Petition for Writ of Certiorari — D'Andre M. Johnson, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefOct 3, 2023

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No. _____

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

D’ANDRE M. JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces

__________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

MAJOR SPENCER R. NELSON

Counsel of Record

United States Air Force

Air Force Appellant Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

spencer.nelson.1@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioner

October 2023

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) states that this Court may review

“[c]ases in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces granted a petition for review.”

Does 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) give this Court jurisdiction,

as part of the case, to consider issues raised to, but not

granted review by, the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces?

II.

Is Second Lieutenant Johnson’s conviction

sexually assaulting M.P. legally sufficient? 1

for

Second Lieutenant Johnson raised Issue II to the Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces, but it did not grant his petition

for review on this issue.

1

i

PROCEEDINGS

The following is a list of all proceedings related

to this case:

(1) United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676, 2020

CCA LEXIS 364 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 2020)

(2) United States v. Johnson, 81 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F.

2021)

(3) United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676

(rem), 2022 CCA LEXIS 413 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July

19, 2022)

(4) United States v. Johnson, No. 22-0280/AF, 2023

CAAF LEXIS 303 (C.A.A.F. May 8, 2023)

ii

Table of Contents

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................ i

PROCEEDINGS ............................................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................ v

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ............................................................... 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................. 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 3

A. Question I ............................................................... 4

B. Question II .............................................................. 5

i. Background .................................................. 5

ii. Legal Sufficiency .......................................... 8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..................... 10

A. This Jurisdictional Question has Existed Since

1983 and is Ripe for This Court’s Consideration 11

B. This Court Should Grant Review Because Various

Canons of Statutory Interpretation Indicate this

Court Has Jurisdiction over “Cases” not Just

Granted Issues ...................................................... 13

i. This Court’s Broad Interpretations of “Case”

and “Decision” Weigh in Favor of

Jurisdiction................................................. 14

ii. The Legislative History Indicates that

“Cases” did not Mean Granted Issues ....... 17

iii. The Surplusage Canon and the Harmonious

Reading Canon Weigh in Favor of

Jurisdiction................................................. 18

C. This Court Should Grant Review to Answer

Questions that Jackson v. Virginia did not

Resolve .................................................................. 19

i. 2d Lt Johnson’s Conviction for Assaulting

M.P. Falls Between “No Evidence” and the

“Lower Limit” Floor of Legal Sufficiency,

Entitling him to Relief ............................... 20

iii

ii. Jackson v. Virginia Stated that a Factfinder

must Apply the Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Standard

Reasonably,

Fairly,

and

Rationally ................................................... 22

iii. This Case Presents Additional Matters that

this Court can Clarify ................................ 26

iv. Conclusion:

Why

Panel

Members

Convicted .................................................... 27

CONCLUSION .............................................................. 28

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

FOR

PETITIONER’S

APPENDIX ........................................................... 000a

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. § 870 ........................................................ 1, 2

10 U.S.C. § 920 ........................................................ 3, 8

10 U.S.C. § 920 (2016) ................................................ 3

28 U.S.C. § 1259 (1983) ...... 1, 2, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 28

SUPREME COURT CASES

Alicia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869) .......................... 14

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) ..... 18

Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).................. 18

Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.

502 (1962) .............................................................. 10

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012) ............... 11

Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Asso., 296 U.S.

64 (1935) ................................................................ 10

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) .......................... 21

Jackson

v.

Virginia,

443

U.S.

307 (1979) ................................ 11, 20, 21, 22, 26, 28

Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ................ 25

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 14

Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) ......... 14

Salinas v. United States RRB, 141 S. Ct.

691 (2021) ........................................................... 15

Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765 (2019) ............... 15

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) .............................. 15

Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)........... 20

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) ........................ 20

United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920) .... 15

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018).................. 15

v

COURT OF

FORCES

APPEALS

FOR

THE

ARMED

United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F.

2023) ...................................................................... 26

United States v. Piolunek, 74 M.J. 107 (C.A.A.F.

2015) ...................................................................... 26

United States v. Pullings, 83 M.J. 205 (C.A.A.F.

2023) ........................................................................ 5

United States v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F.

2017) ...................................................................... 26

FEDERAL COURT CASES

United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.

1993) ...................................................................... 21

RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ......... 16, 19, 24

Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, United

States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020)

(No. 19-108) ............................................... 10, 12, 13

Brief for the United States in Opposition, McKeel v.

United States, 549 U.S. 1019 (2006) (No. 06-58).. 12

Brief for the United States in Opposition,

Wiechmann v. United States, 559 U.S. 904 (2010)

(No. 09-418) ........................................................... 12

Evolving Military Justice (2002) .............................. 18

H.R. 6298 (1980) ....................................................... 17

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jonathan M.

Martinez, Et Al. v. United States, No. 22-0165/AF,

2023 CAAF LEXIS 494 (C.A.A.F. July 18, 2023)

(23-242) .................................................................. 26

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Larrabee v. United

States, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (No. 18-306) .......... 12

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

(2012) ................................................... 14, 17, 18, 19

vi

Reply Brief for Petitioner, Richards v. Barrett, 140

S. Ct. 2760 (2020) (No. 19-55) ............................... 12

Reply Brief of Michael Briggs, United States v.

Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (19-108) .................. 13

Reply Brief of Richard Collins, United States v.

Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (19-184) .................. 13

Reply Brief, Stevenson v. United States, 555 U.S.

816 (2008) (No. 07-1397) ....................................... 12

S. Rep. No. 98-53 (1983) ..................................... 17, 28

Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice

(9th ed. 2007) ......................................................... 11

SUP. CT. R. 10 ................................................ 10, 11, 27

vii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Second Lieutenant D’Andre M. Johnson

(2d Lt Johnson) respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF).

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Air Force Court of Criminal

Appeals (Air Force Court) is unreported, but available

at 2020 CCA LEXIS 364 and reproduced at pages

001a – 048a of the Appendix. The decision of the

CAAF is reported at 81 M.J. 451 and reproduced at

pages 049a – 050a of the Appendix. The Air Force

Court decision on remand is unreported, but available

at 2022 CCA LEXIS 413 and reproduced at pages

051a – 061a of the Appendix. The final CAAF decision

is reported at 2023 CAAF LEXIS 303 and reproduced

at pages 062a – 063a of the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

Article 70(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 870(c) states, “Appellate defense

counsel shall represent the accused before . . . the

Supreme Court . . . when requested by the accused.”

The CAAF entered its judgment in

2d Lt Johnson’s case on May 8, 2023. On July 24,

2023, the Chief Justice extended the time to file a writ

of certiorari until October 5, 2023. The nature of this

petition is whether this Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (3) (1983) 2 over Question

II when the CAAF granted 2d Lt Johnson’s petition

2 Congress made minor updates to this statute in 1989 and 1994

which do not affect the substance of its text or the arguments

below.

1

for review, but not on that specific question. For the

reasons set forth below, 2d Lt Johnson avers this

Court has jurisdiction over this case.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

28 U.S.C. § 1259 – Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces; certiorari

Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in the following

cases:

(1) Cases reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces under section 867(a)(1) of title

10.

(2) Cases certified to the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces by the Judge Advocate General

under section 867(a)(2) of title 10.

(3) Cases in which the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces granted a petition for review

under section 867(a)(3) of title 10.

(4) Cases, other than those described in

paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection, in

which the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces granted relief.

Article 70(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 870(c) Appellate

Counsel

(c) Appellate defense counsel shall represent the

accused before the Court of Criminal Appeals, the

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, or the

Supreme Court—

(1) when requested by the accused;

(2) when the United States is represented by

counsel; or

2

(3) when the Judge Advocate General has sent the

case to the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces.

Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920(b) (2016)

(b) Sexual Assault. Any person subject to this chapter

who—

(1) commits a sexual act upon another person by—

...

(B) causing bodily harm to that other person . . .

is guilty of sexual assault and shall be punished as a

court-martial may direct.

(g) Definitions. In this section:

(1) Sexual act. The term ‘sexual act’ means—

(A) Contact between the penis and the vulva or

anus or mouth, and for purposes of this subparagraph

contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration,

however slight; or

(B) the penetration, however slight, of the vulva

or anus or mouth of another by any part of the body or

by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,

harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify

the sexual desire of any person.

(2) Bodily harm. The term ‘bodily harm’ means any

offensive touching of another, however slight,

including any nonconsensual sexual act or

nonconsensual sexual contact.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Contrary to his pleas, a panel of officer

members sitting at a general court-martial convicted

2d Lt Johnson of two specifications of sexual assault,

in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2016). Pet. App. at

3

002a. The panel sentenced 2d Lt Johnson to a

dismissal, ten years’ confinement, and total forfeiture

of pay and allowances. Id. The Convening Authority

approved the adjudged sentence. Id.

A. Question I

On direct appeal, 2d Lt Johnson raised three

issues to the Air Force Court, and, sua sponte, the Air

Force Court considered an additional matter. Pet.

App. at 002-3a. The Air Force Court found no error

materially prejudicial to 2d Lt Johnson, affirmed the

findings, and then affirmed the sentence. Pet. App. at

003a.

2d Lt Johnson then asked the CAAF to grant

review of five issues, including: (1) whether his

conviction for sexually assaulting M.P. was legally

sufficient; and (2) whether the Air Force Court erred

in failing to consider supplementary evidence of his

cruel and unusual punishment allegations. Pet. App.

at 071-72a.

The CAAF only granted review of the

supplementary evidence issue, affirmed the findings,

but reversed as to the sentence, and remanded the

case back to the Air Force Court. Pet. App. at 049a.

On remand, the Air Force Court affirmed the sentence

by a divided vote, finding that 2d Lt Johnson did not

suffer cruel and unusual punishment. Pet. App. at

057a.

2d Lt Johnson again petitioned the CAAF for

review on whether the Air Force Court’s ruling was

correct that he did not suffer cruel and unusual

punishment. Pet. App. at 062a. 2d Lt Johnson only

raised this issue. Id. The CAAF granted his petition

for review and ordered that no briefs should be filed

because review was granted in conjunction with a

4

similar case, United States v. Pullings, 83 M.J. 205

(C.A.A.F. 2023). Id. The CAAF subsequently affirmed

the Air Force Court’s decision. Id.

B. Question II

This Question concerns 2d Lt Johnson’s conviction

for digitally penetrating M.P.’s vulva without her

consent and by causing bodily harm. Pet. App. at

002a.

i.

Background

2d Lt Johnson graduated from the Air Force

Academy in 2017 and was assigned to Moody Air

Force Base, Georgia. 2d Lt Johnson Clemency

Package at 13, 33. He subsequently joined a fitness

center in neighboring Valdosta, Georgia, where he

met M.P., who managed the gym. R. at 564-65.

2d Lt Johnson and M.P. began conversing over

Instagram. Pros. Ex. 4. Over the next several days,

their discussions ranged from information about their

respective families to flirtatious comments and

promises to meet up. Pros. Ex. 4; R. at 577-83. M.P.

gave 2d Lt Johnson her phone number and later told

him of her plans to go to the Bluewater Bar in

Remerton, Georgia, on September 17, 2017. Pros. Ex.

4 at 14, 37; see also R. at 442.

Prior to arriving at Bluewater that night, M.P.

went to dinner with several friends, including her coworker, A.M. R. at 548, 551, 570. M.P. had a mixed

drink at dinner, while A.M. did not have any alcohol.

R. at 551, 593. Thereafter, the group went to a friend’s

house, where M.P. had another mixed drink. R. at 594.

A.M. consumed “a lot” of alcohol but could not recall

how much. R. at 552. At around 2330 hours, the group

left for Bluewater. R. at 594.

5

2d Lt Johnson also drank prior to going out.

Starting around 1700 hours, he consumed five or six

shots along with five or six beers at another bar. R. at

987. He and his friends eventually made their way to

Bluewater, where he had several more shots and

beers. R. at 988. 2d Lt Johnson consumed enough

alcohol that his friends believed him to be intoxicated.

R. at 989, 994.

At some point, 2d Lt Johnson met up with M.P.

The pair spent the majority of their remaining time at

the bar together, following each other around,

“grinding” while dancing, and kissing. R. at 727-29,

995. Shortly before Bluewater closed, several

individuals—including 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., and

A.M.—decided to walk to the house of J.P., a friend

who lived nearby. R. at 738. The group mingled

outside for a few minutes after arriving at the house,

during which 2d Lt Johnson and M.P. continued

kissing. R. at 434, 731. M.P. later asked J.P. if

2d Lt Johnson could stay the night. R. at 1006. From

J.P.’s perspective, M.P. appeared to be in control of her

faculties and understood what she was doing. R. at

1006-07.

Ultimately, only four people from the group

stayed at J.P.’s house: 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., A.M., and

Senior Airman (SrA) C.C.—a friend of M.P.’s who

A.M. apparently had a romantic interest in. R. at 420,

435, 439. J.P. was also in the house, along with her

friend, SrA K.C. R. at 435, 660-61.

By this time, A.M. appeared extremely

intoxicated. R. at 438. It was estimated that her blood

alcohol content was anywhere from .196 to .267. R. at

892. Following the group’s request, 2d Lt Johnson

6

carried A.M. to a bedroom, put her in bed, and left her

there with SrA C.C. R. at 438-39.

2d Lt Johnson and M.P. then went to the couch

in the living room, where they began kissing and

touching each other. R. at 661, 1008. J.P. asked M.P.

if she was okay or needed a blanket, and M.P.

responded that she was fine. R. at 1008. Observing

nothing wrong and having no concern for her close

friend, J.P. then retreated to her bedroom with SrA

K.C. R. at 1008.

According to SrA C.C., he awoke later that

morning to find 2d Lt Johnson having sex with A.M.

R. at 487. SrA C.C. told 2d Lt Johnson “this is wrong”

and tried to get him off her, to which 2d Lt Johnson

replied: “It’s okay. It’s [M.P.]” R. at 488-90.

2d Lt Johnson was mistaken about the identity of the

person he was having sex with. Pet. App. at 007a. SrA

CC corrected 2d Lt Johnson, telling him that he was,

in fact, having sex with A.M.—not M.P. Id. See also R.

at 490. SrA C.C. responded that he needed to get off

and pushed him. R. at 490. 2d Lt Johnson—who

played fullback for the Air Force Academy’s football

team 3—did not fight back against SrA C.C.; rather, he

said “Oh” and “I’m sorry, I’m sorry” while SrA C.C.

escorted him out of the room. R. at 490. A.M. has no

recollection of these events. R. at 553-54.

SrA C.C. later called a friend for assistance,

and then retrieved M.P. from the couch, where she

was sleeping opposite from 2d Lt Johnson. R. at 49394. Eventually, SrA C.C. and others called an Uber to

pick up 2d Lt Johnson, and escorted him from the

premises. R. at 498-500. Although these events

3 See Clemency at 44-46.

7

occurred a few hours after 2d Lt Johnson left

Bluewater, he still appeared to be very intoxicated. R.

at 689-90.

When the police arrived to investigate the

alleged sexual assault against A.M., M.P. also claimed

to have been assaulted by 2d Lt Johnson. R. at 744. At

no point during the evening or early morning hours

did any individual staying at J.P.’s hear any screams,

struggling, or calls for help from M.P., or harbor any

concerns regarding her well-being with 2d Lt Johnson.

R. at 524, 681, 1008-09.

The Government ultimately charged and

convicted 2d Lt Johnson of penetrating M.P.’s vulva

with his finger, in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 920.

ii. Legal Sufficiency

M.P. testified that she did not remember many

of the events following her arrival at Bluewater. R. at

571. However, she claimed that she remembered

“[w]aking up on the couch with [2d Lt Johnson] on top

of [her].” R. at 572. He was wearing a pink shirt and

still had his pants on. R. at 573. M.P. said he was

kissing her, she “kind of” pushed him off, and then she

“went out again.” R. at 573. When she next awoke,

M.P. attested that 2d Lt Johnson was digitally

penetrating her. R. at 573-74. She claimed she pushed

him off, curled up, and went back to sleep, and

believed he had left at that point. R. at 574. She later

awoke “to a sound or something,” saw 2d Lt Johnson’s

outline in the hallway, and realized he was not

wearing any clothes. Id. She claimed 2d Lt Johnson

was then “on top of [her] and he was in [her] face,

saying [her] name,” but she did not indicate that he

thereafter touched her inappropriately. Id. M.P.’s

8

blood alcohol content was estimated to be anywhere

from .15 to .262. R. at 893.

