Amicus Curiae Brief — Department of State, et al., Petitioners v. Sandra Muñoz, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 28, 2024
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No. 23-334
In the Supreme Court of the United States
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
SANDRA MUÑOZ, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS
CHARLES A. ROTHFELD
EUGENE R. FIDELL
Yale Law School
Counsel of Record
Supreme Court Clinic
Mayer Brown LLP
127 Wall Street
1999 K Street, NW
New Haven, CT 06511
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
(203) 432-4992
crothfeld@mayerbrown.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ...................... 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT .............................................................. 2
ARGUMENT .............................................................. 5
I. There is a strong presumption in favor
of APA review of administrative actions,
and the narrow exceptions to APA
review do not apply here. ................................ 5
A. The INA does not preclude judicial
review.......................................................... 6
B. This was not an action “committed to
agency discretion.” ................................... 15
C. The consular nonreviewability
doctrine finds no support in Section
702(1). ....................................................... 17
II. APA review would be meaningful here......... 21
III.Consular nonreviewability is not a freefloating constitutional doctrine
independent of congressional
authorization. ................................................ 23
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 26
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967) ................................................ 6
Abourezk v. Regan,
785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ...................... 11, 19
Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal
Workers Union, AFL-CIO,
498 U.S. 517 (1991) .............................................. 21
Allen v. Milas,
896 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................. 18
Biden v. Texas,
597 U.S. 785 (2022) ................................................ 8
Brownell v. We Shung,
352 U.S. 180 (1956) .............................................. 19
Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889) .............................................. 15
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) ...................................... 16
Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303 (2009) ................................................ 8
Darby v. Cisneros,
509 U.S. 137, 153 (1993) ..................................... 18
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
Dep’t of Com. v. New York,
139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) .......................................... 16
DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) .................................... 16, 22
Dunlop v. Bachowski,
421 U.S. 560 (1975) ................................................ 6
Estrada v. Ahrens,
296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961) ................................ 13
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,
589 U.S. 221 (2020) ................................................ 6
Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985) .............................................. 16
Hermina Sague v. United States,
416 F. Supp. 217 (D.P.R. 1976) ........................... 13
Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran,
983 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2020) ................................ 24
Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753 (1972) .......................................... 4, 20
U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950) ............................ 14, 15, 25, 26
Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538 (1895) ........................................ 15, 25
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
Lexmark, Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118 (2014) .......................................... 4, 20
Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod,
193 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1960) ............. 13, 25, 26
Lincoln v. Vigil,
508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) ...................................... 16
U.S. ex rel. London v. Phelps,
22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927) ................. 12, 13, 15, 25
Loza-Bedoya v. Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv.,
410 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1969) ................................ 13
Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160 (1948) .............................................. 14
Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) ...................................... 21
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC,
575 U.S. 480 (2015) ................................................ 6
Marcello v. Bonds,
349 U.S. 302 (1955) .............................................. 19
Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning
Council v. Shultz,
443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971) .............................. 20
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320 (1909) ........................................ 24, 25
Perez v. Cuccinelli,
949 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2020) (en
banc) ..................................................................... 24
Reagan v. Abourezk,
484 U.S. 1 (1987) ............................................ 19, 20
Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc.,
509 U.S. 43 (1993) .................................................. 6
Rusk v. Cort,
369 U.S. 367 (1962) ................................................ 6
Saavedra Bruno v. Albright,
197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ........................ 7, 18
Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.,
592 U.S. 188 (2021) ................................................ 6
Ex parte Seid Soo Hong,
23 F.2d 847 (N.D. Cal. 1928) ............................... 12
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48 (1955) ...................................... 7, 10, 19
U.S. ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg,
30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929) ........ 12, 13, 15, 25, 26
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) .............................................. 26
Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988) .............................................. 16
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33 (1950) ................................................ 19
Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
576 U.S. 1 (2015) .................................................. 26
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 701(1) ........................................................ 15
5 U.S.C. § 701(a) ...................................................... 3, 6
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) ................................................... 16
5 U.S.C. § 702 .............................................................. 5
5 U.S.C. § 702(1) .................................... 3, 4, 17, 18, 19
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) ................................... 21, 22
8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) ...................................................... 22
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) .................................. 17, 23
8 U.S.C. § 1201(i) ......................................................... 7
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. ............................................... 6
Other Authorities
9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.4-3(B)(3) ............. 17, 23
98 Cong. Rec. (1952) .................................... 8, 9, 10, 14
H.R. Rep. No. 723, pt. 1, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 38 (1990)...................................................... 21
H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31 (1961)...................................................... 11
H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
29 (1952) ............................................................... 21
Harry N. Rosenfield, Consular NonReviewability: A Case Study in
Administrative Absolutism, 41 ABA
J. 1109 (1955) ....................................................... 13
S. Rep. No. 94-996 (1976) .......................................... 18
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
The American Immigration Lawyers Association
(AILA), founded in 1946, is a national, nonpartisan,
nonprofit association with more than 16,000 members
throughout the United States and abroad, including
lawyers and law school professors who practice and
teach in the field of immigration and nationality law.
