Opposition Brief — Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al., Petitioners v. Food and Drug Administration, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 7, 2023

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No. 23-395

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,

v.

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,

Cross-Respondents,

and

ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,

v.

DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,

Cross-Respondent.

On Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR

DANCO LABORATORIES, LLC

PHILIP KATZ

LYNN W. MEHLER

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

EVA M. SCHIFINI

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

1999 Avenue of the Stars

Suite 1400

Los Angeles, CA 90067

JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH

Counsel of Record

CATHERINE E. STETSON

MARLAN GOLDEN

DANA A. RAPHAEL

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for Danco Laboratories, LLC

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

More than 23 years ago, the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) approved Danco’s drug

Mifeprex, in combination with another FDA-approved

drug misoprostol, for termination of early pregnancy.

The six-year statute of limitations to challenge that

approval came and went. Then, in November 2022,

anti-abortion doctors and associations of anti-abortion

doctors—none of whom prescribe Mifeprex—filed an

untimely challenge to FDA’s September 2000

approval of Mifeprex. As relevant here, they argued

that FDA was not authorized to impose use

restrictions in 2000 under a set of regulations known

as Subpart H. The Fifth Circuit held this challenge

was time-barred. The questions presented are:

1. Whether this Court should adopt the D.C.

Circuit’s judge-made “reopening” doctrine and find

that FDA’s lifting of certain Mifeprex use restrictions

in response to post-approval clinical data and realworld drug experience restarted the statute of

limitations for challenging the drug’s 2000 approval.

2. Whether Mifeprex’s 2000 approval can be

preliminarily enjoined in 2023 based on FDA’s use of

Subpart H to initially impose use restrictions.

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Cross-Petitioners are Alliance for Hippocratic

Medicine; American Association of Pro-Life

Obstetricians & Gynecologists; American College of

Pediatricians;

Christian

Medical

&

Dental

Associations; Shaun Jester, D.O.; Regina Frost-Clark,

M.D.; Tyler Johnson, D.O.; and George Delgado, M.D.

They were plaintiffs in the District Court and

appellees in the Court of Appeals.

Cross-Respondents are Danco Laboratories, LLC,

who was an intervenor in the District Court and an

appellant in the Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Food

and Drug Administration (FDA); Robert M. Califf,

M.D., in his official capacity as Commissioner of Food

and Drugs; Janet Woodcock, M.D., in her official

capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Food and Drugs;

Patrizia Cavazzoni, M.D., in her official capacity as

Director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and

Research; the U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services (HHS); and Xavier Becerra, in his official

capacity as Secretary of HHS, who were defendants in

the District Court and appellants in the Court of

Appeals.

iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Danco

Laboratories, LLC hereby states that it is a whollyowned subsidiary of Danco Investors Group, LP. No

publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of the

stock of either entity.

iv

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Supreme Court of the United States:

Danco Laboratories, LLC v. Alliance for

Hippocratic Medicine, et al., No. 23-236 (Sept. 12,

2023) (petition for a writ of certiorari)

U.S. Food & Drug Administration, et al. v.

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.,

No. 23-235 (Sept. 12, 2023) (petition for a writ of

certiorari)

Danco Laboratories, LLC v. Alliance for

Hippocratic Medicine, et al., No. 22A901 (Apr. 21,

2023) (granting application for stay)

U.S. Food & Drug Administration, et al. v.

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.,

No. 22A902 (Apr. 21, 2023) (granting application

for stay)

United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. v. U.S.

Food & Drug Administration, et al., No. 23-10362

(Aug. 16, 2023) (opinion)

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. v. U.S.

Food & Drug Administration, et al., No. 23-10362

(Apr. 12, 2023) (partially granting and partially

denying stay pending appeal)

United States District Court (N.D. Tex.):

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. v. U.S.

Food & Drug Administration et al., No. 2:22-cv223 (Apr. 7, 2023) (opinion)

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......... iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ..................................... iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................... vii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 3

A. Factual Background ........................................ 3

B. Procedural History .......................................... 7

REASONS FOR DENYING THE

CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION .................... 9

I.

REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED OF A

DOCTRINE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT

ADOPT AND THAT IT FOUND WOULD

NOT MAKE PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGE

TIMELY IN ANY EVENT................................... 9

A. Whether The “Reopening” Doctrine Is A

Valid Exception To The Statute Of

Limitations Does Not Warrant Review ......... 10

B. Even If “Reopening” Could Theoretically

Restart A Limitations Period, The Fifth

Circuit Correctly Found It Inapplicable

Here ................................................................. 15

1. Express Reopening Is Inapplicable To

The Facts Here ............................................. 15

2. Constructive Reopening Is Inapplicable

To The Facts Here........................................ 19

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW

AN ACADEMIC QUESTION ABOUT

THE SCOPE OF A SUPERSEDED

REGULATION THAT HAS NOT

GOVERNED MIFEPREX’S USE

RESTRICTIONS SINCE 2008 .......................... 23

A. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Argument Was Not

Addressed Below And There Is No Circuit

Split.................................................................... 24

B. Subpart H Does Not Govern Mifeprex’s Use

Restrictions Today............................................. 25

C. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Arguments Are

Wrong On The Merits ....................................... 26

D. Plaintiffs’ Argument That FDA Must Match

The Terms Of A Drug’s Approval Exactly To

The Protocol Of A Supporting Clinical Trial

Is Outside The Questions Presented And

Wrong................................................................. 30

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 33

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

American Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA,

588 F.3d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ............................. 18

Biden v. Texas,

142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022) ....................................... 9, 12

Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc.,

139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (per curiam) ...................... 25

Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC,

460 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ................................. 18

Environmental Def. v. EPA,

467 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ............................. 10

FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,

141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) ........................................... 31

Growth Energy v. EPA,

5 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ................................ 11, 16

Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department

of Interior,

88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ......................... 20, 22

Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ........................................... 27

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) ................................................. 33

National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Interior,

134 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ............................. 20

National Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners

v. Surface Transp. Bd.,

158 F.3d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ....................10, 11, 17

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

National Biodiesel Bd. v. EPA,

843 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............10, 11, 19, 20

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA,

571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ...... 10, 11, 20, 22, 23

North Dakota Retail Ass’n v. Board of Governors, FRS,

55 F.4th 634 (8th Cir. 2022), cert. granted sub nom.

Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, No. 22-1008

(U.S. Sept. 29, 2023) ........................................ 13, 14

Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Department of

Homeland Sec.,

983 F.3d 671 (4th Cir. 2020) ................................. 12

Public Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. EPA,

77 F.4th 899 (D.C. Cir. 2023) .......................... 10, 17

Sierra Club v. EPA,

551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ...... 11, 12, 19, 20, 21

Texas v. Biden,

20 F.4th 928 (5th Cir. 2021),

rev’d, 142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022) ................................. 12

Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Env’t Quality, Div. of

Air Quality v. EPA,

750 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................. 12

Yee v. City of Escondido,

503 U.S. 519 (1992) ............................................... 30

Zivotofsky v. Clinton,

566 U.S. 189 (2012) ......................................... 24, 33

STATUTES:

5 U.S.C. § 706(1) ......................................................... 5

21 U.S.C. § 355 ........................................................... 3

21 U.S.C. § 355(c) ..................................................... 31

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

21 U.S.C. § 355(d) ............................................... 26, 31

21 U.S.C. § 355-1 ...................................................... 26

21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1) ............................................... 4

21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(4)(A) ........................................ 20