Analyzing

M.P.’s

testimony

alongside

2d Lt Johnson’s mistake of fact as to consent defense

and other evidence adduced at trial, the Air Force

Court deemed the timing of the incidents involving

A.M. and M.P. as “critical to determining factual and

legal sufficiency.” Pet. App. at 015a. Noting that SrA

C.C. testified he last sent a text message at 0302

hours, fell asleep, and was awoken by 2d Lt Johnson’s

assault on A.M., the Air Force Court determined that

there was no indication of any mal-intent by

2d Lt Johnson prior to this time. Id. Instead, it opined

that M.P. had been “somewhat, if not very, interested”

in 2d Lt Johnson. Id. The Air Force Court added that,

based on the evidence, “[h]ad M.P. alleged a sexual

assault occurring before SrA [C.C.] fell asleep at

0302,” 2d Lt Johnson would have a “viable argument”

regarding mistake of fact. Id. But the Court then

highlighted how A.M.’s DNA was found inside M.P.’s

underwear, SrA C.C. saw 2d Lt Johnson naked during

A.M.’s assault, M.P. saw 2d Lt Johnson naked in the

hallway, and SrA C.C. found 2d Lt Johnson in his

underwear on the couch with M.P. around 0345 hours.

Id. Based on these facts, the Air Force Court held that

the

evidence

“supports

a

conclusion

that

[2d Lt Johnson] sexually assaulted [M.P.] after he

penetrated [A.M.] and before SrA [C.C.] saw [M.P.]

and [2d Lt Johnson] on the couch around 0345.” Id.

(emphasis in original).

The Air Force Court’s analysis did not address

the nature of the DNA evidence, in that the

Government recovered only non-semen, epithelial

DNA; a form relating to skin, saliva, touch, etc. R. at

868-69. Likewise, the Air Force Court did not factor in

9

how 2d Lt Johnson had previously touched A.M.,

when he carried her to one of the house’s bedrooms. R.

at 438-39. The lack of any damage to M.P.’s clothes

and the lack of any significantly corroborating injuries

was also missing from the Air Force Court’s holding.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant this Petition because

the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction is an “important

question of federal law.” See SUP. CT. R. 10(c). See also

Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 505

(1962) (acknowledging that whether federal courts are

the “exclusive arbiters” of certain contract disputes is

an “important question of federal law”); Di Giovanni

v. Camden Fire Ins. Asso., 296 U.S. 64, 66 (1935)

(“This Court granted certiorari to settle an important

question of federal law affecting the jurisdiction of

federal courts.”).

This is not only an important federal question,

but it is also one that has festered “for nearly three

decades” without this Court deciding it. Brief for the

Respondent in Opposition at 4, United States v.

Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (No. 19-108). This case is

the ideal vehicle to resolve the question presented

because it is the primary issue: Without resolving the

first question, this Court cannot reach the second

question. Additionally, an analysis of the canons of

statutory interpretation indicate that this Court does,

in fact, have jurisdiction to hear “cases” under 28

U.S.C. § 1259 and not just granted issues. This further

supports why this Court should grant this Petition.

Finally, 2d Lt Johnson maintains his innocence

even though the CAAF did not grant review on his

legal sufficiency issue. Although this Court “rarely”

grants review when there is a “misapplication of a

10

properly stated rule of law,” this Court should grant

review given that this issue is inextricably linked to a

consequential jurisdictional question. SUP. CT. R. 10.

Even though legal sufficiency is not a common issue

presented to this Court, it is one of great importance

to 2d Lt Johnson; one that can address important,

unanswered legal sufficiency questions; and one that

this Court can easily resolve. See Coleman v. Johnson,

566 U.S. 650 (2012); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979).

A. This Jurisdictional Question has Existed

Since 1983 and is Ripe for This Court’s

Consideration

In his authoritative book Supreme Court

Practice, Stephen M. Shapiro recognized the question

this Petition presents:

It is an unresolved question whether,

once the Armed Forces court grants a

petition for review on some issues, the

Supreme Court has the power to consider

other issues in the case that were not

granted review. The Solicitor General

has taken the position that review of

those issue is unavailable.

STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., Supreme Court Practice §

2.14 at 128 n. 103 (9th ed. 2007) (citing Brief for the

United States in Opposition 6, McKeel v. United

States, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 554 (2006)). Not only

did Mr. Shapiro identify the question, but he also

recognized that the Solicitor General has opposed this

Court’s jurisdiction—despite the plain language of 28

U.S.C. § 1259.

This question is important to military

practitioners and they have pushed back against the

11

Solicitor General’s attempt to limit this Court’s

jurisdiction (i.e., its narrow reading of “cases” in 28

U.S.C. § 1259(3)). 4 In a recent twist, however, the

Solicitor General had to engage in jurisdictional

gymnastics to soften its viewpoint when it became the

appellant-petitioner. Compare Brief

for the

Respondent in Opposition at 4, United States v.

Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (No. 19-108) (“First, the

4 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4, United States v.

Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (No. 19-108) (“To that end, for

nearly three decades (and as recently as this January), the

government has consistently maintained that this Court lacks

jurisdiction under § 1259 to review any questions ‘not resolved

by CAAF’s decision in this case.’”); Reply Brief for Petitioner,

Richards v. Barrett, 140 S. Ct. 2760 (2020) (No. 19-55) (“Congress

intended only to limit the number of cases heard by this Court,

not the scope of its review.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at

23, Larrabee v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (No. 18-306)

(“Despite the clear text of § 1259(3), the Solicitor General has

previously contended that this Court’s jurisdiction under that

provision does not extend to issues on which CAAF did not grant

a discretionary petition for review.”); Brief for the United States

in Opposition at 7 n.2, Wiechmann v. United States, 559 U.S. 904

(2010) (No. 09-418) (“28 U.S.C. 1259 limits this Court’s review to

‘[d]ecisions’ of the CAAF. The CAAF granted review only on

petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim (Pet. App. 2a), and decided

that issue only.”); Reply Brief at *3-4, Stevenson v. United States,

555 U.S. 816 (2008) (No. 07-1397) (“Respondent neither contests

the plain language of section 1259(3), nor challenges the plain

meaning of ‘case.’ Rather, it argues (Opp. Br. 8) that Article

67a(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §

867a(a), confines the Court’s authority to reviewing only ‘claims’

granted by the CAAF.”); Brief for the United States in Opposition

at 3, McKeel v. United States, 549 U.S. 1019 (2006) (No. 06-58)

(“While the CAAF granted a petition for review on petitioner’s

claim that he was entitled to transactional immunity, it refused

to grant a petition to review his Sixth Amendment claim. Under

the terms of Section 867a(a), the Court may not review the

CAAF’s action in refusing to grant review of that claim.”)

12

government itself has long argued that this Court

lacks jurisdiction to consider most of [the issues].”)

with Reply Brief of Richard Collins at *6, United

States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020) (19-184) (“In no

way is the government attempting to inject into this

case at the certiorari stage an issue that was not

central to the appellate proceedings and the CAAF

decision affirming them.”) and Reply Brief of Michael

Briggs at *8, United States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467

(2020) (19-108) (“Respondent’s current noncommittal

suggestion (Br. in Opp. 1) of a jurisdictional “question”

accordingly identifies no actual impediment to

plenary review of the entire question presented.”). The

Government should not be able to have it both ways

on a question of this Court’s jurisdiction.

Although previous petitioners have discussed

this issue in their petitions for a writ of certiorari, this

case is the first to explicitly raise the question as a

stand-alone issue. Supra note 4. As such, this Court

should choose this case to resolve the question because

it is a clean vehicle where the question is squarely in

front of the Court.

B. This Court Should Grant Review Because

Various Canons of Statutory Interpretation

Indicate this Court Has Jurisdiction over

“Cases” not Just Granted Issues

The crux of the question presented is whether

the word “[d]ecisions” in 28 U.S.C. § 1259 narrows the

statute’s five later uses of the word “cases,” to the

point that this Court can only review issues that the

CAAF granted on. There is no such limitation. This

Court has already interpreted the words “cases” and

“decisions” in such a manner that this Court should

have jurisdiction, the legislative history shows that

13

congress rejected “issues” in favor of “cases,” and

giving effect to every word in the statute results in a

harmonious reading of the relevant provisions of the

statute that renders them compatible, not

contradictory.

i. This Court’s Broad Interpretations of

“Case” and “Decision” Weigh in Favor of

Jurisdiction

The prior construction canon states that if “a

statute uses words or phrases that have already

received

authoritative

construction

by

the

jurisdiction’s court of last resort . . . they are to be

understood according to that construction.” ANTONIN

SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 247 (2012) [hereinafter,

Reading Law]. Not only has this Court interpreted the

word “case,” it has done so in the context of the UCMJ.

In 1803, this Court explained, “It is the

essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it

revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already

instituted, and does not create that cause.” Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (emphasis

added). Stated differently, “cause” means “case” and

the sine qua non of a case—and appellate

jurisdiction—is “some judicial determination, some

judgment, decree, or order of an inferior tribunal, from

which an appeal has been taken.” Ortiz v. United

States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2018); Alicia, 74 U.S. (7

Wall.) 571, 573 (1869).

This Court expressly adopted this broad

understanding of “case” and “appellate jurisdiction” in

the context of the UCMJ. Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2173-74.

In addition to discussing the definition of “case” and

“appellate jurisdiction” elucidated in Marbury, this

14

Court in Ortiz focused on the fact that a case is

something that originated at a court-martial, went

through a service court of criminal appeals, and then

the CAAF before arriving at this Court. Id. at 2174.

As such, “this Court would hardly be the first to

render a decision in the case.” Id.

This Court has also defined the word “decision”

in a broad manner. Salinas v. United States RRB, 141

S. Ct. 691, 697 (2021) (“The phrase ‘any final decision’

is broad . . . .”); Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765,

1774 (2019) (“[W]e note that the phrase ‘final decision’

clearly denotes some kind of terminal event, and

Congress’ use of the word ‘any’ suggests an intent to

use that term ‘expansive[ly].’”) (citations omitted);

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018)

(requiring appellate courts to “look through”

unexplained or merits “decisions” in federal habeas

corpus cases); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951)

(finding that an “order denying the motion to reduce

bail is appealable as a ‘final decision’ of the District

Court”), superseded by statute on other grounds as

stated in Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 322 F. Supp.

2d 1045 (C. Dist. Cal Jan. 9, 2004) (unpublished);

United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412 (1920)

(finding that a “decision” includes a motion to quash).

This Court should grant review not only

because it has defined the words “case” and “decision”

expansively in the past, but also because the words’

plain meanings convey that this Court has jurisdiction

over a servicemember’s entire case. “Case” is defined

as:

15

A general term for an action, cause, suit,

or controversy, at law or in equity; a

question contested before a court of

justice; an aggregate of facts which

furnishes occasion for the exercise of the

jurisdiction of a court of justice. A

judicial proceeding for the determination

of a controversy between parties wherein

rights are enforced or protected, or

wrongs are prevented or redressed; any

proceeding judicial in its nature.

Black’s Law Dictionary, 215 (6th ed. 1990). Likewise,

“decision” is also defined capaciously:

A determination arrived at after

consideration of facts, and in legal

context, law. A popular rather than

technical or legal word; a comprehensive

term having no fixed, legal meaning. It

may be employed as referring to

ministerial acts as well as to those that

are judicial or of a judicial character . . .

the term is broad enough to cover both

final judgments and interlocutory orders

. . . the word may also include various

rulings, as well as orders, including

agency and commission orders.

Id. at 407 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

This Court’s prior definitions and the inclusive,

plain language of these words point to one conclusion:

This Court should grant review because it does, in

fact, have jurisdiction over “cases” from the CAAF, not

just granted issues.

16

ii. The Legislative History Indicates that

“Cases” did not Mean Granted Issues

Even Justice Scalia—who loathed legislative

history—gave one exception to consulting it:

Using legislative history to establish

what the legislature “intended” is quite

different from using it for other

purposes. For example, for the purpose of

establishing linguistic usage—showing

that a particular word or phrase is

capable of bearing a particular

meaning—it is no more forbidden

(though no more persuasive) to quote a

statement from the floor debate on the

statute in question than it is to quote the

Wall Street Journal or the Oxford

English Dictionary.

Reading Law at 289 (emphasis added). Initially, the

House drafted 28 U.S.C. § 1259 to use the word

“issues” instead of “cases.” H.R. 6298, at 39 (1980). As

such, this Court would have only been able to review

“issues upon which the Court of Military Appeals

[CAAF] granted review and other issues upon which

the [CAAF] took action in cases in which a petition for

review was granted.” Id.

However, the final version of the bill that

Congress passed replaced “issues” with “cases.” The

legislative history indicates that the Congress was

concerned with this Court’s workload. Meaning,

Congress intended only to limit the number of cases

heard by this Court, not the scope of its review. S. Rep.

No. 98-53, at 33 (1983) (“[T]he Committee has taken

steps to ensure that the bill will not result in an undue

increase in the volume of cases presented to the

17

Supreme Court.”) (emphasis added). Notably, this

legislative history is pre-enactment; as such, this

argument presents the “ordinary meaning at the time

of enactment,” which should govern. Bostock v.

Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750 (2020).

At least one scholar has recognized that the

legislative history “makes it clear that the Supreme

Court has jurisdiction over any case in which the

lower court granted review, even if the grant did not

include the particular issue on which the certiorari

petition is predicated.” Eugene R. Fidell, Review of

Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces by the Supreme Court of the United

States, in Evolving Military Justice 150-51 (Eugene R.

Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds. 2002).

The fact that Congress selected “cases” vice

“issues” confirms that this Court should read “cases”

and “decisions” broadly—in accordance with past

decisions. Congress’ selection of these words confirms

that this Court’s jurisdiction is not limited to only

issues reviewed by the CAAF.

iii. The Surplusage Canon and the

Harmonious Reading Canon Weigh in

Favor of Jurisdiction

The surplusage canon dictates that “every word

and every provision is to be given effect.” Reading Law

at 148. Specifically, every word “Congress used” in the

statute. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009).

This canon “prevents not [only] the total disregard of

a provision, but instead an interpretation that renders

it pointless.” Reading Law at 148. If this Court were

to interpret “decisions” narrowly—like the Solicitor

General has suggested in the past—it would render

Congress’ specific word choice of “cases” a nullity. In

18

other words, the five times 28 U.S.C. § 1259 uses

“cases,” would simply be a redundancy of “decisions.”

However, the use of “decisions” and then

“cases” is not a redundancy. Rather, “decisions” means

any “determination arrived at after consideration of

the facts, and . . . law,” such as the CAAF’s decision

not to grant review on one issue, but to grant the

petition for review on a different issue. Black’s Law

Dictionary, 407 (6th ed. 1990). Once the CAAF has

made the decision to grant a petition on one issue, but

not another, this Court then has jurisdiction over the

entire case because it is a “[c]ase[] in which the Court

of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted a petition for

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3).

This Court should favor this reading because it

aligns with the harmonious-reading canon. Meaning,

“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a

way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”

Reading Law at 152. If this Court were to read 28

U.S.C. § 1259 as the Solicitor General has historically

wished, it would mean “decisions” and “cases” would

be “provisions in conflict.” Id. Notably, this canon of

interpretation is “more categorical than most other

canons of construction because it is invariably true

that intelligent drafters do not contradict

themselves.” Id. Here Congress specifically chose the

word “cases” over “issues.” Thus, if “decisions”

narrowly modified “cases,” Congress would have

contradicted themselves.

C. This Court Should Grant Review to Answer

Questions that Jackson v. Virginia did not

Resolve

To convict 2d Lt Johnson, members had to find

that the Government proved the following two

19

elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that

2d Lt Johnson committed a sexual act upon M.P. by

penetrating her vulva with his fingers; and (2) that he

did so by causing bodily harm to M.P., to wit:

penetrating her vulva with his fingers without her

consent. Pet. App. at 014a (emphasis added).

2d Lt Johnson’s conviction presents several

questions about legal sufficiency with regard to

consent that this Court has not clarified. First,

although there was some evidence of consent, does

2d Lt Johnson’s case fall within the narrow window of

protection that Jackson outlined? Second, what is the

quantum of evidence “necessary to convince a trier of

fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of

every element of the offense,” specifically for the

element of consent? Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. See also

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 (1982) (“We held in

Jackson that the Due Process Clause forbids any

conviction based on evidence insufficient to persuade

a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.”). Third, should any of this Court’s legal

sufficiency

standards

change

given

that

2d Lt Johnson’s case went through Article I courts—

not state or federal habeas proceedings?

i. 2d Lt Johnson’s Conviction for

Assaulting M.P. Falls Between “No

Evidence” and the “Lower Limit” Floor of

Legal Sufficiency, Entitling him to Relief

In Jackson, this Court held that “the

[Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)] ‘no

evidence’ rule is simply inadequate to protect against

misapplications of the constitutional standard of

reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320. In

rejecting Thompson, the Court embraced In re

20

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), noting that “the record

in Winship was not totally devoid of evidence of guilt.”

