Petition for Writ of Certiorari — D'Andre M. Johnson, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefOct 3, 2023
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No. _____
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
D’ANDRE M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
__________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces
__________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
__________
MAJOR SPENCER R. NELSON
Counsel of Record
United States Air Force
Air Force Appellant Defense Division
1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100
Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762
(240) 612-4770
spencer.nelson.1@us.af.mil
Counsel for Petitioner
October 2023
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) states that this Court may review
“[c]ases in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces granted a petition for review.”
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) give this Court jurisdiction,
as part of the case, to consider issues raised to, but not
granted review by, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces?
II.
Is Second Lieutenant Johnson’s conviction
sexually assaulting M.P. legally sufficient? 1
for
Second Lieutenant Johnson raised Issue II to the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces, but it did not grant his petition
for review on this issue.
1
i
PROCEEDINGS
The following is a list of all proceedings related
to this case:
(1) United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676, 2020
CCA LEXIS 364 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 2020)
(2) United States v. Johnson, 81 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F.
2021)
(3) United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676
(rem), 2022 CCA LEXIS 413 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July
19, 2022)
(4) United States v. Johnson, No. 22-0280/AF, 2023
CAAF LEXIS 303 (C.A.A.F. May 8, 2023)
ii
Table of Contents
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................ i
PROCEEDINGS ............................................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................ v
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................... 1
OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................... 1
JURISDICTION ............................................................... 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 3
A. Question I ............................................................... 4
B. Question II .............................................................. 5
i. Background .................................................. 5
ii. Legal Sufficiency .......................................... 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..................... 10
A. This Jurisdictional Question has Existed Since
1983 and is Ripe for This Court’s Consideration 11
B. This Court Should Grant Review Because Various
Canons of Statutory Interpretation Indicate this
Court Has Jurisdiction over “Cases” not Just
Granted Issues ...................................................... 13
i. This Court’s Broad Interpretations of “Case”
and “Decision” Weigh in Favor of
Jurisdiction................................................. 14
ii. The Legislative History Indicates that
“Cases” did not Mean Granted Issues ....... 17
iii. The Surplusage Canon and the Harmonious
Reading Canon Weigh in Favor of
Jurisdiction................................................. 18
C. This Court Should Grant Review to Answer
Questions that Jackson v. Virginia did not
Resolve .................................................................. 19
i. 2d Lt Johnson’s Conviction for Assaulting
M.P. Falls Between “No Evidence” and the
“Lower Limit” Floor of Legal Sufficiency,
Entitling him to Relief ............................... 20
iii
ii. Jackson v. Virginia Stated that a Factfinder
must Apply the Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Standard
Reasonably,
Fairly,
and
Rationally ................................................... 22
iii. This Case Presents Additional Matters that
this Court can Clarify ................................ 26
iv. Conclusion:
Why
Panel
Members
Convicted .................................................... 27
CONCLUSION .............................................................. 28
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
FOR
PETITIONER’S
APPENDIX ........................................................... 000a
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
10 U.S.C. § 870 ........................................................ 1, 2
10 U.S.C. § 920 ........................................................ 3, 8
10 U.S.C. § 920 (2016) ................................................ 3
28 U.S.C. § 1259 (1983) ...... 1, 2, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 28
SUPREME COURT CASES
Alicia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869) .......................... 14
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) ..... 18
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).................. 18
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502 (1962) .............................................................. 10
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012) ............... 11
Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Asso., 296 U.S.
64 (1935) ................................................................ 10
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) .......................... 21
Jackson
v.
Virginia,
443
U.S.
307 (1979) ................................ 11, 20, 21, 22, 26, 28
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ................ 25
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 14
Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) ......... 14
Salinas v. United States RRB, 141 S. Ct.
691 (2021) ........................................................... 15
Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765 (2019) ............... 15
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) .............................. 15
Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)........... 20
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) ........................ 20
United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920) .... 15
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018).................. 15
v
COURT OF
FORCES
APPEALS
FOR
THE
ARMED
United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F.
2023) ...................................................................... 26
United States v. Piolunek, 74 M.J. 107 (C.A.A.F.
2015) ...................................................................... 26
United States v. Pullings, 83 M.J. 205 (C.A.A.F.
2023) ........................................................................ 5
United States v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F.
2017) ...................................................................... 26
FEDERAL COURT CASES
United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ...................................................................... 21
RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ......... 16, 19, 24
Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, United
States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020)
(No. 19-108) ............................................... 10, 12, 13
Brief for the United States in Opposition, McKeel v.
United States, 549 U.S. 1019 (2006) (No. 06-58).. 12
Brief for the United States in Opposition,
Wiechmann v. United States, 559 U.S. 904 (2010)
(No. 09-418) ........................................................... 12
Evolving Military Justice (2002) .............................. 18
H.R. 6298 (1980) ....................................................... 17
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jonathan M.
Martinez, Et Al. v. United States, No. 22-0165/AF,
2023 CAAF LEXIS 494 (C.A.A.F. July 18, 2023)
(23-242) .................................................................. 26
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Larrabee v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (No. 18-306) .......... 12
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
(2012) ................................................... 14, 17, 18, 19
vi
Reply Brief for Petitioner, Richards v. Barrett, 140
S. Ct. 2760 (2020) (No. 19-55) ............................... 12
Reply Brief of Michael Briggs, United States v.
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (19-108) .................. 13
Reply Brief of Richard Collins, United States v.
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (19-184) .................. 13
Reply Brief, Stevenson v. United States, 555 U.S.
816 (2008) (No. 07-1397) ....................................... 12
S. Rep. No. 98-53 (1983) ..................................... 17, 28
Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice
(9th ed. 2007) ......................................................... 11
SUP. CT. R. 10 ................................................ 10, 11, 27
vii
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Second Lieutenant D’Andre M. Johnson
(2d Lt Johnson) respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF).
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals (Air Force Court) is unreported, but available
at 2020 CCA LEXIS 364 and reproduced at pages
001a – 048a of the Appendix. The decision of the
CAAF is reported at 81 M.J. 451 and reproduced at
pages 049a – 050a of the Appendix. The Air Force
Court decision on remand is unreported, but available
at 2022 CCA LEXIS 413 and reproduced at pages
051a – 061a of the Appendix. The final CAAF decision
is reported at 2023 CAAF LEXIS 303 and reproduced
at pages 062a – 063a of the Appendix.
JURISDICTION
Article 70(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 870(c) states, “Appellate defense
counsel shall represent the accused before . . . the
Supreme Court . . . when requested by the accused.”
The CAAF entered its judgment in
2d Lt Johnson’s case on May 8, 2023. On July 24,
2023, the Chief Justice extended the time to file a writ
of certiorari until October 5, 2023. The nature of this
petition is whether this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (3) (1983) 2 over Question
II when the CAAF granted 2d Lt Johnson’s petition
2 Congress made minor updates to this statute in 1989 and 1994
which do not affect the substance of its text or the arguments
below.
1
for review, but not on that specific question. For the
reasons set forth below, 2d Lt Johnson avers this
Court has jurisdiction over this case.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
28 U.S.C. § 1259 – Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces; certiorari
Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in the following
cases:
(1) Cases reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces under section 867(a)(1) of title
10.
(2) Cases certified to the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces by the Judge Advocate General
under section 867(a)(2) of title 10.
(3) Cases in which the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces granted a petition for review
under section 867(a)(3) of title 10.
(4) Cases, other than those described in
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection, in
which the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces granted relief.
Article 70(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 870(c) Appellate
Counsel
(c) Appellate defense counsel shall represent the
accused before the Court of Criminal Appeals, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, or the
Supreme Court—
(1) when requested by the accused;
(2) when the United States is represented by
counsel; or
2
(3) when the Judge Advocate General has sent the
case to the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces.
Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920(b) (2016)
(b) Sexual Assault. Any person subject to this chapter
who—
(1) commits a sexual act upon another person by—
...
(B) causing bodily harm to that other person . . .
is guilty of sexual assault and shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct.
(g) Definitions. In this section:
(1) Sexual act. The term ‘sexual act’ means—
(A) Contact between the penis and the vulva or
anus or mouth, and for purposes of this subparagraph
contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration,
however slight; or
(B) the penetration, however slight, of the vulva
or anus or mouth of another by any part of the body or
by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person.
(2) Bodily harm. The term ‘bodily harm’ means any
offensive touching of another, however slight,
including any nonconsensual sexual act or
nonconsensual sexual contact.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Contrary to his pleas, a panel of officer
members sitting at a general court-martial convicted
2d Lt Johnson of two specifications of sexual assault,
in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2016). Pet. App. at
3
002a. The panel sentenced 2d Lt Johnson to a
dismissal, ten years’ confinement, and total forfeiture
of pay and allowances. Id. The Convening Authority
approved the adjudged sentence. Id.
A. Question I
On direct appeal, 2d Lt Johnson raised three
issues to the Air Force Court, and, sua sponte, the Air
Force Court considered an additional matter. Pet.
App. at 002-3a. The Air Force Court found no error
materially prejudicial to 2d Lt Johnson, affirmed the
findings, and then affirmed the sentence. Pet. App. at
003a.
2d Lt Johnson then asked the CAAF to grant
review of five issues, including: (1) whether his
conviction for sexually assaulting M.P. was legally
sufficient; and (2) whether the Air Force Court erred
in failing to consider supplementary evidence of his
cruel and unusual punishment allegations. Pet. App.
at 071-72a.
The CAAF only granted review of the
supplementary evidence issue, affirmed the findings,
but reversed as to the sentence, and remanded the
case back to the Air Force Court. Pet. App. at 049a.
On remand, the Air Force Court affirmed the sentence
by a divided vote, finding that 2d Lt Johnson did not
suffer cruel and unusual punishment. Pet. App. at
057a.
2d Lt Johnson again petitioned the CAAF for
review on whether the Air Force Court’s ruling was
correct that he did not suffer cruel and unusual
punishment. Pet. App. at 062a. 2d Lt Johnson only
raised this issue. Id. The CAAF granted his petition
for review and ordered that no briefs should be filed
because review was granted in conjunction with a
4
similar case, United States v. Pullings, 83 M.J. 205
(C.A.A.F. 2023). Id. The CAAF subsequently affirmed
the Air Force Court’s decision. Id.
B. Question II
This Question concerns 2d Lt Johnson’s conviction
for digitally penetrating M.P.’s vulva without her
consent and by causing bodily harm. Pet. App. at
002a.
i.
Background
2d Lt Johnson graduated from the Air Force
Academy in 2017 and was assigned to Moody Air
Force Base, Georgia. 2d Lt Johnson Clemency
Package at 13, 33. He subsequently joined a fitness
center in neighboring Valdosta, Georgia, where he
met M.P., who managed the gym. R. at 564-65.
2d Lt Johnson and M.P. began conversing over
Instagram. Pros. Ex. 4. Over the next several days,
their discussions ranged from information about their
respective families to flirtatious comments and
promises to meet up. Pros. Ex. 4; R. at 577-83. M.P.
gave 2d Lt Johnson her phone number and later told
him of her plans to go to the Bluewater Bar in
Remerton, Georgia, on September 17, 2017. Pros. Ex.
4 at 14, 37; see also R. at 442.
Prior to arriving at Bluewater that night, M.P.
went to dinner with several friends, including her coworker, A.M. R. at 548, 551, 570. M.P. had a mixed
drink at dinner, while A.M. did not have any alcohol.
R. at 551, 593. Thereafter, the group went to a friend’s
house, where M.P. had another mixed drink. R. at 594.
A.M. consumed “a lot” of alcohol but could not recall
how much. R. at 552. At around 2330 hours, the group
left for Bluewater. R. at 594.
5
2d Lt Johnson also drank prior to going out.
Starting around 1700 hours, he consumed five or six
shots along with five or six beers at another bar. R. at
987. He and his friends eventually made their way to
Bluewater, where he had several more shots and
beers. R. at 988. 2d Lt Johnson consumed enough
alcohol that his friends believed him to be intoxicated.
R. at 989, 994.
At some point, 2d Lt Johnson met up with M.P.
The pair spent the majority of their remaining time at
the bar together, following each other around,
“grinding” while dancing, and kissing. R. at 727-29,
995. Shortly before Bluewater closed, several
individuals—including 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., and
A.M.—decided to walk to the house of J.P., a friend
who lived nearby. R. at 738. The group mingled
outside for a few minutes after arriving at the house,
during which 2d Lt Johnson and M.P. continued
kissing. R. at 434, 731. M.P. later asked J.P. if
2d Lt Johnson could stay the night. R. at 1006. From
J.P.’s perspective, M.P. appeared to be in control of her
faculties and understood what she was doing. R. at
1006-07.
Ultimately, only four people from the group
stayed at J.P.’s house: 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., A.M., and
Senior Airman (SrA) C.C.—a friend of M.P.’s who
A.M. apparently had a romantic interest in. R. at 420,
435, 439. J.P. was also in the house, along with her
friend, SrA K.C. R. at 435, 660-61.
By this time, A.M. appeared extremely
intoxicated. R. at 438. It was estimated that her blood
alcohol content was anywhere from .196 to .267. R. at
892. Following the group’s request, 2d Lt Johnson
6
carried A.M. to a bedroom, put her in bed, and left her
there with SrA C.C. R. at 438-39.
2d Lt Johnson and M.P. then went to the couch
in the living room, where they began kissing and
touching each other. R. at 661, 1008. J.P. asked M.P.
if she was okay or needed a blanket, and M.P.
responded that she was fine. R. at 1008. Observing
nothing wrong and having no concern for her close
friend, J.P. then retreated to her bedroom with SrA
K.C. R. at 1008.
According to SrA C.C., he awoke later that
morning to find 2d Lt Johnson having sex with A.M.
R. at 487. SrA C.C. told 2d Lt Johnson “this is wrong”
and tried to get him off her, to which 2d Lt Johnson
replied: “It’s okay. It’s [M.P.]” R. at 488-90.
2d Lt Johnson was mistaken about the identity of the
person he was having sex with. Pet. App. at 007a. SrA
CC corrected 2d Lt Johnson, telling him that he was,
in fact, having sex with A.M.—not M.P. Id. See also R.
at 490. SrA C.C. responded that he needed to get off
and pushed him. R. at 490. 2d Lt Johnson—who
played fullback for the Air Force Academy’s football
team 3—did not fight back against SrA C.C.; rather, he
said “Oh” and “I’m sorry, I’m sorry” while SrA C.C.
escorted him out of the room. R. at 490. A.M. has no
recollection of these events. R. at 553-54.
SrA C.C. later called a friend for assistance,
and then retrieved M.P. from the couch, where she
was sleeping opposite from 2d Lt Johnson. R. at 49394. Eventually, SrA C.C. and others called an Uber to
pick up 2d Lt Johnson, and escorted him from the
premises. R. at 498-500. Although these events
3 See Clemency at 44-46.
7
occurred a few hours after 2d Lt Johnson left
Bluewater, he still appeared to be very intoxicated. R.
at 689-90.
When the police arrived to investigate the
alleged sexual assault against A.M., M.P. also claimed
to have been assaulted by 2d Lt Johnson. R. at 744. At
no point during the evening or early morning hours
did any individual staying at J.P.’s hear any screams,
struggling, or calls for help from M.P., or harbor any
concerns regarding her well-being with 2d Lt Johnson.
R. at 524, 681, 1008-09.
The Government ultimately charged and
convicted 2d Lt Johnson of penetrating M.P.’s vulva
with his finger, in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 920.
ii. Legal Sufficiency
M.P. testified that she did not remember many
of the events following her arrival at Bluewater. R. at
571. However, she claimed that she remembered
“[w]aking up on the couch with [2d Lt Johnson] on top
of [her].” R. at 572. He was wearing a pink shirt and
still had his pants on. R. at 573. M.P. said he was
kissing her, she “kind of” pushed him off, and then she
“went out again.” R. at 573. When she next awoke,
M.P. attested that 2d Lt Johnson was digitally
penetrating her. R. at 573-74. She claimed she pushed
him off, curled up, and went back to sleep, and
believed he had left at that point. R. at 574. She later
awoke “to a sound or something,” saw 2d Lt Johnson’s
outline in the hallway, and realized he was not
wearing any clothes. Id. She claimed 2d Lt Johnson
was then “on top of [her] and he was in [her] face,
saying [her] name,” but she did not indicate that he
thereafter touched her inappropriately. Id. M.P.’s
8
blood alcohol content was estimated to be anywhere
from .15 to .262. R. at 893.
