Amicus Curiae Brief — Department of State, et al., Petitioners v. Sandra Muñoz, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 28, 2024

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 23-334

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

SANDRA MUÑOZ, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL AS

AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENTS

CHARLES A. ROTHFELD

EUGENE R. FIDELL

Yale Law School

Counsel of Record

Supreme Court Clinic

Mayer Brown LLP

127 Wall Street

1999 K Street, NW

New Haven, CT 06511

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 263-3000

(203) 432-4992

crothfeld@mayerbrown.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ...................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 2

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 5

I. There is a strong presumption in favor

of APA review of administrative actions,

and the narrow exceptions to APA

review do not apply here. ................................ 5

A. The INA does not preclude judicial

review.......................................................... 6

B. This was not an action “committed to

agency discretion.” ................................... 15

C. The consular nonreviewability

doctrine finds no support in Section

702(1). ....................................................... 17

II. APA review would be meaningful here......... 21

III.Consular nonreviewability is not a freefloating constitutional doctrine

independent of congressional

authorization. ................................................ 23

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 26

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136 (1967) ................................................ 6

Abourezk v. Regan,

785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ...................... 11, 19

Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal

Workers Union, AFL-CIO,

498 U.S. 517 (1991) .............................................. 21

Allen v. Milas,

896 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................. 18

Biden v. Texas,

597 U.S. 785 (2022) ................................................ 8

Brownell v. We Shung,

352 U.S. 180 (1956) .............................................. 19

Chae Chan Ping v. United States,

130 U.S. 581 (1889) .............................................. 15

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) ...................................... 16

Corley v. United States,

556 U.S. 303 (2009) ................................................ 8

Darby v. Cisneros,

509 U.S. 137, 153 (1993) ..................................... 18

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Dep’t of Com. v. New York,

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) .......................................... 16

DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) .................................... 16, 22

Dunlop v. Bachowski,

421 U.S. 560 (1975) ................................................ 6

Estrada v. Ahrens,

296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961) ................................ 13

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,

589 U.S. 221 (2020) ................................................ 6

Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821 (1985) .............................................. 16

Hermina Sague v. United States,

416 F. Supp. 217 (D.P.R. 1976) ........................... 13

Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran,

983 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2020) ................................ 24

Kleindienst v. Mandel,

408 U.S. 753 (1972) .......................................... 4, 20

U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,

338 U.S. 537 (1950) ............................ 14, 15, 25, 26

Lem Moon Sing v. United States,

158 U.S. 538 (1895) ........................................ 15, 25

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Lexmark, Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc.,

572 U.S. 118 (2014) .......................................... 4, 20

Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod,

193 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1960) ............. 13, 25, 26

Lincoln v. Vigil,

508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) ...................................... 16

U.S. ex rel. London v. Phelps,

22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927) ................. 12, 13, 15, 25

Loza-Bedoya v. Immigr. &

Naturalization Serv.,

410 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1969) ................................ 13

Ludecke v. Watkins,

335 U.S. 160 (1948) .............................................. 14

Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n,

497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) ...................................... 21

Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC,

575 U.S. 480 (2015) ................................................ 6

Marcello v. Bonds,

349 U.S. 302 (1955) .............................................. 19

Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning

Council v. Shultz,

443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971) .............................. 20

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.

Stranahan,

214 U.S. 320 (1909) ........................................ 24, 25

Perez v. Cuccinelli,

949 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2020) (en

banc) ..................................................................... 24

Reagan v. Abourezk,

484 U.S. 1 (1987) ............................................ 19, 20

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc.,

509 U.S. 43 (1993) .................................................. 6

Rusk v. Cort,

369 U.S. 367 (1962) ................................................ 6

Saavedra Bruno v. Albright,

197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ........................ 7, 18

Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.,

592 U.S. 188 (2021) ................................................ 6

Ex parte Seid Soo Hong,

23 F.2d 847 (N.D. Cal. 1928) ............................... 12

Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,

349 U.S. 48 (1955) ...................................... 7, 10, 19

U.S. ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg,

30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929) ........ 12, 13, 15, 25, 26

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export

Corp.,

299 U.S. 304 (1936) .............................................. 26

Webster v. Doe,

486 U.S. 592 (1988) .............................................. 16

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,

339 U.S. 33 (1950) ................................................ 19

Zivotofsky v. Kerry,

576 U.S. 1 (2015) .................................................. 26

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 701(1) ........................................................ 15

5 U.S.C. § 701(a) ...................................................... 3, 6

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) ................................................... 16

5 U.S.C. § 702 .............................................................. 5

5 U.S.C. § 702(1) .................................... 3, 4, 17, 18, 19

8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) ................................... 21, 22

8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) ...................................................... 22

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) .................................. 17, 23

8 U.S.C. § 1201(i) ......................................................... 7

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8

U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. ............................................... 6

Other Authorities

9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.4-3(B)(3) ............. 17, 23

98 Cong. Rec. (1952) .................................... 8, 9, 10, 14

H.R. Rep. No. 723, pt. 1, 101st Cong., 2d

Sess. 38 (1990)...................................................... 21

H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st

Sess. 31 (1961)...................................................... 11

H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.

