does not involve a challenge to a
rulemaking. Plaintiffs are thus asking this Court to
grant certiorari to address a question no court has
addressed: whether a “constructive reopening”
doctrine applies outside the rulemaking context. And
in all events, FDA’s subsequent actions on
mifepristone did not “alter[ ] the “regulatory
framework” for drug approvals. National Biodiesel
Bd., 843 F.3d at 1017. The agency’s rules have long
“establish[ed]” that applicants “may seek approval” of
revisions to a product’s labeling and REMS, id.; see 21
U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(4)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, meaning
that FDA’s subsequent actions on mifepristone
“neither alter[ed] that regulatory framework nor
work[ed] a change that [Plaintiffs] could not have
reasonably anticipated.” National Biodiesel Bd., 843
F.3d at 1017.
Plaintiffs also do not contend that FDA’s 2000
approval of Mifeprex was not “worth challenging”
until FDA changed the use restrictions. Sierra Club,
551 F.3d at 1026 (citation omitted). Nor could they;
after all, several Plaintiffs filed a citizen petition
challenging the 2000 approval. ROA.353-444.
Plaintiffs maintain, in the face of all this, that this
case is “on all fours” with the D.C. Circuit’s decision
in Sierra Club. Cross-Pet. 22. It is not. For starters,
21
Sierra Club involved a rulemaking. There, the initial
EPA rule crafted a narrow exemption to emissions
limits for certain operational events where an
emitting source received approval of a plan to
minimize emissions during such events. Later EPA
rulemakings, however, eliminated the need for an
emitting source to obtain approval of a plan to
minimize
emissions
during
those
events.
Environmentalists then challenged the exemption as
unlawful and arbitrary. A divided D.C. Circuit panel
held that the initial rule “may not have been worth
challenging” “from the perspective of environmental
petitioners’ interests” because EPA had crafted it so
that it would not be a “blanket exemption” to Clean
Air Act requirements. Sierra Club, 551 F.3d at 1026
(citation omitted).
The new rule, in contrast,
“completely changed the regulatory context,” by
creating in effect the very blanket exemption EPA had
earlier disclaimed. See id. at 1025 (citation omitted).
Two judges found this sufficient to constructively
reopen EPA’s initial rulemaking.
Compare that to this case. Here, FDA approved
Mifeprex in 2000 after concluding the drug sponsor’s
application showed it was safe and effective for the
indicated use; this was not a rulemaking crafting an
exemption to otherwise applicable law. And Plaintiffs
cannot say with a straight face that FDA’s subsequent
actions so “significantly altered the stakes of judicial
review” that only after the 2016 changes did Plaintiffs
view Mifeprex’s approval as worth challenging “from
the perspective of [their] interests.” Sierra Club, 551
F.3d at 1025-26 (citations and brackets omitted).
After all, Plaintiffs “have consistently opposed
abortion.” ROA.355; see also ROA.232; ROA.239;
ROA.252. From that perspective, FDA’s approval of
22
Mifeprex in 2000 was certainly “worth challenging in
its own right,” Natural Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at
1270, as Plaintiffs “had an ample incentive at that
time to protest” the decision, Kennecott, 88 F.3d at
1215. In fact, some did. See ROA.355.
Plaintiffs suggest (at 23) that this Court should
find “constructive reopening” because Danco’s sNDA
only became public when FDA approved it. That
cannot be right. It would mean every drug approval
is reopened with every sNDA amendment or REMS
revision, because applications for those changes are
never publicly filed. Actual notice of a specific
amendment is not the question anyway. The question
is whether Plaintiffs could have reasonably
anticipated that the use restrictions or indication
might change over time based on scientific studies and
real-world experience with the drug. Of course they
could. FDA frequently authorizes new uses, changes
to indications, and amended use restrictions based on
new data and real-world experience. See PhRMA
Amicus Br. 16, ECF No. 312, Alliance for Hippocratic
Med. v. FDA, No. 23-10362 (5th Cir. May 2, 2023)
(“FDA has approved more than 300 REMS since 2008
and has made more than 800 modifications to
REMS.”).7
7
FDA approved over 100 efficacy supplements in 2021 and 2022
that, for example, added a new or modified indication, new
dosing regimen, or new route of administration; approved use of
a drug in a new patient population; or changed a drug from
prescription to over-the-counter. See FDA, CY 2022 New Drug
Application (NDA) & Biologic License Application (BLA) Efficacy
Supplement Calendar Year Approvals as of December 31, 2022,
https://www.fda.gov/media/165825/download?attachment; FDA,
CY 2021 New Drug Application (NDA) & Biologic License
23
Even in the rulemaking context that the D.C.
