Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Affordable Care, L.L.C., Petitioner v. Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 20, 2023
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS AND ORDERS
Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit (May 24, 2023) .............................. 1a
Judgment, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit (May 24, 2023) .............................. 9a
Memorandum Opinion and Order, U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
(March 31, 2022) ............................................... 11a
REHEARING ORDER
Denial of Petition for Rehearing,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(June 22, 2023) ................................................. 51a
ARBITRATOR DECISION
Arbitrator Final Decision and Award
(March 19, 2021) ............................................... 53a
App.1a
OPINION, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
(MAY 24, 2023)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________________
AFFORDABLE CARE, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD;
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD, P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
No. 22-60245
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:21-CV-85
Before: ELROD and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.†
PER CURIAM: *
† Judge Willett was a member of the panel that heard oral
argument. He has since recused and has not participated in this
decision. This case is being decided by a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R.
47.5.
App.2a
Affordable Care lost at arbitration. It now seeks
vacatur of the resulting arbitration award because the
arbitrator and an attorney for the other side both have
connections to Duke University School of Law.
The district court correctly determined that these
connections do not create a conflict. We therefore
AFFIRM the district court’s denial of relief.
I
Charles Holton was assigned to arbitrate a
contract dispute between Affordable Care L.L.C., which
provides non-clinical business services to affiliated
dentists, and Dr. Raeline McIntyre and her dental
practice. After Holton completed the ordinary conflict
disclosure form, Dr. McIntyre added Paul Sun to her
legal team. Holton made the following supplemental
disclosure the day after Sun entered his appearance:
I would disclose that I know Mr. Sun and
probably have had one or more cases with
him or against him during my career, but
nothing in the last 10 years. I do not believe
that I have seen or communicated with him
in over 10 years. His involvement would not
affect my judgment in the case.1
The American Arbitration Association requested objections to the disclosure, but none were made. The arbitration process then proceeded to its conclusion with
Holton ultimately rejecting each of Affordable’s claims
and awarding attorney fees to Dr. McIntyre.
Affordable subsequently moved to vacate the award
in the United States District Court for the Southern
1 Thus, this is not a case involving a complete lack of disclosure.
App.3a
District of Mississippi, citing the Federal Arbitration
Act’s four statutory grounds for relief. It also sought
discovery related to Holton’s alleged bias and partiality.
In support of its requests, Affordable submitted
screenshots taken from the webpages of Duke’s law
school and Sun’s firm, as well as a local news article.
With this publicly available information, Affordable
was able to ascertain that both Holton and Sun
worked at Duke University School of Law: Holton as
a full-time faculty member and Sun as a “2021 Wintersession” adjunct. Affordable also determined that
Holton served as the director of Duke’s Civil Justice
Clinic, which partners with a local legal aid service
that Sun’s firm also partners with, and that Sun has
provided legal representation to Duke University.2
The district court reviewed this evidence and
concluded that Affordable failed to establish grounds
for vacatur under the FAA and that discovery was not
warranted. It therefore denied Affordable’s motions and
confirmed the award. Affordable now appeals.
II
Affordable maintains that Holton’s arbitration
award must be vacated under the FAA due to “evident
2 Affordable also asserted that “Holton represented Duke
University in many lawsuits from 1983 through 2005” and that
“Sun and [his firm] took over representation of Duke University
following Holton’s long representation.” But, as the district court
noted, Affordable has not produced any evidence of Holton’s “long
representation” of Duke. Nor did it provide any evidence to
substantiate its assertion that Holton had handed litigation over
to Sun or his firm.
App.4a
partiality or corruption in the arbitrator[].” 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(2). We disagree.
The standard for establishing evident partiality
is “stern.” OOGC America, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Expl.,
L.L.C., 975 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg.
Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). The
challenger must show “a concrete, not speculative
impression of bias” that “stem[s] from a significant,”
not trivial, “compromising connection.” Id. (citation
and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he party challenging
the award ‘must produce specific facts from which a
reasonable person would have to conclude that the
arbitrator was partial to’ its opponent.” Id. (quoting
Cooper v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534,
545 (5th Cir. 2016)).