28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) ........................................... 5, 7, 14

Food and Drug Administration Amendments

Act of 2007,

Pub. L. 110-85, Title IX, 121 Stat. 823 ................... 4

§ 909(a) ..................................................................... 5

§ 909(b)(1) .......................................................... 4, 25

§ 909(b)(3) ................................................................ 4

REGULATIONS:

21 C.F.R. § 314.70 .................................................... 20

21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) .............................................. 31

21 C.F.R. § 314.500 .................................................. 26

21 C.F.R. § 314.510 .................................................... 4

21 C.F.R. § 314.520 .............................................. 4, 26

Identification of Drug and Biological Products,

73 Fed. Reg. 16,313 (Mar. 27, 2008) ....................... 5

New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug

Product Regulations,

57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992) ...................... 27

RULES:

Sup. Ct. R. 10............................................................ 25

Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a) .................................................... 30

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language, Therapeutic (5th ed. 2022)

https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?

q=therapeutic (last visited Nov. 7, 2023) ............. 28

Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch.,

Approval Package for: Application Number

020687Orig1s025 (Jan. 3, 2023) ............................. 7

FDA, CY 2022 New Drug Application (NDA) &

Biologic License Application (BLA) Efficacy

Supplement Calendar Year Approvals as of

December 31, 2022,

https://www.fda.gov/media/165825/download?

attachment............................................................. 22

FDA, CY 2021 New Drug Application (NDA) &

Biologic License Application (BLA) Efficacy

Supplement Calendar Year Approvals as of

December 31, 2021,

https://www.fda.gov/media/158154/download?a

ttachment............................................................... 22

FDA, Guidance for Industry, Expedited Programs

for Serious Conditions—Drugs and Biologics

(May 2014)

https://www.fda.gov/media/86377/download ........ 27

FDA, Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse

Events Summary Through 12/31/2022,

https://www.fda.gov/media/164331/download ...... 32

GAO, GAO-08-751, FDA: Approval and

Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex (Aug. 2008) ......... 27

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Therapeutic,

https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/therapeutic (last

visited Nov. 7, 2023) .............................................. 28

Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court

Practice § 6.26.(B) (11th ed. 2019) ........................ 24

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-395

ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,

v.

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,

Cross-Respondents,

and

ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,

v.

DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,

Cross-Respondent.

On Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR

DANCO LABORATORIES, LLC

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs’ conditional cross-petition starts by

asking this Court to adopt a new legal doctrine to

excuse their failure to timely file suit—an issue

presenting no conflict with this Court’s precedent,

involving no circuit split, and that the court below

found was inapplicable to the facts here. Plaintiffs

next ask this Court to address an obsolete regulatory

mechanism FDA once used to implement use

(1)

2

restrictions on approved drugs—prior to 2008—even

though that regulation does not govern Mifeprex’s use

restrictions today, or the use restrictions of any other

drug either. In any event, that mechanism was

properly used. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’

requests.

The Fifth Circuit correctly held that Plaintiffs’

challenge to FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex was

untimely; Plaintiffs filed suit after the statute of

limitations expired. So Plaintiffs are left to argue that

this Court should grant certiorari to recognize—for

the first time—the “reopening” doctrine, a judge-made

exception to the statute of limitations created by the

D.C. Circuit. And because the Fifth Circuit held that

this doctrine would be inapplicable even if it could

validly excuse a failure to timely file suit, Plaintiffs

also ask this Court to find that the Fifth Circuit’s factbound analysis of that issue was wrong.

Equally uncertworthy, this Court should not opine

on a purely academic question that the Fifth Circuit

did not address: whether FDA acted within its

regulatory authority when it imposed use restrictions

under regulations known as Subpart H at the time it

initially approved Mifeprex. The answer to that

question is yes. But neither the question nor the

answer matter one whit, because FDA’s use of its

Subpart H regulatory authority to require Mifeprex

use restrictions was superseded by Congress in 2008.

When Congress gave FDA statutory authority to

impose use restrictions in the form of a Risk

Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), all

drugs with Subpart H use restrictions transitioned to

a REMS. The use restrictions for Mifeprex have been

3

under FDA’s REMS authority for the past fifteen

years, and remain so today.

Indeed, it is truly difficult to come up with a less

certworthy question than whether FDA in 2000

properly applied a long-since-superseded regulation—

unless, perhaps, it is the question whether the Fifth

Circuit erred in finding the D.C. Circuit’s “reopening”

doctrine inapplicable to revive Plaintiffs’ long-expired

claims.

The questions presented in Plaintiffs’ crosspetition are not intertwined with the questions

presented in Danco’s or FDA’s petitions. Those

petitions ask this Court to address Article III standing

and FDA’s 2016 and 2021 administrative actions with

respect to Mifeprex—questions far removed from the

validity of the “reopening” doctrine and FDA’s

obsolete interpretation of Subpart H. As Danco’s

certiorari petition detailed, the Fifth Circuit’s

approach conflicts with this Court’s precedents and

creates multiple circuit splits. The cross-petition

offers nothing remotely similar.

Danco is unaware of any case in which this Court

granted a conditional cross-petition raising separate,

distinct issues involving a separate, distinct agency

action. The conditional cross-petition should be

denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

1. FDA approved Mifeprex in 2000 as safe and

effective for use in combination with misoprostol to

terminate intrauterine pregnancy through 49 days

gestation. ROA.600; see 21 U.S.C. § 355.

4

The New Drug Application (NDA) for Mifeprex,

submitted in 1996, presented extensive data on the

drug’s safety and efficacy, including data from

multiple clinical trials with thousands of participants

showing that mifepristone was effective for 92.1% to

95.5% of women, meaning further intervention to

terminate the pregnancy was not required. ROA.642647, ROA.591-598.

FDA imposed certain use restrictions with

Mifeprex’s approval, including that the drug would be

dispensed by a doctor in-person and that there would

be an in-person follow-up appointment. FDA included

these restrictions under its Subpart H authority,

which—in separate provisions—sets out a mechanism

for imposing use restrictions and a pathway for

accelerating approval of certain new drugs. 21 C.F.R.

§§ 314.520, 314.510; see ROA.596; ROA.600-601. FDA

relied on Subpart H only for its use-restriction

authority; the Mifeprex NDA was not accelerated, and

in fact took more than four and a half years to

approve.

2. In 2007, Congress amended the Food, Drug, and

Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to authorize FDA to impose

certain restrictions on drugs in the form of a Risk

Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) when the

agency concluded use restrictions were necessary “to

ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks

of the drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1). Congress

“deemed” drugs previously approved with use

restrictions under Subpart H to have a REMS in effect

while the drugs’ sponsors supplemented their

approved NDAs to include a REMS. See Food and

Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub.

L. 110-85, Title IX, § 909(b)(1), (3), 121 Stat. 823, 950-

5

951 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331 note); Identification of

Drug and Biological Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,313

(Mar. 27, 2008). The amendment took effect 180 days

after its enactment. § 909(a), 121 Stat. at 950. In

accordance with the amendment, Danco submitted a

supplemental New Drug Application (sNDA) for the

Mifeprex REMS, which FDA approved in 2011.

ROA.672-675.

Since this statutory amendment,

Mifeprex’s use restrictions have been governed by

FDA’s REMS authority—not by Subpart H, which is

no longer the basis for any drug’s use restrictions.