Analyzing
M.P.’s
testimony
alongside
2d Lt Johnson’s mistake of fact as to consent defense
and other evidence adduced at trial, the Air Force
Court deemed the timing of the incidents involving
A.M. and M.P. as “critical to determining factual and
legal sufficiency.” Pet. App. at 015a. Noting that SrA
C.C. testified he last sent a text message at 0302
hours, fell asleep, and was awoken by 2d Lt Johnson’s
assault on A.M., the Air Force Court determined that
there was no indication of any mal-intent by
2d Lt Johnson prior to this time. Id. Instead, it opined
that M.P. had been “somewhat, if not very, interested”
in 2d Lt Johnson. Id. The Air Force Court added that,
based on the evidence, “[h]ad M.P. alleged a sexual
assault occurring before SrA [C.C.] fell asleep at
0302,” 2d Lt Johnson would have a “viable argument”
regarding mistake of fact. Id. But the Court then
highlighted how A.M.’s DNA was found inside M.P.’s
underwear, SrA C.C. saw 2d Lt Johnson naked during
A.M.’s assault, M.P. saw 2d Lt Johnson naked in the
hallway, and SrA C.C. found 2d Lt Johnson in his
underwear on the couch with M.P. around 0345 hours.
Id. Based on these facts, the Air Force Court held that
the
evidence
“supports
a
conclusion
that
[2d Lt Johnson] sexually assaulted [M.P.] after he
penetrated [A.M.] and before SrA [C.C.] saw [M.P.]
and [2d Lt Johnson] on the couch around 0345.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
The Air Force Court’s analysis did not address
the nature of the DNA evidence, in that the
Government recovered only non-semen, epithelial
DNA; a form relating to skin, saliva, touch, etc. R. at
868-69. Likewise, the Air Force Court did not factor in
9
how 2d Lt Johnson had previously touched A.M.,
when he carried her to one of the house’s bedrooms. R.
at 438-39. The lack of any damage to M.P.’s clothes
and the lack of any significantly corroborating injuries
was also missing from the Air Force Court’s holding.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This Court should grant this Petition because
the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction is an “important
question of federal law.” See SUP. CT. R. 10(c). See also
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 505
(1962) (acknowledging that whether federal courts are
the “exclusive arbiters” of certain contract disputes is
an “important question of federal law”); Di Giovanni
v. Camden Fire Ins. Asso., 296 U.S. 64, 66 (1935)
(“This Court granted certiorari to settle an important
question of federal law affecting the jurisdiction of
federal courts.”).
This is not only an important federal question,
but it is also one that has festered “for nearly three
decades” without this Court deciding it. Brief for the
Respondent in Opposition at 4, United States v.
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (No. 19-108). This case is
the ideal vehicle to resolve the question presented
because it is the primary issue: Without resolving the
first question, this Court cannot reach the second
question. Additionally, an analysis of the canons of
statutory interpretation indicate that this Court does,
in fact, have jurisdiction to hear “cases” under 28
U.S.C. § 1259 and not just granted issues. This further
supports why this Court should grant this Petition.
Finally, 2d Lt Johnson maintains his innocence
even though the CAAF did not grant review on his
legal sufficiency issue. Although this Court “rarely”
grants review when there is a “misapplication of a
10
properly stated rule of law,” this Court should grant
review given that this issue is inextricably linked to a
consequential jurisdictional question. SUP. CT. R. 10.
Even though legal sufficiency is not a common issue
presented to this Court, it is one of great importance
to 2d Lt Johnson; one that can address important,
unanswered legal sufficiency questions; and one that
this Court can easily resolve. See Coleman v. Johnson,
566 U.S. 650 (2012); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979).
A. This Jurisdictional Question has Existed
Since 1983 and is Ripe for This Court’s
Consideration
In his authoritative book Supreme Court
Practice, Stephen M. Shapiro recognized the question
this Petition presents:
It is an unresolved question whether,
once the Armed Forces court grants a
petition for review on some issues, the
Supreme Court has the power to consider
other issues in the case that were not
granted review. The Solicitor General
has taken the position that review of
those issue is unavailable.
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., Supreme Court Practice §
2.14 at 128 n. 103 (9th ed. 2007) (citing Brief for the
United States in Opposition 6, McKeel v. United
States, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 554 (2006)). Not only
did Mr. Shapiro identify the question, but he also
recognized that the Solicitor General has opposed this
Court’s jurisdiction—despite the plain language of 28
U.S.C. § 1259.
This question is important to military
practitioners and they have pushed back against the
11
Solicitor General’s attempt to limit this Court’s
jurisdiction (i.e., its narrow reading of “cases” in 28
U.S.C. § 1259(3)). 4 In a recent twist, however, the
Solicitor General had to engage in jurisdictional
gymnastics to soften its viewpoint when it became the
appellant-petitioner. Compare Brief
for the
Respondent in Opposition at 4, United States v.
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (No. 19-108) (“First, the
4 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4, United States v.
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (No. 19-108) (“To that end, for
nearly three decades (and as recently as this January), the
government has consistently maintained that this Court lacks
jurisdiction under § 1259 to review any questions ‘not resolved
by CAAF’s decision in this case.’”); Reply Brief for Petitioner,
Richards v. Barrett, 140 S. Ct. 2760 (2020) (No. 19-55) (“Congress
intended only to limit the number of cases heard by this Court,
not the scope of its review.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
23, Larrabee v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (No. 18-306)
(“Despite the clear text of § 1259(3), the Solicitor General has
previously contended that this Court’s jurisdiction under that
provision does not extend to issues on which CAAF did not grant
a discretionary petition for review.”); Brief for the United States
in Opposition at 7 n.2, Wiechmann v. United States, 559 U.S. 904
(2010) (No. 09-418) (“28 U.S.C. 1259 limits this Court’s review to
‘[d]ecisions’ of the CAAF. The CAAF granted review only on
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim (Pet. App. 2a), and decided
that issue only.”); Reply Brief at *3-4, Stevenson v. United States,
555 U.S. 816 (2008) (No. 07-1397) (“Respondent neither contests
the plain language of section 1259(3), nor challenges the plain
meaning of ‘case.’ Rather, it argues (Opp. Br. 8) that Article
67a(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
867a(a), confines the Court’s authority to reviewing only ‘claims’
granted by the CAAF.”); Brief for the United States in Opposition
at 3, McKeel v. United States, 549 U.S. 1019 (2006) (No. 06-58)
(“While the CAAF granted a petition for review on petitioner’s
claim that he was entitled to transactional immunity, it refused
to grant a petition to review his Sixth Amendment claim. Under
the terms of Section 867a(a), the Court may not review the
CAAF’s action in refusing to grant review of that claim.”)
12
government itself has long argued that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider most of [the issues].”)
with Reply Brief of Richard Collins at *6, United
States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (19-184) (“In no
way is the government attempting to inject into this
case at the certiorari stage an issue that was not
central to the appellate proceedings and the CAAF
decision affirming them.”) and Reply Brief of Michael
Briggs at *8, United States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467
(2020) (19-108) (“Respondent’s current noncommittal
suggestion (Br. in Opp. 1) of a jurisdictional “question”
accordingly identifies no actual impediment to
plenary review of the entire question presented.”). The
Government should not be able to have it both ways
on a question of this Court’s jurisdiction.
Although previous petitioners have discussed
this issue in their petitions for a writ of certiorari, this
case is the first to explicitly raise the question as a
stand-alone issue. Supra note 4. As such, this Court
should choose this case to resolve the question because
it is a clean vehicle where the question is squarely in
front of the Court.
B. This Court Should Grant Review Because
Various Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Indicate this Court Has Jurisdiction over
“Cases” not Just Granted Issues
The crux of the question presented is whether
the word “[d]ecisions” in 28 U.S.C. § 1259 narrows the
statute’s five later uses of the word “cases,” to the
point that this Court can only review issues that the
CAAF granted on. There is no such limitation. This
Court has already interpreted the words “cases” and
“decisions” in such a manner that this Court should
have jurisdiction, the legislative history shows that
13
congress rejected “issues” in favor of “cases,” and
giving effect to every word in the statute results in a
harmonious reading of the relevant provisions of the
statute that renders them compatible, not
contradictory.
i. This Court’s Broad Interpretations of
“Case” and “Decision” Weigh in Favor of
Jurisdiction
The prior construction canon states that if “a
statute uses words or phrases that have already
received
authoritative
construction
by
the
jurisdiction’s court of last resort . . . they are to be
understood according to that construction.” ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 247 (2012) [hereinafter,
Reading Law]. Not only has this Court interpreted the
word “case,” it has done so in the context of the UCMJ.
In 1803, this Court explained, “It is the
essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted, and does not create that cause.” Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (emphasis
added). Stated differently, “cause” means “case” and
the sine qua non of a case—and appellate
jurisdiction—is “some judicial determination, some
judgment, decree, or order of an inferior tribunal, from
which an appeal has been taken.” Ortiz v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2018); Alicia, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 571, 573 (1869).
This Court expressly adopted this broad
understanding of “case” and “appellate jurisdiction” in
the context of the UCMJ. Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
In addition to discussing the definition of “case” and
“appellate jurisdiction” elucidated in Marbury, this
14
Court in Ortiz focused on the fact that a case is
something that originated at a court-martial, went
through a service court of criminal appeals, and then
the CAAF before arriving at this Court. Id. at 2174.
As such, “this Court would hardly be the first to
render a decision in the case.” Id.
This Court has also defined the word “decision”
in a broad manner. Salinas v. United States RRB, 141
S. Ct. 691, 697 (2021) (“The phrase ‘any final decision’
is broad . . . .”); Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765,
1774 (2019) (“[W]e note that the phrase ‘final decision’
clearly denotes some kind of terminal event, and
Congress’ use of the word ‘any’ suggests an intent to
use that term ‘expansive[ly].’”) (citations omitted);
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018)
(requiring appellate courts to “look through”
unexplained or merits “decisions” in federal habeas
corpus cases); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951)
(finding that an “order denying the motion to reduce
bail is appealable as a ‘final decision’ of the District
Court”), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 322 F. Supp.
2d 1045 (C. Dist. Cal Jan. 9, 2004) (unpublished);
United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412 (1920)
(finding that a “decision” includes a motion to quash).
This Court should grant review not only
because it has defined the words “case” and “decision”
expansively in the past, but also because the words’
plain meanings convey that this Court has jurisdiction
over a servicemember’s entire case. “Case” is defined
as:
15
A general term for an action, cause, suit,
or controversy, at law or in equity; a
question contested before a court of
justice; an aggregate of facts which
furnishes occasion for the exercise of the
jurisdiction of a court of justice. A
judicial proceeding for the determination
of a controversy between parties wherein
rights are enforced or protected, or
wrongs are prevented or redressed; any
proceeding judicial in its nature.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 215 (6th ed. 1990). Likewise,
“decision” is also defined capaciously:
A determination arrived at after
consideration of facts, and in legal
context, law. A popular rather than
technical or legal word; a comprehensive
term having no fixed, legal meaning. It
may be employed as referring to
ministerial acts as well as to those that
are judicial or of a judicial character . . .
the term is broad enough to cover both
final judgments and interlocutory orders
. . . the word may also include various
rulings, as well as orders, including
agency and commission orders.
Id. at 407 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This Court’s prior definitions and the inclusive,
plain language of these words point to one conclusion:
This Court should grant review because it does, in
fact, have jurisdiction over “cases” from the CAAF, not
just granted issues.
16
ii. The Legislative History Indicates that
“Cases” did not Mean Granted Issues
Even Justice Scalia—who loathed legislative
history—gave one exception to consulting it:
Using legislative history to establish
what the legislature “intended” is quite
different from using it for other
purposes. For example, for the purpose of
establishing linguistic usage—showing
that a particular word or phrase is
capable of bearing a particular
meaning—it is no more forbidden
(though no more persuasive) to quote a
statement from the floor debate on the
statute in question than it is to quote the
Wall Street Journal or the Oxford
English Dictionary.
Reading Law at 289 (emphasis added). Initially, the
House drafted 28 U.S.C. § 1259 to use the word
“issues” instead of “cases.” H.R. 6298, at 39 (1980). As
such, this Court would have only been able to review
“issues upon which the Court of Military Appeals
[CAAF] granted review and other issues upon which
the [CAAF] took action in cases in which a petition for
review was granted.” Id.
However, the final version of the bill that
Congress passed replaced “issues” with “cases.” The
legislative history indicates that the Congress was
concerned with this Court’s workload. Meaning,
Congress intended only to limit the number of cases
heard by this Court, not the scope of its review. S. Rep.
No. 98-53, at 33 (1983) (“[T]he Committee has taken
steps to ensure that the bill will not result in an undue
increase in the volume of cases presented to the
17
Supreme Court.”) (emphasis added). Notably, this
legislative history is pre-enactment; as such, this
argument presents the “ordinary meaning at the time
of enactment,” which should govern. Bostock v.
Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750 (2020).
At least one scholar has recognized that the
legislative history “makes it clear that the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over any case in which the
lower court granted review, even if the grant did not
include the particular issue on which the certiorari
petition is predicated.” Eugene R. Fidell, Review of
Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Evolving Military Justice 150-51 (Eugene R.
Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds. 2002).
The fact that Congress selected “cases” vice
“issues” confirms that this Court should read “cases”
and “decisions” broadly—in accordance with past
decisions. Congress’ selection of these words confirms
that this Court’s jurisdiction is not limited to only
issues reviewed by the CAAF.
iii. The Surplusage Canon and the
Harmonious Reading Canon Weigh in
Favor of Jurisdiction
The surplusage canon dictates that “every word
and every provision is to be given effect.” Reading Law
at 148. Specifically, every word “Congress used” in the
statute. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009).
This canon “prevents not [only] the total disregard of
a provision, but instead an interpretation that renders
it pointless.” Reading Law at 148. If this Court were
to interpret “decisions” narrowly—like the Solicitor
General has suggested in the past—it would render
Congress’ specific word choice of “cases” a nullity. In
18
other words, the five times 28 U.S.C. § 1259 uses
“cases,” would simply be a redundancy of “decisions.”
However, the use of “decisions” and then
“cases” is not a redundancy. Rather, “decisions” means
any “determination arrived at after consideration of
the facts, and . . . law,” such as the CAAF’s decision
not to grant review on one issue, but to grant the
petition for review on a different issue. Black’s Law
Dictionary, 407 (6th ed. 1990). Once the CAAF has
made the decision to grant a petition on one issue, but
not another, this Court then has jurisdiction over the
entire case because it is a “[c]ase[] in which the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted a petition for
review.” 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3).
This Court should favor this reading because it
aligns with the harmonious-reading canon. Meaning,
“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a
way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”
Reading Law at 152. If this Court were to read 28
U.S.C. § 1259 as the Solicitor General has historically
wished, it would mean “decisions” and “cases” would
be “provisions in conflict.” Id. Notably, this canon of
interpretation is “more categorical than most other
canons of construction because it is invariably true
that intelligent drafters do not contradict
themselves.” Id. Here Congress specifically chose the
word “cases” over “issues.” Thus, if “decisions”
narrowly modified “cases,” Congress would have
contradicted themselves.
C. This Court Should Grant Review to Answer
Questions that Jackson v. Virginia did not
Resolve
To convict 2d Lt Johnson, members had to find
that the Government proved the following two
19
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that
2d Lt Johnson committed a sexual act upon M.P. by
penetrating her vulva with his fingers; and (2) that he
did so by causing bodily harm to M.P., to wit:
penetrating her vulva with his fingers without her
consent. Pet. App. at 014a (emphasis added).
2d Lt Johnson’s conviction presents several
questions about legal sufficiency with regard to
consent that this Court has not clarified. First,
although there was some evidence of consent, does
2d Lt Johnson’s case fall within the narrow window of
protection that Jackson outlined? Second, what is the
quantum of evidence “necessary to convince a trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of
every element of the offense,” specifically for the
element of consent? Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. See also
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 (1982) (“We held in
Jackson that the Due Process Clause forbids any
conviction based on evidence insufficient to persuade
a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”). Third, should any of this Court’s legal
sufficiency
standards
change
given
that
2d Lt Johnson’s case went through Article I courts—
not state or federal habeas proceedings?
i. 2d Lt Johnson’s Conviction for
Assaulting M.P. Falls Between “No
Evidence” and the “Lower Limit” Floor of
Legal Sufficiency, Entitling him to Relief
In Jackson, this Court held that “the
[Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)] ‘no
evidence’ rule is simply inadequate to protect against
misapplications of the constitutional standard of
reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320. In
rejecting Thompson, the Court embraced In re
20
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), noting that “the record
in Winship was not totally devoid of evidence of guilt.”