Id. at 315. Later, this Court explained that the Due

Process Clause sets “a lower limit on an appellate

court’s definition of evidentiary sufficiency.” Tibbs,

457 U.S. at 45. Thus, Jackson stands for the

proposition that a conviction can be legally

insufficient—even with some evidence presented—if

it falls below the “lower limit” of evidentiary

sufficiency.

To gauge the sufficiency of the evidence, this

Court stated that the test is whether “after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319

(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

Although this is a low standard, it is “not

entirely toothless” and was designed to correct the

“occasional abuse” that appellate review missed. See

United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (“We do not . . . fulfill our duty through rote

incantation of the[] principles [outlined above]

followed by summary affirmance.”) (quoting United

States v. Long, F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see

also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 322 (“Although state

appellate review undoubtedly will serve in the vast

majority of cases to vindicate the due process

protection that follows from Winship, the same could

also be said of the vast majority of other federal

constitutional rights that may be implicated in a state

criminal trial.”). This Court should grant review

because 2d Lt Johnson’s case is one of the “occasional

abuses” of evidentiary sufficiency where there was

21

some evidence of consent, but not enough to meet the

“lower limit” that Jackson demands.

ii. Jackson v. Virginia Stated that a

Factfinder must Apply the Beyond a

Reasonable Doubt Standard Reasonably,

Fairly, and Rationally

This Court in Jackson repeatedly emphasized

that the legal sufficiency test is not “simply a trial

ritual.” 443 U.S. at 316-17. For example:

•

“A doctrine establishing so fundamental a

substantive constitutional standard must also

require that the factfinder will rationally apply

that standard to the facts in evidence.” Id. at

317 (emphasis added).

•

“[T]he critical inquiry on review of the

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal

conviction must be not simply to determine

whether the jury was properly instructed, but

to determine whether the record evidence could

reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318 (emphasis added).

•

“This familiar standard gives full play to the

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 319

(emphases added).

In his concurrence, Justice Stevens was concerned

that this new test could not only do constitutional

harm, but that it could also just become a

“meaningless shibboleth.” Id. at 328.

There are two reasons why the evidence

presented on consent did not meet the quantum

22

necessary to have convinced “any rational trier of fact”

of the element of consent. Id. at 319 (emphasis in

original). First, the only evidence that 2d Lt Johnson

touched M.P. without her consent was from M.P.—a

witness whose blood alcohol level was estimated to be

anywhere from .15 to .262 at the time of the touching.

R. at 893. The only thing that M.P. remembered after

going to the bar earlier in the evening was waking up

to 2d Lt Johnson touching her. R. at 572. Without

delving into any of M.P.’s credibility issues, it was not

reasonable, fair, or rational for the members to find

that lack of consent was met given M.P.’s intoxication

level. This is in addition to her lack of memory

throughout the entire night—except for the exact

moment in question. By comparison, A.M.—who had

a similar blood alcohol content as M.P.—had no

memory of her assault to the point that she had to be

told that 2d Lt Johnson assaulted her. R. at 553-54;

892.

Second, per M.P.’s own testimony, the timing of

when 2d Lt Johnson touched her proves her

interactions with him were consensual. That is, the

touching occurred before 2d Lt Johnson assaulted

A.M., when M.P. and he were “laugh[ing],” “making

out,” and “very physically connected” on the couch. R.

at 661-62, 682, 687, 1008. The Air Force Court

explained that the “timing of Appellant’s actions

towards both M.P. and A.M. are critical to

determining legal and factual sufficiency.” Id. This is

because if 2d Lt Johnson touched M.P. before he

assaulted A.M. he would have a “viable argument”

that the touching was consensual as there was “no

indication of any mal-intent” prior to A.M.’s assault.

Pet. App. at 015a - 016a.

23

M.P.’s testimony was that she remembered

2d Lt Johnson touching her while he was fully

clothed. R. at 573. 2d Lt Johnson was only fully

clothed before he assaulted A.M., while M.P. and he

were consensually “touching each other” on the couch.

R. at 674. Once M.P. saw 2d Lt Johnson naked in the

hallway, he did not touch her again. R. at 574.

Based on M.P.’s own testimony, then, the Air

Force Court’s timeline was incorrect—2d Lt Johnson’s

interactions with M.P. while clothed occurred prior to

the incident with A.M. Therefore, using the Air Force

Court’s own logic, 2d Lt Johnson had a “viable

argument” that the touching was consensual. Pet.

App. at 016a.

While it is true that a court must assume “that

the trier of fact resolved” conflicting inferences in

favor of the Government, this is not an issue of an

inference. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. An “inference” is

“[a] logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact not

presented by direct evidence but which, by process of

logic and reason, a trier of fact may conclude exists

from the established facts.” Black’s Law Dictionary,

778 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Here, there was

“direct evidence” presented that while 2d Lt Johnson

was clothed, before assaulting A.M., his interactions

with M.P. were not only consensual, but

enthusiastically consensual:

•

M.P. asked for permission to

have

2d Lt Johnson stay the night with her. R. at

1006.

•

2d Lt Johnson and M.P. were “on the couch,

kissing and touching each other.” R. at 661.

•

2d Lt Johnson and M.P. were “very physically

connected” on the couch. R. at 662.

24

•

2d Lt Johnson and M.P. were “making out.” R.

at 1008.

•

“Everything

seemed

mutual”

2d Lt Johnson and M.P. R. at 674.

•

M.P. said she was “fine.” R. at 1008.

•

2d Lt Johnson

kissing.” Id.

•

M.P. was not resisting when 2d Lt Johnson

kissed her. Id.

•

M.P. was kissing 2d Lt Johnson back. Id.

•

M.P. did not object. R. at 681.

•

M.P. did not ask for help. Id.

•

M.P. and 2d Lt Johnson were laughing when no

one was in the room with them. R. at 688.

•

M.P. did not try to stop any of “the activity”

with 2d Lt Johnson while they were on the

couch. R. at 682.

•

Witnesses did not think M.P.’s actions with

2d Lt Johnson were wrong and they did not try

to stop them. R. at 681-82; 1009.

and

M.P.

were

between

“actively

Given the uncontroverted facts from multiple

witnesses, the panel members’ finding of a lack of

consent did not flow from the facts and circumstances

that were proven in the record. Cf. Leary v. United

States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969) (“[A] statutory

presumption cannot be sustained if there be no

rational connection between the fact proved and the

ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one

from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of

connection between the two in common experience.”).

In the face of these facts and the questionable

25

evidence for lack of consent, the panel members’

decision to convict was not rational, reasonable, or

fair.

iii. This Case Presents Additional Matters

that this Court can Clarify

The question that this Court decided in Jackson

was “what standard is to be applied in a federal

habeas corpus proceeding when the claim is made that

a person has been convicted in a state court upon

insufficient

evidence.”

443

U.S.

at

307.

2d Lt Johnson’s case does not share the same

procedural posture since his case is still on direct

appeal. Because of the distinction, the following

questions are worth this Court’s attention.

First, is the standard articulated in Jackson

applicable to a direct appeal in an Article I court?

Second, is the Jackson standard high enough

since 2d Lt Johnson, and other appellants in courtsmartial, are not entitled to unanimous verdicts?

United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F.

2023). 5

Third, the Air Force Court has statutory

authority to “conduct a de novo review of both the

legal and factual sufficiency of a conviction.” United

States v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

The CAAF does not have statutory authority to review

questions of fact. United States v. Piolunek, 74 M.J.

107, 110 (C.A.A.F. 2015). Because CAAF did not

A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been filed with the

question of “Whether military convictions for serious offenses

must be unanimous.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jonathan

M. Martinez, Et Al. v. United States, No. 22-0165/AF, 2023 CAAF

LEXIS 494 (C.A.A.F. July 18, 2023) (23-242).

5

26

review this issue, and the Air Force Court combined

its legal and factual sufficiency analysis, would this

Court use its powers to review questions of fact to

ensure the Air Force Court’s decision was correct as to

factual sufficiency? See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for

a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted

error consists of erroneous factual findings.”).

If this Court were to use its power to review

factual matters, lack of consent would become even

weaker than it is now for two reasons. First,

2d Lt Johnson could argue mistake of fact as to

consent. Given the numerous indicators of consent

throughout the night—not just those listed above—

any reasonable individual in 2d Lt Johnson’s place

would have believed that M.P. consented to the touch.

Second, this Court could consider M.P.’s poor

credibility and her motives to fabricate. Most notably,

that M.P. was married at the time and she was going

through a contentious divorce where her husband

filed for custody of her daughter. R. at 613. The

morning after the conduct, prior to M.P. reporting, her

husband’s friend came to the house. R. at 614.

iv. Conclusion:

Convicted

Why

Panel

Members

The reason is clear why panel members

convicted 2d Lt Johnson even though they were given

voluminous and qualitative indicators of consent and,

in turn, a dearth of evidence on a must-prove element:

Spillover. A junior ranking Airman caught

2d Lt Johnson in flagrante delicto penetrating A.M.

from behind with his penis—while she was

unconscious. Pet. App. at 007a. The Airman had to

push 2d Lt Johnson off of A.M. Id. Even though the

members were instructed not to consider one crime for

27

the other, the brazenness of A.M.’s assault created

“just too great of a risk” of spillover. R. at 141, 238.

This Court should grant review to state what

quantum of evidence is necessary to fulfill legal

sufficiency for consent issues and to clarify the

standards this Court laid down in Jackson.

CONCLUSION

This Court’s jurisdiction is “an important

question of federal law” that justifies granting this

Petition. Moreover, the decisions of this Court, like the

CAAF, “are of considerable importance to our nation

because they impact directly on the rights of

servicemembers, the prerogative of commanders, and

the public perception of the fairness and effectiveness

of the military justice system.” S. Rep. No. 98-53, at

33 (1983). By granting this Petition, this Court will

not only impact 2d Lt Johnson’s rights, but future

military members who petition this Court under 28

U.S.C. § 1259. A grant of the writ of certiorari, and an

affirmation of the first question presented, will also

positively impact “the public perception of the fairness

and effectiveness of the military justice system” and

this Court’s role in it. Id.

Respectfully submitted,

MAJOR SPENCER R. NELSON

Counsel of Record

United States Air Force

Air Force Appellant Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

spencer.nelson.1@us.af.mil

Counsel for Appellant

28

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PETITIONER’S APPENDIX

Air Force Court Opinion (October 16, 2020) ....... 001a

CAAF Decision without Published Opinion (August

10, 2021) ............................................................... 049a

Air Force Court Opinion (July 19, 2022) ............ 051a

CAAF Decision without Published Opinion (May 8,

2023) ..................................................................... 062a

Appellant’s Supplement to the Petition for Grant of

Review (February 16, 2021) ................................ 064a

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEALS

________________________

No. ACM 39676

________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

D’Andre M. JOHNSON

Second Lieutenant (O-1), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

________________________

Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial

Judiciary

Decided 16 October 2020

________________________

Military Judge: W. Shane Cohen

Sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 10 years, and

forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Sentence

adjudged 1 December 2018 by GCM convened at

Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.

For Appellant: Mark C. Bruegger, Esquire; Catherine

M. Cherkasky, Esquire.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason,

USAF; Major Anne M. Delmare, USAF; Mary Ellen

Payne, Esquire.

Before POSCH, RICHARDSON, and MEGINLEY,

Appellate Military Judges.

001a

Judge MEGINLEY delivered the opinion of the court,

in which Senior Judge POSCH and Judge

RICHARDSON joined.

________________________

This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,

does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule

of Practice and Procedure 30.4.

________________________

MEGINLEY, Judge:

Contrary to his pleas, a general court-martial

composed of officer members convicted Appellant of

one specification of sexual assault of AM, by

penetrating AM’s vulva with his penis, while AM was

incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to

impairment by alcohol, and one specification of sexual

assault of MP, by penetrating her vulva with his

finger by causing bodily harm, both in violation of

Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),

10 U.S.C. § 920. 1 The panel sentenced Appellant to a

dismissal, confinement for ten years, and forfeiture of

all pay and allowances. The military judge credited

Appellant with 138 days against his sentence for time

Appellant spent in pretrial confinement. The

convening authority approved the sentence as

adjudged.

Appellant raises three assignments of error (AOE) on

appeal: (1) whether the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient to support the conviction of sexual

1 All references in this opinion to the Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), Rules for Courts-Martial, and Military Rules of

Evidence are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

(2016 ed.).

002a

assault against MP; (2) whether trial defense counsel

provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3)

whether Appellant suffered cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 2

and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855, when he was

not given proper medical treatment while in

confinement. Alternatively, Appellant contends that

the conditions of his posttrial confinement render his

sentence inappropriately severe, warranting relief

under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). In

addition, as part of our consideration of Appellant’s

second AOE, we consider the issue of whether the

military judge abused his discretion in allowing

portions of MP’s unsworn victim impact statement to

be presented to the members at the sentencing

hearing.

Finding no error materially prejudicial to a

substantial right of Appellant, we affirm the findings

and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant graduated from the United States Air Force

Academy in 2017. After graduation, Appellant was

assigned to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, as a

Logistics Readiness Officer. After his arrival,

Appellant subsequently joined a fitness center in

neighboring Valdosta, Georgia, where he met MP, who

was an assistant manager at the gym.

Until the night of the offense, MP had seen Appellant

twice and talked to him once, and, although she knew

him from the gym, AM had never talked to Appellant

2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

003a

directly. Appellant started “following” MP on the

social networking application Instagram, and on 14

September 2017, made a comment to one of MP’s posts

at 2159 hours. Appellant and MP continued to chat via

Instagram; on 15 September 2017, MP gave Appellant

her phone number after Appellant requested her

number and they texted back and forth. The

Instagram and text messages consisted of messages of

a flirtatious nature, discussions about football and

families, and some sexual innuendos. On 16

September 2017, MP told Appellant of her plans for

that evening, which included going to a local bar,

known as the Bluewater Bar, with some friends,

including her friend AM (also her co-worker).

Appellant responded that maybe he would see her “out

Saturday night.” In all, before MP and Appellant

would meet up on the night of 16 September 2017,

they had been messaging and texting each other for

less than 48 hours.

On 16 September 2017, MP and AM went out to

dinner with friends. MP had a mixed drink at dinner,

while AM did not have any alcohol. Thereafter, the

group went to the house of a friend, JP, where MP had

another mixed drink. At around 2330 hours, the group

left for Bluewater. The bar was approximately a fiveminute walk from JP’s house. AM consumed shots and

mixed drinks at JP’s house prior to going to

Bluewater, and she had more shots and mixed drinks

at Bluewater. AM consumed “a lot” of alcohol, but

could not recall how much. She opined she had “never

drank that much” alcohol in her life.

004a

Appellant arrived at Bluewater around 2100 that

evening. Prior to his arrival, Appellant consumed five

or six shots, along with five or six beers, with friends

at another bar. After MP arrived at Bluewater, she

eventually met up with Appellant. At 0102 on 17

September 2017, Appellant and MP were texting with

each other, with Appellant asking MP where she was

in the bar. While at Bluewater, MP and Appellant

spent time with each other at the bar, grinding 3 on

each other while dancing and kissing.

At approximately 0200 on 17 September 2017,

Bluewater closed. A group of individuals, including

MP, AM, Appellant, Senior Airman (SrA) CC, and

others, decided to go to JP’s house; JP and her male

friend, SrA KC, were already at JP’s house. According

to SrA CC, the group left Bluewater between 0200 and

0215. AM was very intoxicated, slurring her words,

unbalanced, and falling to the ground. Because of her

condition, SrA CC gave her a “piggyback ride” to JP’s

house.

Once they arrived at JP’s house, the group mingled

outside for an undetermined amount of time before

going inside. MP and Appellant continued kissing

outside of JP’s residence. MP asked JP if Appellant

could “stay” the night at JP’s house; JP agreed.

Some individuals eventually left JP’s house. Those

that remained were MP, AM, Appellant, and SrA CC,

along with JP and SrA KC. Once the group entered

the house, SrA CC “plopped [AM] down into the chair”

near the front door. Although the group wanted to

continue drinking and play cards, they were

3 When defense counsel asked the witness, “What is grinding?”

the witness replied, “Female in front of the male, rubbing against

each other.”

005a

concerned about AM because she was “way out of it

and looked extremely intoxicated.” It was decided to

put AM in JP’s son’s vacant room, which was next to

the bathroom. As SrA CC was getting ready to pick up

AM to move her, Appellant picked AM up “like a child”

and carried her to JP’s son’s bedroom. The group

followed Appellant into the bedroom as he laid AM on

the bed. The group suggested SrA CC stay with AM

and cuddle with her until she fell asleep, which he

agreed to do. SrA CC lay down next to AM on his back,

and AM cuddled against SrA CC, putting her left leg

and arm across his body, and her head on SrA CC's

chest. Shortly after, AM fell asleep. AM still had her

clothes on; she was wearing a “romper,” a one-piece

outfit (MP was also wearing a romper during the

evening). SrA CC testified the bedroom was not pitch

black, as the door had been cracked open to allow some

light from the hallway to come into the room.