3. Some

of

the

Plaintiffs—self-described

organizations that “have consistently opposed

abortion and continue to do so”—filed a citizen

petition in 2002 with FDA asserting that Mifeprex

was improperly approved under Subpart H and not

safe and effective as approved.

ROA.355; see

ROA.353-444. Plaintiffs never sought to compel FDA

to act on the petition. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). FDA

ultimately denied the petition in March 2016,

meticulously documenting and reaffirming that

Mifeprex is safe and effective for its approved use and

explaining why the agency initially relied on Subpart

H in setting use restrictions. ROA.635-667. Plaintiffs

had six years to sue after this denial of their citizen

petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).

4. FDA also took a number of other actions related

to mifepristone that are not part of the conditional

cross-petition. In March 2016, FDA approved an

sNDA that Danco had submitted with an extensive

scientific record seeking to amend Mifeprex’s labeling

and to modify its REMS based on data post-dating the

2000 approval.

The sNDA changed the dosing

regimen, altered the mode of administration for

6

misoprostol, extended the approved gestational age

from 49 to 70 days, allowed at-home administration of

misoprostol, authorized flexibility in how follow-up

care occurs, changed references from “physician” to

“health care provider” reflecting that certain nonphysicians are authorized to prescribe drugs by state

law, and modified the prescriber reporting

requirements for certain adverse events. ROA.689696; ROA.2142-2337. In 2019, some Plaintiffs filed a

citizen petition challenging these changes.

Also in 2019, FDA approved a generic version of

mifepristone. ROA.768-773.1

In April 2021, FDA determined that it would

temporarily exercise enforcement discretion during

the COVID-19 public health emergency as to whether

mifepristone must be dispensed in person. ROA.786788.

In December 2021, FDA denied the 2019 citizen

petition challenging the 2016 changes. ROA.802-842;

see ROA.740-766. The petition had urged FDA to

“(I) restore and strengthen elements of the Mifeprex

regimen and prescriber requirements approved in

2000, and (II) retain the Mifeprex [REMS], and

continue limiting the dispensing of Mifeprex to

patients in clinics, medical offices, and hospitals, by or

under the supervision of a certified prescriber.”

ROA.741. In denying the petition, FDA reiterated its

view from April 2021 that “mifepristone may be safely

1

Danco, the manufacturer of Mifeprex, did not intervene as to

Count Four, which is Plaintiffs’ challenge to FDA’s approval of

generic mifepristone. See ROA.2000; ROA.179. That is why

Danco “did not respond to” Plaintiffs’ “challenge to the 2019

Generic Approval in the district court proceedings.” Cross-Pet.

33 n.1.

7

used without in person dispensing” and directed

Danco to propose modifications to the mifepristone

REMS effectuating that change. ROA.829.

In January 2023, FDA approved Danco’s

application to modify the mifepristone REMS,

including removing mandatory in-person dispensing

of the drug. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch.,

Approval

Package

for:

Application

Number

020687Orig1s025

(Jan.

3,

2023),

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/

2023/020687Orig1s025.pdf. Although Plaintiffs had

already filed suit and sought a preliminary injunction

at this time, they did not amend their complaint or

otherwise challenge FDA’s approval of the 2023

REMS modification. No documents pertaining to that

approval are in the record.

B. Procedural History

1. After FDA denied Plaintiffs’ citizen petition

challenging the approval of Mifeprex in March 2016,

Plaintiffs had six years to file suit challenging that

denial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). But March 2022 came

and went.

Eight months after the statute of limitations

expired, Plaintiffs filed suit challenging FDA’s 2000

approval of Mifeprex. They “admit[ted] that they did

not raise a claim as to FDA’s denial of their 2002

citizen petition within six years, as required for civil

actions

filed

against

the

United

States.”

Danco.Pet.App. 46a. Instead, they argued that their

challenge to the 2000 approval was timely under a

judge-made exception to the statute of limitations

called the “reopening doctrine.”

ROA.173-174.

According to Plaintiffs, in taking subsequent actions

related to mifepristone, FDA had “reopened” its 2000

8

decision to approve Mifeprex. See ROA.173-174;

ROA.3333; ROA.3341-3344; ROA.4460-4461.

The District Court excused Plaintiffs’ failure to

meet the six-year statute of limitations and held that

FDA must have reopened its 2000 approval. In the

court’s view, the 2016 changes “significantly

departed” from the original approval; the court also

noted that FDA referenced conducting a “full review”

of the mifepristone REMS in 2021 in its citizen

petition denial, which the court thought must mean

FDA had “necessarily consider[ed] the possibility that

[mifepristone] is too dangerous to be on the market.”

Danco.Pet.App. 191a-192a. The District Court went

on to find that FDA exceeded its authority in using

Subpart H to impose use restrictions in 2000 and, on

that basis, “stayed” the 2000 approval “and all

subsequent challenged actions” from taking effect. Id.

at 213a-225a, 249a.

2. Danco and the Government appealed and

sought an emergency stay of the District Court’s

order. A stay panel of the Fifth Circuit granted relief

as to the 2000 approval, concluding that Plaintiffs’

challenge was likely untimely. Id. at 140a-149a. The

court found that the reopening doctrine was

inapplicable because nothing indicated that FDA had

“substantively reconsider[ed]” its 2000 approval of

Mifeprex at a later date or “significantly alter[ed] the

stakes of judicial review” in an unanticipated way. Id.

at 144a-149a.

The stay panel left in place the District Court’s

injunction of the 2016 changes to the Mifeprex REMS

and the 2021 non-enforcement decision. Id. at 163a.

This Court stayed the District Court’s ruling pending

resolution of any certiorari petition. Id. at 111a.

9

3. A merits panel of the Fifth Circuit likewise held

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2000 approval was

untimely. Id. at 52a. The panel did not address

“whether the reopening doctrine is a legitimate

exception to a statute of limitations” because it

“ultimately conclude[d] that the doctrine does not

apply here.” Id. at 47a n.6. It noted, however, that

this Court has “cast some doubt on whether the

reopening doctrine is a legitimate exception to a

statute of limitations.” Id. (citing Biden v. Texas, 142

S. Ct. 2528, 2545 n.8 (2022)). Because it held the

challenge untimely, the panel majority did not

address the merits of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2000

approval.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary

injunction as to the later FDA actions. That decision

is the subject of pending petitions for certiorari from

Danco and the Government. See Nos. 23-236, 23-235.

In a partial dissent, Judge Ho explained that he

would have found that FDA’s actions in 2016 and 2021

were a “constructive reopening” of the 2000 approval.

Danco.Pet.App. 86a. Judge Ho also disagreed that

Subpart H authorized FDA to impose use restrictions

on Mifeprex at the time it was approved. Id. at 98a.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE CONDITIONAL

CROSS-PETITION

I. REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED OF A

DOCTRINE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT

ADOPT AND THAT IT FOUND WOULD NOT

MAKE PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGE TIMELY

IN ANY EVENT.

Plaintiffs asked the Fifth Circuit to apply the D.C.

Circuit’s “reopening” doctrine to find timely their

10

challenge to Mifeprex’s 2000 approval. The Fifth

Circuit declined to do so. The merits panel explained

that it need not reach whether the reopening doctrine

“is good law in this circuit,” because it would not apply

on the facts here. Danco.Pet.App. 47a n.6. The Court

should deny Plaintiffs’ request for review of this issue.

A. Whether The “Reopening” Doctrine Is A

Valid Exception To The Statute Of

Limitations Does Not Warrant Review.