Id. at 315. Later, this Court explained that the Due
Process Clause sets “a lower limit on an appellate
court’s definition of evidentiary sufficiency.” Tibbs,
457 U.S. at 45. Thus, Jackson stands for the
proposition that a conviction can be legally
insufficient—even with some evidence presented—if
it falls below the “lower limit” of evidentiary
sufficiency.
To gauge the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court stated that the test is whether “after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Although this is a low standard, it is “not
entirely toothless” and was designed to correct the
“occasional abuse” that appellate review missed. See
United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (“We do not . . . fulfill our duty through rote
incantation of the[] principles [outlined above]
followed by summary affirmance.”) (quoting United
States v. Long, F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see
also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 322 (“Although state
appellate review undoubtedly will serve in the vast
majority of cases to vindicate the due process
protection that follows from Winship, the same could
also be said of the vast majority of other federal
constitutional rights that may be implicated in a state
criminal trial.”). This Court should grant review
because 2d Lt Johnson’s case is one of the “occasional
abuses” of evidentiary sufficiency where there was
21
some evidence of consent, but not enough to meet the
“lower limit” that Jackson demands.
ii. Jackson v. Virginia Stated that a
Factfinder must Apply the Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt Standard Reasonably,
Fairly, and Rationally
This Court in Jackson repeatedly emphasized
that the legal sufficiency test is not “simply a trial
ritual.” 443 U.S. at 316-17. For example:
•
“A doctrine establishing so fundamental a
substantive constitutional standard must also
require that the factfinder will rationally apply
that standard to the facts in evidence.” Id. at
317 (emphasis added).
•
“[T]he critical inquiry on review of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction must be not simply to determine
whether the jury was properly instructed, but
to determine whether the record evidence could
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
•
“This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 319
(emphases added).
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens was concerned
that this new test could not only do constitutional
harm, but that it could also just become a
“meaningless shibboleth.” Id. at 328.
There are two reasons why the evidence
presented on consent did not meet the quantum
22
necessary to have convinced “any rational trier of fact”
of the element of consent. Id. at 319 (emphasis in
original). First, the only evidence that 2d Lt Johnson
touched M.P. without her consent was from M.P.—a
witness whose blood alcohol level was estimated to be
anywhere from .15 to .262 at the time of the touching.
R. at 893. The only thing that M.P. remembered after
going to the bar earlier in the evening was waking up
to 2d Lt Johnson touching her. R. at 572. Without
delving into any of M.P.’s credibility issues, it was not
reasonable, fair, or rational for the members to find
that lack of consent was met given M.P.’s intoxication
level. This is in addition to her lack of memory
throughout the entire night—except for the exact
moment in question. By comparison, A.M.—who had
a similar blood alcohol content as M.P.—had no
memory of her assault to the point that she had to be
told that 2d Lt Johnson assaulted her. R. at 553-54;
892.
Second, per M.P.’s own testimony, the timing of
when 2d Lt Johnson touched her proves her
interactions with him were consensual. That is, the
touching occurred before 2d Lt Johnson assaulted
A.M., when M.P. and he were “laugh[ing],” “making
out,” and “very physically connected” on the couch. R.
at 661-62, 682, 687, 1008. The Air Force Court
explained that the “timing of Appellant’s actions
towards both M.P. and A.M. are critical to
determining legal and factual sufficiency.” Id. This is
because if 2d Lt Johnson touched M.P. before he
assaulted A.M. he would have a “viable argument”
that the touching was consensual as there was “no
indication of any mal-intent” prior to A.M.’s assault.
Pet. App. at 015a - 016a.
23
M.P.’s testimony was that she remembered
2d Lt Johnson touching her while he was fully
clothed. R. at 573. 2d Lt Johnson was only fully
clothed before he assaulted A.M., while M.P. and he
were consensually “touching each other” on the couch.
R. at 674. Once M.P. saw 2d Lt Johnson naked in the
hallway, he did not touch her again. R. at 574.
Based on M.P.’s own testimony, then, the Air
Force Court’s timeline was incorrect—2d Lt Johnson’s
interactions with M.P. while clothed occurred prior to
the incident with A.M. Therefore, using the Air Force
Court’s own logic, 2d Lt Johnson had a “viable
argument” that the touching was consensual. Pet.
App. at 016a.
While it is true that a court must assume “that
the trier of fact resolved” conflicting inferences in
favor of the Government, this is not an issue of an
inference. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. An “inference” is
“[a] logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact not
presented by direct evidence but which, by process of
logic and reason, a trier of fact may conclude exists
from the established facts.” Black’s Law Dictionary,
778 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Here, there was
“direct evidence” presented that while 2d Lt Johnson
was clothed, before assaulting A.M., his interactions
with M.P. were not only consensual, but
enthusiastically consensual:
•
M.P. asked for permission to
have
2d Lt Johnson stay the night with her. R. at
1006.
•
2d Lt Johnson and M.P. were “on the couch,
kissing and touching each other.” R. at 661.
•
2d Lt Johnson and M.P. were “very physically
connected” on the couch. R. at 662.
24
•
2d Lt Johnson and M.P. were “making out.” R.
at 1008.
•
“Everything
seemed
mutual”
2d Lt Johnson and M.P. R. at 674.
•
M.P. said she was “fine.” R. at 1008.
•
2d Lt Johnson
kissing.” Id.
•
M.P. was not resisting when 2d Lt Johnson
kissed her. Id.
•
M.P. was kissing 2d Lt Johnson back. Id.
•
M.P. did not object. R. at 681.
•
M.P. did not ask for help. Id.
•
M.P. and 2d Lt Johnson were laughing when no
one was in the room with them. R. at 688.
•
M.P. did not try to stop any of “the activity”
with 2d Lt Johnson while they were on the
couch. R. at 682.
•
Witnesses did not think M.P.’s actions with
2d Lt Johnson were wrong and they did not try
to stop them. R. at 681-82; 1009.
and
M.P.
were
between
“actively
Given the uncontroverted facts from multiple
witnesses, the panel members’ finding of a lack of
consent did not flow from the facts and circumstances
that were proven in the record. Cf. Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969) (“[A] statutory
presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one
from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience.”).
In the face of these facts and the questionable
25
evidence for lack of consent, the panel members’
decision to convict was not rational, reasonable, or
fair.
iii. This Case Presents Additional Matters
that this Court can Clarify
The question that this Court decided in Jackson
was “what standard is to be applied in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding when the claim is made that
a person has been convicted in a state court upon
insufficient
evidence.”
443
U.S.
at
307.
2d Lt Johnson’s case does not share the same
procedural posture since his case is still on direct
appeal. Because of the distinction, the following
questions are worth this Court’s attention.
First, is the standard articulated in Jackson
applicable to a direct appeal in an Article I court?
Second, is the Jackson standard high enough
since 2d Lt Johnson, and other appellants in courtsmartial, are not entitled to unanimous verdicts?
United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F.
2023). 5
Third, the Air Force Court has statutory
authority to “conduct a de novo review of both the
legal and factual sufficiency of a conviction.” United
States v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
The CAAF does not have statutory authority to review
questions of fact. United States v. Piolunek, 74 M.J.
107, 110 (C.A.A.F. 2015). Because CAAF did not
A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been filed with the
question of “Whether military convictions for serious offenses
must be unanimous.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jonathan
M. Martinez, Et Al. v. United States, No. 22-0165/AF, 2023 CAAF
LEXIS 494 (C.A.A.F. July 18, 2023) (23-242).
5
26
review this issue, and the Air Force Court combined
its legal and factual sufficiency analysis, would this
Court use its powers to review questions of fact to
ensure the Air Force Court’s decision was correct as to
factual sufficiency? See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for
a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted
error consists of erroneous factual findings.”).
If this Court were to use its power to review
factual matters, lack of consent would become even
weaker than it is now for two reasons. First,
2d Lt Johnson could argue mistake of fact as to
consent. Given the numerous indicators of consent
throughout the night—not just those listed above—
any reasonable individual in 2d Lt Johnson’s place
would have believed that M.P. consented to the touch.
Second, this Court could consider M.P.’s poor
credibility and her motives to fabricate. Most notably,
that M.P. was married at the time and she was going
through a contentious divorce where her husband
filed for custody of her daughter. R. at 613. The
morning after the conduct, prior to M.P. reporting, her
husband’s friend came to the house. R. at 614.
iv. Conclusion:
Convicted
Why
Panel
Members
The reason is clear why panel members
convicted 2d Lt Johnson even though they were given
voluminous and qualitative indicators of consent and,
in turn, a dearth of evidence on a must-prove element:
Spillover. A junior ranking Airman caught
2d Lt Johnson in flagrante delicto penetrating A.M.
from behind with his penis—while she was
unconscious. Pet. App. at 007a. The Airman had to
push 2d Lt Johnson off of A.M. Id. Even though the
members were instructed not to consider one crime for
27
the other, the brazenness of A.M.’s assault created
“just too great of a risk” of spillover. R. at 141, 238.
This Court should grant review to state what
quantum of evidence is necessary to fulfill legal
sufficiency for consent issues and to clarify the
standards this Court laid down in Jackson.
CONCLUSION
This Court’s jurisdiction is “an important
question of federal law” that justifies granting this
Petition. Moreover, the decisions of this Court, like the
CAAF, “are of considerable importance to our nation
because they impact directly on the rights of
servicemembers, the prerogative of commanders, and
the public perception of the fairness and effectiveness
of the military justice system.” S. Rep. No. 98-53, at
33 (1983). By granting this Petition, this Court will
not only impact 2d Lt Johnson’s rights, but future
military members who petition this Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1259. A grant of the writ of certiorari, and an
affirmation of the first question presented, will also
positively impact “the public perception of the fairness
and effectiveness of the military justice system” and
this Court’s role in it. Id.
Respectfully submitted,
MAJOR SPENCER R. NELSON
Counsel of Record
United States Air Force
Air Force Appellant Defense Division
1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100
Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762
(240) 612-4770
spencer.nelson.1@us.af.mil
Counsel for Appellant
28
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PETITIONER’S APPENDIX
Air Force Court Opinion (October 16, 2020) ....... 001a
CAAF Decision without Published Opinion (August
10, 2021) ............................................................... 049a
Air Force Court Opinion (July 19, 2022) ............ 051a
CAAF Decision without Published Opinion (May 8,
2023) ..................................................................... 062a
Appellant’s Supplement to the Petition for Grant of
Review (February 16, 2021) ................................ 064a
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS
________________________
No. ACM 39676
________________________
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
D’Andre M. JOHNSON
Second Lieutenant (O-1), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
________________________
Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial
Judiciary
Decided 16 October 2020
________________________
Military Judge: W. Shane Cohen
Sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 10 years, and
forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Sentence
adjudged 1 December 2018 by GCM convened at
Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.
For Appellant: Mark C. Bruegger, Esquire; Catherine
M. Cherkasky, Esquire.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason,
USAF; Major Anne M. Delmare, USAF; Mary Ellen
Payne, Esquire.
Before POSCH, RICHARDSON, and MEGINLEY,
Appellate Military Judges.
001a
Judge MEGINLEY delivered the opinion of the court,
in which Senior Judge POSCH and Judge
RICHARDSON joined.
________________________
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,
does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule
of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
________________________
MEGINLEY, Judge:
Contrary to his pleas, a general court-martial
composed of officer members convicted Appellant of
one specification of sexual assault of AM, by
penetrating AM’s vulva with his penis, while AM was
incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to
impairment by alcohol, and one specification of sexual
assault of MP, by penetrating her vulva with his
finger by causing bodily harm, both in violation of
Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. § 920. 1 The panel sentenced Appellant to a
dismissal, confinement for ten years, and forfeiture of
all pay and allowances. The military judge credited
Appellant with 138 days against his sentence for time
Appellant spent in pretrial confinement. The
convening authority approved the sentence as
adjudged.
Appellant raises three assignments of error (AOE) on
appeal: (1) whether the evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to support the conviction of sexual
1 All references in this opinion to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), Rules for Courts-Martial, and Military Rules of
Evidence are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(2016 ed.).
002a
assault against MP; (2) whether trial defense counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3)
whether Appellant suffered cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 2
and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855, when he was
not given proper medical treatment while in
confinement. Alternatively, Appellant contends that
the conditions of his posttrial confinement render his
sentence inappropriately severe, warranting relief
under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). In
addition, as part of our consideration of Appellant’s
second AOE, we consider the issue of whether the
military judge abused his discretion in allowing
portions of MP’s unsworn victim impact statement to
be presented to the members at the sentencing
hearing.
Finding no error materially prejudicial to a
substantial right of Appellant, we affirm the findings
and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant graduated from the United States Air Force
Academy in 2017. After graduation, Appellant was
assigned to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, as a
Logistics Readiness Officer. After his arrival,
Appellant subsequently joined a fitness center in
neighboring Valdosta, Georgia, where he met MP, who
was an assistant manager at the gym.
Until the night of the offense, MP had seen Appellant
twice and talked to him once, and, although she knew
him from the gym, AM had never talked to Appellant
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
003a
directly. Appellant started “following” MP on the
social networking application Instagram, and on 14
September 2017, made a comment to one of MP’s posts
at 2159 hours. Appellant and MP continued to chat via
Instagram; on 15 September 2017, MP gave Appellant
her phone number after Appellant requested her
number and they texted back and forth. The
Instagram and text messages consisted of messages of
a flirtatious nature, discussions about football and
families, and some sexual innuendos. On 16
September 2017, MP told Appellant of her plans for
that evening, which included going to a local bar,
known as the Bluewater Bar, with some friends,
including her friend AM (also her co-worker).
Appellant responded that maybe he would see her “out
Saturday night.” In all, before MP and Appellant
would meet up on the night of 16 September 2017,
they had been messaging and texting each other for
less than 48 hours.
On 16 September 2017, MP and AM went out to
dinner with friends. MP had a mixed drink at dinner,
while AM did not have any alcohol. Thereafter, the
group went to the house of a friend, JP, where MP had
another mixed drink. At around 2330 hours, the group
left for Bluewater. The bar was approximately a fiveminute walk from JP’s house. AM consumed shots and
mixed drinks at JP’s house prior to going to
Bluewater, and she had more shots and mixed drinks
at Bluewater. AM consumed “a lot” of alcohol, but
could not recall how much. She opined she had “never
drank that much” alcohol in her life.
004a
Appellant arrived at Bluewater around 2100 that
evening. Prior to his arrival, Appellant consumed five
or six shots, along with five or six beers, with friends
at another bar. After MP arrived at Bluewater, she
eventually met up with Appellant. At 0102 on 17
September 2017, Appellant and MP were texting with
each other, with Appellant asking MP where she was
in the bar. While at Bluewater, MP and Appellant
spent time with each other at the bar, grinding 3 on
each other while dancing and kissing.
At approximately 0200 on 17 September 2017,
Bluewater closed. A group of individuals, including
MP, AM, Appellant, Senior Airman (SrA) CC, and
others, decided to go to JP’s house; JP and her male
friend, SrA KC, were already at JP’s house. According
to SrA CC, the group left Bluewater between 0200 and
0215. AM was very intoxicated, slurring her words,
unbalanced, and falling to the ground. Because of her
condition, SrA CC gave her a “piggyback ride” to JP’s
house.
Once they arrived at JP’s house, the group mingled
outside for an undetermined amount of time before
going inside. MP and Appellant continued kissing
outside of JP’s residence. MP asked JP if Appellant
could “stay” the night at JP’s house; JP agreed.
Some individuals eventually left JP’s house. Those
that remained were MP, AM, Appellant, and SrA CC,
along with JP and SrA KC. Once the group entered
the house, SrA CC “plopped [AM] down into the chair”
near the front door. Although the group wanted to
continue drinking and play cards, they were
3 When defense counsel asked the witness, “What is grinding?”
the witness replied, “Female in front of the male, rubbing against
each other.”
005a
concerned about AM because she was “way out of it
and looked extremely intoxicated.” It was decided to
put AM in JP’s son’s vacant room, which was next to
the bathroom. As SrA CC was getting ready to pick up
AM to move her, Appellant picked AM up “like a child”
and carried her to JP’s son’s bedroom. The group
followed Appellant into the bedroom as he laid AM on
the bed. The group suggested SrA CC stay with AM
and cuddle with her until she fell asleep, which he
agreed to do. SrA CC lay down next to AM on his back,
and AM cuddled against SrA CC, putting her left leg
and arm across his body, and her head on SrA CC's
chest. Shortly after, AM fell asleep. AM still had her
clothes on; she was wearing a “romper,” a one-piece
outfit (MP was also wearing a romper during the
evening). SrA CC testified the bedroom was not pitch
black, as the door had been cracked open to allow some
light from the hallway to come into the room.