SrA KC testified that after putting AM to bed and

after shutting the door, Appellant and MP were on the

couch kissing and touching each other. SrA KC and JP

asked if MP and Appellant needed a blanket. When

they did not get a response, SrA KC stated [he] “threw

a blanket at them, turned the lights off, and . . . went

back to [JP’s] room.” SrA KC stated he observed

Appellant and MP from the time they entered the

house until he went to bed, and although she was

drunk by appearance, MP was coherent. SrA KC also

stated he heard laughter from MP and Appellant and

that they “were very physically connected.”

JP testified that when she woke up to go to the

bathroom, she went into the living room to check on

MP and Appellant and found them “making out” on

the couch. One was on top of the other, although she

did not recall who was on top. When asked by defense

006a

counsel if JP had any concern about MP’s well-being

when she entered the living room, she stated:

No, if I thought something was of a

harm, I would have done something

about it. . . . [A]t that moment, I didn’t

see anything that was going wrong. Not

saying that something couldn’t have

gone wrong afterwards.

SrA CC received a text at 0254 and responded to that

text at 0302. Shortly after, he fell asleep. At

approximately 0330, while still lying next to AM, SrA

CC woke up feeling something was strange. When he

opened his eyes, he saw Appellant behind AM. He

could see Appellant was naked. SrA CC further stated

AM was “positioned as her right knee was on the

carpet and her left knee was on the bed. It was not on

me anymore, and as in she was still on her stomach

and her head was still on my chest.” SrA CC stated

Appellant was on both knees, “moving back and forth

in a thrusting motion.” At this point, as he was waking

up, SrA CC realized that Appellant was penetrating

AM’s vagina with his penis. SrA CC “tried to shove”

Appellant off AM, and was finally able to push him off

AM within “about three pushes.” SrA CC stated that

AM’s romper had been slid to the right to allow

Appellant’s penis to enter her vagina. SrA CC was

“[o]ne hundred percent” confident he saw Appellant’s

penis inside AM’s vagina, stating he could tell

Appellant was not wearing a condom and that he

“vividly remember[ed] the shape of [Appellant’s]

penis. Like that will not—never leave my head—ever.”

While SrA CC was pushing Appellant off AM,

Appellant said, “It’s okay. It’s [MP].” SrA CC said, “No

man. It’s not [AM]—I mean [MP]. It’s [AM].”

007a

Appellant then stated, “No. This is [MP].” SrA CC told

Appellant, “You need to get off.” Appellant then

stated, “Oh,” and after SrA CC pushed Appellant off

AM, Appellant kept saying, “I’m sorry. I’m sorry.” SrA

CC then escorted Appellant out of the room and locked

the door. During this time, AM was still unconscious

with her eyes shut, and she was still lying with half

her body on the bed, even after SrA CC escorted

Appellant out of the room.

SrA CC panicked. After about 10–15 minutes trying to

decide what to do, at 0343, SrA CC texted his

roommate, SrA DS, and his other roommate, JL. SrA

DS called him back. SrA CC walked out of the bedroom

and into the living room, where he saw MP and

Appellant both on the couch. MP was on one side;

Appellant was on the other. Both were sleeping. SrA

CC tried to wake up MP, telling her, “Hey. This is an

emergency. You need to go into the room with [AM].”

MP would not wake up. According to SrA CC, MP was

“unconscious however, she was moving. It looked like

she was fighting to wake up however, she just couldn’t

get there until I had to put my hands on her and shake

her [on her shoulders] a little bit, be a little louder,

and then finally she did . . . awake to understand what

I was saying.” SrA CC escorted MP to the bedroom

where AM was lying. AM was still “completely”

unconscious. MP fell asleep on the floor; AM was on

the bed.

SrA DS showed up at the house at approximately

0400. When he arrived, Appellant was on the couch.

SrA DS did a sweep of the house to make sure there

were no kids in the house. SrA DS and SrA CC had

trouble waking Appellant, who was in his underwear

(described by SrA DS as “gray with a black waistband,

spandex type”) and was “passed out unconsciously on

008a

the couch.” Appellant’s clothes were on the floor next

to the couch. SrA DS tried to wake Appellant, telling

him, “Hey. You’re not wanted here. You need to leave

right now.” Using Appellant’s phone (which Appellant

unlocked), SrA DS called Appellant an “Uber” ride to

get him out of the house.

SrA DS woke JP and SrA KC up and told them what

was going on. Then SrA CC and SrA DS helped

Appellant off the sofa to get him dressed. Appellant’s

clothes were on the floor next to the couch. Appellant

dressed in the bathroom. SrA DS walked Appellant

outside, sat him down, and waited for the Uber. The

Uber arrived a short time later and took Appellant to

his home. According to the Uber driver’s video,

Appellant was picked up from JP’s residence at 0417

and dropped off at his own residence at 0430.

After Appellant left in the Uber, there was additional

discussion on what to do about AM, who was still

unconscious in the bedroom. SrA KC, who was a

security forces member, called his supervisor to

discuss who would have jurisdiction. His supervisor

told him to call 911. JP went to the room where AM

and MP were sleeping and at approximately 0534, SrA

KC called 911 and reported that AM had been sexually

assaulted. 4 When SrA KC called 911, he was not

aware MP believed Appellant had also sexually

assaulted her.

Officer BT, a deputy sheriff, responded to the 911 call.

Initially, he was told of only one victim. Officer BT

talked to SrA CC about the situation and then went

4 SrA KC recalled calling 911 at approximately 0520; Officer BT

testified the call came in at 0534. He then stated it only took him

five minutes to get to JP’s residence.

009a

into the bedroom where AM was still unconscious.

Officer BT stated, “[AM] was not coherent at the time

and she was still in the process of being woke up in the

front bedroom.” At some point while Officer BT was

there, AM woke up and was “hysterically crying” after

being told what happened. After talking to a few

people, Officer BT then spoke with MP, who made a

comment that “she didn’t consent either.” Officer BT

began to ask questions to MP, who told him that

Appellant had digitally penetrated her, and that the

entire time he was trying to do this, she was “trying to

push him off, and was telling him to stop.” At this

point, Officer BT believed he had two victims and

arranged for both AM and MP to undergo a forensic

evaluation for sexual assault.

DNA was later taken from Appellant, AM, and MP.

Although no semen was found in MP’s underwear,

AM’s cervical swabs, or AM’s rectal swaps, Appellant’s

DNA was found in AM’s cervix and rectum. AM’s DNA

was also found in Appellant’s underwear. The results

also indicated that Appellant’s and AM’s DNA were

found in MP’s underwear.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency of Sexual

Assault of MP

1. Additional Background

At trial, MP testified that even though she was texting

with Appellant, she tried to deflect some interest in

Appellant through some of her responses.

Nonetheless, MP told Appellant she would be at the

Bluewater Bar the evening of 16 September 2017. MP

stated she met up with Appellant at Bluewater and he

010a

got her a drink. According to her testimony, MP

remembered little after this event. After Appellant

brought her a drink, MP stated she did not remember

the following events: (1) dancing with Appellant; (2)

leaving Bluewater that night with Appellant; (3)

walking to JP’s house; (4) taking pictures on her

phone; (5) asking JP if Appellant could stay at her

house; (6) JP asking MP if she was okay while she was

kissing Appellant on the couch; and (7) JP asking if

MP was okay or if she needed a blanket.

MP testified that her next memory after Appellant

brought her a drink at Bluewater was “waking up on

the couch with [Appellant] on top of [her].” She

testified that:

[Appellant] was on top of me kissing me,

and I, kind of like, realized, started to

realize, kind of what was going on. I

remember, kind of pushing him off, and

then, kind of, I guess, went out again, I

guess is a way to put it.

MP stated Appellant was wearing a pink shirt and

was pretty sure he had his pants on.

The next memory MP had was waking up to Appellant

having his hand in her romper outfit. MP stated she

had to “push his hands out of me, basically,” referring

to Appellant having his fingers in her vagina. When

she realized Appellant’s hands were inside her, she

“had to push them out.” She stated, “I told him no, and

I told him stop.”

MP testified,

I remember pushing him off, and then I

remember him finally getting off, and I

011a

thought at that point he had left. So, I

curled over into, like curled over into the

couch, basically, I was trying to go—and

trying to go to sleep, but that way he

couldn’t get to me, I thought. And then

the next thing I remember, I guess I

heard a sound or something. I am not

sure what woke me up, but I remember

seeing him. So, the bathroom light was

on, and I remember seeing him, an

outline, in the hallway, and he didn’t

have any clothes on, and then I

remember him being on top of me and he

was in my face, saying my name.

2. Law

A Court of Criminal Appeals may affirm only such

findings of guilty “as it finds correct in law and fact

and determines, on the basis of the entire record,

should be approved.” Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §

866(c). “Article 66(c) requires the Courts of Criminal

Appeals to conduct a de novo review of legal and

factual sufficiency of the case.” United States v.

Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation

omitted).

“The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J.

294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States v.

Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). “The term

reasonable doubt, however, does not mean that the

evidence must be free from conflict.” United States v.

Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017)

012a

(citing United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684

(A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

“[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are

bound to draw every reasonable inference from the

evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.” United

States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001)

(citations omitted). As a result, “[t]he standard for

legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold to

sustain a conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J.

218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (alteration in original)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 3102,

139 S. Ct. 1641 (2019).

The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after

weighing the evidence in the record of trial and

making allowances for not having personally observed

the witnesses,” this court is “convinced of the

[appellant]’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United

States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting

United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A.

1987)). “In conducting this unique appellate role, we

take ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying

‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a

presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our] own independent

determination as to whether the evidence constitutes

proof of each required element beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568 (alteration in original)

(quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399). This court’s

review of the factual sufficiency of evidence for findings

is limited to the evidence admitted at trial. Article 66(c),

UCMJ; United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 458

(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citations omitted).

Appellant was convicted of sexual assault by bodily

harm against MP in violation of Article 120(b)(1)(B),

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(1)(B), which required the

Prosecution to prove two elements beyond a

013a

reasonable doubt: (1) that Appellant committed a

sexual act upon MP by penetrating her vulva with his

fingers; and (2) that Appellant did so by causing bodily

harm to MP, to wit: penetrating her vulva with his

fingers without her consent. See Manual for CourtsMartial, United States (2016 ed.) (MCM), pt. IV, ¶

45.b.(3)(b). “‘[B]odily harm’ means any offensive

touching of another, however slight, including any

nonconsensual sexual act.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45.a.(g)(3).

With regard to consent, the statute explains,

[t]he term “consent” means a freely given

agreement to the conduct at issue by a

competent person. An expression of lack

of consent through words or conduct

means there is no consent. Lack of verbal

or physical resistance or submission

resulting from the use of force, threat of

force, or placing another person in fear

does not constitute consent. A current or

previous dating or social or sexual

relationship by itself or the manner of

dress of the person involved with the

accused in the conduct at issue shall not

constitute consent.

MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45.a.(g)(8)(A). The statute further

explains that “[a] sleeping, unconscious, or

incompetent person cannot consent.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶

45.a.(g)(8)(B). “Lack of consent may be inferred based

on the circumstances of the offense. All the

surrounding circumstances are to be considered in

determining whether a person gave consent, or

whether a person did not resist or ceased to resist only

because of another person’s actions.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶

45.a.(g)(8)(C).

014a

The defense of mistake of fact as to consent requires

that an appellant, because of ignorance or mistake,

incorrectly believe that another consented to the

sexual contact. See R.C.M. 916(j)(1). In order to rely on

a mistake of fact as to a consent defense, Appellant’s

belief must be honest and reasonable. See id.; United

States v. Gans, No. ACM 39321, 2019 CCA LEXIS 162,

at *14 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 11 Apr. 2019) (unpub. op.);

United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85, 91 (C.A.A.F. 1998)

(quoting United States v. Willis, 41 M.J. 435, 438

(C.A.A.F 1995)). Once raised, the Government bears

the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defense does not exist. R.C.M. 916(b)(1); see United

States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376, 379 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

Yet, the “burden is on the actor to obtain consent,

rather than the victim to manifest a lack of consent.”

McDonald, 78 M.J. at 381. An “[a]ppellant’s actions

could only be considered innocent if he had formed a

reasonable belief that he had obtained consent. The

government only needed to prove that he had not done

so to eliminate the mistake of fact defense.” Id.

3. Analysis

The timing of Appellant’s actions towards both MP

and AM are critical to determining legal and factual

sufficiency. At 0254 on 17 September 2017, SrA CC

received a text and responded to that text at 0302.

Shortly after, he fell asleep; the door to his room was

cracked open. At approximately 0330, SrA CC awoke

to Appellant penetrating AM with his penis while

Appellant was on his knees.

Prior to 0302, there is no indication of any mal-intent

on the part of Appellant towards either MP or AM. In

fact, regarding MP the converse is true: the testimony

shows that MP was somewhat, if not very, interested

015a

in Appellant. The text messages leading up to

Appellant and MP meeting at the Bluewater show a

rapid escalation in MP and Appellant’s relationship.

MP was observed both dancing and “grinding” with

Appellant at Bluewater, and kissing him outside JP’s

residence. No witness indicated MP was in distress at

any point during the night. MP asked JP if Appellant

could stay the night at the house. Both JP and SrA KC

indicated MP was engaged in intimate behavior with

Appellant while in JP’s residence. SrA KC heard

laughter coming from the living room. JP did not sense

anything was wrong between MP and Appellant, and

even went so far as to say that if she thought MP was

in harm, she would have done something about the

situation. Before 0302, when SrA CC received a text,

there is nothing in the record to suggest that

Appellant committed a sexual assault against MP.

Appellant argues that MP’s claim of sexual assault is

inconsistent with the balance of the evidence and

demonstrates Appellant’s reasonable mistake of fact

as to consent. Had MP alleged a sexual assault

occurring before SrA CC fell asleep at 0302, the facts

above indicate a viable argument. However, the fact

that AM’s DNA was found in MP’s underwear

supports a conclusion that Appellant sexually

assaulted MP after he penetrated AM and before SrA

CC saw MP and Appellant on the couch around 0345.

The following evidence supports this conclusion: (1)

Appellant was clothed when MP said “no” and “stop”

on the couch; (2) SrA CC testified he saw Appellant’s

clothes near the couch and Appellant was naked when

he was in the bedroom, which supports an inference

that Appellant took off his clothes in the living room

before he sexually assaulted AM; (3) Appellant told

SrA CC it was okay he was having sex with MP, when

016a

he was actually having sex with AM, and that he was

“sorry”; (4) MP remembered seeing Appellant naked

in the hallway; (5) MP testified she was asleep when

Appellant came back to the couch; (6) SrA CC saw MP

and Appellant asleep on the couch when he came out

to the living room; and (7) SrA CC’s observation of

Appellant on the couch in his underwear indicated to

him Appellant put his underwear back on after he left

AM’s room and returned to the couch where MP slept.

Appellant penetrated AM’s vagina with his penis, and

after SrA CC pushed Appellant off AM, Appellant

moved back to the couch, where he digitally

penetrated MP’s vagina. The evidence does not

support a finding that Appellant had a reasonable or

honest belief that MP was consenting to Appellant’s

digital penetration.

Appellant argues that MP had a personal motive to

fabricate her allegations against Appellant due to an

ongoing child custody battle with her soon to-be exhusband. Appellant hinges this argument on the fact

that SrA DS, who showed up at JP’s house right after

the sexual assaults, was a friend of MP’s soon-to-be exhusband, and had MP’s ex-husband learned MP had

been engaged in sexual activities “with an accused

sexual assaulter on the same night her friend, AM,

was attacked,” it could cast her in an unfavorable light

in those proceedings. Appellant notes the timing of

when MP came forward, stating MP only decided to

report her alleged assault after SrA DS showed up.

We find no evidence to support this attack on MP’s

credibility. The Defense has essentially asked us to

speculate why MP did not tell anyone what happened

to her before her disclosure to Officer BT. There was

no evidence, or comments, or any reaction to MP

seeing SrA DS in a negative light when he showed up

017a

to assist. In fact, SrA DS testified that MP told SrA

DS that Appellant pressed on her, that he was

aggressive, and that she told him no. MP’s comments

to SrA DS could be viewed as MP trying to prevent or

preempt SrA DS from telling MP’s husband that MP

was possibly engaged in sexual activity, by fabricating

a sexual assault when SrA DS suddenly showed up at

the house. However, from this court’s review of the

testimony and evidence, the record suggests this is not

the case. Most importantly, there was no evidence SrA

DS called MP’s husband to inform him of what

happened to MP. MP did report an assault to Officer

BT. Finally, MP subjected herself to a SANE

examination.