1. The “reopening” doctrine was created by the

D.C. Circuit as “an exception to statutory limits on the

time for seeking review of an agency decision.”

Environmental Def. v. EPA, 467 F.3d 1329, 1333 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Despite recognizing that

“statutory time limits reflect Congress’s express

preference for regulatory finality,” Public Emps. for

Env’t Resp. v. EPA, 77 F.4th 899, 915 (D.C. Cir. 2023),

the D.C. Circuit’s “reopener doctrine allows an

otherwise untimely challenge to proceed” if the agency

later “reexamine[s] its former choice” in that rule,

National Biodiesel Bd. v. EPA, 843 F.3d 1010, 1017

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As the D.C. Circuit

sees it, the period for judicial review of the original

rule “runs anew” from the date of reopening. National

Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners v. Surface Transp.

Bd., 158 F.3d 135, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

In what the D.C. Circuit calls “express” reopening,

an agency “literal[ly]” reopens a previous decision.

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245,

1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This can happen when “an

agency conducts a rulemaking or adopts a policy on an

issue at one time, and then in a later rulemaking

restates the policy or otherwise addresses the issue

again without altering the original decision.”

11

National Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners, 158

F.3d at 141. For it to apply, the agency must

“undertake[ ] a serious, substantive reconsideration of

the existing rule.” Growth Energy v. EPA, 5 F.4th 1,

21 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation and brackets omitted).

This strain of reopening does not apply when an

agency “merely responds to an unsolicited comment

by reaffirming its prior position,” or “respond[s] to a

comment that addresses a settled aspect of some

matter.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019, 1024

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

In a few cases, the D.C. Circuit has applied a

different strain of the reopening doctrine for rules it

describes as having been “constructively”—but “not

actually”—reopened. Natural Res. Def. Council, 571

F.3d at 1266 (citation omitted). This doctrinal strain

requires an agency to promulgate a new rule effecting

such a “sea change” to “the basic regulatory scheme”

that it “significantly alters the stakes” of seeking

judicial review of the earlier rule in a way the plaintiff

could not have anticipated at the time of the earlier

rule. National Biodiesel Bd., 843 F.3d at 1017

(citations omitted). The facts must show that the

original rule was not “worth challenging” for the

plaintiff, but the “completely changed” regulatory

context is. Sierra Club, 551 F.3d at 1025-26 (citations

and emphasis omitted). The D.C. Circuit has made

clear its view that an agency’s “elimination” of a “more

stringent requirement” “in favor of an alternative”

does “not work such a sea change” to the original rule.

Natural Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at 1266.

2. Relying exclusively on D.C. Circuit caselaw,

Plaintiffs contend that the Fifth Circuit erred in its

analysis of the reopening doctrine. See Cross-Pet. 16-

12

23. But Plaintiffs identify no conflict between the

Fifth Circuit’s analysis and this Court’s precedents,

and no disagreement among the courts of appeals

concerning the legal standard.

Indeed, as the panel below noted, the Fifth Circuit

has yet to decide “whether the reopening doctrine is a

legitimate exception to a statute of limitations.”

Danco.Pet.App. 47a n.6. The panel did “not address

that threshold question” because it “ultimately

conclude[d] that the doctrine does not apply here.” Id.

No other Fifth Circuit case has ruled on the doctrine’s

validity, either.

The Fifth Circuit previously

analogized to the reopening doctrine in analyzing

when agency action becomes final in Texas v. Biden,

20 F.4th 928, 951-955 (5th Cir. 2021), rev’d, 142 S. Ct.

2528 (2022), but no party defended that analogy in

this Court, which noted that the doctrine appeared

“inapposite” to the finality question at issue, 142 S.

Ct. at 2545 n.8.

Plaintiffs also do not argue that the legal standard

the panel applied diverged from the D.C. Circuit’s

standard.2 While Plaintiffs say (at 22) that this case

is “on all fours” factually with Sierra Club v. EPA, 551

F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008)—which is wrong, see infra

2

Danco has not identified any other circuit that has applied the

D.C. Circuit’s reopening doctrine to excuse an untimely claim.

See, e.g., Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Department of

Homeland Sec., 983 F.3d 671, 682 n.5 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Even

assuming this Court would adopt the doctrine—an issue we need

not reach today—we agree with the district court that it would

not apply here.”); Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Env’t Quality, Div. of

Air Quality v. EPA, 750 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We

need not decide here whether to adopt the doctrine. Even if we

were to do so, it would not apply.”). Plaintiffs have not identified

any such circuit either.

13

pp. 20-22—they notably never contend that the Fifth

Circuit applied a different legal standard. Plaintiffs

instead complain (at 23) that the panel’s assessment

of the facts was “simply untrue.” This sort of factbound application does not merit review.

3. Plaintiffs also do not argue that the validity of

the reopening doctrine is an important federal

question. Instead, Plaintiffs suggest in a single

sentence that this issue has “greater importance”

because of a petition the Court granted in another

case to resolve a clear circuit split related to when a

claim accrues under the Administrative Procedure

Act. See Cross-Pet. 18 (citing Corner Post, Inc. v.

Board of Governors, FRS, No. 22-1008).

Since Plaintiffs offer no further explanation,

Danco will. The plaintiffs in Corner Post made two

arguments in asserting their challenge to the rule at

issue was timely despite the APA’s six-year statute of

limitations. First, they argued that a “clarification” of

the 2011 rule by the agency in 2015 “renewed the

statute of limitations under the D.C. Circuit’s

reopening doctrine.” North Dakota Retail Ass’n v.

Board of Governors, FRS, 55 F.4th 634, 638 (8th Cir.

2022). The Eighth Circuit rejected that argument. It

explained that “[t]his court has not adopted or even

referenced the D.C. Circuit’s reopening doctrine,”

which it concluded would not apply “[e]ven if the

reopening doctrine has any validity,” because the

agency’s clarification was “not a ‘later rulemaking’

and did not ‘actually reconsider the rule.’ ” Id. at 639

(citation omitted). Second, the plaintiffs argued that

for one plaintiff (Corner Post), the challenge to the

2011 rule “first accrued when Corner Post opened in

2018” and became subject to the rule, “rather than

14

when [the rule] was published in 2011,” so the statute

of limitations did not begin to run until 2018. Id. The

Eighth Circuit rejected that theory too. Id.

Corner Post sought and was granted certiorari

only on the second theory—whether an APA claim

“first accrues” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an

agency issues a rule or when the rule first harms an

individual plaintiff. See Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of

Governors, FRS, No. 22-1008 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2023).

The answer to that question has no relevance here,

and Plaintiffs never made a claim-accrual argument

akin to Corner Post below. Claim accrual concerns

whether a lawsuit is timely in the first instance—not

whether there are valid excuses for failing to timely

assert a claim.3

4. Even if the validity of the reopening doctrine

were a question worthy of this Court’s review, this

case is a poor vehicle to address it. Because the Fifth

Circuit did “not address [the] threshold question”

whether to adopt the reopening doctrine,

Danco.Pet.App. 47a n.6, this Court thus lacks the

Fifth Circuit’s considered views on the validity of the

reopening doctrine. If the Court is inclined to address

3

To the extent Plaintiffs suggest (at 18) that Corner Post might

be relevant here because one Plaintiff was supposedly injured

“just last year,” that argument is both forfeited and unsupported

by the record. Plaintiffs never pressed this argument below,

ROA.153-166, and three sentences in a conditional cross-petition

hardly suffices to raise it for this Court’s review. Nor is it

supported by the record. Plaintiff Shaun Jester—the Plaintiff

identified by the cross-petition—made no such claim. See

ROA.955-962. He received his medical license in 1999, has been

a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist since 2007, and

offered one undated example of treating a patient who had

experienced an adverse event after a medication abortion.