SrA KC testified that after putting AM to bed and
after shutting the door, Appellant and MP were on the
couch kissing and touching each other. SrA KC and JP
asked if MP and Appellant needed a blanket. When
they did not get a response, SrA KC stated [he] “threw
a blanket at them, turned the lights off, and . . . went
back to [JP’s] room.” SrA KC stated he observed
Appellant and MP from the time they entered the
house until he went to bed, and although she was
drunk by appearance, MP was coherent. SrA KC also
stated he heard laughter from MP and Appellant and
that they “were very physically connected.”
JP testified that when she woke up to go to the
bathroom, she went into the living room to check on
MP and Appellant and found them “making out” on
the couch. One was on top of the other, although she
did not recall who was on top. When asked by defense
006a
counsel if JP had any concern about MP’s well-being
when she entered the living room, she stated:
No, if I thought something was of a
harm, I would have done something
about it. . . . [A]t that moment, I didn’t
see anything that was going wrong. Not
saying that something couldn’t have
gone wrong afterwards.
SrA CC received a text at 0254 and responded to that
text at 0302. Shortly after, he fell asleep. At
approximately 0330, while still lying next to AM, SrA
CC woke up feeling something was strange. When he
opened his eyes, he saw Appellant behind AM. He
could see Appellant was naked. SrA CC further stated
AM was “positioned as her right knee was on the
carpet and her left knee was on the bed. It was not on
me anymore, and as in she was still on her stomach
and her head was still on my chest.” SrA CC stated
Appellant was on both knees, “moving back and forth
in a thrusting motion.” At this point, as he was waking
up, SrA CC realized that Appellant was penetrating
AM’s vagina with his penis. SrA CC “tried to shove”
Appellant off AM, and was finally able to push him off
AM within “about three pushes.” SrA CC stated that
AM’s romper had been slid to the right to allow
Appellant’s penis to enter her vagina. SrA CC was
“[o]ne hundred percent” confident he saw Appellant’s
penis inside AM’s vagina, stating he could tell
Appellant was not wearing a condom and that he
“vividly remember[ed] the shape of [Appellant’s]
penis. Like that will not—never leave my head—ever.”
While SrA CC was pushing Appellant off AM,
Appellant said, “It’s okay. It’s [MP].” SrA CC said, “No
man. It’s not [AM]—I mean [MP]. It’s [AM].”
007a
Appellant then stated, “No. This is [MP].” SrA CC told
Appellant, “You need to get off.” Appellant then
stated, “Oh,” and after SrA CC pushed Appellant off
AM, Appellant kept saying, “I’m sorry. I’m sorry.” SrA
CC then escorted Appellant out of the room and locked
the door. During this time, AM was still unconscious
with her eyes shut, and she was still lying with half
her body on the bed, even after SrA CC escorted
Appellant out of the room.
SrA CC panicked. After about 10–15 minutes trying to
decide what to do, at 0343, SrA CC texted his
roommate, SrA DS, and his other roommate, JL. SrA
DS called him back. SrA CC walked out of the bedroom
and into the living room, where he saw MP and
Appellant both on the couch. MP was on one side;
Appellant was on the other. Both were sleeping. SrA
CC tried to wake up MP, telling her, “Hey. This is an
emergency. You need to go into the room with [AM].”
MP would not wake up. According to SrA CC, MP was
“unconscious however, she was moving. It looked like
she was fighting to wake up however, she just couldn’t
get there until I had to put my hands on her and shake
her [on her shoulders] a little bit, be a little louder,
and then finally she did . . . awake to understand what
I was saying.” SrA CC escorted MP to the bedroom
where AM was lying. AM was still “completely”
unconscious. MP fell asleep on the floor; AM was on
the bed.
SrA DS showed up at the house at approximately
0400. When he arrived, Appellant was on the couch.
SrA DS did a sweep of the house to make sure there
were no kids in the house. SrA DS and SrA CC had
trouble waking Appellant, who was in his underwear
(described by SrA DS as “gray with a black waistband,
spandex type”) and was “passed out unconsciously on
008a
the couch.” Appellant’s clothes were on the floor next
to the couch. SrA DS tried to wake Appellant, telling
him, “Hey. You’re not wanted here. You need to leave
right now.” Using Appellant’s phone (which Appellant
unlocked), SrA DS called Appellant an “Uber” ride to
get him out of the house.
SrA DS woke JP and SrA KC up and told them what
was going on. Then SrA CC and SrA DS helped
Appellant off the sofa to get him dressed. Appellant’s
clothes were on the floor next to the couch. Appellant
dressed in the bathroom. SrA DS walked Appellant
outside, sat him down, and waited for the Uber. The
Uber arrived a short time later and took Appellant to
his home. According to the Uber driver’s video,
Appellant was picked up from JP’s residence at 0417
and dropped off at his own residence at 0430.
After Appellant left in the Uber, there was additional
discussion on what to do about AM, who was still
unconscious in the bedroom. SrA KC, who was a
security forces member, called his supervisor to
discuss who would have jurisdiction. His supervisor
told him to call 911. JP went to the room where AM
and MP were sleeping and at approximately 0534, SrA
KC called 911 and reported that AM had been sexually
assaulted. 4 When SrA KC called 911, he was not
aware MP believed Appellant had also sexually
assaulted her.
Officer BT, a deputy sheriff, responded to the 911 call.
Initially, he was told of only one victim. Officer BT
talked to SrA CC about the situation and then went
4 SrA KC recalled calling 911 at approximately 0520; Officer BT
testified the call came in at 0534. He then stated it only took him
five minutes to get to JP’s residence.
009a
into the bedroom where AM was still unconscious.
Officer BT stated, “[AM] was not coherent at the time
and she was still in the process of being woke up in the
front bedroom.” At some point while Officer BT was
there, AM woke up and was “hysterically crying” after
being told what happened. After talking to a few
people, Officer BT then spoke with MP, who made a
comment that “she didn’t consent either.” Officer BT
began to ask questions to MP, who told him that
Appellant had digitally penetrated her, and that the
entire time he was trying to do this, she was “trying to
push him off, and was telling him to stop.” At this
point, Officer BT believed he had two victims and
arranged for both AM and MP to undergo a forensic
evaluation for sexual assault.
DNA was later taken from Appellant, AM, and MP.
Although no semen was found in MP’s underwear,
AM’s cervical swabs, or AM’s rectal swaps, Appellant’s
DNA was found in AM’s cervix and rectum. AM’s DNA
was also found in Appellant’s underwear. The results
also indicated that Appellant’s and AM’s DNA were
found in MP’s underwear.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency of Sexual
Assault of MP
1. Additional Background
At trial, MP testified that even though she was texting
with Appellant, she tried to deflect some interest in
Appellant through some of her responses.
Nonetheless, MP told Appellant she would be at the
Bluewater Bar the evening of 16 September 2017. MP
stated she met up with Appellant at Bluewater and he
010a
got her a drink. According to her testimony, MP
remembered little after this event. After Appellant
brought her a drink, MP stated she did not remember
the following events: (1) dancing with Appellant; (2)
leaving Bluewater that night with Appellant; (3)
walking to JP’s house; (4) taking pictures on her
phone; (5) asking JP if Appellant could stay at her
house; (6) JP asking MP if she was okay while she was
kissing Appellant on the couch; and (7) JP asking if
MP was okay or if she needed a blanket.
MP testified that her next memory after Appellant
brought her a drink at Bluewater was “waking up on
the couch with [Appellant] on top of [her].” She
testified that:
[Appellant] was on top of me kissing me,
and I, kind of like, realized, started to
realize, kind of what was going on. I
remember, kind of pushing him off, and
then, kind of, I guess, went out again, I
guess is a way to put it.
MP stated Appellant was wearing a pink shirt and
was pretty sure he had his pants on.
The next memory MP had was waking up to Appellant
having his hand in her romper outfit. MP stated she
had to “push his hands out of me, basically,” referring
to Appellant having his fingers in her vagina. When
she realized Appellant’s hands were inside her, she
“had to push them out.” She stated, “I told him no, and
I told him stop.”
MP testified,
I remember pushing him off, and then I
remember him finally getting off, and I
011a
thought at that point he had left. So, I
curled over into, like curled over into the
couch, basically, I was trying to go—and
trying to go to sleep, but that way he
couldn’t get to me, I thought. And then
the next thing I remember, I guess I
heard a sound or something. I am not
sure what woke me up, but I remember
seeing him. So, the bathroom light was
on, and I remember seeing him, an
outline, in the hallway, and he didn’t
have any clothes on, and then I
remember him being on top of me and he
was in my face, saying my name.
2. Law
A Court of Criminal Appeals may affirm only such
findings of guilty “as it finds correct in law and fact
and determines, on the basis of the entire record,
should be approved.” Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c). “Article 66(c) requires the Courts of Criminal
Appeals to conduct a de novo review of legal and
factual sufficiency of the case.” United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation
omitted).
“The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J.
294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States v.
Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). “The term
reasonable doubt, however, does not mean that the
evidence must be free from conflict.” United States v.
Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017)
012a
(citing United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684
(A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
“[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are
bound to draw every reasonable inference from the
evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.” United
States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001)
(citations omitted). As a result, “[t]he standard for
legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold to
sustain a conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J.
218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 3102,
139 S. Ct. 1641 (2019).
The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after
weighing the evidence in the record of trial and
making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses,” this court is “convinced of the
[appellant]’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A.
1987)). “In conducting this unique appellate role, we
take ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying
‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a
presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our] own independent
determination as to whether the evidence constitutes
proof of each required element beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568 (alteration in original)
(quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399). This court’s
review of the factual sufficiency of evidence for findings
is limited to the evidence admitted at trial. Article 66(c),
UCMJ; United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 458
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citations omitted).
Appellant was convicted of sexual assault by bodily
harm against MP in violation of Article 120(b)(1)(B),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(1)(B), which required the
Prosecution to prove two elements beyond a
013a
reasonable doubt: (1) that Appellant committed a
sexual act upon MP by penetrating her vulva with his
fingers; and (2) that Appellant did so by causing bodily
harm to MP, to wit: penetrating her vulva with his
fingers without her consent. See Manual for CourtsMartial, United States (2016 ed.) (MCM), pt. IV, ¶
45.b.(3)(b). “‘[B]odily harm’ means any offensive
touching of another, however slight, including any
nonconsensual sexual act.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45.a.(g)(3).
With regard to consent, the statute explains,
[t]he term “consent” means a freely given
agreement to the conduct at issue by a
competent person. An expression of lack
of consent through words or conduct
means there is no consent. Lack of verbal
or physical resistance or submission
resulting from the use of force, threat of
force, or placing another person in fear
does not constitute consent. A current or
previous dating or social or sexual
relationship by itself or the manner of
dress of the person involved with the
accused in the conduct at issue shall not
constitute consent.
MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45.a.(g)(8)(A). The statute further
explains that “[a] sleeping, unconscious, or
incompetent person cannot consent.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶
45.a.(g)(8)(B). “Lack of consent may be inferred based
on the circumstances of the offense. All the
surrounding circumstances are to be considered in
determining whether a person gave consent, or
whether a person did not resist or ceased to resist only
because of another person’s actions.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶
45.a.(g)(8)(C).
014a
The defense of mistake of fact as to consent requires
that an appellant, because of ignorance or mistake,
incorrectly believe that another consented to the
sexual contact. See R.C.M. 916(j)(1). In order to rely on
a mistake of fact as to a consent defense, Appellant’s
belief must be honest and reasonable. See id.; United
States v. Gans, No. ACM 39321, 2019 CCA LEXIS 162,
at *14 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 11 Apr. 2019) (unpub. op.);
United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85, 91 (C.A.A.F. 1998)
(quoting United States v. Willis, 41 M.J. 435, 438
(C.A.A.F 1995)). Once raised, the Government bears
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defense does not exist. R.C.M. 916(b)(1); see United
States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376, 379 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
Yet, the “burden is on the actor to obtain consent,
rather than the victim to manifest a lack of consent.”
McDonald, 78 M.J. at 381. An “[a]ppellant’s actions
could only be considered innocent if he had formed a
reasonable belief that he had obtained consent. The
government only needed to prove that he had not done
so to eliminate the mistake of fact defense.” Id.
3. Analysis
The timing of Appellant’s actions towards both MP
and AM are critical to determining legal and factual
sufficiency. At 0254 on 17 September 2017, SrA CC
received a text and responded to that text at 0302.
Shortly after, he fell asleep; the door to his room was
cracked open. At approximately 0330, SrA CC awoke
to Appellant penetrating AM with his penis while
Appellant was on his knees.
Prior to 0302, there is no indication of any mal-intent
on the part of Appellant towards either MP or AM. In
fact, regarding MP the converse is true: the testimony
shows that MP was somewhat, if not very, interested
015a
in Appellant. The text messages leading up to
Appellant and MP meeting at the Bluewater show a
rapid escalation in MP and Appellant’s relationship.
MP was observed both dancing and “grinding” with
Appellant at Bluewater, and kissing him outside JP’s
residence. No witness indicated MP was in distress at
any point during the night. MP asked JP if Appellant
could stay the night at the house. Both JP and SrA KC
indicated MP was engaged in intimate behavior with
Appellant while in JP’s residence. SrA KC heard
laughter coming from the living room. JP did not sense
anything was wrong between MP and Appellant, and
even went so far as to say that if she thought MP was
in harm, she would have done something about the
situation. Before 0302, when SrA CC received a text,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that
Appellant committed a sexual assault against MP.
Appellant argues that MP’s claim of sexual assault is
inconsistent with the balance of the evidence and
demonstrates Appellant’s reasonable mistake of fact
as to consent. Had MP alleged a sexual assault
occurring before SrA CC fell asleep at 0302, the facts
above indicate a viable argument. However, the fact
that AM’s DNA was found in MP’s underwear
supports a conclusion that Appellant sexually
assaulted MP after he penetrated AM and before SrA
CC saw MP and Appellant on the couch around 0345.
The following evidence supports this conclusion: (1)
Appellant was clothed when MP said “no” and “stop”
on the couch; (2) SrA CC testified he saw Appellant’s
clothes near the couch and Appellant was naked when
he was in the bedroom, which supports an inference
that Appellant took off his clothes in the living room
before he sexually assaulted AM; (3) Appellant told
SrA CC it was okay he was having sex with MP, when
016a
he was actually having sex with AM, and that he was
“sorry”; (4) MP remembered seeing Appellant naked
in the hallway; (5) MP testified she was asleep when
Appellant came back to the couch; (6) SrA CC saw MP
and Appellant asleep on the couch when he came out
to the living room; and (7) SrA CC’s observation of
Appellant on the couch in his underwear indicated to
him Appellant put his underwear back on after he left
AM’s room and returned to the couch where MP slept.
Appellant penetrated AM’s vagina with his penis, and
after SrA CC pushed Appellant off AM, Appellant
moved back to the couch, where he digitally
penetrated MP’s vagina. The evidence does not
support a finding that Appellant had a reasonable or
honest belief that MP was consenting to Appellant’s
digital penetration.
Appellant argues that MP had a personal motive to
fabricate her allegations against Appellant due to an
ongoing child custody battle with her soon to-be exhusband. Appellant hinges this argument on the fact
that SrA DS, who showed up at JP’s house right after
the sexual assaults, was a friend of MP’s soon-to-be exhusband, and had MP’s ex-husband learned MP had
been engaged in sexual activities “with an accused
sexual assaulter on the same night her friend, AM,
was attacked,” it could cast her in an unfavorable light
in those proceedings. Appellant notes the timing of
when MP came forward, stating MP only decided to
report her alleged assault after SrA DS showed up.
We find no evidence to support this attack on MP’s
credibility. The Defense has essentially asked us to
speculate why MP did not tell anyone what happened
to her before her disclosure to Officer BT. There was
no evidence, or comments, or any reaction to MP
seeing SrA DS in a negative light when he showed up
017a
to assist. In fact, SrA DS testified that MP told SrA
DS that Appellant pressed on her, that he was
aggressive, and that she told him no. MP’s comments
to SrA DS could be viewed as MP trying to prevent or
preempt SrA DS from telling MP’s husband that MP
was possibly engaged in sexual activity, by fabricating
a sexual assault when SrA DS suddenly showed up at
the house. However, from this court’s review of the
testimony and evidence, the record suggests this is not
the case. Most importantly, there was no evidence SrA
DS called MP’s husband to inform him of what
happened to MP. MP did report an assault to Officer
BT. Finally, MP subjected herself to a SANE
examination.