In assessing legal sufficiency, we are limited to the

evidence produced at trial and are required to consider

it in the light most favorable to the Government. In

doing so, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could

have found beyond a reasonable doubt all the

elements to support Appellant’s conviction of sexual

assault against MP. Furthermore, in assessing factual

sufficiency, after weighing all the evidence in the

record of trial and having made allowances for not

having personally observed the witnesses, we are

convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Therefore, we find Appellant’s conviction of

sexual assault against MP both legally and factually

sufficient.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

1. Additional Background

Appellant asserts his trial defense counsel, Mr. JMB,

Mr. LEC, Mr. JRH, and Captain (Capt) RM, were

ineffective in that they (1) failed to submit a

resignation-in-lieu of court-martial (RILO) request

018a

within seven days of referral of Appellant’s case; (2)

engaged in harassing behavior against MP; and (3)

offered a theory of the case that conceded Appellant’s

guilt. We examine each claim in turn.

Pursuant to Appellant’s second assignment of error,

on 7 May 2020 this court ordered Appellant’s four trial

defense counsel to provide affidavits or declarations

that were responsive to Appellant’s claims that he did

not receive effective assistance of counsel. 5 We have

considered whether a post-trial evidentiary hearing is

required to resolve any factual disputes. Reviewing

trial defense counsel’s declarations and the record as

a whole, we are convinced such a hearing is

unnecessary. See United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236,

248 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. DuBay, 37

C.M.R. 411, 413 (C.M.A. 1967) (per curiam).

Charges were preferred against Appellant on 18 April

2018, the preliminary hearing occurred on 1 June

2018, the case was referred on 21 June 2018, and

Appellant was served with the referral on 29 June

2018. On 19 October 2018, three days before

Appellant’s initial trial date (22 October 2018),

Appellant submitted a RILO. At trial, the military

judge granted a defense request for a continuance

until 26 November 2018 that was unrelated to the

RILO submission.

The Government sought to proceed to trial while the

decision of the Secretary of the Air Force on

Appellant’s RILO was pending. On 15 November 2018,

This court did not receive a declaration from trial defense

counsel, Mr. JMB. However, Mr. JMB did concur with Mr. LEC’s

declaration. Mr. LEC is a member of Mr. JMB’s law firm and one

of Appellant’s defense attorneys. Appellant did not raise

opposition to the absence of Mr. JMB’s affidavit or declaration.

5

019a

the Chief of the Military Justice Division (JAJM)

granted the Government permission to proceed to trial

based on “the particular circumstances of

[Appellant’s] request to resign, including his failure to

submit his request within seven (7) days of referral.”

Appellant’s court-martial concluded on 1 December

2018 with findings of guilty to the Charge and its two

specifications. On 4 April 2019, Appellant’s request for

a RILO was denied.

As part of his pretrial investigation, Appellant,

through counsel, hired a private investigator to

interview the witnesses who were identified as victims

in the case. The investigator attempted to interview

MP at her residence and place of employment. Upon

receiving notice from trial counsel that MP requested

a Special Victims’ Counsel, the defense team notified

the investigator to cease attempts to contact MP, and

the investigator complied. Capt RM also stated that

he talked to Mr. LEC and Mr. JMB and they related

there was no intent to harass the alleged victim, only

to investigate the case.

At trial, it was revealed that one of Appellant’s civilian

defense counsel, Mr. LEC, provided MP’s blood alcohol

report from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and

MP’s written statement in Appellant’s case to MP’s

husband’s divorce attorney. In exchange, Mr. LEC

received a deposition from the divorce proceedings.

As lead counsel for the Defense, Mr. JMB gave the

closing argument at the conclusion of findings.

According to Capt RM, Mr. JMB’s strategy during

closing argument was to raise reasonable doubt

throughout the entirety of his argument. Mr. JMB

talked about a “terrible mistake” by Appellant, stating

that:

020a

I think it’s a plausible suggestion that

[Appellant] got up, went to the bathroom

just a short distance away, just the end

of the hallway. [Appellant] went in the

bathroom, instead of going straight and

coming right back out to [MP],

[Appellant] took a left turn in a house

he’d never been in and went into the

bedroom instead. Another girl in there,

near darkness. It’s night. The only light

was coming from the hallway. Both

[women] were wearing black rompers. It

doesn’t make sense that he would go in

there unless [Appellant] was just making

a huge mistake with another guy laying

on the bed.

Capt RM stated in his declaration:

Based on my conversations with Mr.

[JMB] about his closing argument prior

to trial, the argument was not intended

to be a misguided presentation of the

case nor a concession of guilt, but a way

to raise reasonable doubt as to the

prosecution’s presentation of the case.

Mr. LEC declared, “[a]ny defense theory tendered by

the defense team during trial was a strategic decision

made to obtain the best possible outcome for

Appellant based on the facts known at the time.”

2. Law

a. RILO

The Secretary of the Air Force clearly has authority to

promulgate an administrative regulation providing

for the tender of a RILO, if that officer has committed

021a

acts rendering him subject to such trial. United States

v. Little, No. ACM 34726, 2003 CCA LEXIS 224, at *7

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 26 Sep. 2003) (unpub. op.)

(citation omitted). When an officer has submitted a

RILO, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-201,

Administration of Military Justice, ¶ 7.24.7.1

(8 Dec. 2017), dictates the process. Prior permission

from the Air Force Legal Operations Agency, Military

Justice Division (AFLOA/JAJM), is required before a

case proceeds to trial if the officer accused has submitted

a RILO on which action is pending. Id. at ¶ 7.24.7.

JAJM will “normally approve [government] requests

for permission to proceed while a [RILO] is pending if

the officer submitted the request more than seven

calendar days after service of” referred charges. Id. at

¶ 7.24.7.1. However, when officers submit resignation

requests within seven days of receiving referred

charges,

JAJM

“will

normally

disapprove

[government] requests for permission to proceed.” Id.

at ¶ 7.24.7.2.

b. Ineffective assistance of counsel

We review allegations of ineffective assistance de

novo. United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 362

(C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J.

470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2009)). In order for Appellant to

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

he must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

so deficient that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment, and that the deficiency resulted in

prejudice “as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a

trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

022a

We employ a presumption of competence, and apply a

three-part test in assessing whether that presumption

has been overcome: (1) “is there a reasonable

explanation for counsel’s actions?;” (2) “did defense

counsel’s level of advocacy ‘fall measurably below the

performance . . . [ordinarily expected] of fallible

lawyers?;’” and (3) “[i]f defense counsel was

ineffective, is there ‘a reasonable probability that,

absent the errors,’ there would have been a different

result?” Gooch, 69 M.J. at 362 (omission and

alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Polk,

32 M.J. 150, 153 (C.M.A. 1991)).

“Defense counsel do not perform deficiently when they

make a strategic decision to accept a risk or forego a

potential benefit, where it is objectively reasonable to

do so.” United States v. Datavs, 71 M.J. 420, 424

(C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing Gooch, 69 M.J. at 362–63)

(additional citation omitted). In reviewing the

decisions and actions of trial defense counsel, this

court does not second guess strategic or tactical

decisions. See United States v. Morgan, 37 M.J. 407,

410 (C.M.A. 1993) (citations omitted). It is only in

those limited circumstances where a purported

“strategic” or “deliberate” decision is unreasonable or

based on inadequate investigation that it can provide

the foundation for a finding of ineffective assistance.

See United States v. Davis, 60 M.J. 469, 474 (C.A.A.F.

2005).

“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions

concerning the objectives of representation, and . . .

shall consult with the client as to the means by which

they are to be pursued.” AFI 51-110, Professional

Responsibility Program, Attachment 2, Rule 1.2(a) (5

023a

Aug. 2014)). 6 “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s

decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case,

the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after

consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be

entered, whether to waive trial by court members, the

composition of the court, and whether the client will

testify.” Id.

“Whenever the law, nature, and circumstances of the

case permit, trial defense counsel should explore the

possibility of an early diversion of the case from the

criminal process.” AFI 51-110, Attachment 7,

Standard 4-6.1(a). This includes requests for

administrative discharge in lieu of court-martial. Id.,

Discussion.

3. Analysis

a. Appellant’s RILO case

As stated, Appellant did not submit a RILO until 19

October 2018, nearly four months after he

acknowledged receipt of the referred charges. We

understand Appellant’s argument to be that by failing

to submit the RILO immediately or soon after referral,

his counsel’s justification that approval of the RILO

would save Government time, expense, and manpower

was lost. More important to Appellant, his counsel

also lost the justification of “uncertainty,” which we

understand to mean the uncertainty of whether the

Government would continue to garner the victims’

cooperation and their desire to testify in the

Government’s case at trial. 7 Coupled with a viable

6 This AFI was updated on 11 Dec. 2018.

7 Appellant’s brief highlights challenges the Government needed

to overcome, including that AM “considered not going through

024a

mistake of fact defense, as well as issues regarding

MP’s credibility, Appellant believes these factors

support the notion that a timely RILO request would

not have been a “[H]ail [M]ary,” but a “legitimate and

reasonable offer that should have garnered serious

consideration.”

Trial defense counsel rebutted Appellant’s claims

about his desire to submit a RILO. In his declaration

to this court, Mr. LEC explained:

The defense team regularly discussed

the process for submitting a [RILO]

request with Appellant, as well as the

pros and cons associated [sic] submitting

his request. Appellant was the ultimate

decision maker as to whether to submit

a request to resign in lieu of courtmartial and as to the timing for its

submission.

In his declaration to this court, Mr. JRH explained

that he discussed the issue of the RILO multiple times

with Appellant who was aware of his right to submit

one. Mr. JRH stated, “Initially, [Appellant] stated that

he did not want to submit a RILO, but then in October

[Appellant] indicated that he would like to submit

such a request—which was well after the date the

charges were referred in June.” Mr. JRH also stated,

[I]t should be noted that based upon

various conversations with the Chief of

Military Justice and other members of

the legal office, it was clear that there

would not be any support for a RILO

with this case because [she] just wanted to put it in the past and

get on with [her] life.”

025a

from the legal office or from the

command. In short, the chances of a

RILO being approved for a sexual

assault case that had two victims was

virtually nonexistent. . . . it was well

after the referral of charges and there

was not any support for such a

resolution.

Appellant did not provide any documentation to rebut

these declarations.

“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions

concerning the objectives of representation, and . . .

shall consult with the client as to the means by which

they are to be pursued. . . . A lawyer shall abide by a

client’s decision whether to settle a matter.” AFI 51110, Rule 1.2(a) (5 Aug. 2014). In their declarations,

trial defense counsel stated they advised Appellant

before referral, yet Appellant chose to not submit a

RILO until shortly before trial. Trial defense counsel

abided by Appellant’s decision on the matter, and

therefore, we agree with Appellee that “trial defense

counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to submit

a request to settle Appellant’s case when they lacked

the authority to submit such a request.”

Further, Appellant notes there was no value in failing

to request a delay in the trial pending the Secretary of

the Air Force’s decision on this matter. Given that the

Government had a strong case, the lack of support for

Appellant’s request from the Government for the

RILO, and timing of Appellant’s RILO submission, it

is unlikely the military judge would have granted a

continuance on this collateral matter pending the

Secretary’s decision. We find that Appellant has failed

to show any prejudice in the processing of a RILO, or

026a

that his counsel were ineffective regarding the timing

of his RILO request, nor were they ineffective in

failing to request a continuance of his trial from the

court pending the Secretary’s decision.

b. Trial defense counsel’s investigation of

Appellant’s case

We do not believe trial defense counsel engaged in

harassing behavior against MP by hiring an

investigator, as it is expected defense counsel would

do their due diligence investigating facts. See AFI 51110, Attachment 7, Standard 4-1.1. Specifically

regarding MP, as soon as trial counsel notified trial

defense counsel that MP requested a SVC, the

investigator stood down.

However, we have given great consideration to

Appellant’s claim that release of MP’s records to her

estranged husband, by Appellant’s defense attorneys,

damaged the Defense’s case. Specifically, at the time

of her sexual assault, MP was in the process of getting

a divorce from her husband and child custody was a

significant issue. Trial defense counsel provided to

MP’s husband’s divorce attorney MP’s blood alcohol

report from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and

MP’s written statement to investigators, in exchange

for a deposition from the divorce proceedings.

Ultimately, during their cross-examination of MP,

trial defense counsel sought to show MP had a motive

to fabricate being a victim; that, by claiming to be a

victim and not a voluntary actor, she would be put in

a better light in her ongoing divorce and custody

proceedings. Mr. LEC stated in his declaration that

this type of exchange of evidence, “is not prohibited in

Georgia” and “at all times [Appellant’s trial defense

027a

counsel] acted in conformance with the Georgia Rules

of Professional Conduct.”

During cross-examination of MP, assistant trial

counsel objected to the relevance of MP’s divorce

proceedings. In the following Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 839(a), session, when asked by the military

judge about the relevance of the child custody issue,

trial defense counsel stated:

Well, it certainly could have an impact, if

someone is living a certain way and

doing certain things that the court does

not approve of. And I can certainly state

my place, Judge. We are still in a very

conservative venue here in South

Georgia, and they expect mothers of

children are not to go out and do certain

things. And again, it is certainly better

in a case arguably to be a victim, as

opposed to being something else.

Ascertaining the situation, the military judge asked

Mr. JMB, “why would you be releasing this discovery

for this case to someone else, who had no interest?”

Mr. JMB responded, “It was a quid pro quo for—he

wanted something from us, for us, to give us the . . . .

The deposition from the divorce.” Mr. JMB stated this

type of “quid pro quo” frequently happened in civilian

court. Mr. JMB denied releasing any medical records.

Shortly thereafter, trial defense counsel clarified the

relevance of the information, stating that MP’s level of

intoxication that night “goes toward whether [MP]

was out being promiscuous, or whether she was

forcibly assaulted.”

After some debate on the relevance of the documents,

MP’s possible motive, and the prejudice to the Defense

028a

regarding the release of the records, the military judge

stated:

[T]he real prejudice is not to you guys,

because you are the ones, who released

it. The real question is whether it is

prejudicial to your client, and that’s

really my only concern here. Whether or

not you guys did the right thing, that is

something we are going to take up later,

whether

you

released

official

government, you know, government

documents that were part of a trial, and

you released them as part of a quid pro

quo agreement with another attorney,

knowing that it would have a beneficial

impact also to your particular case here,

when those government documents were

released under Rules for Courts-Martial,

and under our guidelines, and under our

ethical rules and those kinds of things,

that is a separate issue, which we may

take up after this trial is over. The real

question is, why let your actions

prejudice your client? That is my only

concern right here.

...

I do have an issue with what you did. I

don’t care whether if it is the good old

boys and girls network and that’s how

you work things. That is not the way it

works in a court-martial. That is for

official use only. That is how those

documents are released.

029a

Finding that there was grounds under Mil. R. Evid.

608(c), the military judge allowed minimal

questioning of MP on the issue of her divorce and

custody, as well as that SrA DS knew her husband, as

proper bias, motive to

misrepresent,

and

impeachment evidence of MP.

Yet, in her testimony at sentencing, MP noted that the

documents trial defense counsel turned over to her

husband’s attorney resulted in the family court judge’s

“concerns about [her] character and alcohol. And so at

that point, he did not decide it was okay to give

custody to us. So he, in turn gave custody to our

grandmothers. And, I attended alcohol counseling and

counseling for that.” Trial counsel then asked MP if it

was her understanding that the family court judge’s

decision was a direct result of the documents turned

over. MP responded, “That’s my understanding; yes,

sir.” The military judge also allowed MP to provide

information related to her divorce to be presented in

an unsworn statement to the members.

After announcement of sentence, trial counsel

reminded the military judge about the release of the

documents. The military judge concluded that under

Article 48, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 848, his authority to

punish for contempt was limited, and that Article 6(b),

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 806b, did not specifically indicate

Article 48 was a remedy for an Article 6(b) violation.

However, he left the door open in the event trial

counsel chose to pursue contempt proceedings. They

did not.

The Defense had no evidence that MP fabricated being

a victim; it was a mere theory. The disclosure of

documents in a “quid pro quo” transaction related to

Appellant’s case to MP’s estranged husband’s attorney

030a

was done to gain an advantage in an attempt to attack

MP’s credibility. Standard 4-4.3(a) of Attachment 7,

AFI 51-110, states that defense counsel “should not

use means that have no substantial purpose other to

embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . . .” While

the disclosure of this evidence did burden and affect

MP’s civil case with her husband, we do not believe

trial defense counsel’s substantial purpose in the

“quid pro quo” was to embarrass or burden MP.