Circuit has limited this doctrine to, a litigant may
“reasonably anticipate[ ]” that an agency might
“subsequently eliminate” a rule’s “more stringent
requirement[s]” “in favor of an alternative” that would
“allow more liberal use” of the original rule. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at 1266 (citation omitted).
Such an “elimination” of stricter requirements “does
not provide a ground to conclude that the broader
issue” of the merits of the original rule “has been
reopened.” Id.
*
*
*
This is not the case to address the “reopening”
doctrine. The Fifth Circuit did not address that
question below. And Plaintiffs do not even have
support from the D.C. Circuit for their position here.
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW AN
ACADEMIC QUESTION ABOUT THE
SCOPE OF A SUPERSEDED REGULATION
THAT HAS NOT GOVERNED MIFEPREX’S
USE RESTRICTIONS SINCE 2008.
Plaintiffs also ask this Court to address the scope
of Subpart H—a statutory provision that has not
applied to Mifeprex since 2008. That academic
question is legally irrelevant to Mifeprex today, and
this Court should not reach it for four reasons.
First, the panel majority did not address the scope
of Subpart H. This Court should not pass on an issue
that the court below did not decide.
Application (BLA) Efficacy Supplement Calendar Year
Approvals as of December 31, 2021,
https://www.fda.gov/media/158154/download?attachment.
24
Second, Plaintiffs’ argument has a glaring vehicle
problem:
Subpart H does not govern the use
restrictions for any drug, including Mifeprex. Danco
is unaware of any case in which this Court has
granted review to opine on the scope of a defunct
regulation.
Third, Plaintiffs are wrong when they contend that
FDA could not have relied on Subpart H to set use
restrictions prior to 2008. This Court does not grant
review to decide fact-bound error-correction
arguments about an agency’s interpretation of an
obsolete regulation more than two decades ago.
Fourth, nothing supports Plaintiffs’ contention
that FDA may only approve a drug on the precise
terms of a completed clinical trial protocol. This issue
is outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ question presented,
which is limited to Subpart H, and has no basis in the
law. It would mean that virtually every drug on the
market was wrongly approved.
A. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Argument Was Not
Addressed Below And There Is No Circuit
Split.
The panel decision did not reach Plaintiffs’
Subpart H argument. This Court should decline to
reach a question that was not passed on below. See,
e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012)
(“Ours is a court of ‘final review and not first view.’ ”
(citation omitted)); Stephen M. Shapiro et al.,
Supreme Court Practice § 6.26.(B) (11th ed. 2019).
There is also no conflict between the circuits, or
between the panel decision and this Court’s
precedents. As Plaintiffs acknowledged in response to
Danco’s and the Government’s emergency stay
25
applications, no court of appeals has ever ruled on this
issue. See Plaintiffs’ Opp. to App. for Stay 13-14, No.
22A901 (Apr. 18, 2023) (noting that “even when the
Fifth Circuit completes its expedited merits review,”
there could be “no cases that will conflict”). That fact
counsels against deviating from the Court’s “ordinary
practice of denying petitions insofar as they raise legal
issues that have not been considered by additional
Courts of Appeals.” Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind.
& Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019) (per curiam);
see also Sup. Ct. R. 10.
B. Subpart H Does Not Govern Mifeprex’s
Use Restrictions Today.
Whatever the historical relevance of Subpart H for
Mifeprex, it was superseded by Congress’s
amendment to the FDCA in 2007 authorizing FDA to
impose use restrictions through a REMS and by FDA’s
approval of the Mifeprex REMS. Since 2007, no new
drugs have been approved with use restrictions under
Subpart H and no drugs that were already on the
market in 2007 have use restrictions governed by
Subpart H.
When Congress enacted the REMS authority, it
specifically “deemed” drugs with Subpart H use
restrictions—including Mifeprex—“to have in effect
an approved [REMS].” § 909(b)(1), 121 Stat. at 950.