In assessing legal sufficiency, we are limited to the
evidence produced at trial and are required to consider
it in the light most favorable to the Government. In
doing so, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt all the
elements to support Appellant’s conviction of sexual
assault against MP. Furthermore, in assessing factual
sufficiency, after weighing all the evidence in the
record of trial and having made allowances for not
having personally observed the witnesses, we are
convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Therefore, we find Appellant’s conviction of
sexual assault against MP both legally and factually
sufficient.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
1. Additional Background
Appellant asserts his trial defense counsel, Mr. JMB,
Mr. LEC, Mr. JRH, and Captain (Capt) RM, were
ineffective in that they (1) failed to submit a
resignation-in-lieu of court-martial (RILO) request
018a
within seven days of referral of Appellant’s case; (2)
engaged in harassing behavior against MP; and (3)
offered a theory of the case that conceded Appellant’s
guilt. We examine each claim in turn.
Pursuant to Appellant’s second assignment of error,
on 7 May 2020 this court ordered Appellant’s four trial
defense counsel to provide affidavits or declarations
that were responsive to Appellant’s claims that he did
not receive effective assistance of counsel. 5 We have
considered whether a post-trial evidentiary hearing is
required to resolve any factual disputes. Reviewing
trial defense counsel’s declarations and the record as
a whole, we are convinced such a hearing is
unnecessary. See United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236,
248 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. DuBay, 37
C.M.R. 411, 413 (C.M.A. 1967) (per curiam).
Charges were preferred against Appellant on 18 April
2018, the preliminary hearing occurred on 1 June
2018, the case was referred on 21 June 2018, and
Appellant was served with the referral on 29 June
2018. On 19 October 2018, three days before
Appellant’s initial trial date (22 October 2018),
Appellant submitted a RILO. At trial, the military
judge granted a defense request for a continuance
until 26 November 2018 that was unrelated to the
RILO submission.
The Government sought to proceed to trial while the
decision of the Secretary of the Air Force on
Appellant’s RILO was pending. On 15 November 2018,
This court did not receive a declaration from trial defense
counsel, Mr. JMB. However, Mr. JMB did concur with Mr. LEC’s
declaration. Mr. LEC is a member of Mr. JMB’s law firm and one
of Appellant’s defense attorneys. Appellant did not raise
opposition to the absence of Mr. JMB’s affidavit or declaration.
5
019a
the Chief of the Military Justice Division (JAJM)
granted the Government permission to proceed to trial
based on “the particular circumstances of
[Appellant’s] request to resign, including his failure to
submit his request within seven (7) days of referral.”
Appellant’s court-martial concluded on 1 December
2018 with findings of guilty to the Charge and its two
specifications. On 4 April 2019, Appellant’s request for
a RILO was denied.
As part of his pretrial investigation, Appellant,
through counsel, hired a private investigator to
interview the witnesses who were identified as victims
in the case. The investigator attempted to interview
MP at her residence and place of employment. Upon
receiving notice from trial counsel that MP requested
a Special Victims’ Counsel, the defense team notified
the investigator to cease attempts to contact MP, and
the investigator complied. Capt RM also stated that
he talked to Mr. LEC and Mr. JMB and they related
there was no intent to harass the alleged victim, only
to investigate the case.
At trial, it was revealed that one of Appellant’s civilian
defense counsel, Mr. LEC, provided MP’s blood alcohol
report from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and
MP’s written statement in Appellant’s case to MP’s
husband’s divorce attorney. In exchange, Mr. LEC
received a deposition from the divorce proceedings.
As lead counsel for the Defense, Mr. JMB gave the
closing argument at the conclusion of findings.
According to Capt RM, Mr. JMB’s strategy during
closing argument was to raise reasonable doubt
throughout the entirety of his argument. Mr. JMB
talked about a “terrible mistake” by Appellant, stating
that:
020a
I think it’s a plausible suggestion that
[Appellant] got up, went to the bathroom
just a short distance away, just the end
of the hallway. [Appellant] went in the
bathroom, instead of going straight and
coming right back out to [MP],
[Appellant] took a left turn in a house
he’d never been in and went into the
bedroom instead. Another girl in there,
near darkness. It’s night. The only light
was coming from the hallway. Both
[women] were wearing black rompers. It
doesn’t make sense that he would go in
there unless [Appellant] was just making
a huge mistake with another guy laying
on the bed.
Capt RM stated in his declaration:
Based on my conversations with Mr.
[JMB] about his closing argument prior
to trial, the argument was not intended
to be a misguided presentation of the
case nor a concession of guilt, but a way
to raise reasonable doubt as to the
prosecution’s presentation of the case.
Mr. LEC declared, “[a]ny defense theory tendered by
the defense team during trial was a strategic decision
made to obtain the best possible outcome for
Appellant based on the facts known at the time.”
2. Law
a. RILO
The Secretary of the Air Force clearly has authority to
promulgate an administrative regulation providing
for the tender of a RILO, if that officer has committed
021a
acts rendering him subject to such trial. United States
v. Little, No. ACM 34726, 2003 CCA LEXIS 224, at *7
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 26 Sep. 2003) (unpub. op.)
(citation omitted). When an officer has submitted a
RILO, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-201,
Administration of Military Justice, ¶ 7.24.7.1
(8 Dec. 2017), dictates the process. Prior permission
from the Air Force Legal Operations Agency, Military
Justice Division (AFLOA/JAJM), is required before a
case proceeds to trial if the officer accused has submitted
a RILO on which action is pending. Id. at ¶ 7.24.7.
JAJM will “normally approve [government] requests
for permission to proceed while a [RILO] is pending if
the officer submitted the request more than seven
calendar days after service of” referred charges. Id. at
¶ 7.24.7.1. However, when officers submit resignation
requests within seven days of receiving referred
charges,
JAJM
“will
normally
disapprove
[government] requests for permission to proceed.” Id.
at ¶ 7.24.7.2.
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel
We review allegations of ineffective assistance de
novo. United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 362
(C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J.
470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2009)). In order for Appellant to
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
he must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
so deficient that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment, and that the deficiency resulted in
prejudice “as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
022a
We employ a presumption of competence, and apply a
three-part test in assessing whether that presumption
has been overcome: (1) “is there a reasonable
explanation for counsel’s actions?;” (2) “did defense
counsel’s level of advocacy ‘fall measurably below the
performance . . . [ordinarily expected] of fallible
lawyers?;’” and (3) “[i]f defense counsel was
ineffective, is there ‘a reasonable probability that,
absent the errors,’ there would have been a different
result?” Gooch, 69 M.J. at 362 (omission and
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Polk,
32 M.J. 150, 153 (C.M.A. 1991)).
“Defense counsel do not perform deficiently when they
make a strategic decision to accept a risk or forego a
potential benefit, where it is objectively reasonable to
do so.” United States v. Datavs, 71 M.J. 420, 424
(C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing Gooch, 69 M.J. at 362–63)
(additional citation omitted). In reviewing the
decisions and actions of trial defense counsel, this
court does not second guess strategic or tactical
decisions. See United States v. Morgan, 37 M.J. 407,
410 (C.M.A. 1993) (citations omitted). It is only in
those limited circumstances where a purported
“strategic” or “deliberate” decision is unreasonable or
based on inadequate investigation that it can provide
the foundation for a finding of ineffective assistance.
See United States v. Davis, 60 M.J. 469, 474 (C.A.A.F.
2005).
“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation, and . . .
shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued.” AFI 51-110, Professional
Responsibility Program, Attachment 2, Rule 1.2(a) (5
023a
Aug. 2014)). 6 “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case,
the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered, whether to waive trial by court members, the
composition of the court, and whether the client will
testify.” Id.
“Whenever the law, nature, and circumstances of the
case permit, trial defense counsel should explore the
possibility of an early diversion of the case from the
criminal process.” AFI 51-110, Attachment 7,
Standard 4-6.1(a). This includes requests for
administrative discharge in lieu of court-martial. Id.,
Discussion.
3. Analysis
a. Appellant’s RILO case
As stated, Appellant did not submit a RILO until 19
October 2018, nearly four months after he
acknowledged receipt of the referred charges. We
understand Appellant’s argument to be that by failing
to submit the RILO immediately or soon after referral,
his counsel’s justification that approval of the RILO
would save Government time, expense, and manpower
was lost. More important to Appellant, his counsel
also lost the justification of “uncertainty,” which we
understand to mean the uncertainty of whether the
Government would continue to garner the victims’
cooperation and their desire to testify in the
Government’s case at trial. 7 Coupled with a viable
6 This AFI was updated on 11 Dec. 2018.
7 Appellant’s brief highlights challenges the Government needed
to overcome, including that AM “considered not going through
024a
mistake of fact defense, as well as issues regarding
MP’s credibility, Appellant believes these factors
support the notion that a timely RILO request would
not have been a “[H]ail [M]ary,” but a “legitimate and
reasonable offer that should have garnered serious
consideration.”
Trial defense counsel rebutted Appellant’s claims
about his desire to submit a RILO. In his declaration
to this court, Mr. LEC explained:
The defense team regularly discussed
the process for submitting a [RILO]
request with Appellant, as well as the
pros and cons associated [sic] submitting
his request. Appellant was the ultimate
decision maker as to whether to submit
a request to resign in lieu of courtmartial and as to the timing for its
submission.
In his declaration to this court, Mr. JRH explained
that he discussed the issue of the RILO multiple times
with Appellant who was aware of his right to submit
one. Mr. JRH stated, “Initially, [Appellant] stated that
he did not want to submit a RILO, but then in October
[Appellant] indicated that he would like to submit
such a request—which was well after the date the
charges were referred in June.” Mr. JRH also stated,
[I]t should be noted that based upon
various conversations with the Chief of
Military Justice and other members of
the legal office, it was clear that there
would not be any support for a RILO
with this case because [she] just wanted to put it in the past and
get on with [her] life.”
025a
from the legal office or from the
command. In short, the chances of a
RILO being approved for a sexual
assault case that had two victims was
virtually nonexistent. . . . it was well
after the referral of charges and there
was not any support for such a
resolution.
Appellant did not provide any documentation to rebut
these declarations.
“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation, and . . .
shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. . . . A lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decision whether to settle a matter.” AFI 51110, Rule 1.2(a) (5 Aug. 2014). In their declarations,
trial defense counsel stated they advised Appellant
before referral, yet Appellant chose to not submit a
RILO until shortly before trial. Trial defense counsel
abided by Appellant’s decision on the matter, and
therefore, we agree with Appellee that “trial defense
counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to submit
a request to settle Appellant’s case when they lacked
the authority to submit such a request.”
Further, Appellant notes there was no value in failing
to request a delay in the trial pending the Secretary of
the Air Force’s decision on this matter. Given that the
Government had a strong case, the lack of support for
Appellant’s request from the Government for the
RILO, and timing of Appellant’s RILO submission, it
is unlikely the military judge would have granted a
continuance on this collateral matter pending the
Secretary’s decision. We find that Appellant has failed
to show any prejudice in the processing of a RILO, or
026a
that his counsel were ineffective regarding the timing
of his RILO request, nor were they ineffective in
failing to request a continuance of his trial from the
court pending the Secretary’s decision.
b. Trial defense counsel’s investigation of
Appellant’s case
We do not believe trial defense counsel engaged in
harassing behavior against MP by hiring an
investigator, as it is expected defense counsel would
do their due diligence investigating facts. See AFI 51110, Attachment 7, Standard 4-1.1. Specifically
regarding MP, as soon as trial counsel notified trial
defense counsel that MP requested a SVC, the
investigator stood down.
However, we have given great consideration to
Appellant’s claim that release of MP’s records to her
estranged husband, by Appellant’s defense attorneys,
damaged the Defense’s case. Specifically, at the time
of her sexual assault, MP was in the process of getting
a divorce from her husband and child custody was a
significant issue. Trial defense counsel provided to
MP’s husband’s divorce attorney MP’s blood alcohol
report from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and
MP’s written statement to investigators, in exchange
for a deposition from the divorce proceedings.
Ultimately, during their cross-examination of MP,
trial defense counsel sought to show MP had a motive
to fabricate being a victim; that, by claiming to be a
victim and not a voluntary actor, she would be put in
a better light in her ongoing divorce and custody
proceedings. Mr. LEC stated in his declaration that
this type of exchange of evidence, “is not prohibited in
Georgia” and “at all times [Appellant’s trial defense
027a
counsel] acted in conformance with the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct.”
During cross-examination of MP, assistant trial
counsel objected to the relevance of MP’s divorce
proceedings. In the following Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 839(a), session, when asked by the military
judge about the relevance of the child custody issue,
trial defense counsel stated:
Well, it certainly could have an impact, if
someone is living a certain way and
doing certain things that the court does
not approve of. And I can certainly state
my place, Judge. We are still in a very
conservative venue here in South
Georgia, and they expect mothers of
children are not to go out and do certain
things. And again, it is certainly better
in a case arguably to be a victim, as
opposed to being something else.
Ascertaining the situation, the military judge asked
Mr. JMB, “why would you be releasing this discovery
for this case to someone else, who had no interest?”
Mr. JMB responded, “It was a quid pro quo for—he
wanted something from us, for us, to give us the . . . .
The deposition from the divorce.” Mr. JMB stated this
type of “quid pro quo” frequently happened in civilian
court. Mr. JMB denied releasing any medical records.
Shortly thereafter, trial defense counsel clarified the
relevance of the information, stating that MP’s level of
intoxication that night “goes toward whether [MP]
was out being promiscuous, or whether she was
forcibly assaulted.”
After some debate on the relevance of the documents,
MP’s possible motive, and the prejudice to the Defense
028a
regarding the release of the records, the military judge
stated:
[T]he real prejudice is not to you guys,
because you are the ones, who released
it. The real question is whether it is
prejudicial to your client, and that’s
really my only concern here. Whether or
not you guys did the right thing, that is
something we are going to take up later,
whether
you
released
official
government, you know, government
documents that were part of a trial, and
you released them as part of a quid pro
quo agreement with another attorney,
knowing that it would have a beneficial
impact also to your particular case here,
when those government documents were
released under Rules for Courts-Martial,
and under our guidelines, and under our
ethical rules and those kinds of things,
that is a separate issue, which we may
take up after this trial is over. The real
question is, why let your actions
prejudice your client? That is my only
concern right here.
...
I do have an issue with what you did. I
don’t care whether if it is the good old
boys and girls network and that’s how
you work things. That is not the way it
works in a court-martial. That is for
official use only. That is how those
documents are released.
029a
Finding that there was grounds under Mil. R. Evid.
608(c), the military judge allowed minimal
questioning of MP on the issue of her divorce and
custody, as well as that SrA DS knew her husband, as
proper bias, motive to
misrepresent,
and
impeachment evidence of MP.
Yet, in her testimony at sentencing, MP noted that the
documents trial defense counsel turned over to her
husband’s attorney resulted in the family court judge’s
“concerns about [her] character and alcohol. And so at
that point, he did not decide it was okay to give
custody to us. So he, in turn gave custody to our
grandmothers. And, I attended alcohol counseling and
counseling for that.” Trial counsel then asked MP if it
was her understanding that the family court judge’s
decision was a direct result of the documents turned
over. MP responded, “That’s my understanding; yes,
sir.” The military judge also allowed MP to provide
information related to her divorce to be presented in
an unsworn statement to the members.
After announcement of sentence, trial counsel
reminded the military judge about the release of the
documents. The military judge concluded that under
Article 48, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 848, his authority to
punish for contempt was limited, and that Article 6(b),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 806b, did not specifically indicate
Article 48 was a remedy for an Article 6(b) violation.
However, he left the door open in the event trial
counsel chose to pursue contempt proceedings. They
did not.
The Defense had no evidence that MP fabricated being
a victim; it was a mere theory. The disclosure of
documents in a “quid pro quo” transaction related to
Appellant’s case to MP’s estranged husband’s attorney
030a
was done to gain an advantage in an attempt to attack
MP’s credibility. Standard 4-4.3(a) of Attachment 7,
AFI 51-110, states that defense counsel “should not
use means that have no substantial purpose other to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . . .” While
the disclosure of this evidence did burden and affect
MP’s civil case with her husband, we do not believe
trial defense counsel’s substantial purpose in the
“quid pro quo” was to embarrass or burden MP.