The connections derived from Affordable’s internet
research do not establish a conflict of the sort
contemplated by the FAA. To the contrary, they are
quintessential examples of the kind of “trivial past
association” our precedents have deemed insufficient
to warrant “the extreme remedy of vacatur.” Positive
Software, 476 F.3d at 279. Indeed, once separated
from Affordable’s inflammatory characterizations, the
evidence in the record reflects the kind of professional
intersections that one might expect to find between
any two attorneys working in the same geographical
location.
Affordable has shown that both Holton and Sun
served on the faculty of Duke’s law school—one as an
adjunct for the winter term and one as a full-time
faculty member—and that Holton and Sun were both
part of organizations that served the same legal aid
non-profit. This cannot, standing alone, cast Holton’s
App.5a
impartiality into doubt. It does not follow that Sun
and Holton had any kind of personal, professional, or
financial relationship. We also agree with the district
court that Affordable’s bald assertion that Sun and
Holton shared an attorney-c lient relationship through
Holton’s employment with Duke University is unsupported by the facts and the law.
This would be a different case if Affordable had
offered evidence that Holton and Sun worked closely
together. But we cannot, on this record, conclude that
Holton and Sun were even aware of their shared Duke
connection.
We have upheld arbitration awards in the face of
much stronger indicia of a potential conflict. See e.g.,
Positive Software, 476 F.3d at 283-84 (declining to
vacate award where prevailing party’s attorney had
previously litigated with the arbitrator); Cooper, 832
F.3d at 540 (declining to vacate award based on an
undisclosed relationship between the opposing party
and another arbitrator who worked for the same
arbitral organization that the presiding arbitrator
belonged to); OOGC, 975 F.3d at 451 (declining to
vacate award despite allegations that the arbitrator
had a financial incentive to rule a certain way).
In each of these cases, the unsuccessful party to
an arbitration identified an unremarkable professional
intersection between a party or attorney and an
arbitrator, then used speculation and conjecture in an
attempt to parlay that innocuous connection into a
conflict of interest. Affordable’s challenge is no different.
Affordable has not offered specific, concrete facts that
would cause a reasonable person to speculate—much
App.6a
less require a reasonable person to conclude—that
Holton was biased.3
III
In the event that we deem vacatur of the arbitration award unwarranted, as we now do, Affordable
asks that it be permitted to conduct limited discovery
to further probe the relationship between Holton and
Sun.
We review a district court’s order denying postarbitration discovery for abuse of discretion. Vantage
Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras Am., Inc., 966 F.3d 361,
373 (5th Cir. 2020). “District courts occasionally allow
discovery in vacatur and confirmation proceedings,”
and the Fifth Circuit has “endorsed a flexible inquiry
for district courts to use.” Id. at 372. Namely, “the court
must weigh the asserted need for hitherto undisclosed
information and assess the impact of granting such
discovery on the arbitral process.” Id. at 373 (citation
omitted). In doing so, the district court “should focus
on ‘specific issues raised by the party challenging the
award and the degree to which those issues implicated
factual questions that cannot be reliably resolved
without some further disclosure.’” Id. (citation omitted).
“The party seeking discovery bears the burden of showing its necessity.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court’s analysis is entirely consistent
with this court’s flexible standard. Affordable has not
pointed to any compelling evidence of impropriety that
3 Even combining the Duke connections with the perceived procedural and substantive advantages that Affordable believes
Holton extended to Sun and his client, we cannot conclude that
Affordable has established evident partiality.
App.7a
might demonstrate the need for further discovery.
Permitting discovery in this situation would therefore
needlessly undermine the efficacy of the arbitral
process. See id. (observing that “the loser in arbitration
cannot freeze the confirmation proceedings in their
tracks and indefinitely postpone judgment by merely
requesting discovery” (citation omitted)).