Additionally, revisiting Appellant’s assignment of

error on factual sufficiency, trial defense counsel had

little evidence to attack MP’s credibility. As Appellee

argued, the Government’s case was strong, and

because Appellant did not have a credible defense to

counter the evidence, there was no reasonable

probability

“absent

trial

defense

counsel’s

investigation there would have been a different result

at trial.” Appellee also notes that the members were

never informed how MP’s husband gained the

knowledge of Appellant’s case. From our view, while

we do not subscribe with, or condone, trial defense

counsel’s interactions with MP’s husband’s attorneys,

we do recognize that trial defense counsel had an

obligation to conduct a prompt investigation of this

case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant

to the merits of the case. See AFI 51-110, Attachment

7, Standard 4-1.1.

With this said, evaluating whether trial defense

counsel was ineffective on this issue, we look at the

three-part test in in Gooch. First, was there a

reasonable explanation for trial defense counsel’s

actions? See Gooch, 69 M.J. at 362. In this case, the

Defense was trying to develop a theory that would

attack MP’s credibility. Second, did trial defense

counsel’s level of advocacy “fall measurably below the

031a

performance . . . [ordinarily expected] of fallible

lawyers?” Id. Pursuant to their obligations as

Appellant’s counsel, we would expect trial defense

counsel to do their due diligence in conducting an

investigation to discover all facts relevant to the case.

Trial defense counsel took a risk in this case, in that,

had they been able to attack MP’s credibility with this

information, Appellant could have been acquitted of

the specification related to MP; conversely, if this

information backfired, it could impact Appellant in

sentencing. We find that there was no prejudice to

Appellant, and that the level of advocacy provided by

trial defense counsel did not fall below the

performance expected of attorneys practicing in the

military justice arena. Finding that trial defense

counsel were not ineffective, we need not address the

third prong of Gooch —‘“a reasonable probability that,

absent the errors,’ there would have been a different

result.” Id.

c. Trial defense counsel’s theory of the case

The facts of this case strongly favored the

Government’s charging, particularly regarding AM.

Trial defense counsel noted their strategy was to try

to create as much reasonable doubt as possible. As Mr.

JRH declared, the possible defenses were limited,

given the eyewitness and scientific evidence against

Appellant. Trial defense counsel did their best to

attack the credibility and biases of witnesses, to

provide explanations for Appellant’s behavior, and

ultimately in our view, they did not concede guilt. One

of those explanations was the “terrible mistake”

Appellant made when he thought AM was MP.

We do not agree with Appellant that “but for counsel’s

errors,” the result of the proceedings would have been

032a

different. As Appellant stated, trial defense counsel

could have offered a strategy of no defense or a limited

defense; however, it is speculative how that might

have helped Appellant in this case. Trial defense

counsel could have chosen a different closing

argument strategy. However, the record shows their

trial strategy in this case was not unreasonable. That

strategy brought relevant information to the attention

of the members. We evaluate trial defense counsel’s

performance not by the success of their strategy, but

whether counsel made reasonable choices from the

alternatives available at trial. See United States v.

Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting

United States v. Hughes, 48 M.J. 700, 718 (A.F. Ct.

Crim. App. 1998)). Under these circumstances,

Appellant fails to overcome the strong presumption

that counsel’s performance was within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance.

C. Portions of MP’s Unsworn Victim Impact

Statement

1. Law

Although not raised by Appellant in his brief, in light

of the information provided by MP in her unsworn

victim impact statement, we address whether the

military judge abused his discretion in allowing

portions of that statement to be presented to the

members at the sentencing hearing. In United States

v. Hamilton, this court stated that “Article 6b, UCMJ,

gives victims the right to be reasonably heard through

an unsworn statement, which is tantamount to victim

allocution at sentencing.” 77 M.J. 579, 584 (A.F. Ct.

Crim. App. 2017) (citing Kenna v. United States Dist.

Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1351 (D.

033a

Utah 2005)). “R.C.M. 1001A broadly defines the scope

of victim impact.” Id. The court went further in

Hamilton, stating:

[U]nsworn victim impact statements

offered pursuant to R.C.M. 1001A are

not evidence, and therefore not

aggravation evidence offered by the

Prosecution.

....

. . . The military judge has the obligation

to ensure the content of a victim’s

unsworn statement comports with the

defined parameters of victim impact or

mitigation as defined by the statute and

R.C.M. 1001A. See [MCM], pt. II,

Discussion

(“A

victim's

unsworn

statement should not exceed what is

permitted under R.C.M. 1001A(c) . . . .

Upon objection or sua sponte, a military

judge may stop or interrupt a victim’s

unsworn statement that includes

matters outside the scope of R.C.M.

1001A”). A victim’s right to be heard at

sentencing is the right to be “reasonably”

heard. 10 U.S.C. § 806b(a)(4). What a

military judge may find to be

“reasonable” in a particular context may

be informed to some extent by legal

principles embodied in the Military

Rules of Evidence. However, those rules

do not apply to victim unsworn

statements, which are not evidence.

Mil. R. Evid. 403 addresses “legal

relevance” and provides that “evidence”

034a

may be excluded notwithstanding its

logical relevance. In the decision to allow

a victim to exercise their right to be

heard on sentencing, a military judge is

neither

making

a

relevance

determination nor ruling on the

admissibility of otherwise relevant

evidence. Instead, the military judge

assesses the content of a victim’s

unsworn statement not for relevance,

but for scope as defined by R.C.M.

1001A.

Id. at 585–86 (Third omission in original).

Under R.C.M. 1001A(b)(2), ‘“victim impact’ includes

any financial, social, psychological, or medical impact

on the victim directly relating to or arising from the

offense of which the accused has been found guilty.”

When there is error regarding the presentation of

victim statements under R.C.M. 1001A, the test for

prejudice “is whether the error substantially

influenced the adjudged sentence.” United States v.

Barker, 77 M.J. 377, 384 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2018)

(citation omitted). When determining whether an

error had a substantial influence on a sentence, this

court considers the following four factors: “(1) the

strength of the [g]overnment’s case; (2) the strength of

the defense case; (3) the materiality of the evidence in

question; and (4) the quality of the evidence in

question.” Id. (citations omitted); see also United

States v. Machen, No. ACM 39295, 2018 CCA LEXIS

419, at *12 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 29 Aug. 2018) (unpub.

op.) (citing United States v. Bowen, 76 M.J. 83, 89

(C.A.A.F. 2017)). “An error is more likely to be

prejudicial if the fact was not already obvious from the

035a

other evidence presented at trial and would have

provided new ammunition against an appellant.”

Barker, 77 M.J. at 384 (citing United States v. Harrow,

65 M.J. 190, 200 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).

2. Analysis

Trial defense counsel objected to portions of MP’s

statement, specifically that MP “lost [her]

employment in Valdosta because [she] had to move to

Mississippi to be near [her] daughter,” that MP had

been followed by investigators, and that MP felt

Appellant “ha[d] [no] remorse for what he had done.

He’s just upset he got caught.”

In an Article 39(a), UCMJ session, before she

presented her statement to the members, MP provided

clarification to the military judge about her victim

impact. At the session and outside the presence of the

members, MP described in greater detail the impact

the case had on her, and her divorce and custody trial,

testifying that the documents trial defense counsel

turned over to her estranged husband resulted in her

losing custody of her daughter to her own mother, and

that MP had to attend alcohol counseling ordered by

the court.

Initially, and although in error, the military judge did

a Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test. In finding MP’s

statement relevant under R.C.M. 1001A, the military

judge found evidence of a social and psychological

impact on MP, and found the probative value of this

evidence was not substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice to Appellant. The military

judge later addressed that he was in error in doing a

balancing test, and simply looked at the confines of

R.C.M. 1001A to determine if the contents of MP’s

036a

statement would be allowed. In doing so, he allowed

MP’s statement to go forward as drafted.

The question for this court is whether the military

judge abused his discretion in allowing the court

exhibit and MP’s presentation. We find that he did.

The military judge stated he had “no doubt that [trial

defense] counsel’s actions . . . have caused [MP]

additional psychological impact,” and we agree with

this statement. However, allowing that information

potentially resulted in Appellant being held

accountable for the actions of his attorneys, who

exacerbated MP’s status as a victim, and made MP’s

situation worse by the disclosure of evidence to her

soon-to-be ex-husband, who may have used her

situation to his advantage in their divorce and custody

proceedings.

While

MP

suffered

personal

consequences that arose as part of Appellant’s actions

and his counsel’s litigation strategy, the statements

admitted as written allowed MP to pin the blame of

her personal situation onto Appellant. We find these

statements went outside the scope of victim impact

allowed, as her divorce and custody issues did not

directly arise from Appellant’s offenses.

With that said, we apply the test from Bowen to

determine whether the error regarding MP’s

statement had a substantial influence on the

sentence.

The Government had a very strong case against

Appellant involving two victims. The facts

surrounding the sexual assault committed against AM

were extremely egregious and disturbing, and then

just minutes after penetrating AM’s vagina with his

penis, Appellant sexually assaulted MP. Conversely,

Appellant had few facts in his favor. Regarding the

037a

materiality and quality of MP’s statement, we assess

how much the erroneously admitted evidence may

have affected the court-martial. See United States v.

Washington, 80 M.J. 106, 111 (C.A.A.F. 2020). Here,

trial defense counsel cross-examined MP on her

divorce in findings, so this information was not a

surprise to the panel at the sentencing hearing. Also,

the information provided by MP was given through an

unsworn statement, and the military judge

appropriately provided guidance through an

instruction to the panel on how to consider the

information and that the weight and significance of

that unsworn statement rests “within the sound

discretion of each court member.” Applying the Bowen

test, we find the admission of MP’s victim unsworn

statement did not substantially influence Appellant’s

sentence, nor affect the court-martial, and we are

confident the panel gave MP’s statement the proper

weight it deserved.

D. Conditions

Confinement

of

Appellant’s

Post-Trial

1. Additional Background

Appellant spent 33 days in pretrial confinement at the

Lowndes County, Georgia, Jail, before his release and

restriction to base. 8 After his conviction, Appellant

was again confined in the Lowndes County Jail, where

he remained for approximately two months before his

transfer to a military confinement facility. On 29

March 2019, Appellant submitted a clemency letter to

the convening authority, alleging that while confined

in the civilian confinement facility, he was subjected

8 Appellant was released by civilian authorities conditioned upon

being restricted to base.

038a

to the following post-trial living conditions: (1) he had

to share a single cell and toilet with 16 other

prisoners, some of whom were gang members and

suffering drug-withdrawal symptoms; (2) he suffered

physical attacks and injuries from other prisoners; (3)

the guards were not located close to his cell and

neglected calls for help; (4) cleaning supplies were

never made available to clean the toilet; (5)

confinement officials withheld his mail;

(6) he was not allowed any visitors until his transfer

to military confinement; (7) confinement officials

withheld food from him; (8) he was not permitted to go

outside for the entirety of his two-month confinement;

(9) he was not provided clean clothes; and (10) he had

limited opportunities to bathe.

Appellant argues these post-trial conditions adversely

affected him both physically and mentally. On 31

March 2019, the staff judge advocate wrote an

addendum to her 18 March 2019 staff judge advocate

recommendation (SJAR). In the SJAR Addendum, she

stated she received Appellant’s clemency matters. Her

recommendation to the convening authority, which

was to approve the sentence as adjudged, remained

unchanged. Action was taken on 5 April 2019.

On 10 April 2020, as part of his appeal, Appellant and

his mother provided affidavits attesting to his

conditions while in the civilian confinement facility.

Appellant stated he did not file a complaint under

Article 138, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 938, because he was

afraid of being labeled a “snitch,” he knew his

complaint would fall on deaf ears with the facility, and

because of lack of access to his unit. In her affidavit,

Appellant’s mother, Ms. VR, noted that her son was

not allowed visits during his time in civilian

confinement and he did not have access to his mail.

039a

Ms. VR also declared that she noticed a decline in

Appellant’s mental state and that her son was refused

medical care. Finally, she noticed a decline in

Appellant’s overall demeanor and appearance.

In response to Appellant’s assignment of error

regarding his post-trial confinement conditions,

Appellee moved to attach two declarations: a

declaration from Captain JC, the jail administrator at

the Lowndes County Jail, and a declaration from

MSgt GB, Appellant’s first sergeant. That motion was

granted by this court. The declarations were deemed

relevant to rebut Appellant’s allegation of his posttrial conditions.

In his declaration, Captain JC outlined basic rules,

standards, and conditions for inmates. Captain JC

noted Appellant did file six grievances with the

facility; however, Appellant never submitted any

complaints about the conditions of his cell, concerns

about his safety, not receiving mail, or being denied

visitors. Captain JC also stated there were no records

indicating Appellant was ever assaulted while

confined at the jail.

MSgt GB declared that Appellant did complain he did

not receive mail, but that Appellant did not show up

at the designated location to pick up mail. MSgt GB

also refuted Appellant’s claims that his unit did not

visit him. MSgt GB stated he attempted to resolve any

complaints Appellant raised to him about the

conditions of his post-trial confinement.

Finally, on 7 July 2020, this court granted a request

from Appellant to attach an affidavit from Appellant’s

wife regarding his post-trial confinement conditions.

In this affidavit, Ms. VJ stated she saw injuries to her

husband (through video chat), including a black eye

040a

and swelling around his lip. Ms. VJ stated Appellant

did not tell her what happened to him until he was

transferred to the Naval Consolidated Brig in

Miramar, California; the true nature of what

happened to Appellant is unknown, but according to

Ms. VJ, it appears to have been a violation of the

“snitch code.”

2. Law

We review de novo whether an appellant has been

subjected to impermissible post-trial confinement

conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment or

Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855. United States v.

Wise, 64 M.J. 468, 473 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United

States v. White, 54 M.J. 469, 471 (C.A.A.F. 2001)).

“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits two types of

punishments: (1) those ‘incompatible with the

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress

of a maturing society’ or (2) those ‘which involve the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” United

States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F. 2006)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03

(1976)). As the United States Supreme Court has

explained, “[t]he Constitution ‘does not mandate

comfortable prisons,’ but neither does it permit

inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

349 (1981)). “[P]rison officials must ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and

medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. at 832

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27

(1984)). This includes protecting prisoners from

violence committed by other prisoners. Id. at 833.

041a

A violation of the Eighth Amendment is shown by

demonstrating:

(1) an objectively, sufficiently serious act

or omission resulting in the denial of

necessities; (2) a culpable state of mind

on the part of prison officials amounting

to deliberate indifference to [an

appellant]’s health and safety; and (3)

that [an appellant] “has exhausted the

prisoner-grievance system . . . and that

he has petitioned for relief under Article

138, UCMJ . . . .”

Lovett, 63 M.J. at 215 (first omission in original)

(footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 46

M.J. 248, 250 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).

Our superior court has emphasized that “[a] prisoner

must seek administrative relief prior to invoking

judicial intervention to redress concerns regarding

post-trial confinement conditions.” Wise, 64 M.J. at

469 (citing White, 54 M.J. at 472). “This requirement

‘promot[es] resolution of grievances at the lowest

possible level [and ensures] that an adequate record

has been developed [to aid appellate review].’” Id. at

471 (alterations in original) (quoting Miller, 46 M.J. at

250). Appellant must show that “absent some unusual

or egregious circumstance . . . he has exhausted the

prisoner-grievance system [in his detention facility]

and that he has petitioned for relief under Article 138,

UCMJ.” White, 54 M.J. at 472 (citation omitted).

Under Article 66(c), UCMJ, we have broad authority

and the mandate to approve only so much of the

sentence as we find “correct in law and fact and

determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be

approved.” The scope of our Article 66(c), UCMJ,

042a

authority to consider claims of post-trial confinement

conditions “is limited to consideration of these claims

as part of our determination of sentence

appropriateness.” United States v. Willman, No. ACM

39642, 2020 CCA LEXIS 300, at *17 (A.F. Ct. Crim

App. 2 Sep. 2020) (unpub. op.) (quoting United States

v. Towns, 52 M.J. 830, 833 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000),

aff’d, 55 M.J. 361 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). “It is also limited

to claims based on post-trial treatment that occurs

prior to the action of the convening authority and

which is documented in the record of trial.” Id.

(quoting Towns, 52 M.J. at 833).

3. Analysis

This is not the first time this court has seen an

appellant bring forth a posttrial confinement claim

from Lowndes County Jail. Earlier this year, we

considered in United States v. O’Bryan, No. ACM

39602, 2020 CCA LEXIS 211 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 24

Jun. 2020) (unpub. op.), a case where the appellant

made similar claims against the facility. Interestingly,

the appellant in O’Bryan was incarcerated at the

Lowndes County Jail just months before Appellant in

the present case was transferred there. See id. Our

court also reviewed an affidavit from Captain JC in

O’Bryan. See id. at *8. Ultimately, no relief was

granted in that case. 9,10

9 As in O’Bryan, Appellant’s claims of maltreatment at Lowndes

County Jail were documented in the record in his clemency

response. In O’Bryan, the appellant’s defense counsel submitted

a statement outlining the conditions; in the present case,

Appellant did not. See O’Bryan, unpub. op. at *5.