AILA seeks to promote justice, advocate for fair and
reasonable immigration law and policy, and advance
the quality of immigration and nationality law and
practice. AILA’s members practice regularly before
the Department of Homeland Security, immigration
courts, and the Board of Immigration Appeals, as well
as before the federal courts. AILA has participated as
amicus curiae in numerous cases before the U.S.
Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The American Immigration Council is a nonprofit
organization established to increase public understanding of immigration law and policy, advocate for
the fair and just administration of our immigration
laws, protect the legal rights of noncitizens, and educate the public about the enduring contributions of immigrants in the United States. The Council regularly
litigates and advocates around issues involving access
to immigration benefits and federal court review.
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no
person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
1
2
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondents’ brief demonstrates that the Government’s assertion of limitless and unreviewable discretion to deny visas in all circumstances is inconsistent
with fundamental constitutional principles of liberty
and due process. Amici agree fully with respondents’
arguments on those points and will not repeat them
here. Instead, amici address a different but equally
fatal flaw in the Government’s theory: Its assertion
that judicial review of consular visa denial determinations is completely unavailable cannot be squared
with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
generally assures affected individuals the right to
challenge agency action that departs from the governing statute and agency rules.
In the face of harmful government action, such
APA review is presumptively available; exceptions are
narrow and rare. But here, the Government makes no
attempt at all to demonstrate that the APA is inapplicable. Nor could it. Congress was clear and express in
setting the APA reviewability rules, which apply in
this case by their plain terms; agency officials have no
discretion to simply disregard such statutory mandates. Yet the Government’s assertion of absolute Executive Branch authority in the immigration context,
on which its position ultimately rests, lacks lawful
support. This Court should find that the APA governs
and applies to respondents’ challenge.
A. The Court has recognized a strong presumption
favoring the availability of review under the APA.
Such review will be precluded in only narrow circumstances: when (1) the substantive statute itself makes
3
review unavailable; or (2) the decision is committed to
agency discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). Neither of these
exceptions is present here.
First, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
does not preclude review. Nothing in the statutory
text even arguably makes consular visa decisions unreviewable. Nor is there any such suggestion in the
statutory background. To the contrary, the INA’s
sponsors were insistent and expressly clear that the
statute did not displace APA review. And there is no
basis to assume that the Congress that enacted the
APA and the INA would have intended either statute
to incorporate a consular nonreviewability principle
as part of the presumed legal background. At the time
Congress enacted these statutes, consular nonreviewability was a relatively new, infrequently stated, and
largely unsupported doctrine. Such a dubious rule is
not presumptively incorporated into legislation.
Second, consular visa decisions are not committed
to agency discretion. There is law to apply. The INA
includes clear language governing how a consular officer is to judge a visa applicant’s eligibility. This
means that the officer does not have freewheeling discretion in making a decision; rather, the officer’s determination must be grounded in specific facts made
relevant by the INA’s substantive standard.
Third, although a handful of courts have concluded that review of consular visa decisions is barred
by 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)—which preserves the authority
of courts to dismiss an action “on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground” (5 U.S.C. § 702(1))—
that view is insupportable. Section 702(1) does not
curtail judicial review; it simply provides that a provi-
4
sion eliminating the United States’ sovereign immunity in specified circumstances does not otherwise expand judicial review.
Moreover, to the extent that case law supports
some limitation on courts’ ability to hear challenges to
consular visa denials, the decisions misconceive the
basis for that limitation. The purported doctrine of
consular nonreviewability has been persistent, perhaps, not because of reviewability concerns, but because of the presumption that a statute provides a
cause of action only to “particular plaintiff[s]” whose
claims fall within the zone of interests protected by
the law invoked. Lexmark, Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014). In the typical case, the disappointed party is an “unadmitted
and nonresident alien” with no adequate basis for asserting a claim in the courts of this country.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). Such
parties appear to be outside of the zone of interests
protected by the INA, and therefore ordinary APA
principles forbid their suit. But that concern provides
no basis for barring the review sought by a U.S. citizen
seeking reunification with her spouse.
B. This case offers a quintessential example of the
circumstances in which APA review is valuable, judicially manageable, and an essential safeguard against
arbitrary or capricious agency action. The governing
statute sets out a familiar factual standard that governs the agency action, establishing specific, judicially
determinable factual grounds for inadmissibility. And
here, for all that appears in the public record, the consular officer did not properly apply that standard (or,
indeed, make any serious attempt to apply it at all).
5
Accordingly, there are strong grounds to believe that
judicial review would find error in the agency action.