ROA.957; ROA.959.

15

the “reopening” doctrine at some point, it should grant

review of a decision that has adopted and applied the

doctrine. This case checks none of those boxes. Even

the District Court admitted that there was no

precedent for applying the doctrine “in the precise

context of FDA’s approval of an NDA.”

Danco.Pet.App. 192a n.18.

B. Even If “Reopening” Could Theoretically

Restart A Limitations Period, The Fifth

Circuit Correctly Found It Inapplicable

Here.

Plaintiffs ask this Court to correct a purported

error in how the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the

facts here demonstrate the D.C. Circuit’s reopening

doctrine applies. That is not the province of this

Court, and there are no errors to be corrected.

Plaintiffs’ contention that three subsequent FDA

actions involving mifepristone “reopened” FDA’s

initial approval of the drug is plainly wrong. The Fifth

Circuit’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ meritless, fact-bound

arguments does not warrant further review.

1. Express Reopening Is Inapplicable To

The Facts Here.

Plaintiffs identify two actions they say “expressly”

reopened FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex: (1) FDA’s

March 2016 approval of Danco’s sNDA requesting to

amend certain aspects of Mifeprex’s approval,

including its indication, dosing regimen, and REMS,

and (2) FDA’s December 2021 denial of Plaintiffs’

citizen petition (filed in 2019) contesting the 2016

changes. See Cross-Pet. 19. Neither fits the bill.

For starters, FDA’s approval of the sNDA making

changes to the label and REMS in 2016 cannot

16

support application of the reopening doctrine for a

simple reason: Plaintiffs waited more than 6 years

from that sNDA approval to file suit. Thus, even if

FDA’s actions in March 2016 somehow reopened

FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex, the six-year statute

of limitations would have run in March 2022.

Plaintiffs sued in November 2022. Therefore, “even

assuming such a * * * reopening occurred, the

challenge is still untimely.” Growth Energy, 5 F.4th

at 26.

Plaintiffs’ delay aside, nothing in the existing

record shows that FDA’s 2016 sNDA approval

“expressly” reopened FDA’s 2000 decision to approve

the drug as safe and effective.4 Plaintiffs never assert

FDA “explicitly” said it had “undertaken a serious,

substantive reconsideration” of its 2000 Mifeprex

approval decision. Growth Energy, 5 F.4th at 21

(citations and brackets omitted). They say that FDA

did so silently, because it also denied their citizen

petition challenging the 2000 approval at the same

time. Cross-Pet. 20 But as the Fifth Circuit

explained, this “context” assertion is “really just an

end-run around the fact that [Plaintiffs] were too late

to challenge FDA’s denial of their [2002] citizen

petition.” Danco.Pet.App. 48a; see also id. at 144a

(same conclusion by stay panel).

It does not show that FDA “actually reconsidered”

whether it should have approved mifepristone in the

first place. Growth Energy, 5 F.4th at 21 (citation

omitted). Action on separate pending matters at the

4

Plaintiffs’ assertion that FDA’s 2016 sNDA approval

“chang[ed] the safeguards essential to th[e] original approval,”

Cross-Pet. 19, is an argument about constructive reopening and

addressed infra pp. 19-23.

17

same time is not a valid basis to infer otherwise. See

National Ass’n of Reversionary Prop. Owners, 158

F.3d at 142 (“[A]nything less than a direct

relationship between the two rules would be too lax a

standard for triggering the reopening doctrine.”).

“FDA took the restrictions imposed in 2000 as a given,

and considered only whether the [labeling and] REMS

amendments were safe and effective.” Danco.Pet.App.

48a.

FDA’s 2021 denial of Plaintiffs’ citizen petition is

also unhelpful for them. As the D.C. Circuit itself

confirmed a few months ago, the denial of a petition,

like Plaintiffs’ citizen petition, does not trigger the

reopening doctrine. The D.C. Circuit applies the

“reopening” doctrine only to “a voluntary and

affirmative agency action,” which “is the hallmark of

a reopening”—not to an agency action that is

“required or reactive.” Public Emps. for Env’t Resp.,

77 F.4th at 914 (finding reopening inapplicable).

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has never found that “an

agency reopened an issue by merely responding to a

petition * * * submitted by a third party.” Id. at 913.5

That is because “if a party were allowed to goad an

agency into a reply, and then sue on the grounds that

5

And while the D.C. Circuit recently speculated that an agency’s

“response to a petition” “could conceivably reopen an

administrative proceeding,” it emphasized that “the party

challenging the denial of such a petition must show that the

agency’s intention to initiate a reopening is clear from the

administrative record,” which “requires showing that the agency

did much more than merely take legally required steps to

respond to the petition.” Public Emps. for Env’t Resp., 77 F.4th

at 914 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Of

course, Plaintiffs never asserted that FDA’s supposed intention

to reopen the 2000 approval was “crystal clear” when FDA denied

their petition in 2021. Id.

18

the agency re-opened the issue, the agency’s thorough

answer would put it at risk of reopening, while a

taciturn response would put it at risk of being faulted

for acting without reasoned decisionmaking.”

American Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 588

F.3d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations, internal

quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). This Court

should not grant certiorari to address whether the

reopening doctrine applies in a context where even the

D.C. Circuit would not apply it.

Moreover, the petition that FDA denied in 2021

requested that FDA return to the use restrictions that

accompanied the 2000 approval—not that it rethink

that approval in the first place. See ROA.741.

Plaintiffs seize on FDA’s remark that the agency had

conducted a “full review” of the mifepristone REMS in

2021. Cross-Pet. 20 (quoting ROA.808). That gets

them nowhere. It is nonsensical that FDA’s review of

the use restrictions in the REMS as of 2021—which

are not the initial use restrictions—would reopen

FDA’s 2000 approval or the original use restrictions.

Cf. Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 38

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (by saying the agency had “review[ed]

the effectiveness of the rules,” agency did not

“reopen[ ] the question of its statutory authority to

adopt the rules in the first place”; “nothing in those

notices suggested that, in reviewing the ‘effectiveness’

of the rules, the [agency] intended to review their

statutory basis as well” (citation omitted)).

As the Fifth Circuit merits panel emphasized,

“FDA had no reason to reevaluate” the 2000 approval

of Mifeprex in the course of addressing Plaintiffs’ 2019

petition because Plaintiffs “did not actually ask FDA

to reconsider its approval of mifepristone” in that

19

petition; instead, they merely “requested that FDA

‘restore’ previous restrictions and ‘retain’ others

currently in place.” Danco.Pet.App. 50a (quoting

ROA.741).

2. Constructive Reopening Is

Inapplicable To The Facts Here.

Plaintiffs next ask this Court to review whether,

even if FDA did not expressly reopen its 2000 approval

of Mifeprex, FDA’s 2016 changes, 2021 petition

denial,

and

2021

non-enforcement

decision

“constructively” did so. Cross-Pet. 21. This argument

is just as fact-bound as Plaintiffs’ express-reopening

argument, and is poorly suited for certiorari review for

all the same reasons.