***
Affordable has failed to satisfy the strict requirements for vacatur of an arbitration award set out by
the FAA.4 It has likewise failed to demonstrate that
4 Affordable’s challenges based on sections 10(a)(1), 10(a)(3), and
10(a)(4) of the FAA also fail. Affordable cannot satisfy the due
diligence prong of the section 10(a)(1) analysis because it was on
notice of a possible connection between Holton and Sun as soon
as Sun entered his appearance, yet it did not follow up on that
information until it had already lost at arbitration. See Morgan
Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Garrett, 495 F. App’x 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Barahona v. Dillard’s, Inc., 376 F. App’x 395, 397 (5th
Cir. 2010)). Affordable’s argument under section 10(a)(3), that
Holton engaged in misconduct by disregarding the ruling of a federal
district court in concurrent federal litigation also involving
Affordable and Dr. McIntyre, is contrary to the record. Holton
heard evidence on this ruling, received the ruling into the record,
and allowed oral argument on the issue after closing arguments
had been completed. Nor does Affordable provide any argument
to support its contention that Holton was bound by the ruling,
which involved a different contract from the one at issue in the
arbitration, different facts, and a different state’s law. Affordable’s
argument under section 10(a)(4), that Holton exceeded his powers
by granting unsolicited attorney fees to Dr. McIntyre, is also
contrary to the record. The services contract between Affordable
and Dr. McIntyre expressly incorporated American Arbitration
Association rules, which permit an award of attorney fees “if all
parties have requested such an award.” American Arbitration
Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures R-47(d)ii (2013). Both Affordable and Dr. McIntyre
requested an award of attorney fees in their arbitration pleadings
App.8a
the district court abused its discretion in denying postarbitration discovery. We therefore AFFIRM.
and reiterated that request in their proposed findings and
conclusions.
App.9a
JUDGMENT, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
(MAY 24, 2023)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________________
AFFORDABLE CARE, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD;
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD, P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
No. 22-60245
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:21-CV-85
Before: ELROD and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.†
JUDGMENT
This cause was considered on the record on appeal
and was argued by counsel.
† Judge Willett was a member of the panel that heard oral
argument. He has since recused and has not participated in this
decision. This case is being decided by a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
App.10a
IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the
judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party bear
its own costs on appeal.
App.11a
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER,
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
(MARCH 31, 2022)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
________________________
AFFORDABLE CARE, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD and
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD, P.C.,
Defendants.
________________________
Civil Action No. 21-cv-85-TBM-RPM
Before: Taylor B. MCNEEL,
United States District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Affordable Care, LLC lost in arbitration. Affordable
Care now seeks to set aside the arbitration award
because it believes the arbitrator was partial to
Defendants. Affordable Care has not put forward
evidence to demonstrate that the draconian remedy of
vacatur is appropriate.
App.12a
Affordable Care is a North Carolina company that
prepared the governing contract with the Defendants.
That contract required any disputes to be resolved in
arbitration in Raleigh, North Carolina. Also, North
Carolina law governed the interpretation and performance of the contract. Affordable Care demanded arbitration. An arbitrator from North Carolina was chosen.
Unsurprisingly, the Defendants—who are from Mississippi—associated a Raleigh attorney as local counsel.
Upon the local counsel’s entry of appearance, the arbitrator disclosed that he “probably” has “had one or
more cases [either] with [Defendants’ local counsel] or
against him during my career, but nothing in the last
10 years.” He further clarified “I do not believe I have
seen or communicated with [Defendants’ local counsel]
in over 10 years.” Affordable Care does not dispute the
truthfulness of these statements. Instead, Affordable
Care complains that the arbitrator and Defendants’
local counsel had other mutual connections within the
North Carolina legal community and at Duke University,
and these mutual connections are sufficient to set
aside the award. The law does not support Affordable
Care’s position.
The Court denies Affordable Care’s Motion to
Vacate and Motion for Discovery. The Court grants
the Defendants’ Motion to Confirm. The Court finds
there is no evidence of fraud or evident partiality by
the arbitrator. Nor did the arbitrator engage in
misconduct or exceed his powers. Finally, Defendants’
Motion for Sanctions is denied. While Affordable Care’s
claims are weak, Defendants have not demonstrated
Affordable Care’s Motion was frivolous or filed for the
purpose of delay.
App.13a
I. BACKGROUND
Affordable Care, LLC, a dental practice management company, entered into a twenty-year management
services contract with Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD,
P.C., on November 1, 2002.1 On July 24, 2013, JNM
Office Property—a company owned by Dr. Raeline
McIntyre and her husband, Dr. Neil McIntyre—entered
into a lease agreement with Affordable Care to lease
property JNM had recently purchased in Gulfport,
Mississippi.