C. The Government appears to suggest that the
consular nonreviewability doctrine has some independent constitutional basis that overrides the ordinary rules of judicial review. But that is not so. Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, the consular
nonreviewability doctrine has no basis in the text, history, or structure of the Constitution. Rather, it is a
creature of lower court decisions that place it on no
substantial constitutional grounding. If there is to be
such a doctrine, it must be created by Congress—
which, far from recognizing a general consular nonreviewability principle, subjected Executive Branch authority to the limits set by the APA.
ARGUMENT
I.
There is a strong presumption in favor of
APA review of administrative actions, and
the narrow exceptions to APA review do not
apply here.
At the outset, it has long been settled that APA
review of administrative actions is available in all but
the most unusual circumstances. The APA itself
makes this clear: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5
U.S.C. § 702. And this Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Salinas v. U.S.
R.R. Ret. Bd., 592 U.S. 188, 197 (2021) (quoting Mach
Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015)). Although this presumption is rebuttable, agencies bear a
6
“‘heavy burden’ in attempting to show that Congress
‘prohibit[ed] all judicial review’ of the agency’s compliance with a legislative mandate.” Mach Mining, 575
U.S. at 486 (quoting Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
560, 567 (1975)). “[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and
convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent
should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”
Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)
(quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379 (1962)).
There are only two exceptions to the presumption
of reviewability under the APA: when (1) the underlying substantive statute precludes review; or (2) the action is committed to agency discretion. 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a). Neither of these exceptions applies here.
A. The INA does not preclude judicial review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., does not preclude judicial review of agency action. As a general matter, the “wellsettled” and “strong presumption” in favor of judicial
review “has consistently been applied to immigration
statutes.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221,
222 (2020). This presumption of reviewability is so
strong that the Government must provide “clear and
convincing evidence” that Congress intended the INA
to modify this default principle. Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 64 (1993). But there is no
such evidence here: both the text and history of the
INA demonstrate the availability of APA review.
1.
The INA’s text supports judicial review.
Most obviously, there is no textual hook in the
INA for eliminating APA review. The statutory language makes no reference to the doctrine of consular
7
nonreviewability, on which the Government rests its
argument against review. See Shaughnessy v.
Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).2 Indeed, if anything,
the statutory text affirmatively supports the availability of review in this context. Thus, Congress specified that a consular officer “may at any time, in his
discretion, revoke * * * visa[s]” and that “[t]here shall
be no means of judicial review” of that visa revocation
decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). This denial-of-review provision, which is limited to the visa revocation context,
would be unnecessary if all consular decisions were
unreviewable, as the Government postulates.3 Because a “statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant” (Corley v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)), the INA’s
structure suggests that it does not incorporate the
doctrine of consular nonreviewability. See Biden v.
Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 799 (2022) (“where Congress intended to deny subject matter jurisdiction over a par-
Even courts that have sharply limited review of visa determinations have recognized that Congress did not limit review “expressly.” See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1162
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
2
3 The Government has suggested that decisions to grant and to
revoke visas are equally subject to the consular nonreviewability
doctrine. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Trump v. Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project, 583 U.S. 912 (2017) (No. 16-1436),
2017 WL 2391562, at *14 (consular nonreviewability means
“that the Executive’s decision to issue or revoke a visa for an alien abroad ‘is not subject to judicial review’”). If that is so, that
Congress denied review expressly in the revocation but not in the
issuance context suggests that Congress did not intend to make
the APA unavailable in the setting of this case.
8
ticular class of claims [in the INA], it did so unambiguously”). And certainly, there is no clear and convincing evidence of nonreviewability in the INA text.
2.
The INA’s history supports judicial review.
The legislative history and background confirms
the availability of APA review. When enacting the
INA, Congress legislated against a well-established
background rule of reviewability under the APA. Congress enacted the INA in 1952, just six years after passage of the APA; the drafters of the INA therefore
surely would have had the APA in mind. Lacking a
textual basis for denying APA review of visa denials,
the Government must make a clear showing that Congress nevertheless affirmatively intended to reject
APA review. But the legislative history shows the opposite: key sponsors and opponents of the INA agreed
almost universally that judicial review would exist for
consular decisions.
Opponents of the INA, including Senator (and future Vice President) Hubert Humphrey and Senator
Herbert Lehman, expressed concern that the bill that
became the INA did not permit such review. See 98
Cong. Rec. 5419, 5779 (1952) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey); id. at 5604 (statement of by Sen. Lehman). Senator Paul Douglas likewise worried that the
bill did “not provide the administrative procedures
which Congress and the Nation thought were being
put into effect when we enacted the Administrative
Procedure Act.” Id. at 5410; see also id. at 5604 (statement of Sen. Lehman) (“It continues the present exemption of immigration proceedings from the terms of
9
the Administrative Procedure Act, thus blocking correction by the courts of erroneous or unfair judgments
of immigration officials.”).