10 We also note United States v. Melson, No. ACM 36523, 2007

CCA LEXIS 372 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 14 Sep. 2007) (unpub. op.),

where the appellant in that case alleged pretrial confinement

043a

In this case, by the time Appellant submitted his

clemency response to the convening authority,

Appellant had been moved to a military confinement

facility. Although Appellant made reference to his

confinement conditions in his clemency submission to

the convening authority, Appellant acknowledged

that he did not file a complaint under Article 138,

UCMJ, because he was afraid of being labeled a

“snitch,” he knew his complaint would fall on “deaf

ears” with the facility, and because of lack of access to

his unit. Appellant relies on the “snitch code” for his

justification for not addressing his issues with

command.

Captain JC acknowledged in his affidavit a “snitch

code,” where inmates give information to officers, but

stated the jail “protect[s] the information and identity

of inmates that give us information.” Captain JC’s

affidavit also noted Appellant filed six grievances with

the facility; however, five of those grievances were

filed when Appellant was in pretrial confinement.

Despite having command visits while at the civilian

confinement facility, the first time Appellant

complained to his command about his post-trial

confinement conditions was in his clemency

submission after he had already been transferred to a

military confinement facility. The requirement that a

confinee must seek administrative relief, including

under Article 138, UCMJ, “‘promot[es] resolution of

grievances at the lowest possible level [and ensures]

conditions at Lowndes County Jail. In Melson, trial defense

counsel failed to raise illegal pretrial punishment at trial. Id. at

*2. This court granted the appellant relief pursuant to United

States v. Suzuki, 20 M.J. 248 (C.M.A. 1985). Melson, unpub. op.

at *19.

044a

that an adequate record has been developed [to aid

appellate review].’” Wise, 64 M.J. at 471 (alterations

in original) (quoting Miller, 46 M.J. at 250). As in

O’Bryan, had Appellant filed an Article 138, UCMJ,

complaint and a prisoner grievance while in the

civilian confinement facility, the record would reflect

what action, if any, his command and prison officials

took in response. Also, Appellant does not

convincingly explain how raising issues of hygiene,

visitation rights, and the receipt of mail would result

in adverse consequences to him from confinement

officials or inmates. Yet, although he was aware of the

grievance procedures, as attested to by Captain JC,

Appellant failed to make his grievances known to his

command and prison officials and thus made it

impossible for them to ameliorate, let alone record, all

of his grievances. 11

By failing to raise his issues to prison officials or his

command, Appellant has not shown deliberate

indifference by the Lowndes County Jail. “[A] military

prisoner’s burden to show deliberate indifference [by

prison officials with respect to his health or safety]

requires him to show that ‘official[s] [knew] of and

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official[s] must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw

the inference.’” Lovett, 63 M.J. at 216 (alterations in

11 We note the affidavits from Captain JC and MSgt GB were

written over a year after clemency was submitted. MSgt GB’s

affidavit would have been much more powerful had he been given

an opportunity to rebut Appellant’s claims in March 2019,

instead of April 2020; yet, there is no evidence the convening

authority or the staff judge advocate addressed Appellant’s

allegations with Lowndes County Jail.

045a

original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The record

shows Appellant has failed to meet his burden that he

was subjected to any forms of cruel or unusual

punishment. As a result, Appellant is not entitled to

any relief for his alleged Eighth Amendment or Article

55, UCMJ, violations. Further, for the reasons already

articulated, we also do not grant relief under Article

66, UCMJ, for his alleged post-trial confinement

conditions.

We have also considered whether Appellant’s

assertions warrant sentence relief under our Article

66(c), UCMJ, authority. We review issues of sentence

appropriateness de novo. United States v. Lane, 64

M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (footnote omitted). We may

affirm only as much of the sentence as we find correct

in law and fact and determine should be approved on

the basis of the entire record. Article 66(c), UCMJ. In

determining whether a sentence should be approved,

our authority is “not legality alone, but legality limited

by appropriateness.” United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J.

138, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing United States v.

Atkins, 23 C.M.R. 301, 303 (C.M.A. 1957)). This

authority is “a sweeping congressional mandate to the

Courts of Criminal Appeal to ensure a fair and just

punishment for every accused.” United States v. Baier,

60 M.J. 382, 384 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (internal quotation

marks and footnote omitted). This task requires

“individualized consideration of the particular

accused on the basis of the nature and seriousness of

the offense and the character of the offender.” United

States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In

conducting this review, we must also be sensitive to

considerations of uniformity and even-handedness.

United States v. Sothen, 54 M.J. 294, 296 (C.A.A.F.

046a

2001) (citing United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 287–

88 (C.A.A.F. 1999)). Although we have great discretion

to determine whether a sentence is appropriate, we

have no authority to grant mercy. Nerad, 69 M.J. at

146. 12

There is no question Appellant’s crimes are serious.

Appellant sexually assaulted two women—one victim

who was incapable of consenting, the other a victim of

bodily harm—both in a matter of mere minutes. Based

on our review of the entire record, we find that

Appellant’s sentence is appropriate for the offenses he

committed.

III. CONCLUSION

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law

and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the

substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a)

and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c).

Accordingly, the findings and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

12 Although we exercise our authority to consider outside-the-

record matters to determine if Appellant’s sentence is correct in

law under Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment, see

United States v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478 (C.A.A.F. 2001), we are

precluded from considering additional information about those

conditions that Appellant presents in his post-trial statement of

facts to determine if his sentence is appropriate and “should be

approved” as part of our Article 66(c), UCMJ, review. See United

States v. Jessie, 79 M.J 437, 441 (C.A.A.F. 2020).

047a

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court

048a

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces

Washington, D.C.

United States,

Appellee

v.

D’Andre M.

Johnson,

USCA Dkt. No.

210135/AF

Crim.App. No. 39676

ORDER

Appellant

On further consideration of the granted issues

(81 M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. April 14, 2021)), and in view of

United States v. Willman, 81 M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. July 21,

2021), we note that in its sentence appropriateness

review, the United States Air Force Court of Criminal

Appeals erred in failing to consider additional

information about Appellant’s post-trial confinement

conditions even though Appellant had raised the

matter in his clemency response to the convening

authority. Appellate courts may “consider affidavits

and gather additional facts through a DuBay hearing

when doing so is necessary for resolving issues raised

by materials in the record.” United States v. Jessie, 79

M.J. 437, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2020). In United States v. Tyler,

81 M.J. 108 (C.A.A.F. 2021), we held that either party

may comment on properly admitted unsworn victim

statements. Therefore, the military judge did not

plainly err in permitting trial counsel to present

argument based on the victim’s unsworn statement.

Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 10th day of

August, 2021,

ORDERED:

049a

That the decision of the United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed as to findings

but reversed as to sentence; and,

The record of trial is returned to the Judge

Advocate General of the Air Force for further review

under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10

U.S.C. § 866. Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.

§ 867, shall apply.

For the Court,

/s/

cc:

David A. Anderson

Acting Clerk of the Court

The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel (Bruegger)

Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)

050a

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEALS

________________________

No. ACM 39676 (rem)

________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

D’Andre M. JOHNSON

Second Lieutenant (O-1), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

________________________

On Remand from

the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces

Decided 19 July 2022

________________________

Military Judge: W. Shane Cohen.

Approved Sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 10

years, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances.

Sentence adjudged 1 December 2018 by GCM

convened at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.

For Appellant: Major Sara J. Hickmon, USAF; Mark

C. Bruegger, Esquire; Catherine M. Cherkasky,

Esquire.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason,

USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Neil, USAF;

051a

Major Anne M. Delmare, USAF; Major John P.

Patera, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.

Before POSCH, RICHARDSON, and MEGINLEY,

Appellate Military Judges.

Judge RICHARDSON delivered the opinion of the

court, in which Senior Judge POSCH joined. Judge

MEGINLEY filed a separate opinion, dissenting in

part and in the result.

________________________

This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,

does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule

of Practice and Procedure 30.4.

________________________

RICHARDSON, Judge:

Contrary to his pleas, a general court-martial

composed of officer members convicted Appellant of

one specification of sexual assault of AM, by

penetrating AM’s vulva with his penis while AM was

incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to

impairment by alcohol, and one specification of sexual

assault of MP, by penetrating her vulva with his finger

by causing MP bodily harm, both in violation of Article

120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10

U.S.C. § 920. 1 The panel sentenced Appellant to a

dismissal, confinement for ten years, and forfeiture of

all pay and allowances. The military judge credited

Appellant with 138 days against his sentence for time

Appellant spent in pretrial confinement. The

1 All references in this opinion to the UCMJ, Rules for Courts-

Martial, and Military Rules of Evidence are to the Manual for

Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.).

052a

convening

adjudged.

authority approved the

sentence

as

I. BACKGROUND

On initial appeal, Appellant contended, inter alia,

that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution 2 and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.

§ 855, due to inhumane and dangerous conditions and

mistreatment while in post-trial confinement. In a

related claim, Appellant contended that the conditions

of his post-trial confinement render his sentence

inappropriately severe. Considered together, the

claims sought relief under this court’s authority to

affirm “the sentence or such part or amount of the

sentence” as we “find[ ] correct in law and fact and

determine[ ], on the basis of the entire record, should

be approved.” Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).

In United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676, 2020

CCA LEXIS 364 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 16 Oct. 2020)

(unpub. op.), rev’d and remanded in part, 81 M.J. 451

(C.A.A.F. 2021) (mem.), we found Appellant failed to

meet his burden that he was subjected to cruel or

unusual punishment, and we concluded that he was

not entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment or

Article 55, UCMJ. In particular, we found Appellant

did not demonstrate deliberate indifference of prison

officials, exhaustion of the prisoner-grievance system,

or that he petitioned for relief under Article 138,

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 938. Johnson, unpub. op. at *54;

see also United States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215

(C.A.A.F. 2006). We “also considered whether

2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

053a

Appellant’s assertions [regarding his post-trial

confinement conditions] warrant sentence relief under

our Article 66(c), UCMJ, authority,” without

considering Appellant’s extra-record matters, and

found Appellant’s sentence was appropriate. Id.,

unpub. op. at *55, *56 n.12.

Finding no errors that materially prejudiced

Appellant, we affirmed the findings and sentence.

Appellant petitioned the United States Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) to review his

case, and the CAAF granted that petition on the

following issue:

During clemency, Appellant detailed the

deplorable conditions of his post-trial

confinement. On appeal, he provided

supplementary information on these

conditions to support his claims of cruel

and unusual punishment and to seek

sentence relief. Did the lower court err

when it decided it could not consider this

supplementary evidence for its sentence

appropriateness review?[ 3]

United States v. Johnson, 81 M.J. 229, 229–30

(C.A.A.F. 2021).

The CAAF summarily disposed of the issue,

affirming our decision as to findings but reversing it

as to sentence. Johnson, 81 M.J. at 452. The CAAF

“note[d] that in its sentence appropriateness review,

the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals

erred in failing to consider additional information

The CAAF granted an additional issue unrelated to this

remand.

3

054a

about Appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions

even though Appellant had raised the matter in his

clemency response to the convening authority.” Id.

The CAAF returned Appellant’s record of trial “to the

Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for further

review under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military

Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866.” Id. This is that review.

After his case was again docketed with this court,

Appellant identified three assignments of error: (1)

the conditions of his post-trial confinement render his

sentence inappropriately severe, warranting sentence

appropriateness relief; (2) he was entitled to a

unanimous verdict at trial; and (3) the conditions of

his post-trial confinement represented cruel and

unusual punishment, warranting sentence relief. 4

Having considered the additional information about

Appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions, we

conclude that relief is not warranted under the first

assignment of error.

I. DISCUSSION

In Johnson, this court noted that “[a]lthough we

have great discretion to determine whether a sentence

is appropriate, we have no authority to grant mercy.”

Unpub. op. at *56 (citing United States v. Nerad, 69

M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010)). We added the following

footnote:

4 Appellant personally raised issues (2) and (3) pursuant to

United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). Appellant

raised issue (2) for the first time after his case was remanded for

further review; he did not raise it at trial or earlier on appeal to

this court. We addressed issue (3) in our previous opinion, and

find no cause to alter our conclusions. We find issues (2) and (3)

do not warrant further discussion or relief. See United States v.

Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A. 1987).

055a

Although we exercise our authority to

consider outside-the-record matters to

determine if Appellant’s sentence is

correct in law under Article 55, UCMJ,

and the Eighth Amendment, see United

States v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478 (C.A.A.F.

2001), we are precluded from considering

additional information about those

conditions that Appellant presents in his

post-trial statement of facts to determine

if his sentence is appropriate and

“should be approved” as part of our

Article 66(c), UCMJ, review. See United

States v. Jessie, 79 M.J 437, 441

(C.A.A.F. 2020).

Johnson, unpub. op. at *56 n.12. The CAAF found we

erred by not considering this additional information in

our

sentence-appropriateness

review

because

“Appellant had raised the matter in his clemency

response to the convening authority.” Johnson, 81

M.J. at 452; see also United States v. Willman, 81 M.J.

355, 359–60 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (finding that outside-therecord declarations about post-trial confinement

conditions may be considered in an Article 66(c),

UCMJ, sentence appropriateness review when an

appellant raised the issue to the convening authority

during clemency).

We consider all of Appellant’s assertions regarding

post-trial confinement conditions and whether relief is

warranted under Article 66(c), UCMJ, for sentence

appropriateness. Having reviewed all matters

presented on this issue, including all post-trial

declarations submitted to this court, we find

Appellant’s

sentence

was

not

rendered

inappropriately severe by the conditions of his

056a

posttrial confinement. Relief is not warranted; the

sentence is appropriate and should be approved.

I. CONCLUSION

In our previous decision, we affirmed the findings

of guilty; the CAAF affirmed our decision as to

findings. On remand, the sentence is correct in law

and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the

substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a)

and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c).

Accordingly, the sentence is AFFIRMED.

MEGINLEY, Judge (dissenting in part and in the

result):

I concur with the majority’s opinion in footnote

four, supra, with respect to Appellant’s second

assignment of error.

As this opinion notes, the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces (CAAF) opined that in our sentence

appropriateness review, this court erred in “failing to

consider additional information about Appellant’s

post-trial confinement conditions even though

Appellant had raised the matter in his clemency

response to the convening authority.” United States v.

Johnson, 81 M.J. 451, 452 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (mem.). The

CAAF returned this case to our court to consider

whether Appellant’s assertions regarding post-trial

confinement conditions warrant relief under our

Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c), review for

sentence appropriateness. Id. In light of this directive,

and now taking into consideration the additional

information Appellant provided about his posttrial

confinement conditions after he submitted clemency,

057a

along with recent developments discussed in more

detail below, I find it is worth reevaluating Appellant’s

third assignment of error: that the conditions of his

post-trial confinement represented cruel and unusual

punishment.

Since my delivering the opinion of the court in

United States v. Johnson, No. ACM 39676, 2020 CCA

LEXIS 364 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 16 Oct. 2020) (unpub.

op.), rev’d and remanded in part, 81 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F.

2021) (mem.), three opinions have been released by

this court that have led to me to question whether

Appellant suffered cruel and unusual punishment,

and subsequently, whether he is entitled to any

sentence relief. See United States v. Pullings, No.

ACM 39948, 2021 CCA LEXIS 648 (A.F. Ct. Crim.

App. 30 Nov. 2021) (unpub. op.), rev. denied, No. 220123, 2022 CAAF LEXIS 165 (C.A.A.F. 2 Mar. 2022),

then rev. granted, No. 22-0123, 2022 CAAF LEXIS 395

(C.A.A.F. 26 May 2022); United States v. Merritt, No.

ACM 39754, 2021 CCA LEXIS 61 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.

11 Feb. 2021) (unpub. op.), rev. denied, 2021 CAAF

LEXIS 731 (C.A.A.F. 9 Aug. 2021); United States v.

Citsay, No. ACM 39712, 2020 CCA LEXIS 453 (A.F.