29 (1952) ............................................................... 21

Harry N. Rosenfield, Consular NonReviewability: A Case Study in

Administrative Absolutism, 41 ABA

J. 1109 (1955) ....................................................... 13

S. Rep. No. 94-996 (1976) .......................................... 18

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1

The American Immigration Lawyers Association

(AILA), founded in 1946, is a national, nonpartisan,

nonprofit association with more than 16,000 members

throughout the United States and abroad, including

lawyers and law school professors who practice and

teach in the field of immigration and nationality law.

AILA seeks to promote justice, advocate for fair and

reasonable immigration law and policy, and advance

the quality of immigration and nationality law and

practice. AILA’s members practice regularly before

the Department of Homeland Security, immigration

courts, and the Board of Immigration Appeals, as well

as before the federal courts. AILA has participated as

amicus curiae in numerous cases before the U.S.

Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.

The American Immigration Council is a nonprofit

organization established to increase public understanding of immigration law and policy, advocate for

the fair and just administration of our immigration

laws, protect the legal rights of noncitizens, and educate the public about the enduring contributions of immigrants in the United States. The Council regularly

litigates and advocates around issues involving access

to immigration benefits and federal court review.

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel

for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no

person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

1

2

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondents’ brief demonstrates that the Government’s assertion of limitless and unreviewable discretion to deny visas in all circumstances is inconsistent

with fundamental constitutional principles of liberty

and due process. Amici agree fully with respondents’

arguments on those points and will not repeat them

here. Instead, amici address a different but equally

fatal flaw in the Government’s theory: Its assertion

that judicial review of consular visa denial determinations is completely unavailable cannot be squared

with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which

generally assures affected individuals the right to

challenge agency action that departs from the governing statute and agency rules.

In the face of harmful government action, such

APA review is presumptively available; exceptions are

narrow and rare. But here, the Government makes no

attempt at all to demonstrate that the APA is inapplicable. Nor could it. Congress was clear and express in

setting the APA reviewability rules, which apply in

this case by their plain terms; agency officials have no

discretion to simply disregard such statutory mandates. Yet the Government’s assertion of absolute Executive Branch authority in the immigration context,

on which its position ultimately rests, lacks lawful

support. This Court should find that the APA governs

and applies to respondents’ challenge.

A. The Court has recognized a strong presumption

favoring the availability of review under the APA.

Such review will be precluded in only narrow circumstances: when (1) the substantive statute itself makes

3

review unavailable; or (2) the decision is committed to

agency discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). Neither of these

exceptions is present here.

First, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)

does not preclude review. Nothing in the statutory

text even arguably makes consular visa decisions unreviewable. Nor is there any such suggestion in the

statutory background. To the contrary, the INA’s

sponsors were insistent and expressly clear that the

statute did not displace APA review. And there is no

basis to assume that the Congress that enacted the

APA and the INA would have intended either statute

to incorporate a consular nonreviewability principle

as part of the presumed legal background. At the time

Congress enacted these statutes, consular nonreviewability was a relatively new, infrequently stated, and

largely unsupported doctrine. Such a dubious rule is

not presumptively incorporated into legislation.

Second, consular visa decisions are not committed

to agency discretion. There is law to apply. The INA

includes clear language governing how a consular officer is to judge a visa applicant’s eligibility. This

means that the officer does not have freewheeling discretion in making a decision; rather, the officer’s determination must be grounded in specific facts made

relevant by the INA’s substantive standard.

Third, although a handful of courts have concluded that review of consular visa decisions is barred

by 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)—which preserves the authority

of courts to dismiss an action “on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground” (5 U.S.C. § 702(1))—

that view is insupportable. Section 702(1) does not

curtail judicial review; it simply provides that a provi-

4

sion eliminating the United States’ sovereign immunity in specified circumstances does not otherwise expand judicial review.

Moreover, to the extent that case law supports

some limitation on courts’ ability to hear challenges to

consular visa denials, the decisions misconceive the

basis for that limitation. The purported doctrine of

consular nonreviewability has been persistent, perhaps, not because of reviewability concerns, but because of the presumption that a statute provides a

cause of action only to “particular plaintiff[s]” whose

claims fall within the zone of interests protected by

the law invoked. Lexmark, Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014). In the typical case, the disappointed party is an “unadmitted

and nonresident alien” with no adequate basis for asserting a claim in the courts of this country.

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). Such

parties appear to be outside of the zone of interests

protected by the INA, and therefore ordinary APA

principles forbid their suit. But that concern provides

no basis for barring the review sought by a U.S. citizen

seeking reunification with her spouse.