But the bill’s sponsor, Senator Patrick McCarran,
could not have been clearer that the INA preserved
review: “[A] perusal of the bill would convince any
fair-minded man that the bill is 100 percent within
the framework of the Administrative Procedure Act.”
98 Cong. Rec. at 5329. Indeed, as Sen. McCarran took
care to remind the Senate, he was not only a principal
sponsor of the INA, but the primary sponsor and author of the APA. Likewise, Representative Francis
Walter, Sen. McCarran’s cosponsor of both the APA
and INA, explicitly addressed the criticism that “H.R.
5678 [the INA’s predecessor bill] would emasculate judicial review and authorize arbitrary administrative
practices of the very sort which the Administrative
Procedure[] Act sought to correct and guard against.”
Id. at 4302. Rep. Walter refuted the claim:
Instead of destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we undo what the Congress did
in a deficiency appropriation bill several years
ago when it legislated to overturn a decision of
the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable in
deportation proceedings. We undo that. So
here, instead of our destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we actually see that it is
reinstated in every instance.
10
Ibid. (emphasis added). See also Pedreiro, 349 U.S. at
52 (recounting legislative history and role of Sen.
McCarran and Rep. Walter).4
When some critics, including Senators Blair
Moody and Humphrey, proposed amendments that
would make APA protections more explicit (see 98
Cong. Rec. at 5778-5781), Sen. McCarran and Rep.
Walter repeatedly countered that such provisions
were superfluous. In rebutting the Moody/Humphrey
amendment, Sen. McCarran declared that the APA “is
made applicable to the bill * * * it prevails now.” Id.
at 5778. “Any aggrieved immigrant, or any aggrieved
applicant for entry into this country can and now does
resort to the courts; and that is separate and apart
from the Department of Justice, and in no wise under
the control of the Attorney General.” Ibid. (emphasis
added). The amendment was rejected shortly thereafter, following this assurance that the APA made judicial review available. See id. at 5781. That should be
taken as the intent underlying the INA.5
4 One supporter of the INA did suggest that maintaining judicial
review was unmanageable for reasons of judicial economy. 98
Cong. Rec. 4431 (1952) (statement of Rep. Graham). This concern, however, was not shared by the bill’s sponsors. And notably, this is not the rationale now advanced by the Government in
support of the consular nonreviewability doctrine, which (as we
discuss below) is said to rest on vague concerns of executive
power and national security. See infra at 24-27.
5 In amending the INA in 1961, Congress would clarify that the
only pathway to judicial review of exclusion proceedings is the
writ of habeas corpus. H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1961). Exclusion proceedings, however, are distinct from re-
11
3.
Congress would not have intended the
APA or INA to incorporate the consular
nonreviewability doctrine.
Moreover, there is no basis to assume that the
Congress that enacted either the APA or the INA
would have intended the statute to incorporate a consular nonreviewability principle as part of the presumed legal background. At the time Congress enacted those statutes, consular nonreviewability was
an obscure, infrequently stated, and largely unsupported doctrine. In particular, there existed “no
longstanding judicial practice of refusing to review
claims like those raised here,” and the Government
has “not produced a single case * * * in which this
kind of claim [had been] found to be outside the province of the federal courts” at the time the relevant
statutes were enacted. Abourezk v. Regan, 785 F.2d
1043, 1051 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Such a dubious rule is
not presumptively incorporated into legislation.
In its modern incarnation, the consular nonreviewability doctrine first arose in two court of appeals
decisions issued during the late 1920s: (1) U.S. ex rel.
Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1929), in
which the court indicated that it was “not able to find
any provision of the immigration laws which provides
fusals to grant a visa, and Congress specified that the writ applied only when an immigrant sought to secure release from custody. Ibid.
Congress again amended the INA in 1996 to curtail judicial
review of removal proceedings. Once again, Congress did nothing
to bar judicial review of decisions by consular officers to deny visas. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656 (Oct. 11, 1996).
12
for an official review of the action of the consular officers in such case by a cabinet officer or other authority”; and (2) U.S. ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288,
290 (2d Cir. 1927), in which the court held that
“[w]hether the consul has acted reasonably or unreasonably is not for us to determine. Unjustifiable refusal to vise a passport may be ground for diplomatic
complaint by the nation whose subject has been discriminated against. * * * It is beyond the jurisdiction
of the court.” Notably, these decisions rested on different rationales (lack of statutory authority in one, lack
of jurisdiction in the other), and neither discussed the
basis for nonreviewability in any detail—the courts
simply declared that they would refrain from judicial
review. See also Ex parte Seid Soo Hong, 23 F.2d 847,
848 (N.D. Cal. 1928) (“The granting or denying of a
visa involves the exercise of discretion by consular officers with which the courts will not interfere * * *”).