Plaintiffs’ argument is also based on a

misunderstanding of the “constructive” version of the

D.C. Circuit’s reopening doctrine. That court has

invoked “constructive reopening” to permit an

otherwise untimely challenge in less than a handful of

cases, and only in the rulemaking context.6

Even in the rulemaking context, moreover, the

D.C. Circuit has held that “ ‘constructive’ reopening”

occurs only when a new rule results in such a “sea

change” to “the basic regulatory scheme” that it

“significantly alters the stakes” of seeking judicial

review in a way that the plaintiffs could not have

“reasonably anticipated” when they chose not to

challenge that scheme in the first instance. National

Biodiesel Bd., 843 F.3d at 1017 (citations omitted);

6

And these cases, except for one, have “limited the constructive

reopening doctrine to cases involving regulated entities,” rather

than “challenges from third parties” like Plaintiffs. Sierra Club,

551 F.3d at 1029 (Randolph, J., dissenting).

20

accord Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of

Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1214-15, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(applying doctrine in rulemaking context); National

Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Interior, 134 F.3d

1095, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same). An agency’s

“elimination” of a “more stringent requirement” “in

favor of an alternative” does “not work such a sea

change.” Natural Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at 1266.

This case does not involve a challenge to a

rulemaking. Plaintiffs are thus asking this Court to

grant certiorari to address a question no court has

addressed: whether a “constructive reopening”

doctrine applies outside the rulemaking context. And

in all events, FDA’s subsequent actions on

mifepristone did not “alter[ ] the “regulatory

framework” for drug approvals. National Biodiesel

Bd., 843 F.3d at 1017. The agency’s rules have long

“establish[ed]” that applicants “may seek approval” of

revisions to a product’s labeling and REMS, id.; see 21

U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(4)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, meaning

that FDA’s subsequent actions on mifepristone

“neither alter[ed] that regulatory framework nor

work[ed] a change that [Plaintiffs] could not have

reasonably anticipated.” National Biodiesel Bd., 843

F.3d at 1017.

Plaintiffs also do not contend that FDA’s 2000

approval of Mifeprex was not “worth challenging”

until FDA changed the use restrictions. Sierra Club,

551 F.3d at 1026 (citation omitted). Nor could they;

after all, several Plaintiffs filed a citizen petition

challenging the 2000 approval. ROA.353-444.

Plaintiffs maintain, in the face of all this, that this

case is “on all fours” with the D.C. Circuit’s decision

in Sierra Club. Cross-Pet. 22. It is not. For starters,

21

Sierra Club involved a rulemaking. There, the initial

EPA rule crafted a narrow exemption to emissions

limits for certain operational events where an

emitting source received approval of a plan to

minimize emissions during such events. Later EPA

rulemakings, however, eliminated the need for an

emitting source to obtain approval of a plan to

minimize

emissions

during

those

events.

Environmentalists then challenged the exemption as

unlawful and arbitrary. A divided D.C. Circuit panel

held that the initial rule “may not have been worth

challenging” “from the perspective of environmental

petitioners’ interests” because EPA had crafted it so

that it would not be a “blanket exemption” to Clean

Air Act requirements. Sierra Club, 551 F.3d at 1026

(citation omitted).

The new rule, in contrast,

“completely changed the regulatory context,” by

creating in effect the very blanket exemption EPA had

earlier disclaimed. See id. at 1025 (citation omitted).

Two judges found this sufficient to constructively

reopen EPA’s initial rulemaking.

Compare that to this case. Here, FDA approved

Mifeprex in 2000 after concluding the drug sponsor’s

application showed it was safe and effective for the

indicated use; this was not a rulemaking crafting an

exemption to otherwise applicable law. And Plaintiffs

cannot say with a straight face that FDA’s subsequent

actions so “significantly altered the stakes of judicial

review” that only after the 2016 changes did Plaintiffs

view Mifeprex’s approval as worth challenging “from

the perspective of [their] interests.” Sierra Club, 551

F.3d at 1025-26 (citations and brackets omitted).

After all, Plaintiffs “have consistently opposed

abortion.” ROA.355; see also ROA.232; ROA.239;

ROA.252. From that perspective, FDA’s approval of

22

Mifeprex in 2000 was certainly “worth challenging in

its own right,” Natural Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at

1270, as Plaintiffs “had an ample incentive at that

time to protest” the decision, Kennecott, 88 F.3d at

1215. In fact, some did. See ROA.355.

Plaintiffs suggest (at 23) that this Court should

find “constructive reopening” because Danco’s sNDA

only became public when FDA approved it. That

cannot be right. It would mean every drug approval

is reopened with every sNDA amendment or REMS

revision, because applications for those changes are

never publicly filed. Actual notice of a specific

amendment is not the question anyway. The question

is whether Plaintiffs could have reasonably

anticipated that the use restrictions or indication

might change over time based on scientific studies and

real-world experience with the drug. Of course they

could. FDA frequently authorizes new uses, changes

to indications, and amended use restrictions based on

new data and real-world experience. See PhRMA

Amicus Br. 16, ECF No. 312, Alliance for Hippocratic

Med. v. FDA, No. 23-10362 (5th Cir. May 2, 2023)

(“FDA has approved more than 300 REMS since 2008

and has made more than 800 modifications to

REMS.”).7

7

FDA approved over 100 efficacy supplements in 2021 and 2022

that, for example, added a new or modified indication, new

dosing regimen, or new route of administration; approved use of

a drug in a new patient population; or changed a drug from

prescription to over-the-counter. See FDA, CY 2022 New Drug

Application (NDA) & Biologic License Application (BLA) Efficacy

Supplement Calendar Year Approvals as of December 31, 2022,

https://www.fda.gov/media/165825/download?attachment; FDA,

CY 2021 New Drug Application (NDA) & Biologic License

23

Even in the rulemaking context that the D.C.

Circuit has limited this doctrine to, a litigant may

“reasonably anticipate[ ]” that an agency might

“subsequently eliminate” a rule’s “more stringent

requirement[s]” “in favor of an alternative” that would

“allow more liberal use” of the original rule. Natural

Res. Def. Council, 571 F.3d at 1266 (citation omitted).

Such an “elimination” of stricter requirements “does

not provide a ground to conclude that the broader

issue” of the merits of the original rule “has been

reopened.” Id.

*

*

*

This is not the case to address the “reopening”

doctrine. The Fifth Circuit did not address that

question below. And Plaintiffs do not even have

support from the D.C. Circuit for their position here.

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW AN

ACADEMIC QUESTION ABOUT THE

SCOPE OF A SUPERSEDED REGULATION

THAT HAS NOT GOVERNED MIFEPREX’S

USE RESTRICTIONS SINCE 2008.

Plaintiffs also ask this Court to address the scope

of Subpart H—a statutory provision that has not

applied to Mifeprex since 2008. That academic

question is legally irrelevant to Mifeprex today, and

this Court should not reach it for four reasons.

First, the panel majority did not address the scope

of Subpart H. This Court should not pass on an issue

that the court below did not decide.

Application (BLA) Efficacy Supplement Calendar Year

Approvals as of December 31, 2021,

https://www.fda.gov/media/158154/download?attachment.

24

Second, Plaintiffs’ argument has a glaring vehicle

problem:

Subpart H does not govern the use

restrictions for any drug, including Mifeprex. Danco

is unaware of any case in which this Court has

granted review to opine on the scope of a defunct

regulation.