Additionally, revisiting Appellant’s assignment of
error on factual sufficiency, trial defense counsel had
little evidence to attack MP’s credibility. As Appellee
argued, the Government’s case was strong, and
because Appellant did not have a credible defense to
counter the evidence, there was no reasonable
probability
“absent
trial
defense
counsel’s
investigation there would have been a different result
at trial.” Appellee also notes that the members were
never informed how MP’s husband gained the
knowledge of Appellant’s case. From our view, while
we do not subscribe with, or condone, trial defense
counsel’s interactions with MP’s husband’s attorneys,
we do recognize that trial defense counsel had an
obligation to conduct a prompt investigation of this
case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant
to the merits of the case. See AFI 51-110, Attachment
7, Standard 4-1.1.
With this said, evaluating whether trial defense
counsel was ineffective on this issue, we look at the
three-part test in in Gooch. First, was there a
reasonable explanation for trial defense counsel’s
actions? See Gooch, 69 M.J. at 362. In this case, the
Defense was trying to develop a theory that would
attack MP’s credibility. Second, did trial defense
counsel’s level of advocacy “fall measurably below the
031a
performance . . . [ordinarily expected] of fallible
lawyers?” Id. Pursuant to their obligations as
Appellant’s counsel, we would expect trial defense
counsel to do their due diligence in conducting an
investigation to discover all facts relevant to the case.
Trial defense counsel took a risk in this case, in that,
had they been able to attack MP’s credibility with this
information, Appellant could have been acquitted of
the specification related to MP; conversely, if this
information backfired, it could impact Appellant in
sentencing. We find that there was no prejudice to
Appellant, and that the level of advocacy provided by
trial defense counsel did not fall below the
performance expected of attorneys practicing in the
military justice arena. Finding that trial defense
counsel were not ineffective, we need not address the
third prong of Gooch —‘“a reasonable probability that,
absent the errors,’ there would have been a different
result.” Id.
c. Trial defense counsel’s theory of the case
The facts of this case strongly favored the
Government’s charging, particularly regarding AM.
Trial defense counsel noted their strategy was to try
to create as much reasonable doubt as possible. As Mr.
JRH declared, the possible defenses were limited,
given the eyewitness and scientific evidence against
Appellant. Trial defense counsel did their best to
attack the credibility and biases of witnesses, to
provide explanations for Appellant’s behavior, and
ultimately in our view, they did not concede guilt. One
of those explanations was the “terrible mistake”
Appellant made when he thought AM was MP.
We do not agree with Appellant that “but for counsel’s
errors,” the result of the proceedings would have been
032a
different. As Appellant stated, trial defense counsel
could have offered a strategy of no defense or a limited
defense; however, it is speculative how that might
have helped Appellant in this case. Trial defense
counsel could have chosen a different closing
argument strategy. However, the record shows their
trial strategy in this case was not unreasonable. That
strategy brought relevant information to the attention
of the members. We evaluate trial defense counsel’s
performance not by the success of their strategy, but
whether counsel made reasonable choices from the
alternatives available at trial. See United States v.
Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Hughes, 48 M.J. 700, 718 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 1998)). Under these circumstances,
Appellant fails to overcome the strong presumption
that counsel’s performance was within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.
C. Portions of MP’s Unsworn Victim Impact
Statement
1. Law
Although not raised by Appellant in his brief, in light
of the information provided by MP in her unsworn
victim impact statement, we address whether the
military judge abused his discretion in allowing
portions of that statement to be presented to the
members at the sentencing hearing. In United States
v. Hamilton, this court stated that “Article 6b, UCMJ,
gives victims the right to be reasonably heard through
an unsworn statement, which is tantamount to victim
allocution at sentencing.” 77 M.J. 579, 584 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 2017) (citing Kenna v. United States Dist.
Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1351 (D.
033a
Utah 2005)). “R.C.M. 1001A broadly defines the scope
of victim impact.” Id. The court went further in
Hamilton, stating:
[U]nsworn victim impact statements
offered pursuant to R.C.M. 1001A are
not evidence, and therefore not
aggravation evidence offered by the
Prosecution.
....
. . . The military judge has the obligation
to ensure the content of a victim’s
unsworn statement comports with the
defined parameters of victim impact or
mitigation as defined by the statute and
R.C.M. 1001A. See [MCM], pt. II,
Discussion
(“A
victim's
unsworn
statement should not exceed what is
permitted under R.C.M. 1001A(c) . . . .
Upon objection or sua sponte, a military
judge may stop or interrupt a victim’s
unsworn statement that includes
matters outside the scope of R.C.M.
1001A”). A victim’s right to be heard at
sentencing is the right to be “reasonably”
heard. 10 U.S.C. § 806b(a)(4). What a
military judge may find to be
“reasonable” in a particular context may
be informed to some extent by legal
principles embodied in the Military
Rules of Evidence. However, those rules
do not apply to victim unsworn
statements, which are not evidence.
Mil. R. Evid. 403 addresses “legal
relevance” and provides that “evidence”
034a
may be excluded notwithstanding its
logical relevance. In the decision to allow
a victim to exercise their right to be
heard on sentencing, a military judge is
neither
making
a
relevance
determination nor ruling on the
admissibility of otherwise relevant
evidence. Instead, the military judge
assesses the content of a victim’s
unsworn statement not for relevance,
but for scope as defined by R.C.M.
1001A.
Id. at 585–86 (Third omission in original).
Under R.C.M. 1001A(b)(2), ‘“victim impact’ includes
any financial, social, psychological, or medical impact
on the victim directly relating to or arising from the
offense of which the accused has been found guilty.”
When there is error regarding the presentation of
victim statements under R.C.M. 1001A, the test for
prejudice “is whether the error substantially
influenced the adjudged sentence.” United States v.
Barker, 77 M.J. 377, 384 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2018)
(citation omitted). When determining whether an
error had a substantial influence on a sentence, this
court considers the following four factors: “(1) the
strength of the [g]overnment’s case; (2) the strength of
the defense case; (3) the materiality of the evidence in
question; and (4) the quality of the evidence in
question.” Id. (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Machen, No. ACM 39295, 2018 CCA LEXIS
419, at *12 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 29 Aug. 2018) (unpub.
op.) (citing United States v. Bowen, 76 M.J. 83, 89
(C.A.A.F. 2017)). “An error is more likely to be
prejudicial if the fact was not already obvious from the
035a
other evidence presented at trial and would have
provided new ammunition against an appellant.”
Barker, 77 M.J. at 384 (citing United States v. Harrow,
65 M.J. 190, 200 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).
2. Analysis
Trial defense counsel objected to portions of MP’s
statement, specifically that MP “lost [her]
employment in Valdosta because [she] had to move to
Mississippi to be near [her] daughter,” that MP had
been followed by investigators, and that MP felt
Appellant “ha[d] [no] remorse for what he had done.
He’s just upset he got caught.”
In an Article 39(a), UCMJ session, before she
presented her statement to the members, MP provided
clarification to the military judge about her victim
impact. At the session and outside the presence of the
members, MP described in greater detail the impact
the case had on her, and her divorce and custody trial,
testifying that the documents trial defense counsel
turned over to her estranged husband resulted in her
losing custody of her daughter to her own mother, and
that MP had to attend alcohol counseling ordered by
the court.
Initially, and although in error, the military judge did
a Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test. In finding MP’s
statement relevant under R.C.M. 1001A, the military
judge found evidence of a social and psychological
impact on MP, and found the probative value of this
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to Appellant. The military
judge later addressed that he was in error in doing a
balancing test, and simply looked at the confines of
R.C.M. 1001A to determine if the contents of MP’s
036a
statement would be allowed. In doing so, he allowed
MP’s statement to go forward as drafted.
The question for this court is whether the military
judge abused his discretion in allowing the court
exhibit and MP’s presentation. We find that he did.
The military judge stated he had “no doubt that [trial
defense] counsel’s actions . . . have caused [MP]
additional psychological impact,” and we agree with
this statement. However, allowing that information
potentially resulted in Appellant being held
accountable for the actions of his attorneys, who
exacerbated MP’s status as a victim, and made MP’s
situation worse by the disclosure of evidence to her
soon-to-be ex-husband, who may have used her
situation to his advantage in their divorce and custody
proceedings.
While
MP
suffered
personal
consequences that arose as part of Appellant’s actions
and his counsel’s litigation strategy, the statements
admitted as written allowed MP to pin the blame of
her personal situation onto Appellant. We find these
statements went outside the scope of victim impact
allowed, as her divorce and custody issues did not
directly arise from Appellant’s offenses.
With that said, we apply the test from Bowen to
determine whether the error regarding MP’s
statement had a substantial influence on the
sentence.
The Government had a very strong case against
Appellant involving two victims. The facts
surrounding the sexual assault committed against AM
were extremely egregious and disturbing, and then
just minutes after penetrating AM’s vagina with his
penis, Appellant sexually assaulted MP. Conversely,
Appellant had few facts in his favor. Regarding the
037a
materiality and quality of MP’s statement, we assess
how much the erroneously admitted evidence may
have affected the court-martial. See United States v.
Washington, 80 M.J. 106, 111 (C.A.A.F. 2020). Here,
trial defense counsel cross-examined MP on her
divorce in findings, so this information was not a
surprise to the panel at the sentencing hearing. Also,
the information provided by MP was given through an
unsworn statement, and the military judge
appropriately provided guidance through an
instruction to the panel on how to consider the
information and that the weight and significance of
that unsworn statement rests “within the sound
discretion of each court member.” Applying the Bowen
test, we find the admission of MP’s victim unsworn
statement did not substantially influence Appellant’s
sentence, nor affect the court-martial, and we are
confident the panel gave MP’s statement the proper
weight it deserved.
D. Conditions
Confinement
of
Appellant’s
Post-Trial
1. Additional Background
Appellant spent 33 days in pretrial confinement at the
Lowndes County, Georgia, Jail, before his release and
restriction to base. 8 After his conviction, Appellant
was again confined in the Lowndes County Jail, where
he remained for approximately two months before his
transfer to a military confinement facility. On 29
March 2019, Appellant submitted a clemency letter to
the convening authority, alleging that while confined
in the civilian confinement facility, he was subjected
8 Appellant was released by civilian authorities conditioned upon
being restricted to base.
038a
to the following post-trial living conditions: (1) he had
to share a single cell and toilet with 16 other
prisoners, some of whom were gang members and
suffering drug-withdrawal symptoms; (2) he suffered
physical attacks and injuries from other prisoners; (3)
the guards were not located close to his cell and
neglected calls for help; (4) cleaning supplies were
never made available to clean the toilet; (5)
confinement officials withheld his mail;
(6) he was not allowed any visitors until his transfer
to military confinement; (7) confinement officials
withheld food from him; (8) he was not permitted to go
outside for the entirety of his two-month confinement;
(9) he was not provided clean clothes; and (10) he had
limited opportunities to bathe.
Appellant argues these post-trial conditions adversely
affected him both physically and mentally. On 31
March 2019, the staff judge advocate wrote an
addendum to her 18 March 2019 staff judge advocate
recommendation (SJAR). In the SJAR Addendum, she
stated she received Appellant’s clemency matters. Her
recommendation to the convening authority, which
was to approve the sentence as adjudged, remained
unchanged. Action was taken on 5 April 2019.
On 10 April 2020, as part of his appeal, Appellant and
his mother provided affidavits attesting to his
conditions while in the civilian confinement facility.
Appellant stated he did not file a complaint under
Article 138, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 938, because he was
afraid of being labeled a “snitch,” he knew his
complaint would fall on deaf ears with the facility, and
because of lack of access to his unit. In her affidavit,
Appellant’s mother, Ms. VR, noted that her son was
not allowed visits during his time in civilian
confinement and he did not have access to his mail.
039a
Ms. VR also declared that she noticed a decline in
Appellant’s mental state and that her son was refused
medical care. Finally, she noticed a decline in
Appellant’s overall demeanor and appearance.
In response to Appellant’s assignment of error
regarding his post-trial confinement conditions,
Appellee moved to attach two declarations: a
declaration from Captain JC, the jail administrator at
the Lowndes County Jail, and a declaration from
MSgt GB, Appellant’s first sergeant. That motion was
granted by this court. The declarations were deemed
relevant to rebut Appellant’s allegation of his posttrial conditions.
In his declaration, Captain JC outlined basic rules,
standards, and conditions for inmates. Captain JC
noted Appellant did file six grievances with the
facility; however, Appellant never submitted any
complaints about the conditions of his cell, concerns
about his safety, not receiving mail, or being denied
visitors. Captain JC also stated there were no records
indicating Appellant was ever assaulted while
confined at the jail.
MSgt GB declared that Appellant did complain he did
not receive mail, but that Appellant did not show up
at the designated location to pick up mail. MSgt GB
also refuted Appellant’s claims that his unit did not
visit him. MSgt GB stated he attempted to resolve any
complaints Appellant raised to him about the
conditions of his post-trial confinement.
Finally, on 7 July 2020, this court granted a request
from Appellant to attach an affidavit from Appellant’s
wife regarding his post-trial confinement conditions.
In this affidavit, Ms. VJ stated she saw injuries to her
husband (through video chat), including a black eye
040a
and swelling around his lip. Ms. VJ stated Appellant
did not tell her what happened to him until he was
transferred to the Naval Consolidated Brig in
Miramar, California; the true nature of what
happened to Appellant is unknown, but according to
Ms. VJ, it appears to have been a violation of the
“snitch code.”
2. Law
We review de novo whether an appellant has been
subjected to impermissible post-trial confinement
conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment or
Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855. United States v.
Wise, 64 M.J. 468, 473 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United
States v. White, 54 M.J. 469, 471 (C.A.A.F. 2001)).
“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits two types of
punishments: (1) those ‘incompatible with the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society’ or (2) those ‘which involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” United
States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F. 2006)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03
(1976)). As the United States Supreme Court has
explained, “[t]he Constitution ‘does not mandate
comfortable prisons,’ but neither does it permit
inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
349 (1981)). “[P]rison officials must ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and
medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. at 832
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27
(1984)). This includes protecting prisoners from
violence committed by other prisoners. Id. at 833.
041a
A violation of the Eighth Amendment is shown by
demonstrating:
(1) an objectively, sufficiently serious act
or omission resulting in the denial of
necessities; (2) a culpable state of mind
on the part of prison officials amounting
to deliberate indifference to [an
appellant]’s health and safety; and (3)
that [an appellant] “has exhausted the
prisoner-grievance system . . . and that
he has petitioned for relief under Article
138, UCMJ . . . .”
Lovett, 63 M.J. at 215 (first omission in original)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 46
M.J. 248, 250 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
Our superior court has emphasized that “[a] prisoner
must seek administrative relief prior to invoking
judicial intervention to redress concerns regarding
post-trial confinement conditions.” Wise, 64 M.J. at
469 (citing White, 54 M.J. at 472). “This requirement
‘promot[es] resolution of grievances at the lowest
possible level [and ensures] that an adequate record
has been developed [to aid appellate review].’” Id. at
471 (alterations in original) (quoting Miller, 46 M.J. at
250). Appellant must show that “absent some unusual
or egregious circumstance . . . he has exhausted the
prisoner-grievance system [in his detention facility]
and that he has petitioned for relief under Article 138,
UCMJ.” White, 54 M.J. at 472 (citation omitted).
Under Article 66(c), UCMJ, we have broad authority
and the mandate to approve only so much of the
sentence as we find “correct in law and fact and
determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved.” The scope of our Article 66(c), UCMJ,
042a
authority to consider claims of post-trial confinement
conditions “is limited to consideration of these claims
as part of our determination of sentence
appropriateness.” United States v. Willman, No. ACM
39642, 2020 CCA LEXIS 300, at *17 (A.F. Ct. Crim
App. 2 Sep. 2020) (unpub. op.) (quoting United States
v. Towns, 52 M.J. 830, 833 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000),
aff’d, 55 M.J. 361 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). “It is also limited
to claims based on post-trial treatment that occurs
prior to the action of the convening authority and
which is documented in the record of trial.” Id.
(quoting Towns, 52 M.J. at 833).
3. Analysis
This is not the first time this court has seen an
appellant bring forth a posttrial confinement claim
from Lowndes County Jail. Earlier this year, we
considered in United States v. O’Bryan, No. ACM
39602, 2020 CCA LEXIS 211 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 24
Jun. 2020) (unpub. op.), a case where the appellant
made similar claims against the facility. Interestingly,
the appellant in O’Bryan was incarcerated at the
Lowndes County Jail just months before Appellant in
the present case was transferred there. See id. Our
court also reviewed an affidavit from Captain JC in
O’Bryan. See id. at *8. Ultimately, no relief was
granted in that case. 9,10
9 As in O’Bryan, Appellant’s claims of maltreatment at Lowndes
County Jail were documented in the record in his clemency
response. In O’Bryan, the appellant’s defense counsel submitted
a statement outlining the conditions; in the present case,
Appellant did not. See O’Bryan, unpub. op. at *5.