B. This case offers a quintessential example of the

circumstances in which APA review is valuable, judicially manageable, and an essential safeguard against

arbitrary or capricious agency action. The governing

statute sets out a familiar factual standard that governs the agency action, establishing specific, judicially

determinable factual grounds for inadmissibility. And

here, for all that appears in the public record, the consular officer did not properly apply that standard (or,

indeed, make any serious attempt to apply it at all).

5

Accordingly, there are strong grounds to believe that

judicial review would find error in the agency action.

C. The Government appears to suggest that the

consular nonreviewability doctrine has some independent constitutional basis that overrides the ordinary rules of judicial review. But that is not so. Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, the consular

nonreviewability doctrine has no basis in the text, history, or structure of the Constitution. Rather, it is a

creature of lower court decisions that place it on no

substantial constitutional grounding. If there is to be

such a doctrine, it must be created by Congress—

which, far from recognizing a general consular nonreviewability principle, subjected Executive Branch authority to the limits set by the APA.

ARGUMENT

I.

There is a strong presumption in favor of

APA review of administrative actions, and

the narrow exceptions to APA review do not

apply here.

At the outset, it has long been settled that APA

review of administrative actions is available in all but

the most unusual circumstances. The APA itself

makes this clear: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5

U.S.C. § 702. And this Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Salinas v. U.S.

R.R. Ret. Bd., 592 U.S. 188, 197 (2021) (quoting Mach

Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015)). Although this presumption is rebuttable, agencies bear a

6

“‘heavy burden’ in attempting to show that Congress

‘prohibit[ed] all judicial review’ of the agency’s compliance with a legislative mandate.” Mach Mining, 575

U.S. at 486 (quoting Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.

560, 567 (1975)). “[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and

convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent

should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”

Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)

(quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379 (1962)).

There are only two exceptions to the presumption

of reviewability under the APA: when (1) the underlying substantive statute precludes review; or (2) the action is committed to agency discretion. 5 U.S.C.

§ 701(a). Neither of these exceptions applies here.

A. The INA does not preclude judicial review.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),

8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., does not preclude judicial review of agency action. As a general matter, the “wellsettled” and “strong presumption” in favor of judicial

review “has consistently been applied to immigration

statutes.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221,

222 (2020). This presumption of reviewability is so

strong that the Government must provide “clear and

convincing evidence” that Congress intended the INA

to modify this default principle. Reno v. Catholic Soc.

Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 64 (1993). But there is no

such evidence here: both the text and history of the

INA demonstrate the availability of APA review.

1.

The INA’s text supports judicial review.

Most obviously, there is no textual hook in the

INA for eliminating APA review. The statutory language makes no reference to the doctrine of consular

7

nonreviewability, on which the Government rests its

argument against review. See Shaughnessy v.

Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).2 Indeed, if anything,

the statutory text affirmatively supports the availability of review in this context. Thus, Congress specified that a consular officer “may at any time, in his

discretion, revoke * * * visa[s]” and that “[t]here shall

be no means of judicial review” of that visa revocation

decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). This denial-of-review provision, which is limited to the visa revocation context,

would be unnecessary if all consular decisions were

unreviewable, as the Government postulates.3 Because a “statute should be construed so that effect is

given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant” (Corley v.

United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)), the INA’s

structure suggests that it does not incorporate the

doctrine of consular nonreviewability. See Biden v.

Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 799 (2022) (“where Congress intended to deny subject matter jurisdiction over a par-

Even courts that have sharply limited review of visa determinations have recognized that Congress did not limit review “expressly.” See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1162

(D.C. Cir. 1999).

2

3 The Government has suggested that decisions to grant and to

revoke visas are equally subject to the consular nonreviewability

doctrine. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Trump v. Int’l

Refugee Assistance Project, 583 U.S. 912 (2017) (No. 16-1436),

2017 WL 2391562, at *14 (consular nonreviewability means

“that the Executive’s decision to issue or revoke a visa for an alien abroad ‘is not subject to judicial review’”). If that is so, that

Congress denied review expressly in the revocation but not in the

issuance context suggests that Congress did not intend to make

the APA unavailable in the setting of this case.

8

ticular class of claims [in the INA], it did so unambiguously”). And certainly, there is no clear and convincing evidence of nonreviewability in the INA text.

2.

The INA’s history supports judicial review.

The legislative history and background confirms

the availability of APA review. When enacting the

INA, Congress legislated against a well-established

background rule of reviewability under the APA. Congress enacted the INA in 1952, just six years after passage of the APA; the drafters of the INA therefore

surely would have had the APA in mind. Lacking a

textual basis for denying APA review of visa denials,

the Government must make a clear showing that Congress nevertheless affirmatively intended to reject

APA review. But the legislative history shows the opposite: key sponsors and opponents of the INA agreed

almost universally that judicial review would exist for

consular decisions.

Opponents of the INA, including Senator (and future Vice President) Hubert Humphrey and Senator

Herbert Lehman, expressed concern that the bill that

became the INA did not permit such review. See 98

Cong. Rec. 5419, 5779 (1952) (statement of Sen.