Third, Plaintiffs are wrong when they contend that

FDA could not have relied on Subpart H to set use

restrictions prior to 2008. This Court does not grant

review to decide fact-bound error-correction

arguments about an agency’s interpretation of an

obsolete regulation more than two decades ago.

Fourth, nothing supports Plaintiffs’ contention

that FDA may only approve a drug on the precise

terms of a completed clinical trial protocol. This issue

is outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ question presented,

which is limited to Subpart H, and has no basis in the

law. It would mean that virtually every drug on the

market was wrongly approved.

A. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Argument Was Not

Addressed Below And There Is No Circuit

Split.

The panel decision did not reach Plaintiffs’

Subpart H argument. This Court should decline to

reach a question that was not passed on below. See,

e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012)

(“Ours is a court of ‘final review and not first view.’ ”

(citation omitted)); Stephen M. Shapiro et al.,

Supreme Court Practice § 6.26.(B) (11th ed. 2019).

There is also no conflict between the circuits, or

between the panel decision and this Court’s

precedents. As Plaintiffs acknowledged in response to

Danco’s and the Government’s emergency stay

25

applications, no court of appeals has ever ruled on this

issue. See Plaintiffs’ Opp. to App. for Stay 13-14, No.

22A901 (Apr. 18, 2023) (noting that “even when the

Fifth Circuit completes its expedited merits review,”

there could be “no cases that will conflict”). That fact

counsels against deviating from the Court’s “ordinary

practice of denying petitions insofar as they raise legal

issues that have not been considered by additional

Courts of Appeals.” Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind.

& Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019) (per curiam);

see also Sup. Ct. R. 10.

B. Subpart H Does Not Govern Mifeprex’s

Use Restrictions Today.

Whatever the historical relevance of Subpart H for

Mifeprex, it was superseded by Congress’s

amendment to the FDCA in 2007 authorizing FDA to

impose use restrictions through a REMS and by FDA’s

approval of the Mifeprex REMS. Since 2007, no new

drugs have been approved with use restrictions under

Subpart H and no drugs that were already on the

market in 2007 have use restrictions governed by

Subpart H.

When Congress enacted the REMS authority, it

specifically “deemed” drugs with Subpart H use

restrictions—including Mifeprex—“to have in effect

an approved [REMS].” § 909(b)(1), 121 Stat. at 950.

By doing so, Congress superseded FDA’s earlier

decision to implement use restrictions under Subpart

H. And in 2011, FDA expressly approved Danco’s

REMS proposal.

ROA.672-675.

Plaintiffs’

acknowledgement (at 18-19) that Subpart H has been

superseded by statute underscores that certiorari is

26

not warranted here. This Court does not review

regulatory dinosaurs.8

C. Plaintiffs’ Subpart H Arguments Are

Wrong On The Merits.

Plaintiffs’ arguments about the scope of Subpart H

also are meritless. Subpart H includes a regulation

that FDA used, prior to its REMS authority, to impose

use restrictions. ROA.596. That regulation refers to

“new drug products that have been studied for their

safety and effectiveness in treating serious or lifethreatening illnesses and that provide meaningful

therapeutic benefit to patients over existing

treatments.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. Plaintiffs contend

(at 24-28) that pregnancy is not an “illness,” and that

medication abortion lacks a meaningful therapeutic

benefit compared to surgical abortion, such that use

restrictions could not have been imposed under

Subpart H.

Consistent with FDA’s interchangeable use of

“illness,” “condition,” and “disease” under the FDCA,

the agency reasonably concluded that it could use

8

At times, Plaintiffs appear to suggest that Subpart H was the

source of FDA’s authority to approve Mifeprex as safe and

effective for its intended use. That is wrong. As Plaintiffs

recognize elsewhere, Cross-Pet. 4, FDA’s approval authority in

2000 and today is found at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). Subpart H is a

regulation that FDA used prior to 2007 when it determined use

restrictions were warranted. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.520. Today,

FDA is authorized to require use restrictions under its REMS

authority, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1. Plaintiffs are also wrong

to proclaim that without Subpart H, FDA would have denied

approval of Mifeprex. For example, another FDA-approved

mifepristone product—Korlym, which is approved to treat

Cushing’s disease—was approved by FDA with restrictions that

were not in the form of a REMS or Subpart H use restrictions.

27

Subpart H to approve drugs to treat a variety of

conditions even if they are not considered an

“illness”—including Mifeprex.

See New Drug,

Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations,

57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,946 (Dec. 11, 1992). An

independent review by the U.S. Government

Accountability Office (GAO) confirmed that FDA’s

approval and oversight processes for Mifeprex were

consistent with its processes for other drugs with

Subpart H use restrictions. GAO, GAO-08-751, FDA:

Approval and Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex (Aug.

2008), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-751.pdf.

Mifeprex is not an outlier: FDA cited Subpart H

when approving use restrictions for drugs treating, for

example, acute acne and severe diarrheapredominant irritable bowel syndrome. See id. at 4-5;

Former FDA Officials Amicus Br. 12, ECF No. 307,

Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, No. 23-10362

(5th Cir. May 2, 2023). And FDA has similarly

interpreted illness and condition interchangeably in

other contexts as well. See FDA, Guidance for

Industry,

Expedited

Programs

for

Serious

Conditions—Drugs and Biologics 3 (May 2014)

https://www.fda.gov/media/86377/download

(using

terms

interchangeably).

FDA’s

reasonable

interpretation of its own regulation as encompassing

serious or life-threatening conditions easily meets this

Court’s standard in Kisor v. Wilkie for granting

deference to an agency. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412 (2019)

(plurality) (“[T]he agency that promulgated a rule is

in the better position to reconstruct its original

meaning.” (citation and brackets omitted)).

Plaintiffs’ argument (at 26-27) that FDA acted

unlawfully in finding that Mifeprex provides a

28

“meaningful therapeutic benefit” is also wrong on the

merits. FDA evaluated data from multiple clinical

trials comparing medication abortion to surgical

abortion and reasonably concluded that Mifeprex

confers various benefits over surgical abortion,

including avoiding an invasive surgical procedure and

avoiding anesthesia, each of which has complications

and reactions that make it inappropriate for some

patients. ROA.639; see ECF No. 29, Alliance for

Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, No. 23-10362, at 71-73

¶¶ 10-11, 13-14 (Goldberg Decl.) (5th Cir. Apr. 7,

2023) (explaining that medication abortion is

preferable for some patients); id. at 82, 86-88 ¶¶ 8, 1819, 21 (Schreiber Decl.) (same).

Plaintiffs argue that a Merriam-Webster dictionary limits the definition of “therapeutic” to the “treatment or curing of a disease or disorder” and that mifepristone would have to treat all “pregnancy-related

complications,” including ectopic pregnancies, to fall

within Subpart H. Cross-Pet. 27. But the same dictionary also defines “therapeutic” as “producing a useful or favorable result or effect,” such as “the therapeutic benefits of yoga,” “laughter,” and “[g]ardening.”

Merriam-Webster

Dictionary,

Therapeutic,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/therapeutic (last visited Nov. 7, 2023). Other dictionaries

similarly recognize a broader meaning for “therapeutic” than just relating to illness. The American Heritage Dictionary, for example, defines “therapeutic” as

“[o]f or relating to the medical treatment of a disease

or condition.” American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language, Therapeutic (5th ed. 2022),

https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=therapeutic (last visited Nov. 7, 2023) (emphasis added).