In September, 2019, the Defendants notified Affordable Care of their desire to terminate the management
services contract. On November 1, 2019, Affordable
Care filed its initial demand for arbitration against the
Defendants, in accordance with the mandatory arbitration provision in the management services agreement. On that same date, Affordable Care filed a federal
civil suit (1:19-cv-827-HSO-RPM) against JNM Office
Property, LLC, seeking a declaratory judgment that
Affordable Care was not in default on the lease of the
Gulfport property.
On June 3, 2020, Affordable Care filed an Amended
Demand for Arbitration, bringing seventeen grounds
for relief, including declaratory relief under the management services contract, attorneys’ fees and indemnification, and multiple breach of contract claims. Later
that month, the arbitrator who was originally selected
by the parties withdrew from the matter due to Covid1 Defendant Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, is the sole owner of
Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, P.C. Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD and
Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, P.C. will collectively be referred to
as the “Defendants.”
App.14a
19 concerns. The parties selected Charles Holton,
using the AAA process, as the new arbitrator.
The Arbitration merits hearing was held over
the course of five days in December, 2020. Closing
arguments were made by the parties on February 11,
2021. On March 4, 2021, Affordable Care was granted
leave by Arbitrator Holton to present additional
arguments on the summary judgment decision entered
in the lawsuit pending between Affordable Care and
JNM Office Property. Finally, on March 22, 2021, the
parties were notified that Arbitrator Holton had
rendered his decision on March 19, 2021.
In his 115 page decision, Arbitrator Holton found
in favor of the Defendants on all seventeen counts,
and then awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$379,168 and expenses in the amount of $14,430.75 to
the Defendants. [16-38] at 115.
On March 24, 2021, Affordable Care filed a
Complaint with this Court, seeking vacatur of the
arbitration award and requesting remand of the matter
to the AAA for a hearing on damages. Defendants
moved [13] to dismiss the Complaint, asserting that
the proper way to argue vacatur is by filing a motion
to vacate as opposed to a complaint. [14] at 7. Affordable Care filed a Motion [16] to Vacate on June 17,
2021, arguing that vacatur is proper on all four grounds
under 9 U.S.C. § 10. Additionally, Affordable Care
filed a Motion [17] for Discovery, seeking discovery on
Arbitrator
Holton and his relationship with Defendants’
local North Carolina attorney, Paul Sun. On June 18,
2021, the Defendants filed a Motion [20] to Confirm
App.15a
the Arbitration Award. Finally, on August 2, 2021,
Defendants filed a Motion [33] for Sanctions.
Affordable Care argues for vacatur on the grounds
that the arbitrator, Charles Holton, had an undisclosed
relationship with the Defendants’ counsel, Paul Sun
and the Winters Law Firm. Affordable Care contends
that because of that relationship, Arbitrator Holton
was partial to the Defendants throughout the proceedings resulting in an “egregious award.”
Based on its search of publicly available information, Affordable Care submits documents printed
off of websites to show that Arbitrator Holton is a full
time law professor at Duke University School of Law
and serves as the Director of Duke Law School’s Civil
Justice Clinic, which partners with the Legal Aid of
North Carolina. [16-43]. Th e Winters Firm, of which
Paul Sun is a founding partner, provides pro bono
services to the Legal Aid of North Carolina. [16-41]
and [16-42]. Before joining Duke Law, Arbitrator
Holton practiced in the private sector and represented
Duke University in “many lawsuits from 1983
through 2005.” Id. The Winters Firm allegedly took
over representation of Duke University, and Paul Sun
has represented Duke University in several cases since
then.2 Finally, Paul Sun taught a “Wintersession
2 Affordable Care does not produce documents to support the
statement that Arbitrator Holton Represented Duke University
from 1983 through 2005 or that the Winters Law Firm took over
representation of Duke University, except for a newspaper
article indicating that Paul Sun represented a Duke University
employee in 2018. [16-45]. Affordab le Care also does not allege
that the Winters Law Firm is the only firm representing Duke
University, as opposed to numerous firms representing a university
as large as Duke.