Humphrey); id. at 5604 (statement of by Sen. Lehman). Senator Paul Douglas likewise worried that the

bill did “not provide the administrative procedures

which Congress and the Nation thought were being

put into effect when we enacted the Administrative

Procedure Act.” Id. at 5410; see also id. at 5604 (statement of Sen. Lehman) (“It continues the present exemption of immigration proceedings from the terms of

9

the Administrative Procedure Act, thus blocking correction by the courts of erroneous or unfair judgments

of immigration officials.”).

But the bill’s sponsor, Senator Patrick McCarran,

could not have been clearer that the INA preserved

review: “[A] perusal of the bill would convince any

fair-minded man that the bill is 100 percent within

the framework of the Administrative Procedure Act.”

98 Cong. Rec. at 5329. Indeed, as Sen. McCarran took

care to remind the Senate, he was not only a principal

sponsor of the INA, but the primary sponsor and author of the APA. Likewise, Representative Francis

Walter, Sen. McCarran’s cosponsor of both the APA

and INA, explicitly addressed the criticism that “H.R.

5678 [the INA’s predecessor bill] would emasculate judicial review and authorize arbitrary administrative

practices of the very sort which the Administrative

Procedure[] Act sought to correct and guard against.”

Id. at 4302. Rep. Walter refuted the claim:

Instead of destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we undo what the Congress did

in a deficiency appropriation bill several years

ago when it legislated to overturn a decision of

the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable in

deportation proceedings. We undo that. So

here, instead of our destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we actually see that it is

reinstated in every instance.

10

Ibid. (emphasis added). See also Pedreiro, 349 U.S. at

52 (recounting legislative history and role of Sen.

McCarran and Rep. Walter).4

When some critics, including Senators Blair

Moody and Humphrey, proposed amendments that

would make APA protections more explicit (see 98

Cong. Rec. at 5778-5781), Sen. McCarran and Rep.

Walter repeatedly countered that such provisions

were superfluous. In rebutting the Moody/Humphrey

amendment, Sen. McCarran declared that the APA “is

made applicable to the bill * * * it prevails now.” Id.

at 5778. “Any aggrieved immigrant, or any aggrieved

applicant for entry into this country can and now does

resort to the courts; and that is separate and apart

from the Department of Justice, and in no wise under

the control of the Attorney General.” Ibid. (emphasis

added). The amendment was rejected shortly thereafter, following this assurance that the APA made judicial review available. See id. at 5781. That should be

taken as the intent underlying the INA.5

4 One supporter of the INA did suggest that maintaining judicial

review was unmanageable for reasons of judicial economy. 98

Cong. Rec. 4431 (1952) (statement of Rep. Graham). This concern, however, was not shared by the bill’s sponsors. And notably, this is not the rationale now advanced by the Government in

support of the consular nonreviewability doctrine, which (as we

discuss below) is said to rest on vague concerns of executive

power and national security. See infra at 24-27.

5 In amending the INA in 1961, Congress would clarify that the

only pathway to judicial review of exclusion proceedings is the

writ of habeas corpus. H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.

31 (1961). Exclusion proceedings, however, are distinct from re-

11

3.

Congress would not have intended the

APA or INA to incorporate the consular

nonreviewability doctrine.

Moreover, there is no basis to assume that the

Congress that enacted either the APA or the INA

would have intended the statute to incorporate a consular nonreviewability principle as part of the presumed legal background. At the time Congress enacted those statutes, consular nonreviewability was

an obscure, infrequently stated, and largely unsupported doctrine. In particular, there existed “no

longstanding judicial practice of refusing to review

claims like those raised here,” and the Government

has “not produced a single case * * * in which this

kind of claim [had been] found to be outside the province of the federal courts” at the time the relevant

statutes were enacted. Abourezk v. Regan, 785 F.2d

1043, 1051 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Such a dubious rule is

not presumptively incorporated into legislation.

In its modern incarnation, the consular nonreviewability doctrine first arose in two court of appeals

decisions issued during the late 1920s: (1) U.S. ex rel.

Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1929), in

which the court indicated that it was “not able to find

any provision of the immigration laws which provides

fusals to grant a visa, and Congress specified that the writ applied only when an immigrant sought to secure release from custody. Ibid.

Congress again amended the INA in 1996 to curtail judicial

review of removal proceedings. Once again, Congress did nothing

to bar judicial review of decisions by consular officers to deny visas. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), as

amended by Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656 (Oct. 11, 1996).

12

for an official review of the action of the consular officers in such case by a cabinet officer or other authority”; and (2) U.S. ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288,

290 (2d Cir. 1927), in which the court held that

“[w]hether the consul has acted reasonably or unreasonably is not for us to determine. Unjustifiable refusal to vise a passport may be ground for diplomatic

complaint by the nation whose subject has been discriminated against. * * * It is beyond the jurisdiction

of the court.” Notably, these decisions rested on different rationales (lack of statutory authority in one, lack

of jurisdiction in the other), and neither discussed the

basis for nonreviewability in any detail—the courts

simply declared that they would refrain from judicial

review. See also Ex parte Seid Soo Hong, 23 F.2d 847,

848 (N.D. Cal. 1928) (“The granting or denying of a

visa involves the exercise of discretion by consular officers with which the courts will not interfere * * *”).