By doing so, Congress superseded FDA’s earlier
decision to implement use restrictions under Subpart
H. And in 2011, FDA expressly approved Danco’s
REMS proposal.
ROA.672-675.
Plaintiffs’
acknowledgement (at 18-19) that Subpart H has been
superseded by statute underscores that certiorari is
26
not warranted here. This Court does not review
regulatory dinosaurs.8
C. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Arguments Are
Wrong On The Merits.
Plaintiffs’ arguments about the scope of Subpart H
also are meritless. Subpart H includes a regulation
that FDA used, prior to its REMS authority, to impose
use restrictions. ROA.596. That regulation refers to
“new drug products that have been studied for their
safety and effectiveness in treating serious or lifethreatening illnesses and that provide meaningful
therapeutic benefit to patients over existing
treatments.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. Plaintiffs contend
(at 24-28) that pregnancy is not an “illness,” and that
medication abortion lacks a meaningful therapeutic
benefit compared to surgical abortion, such that use
restrictions could not have been imposed under
Subpart H.
Consistent with FDA’s interchangeable use of
“illness,” “condition,” and “disease” under the FDCA,
the agency reasonably concluded that it could use
8
At times, Plaintiffs appear to suggest that Subpart H was the
source of FDA’s authority to approve Mifeprex as safe and
effective for its intended use. That is wrong. As Plaintiffs
recognize elsewhere, Cross-Pet. 4, FDA’s approval authority in
2000 and today is found at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). Subpart H is a
regulation that FDA used prior to 2007 when it determined use
restrictions were warranted. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.520. Today,
FDA is authorized to require use restrictions under its REMS
authority, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1. Plaintiffs are also wrong
to proclaim that without Subpart H, FDA would have denied
approval of Mifeprex. For example, another FDA-approved
mifepristone product—Korlym, which is approved to treat
Cushing’s disease—was approved by FDA with restrictions that
were not in the form of a REMS or Subpart H use restrictions.
27
Subpart H to approve drugs to treat a variety of
conditions even if they are not considered an
“illness”—including Mifeprex.
See New Drug,
Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations,
57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,946 (Dec. 11, 1992). An
independent review by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) confirmed that FDA’s
approval and oversight processes for Mifeprex were
consistent with its processes for other drugs with
Subpart H use restrictions. GAO, GAO-08-751, FDA:
Approval and Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex (Aug.
2008), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-751.pdf.
Mifeprex is not an outlier: FDA cited Subpart H
when approving use restrictions for drugs treating, for
example, acute acne and severe diarrheapredominant irritable bowel syndrome. See id. at 4-5;
Former FDA Officials Amicus Br. 12, ECF No. 307,
Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, No. 23-10362
(5th Cir. May 2, 2023). And FDA has similarly
interpreted illness and condition interchangeably in
other contexts as well. See FDA, Guidance for
Industry,
Expedited
Programs
for
Serious
Conditions—Drugs and Biologics 3 (May 2014)
https://www.fda.gov/media/86377/download
(using
terms
interchangeably).
FDA’s
reasonable
interpretation of its own regulation as encompassing
serious or life-threatening conditions easily meets this
Court’s standard in Kisor v. Wilkie for granting
deference to an agency. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412 (2019)
(plurality) (“[T]he agency that promulgated a rule is
in the better position to reconstruct its original
meaning.” (citation and brackets omitted)).
Plaintiffs’ argument (at 26-27) that FDA acted
unlawfully in finding that Mifeprex provides a
28
“meaningful therapeutic benefit” is also wrong on the
merits. FDA evaluated data from multiple clinical
trials comparing medication abortion to surgical
abortion and reasonably concluded that Mifeprex
confers various benefits over surgical abortion,
including avoiding an invasive surgical procedure and
avoiding anesthesia, each of which has complications
and reactions that make it inappropriate for some
patients. ROA.639; see ECF No. 29, Alliance for
Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, No. 23-10362, at 71-73
¶¶ 10-11, 13-14 (Goldberg Decl.) (5th Cir. Apr. 7,
2023) (explaining that medication abortion is
preferable for some patients); id. at 82, 86-88 ¶¶ 8, 1819, 21 (Schreiber Decl.) (same).