App.16a
2021” class at Duke Law School which occurred during
the arbitration proceedings. [16-44].
There is no suggestion that there is a financial
arrangement between Arbitrator Holton and Paul
Sun. However, Affordable Care argues that because
the Winters Law Firm and Paul Sun have previously
represented Duke University and some faculty
members in litigation, then there is an attorney-client
relationship between Arbitrator Holton and Paul Sun,
since Arbitrator Holton is a faculty member at Duke
Law School.
In response to Affordable Care’s motion to vacate
the arbitration award, the Defendants point to the
following disclosure made by Arbitrator Holton:
I would disclose that I know Mr. Sun [an
attorney with Ellis & Winters] and probably
have had one or more cases with him or
against him during my career, but nothing in
the last 10 years. I do not believe I have seen
or communicated with him in over 10 years.
His involvement would not affect my judgment in this case.
[28-1] at 1. This disclosu re was made July 23, 2020,
the day after Paul Sun and his firm were retained by
the Defendants, and was forwarded to all counsel of
record, along with the case manager’s request that
any objections to this disclosure be made by July 30,
2020. Id. Affordable Care did not raise any objections
or concerns with regard to this disclosure. [29] at 11.
And Affordable Care has not alleged that Arbitrator
Holton was untruthful in making this disclosure. Nor
has Affordable Care offered any evidence to contradict
this disclosure.
App.17a
The Defendants contend that they are entitled to
enforce the arbitral award and request an entry of a
judgment. Defendants contend that Affordable Care’s
assertions are nothing more than “rank speculation,
conjecture, and conclusory allegations” made in an
effort to have the Court vacate the award. [29] at 8.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, federal courts
are limited to a narrow review of arbitration awards.
See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576, 584, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008)
(holding that §§ 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration
Act provide the exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur
and modification); Hamstein Cumberland Music Grp.
v. Williams, 532 F. App’x 538, 542 (5th Cir. 2013). “In
light of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration,
judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow” and “exceedingly deferential.” Cooper
v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 543-44
(5th Cir. 2016) (citing Rain CII Carbon, LLC v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 471-72 (5th Cir.
2012)). Courts may vacate an arbitration award “only
in very unusual circumstances.” Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 568, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 186
L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013) (quoting First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131
L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995)). In accordance with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hall Street, the four grounds listed
in Section 10 of the FAA are the exclusive means by
which a party can vacate an arbitration award.
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F. 3d 349,
352 (5th Cir. 2009).
App.18a
According to Section 10 of the FAA, an award can
be vacated:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been
prejudice; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10). “The Court does not ‘conduct
a review of an arbitrator’s decision on the merits,’
therefore ‘arguments concerning the merits are irrelevant’ to the Court’s ‘determination of whether there
are statutory grounds within Section 10(a) under
which the arbitration award should be vacated.’”
Vantage Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras Am. Inc., 4:18-cv02246, 2019 WL 2161037, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 17,
2019) (quoting Householder Grp. v. Caughran, 354 F.
App’x 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2009)). An arbitration award
“may not be set aside for a mere mistake of fact or
law.” WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d at 546
(quoting Rain CII Carbon, L.L.C., 674 F.3d at 471-72).
The party moving to vacate an arbitration award has
the burden of proof, and any doubts or uncertainties
must be resolved in favor of upholding the award.
App.19a
WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d at 544 (citing
Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377,
385 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2004)).
In seeking vacatur, Affordable Care raises all
four statutory grounds available in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
[18] at 16-26. Defendants mo ve to confirm the award,
disputing Affordable Care’s grounds for vacatur.3 [21] at
5-7; [29] at 5-11. Additional ly, Affordable Care requests
that it be allowed to conduct limited discovery of the
Arbitrator. [17]. Finally, Defendants seek sanctions in
the form of attorneys’ fees and costs associated with
defending this action. [33]. The Court will first address
each of Affordable Care’s proposed grounds for vacatur
and then consider the requests for discovery and
sanctions.
A. Fraud
Affordable Care first contends that the arbitral
award must be vacated because Arbitrator Holton had
a conflict of interest arising from his past and current
dealings with Defense counsel Paul Sun and his law
firm, and that the failure to disclose these past
dealings resulted in an award procured by fraud.