With a few minor exceptions, these two courts’ discussions of consular nonreviewability were almost entirely disregarded until the 1960s.6 In fact, the term
“consular non-reviewability” did not appear in the
scholarly literature until 1955. See Harry N. Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability: A Case Study in
Administrative Absolutism, 41 ABA J. 1109 (1955)
(calling it an “anomaly in American jurisprudence”).
This is hardly, as the Government characterizes it, a
principle with “deep roots.” U.S. Br. 16. The obscurity
6 Courts began paying substantial attention to the doctrine only
in subsequent decades, after enactment of the INA. See, e.g.
Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1960)
(dicta without analysis); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 701
n.2 (5th Cir. 1961) (same); Loza-Bedoya v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 410 F.2d 343, 347 (9th Cir. 1969) (same)..
13
of the doctrine thus refutes any assumption that Congress either (1) meant to integrate the consular nonreviewability doctrine into the APA in 1946 or (2) acquiesced in 1952 to a pattern of nonreviewability in
judicial decisions post-dating enactment of the APA.7
No such pattern existed.
Moreover, both Ulrich and London long predated
enactment of the APA, which created an express
mechanism for, and gave a strong endorsement to, judicial review. And those decisions also predated enactment of the INA by more than two decades, so surely
would not have been top of mind for the enacting Congress. It therefore is plain that no default presumption of nonreviewability existed at the time of the
INA’s enactment.
To be sure, prior to enactment of the INA this
Court declined to review a decision by the Attorney
General to exclude permanently, without a hearing, a
noncitizen from admission to the United States in
U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950). But that case did not involve a consular decision at all, and therefore says nothing about a principle of consular nonreviewability. Moreover, the Court
there understood the usual rule—that courts could review exclusion decisions as “authorized by law”—to
have been displaced “during a time of national emergency” by the statute’s wartime provisions. Id. at 543.
7 Although a few courts have suggested that Congress intended
to remove the INA from the ambit of the APA (see Licea-Gomez,
193 F. Supp. at 582; Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F.
Supp. 217, 219 (D.P.R. 1976), they proffered no evidence for this
proposition; the contrary statements of Sen. McCarran and Rep.
Walter prove otherwise.
14
The Court found the procedures under review “reasonable in the circumstances of the period for which they
were authorized, namely, the national emergency of
World War II.” Id. at 544. Emphasizing the case’s national-security implications, the Court relied on Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171-72 (1948) (upholding the President’s war-power authority to deport citizens of hostile governments during wartime), for its
conclusion that it could not “retry the determination
of the Attorney General” that Knauff was a security
risk. Id. at 546. This is not that case: It is not wartime,
and the government makes no national-security
claim. The Congress that enacted the INA thus would
not have understood Knauff as precluding ordinary
APA review in the circumstances of this case.8
Finally, it bears emphasis that the decisions in Ulrich, London, and Knauff relied on the Chinese Exclusion Cases of the late-nineteenth century as the principal evidence of Congress’s plenary power to imbue
consular officers with ultimate, unreviewable discretion. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581 (1889); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538 (1895). But the Chinese Exclusion Cases are now
generally understood to reflect racist and xenophobic
8 We also note that, even so, when the facts of Knauff were men-
tioned during debate on the INA, critics and sponsors of the bills
that became the INA both criticized Ms. Knauff’s exclusion. This
background strongly suggests that Congress did not acquiesce in
the decision when enacting the INA. See, e.g., 98 Cong. Rec. 4302
(1952) (statement of Rep. Walter); id. at 4401 (statement of Rep.
Celler); id. at 5154 (statement of Sen. Benton). Indeed, as noted,
the legislative history indicates that the INA’s sponsors intended
the APA to govern determinations made under the INA. See supra, at 8-10.
15
premises that are inconsistent with currently recognized constitutional values; the decisions have largely
been repudiated by historians, lawyers, and political
scientists. See Amicus Br. Fred T. Korematsu Center
for Law and Equality et al. 4-12.. The Court should
hesitate before extending these decisions’ dubious legacy here.
*
*
*
In short, the lack of a clear textual or historical
hook for eliminating APA review means that this is
not a case in which “statutes preclude judicial review.”
5 U.S.C. § 701(1).
B. This was not an action “committed to
agency discretion.”
It is equally apparent that the decision to deny the
visa application here did not fall within the APA’s second review exception: it is not an action “committed to
agency discretion.”
To “honor the presumption of [APA] review,” this
Court reads “quite narrowly” the exception for
“agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law.” DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140
S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This exception is confined to “those rare ‘administrative decision[s] traditionally left to agency discretion.” Ibid.
(quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993)). It
should be invoked only when there is “no law to apply.” Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569
(2019) (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)). The instances in
which this exception has been held to govern are extremely rare: employment decisions at the CIA (Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988)); the allocation of
16
lump-sum appropriations (Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192 );
and decisions to not undertake certain enforcement
actions (Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-838
(1985)).
Here, however, there is law to apply. The INA includes clear language governing how a consular officer
is to judge a visa applicant’s eligibility. The provision
relevant to Asencio-Cordero’s case specifically requires that the consular officer have “reasonable
ground to believe” that the applicant “seeks to enter
the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in * * * any other unlawful activity.”
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii). The officer does not have
freewheeling discretion in making this decision; rather, it must be grounded in specific facts made relevant by the INA’s substantive standard. In particular,
relevant agency guidance explains that the “reason to
believe” standard means that the consular officer
“must have more than a mere suspicion; there must
exist a probability, supported by evidence,” that the
inadmissibility ground applies to the applicant. 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.4-3(B)(3). This “might be established by a conviction, an admission, a long record
of arrests with an unexplained failure to prosecute by
the local government, or several reliable and corroborative reports.” Ibid.
The United States appears to agree on this point:
“Unlike a discretionary waiver decision, which could
be based on a wide range of considerations deemed relevant by the Executive, a consular officer’s decision
that a noncitizen is not eligible for a visa must be tethered to the legal provisions that define such ineligibility.” U.S. Br. 25 (emphasis added). As such, the deci-
17
sion to deny Asencio-Cordero’s spousal visa is not committed to agency discretion and therefore not barred
from review.
C. The consular nonreviewability doctrine
finds no support in Section 702(1).
Although the inapplicability of the exceptions
statutory exceptions to APA review should be the end
of the matter, a few courts have understood Section
702(1)—which provides that “[n]othing herein affects
other limitations on judicial review or the power or
duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief
on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground” (5
U.S.C. § 702(1))—to somehow incorporate the consular nonreviewability doctrine into the APA. See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); Allen v. Milas, 896 F.3d 1094, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2018). That conclusion is incorrect.
1. As this Court noted in Darby v. Cisneros, Congress added Section 702(1) to the APA through the
statute’s 1976 amendments, limiting sovereign immunity while “simply * * * mak[ing] clear that ‘[a]ll
other than the law of sovereign immunity remain unchanged.’” 509 U.S. 137, 153 (1993) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 94-996, at 11 (1976)). That is, the amendments’
“elimination of the defense of sovereign immunity did
not affect any other limitation on judicial review that
would otherwise apply under the APA.” Ibid. (emphasis added).The provision therefore creates no new limits on judicial review; it simply confirms that the
amendment did not further expand judicial review. If
it is correct that the INA does not itself foreclose review and that there is law to apply, Section 702(1) offers the Government no further support.
18
With seeming disregard of Darby, the D.C. and
Ninth Circuits in Saavedra Bruno and Milas held that
Section 702(1) retroactively incorporated consular
nonreviewability as a basis for barring APA review.
But as we have already established, that doctrine did
not exist in any meaningful form when Congress enacted the APA. The phrase “consular nonreviewability” had not yet been coined. There was dicta in a few
old decisions suggesting the unavailability of review,
but those comments did not constitute a well-established understanding. Legislators would have thought
that immigration decision-making was subject to review, as the Supreme Court would reaffirm four years
later in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47,
53 (1950) (“We find no basis * * * for judicially declaring an exemption in favor of deportation proceedings
from the procedural safeguards enacted for general
application to administrative agencies.”).9 Consequently, as Section 702(1) left the law of reviewability
unchanged, it did not incorporate an unstated doctrine of consular nonreviewability into the APA.
Indeed, in Abourezk v. Reagan, then-Judge Ginsburg wrote for the D.C. Circuit that the APA “endow[s] plaintiffs with a right of action” to challenge
visa denials so long as the plaintiffs “suffer injury in
fact by reason of the challenged agency action and are
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated under a relevant statute.” 785 F.2d 1043,
While the Court in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955),
held that enactment of the INA displaced the APA’s applicability
in certain deportation proceedings, the Court would swiftly rule
that the APA was available to prospective immigrants seeking to
challenge their exclusion. See Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S.
180 (1956); see also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
9
19
1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The court of appeals labeled “insubstantial” the Government’s assertion that authority to review the visa denial was unavailable under
the APA. Ibid.; see id. at 1051 (specifically rejecting
suggestions that the INA precludes review or that visa
determinations are committed to agency discretion).
An equally divided Court upheld that decision.
Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1, 1 (1987) (mem.).