Ct. Crim. App. 18 Dec. 2020) (unpub. op.), rev. denied,

2021 CAAF LEXIS 331 (C.A.A.F. 13 Apr. 2021).

In Johnson, we addressed the various issues

Appellant raised regarding the conditions he faced at

Lowndes County Jail (LCJ); along with the response

provided by Captain JC, the jail administrator at the

LCJ; and Master Sergeant GB, Appellant’s first

sergeant. Unpub. op. at *54–55. In that same opinion,

this court also noted a then-recent case involving LCJ,

United States v. O’Bryan, No. ACM 39602, 2020 CCA

LEXIS 211 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 24 Jun. 2020) (unpub.

op.), rev. denied, No. 20-0296, 2020 CAAF LEXIS 438

058a

(C.A.A.F. 11 Aug. 2020), a case where that appellant

made similar claims against the facility. Nonetheless,

because Appellant failed “to raise his issues to prison

officials or his command” under Article 138, UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 938, we found he had failed to show

“deliberate indifference by the [LCJ].” Johnson,

unpub. op. at *54–55.

A few months after Johnson, I penned a dissent in

Merritt that questioned the reasonableness of

dismissing allegations of cruel or unusual conditions

of post-trial confinement simply because an appellant

failed to file an Article 138, UCMJ, complaint with his

or her leadership, a factor to be considered under

United States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F.

2006). See Merritt, unpub. op. at *26–43 (Meginley, J.,

dissenting in part and in the result). Specifically,

I wrote that

[u]nder the current state of the law, even

if a confinee is able to prove the first

factor under Lovett [that an appellant

must show an objectively, sufficiently

serious act or omission resulting in the

denial of necessities], it is a rare case

where a confinee will be able to prove the

state of mind of prisons officials and

deliberate indifference.

Id. at *31.

Following Johnson, this court has written on two

additional cases involving LCJ: Pullings and Citsay.

In both cases, this court chose not to grant relief to

those appellants. Yet, earlier this year, our superior

court granted review of our decision in Pullings on the

following issues:

059a

In addition to prison officials, can the

decisions of military personnel satisfy the

“Deliberate Indifference” aspect of cruel and

unusual punishment test when they

repeatedly send military inmates to a local

civilian confinement center with a history of

inhumane living conditions for inmates?

I.

Additionally or alternatively, did

Appellant suffer cruel and unusual

punishment for 247 days and nights at

Lowndes County

Jail?

II.

Pullings, 2022 CAAF LEXIS at 395.

I now raise the same questions in Appellant’s case

as posed by the CAAF above. I cannot determine

whether Appellant is entitled to relief under the

Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution 1 or Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855, or

if his sentence is appropriate under Article 66(c),

UCMJ, without knowing the answer to these

questions. I now believe a post-trial evidentiary

hearing is required to resolve any factual disputes

between Appellant’s clemency and post-clemency

matters and the declarations submitted by the

Government, particularly Captain JC’s affidavit. See

United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 248 (C.A.A.F.

1997); United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411, 413

(C.M.A. 1967). To the degree that such a hearing is

found to be impractical, as it has been three and half

1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

060a

years since Appellant’s trial, I would grant Appellant

relief under Article 66(c), UCMJ. 2

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court

2 As for whether Air Force officials have exhibited “deliberate

indifference” on civilian confinement matters arising from Moody

Air Force Base (AFB) cases, it is worth noting that this court has

previously addressed other cases of confinement conditions of

Airmen from Moody AFB at local confinement facilities and/or

claims of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., United States

v. Burke, No. ACM S32137, 2014 CCA LEXIS 834 (A.F. Ct. Crim.

App. 3 Nov. 2014) (unpub. op.); United States v. Luckado, No.

ACM 37962, 2013 CCA LEXIS 741 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1 Aug.

2013) (unpub. op); United States v. Wilson, No. ACM 37897, 2012

CCA LEXIS 385 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 12 Oct. 2012) (per curiam)

(unpub. op.); United States v. Simmons, No. ACM 37967, 2012

CCA LEXIS 230 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 27 Jun. 2012) (unpub. op.);

United States v. Branch, No. ACM S31691, 2010 CCA LEXIS 403

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 13 Dec. 2010) (per curiam) (unpub. op.);

United States v. Lucas, No. ACM 37363, 2009 CCA LEXIS 479

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 28 Dec. 2009) (unpub. op.); United States v.

Melson, No. ACM 36523, 2007 CCA LEXIS 372 (A.F. Ct. Crim.

App. 14 Sep. 2007) (per curiam) (unpub. op.). Most of these cases

also involve the nearby Cook County Jail, Cook County, Georgia.

No relief was granted to any of these appellants for cruel and

unusual punishment, although the appellant in Melson was

granted relief for his illegal pretrial punishment.

061a

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces

Washington, D.C.

United States,

Appellee

USCA Dkt. No.

220280/AF Crim. App. No.

39676

v.

ORDER

D'Andre M.

JOHNSON

Appellant

On consideration of the petition for grant of review of

the decision of the United States Air Force Court of

Criminal Appeals, and in the light of United States v.

Pullings, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2023), it is, by the Court,

this 8th day of May 2023,

ORDERED:

That the granted issue is answered in the

negative, and the decision of the United States Air

Force Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed.

For the Court,*

/s/

________________

Malcolm H. Squires, Jr.

Clerk of the Court

* HARDY, Judge (concurring in the judgment): For

the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in United

States v. Pulling, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2023) (Hardy, J.,

concurring in the judgment), I concur in the judgment.

062a

cc:

The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel (Nelson)

Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)

063a

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

D’ANDRE M. JOHNSON,

Second Lieutenant (O-1), USAF

Appellant.

Crim. App. No. 39676

USCA Dkt. No. 21-0135AF

SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR GRANT OF

REVIEW

MARK C. BRUEGGER

Senior Counsel

U.S.C.A.A.F. Bar No. 34247

Air Force Appellate Defense Division

1500 W. Perimeter Road, Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews NAF, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

mark.bruegger.1@us.af.mil

SARA J. HICKMON, Capt, USAF

U.S.C.A.A.F. Bar No. 37207

064a

Air Force Appellate Defense Division

1500 W. Perimeter Road, Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews NAF, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

sara.hickmon@us.af.mil

Counsel for Appellant

065a

Index

Issues Presented ............................................................ 1

Statement of Statutory Jurisdiction ............................. 2

Statement of the Case ................................................... 2

Statement of Facts......................................................... 3

Background. ................................................................... 3

The Air Force Court’s Decision ..................................... 7

1. Legal and Factual Sufficiency .................................. 7

2. M.P.’s Unsworn Statement .................................... 10

3.

Conditions of 2d Lt Johnson’s Post-Trial

Confinement ................................................................ 12

Reasons to Grant Review ............................................ 16

Argument ..................................................................... 19

I.

SECOND

LIEUTENANT

JOHNSON’S

CONVICTION FOR SEXUALLY ASSAULTING

M.P. IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. ................. 19

Standard of Review...................................................... 19

Law & Analysis............................................................ 19

II. PORTIONS OF THE VICTIM’S UNSWORN

STATEMENT FELL OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF

R.C.M. 1001A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED

WHEN IT FOUND THESE STATEMENTS DID

NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE THE

SENTENCE. ....................................................... 22

Standard of Review...................................................... 22

Law ............................................................................... 23

Analysis ........................................................................ 24

066a

III. THE MILITARY JUDGE PLAINLY ERRED

BY PERMITTING TRIAL COUNSEL TO ARGUE

FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE. ............................ 26

Additional Facts........................................................... 26

Standard of Review...................................................... 29

Law & Analysis............................................................ 29

IV.

DURING

CLEMENCY,

SECOND

LIEUTENANT JOHNSON DETAILED THE

DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS OF HIS POSTTRIAL CONFINEMENT. ON APPEAL, HE

PROVIDED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

ON THESE CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HIS

ALLEGATIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENT, AND TO SEEK SENTENCE

APPROPRIATENESS RELIEF. THE LOWER

COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED IT COULD

NOT CONSIDER THIS SUPPLEMENTARY

EVIDENCE

FOR

ITS

SENTENCE

APPROPRIATENESS REVIEW. ....................... 31

Standard of Review...................................................... 32

Law & Analysis............................................................ 32

Certificate of Filing and Service ................................. 37

067a

Table of Authorities

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

United States v. Andrews, 77 M.J. 393 (C.A.A.F. 2018)

................................................................................... 29

United States v. Atchak, 75 M.J. 193 (C.A.A.F. 2016)

................................................................................... 32

United States v. Barker, 77 M.J. 377 (C.A.A.F. 2018)

................................................................................... 30

United States v. Bowen, 76 M.J. 83 (C.A.A.F. 2017) 23

United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1990).... 32

United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175 (C.A.A.F. 2005)

................................................................................... 29

United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982)

..................................................................................... 1

United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2008)

................................................................................... 29

United States v. Harrow, 65 M.J. 190 (C.A.A.F. 2007)

....................................................................... 18, 23, 25

United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J 437 (C.A.A.F. 2020)

................................................................. 16, 17, 32, 33

United States v. Kearns, 73 M.J. 177 (C.A.A.F. 2014)

................................................................................... 19

United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218 (C.A.A.F. 2019) 19

United States v. Hamilton, 78 M.J. 335 (C.A.A.F.

2019) .................................................................... 22, 23

United States v. Marsh, 70 M.J. 101 (C.A.A.F. 2011)

................................................................................... 31

United States v. McGriff, 78 M.J. 487 (C.A.A.F. 2019)

................................................................................... 34

068a

United States v. Paxton, 64 M.J. 484 (C.A.A.F. 2007)

................................................................................... 31

United States v. Provost, 32 M.J. 98 (C.A.A.F. 1991)

................................................................................... 30

United States v. Roach, 66 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 2008)

................................................................................... 32

United States v. Tyler, USCA Dkt. No. 20-0252/AF

…………………..17, 29

United States v. Willman, USCA Dkt. No. 21-0030/AF

……………...16, 35

Service Courts of Criminal Appeals

United States v. DeFalco, No. ACM 39607, 2020 CCA

LEXIS 164, (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 21 May 2020) ...... 34

United States v. Frantz, No. ACM 39657, 2020 CCA

LEXIS 404, (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2020) ..... 33

United States v. Jacinto, 79 M.J. 870 (N-M Ct. Crim.

App. 2020) ................................................................. 33

United States v. Lawler, No. ACM 39699, 2020 CCA

LEXIS 186, (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 28, 2020) ..... 34

United States v. Matthews, No. ACM 39593, 2020 CCA

LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 2, 2020)... 34-35

United States v. McGriff, No. ACM 39306, 2018 CCA

LEXIS 567, at *24-25 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 11 Dec.

2018) .......................................................................... 34

Constitutional

Provisions,

Statutes,

and

Regulations

Eighth Amendment ..................................... 7, 14-16, 34

10 U.S.C. § 866(c)........................................................... 2

069a

10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) ...................................................... 2

Article 55, UCMJ .......................................... 7, 14-16, 34

Article 66, UCMJ ................................................... 32, 35

Article 120, UCMJ ......................................................... 2

R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(C) .................................................... 30

R.C.M. 1001A .......................................................passim

R.C.M. 1001A(a)........................................................... 30

R.C.M. 1001A(b)(1) ...................................................... 23

R.C.M. 1001A(b)(2) ................................................ 11, 23

R.C.M. 1001A(c) ........................................................... 24

R.C.M. 1001A(e) ........................................................... 30

R.C.M. 1001A(e)(2) ........................................................ 2

070a

Issues Presented 1

I.

WHETHER SECOND LIEUTENANT

JOHNSON’S CONVICTION FOR

SEXUALLY ASSAULTING M.P. IS

LEGALLY SUFFICIENT?

II.

PORTIONS OF M.P.’S UNSWORN

STATEMENT FELL OUTSIDE THE

SCOPE OF R.C.M. 1001A. DID THE

LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT

FOUND THESE STATEMENTS DID

NOT

SUBSTANTIALLY

INFLUENCE THE SENTENCE?

III.

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE

PLAINLY ERRED BY PERMITTING

TRIAL COUNSEL TO ARGUE

FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE?

IV.

DURING CLEMENCY, SECOND

LIEUTENANT

JOHNSON

DETAILED THE DEPLORABLE

CONDITIONS OF HIS POST-TRIAL

1 2d Lt Johnson raises one additional issue pursuant to United

States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). See Appendix A.

071a

CONFINEMENT. ON APPEAL, HE

PROVIDED

SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION

ON

THESE

CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HIS

CLAIMS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENT, AND TO SEEK

SENTENCE RELIEF.

DID THE

LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT

DECIDED

IT

COULD

NOT

CONSIDER

THIS

SUPPLEMENTARY

EVIDENCE

FOR

ITS

SENTENCE

APPROPRIATENESS REVIEW?

Statement of Statutory Jurisdiction

The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals

(hereinafter Air Force Court) reviewed this case

pursuant to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012).

This

Honorable Court has jurisdiction to review this case

under Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3)

(2012).

Statement of the Case

Second Lieutenant (2d Lt) D’Andre M. Johnson

was tried by general court-martial before a panel of

officer members at Moody Air Force Base (AFB),

Georgia, on October 22-23, 2018, and November 26 December 1, 2018. Contrary to 2d Lt Johnson’s pleas,

the panel found him guilty of one charge and two

specifications in violation of Article 120, UCMJ.

(Record (R.) at 1106-07.) The panel sentenced 2d Lt

Johnson to a dismissal, ten-years confinement, and

total forfeitures. (R. at 1192.) The convening

authority approved the adjudged sentence. (R. at Vol.

1, General Court-Martial Order, dtd 5 April 2019.)

072a

On October 16, 2020, the Air Force Court

affirmed the findings and sentence. Appendix B. On

November 14, 2020, the Air Force Court denied 2d Lt

Johnson’s Motion for Reconsideration. Appendix C.

Statement of Facts

Background

2d Lt Johnson graduated from the Air Force

Academy in 2017 and was assigned to Moody AFB. (R.

at Vol. 1, 2d Lt D’Andre Johnson Clemency Package

(hereinafter Clemency) at 13, 33.) He subsequently

joined a fitness center in neighboring Valdosta,

Georgia, where he met M.P., who managed the gym.

(R. at 564-65.)

On September 14, 2017, 2d Lt Johnson and

M.P. began conversing over Instagram. (Prosecution

Exhibit (PE) 4.) Over the next several days, their

discussions ranged from information about their

respective families to flirtatious comments and

promises to meet up. (PE 4; R. at 577-83.) M.P. gave

2d Lt Johnson her phone number and later told him

of her plans to go to the Bluewater Bar in Remerton,

Georgia, on September 17, 2017. (PE 4 at 14, 37; see

also R. at 442.)

Prior to arriving at Bluewater that night, M.P.

went to dinner with several friends, including her coworker, A.M. (R. at 548, 551, 570.) M.P. had a mixed

drink at dinner, while A.M. did not have any alcohol.

(R. at 551, 593.) Thereafter, the group went to a

friend’s house, where M.P. had another mixed drink.

(R. at 594.) A.M. consumed “a lot” of alcohol, but could

not recall how much. (R. at 552.) At around 2330

073a

hours, the group left for Bluewater. (R. at 594.)

2d Lt Johnson also drank prior to going out.

Starting around 1700 hours, he consumed five or six

shots along with five or six beers at another bar. (R.

at 987.) He and his friends eventually made their way

to Bluewater, where he had several more shots and

beers. (R. at 988.) 2d Lt Johnson consumed enough

alcohol that his friends believed him to be intoxicated.

(R. at 989, 994.)

At some point, 2d Lt Johnson met up with M.P.

The pair spent the majority of their remaining time at

the bar together, following each other around,

“grinding” while dancing, and kissing. 2 (R. at 727-29,

995.)

Shortly before Bluewater closed, several

individuals—including 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., and

A.M.—decided to walk to the house of J.P., a friend

who lived nearby. (R. at 738.) The group mingled

outside for a few minutes after arriving at the house,

during which 2d Lt Johnson and M.P. continued

kissing. (R. at 434, 731.) M.P. later asked J.P. if 2d

Lt Johnson could stay the night. (R. at 1006.) From

J.P.’s perspective, M.P appeared to be in control of her

faculties and understood what she was doing. (R. at

1006-07.)

Ultimately, only four people from the group

stayed at J.P.’s house: 2d Lt Johnson, M.P., A.M., and

SrA C.C.—a friend of M.P.’s who A.M. apparently had

a romantic interest in. (R. at 420, 435, 439.) J.P. was

also in the house, along with her friend, SrA K.C. (R.

at 435, 660-61.)

By

this

time,

A.M.

appeared

extremely

2 “Grinding” involves a woman dancing in front of a male while

“rubbing against each other.” (R. at 728-29.)

074a

intoxicated. (R. at 438.) Following the group’s

request, 2d Lt Johnson carried A.M. to a bedroom, put

her in bed, and left her there with SrA C.C. (R. at 43839.) 2d Lt Johnson and M.P. then went to the couch

in the living room, where they began kissing and

touching each other. (R. at 661, 1008.) J.P. asked

M.P. if she was okay or needed a blanket, and M.P.

responded that she was fine. (R. at 1008.) Observing

nothi

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