With a few minor exceptions, these two courts’ discussions of consular nonreviewability were almost entirely disregarded until the 1960s.6 In fact, the term

“consular non-reviewability” did not appear in the

scholarly literature until 1955. See Harry N. Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability: A Case Study in

Administrative Absolutism, 41 ABA J. 1109 (1955)

(calling it an “anomaly in American jurisprudence”).

This is hardly, as the Government characterizes it, a

principle with “deep roots.” U.S. Br. 16. The obscurity

6 Courts began paying substantial attention to the doctrine only

in subsequent decades, after enactment of the INA. See, e.g.

Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1960)

(dicta without analysis); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 701

n.2 (5th Cir. 1961) (same); Loza-Bedoya v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 410 F.2d 343, 347 (9th Cir. 1969) (same)..

13

of the doctrine thus refutes any assumption that Congress either (1) meant to integrate the consular nonreviewability doctrine into the APA in 1946 or (2) acquiesced in 1952 to a pattern of nonreviewability in

judicial decisions post-dating enactment of the APA.7

No such pattern existed.

Moreover, both Ulrich and London long predated

enactment of the APA, which created an express

mechanism for, and gave a strong endorsement to, judicial review. And those decisions also predated enactment of the INA by more than two decades, so surely

would not have been top of mind for the enacting Congress. It therefore is plain that no default presumption of nonreviewability existed at the time of the

INA’s enactment.

To be sure, prior to enactment of the INA this

Court declined to review a decision by the Attorney

General to exclude permanently, without a hearing, a

noncitizen from admission to the United States in

U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537

(1950). But that case did not involve a consular decision at all, and therefore says nothing about a principle of consular nonreviewability. Moreover, the Court

there understood the usual rule—that courts could review exclusion decisions as “authorized by law”—to

have been displaced “during a time of national emergency” by the statute’s wartime provisions. Id. at 543.

7 Although a few courts have suggested that Congress intended

to remove the INA from the ambit of the APA (see Licea-Gomez,

193 F. Supp. at 582; Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F.

Supp. 217, 219 (D.P.R. 1976), they proffered no evidence for this

proposition; the contrary statements of Sen. McCarran and Rep.

Walter prove otherwise.

14

The Court found the procedures under review “reasonable in the circumstances of the period for which they

were authorized, namely, the national emergency of

World War II.” Id. at 544. Emphasizing the case’s national-security implications, the Court relied on Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171-72 (1948) (upholding the President’s war-power authority to deport citizens of hostile governments during wartime), for its

conclusion that it could not “retry the determination

of the Attorney General” that Knauff was a security

risk. Id. at 546. This is not that case: It is not wartime,

and the government makes no national-security

claim. The Congress that enacted the INA thus would

not have understood Knauff as precluding ordinary

APA review in the circumstances of this case.8

Finally, it bears emphasis that the decisions in Ulrich, London, and Knauff relied on the Chinese Exclusion Cases of the late-nineteenth century as the principal evidence of Congress’s plenary power to imbue

consular officers with ultimate, unreviewable discretion. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.

581 (1889); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.

538 (1895). But the Chinese Exclusion Cases are now

generally understood to reflect racist and xenophobic

8 We also note that, even so, when the facts of Knauff were men-

tioned during debate on the INA, critics and sponsors of the bills

that became the INA both criticized Ms. Knauff’s exclusion. This

background strongly suggests that Congress did not acquiesce in

the decision when enacting the INA. See, e.g., 98 Cong. Rec. 4302

(1952) (statement of Rep. Walter); id. at 4401 (statement of Rep.

Celler); id. at 5154 (statement of Sen. Benton). Indeed, as noted,

the legislative history indicates that the INA’s sponsors intended

the APA to govern determinations made under the INA. See supra, at 8-10.

15

premises that are inconsistent with currently recognized constitutional values; the decisions have largely

been repudiated by historians, lawyers, and political

scientists. See Amicus Br. Fred T. Korematsu Center

for Law and Equality et al. 4-12.. The Court should

hesitate before extending these decisions’ dubious legacy here.

*

*

*

In short, the lack of a clear textual or historical

hook for eliminating APA review means that this is

not a case in which “statutes preclude judicial review.”

5 U.S.C. § 701(1).

B. This was not an action “committed to

agency discretion.”

It is equally apparent that the decision to deny the

visa application here did not fall within the APA’s second review exception: it is not an action “committed to

agency discretion.”

To “honor the presumption of [APA] review,” this

Court reads “quite narrowly” the exception for

“agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law.” DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140

S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This exception is confined to “those rare ‘administrative decision[s] traditionally left to agency discretion.” Ibid.

(quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993)). It

should be invoked only when there is “no law to apply.” Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569

(2019) (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)). The instances in

which this exception has been held to govern are extremely rare: employment decisions at the CIA (Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988)); the allocation of

16

lump-sum appropriations (Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192 );

and decisions to not undertake certain enforcement

actions (Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-838

(1985)).

Here, however, there is law to apply. The INA includes clear language governing how a consular officer

is to judge a visa applicant’s eligibility. The provision

relevant to Asencio-Cordero’s case specifically requires that the consular officer have “reasonable

ground to believe” that the applicant “seeks to enter

the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in * * * any other unlawful activity.”

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii). The officer does not have

freewheeling discretion in making this decision; rather, it must be grounded in specific facts made relevant by the INA’s substantive standard. In particular,

relevant agency guidance explains that the “reason to

believe” standard means that the consular officer

“must have more than a mere suspicion; there must

exist a probability, supported by evidence,” that the

inadmissibility ground applies to the applicant. 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.4-3(B)(3). This “might be established by a conviction, an admission, a long record

of arrests with an unexplained failure to prosecute by

the local government, or several reliable and corroborative reports.” Ibid.

The United States appears to agree on this point:

“Unlike a discretionary waiver decision, which could

be based on a wide range of considerations deemed relevant by the Executive, a consular officer’s decision

that a noncitizen is not eligible for a visa must be tethered to the legal provisions that define such ineligibility.” U.S. Br. 25 (emphasis added). As such, the deci-

17

sion to deny Asencio-Cordero’s spousal visa is not committed to agency discretion and therefore not barred

from review.

C. The consular nonreviewability doctrine

finds no support in Section 702(1).

Although the inapplicability of the exceptions

statutory exceptions to APA review should be the end

of the matter, a few courts have understood Section

702(1)—which provides that “[n]othing herein affects

other limitations on judicial review or the power or

duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief

on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground” (5

U.S.C. § 702(1))—to somehow incorporate the consular nonreviewability doctrine into the APA. See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1160 (D.C.

Cir. 1999); Allen v. Milas, 896 F.3d 1094, 1107 (9th

Cir. 2018). That conclusion is incorrect.

1. As this Court noted in Darby v. Cisneros, Congress added Section 702(1) to the APA through the

statute’s 1976 amendments, limiting sovereign immunity while “simply * * * mak[ing] clear that ‘[a]ll

other than the law of sovereign immunity remain unchanged.’” 509 U.S. 137, 153 (1993) (quoting S. Rep.

No. 94-996, at 11 (1976)). That is, the amendments’

“elimination of the defense of sovereign immunity did

not affect any other limitation on judicial review that

would otherwise apply under the APA.” Ibid. (emphasis added).The provision therefore creates no new limits on judicial review; it simply confirms that the

amendment did not further expand judicial review. If

it is correct that the INA does not itself foreclose review and that there is law to apply, Section 702(1) offers the Government no further support.

18

With seeming disregard of Darby, the D.C. and

Ninth Circuits in Saavedra Bruno and Milas held that

Section 702(1) retroactively incorporated consular

nonreviewability as a basis for barring APA review.

But as we have already established, that doctrine did

not exist in any meaningful form when Congress enacted the APA. The phrase “consular nonreviewability” had not yet been coined. There was dicta in a few

old decisions suggesting the unavailability of review,

but those comments did not constitute a well-established understanding. Legislators would have thought

that immigration decision-making was subject to review, as the Supreme Court would reaffirm four years

later in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47,

53 (1950) (“We find no basis * * * for judicially declaring an exemption in favor of deportation proceedings

from the procedural safeguards enacted for general

application to administrative agencies.”).9 Consequently, as Section 702(1) left the law of reviewability

unchanged, it did not incorporate an unstated doctrine of consular nonreviewability into the APA.

Indeed, in Abourezk v. Reagan, then-Judge Ginsburg wrote for the D.C. Circuit that the APA “endow[s] plaintiffs with a right of action” to challenge

visa denials so long as the plaintiffs “suffer injury in

fact by reason of the challenged agency action and are

arguably within the zone of interests to be protected

or regulated under a relevant statute.” 785 F.2d 1043,

While the Court in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955),

held that enactment of the INA displaced the APA’s applicability

in certain deportation proceedings, the Court would swiftly rule

that the APA was available to prospective immigrants seeking to

challenge their exclusion. See Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S.

180 (1956); see also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).

9

19

1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The court of appeals labeled “insubstantial” the Government’s assertion that authority to review the visa denial was unavailable under

the APA. Ibid.; see id. at 1051 (specifically rejecting

suggestions that the INA precludes review or that visa

determinations are committed to agency discretion).

An equally divided Court upheld that decision.

Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1, 1 (1987) (mem.).