29

As for Plaintiffs’ argument (at 27) about

pregnancy-related complications, they offer no

rationale for why medication abortion would have to

treat every possible pregnancy-related complication,

including ectopic pregnancies, to qualify as

“therapeutic.” And the amicus brief below from the

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,

the American Medical Association, and the Society for

Maternal Fetal Medicine explains that mifepristone

is, in fact, used off-label for a number of pregnancyrelated complications, including to treat miscarriages,

“to reduce the duration of bleeding or hemorrhaging

during certain serious pregnancy complications,” and

for its “beneficial effects on the cervix in full-term

pregnancies, which may in turn affect the likelihood

of successful labor.”

American College of

Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. Amicus Br. 2526, ECF No. 354, Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v.

FDA, No. 23-10362 (5th Cir. May 4, 2023).

Plaintiffs also assert (at 27-28) that FDA could not

have found mifepristone provides meaningful

therapeutic benefit because a very small number of

patients might need a follow-up surgical procedure.

But the fact that a drug may require additional followup care in some circumstances does not mean it lacks

therapeutic effect. For the 92.1% to 95.5% of women

who the pre-2000 approval studies showed did not

need follow up care, the pregnancy was successfully

terminated with no further intervention. ROA.591.

Requiring every drug to work for every patient in

order to obtain FDA approval would prevent nearly all

drugs from reaching the market. See Patient and

Provider Advocacy Organizations Amicus Br. 2, ECF

No. 346, Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, No. 2310362 (5th Cir. May 4, 2023) (explaining that the

30

District Court’s “decision would cast uncertainty over

the continued availability of all FDA-approved

drugs”); see also Food and Drug Scholars Amicus Br.

9-10, ECF No. 308, Alliance for Hippocratic Med. v.

FDA, No. 23-10362 (5th Cir. May 2, 2023).

D. Plaintiffs’ Argument That FDA Must

Match The Terms Of A Drug’s Approval

Exactly To The Protocol Of A Supporting

Clinical Trial Is Outside The Questions

Presented And Wrong.

Plaintiffs chose to limit their second question

presented to whether FDA’s approval of Mifeprex

“under Subpart H” was unlawful. Cross-Pet. i.

Plaintiffs nevertheless contend in their cross-petition

that FDA was required to reject the Mifeprex NDA

because the proposed labeling did not exactly match

the protocol under which the drug was used in the

clinical trials on which FDA relied to make its safety

and efficacy determination.

Review of this issue can and should be denied

because Plaintiffs did not raise it in their questions

presented, and it is not a subsidiary question to the

issue of Subpart H approval. See Yee v. City of

Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 537 (1992) (even a “related”

question is not reviewable if it is not “fairly included”

within the question presented); Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a).

And in any event, Plaintiffs’ argument is meritless.

According to Plaintiffs, FDA cannot approve a drug

unless there is a clinical trial using the precise

conditions under which the drug is ultimately

approved. Cross-Pet. 30. Plaintiffs have no support

for their position. FDA must consider whether there

is “substantial evidence” of effectiveness from

“adequate and well-controlled investigations” and

31

sufficient evidence of safety, and whether the drug’s

benefits outweigh any risks. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). A

team of experts (including physicians, statisticians,

chemists, pharmacologists, and other scientists)

reviews each application and carefully assesses all

relevant data in light of the drug’s proposed labeling

and intended use. If the applicant has demonstrated

the drug is safe and effective under the conditions of

use in the proposed labeling and satisfies certain

other conditions, FDA must approve the drug. 21

U.S.C. § 355(c)-(d).

These intentionally flexible standards allow FDA

to rely on a range of data in evaluating an NDA and

to extrapolate from various sources as it deems

appropriate. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c). That

flexibility is particularly important because clinical

trials often employ more restrictive conditions than

those ultimately recommended for approved labeling,

a practice intended to protect study participants

before FDA has concluded a drug is safe and effective

for a particular use. See ROA.662; see also ROA.32923293.

No statutory or regulatory provision prohibits FDA

from approving an NDA without a clinical trial

evaluating a drug under all of the approved conditions

of use. FDA can, in its scientific judgment, determine

that the existing studies show the drug is safe for use

under the proposed labeling. That is what occurred

here, and what occurs with virtually every drug on the

market. See PhRMA Amicus Br. 12-15. This Court

has made clear that agencies can form a “reasonable

predictive judgment” based on the evidence before

them. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct.

1150, 1160 (2021). That is what FDA did here.

32

Plaintiffs nevertheless ask this Court to conclude

that FDA acted unreasonably when it approved

Mifeprex in 2000 without requiring prescribers to

perform an ultrasound to check for an ectopic

pregnancy and for gestational dating. Cross-Pet. 30.

They ignore that FDA has consistently required that

certified prescribers be able to accurately “assess the

duration of the pregnancy” and “diagnose ectopic

pregnancies,” ROA.813-814, whether through an

ultrasound or “other clinical methods” that elicit that

information effectively, ROA.652.

The agency

“carefully considered” “[t]he role of the ultrasound,”

and it reasonably explained its decision to leave the

method of dating pregnancies and ectopic-pregnancy

diagnosis to “the medical judgment of the physician.”

ROA.595; see also ROA.651-653 (discussing

alternative methods and noting that, among women

with reported ectopic pregnancies who took

mifepristone and received ultrasounds, more than

half of the ultrasounds failed to detect the ectopic

pregnancy). The rarity of ectopic pregnancies in

women who have been prescribed mifepristone over

the past 23 years—further evidenced by the fact that

no Plaintiff identified ever treating a woman with an

ectopic pregnancy after taking mifepristone—

suggests that FDA was right in its judgment call. See

FDA, Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse

Events

Summary

Through

12/31/2022,

https://www.fda.gov/media/164331/download

(documenting 97 total instances of ectopic

pregnancies out of the millions of women who have

had medication abortions).

Plaintiffs also argue that FDA erred by not

requiring women to remain under a doctor’s

observation for multiple hours after taking

33

misoprostol (the second drug in the approved regimen)

because the clinical trials on which the approval was

based had included such observation. Cross-Pet. 31.

But Plaintiffs never made this argument below,

making it unfit for this Court’s review. See, e.g.,

Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 201. Their Complaint likewise

did not allege this observation period was included in

each clinical trial supporting Mifeprex’s approval.

ROA.74-186.

Moreover, again, there is no

requirement that clinical trial protocols dictate a

drug’s approved labeling.

Clinical trials of

unapproved drugs routinely implement stringent

safety measures to account for the fact that safety and

efficacy have not yet been established.

These

measures are often unnecessary once the drug is

approved. Former FDA Officials Amicus Br. 19-20.

FDA’s considered exercise of its expert scientific

judgment—based on a huge array of evidence—to

determine that some conditions of use imposed in

clinical trials need not be included in a drug label does

not render the agency’s choice unreasonable. See

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Plaintiffs’

position, which lacks any legal support and has never

been accepted by any court, would undermine the

approval of nearly all FDA-approved drugs on the

market today.

Certiorari review is plainly

unwarranted.

CONCLUSION

The conditional cross-petition should be denied.

34

Respectfully submitted,

PHILIP KATZ

LYNN W. MEHLER

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

EVA M. SCHIFINI

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

1999 Avenue of the Stars

Suite 1400

Los Angeles, CA 90067

JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH

Counsel of Record

CATHERINE E. STETSON

MARLAN GOLDEN

DANA A. RAPHAEL

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for Danco Laboratories, LLC

NOVEMBER 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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