10 We also note United States v. Melson, No. ACM 36523, 2007
CCA LEXIS 372 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 14 Sep. 2007) (unpub. op.),
where the appellant in that case alleged pretrial confinement
043a
In this case, by the time Appellant submitted his
clemency response to the convening authority,
Appellant had been moved to a military confinement
facility. Although Appellant made reference to his
confinement conditions in his clemency submission to
the convening authority, Appellant acknowledged
that he did not file a complaint under Article 138,
UCMJ, because he was afraid of being labeled a
“snitch,” he knew his complaint would fall on “deaf
ears” with the facility, and because of lack of access to
his unit. Appellant relies on the “snitch code” for his
justification for not addressing his issues with
command.
Captain JC acknowledged in his affidavit a “snitch
code,” where inmates give information to officers, but
stated the jail “protect[s] the information and identity
of inmates that give us information.” Captain JC’s
affidavit also noted Appellant filed six grievances with
the facility; however, five of those grievances were
filed when Appellant was in pretrial confinement.
Despite having command visits while at the civilian
confinement facility, the first time Appellant
complained to his command about his post-trial
confinement conditions was in his clemency
submission after he had already been transferred to a
military confinement facility. The requirement that a
confinee must seek administrative relief, including
under Article 138, UCMJ, “‘promot[es] resolution of
grievances at the lowest possible level [and ensures]
conditions at Lowndes County Jail. In Melson, trial defense
counsel failed to raise illegal pretrial punishment at trial. Id. at
*2. This court granted the appellant relief pursuant to United
States v. Suzuki, 20 M.J. 248 (C.M.A. 1985). Melson, unpub. op.
at *19.
044a
that an adequate record has been developed [to aid
appellate review].’” Wise, 64 M.J. at 471 (alterations
in original) (quoting Miller, 46 M.J. at 250). As in
O’Bryan, had Appellant filed an Article 138, UCMJ,
complaint and a prisoner grievance while in the
civilian confinement facility, the record would reflect
what action, if any, his command and prison officials
took in response. Also, Appellant does not
convincingly explain how raising issues of hygiene,
visitation rights, and the receipt of mail would result
in adverse consequences to him from confinement
officials or inmates. Yet, although he was aware of the
grievance procedures, as attested to by Captain JC,
Appellant failed to make his grievances known to his
command and prison officials and thus made it
impossible for them to ameliorate, let alone record, all
of his grievances. 11
By failing to raise his issues to prison officials or his
command, Appellant has not shown deliberate
indifference by the Lowndes County Jail. “[A] military
prisoner’s burden to show deliberate indifference [by
prison officials with respect to his health or safety]
requires him to show that ‘official[s] [knew] of and
disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official[s] must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw
the inference.’” Lovett, 63 M.J. at 216 (alterations in
11 We note the affidavits from Captain JC and MSgt GB were
written over a year after clemency was submitted. MSgt GB’s
affidavit would have been much more powerful had he been given
an opportunity to rebut Appellant’s claims in March 2019,
instead of April 2020; yet, there is no evidence the convening
authority or the staff judge advocate addressed Appellant’s
allegations with Lowndes County Jail.
045a
original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The record
shows Appellant has failed to meet his burden that he
was subjected to any forms of cruel or unusual
punishment. As a result, Appellant is not entitled to
any relief for his alleged Eighth Amendment or Article
55, UCMJ, violations. Further, for the reasons already
articulated, we also do not grant relief under Article
66, UCMJ, for his alleged post-trial confinement
conditions.
We have also considered whether Appellant’s
assertions warrant sentence relief under our Article
66(c), UCMJ, authority. We review issues of sentence
appropriateness de novo. United States v. Lane, 64
M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (footnote omitted). We may
affirm only as much of the sentence as we find correct
in law and fact and determine should be approved on
the basis of the entire record. Article 66(c), UCMJ. In
determining whether a sentence should be approved,
our authority is “not legality alone, but legality limited
by appropriateness.” United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J.
138, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing United States v.
Atkins, 23 C.M.R. 301, 303 (C.M.A. 1957)). This
authority is “a sweeping congressional mandate to the
Courts of Criminal Appeal to ensure a fair and just
punishment for every accused.” United States v. Baier,
60 M.J. 382, 384 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted). This task requires
“individualized consideration of the particular
accused on the basis of the nature and seriousness of
the offense and the character of the offender.” United
States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
conducting this review, we must also be sensitive to
considerations of uniformity and even-handedness.
United States v. Sothen, 54 M.J. 294, 296 (C.A.A.F.
046a
2001) (citing United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 287–
88 (C.A.A.F. 1999)). Although we have great discretion
to determine whether a sentence is appropriate, we
have no authority to grant mercy. Nerad, 69 M.J. at
146. 12
There is no question Appellant’s crimes are serious.
Appellant sexually assaulted two women—one victim
who was incapable of consenting, the other a victim of
bodily harm—both in a matter of mere minutes. Based
on our review of the entire record, we find that
Appellant’s sentence is appropriate for the offenses he
committed.
III. CONCLUSION
The approved findings and sentence are correct in law
and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the
substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a)
and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c).
Accordingly, the findings and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
12 Although we exercise our authority to consider outside-the-
record matters to determine if Appellant’s sentence is correct in
law under Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment, see
United States v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478 (C.A.A.F. 2001), we are
precluded from considering additional information about those
conditions that Appellant presents in his post-trial statement of
facts to determine if his sentence is appropriate and “should be
approved” as part of our Article 66(c), UCMJ, review. See United
States v. Jessie, 79 M.J 437, 441 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
047a
FOR THE COURT
CAROL K. JOYCE
Clerk of the Court
048a
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces
Washington, D.C.
United States,
Appellee
v.
D’Andre M.
Johnson,
USCA Dkt. No.
210135/AF
Crim.App. No. 39676
ORDER
Appellant
On further consideration of the granted issues
(81 M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. April 14, 2021)), and in view of
United States v. Willman, 81 M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. July 21,
2021), we note that in its sentence appropriateness
review, the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in failing to consider additional
information about Appellant’s post-trial confinement
conditions even though Appellant had raised the
matter in his clemency response to the convening
authority. Appellate courts may “consider affidavits
and gather additional facts through a DuBay hearing
when doing so is necessary for resolving issues raised
by materials in the record.” United States v. Jessie, 79
M.J. 437, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2020). In United States v. Tyler,
81 M.J. 108 (C.A.A.F. 2021), we held that either party
may comment on properly admitted unsworn victim
statements. Therefore, the military judge did not
plainly err in permitting trial counsel to present
argument based on the victim’s unsworn statement.
Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 10th day of
August, 2021,
ORDERED:
049a
That the decision of the United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed as to findings
but reversed as to sentence; and,
The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force for further review
under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. § 866. Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 867, shall apply.
For the Court,
/s/
cc:
David A. Anderson
Acting Clerk of the Court
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel (Bruegger)
Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)
050a
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS
________________________
No. ACM 39676 (rem)
________________________
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
D’Andre M. JOHNSON
Second Lieutenant (O-1), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
________________________
On Remand from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces
Decided 19 July 2022
________________________
Military Judge: W. Shane Cohen.
Approved Sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 10
years, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances.
Sentence adjudged 1 December 2018 by GCM
convened at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.
For Appellant: Major Sara J. Hickmon, USAF; Mark
C. Bruegger, Esquire; Catherine M. Cherkasky,
Esquire.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason,
USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Neil, USAF;
051a
Major Anne M. Delmare, USAF; Major John P.
Patera, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before POSCH, RICHARDSON, and MEGINLEY,
Appellate Military Judges.
Judge RICHARDSON delivered the opinion of the
court, in which Senior Judge POSCH joined. Judge
MEGINLEY filed a separate opinion, dissenting in
part and in the result.
________________________
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,
does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule
of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
________________________
RICHARDSON, Judge:
Contrary to his pleas, a general court-martial
composed of officer members convicted Appellant of
one specification of sexual assault of AM, by
penetrating AM’s vulva with his penis while AM was
incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to
impairment by alcohol, and one specification of sexual
assault of MP, by penetrating her vulva with his finger
by causing MP bodily harm, both in violation of Article
120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. § 920. 1 The panel sentenced Appellant to a
dismissal, confinement for ten years, and forfeiture of
all pay and allowances. The military judge credited
Appellant with 138 days against his sentence for time
Appellant spent in pretrial confinement. The
1 All references in this opinion to the UCMJ, Rules for Courts-
Martial, and Military Rules of Evidence are to the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.).
052a
convening
adjudged.
authority approved the
sentence
as
I. BACKGROUND
On initial appeal, Appellant contended, inter alia,
that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution 2 and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 855, due to inhumane and dangerous conditions and
mistreatment while in post-trial confinement. In a
related claim, Appellant contended that the conditions
of his post-trial confinement render his sentence
inappropriately severe. Considered together, the
claims sought relief under this court’s authority to
affirm “the sentence or such part or amount of the
sentence” as we “find[ ] correct in law and fact and
determine[ ], on the basis of the entire record, should
be approved.” Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).
In United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676, 2020
CCA LEXIS 364 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 16 Oct. 2020)
(unpub. op.), rev’d and remanded in part, 81 M.J. 451
(C.A.A.F. 2021) (mem.), we found Appellant failed to
meet his burden that he was subjected to cruel or
unusual punishment, and we concluded that he was
not entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment or
Article 55, UCMJ. In particular, we found Appellant
did not demonstrate deliberate indifference of prison
officials, exhaustion of the prisoner-grievance system,
or that he petitioned for relief under Article 138,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 938. Johnson, unpub. op. at *54;
see also United States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215
(C.A.A.F. 2006). We “also considered whether
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
053a
Appellant’s assertions [regarding his post-trial
confinement conditions] warrant sentence relief under
our Article 66(c), UCMJ, authority,” without
considering Appellant’s extra-record matters, and
found Appellant’s sentence was appropriate. Id.,
unpub. op. at *55, *56 n.12.
Finding no errors that materially prejudiced
Appellant, we affirmed the findings and sentence.
Appellant petitioned the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) to review his
case, and the CAAF granted that petition on the
following issue:
During clemency, Appellant detailed the
deplorable conditions of his post-trial
confinement. On appeal, he provided
supplementary information on these
conditions to support his claims of cruel
and unusual punishment and to seek
sentence relief. Did the lower court err
when it decided it could not consider this
supplementary evidence for its sentence
appropriateness review?[ 3]
United States v. Johnson, 81 M.J. 229, 229–30
(C.A.A.F. 2021).
The CAAF summarily disposed of the issue,
affirming our decision as to findings but reversing it
as to sentence. Johnson, 81 M.J. at 452. The CAAF
“note[d] that in its sentence appropriateness review,
the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in failing to consider additional information
The CAAF granted an additional issue unrelated to this
remand.
3
054a
about Appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions
even though Appellant had raised the matter in his
clemency response to the convening authority.” Id.
The CAAF returned Appellant’s record of trial “to the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for further
review under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866.” Id. This is that review.
After his case was again docketed with this court,
Appellant identified three assignments of error: (1)
the conditions of his post-trial confinement render his
sentence inappropriately severe, warranting sentence
appropriateness relief; (2) he was entitled to a
unanimous verdict at trial; and (3) the conditions of
his post-trial confinement represented cruel and
unusual punishment, warranting sentence relief. 4
Having considered the additional information about
Appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions, we
conclude that relief is not warranted under the first
assignment of error.
I. DISCUSSION
In Johnson, this court noted that “[a]lthough we
have great discretion to determine whether a sentence
is appropriate, we have no authority to grant mercy.”
Unpub. op. at *56 (citing United States v. Nerad, 69
M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010)). We added the following
footnote:
4 Appellant personally raised issues (2) and (3) pursuant to
United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). Appellant
raised issue (2) for the first time after his case was remanded for
further review; he did not raise it at trial or earlier on appeal to
this court. We addressed issue (3) in our previous opinion, and
find no cause to alter our conclusions. We find issues (2) and (3)
do not warrant further discussion or relief. See United States v.
Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A. 1987).
055a
Although we exercise our authority to
consider outside-the-record matters to
determine if Appellant’s sentence is
correct in law under Article 55, UCMJ,
and the Eighth Amendment, see United
States v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478 (C.A.A.F.
2001), we are precluded from considering
additional information about those
conditions that Appellant presents in his
post-trial statement of facts to determine
if his sentence is appropriate and
“should be approved” as part of our
Article 66(c), UCMJ, review. See United
States v. Jessie, 79 M.J 437, 441
(C.A.A.F. 2020).
Johnson, unpub. op. at *56 n.12. The CAAF found we
erred by not considering this additional information in
our
sentence-appropriateness
review
because
“Appellant had raised the matter in his clemency
response to the convening authority.” Johnson, 81
M.J. at 452; see also United States v. Willman, 81 M.J.
355, 359–60 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (finding that outside-therecord declarations about post-trial confinement
conditions may be considered in an Article 66(c),
UCMJ, sentence appropriateness review when an
appellant raised the issue to the convening authority
during clemency).
We consider all of Appellant’s assertions regarding
post-trial confinement conditions and whether relief is
warranted under Article 66(c), UCMJ, for sentence
appropriateness. Having reviewed all matters
presented on this issue, including all post-trial
declarations submitted to this court, we find
Appellant’s
sentence
was
not
rendered
inappropriately severe by the conditions of his
056a
posttrial confinement. Relief is not warranted; the
sentence is appropriate and should be approved.
I. CONCLUSION
In our previous decision, we affirmed the findings
of guilty; the CAAF affirmed our decision as to
findings. On remand, the sentence is correct in law
and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the
substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a)
and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c).
Accordingly, the sentence is AFFIRMED.
MEGINLEY, Judge (dissenting in part and in the
result):
I concur with the majority’s opinion in footnote
four, supra, with respect to Appellant’s second
assignment of error.
As this opinion notes, the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces (CAAF) opined that in our sentence
appropriateness review, this court erred in “failing to
consider additional information about Appellant’s
post-trial confinement conditions even though
Appellant had raised the matter in his clemency
response to the convening authority.” United States v.
Johnson, 81 M.J. 451, 452 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (mem.). The
CAAF returned this case to our court to consider
whether Appellant’s assertions regarding post-trial
confinement conditions warrant relief under our
Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c), review for
sentence appropriateness. Id. In light of this directive,
and now taking into consideration the additional
information Appellant provided about his posttrial
confinement conditions after he submitted clemency,
057a
along with recent developments discussed in more
detail below, I find it is worth reevaluating Appellant’s
third assignment of error: that the conditions of his
post-trial confinement represented cruel and unusual
punishment.
Since my delivering the opinion of the court in
United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676, 2020 CCA
LEXIS 364 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 16 Oct. 2020) (unpub.
op.), rev’d and remanded in part, 81 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F.
2021) (mem.), three opinions have been released by
this court that have led to me to question whether
Appellant suffered cruel and unusual punishment,
and subsequently, whether he is entitled to any
sentence relief. See United States v. Pullings, No.
ACM 39948, 2021 CCA LEXIS 648 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 30 Nov. 2021) (unpub. op.), rev. denied, No. 220123, 2022 CAAF LEXIS 165 (C.A.A.F. 2 Mar. 2022),
then rev. granted, No. 22-0123, 2022 CAAF LEXIS 395
(C.A.A.F. 26 May 2022); United States v. Merritt, No.
ACM 39754, 2021 CCA LEXIS 61 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
11 Feb. 2021) (unpub. op.), rev. denied, 2021 CAAF
LEXIS 731 (C.A.A.F. 9 Aug. 2021); United States v.
Citsay, No. ACM 39712, 2020 CCA LEXIS 453 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 18 Dec. 2020) (unpub. op.), rev. denied,
2021 CAAF LEXIS 331 (C.A.A.F. 13 Apr. 2021).
In Johnson, we addressed the various issues
Appellant raised regarding the conditions he faced at
Lowndes County Jail (LCJ); along with the response
provided by Captain JC, the jail administrator at the
LCJ; and Master Sergeant GB, Appellant’s first
sergeant. Unpub. op. at *54–55. In that same opinion,
this court also noted a then-recent case involving LCJ,
United States v. O’Bryan, No. ACM 39602, 2020 CCA
LEXIS 211 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 24 Jun. 2020) (unpub.
op.), rev. denied, No. 20-0296, 2020 CAAF LEXIS 438
058a
(C.A.A.F. 11 Aug. 2020), a case where that appellant
made similar claims against the facility. Nonetheless,
because Appellant failed “to raise his issues to prison
officials or his command” under Article 138, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 938, we found he had failed to show
“deliberate indifference by the [LCJ].” Johnson,
unpub. op. at *54–55.