2. To the extent that case law supports some limitation on courts’ ability to hear challenges to consular

visa denials, it misconceives the basis for that limitation. As Judge Leventhal wrote for the court of appeals: “In past decisions refraining from judicial review courts have summoned, and often confused, a variety of concepts, finding a lack in one or another of

the elements a suitor must provide to obtain judicial

review.” Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council

v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Those

concepts, including standing and reviewability, “are

separable [but] * * * are intermeshed in the overall

determination of the appropriate occasion for judicial

review.” Ibid.

Courts’ refusals to hear challenges to consular

visa determinations have often been couched in terms

of nonreviewability. As we have shown, though, there

is no basis for such a bar. The purported doctrine of

consular nonreviewability therefore has been persistent, perhaps, because of concerns relating not to reviewability, but to the presumption that a statute provides a cause of action only to “particular plaintiff[s]”

whose claim falls within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Lexmark, Int’l, Inc. v. Static

Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014). In

20

the typical visa denial case, the disappointed party is

an “unadmitted and nonresident alien” with no adequate basis for asserting a claim in the courts of this

country. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762

(1972). Such parties appear to be outside of the zone

of interests protected by the INA, and therefore ordinary law forbids their suit. But that concern provides

no basis for barring the review sought by a U.S. citizen

seeking reunification with her spouse.

The zone-of-interests test has no precise definition; rather, courts look broadly to legislative text, intent, and history to determine whether a plaintiff’s injury “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be

protected by the statutory provision whose violation

forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Air Courier

Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO,

498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)). That surely describes the circumstances here. Congress has long legislated favorably towards U.S. citizens seeking to

bring their noncitizen spouses (and children) to the

United States, granting them substantial legal protection in the INA. That is clear from statutory text, in a

wide range of contexts. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§

1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(b); Resp. Br. 18-22.

Legislative history confirms that a primary goal of

the INA is to “implement[] the underlying intention of

our immigration laws regarding the preservation of

the family unit.” H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d

Sess. 29 (1952). In furtherance of that goal, Congress

intended to permit “[a]n American citizen [to] have

the right to bring his [non-citizen] spouse (wife or husband) as a nonquota immigrant.” Ibid. And more recently, in the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress

21

sought to affirm that “family reunification should remain the cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy.”

H.R. Rep. No. 723, pt. 1, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 38

(1990). During debate on that provision, legislators

decried “the separation of nuclear families” as “antithetical to the national objective of preserving the integrity of the family unit.” Id. at 39-40. Today, the INA

continues to provide exemptions from quotas for the

noncitizen spouses of U.S. citizens and provides them

with preferential status. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i),

1154(b).

In light of this, U.S. citizens seeking admission of

their noncitizen spouses to the United States clearly

fall within the zone of interests that the INA protects.

To the extent that modern decisions denying review of

consular decisions are rooted in zone-of-interests concerns, nothing in those decisions supports denying review to Ms. Muñoz and others in her position.

II. APA review would be meaningful here.

APA review is presumptively available for a reason; it guards against arbitrary action taken by an

agency bureaucracy, “set[ting] forth the procedures by

which federal agencies are accountable to the public

and their actions subject to review by the courts.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 140 S. Ct. at 1905. This case

offers a quintessential example of the circumstances

in which APA review is valuable, judicially manageable, and an essential safeguard against agency action

that is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Here, there is good reason to believe that judicial review could change the outcome

and prevent a patently wrongful result.

22

First, as has been noted, the governing statute

sets out a familiar factual standard that governs the

agency action. In relevant part, the statute provides

that a noncitizen is inadmissible if the consular officer

“knows, or has reasonable ground to believe,” that the

applicant “seeks to enter the United States to engage

solely, principally, or incidentally in * * * unlawful activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii). This states specific, judicially determinable factual grounds for inadmissibility, as well as the standard to be applied in

making that determination: “reason to believe.” And

although this standard is sufficient to offer a clear

guidepost for decision, we also explain above that

agency guidance describes “reason to believe” standard as requiring that the consular officer “must have

more than a mere suspicion; there must exist a probability, supported by evidence,” that the inadmissibility ground applies to the applicant. 9 Foreign Affairs

Manual 302.4-3(B)(3). This “might be established by a

conviction, an admission, a long record of arrests with

an unexplained failure to prosecute by the local government, or several reliable and corroborative reports.” Ibid.

Second, for all that appears in the public record,

the consular officer did not properly apply that standard (or, indeed, make any serious attempt to apply it

at all). As respondents explain, it is uncontested that

Asencio-Cordero has no criminal history. Resp. Br. 8.

His tattoos were not gang-related and instead depicted Our Lady of Guadalupe, Sigmund Freud, an artistic “tribal” pattern, and theatrical masks. See id. at

2, 7-8. Against this background, the consular officer

did not provide any reasoning or factual basis to justify the conclusion that Asencio-Cordero’s visa should

be denied, simply citing the controlling statutory

23

standard. Accordingly, there are strong grounds to believe that review would find error in the agency action.