2. To the extent that case law supports some limitation on courts’ ability to hear challenges to consular
visa denials, it misconceives the basis for that limitation. As Judge Leventhal wrote for the court of appeals: “In past decisions refraining from judicial review courts have summoned, and often confused, a variety of concepts, finding a lack in one or another of
the elements a suitor must provide to obtain judicial
review.” Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council
v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Those
concepts, including standing and reviewability, “are
separable [but] * * * are intermeshed in the overall
determination of the appropriate occasion for judicial
review.” Ibid.
Courts’ refusals to hear challenges to consular
visa determinations have often been couched in terms
of nonreviewability. As we have shown, though, there
is no basis for such a bar. The purported doctrine of
consular nonreviewability therefore has been persistent, perhaps, because of concerns relating not to reviewability, but to the presumption that a statute provides a cause of action only to “particular plaintiff[s]”
whose claim falls within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Lexmark, Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014). In
20
the typical visa denial case, the disappointed party is
an “unadmitted and nonresident alien” with no adequate basis for asserting a claim in the courts of this
country. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762
(1972). Such parties appear to be outside of the zone
of interests protected by the INA, and therefore ordinary law forbids their suit. But that concern provides
no basis for barring the review sought by a U.S. citizen
seeking reunification with her spouse.
The zone-of-interests test has no precise definition; rather, courts look broadly to legislative text, intent, and history to determine whether a plaintiff’s injury “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be
protected by the statutory provision whose violation
forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Air Courier
Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO,
498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)). That surely describes the circumstances here. Congress has long legislated favorably towards U.S. citizens seeking to
bring their noncitizen spouses (and children) to the
United States, granting them substantial legal protection in the INA. That is clear from statutory text, in a
wide range of contexts. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§
1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(b); Resp. Br. 18-22.
Legislative history confirms that a primary goal of
the INA is to “implement[] the underlying intention of
our immigration laws regarding the preservation of
the family unit.” H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1952). In furtherance of that goal, Congress
intended to permit “[a]n American citizen [to] have
the right to bring his [non-citizen] spouse (wife or husband) as a nonquota immigrant.” Ibid. And more recently, in the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress
21
sought to affirm that “family reunification should remain the cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy.”
H.R. Rep. No. 723, pt. 1, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 38
(1990). During debate on that provision, legislators
decried “the separation of nuclear families” as “antithetical to the national objective of preserving the integrity of the family unit.” Id. at 39-40. Today, the INA
continues to provide exemptions from quotas for the
noncitizen spouses of U.S. citizens and provides them
with preferential status. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i),
1154(b).
In light of this, U.S. citizens seeking admission of
their noncitizen spouses to the United States clearly
fall within the zone of interests that the INA protects.
To the extent that modern decisions denying review of
consular decisions are rooted in zone-of-interests concerns, nothing in those decisions supports denying review to Ms. Muñoz and others in her position.
II. APA review would be meaningful here.
APA review is presumptively available for a reason; it guards against arbitrary action taken by an
agency bureaucracy, “set[ting] forth the procedures by
which federal agencies are accountable to the public
and their actions subject to review by the courts.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 140 S. Ct. at 1905. This case
offers a quintessential example of the circumstances
in which APA review is valuable, judicially manageable, and an essential safeguard against agency action
that is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Here, there is good reason to believe that judicial review could change the outcome
and prevent a patently wrongful result.
22
First, as has been noted, the governing statute
sets out a familiar factual standard that governs the
agency action. In relevant part, the statute provides
that a noncitizen is inadmissible if the consular officer
“knows, or has reasonable ground to believe,” that the
applicant “seeks to enter the United States to engage
solely, principally, or incidentally in * * * unlawful activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii). This states specific, judicially determinable factual grounds for inadmissibility, as well as the standard to be applied in
making that determination: “reason to believe.” And
although this standard is sufficient to offer a clear
guidepost for decision, we also explain above that
agency guidance describes “reason to believe” standard as requiring that the consular officer “must have
more than a mere suspicion; there must exist a probability, supported by evidence,” that the inadmissibility ground applies to the applicant. 9 Foreign Affairs
Manual 302.4-3(B)(3). This “might be established by a
conviction, an admission, a long record of arrests with
an unexplained failure to prosecute by the local government, or several reliable and corroborative reports.” Ibid.
Second, for all that appears in the public record,
the consular officer did not properly apply that standard (or, indeed, make any serious attempt to apply it
at all). As respondents explain, it is uncontested that
Asencio-Cordero has no criminal history. Resp. Br. 8.
His tattoos were not gang-related and instead depicted Our Lady of Guadalupe, Sigmund Freud, an artistic “tribal” pattern, and theatrical masks. See id. at
2, 7-8. Against this background, the consular officer
did not provide any reasoning or factual basis to justify the conclusion that Asencio-Cordero’s visa should
be denied, simply citing the controlling statutory
23
standard. Accordingly, there are strong grounds to believe that review would find error in the agency action.
Nor is there anything in cases like this that would
make judicial review especially difficult or unreliable.