Plaintiffs argue that a Merriam-Webster dictionary limits the definition of “therapeutic” to the “treatment or curing of a disease or disorder” and that mifepristone would have to treat all “pregnancy-related
complications,” including ectopic pregnancies, to fall
within Subpart H. Cross-Pet. 27. But the same dictionary also defines “therapeutic” as “producing a useful or favorable result or effect,” such as “the therapeutic benefits of yoga,” “laughter,” and “[g]ardening.”
Merriam-Webster
Dictionary,
Therapeutic,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/therapeutic (last visited Nov. 7, 2023). Other dictionaries
similarly recognize a broader meaning for “therapeutic” than just relating to illness. The American Heritage Dictionary, for example, defines “therapeutic” as
“[o]f or relating to the medical treatment of a disease
or condition.” American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, Therapeutic (5th ed. 2022),
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=therapeutic (last visited Nov. 7, 2023) (emphasis added).
29
As for Plaintiffs’ argument (at 27) about
pregnancy-related complications, they offer no
rationale for why medication abortion would have to
treat every possible pregnancy-related complication,
including ectopic pregnancies, to qualify as
“therapeutic.” And the amicus brief below from the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
the American Medical Association, and the Society for
Maternal Fetal Medicine explains that mifepristone
is, in fact, used off-label for a number of pregnancyrelated complications, including to treat miscarriages,
“to reduce the duration of bleeding or hemorrhaging
during certain serious pregnancy complications,” and
for its “beneficial effects on the cervix in full-term
pregnancies, which may in turn affect the likelihood
of successful labor.”
American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. Amicus Br. 2526, ECF No. 354, Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v.
FDA, No. 23-10362 (5th Cir. May 4, 2023).
Plaintiffs also assert (at 27-28) that FDA could not
have found mifepristone provides meaningful
therapeutic benefit because a very small number of
patients might need a follow-up surgical procedure.
But the fact that a drug may require additional followup care in some circumstances does not mean it lacks
therapeutic effect. For the 92.1% to 95.5% of women
who the pre-2000 approval studies showed did not
need follow up care, the pregnancy was successfully
terminated with no further intervention. ROA.591.
Requiring every drug to work for every patient in
order to obtain FDA approval would prevent nearly all
drugs from reaching the market. See Patient and
Provider Advocacy Organizations Amicus Br. 2, ECF
No. 346, Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, No. 2310362 (5th Cir. May 4, 2023) (explaining that the
30
District Court’s “decision would cast uncertainty over
the continued availability of all FDA-approved
drugs”); see also Food and Drug Scholars Amicus Br.
9-10, ECF No. 308, Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v.
FDA, No. 23-10362 (5th Cir. May 2, 2023).
D. Plaintiffs’ Argument That FDA Must
Match The Terms Of A Drug’s Approval
Exactly To The Protocol Of A Supporting
Clinical Trial Is Outside The Questions
Presented And Wrong.
Plaintiffs chose to limit their second question
presented to whether FDA’s approval of Mifeprex
“under Subpart H” was unlawful. Cross-Pet. i.
Plaintiffs nevertheless contend in their cross-petition
that FDA was required to reject the Mifeprex NDA
because the proposed labeling did not exactly match
the protocol under which the drug was used in the
clinical trials on which FDA relied to make its safety
and efficacy determination.
Review of this issue can and should be denied
because Plaintiffs did not raise it in their questions
presented, and it is not a subsidiary question to the
issue of Subpart H approval. See Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 537 (1992) (even a “related”
question is not reviewable if it is not “fairly included”
within the question presented); Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a).
And in any event, Plaintiffs’ argument is meritless.
According to Plaintiffs, FDA cannot approve a drug
unless there is a clinical trial using the precise
conditions under which the drug is ultimately
approved. Cross-Pet. 30. Plaintiffs have no support
for their position. FDA must consider whether there
is “substantial evidence” of effectiveness from
“adequate and well-controlled investigations” and
31
sufficient evidence of safety, and whether the drug’s
benefits outweigh any risks. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). A
team of experts (including physicians, statisticians,
chemists, pharmacologists, and other scientists)
reviews each application and carefully assesses all
relevant data in light of the drug’s proposed labeling
and intended use. If the applicant has demonstrated
the drug is safe and effective under the conditions of
use in the proposed labeling and satisfies certain
other conditions, FDA must approve the drug. 21
U.S.C. § 355(c)-(d).