Nor is there anything in cases like this that would

make judicial review especially difficult or unreliable.

Courts routinely review numerous sorts of agency immigration decisions under the arbitrary, capricious, or

otherwise not-in-accordance-with-law standard. See,

e.g., Perez v. Cuccinelli, 949 F.3d 865, 872 (4th Cir.

2020) (en banc); Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran, 983

F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 2020). It would not be problematic or overly burdensome to apply APA review to this

context, especially if review of consular visa denials

were confined to instances where the individual seeking review is a U.S. citizen whose claim falls within

the INA’s zone of interests.

III. Consular nonreviewability is not a freefloating constitutional doctrine independent of congressional authorization.

Against all this, the Government appears to suggest that the consular nonreviewability doctrine has

some independent constitutional basis that overrides

the ordinary rules of judicial review. But that is not

so. Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, the doctrine finds no independent basis in the text, history,

or structure of the Constitution. Rather, the doctrine

is the creation of a handful of lower courts.

If there is to be a consular nonreviewability doctrine, it would have to be derived from congressional

plenary power over agency decision-making, not executive authority over foreign affairs. See Oceanic

Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 343

(1909) (discussing “the plenary power of Congress as

24

to the admission of aliens”). The Government attempts to obscure this distinction by repeatedly referring to the plenary power of the “political branches”

(U.S. Br. 17-18), but the Executive Branch holds no

such authority independent of congressional delegation—nothing in the “executive power” gives consular

officers, or even the President, such authority. Their

actions must be congressionally sanctioned. This

Court recognized that distinction even before Ulrich

and London first articulated the consular nonreviewability doctrine. See Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 54546 (“Congress, having the right, as it may see fit, to

expel aliens of a particular class, or to permit them to

remain has undoubtedly the right * * * to take all

proper means to carry out the system which it provides.”); Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 214 U.S. at 336

(1909) (“[The] [P]ower of Congress to legislate concerning the exclusion of aliens, and to intrust the enforcement of legislation of that character to administrative officers” is “complete,” provided only that such

legislation is not “repugnant to the Constitution.”).

Indeed, the decisions that defenders of consular

nonreviewability cite as foundational did not ground

it in the Constitution. Rather, courts rejecting the

claims of immigrants seeking to enter the United

States uniformly found any applicable bar to review

in the text of relevant statutes. That was true without

regard to whether the decision for which review was

sought was that of a consular officer (see Ulrich, 30

F.2d at 986 (invoking Section 2(a) of the Immigration

Act of 1922)), or that of an immigration officer at an

exclusion hearing (see, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 546

(invoking the War Brides Act of 1941); Licea-Gomez,

193 F. Supp. at 582 (invoking Section 104(a) of the

25

INA)). Those decisions invoked statutory bars (enacted by Congress), not constitutional concerns.

Instead they premise nonreviewability on supposed statutory authorization. See, e.g., Licea-Gomez,

193 F. Supp. at 582 (invoking Section 104(a) of the

INA). These decisions thus relied on statutory bars

(enacted by Congress), not constitutional concerns.

See, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 546 (invoking the War

Brides Act of 1941); Ulrich, 30 F.2d at 986 (invoking

Section 2(a) of the Immigration Act of 1922).

And although courts generally do not question the

scope of executive plenary power in the sphere of foreign affairs and national security (see, e.g., United

States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304

(1936); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)), the executive’s exercise of authority delegated to it by Congress may be subject to judicial review to assure that

the executive acted in accord with legal limits. Because Congress has the authority to regulate immigration and determine the level of executive autonomy

in the area, Congress may either permit or deny judicial review of consular decisions. Here, Congress has

chosen to delegate power to executive officials on the

condition that certain consular visa decisions remain

subject to the APA’s system of review. Such a limit

serves a separation-of-powers function—it prevents

the Executive Branch from undermining Congress’s

plenary power over immigration.

Additionally, viewing consular nonreviewability

as a free-floating constitutional doctrine that precludes judicial review of consular visa denials conflicts

with this Court’s decisions. In Kerry v. Din, the Court

reached the merits of a visa denial challenged by a

U.S. citizen spouse without addressing the doctrine of

26

consular nonreviewability. 576 U.S. 86, 101 (2015).

And in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court highlighted the

possibility of “circumscribed judicial inquiry when the

denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional

rights of a U.S. citizen.” 585 U.S. 667, 703 (2018).

Here, Congress permitted judicial review through

the APA and did not clearly withdraw such review in

the INA. Thus, asserting its plenary power to regulate

immigration, Congress predicated consular authority

over the award of visas on the availability of judicial

review, rejecting a strict policy of nonreviewability.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

EUGENE R. FIDELL

Yale Law School

Supreme Court Clinic

127 Wall Street

New Haven, CT 06511

(203) 432-4992

CHARLES A. ROTHFELD

Counsel of Record

Mayer Brown LLP

1999 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 263-3000

crothfeld@mayerbrown.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

MARCH 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.