Courts routinely review numerous sorts of agency immigration decisions under the arbitrary, capricious, or
otherwise not-in-accordance-with-law standard. See,
e.g., Perez v. Cuccinelli, 949 F.3d 865, 872 (4th Cir.
2020) (en banc); Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran, 983
F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 2020). It would not be problematic or overly burdensome to apply APA review to this
context, especially if review of consular visa denials
were confined to instances where the individual seeking review is a U.S. citizen whose claim falls within
the INA’s zone of interests.
III. Consular nonreviewability is not a freefloating constitutional doctrine independent of congressional authorization.
Against all this, the Government appears to suggest that the consular nonreviewability doctrine has
some independent constitutional basis that overrides
the ordinary rules of judicial review. But that is not
so. Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, the doctrine finds no independent basis in the text, history,
or structure of the Constitution. Rather, the doctrine
is the creation of a handful of lower courts.
If there is to be a consular nonreviewability doctrine, it would have to be derived from congressional
plenary power over agency decision-making, not executive authority over foreign affairs. See Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 343
(1909) (discussing “the plenary power of Congress as
24
to the admission of aliens”). The Government attempts to obscure this distinction by repeatedly referring to the plenary power of the “political branches”
(U.S. Br. 17-18), but the Executive Branch holds no
such authority independent of congressional delegation—nothing in the “executive power” gives consular
officers, or even the President, such authority. Their
actions must be congressionally sanctioned. This
Court recognized that distinction even before Ulrich
and London first articulated the consular nonreviewability doctrine. See Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 54546 (“Congress, having the right, as it may see fit, to
expel aliens of a particular class, or to permit them to
remain has undoubtedly the right * * * to take all
proper means to carry out the system which it provides.”); Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 214 U.S. at 336
(1909) (“[The] [P]ower of Congress to legislate concerning the exclusion of aliens, and to intrust the enforcement of legislation of that character to administrative officers” is “complete,” provided only that such
legislation is not “repugnant to the Constitution.”).
Indeed, the decisions that defenders of consular
nonreviewability cite as foundational did not ground
it in the Constitution. Rather, courts rejecting the
claims of immigrants seeking to enter the United
States uniformly found any applicable bar to review
in the text of relevant statutes. That was true without
regard to whether the decision for which review was
sought was that of a consular officer (see Ulrich, 30
F.2d at 986 (invoking Section 2(a) of the Immigration
Act of 1922)), or that of an immigration officer at an
exclusion hearing (see, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 546
(invoking the War Brides Act of 1941); Licea-Gomez,
193 F. Supp. at 582 (invoking Section 104(a) of the
25
INA)). Those decisions invoked statutory bars (enacted by Congress), not constitutional concerns.
Instead they premise nonreviewability on supposed statutory authorization. See, e.g., Licea-Gomez,
193 F. Supp. at 582 (invoking Section 104(a) of the
INA). These decisions thus relied on statutory bars
(enacted by Congress), not constitutional concerns.
See, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 546 (invoking the War
Brides Act of 1941); Ulrich, 30 F.2d at 986 (invoking
Section 2(a) of the Immigration Act of 1922).
And although courts generally do not question the
scope of executive plenary power in the sphere of foreign affairs and national security (see, e.g., United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)), the executive’s exercise of authority delegated to it by Congress may be subject to judicial review to assure that
the executive acted in accord with legal limits. Because Congress has the authority to regulate immigration and determine the level of executive autonomy
in the area, Congress may either permit or deny judicial review of consular decisions. Here, Congress has
chosen to delegate power to executive officials on the
condition that certain consular visa decisions remain
subject to the APA’s system of review. Such a limit
serves a separation-of-powers function—it prevents
the Executive Branch from undermining Congress’s
plenary power over immigration.
Additionally, viewing consular nonreviewability
as a free-floating constitutional doctrine that precludes judicial review of consular visa denials conflicts
with this Court’s decisions. In Kerry v. Din, the Court
reached the merits of a visa denial challenged by a
U.S. citizen spouse without addressing the doctrine of
26
consular nonreviewability. 576 U.S. 86, 101 (2015).
And in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court highlighted the
possibility of “circumscribed judicial inquiry when the
denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional
rights of a U.S. citizen.” 585 U.S. 667, 703 (2018).
Here, Congress permitted judicial review through
the APA and did not clearly withdraw such review in
the INA. Thus, asserting its plenary power to regulate
immigration, Congress predicated consular authority
over the award of visas on the availability of judicial
review, rejecting a strict policy of nonreviewability.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
EUGENE R. FIDELL
Yale Law School
Supreme Court Clinic
127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
(203) 432-4992
CHARLES A. ROTHFELD
Counsel of Record
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
crothfeld@mayerbrown.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
MARCH 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.