These intentionally flexible standards allow FDA
to rely on a range of data in evaluating an NDA and
to extrapolate from various sources as it deems
appropriate. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c). That
flexibility is particularly important because clinical
trials often employ more restrictive conditions than
those ultimately recommended for approved labeling,
a practice intended to protect study participants
before FDA has concluded a drug is safe and effective
for a particular use. See ROA.662; see also ROA.32923293.
No statutory or regulatory provision prohibits FDA
from approving an NDA without a clinical trial
evaluating a drug under all of the approved conditions
of use. FDA can, in its scientific judgment, determine
that the existing studies show the drug is safe for use
under the proposed labeling. That is what occurred
here, and what occurs with virtually every drug on the
market. See PhRMA Amicus Br. 12-15. This Court
has made clear that agencies can form a “reasonable
predictive judgment” based on the evidence before
them. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct.
1150, 1160 (2021). That is what FDA did here.
32
Plaintiffs nevertheless ask this Court to conclude
that FDA acted unreasonably when it approved
Mifeprex in 2000 without requiring prescribers to
perform an ultrasound to check for an ectopic
pregnancy and for gestational dating. Cross-Pet. 30.
They ignore that FDA has consistently required that
certified prescribers be able to accurately “assess the
duration of the pregnancy” and “diagnose ectopic
pregnancies,” ROA.813-814, whether through an
ultrasound or “other clinical methods” that elicit that
information effectively, ROA.652.
The agency
“carefully considered” “[t]he role of the ultrasound,”
and it reasonably explained its decision to leave the
method of dating pregnancies and ectopic-pregnancy
diagnosis to “the medical judgment of the physician.”
ROA.595; see also ROA.651-653 (discussing
alternative methods and noting that, among women
with reported ectopic pregnancies who took
mifepristone and received ultrasounds, more than
half of the ultrasounds failed to detect the ectopic
pregnancy). The rarity of ectopic pregnancies in
women who have been prescribed mifepristone over
the past 23 years—further evidenced by the fact that
no Plaintiff identified ever treating a woman with an
ectopic pregnancy after taking mifepristone—
suggests that FDA was right in its judgment call. See
FDA, Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse
Events
Summary
Through
12/31/2022,
https://www.fda.gov/media/164331/download
(documenting 97 total instances of ectopic
pregnancies out of the millions of women who have
had medication abortions).
Plaintiffs also argue that FDA erred by not
requiring women to remain under a doctor’s
observation for multiple hours after taking
33
misoprostol (the second drug in the approved regimen)
because the clinical trials on which the approval was
based had included such observation. Cross-Pet. 31.
But Plaintiffs never made this argument below,
making it unfit for this Court’s review. See, e.g.,
Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 201. Their Complaint likewise
did not allege this observation period was included in
each clinical trial supporting Mifeprex’s approval.
ROA.74-186.
Moreover, again, there is no
requirement that clinical trial protocols dictate a
drug’s approved labeling.
Clinical trials of
unapproved drugs routinely implement stringent
safety measures to account for the fact that safety and
efficacy have not yet been established.
These
measures are often unnecessary once the drug is
approved. Former FDA Officials Amicus Br. 19-20.
FDA’s considered exercise of its expert scientific
judgment—based on a huge array of evidence—to
determine that some conditions of use imposed in
clinical trials need not be included in a drug label does
not render the agency’s choice unreasonable. See
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Plaintiffs’
position, which lacks any legal support and has never
been accepted by any court, would undermine the
approval of nearly all FDA-approved drugs on the
market today.
Certiorari review is plainly
unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
The conditional cross-petition should be denied.
34
Respectfully submitted,
PHILIP KATZ
LYNN W. MEHLER
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
EVA M. SCHIFINI
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 1400
Los Angeles, CA 90067
JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH
Counsel of Record
CATHERINE E. STETSON
MARLAN GOLDEN
DANA A. RAPHAEL
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com
Counsel for Danco Laboratories, LLC
NOVEMBER 2023
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.