A few months after Johnson, I penned a dissent in
Merritt that questioned the reasonableness of
dismissing allegations of cruel or unusual conditions
of post-trial confinement simply because an appellant
failed to file an Article 138, UCMJ, complaint with his
or her leadership, a factor to be considered under
United States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F.
2006). See Merritt, unpub. op. at *26–43 (Meginley, J.,
dissenting in part and in the result). Specifically,
I wrote that
[u]nder the current state of the law, even
if a confinee is able to prove the first
factor under Lovett [that an appellant
must show an objectively, sufficiently
serious act or omission resulting in the
denial of necessities], it is a rare case
where a confinee will be able to prove the
state of mind of prisons officials and
deliberate indifference.
Id. at *31.
Following Johnson, this court has written on two
additional cases involving LCJ: Pullings and Citsay.
In both cases, this court chose not to grant relief to
those appellants. Yet, earlier this year, our superior
court granted review of our decision in Pullings on the
following issues:
059a
In addition to prison officials, can the
decisions of military personnel satisfy the
“Deliberate Indifference” aspect of cruel and
unusual punishment test when they
repeatedly send military inmates to a local
civilian confinement center with a history of
inhumane living conditions for inmates?
I.
Additionally or alternatively, did
Appellant suffer cruel and unusual
punishment for 247 days and nights at
Lowndes County
Jail?
II.
Pullings, 2022 CAAF LEXIS at 395.
I now raise the same questions in Appellant’s case
as posed by the CAAF above. I cannot determine
whether Appellant is entitled to relief under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution 1 or Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855, or
if his sentence is appropriate under Article 66(c),
UCMJ, without knowing the answer to these
questions. I now believe a post-trial evidentiary
hearing is required to resolve any factual disputes
between Appellant’s clemency and post-clemency
matters and the declarations submitted by the
Government, particularly Captain JC’s affidavit. See
United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 248 (C.A.A.F.
1997); United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411, 413
(C.M.A. 1967). To the degree that such a hearing is
found to be impractical, as it has been three and half
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
060a
years since Appellant’s trial, I would grant Appellant
relief under Article 66(c), UCMJ. 2
FOR THE COURT
CAROL K. JOYCE
Clerk of the Court
2 As for whether Air Force officials have exhibited “deliberate
indifference” on civilian confinement matters arising from Moody
Air Force Base (AFB) cases, it is worth noting that this court has
previously addressed other cases of confinement conditions of
Airmen from Moody AFB at local confinement facilities and/or
claims of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., United States
v. Burke, No. ACM S32137, 2014 CCA LEXIS 834 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 3 Nov. 2014) (unpub. op.); United States v. Luckado, No.
ACM 37962, 2013 CCA LEXIS 741 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1 Aug.
2013) (unpub. op); United States v. Wilson, No. ACM 37897, 2012
CCA LEXIS 385 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 12 Oct. 2012) (per curiam)
(unpub. op.); United States v. Simmons, No. ACM 37967, 2012
CCA LEXIS 230 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 27 Jun. 2012) (unpub. op.);
United States v. Branch, No. ACM S31691, 2010 CCA LEXIS 403
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 13 Dec. 2010) (per curiam) (unpub. op.);
United States v. Lucas, No. ACM 37363, 2009 CCA LEXIS 479
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 28 Dec. 2009) (unpub. op.); United States v.
Melson, No. ACM 36523, 2007 CCA LEXIS 372 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 14 Sep. 2007) (per curiam) (unpub. op.). Most of these cases
also involve the nearby Cook County Jail, Cook County, Georgia.
No relief was granted to any of these appellants for cruel and
unusual punishment, although the appellant in Melson was
granted relief for his illegal pretrial punishment.
061a
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces
Washington, D.C.
United States,
Appellee
USCA Dkt. No.
220280/AF Crim. App. No.
39676
v.
ORDER
D'Andre M.
JOHNSON
Appellant
On consideration of the petition for grant of review of
the decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals, and in the light of United States v.
Pullings, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2023), it is, by the Court,
this 8th day of May 2023,
ORDERED:
That the granted issue is answered in the
negative, and the decision of the United States Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed.
For the Court,*
/s/
________________
Malcolm H. Squires, Jr.
Clerk of the Court
* HARDY, Judge (concurring in the judgment): For
the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in United
States v. Pulling, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2023) (Hardy, J.,
concurring in the judgment), I concur in the judgment.
062a
cc:
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel (Nelson)
Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)
063a
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
D’ANDRE M. JOHNSON,
Second Lieutenant (O-1), USAF
Appellant.
Crim. App. No. 39676
USCA Dkt. No. 21-0135AF
SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR GRANT OF
REVIEW
MARK C. BRUEGGER
Senior Counsel
U.S.C.A.A.F. Bar No. 34247
Air Force Appellate Defense Division
1500 W. Perimeter Road, Suite 1100
Joint Base Andrews NAF, MD 20762
(240) 612-4770
mark.bruegger.1@us.af.mil
SARA J. HICKMON, Capt, USAF
U.S.C.A.A.F. Bar No. 37207
064a
Air Force Appellate Defense Division
1500 W. Perimeter Road, Suite 1100
Joint Base Andrews NAF, MD 20762
(240) 612-4770
sara.hickmon@us.af.mil
Counsel for Appellant
065a
Index
Issues Presented ............................................................ 1
Statement of Statutory Jurisdiction ............................. 2
Statement of the Case ................................................... 2
Statement of Facts......................................................... 3
Background. ................................................................... 3
The Air Force Court’s Decision ..................................... 7
1. Legal and Factual Sufficiency .................................. 7
2. M.P.’s Unsworn Statement .................................... 10
3.
Conditions of 2d Lt Johnson’s Post-Trial
Confinement ................................................................ 12
Reasons to Grant Review ............................................ 16
Argument ..................................................................... 19
I.
SECOND
LIEUTENANT
JOHNSON’S
CONVICTION FOR SEXUALLY ASSAULTING
M.P. IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. ................. 19
Standard of Review...................................................... 19
Law & Analysis............................................................ 19
II. PORTIONS OF THE VICTIM’S UNSWORN
STATEMENT FELL OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
R.C.M. 1001A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED
WHEN IT FOUND THESE STATEMENTS DID
NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE THE
SENTENCE. ....................................................... 22
Standard of Review...................................................... 22
Law ............................................................................... 23
Analysis ........................................................................ 24
066a
III. THE MILITARY JUDGE PLAINLY ERRED
BY PERMITTING TRIAL COUNSEL TO ARGUE
FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE. ............................ 26
Additional Facts........................................................... 26
Standard of Review...................................................... 29
Law & Analysis............................................................ 29
IV.
DURING
CLEMENCY,
SECOND
LIEUTENANT JOHNSON DETAILED THE
DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS OF HIS POSTTRIAL CONFINEMENT. ON APPEAL, HE
PROVIDED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
ON THESE CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HIS
ALLEGATIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT, AND TO SEEK SENTENCE
APPROPRIATENESS RELIEF. THE LOWER
COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED IT COULD
NOT CONSIDER THIS SUPPLEMENTARY
EVIDENCE
FOR
ITS
SENTENCE
APPROPRIATENESS REVIEW. ....................... 31
Standard of Review...................................................... 32
Law & Analysis............................................................ 32
Certificate of Filing and Service ................................. 37
067a
Table of Authorities
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
United States v. Andrews, 77 M.J. 393 (C.A.A.F. 2018)
................................................................................... 29
United States v. Atchak, 75 M.J. 193 (C.A.A.F. 2016)
................................................................................... 32
United States v. Barker, 77 M.J. 377 (C.A.A.F. 2018)
................................................................................... 30
United States v. Bowen, 76 M.J. 83 (C.A.A.F. 2017) 23
United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1990).... 32
United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
................................................................................... 29
United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982)
..................................................................................... 1
United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
................................................................................... 29
United States v. Harrow, 65 M.J. 190 (C.A.A.F. 2007)
....................................................................... 18, 23, 25
United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J 437 (C.A.A.F. 2020)
................................................................. 16, 17, 32, 33
United States v. Kearns, 73 M.J. 177 (C.A.A.F. 2014)
................................................................................... 19
United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218 (C.A.A.F. 2019) 19
United States v. Hamilton, 78 M.J. 335 (C.A.A.F.
2019) .................................................................... 22, 23
United States v. Marsh, 70 M.J. 101 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
................................................................................... 31
United States v. McGriff, 78 M.J. 487 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
................................................................................... 34
068a
United States v. Paxton, 64 M.J. 484 (C.A.A.F. 2007)
................................................................................... 31
United States v. Provost, 32 M.J. 98 (C.A.A.F. 1991)
................................................................................... 30
United States v. Roach, 66 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
................................................................................... 32
United States v. Tyler, USCA Dkt. No. 20-0252/AF
…………………..17, 29
United States v. Willman, USCA Dkt. No. 21-0030/AF
……………...16, 35
Service Courts of Criminal Appeals
United States v. DeFalco, No. ACM 39607, 2020 CCA
LEXIS 164, (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 21 May 2020) ...... 34
United States v. Frantz, No. ACM 39657, 2020 CCA
LEXIS 404, (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2020) ..... 33
United States v. Jacinto, 79 M.J. 870 (N-M Ct. Crim.
App. 2020) ................................................................. 33
United States v. Lawler, No. ACM 39699, 2020 CCA
LEXIS 186, (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 28, 2020) ..... 34
United States v. Matthews, No. ACM 39593, 2020 CCA
LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 2, 2020)... 34-35
United States v. McGriff, No. ACM 39306, 2018 CCA
LEXIS 567, at *24-25 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 11 Dec.
2018) .......................................................................... 34
Constitutional
Provisions,
Statutes,
and
Regulations
Eighth Amendment ..................................... 7, 14-16, 34
10 U.S.C. § 866(c)........................................................... 2
069a
10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) ...................................................... 2
Article 55, UCMJ .......................................... 7, 14-16, 34
Article 66, UCMJ ................................................... 32, 35
Article 120, UCMJ ......................................................... 2
R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(C) .................................................... 30
R.C.M. 1001A .......................................................passim
R.C.M. 1001A(a)........................................................... 30
R.C.M. 1001A(b)(1) ...................................................... 23
R.C.M. 1001A(b)(2) ................................................ 11, 23
R.C.M. 1001A(c) ........................................................... 24
R.C.M. 1001A(e) ........................................................... 30
R.C.M. 1001A(e)(2) ........................................................ 2
070a
Issues Presented 1
I.
WHETHER SECOND LIEUTENANT
JOHNSON’S CONVICTION FOR
SEXUALLY ASSAULTING M.P. IS
LEGALLY SUFFICIENT?
II.
PORTIONS OF M.P.’S UNSWORN
STATEMENT FELL OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF R.C.M. 1001A. DID THE
LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT
FOUND THESE STATEMENTS DID
NOT
SUBSTANTIALLY
INFLUENCE THE SENTENCE?
III.
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE
PLAINLY ERRED BY PERMITTING
TRIAL COUNSEL TO ARGUE
FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE?
IV.
DURING CLEMENCY, SECOND
LIEUTENANT
JOHNSON
DETAILED THE DEPLORABLE
CONDITIONS OF HIS POST-TRIAL
1 2d Lt Johnson raises one additional issue pursuant to United
States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). See Appendix A.
071a
CONFINEMENT. ON APPEAL, HE
PROVIDED
SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION
ON
THESE
CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HIS
CLAIMS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT, AND TO SEEK
SENTENCE RELIEF.
DID THE
LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT
DECIDED
IT
COULD
NOT
CONSIDER
THIS
SUPPLEMENTARY
EVIDENCE
FOR
ITS
SENTENCE
APPROPRIATENESS REVIEW?
Statement of Statutory Jurisdiction
The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
(hereinafter Air Force Court) reviewed this case
pursuant to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012).
This
Honorable Court has jurisdiction to review this case
under Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3)
(2012).
Statement of the Case
Second Lieutenant (2d Lt) D’Andre M. Johnson
was tried by general court-martial before a panel of
officer members at Moody Air Force Base (AFB),
Georgia, on October 22-23, 2018, and November 26 December 1, 2018. Contrary to 2d Lt Johnson’s pleas,
the panel found him guilty of one charge and two
specifications in violation of Article 120, UCMJ.
(Record (R.) at 1106-07.) The panel sentenced 2d Lt
Johnson to a dismissal, ten-years confinement, and
total forfeitures. (R. at 1192.) The convening
authority approved the adjudged sentence. (R. at Vol.
1, General Court-Martial Order, dtd 5 April 2019.)
072a
On October 16, 2020, the Air Force Court
affirmed the findings and sentence. Appendix B. On
November 14, 2020, the Air Force Court denied 2d Lt
Johnson’s Motion for Reconsideration. Appendix C.
Statement of Facts
Background
2d Lt Johnson graduated from the Air Force
Academy in 2017 and was assigned to Moody AFB. (R.
at Vol. 1, 2d Lt D’Andre Johnson Clemency Package
(hereinafter Clemency) at 13, 33.) He subsequently
joined a fitness center in neighboring Valdosta,
Georgia, where he met M.P., who managed the gym.
(R. at 564-65.)
On September 14, 2017, 2d Lt Johnson and
M.P. began conversing over Instagram. (Prosecution
Exhibit (PE) 4.) Over the next several days, their
discussions ranged from information about their
respective families to flirtatious comments and
promises to meet up. (PE 4; R. at 577-83.) M.P. gave
2d Lt Johnson her phone number and later told him
of her plans to go to the Bluewater Bar in Remerton,
Georgia, on September 17, 2017. (PE 4 at 14, 37; see
also R. at 442.)
Prior to arriving at Bluewater that night, M.P.
went to dinner with several friends, including her coworker, A.M. (R. at 548, 551, 570.) M.P. had a mixed
drink at dinner, while A.M. did not have any alcohol.
(R. at 551, 593.) Thereafter, the group went to a
friend’s house, where M.P. had another mixed drink.
(R. at 594.) A.M. consumed “a lot” of alcohol, but could
not recall how much. (R. at 552.) At around 2330
073a
hours, the group left for Bluewater. (R. at 594.)
2d Lt Johnson also drank prior to going out.
Starting around 1700 hours, he consumed five or six
shots along with five or six beers at another bar. (R.
at 987.) He and his friends eventually made their way
to Bluewater, where he had several more shots and
beers. (R. at 988.) 2d Lt Johnson consumed enough
alcohol that his friends believed him to be intoxicated.
(R. at 989, 994.)
At some point, 2d Lt Johnson met up with M.P.
The pair spent the majority of their remaining time at
the bar together, following each other around,
“grinding” while dancing, and kissing. 2 (R. at 727-29,
995.)
Shortly before Bluewater closed, several
individuals—including 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., and
A.M.—decided to walk to the house of J.P., a friend
who lived nearby. (R. at 738.) The group mingled
outside for a few minutes after arriving at the house,
during which 2d Lt Johnson and M.P. continued
kissing. (R. at 434, 731.) M.P. later asked J.P. if 2d
Lt Johnson could stay the night. (R. at 1006.) From
J.P.’s perspective, M.P appeared to be in control of her
faculties and understood what she was doing. (R. at
1006-07.)
Ultimately, only four people from the group
stayed at J.P.’s house: 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., A.M., and
SrA C.C.—a friend of M.P.’s who A.M. apparently had
a romantic interest in. (R. at 420, 435, 439.) J.P. was
also in the house, along with her friend, SrA K.C. (R.
at 435, 660-61.)
By
this
time,
A.M.
appeared
extremely
2 “Grinding” involves a woman dancing in front of a male while
“rubbing against each other.” (R. at 728-29.)
074a
intoxicated. (R. at 438.) Following the group’s
request, 2d Lt Johnson carried A.M. to a bedroom, put
her in bed, and left her there with SrA C.C. (R. at 43839.) 2d Lt Johnson and M.P. then went to the couch
in the living room, where they began kissing and
touching each other. (R. at 661, 1008.) J.P. asked
M.P. if she was okay or needed a blanket, and M.P.
responded that she was fine. (R. at 1008.) Observing
nothi
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