The FAA provides that a district court can refuse
to enforce an arbitral award when it has been
“procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.” 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). Under Section 10(a)(1), “a party who
alleges that an arbitration award was procured by
fraud must demonstrate: (1) that the fraud occurred
3 Defendants also filed a Motion [13] to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint [1], asserting that the filing of a Complaint was
procedurally improper. Given the Court’s ultimate decision in
this matter, the Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot.
App.20a
by clear and convincing evidence; (2) that the fraud
was not discoverable by due diligence before or during
the arbitration hearing; and (3) the fraud materially
related to an issue in the arbitration.” Morgan Keegan
& Co., Inc. v. Garrett, 495 F. App’x 443, 447 (5th Cir.
2012) (quoting Barahona v. Dillard’s, Inc., 376 F. App’x
395, 397 (5th Cir. 2010)); see also Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004). With regard
to the third prong, “[i]t is not necessary to establish
that the result of the arbitration would have been
different if the fraud had not occurred.” Karaha Bodas,
364 F.3d at 306-07. However, Section 10(a)(1) does
require “a nexus between the alleged fraud and the
basis for the panel’s decision.” Morgan Keegan & Co.,
495 F. App’x at 447 (quoting Forsythe Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs
Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990)).
Under the FAA, Affordable Care must meet its
burden of proof on each of the three prongs. See
Barahona, 376 F. App’x at 398, n.2 (declining to reach
two of the prongs because failure to satisfy even one
of them was dispositive). Affordable Care makes a
blanket statement that the “undisclosed bias of an
arbitrator” can meet the required showing. [18] at 16.
Other than the conclusory statement that the “undisclosed bias of an arbitrator is an enumerated action
that will satisfy this [fraud] requirement,” Affordable
Care provides no support with the facts or case law to
demonstrate that any of the actions of the arbitrator
rise to the level of “clear and convincing evidence” of
fraud. Nor does Affordable Care even make a single
argument under Section 10(a)(1) to explain how any
one of the three prongs are met.
App.21a
Arbitrator Holton disclosed that he “had one or
more cases with [Paul Sun] or against him during [his]
career, but nothing in the last 10 years.” [28-1] at 1.
He also disclosed that “I do not believe I have seen or
communicated with him in over 10 years.” Id. All that
Affordable Care has demonstrated is that Paul Sun
and his law firm have provided legal representation
for Duke University and some of its employees in the
past. And Arbitrator Holton—as a full-time professor
at Duke Law School and the Director of Duke Law
School’s Civil Justice Clinic—does some work with
Legal Aid of North Carolina. Paul Sun’s firm lists the
Legal Aid of North Carolina as one of the seven
entities for which it provides pro bono services.
Finally, Affordable Care demonstrated that Paul Sun
was listed as a professor for a “2021 Wintersession”
class at Duke Law School. Notably, Arbitrator Holton
was not listed as a “2021 Wintersession” instructor.
There is no evidence, nor has there been any
allegation of such by Affordable Care, that Arbitrator
Holton had any kind of financial dealings or close,
personal relationships with Paul Sun or the Winters
Law Firm. And the relationships described—such as
the fact that both the Winters Law Firm and Arbitrator
Holton do work for the Legal Aid of North Carolina—
are the kind of professional relationships and contacts
one would expect of people working in the same locality
in the legal field. See Midwest Generation EME, LLC
v. Continuum Chem. Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 939, 94647 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that interactions between
the arbitrator and one party’s law firm such as
lecturing at seminars and serving as past-presidents
of the same legal organization reveal nothing beyond
the kind of professional interactions one would expect
App.22a
of successful lawyers in a specialized field). And there
is no evidence of any interaction between Paul Sun
and Arbitrator Holton and any work with the Legal
Aid of North Carolina. In fact, Arbitrator Holton
disclosed that he did not think he had seen or spoken
with Paul Sun in over ten years. And all of these
“connections” could have been discovered through “due
diligence during the arbitration hearing,” after
Arbitrator Holton made the disclosure describing his
prior knowledge of Paul Sun. Morgan Keegan & Co.,
495 F. App’x at 447 (quoting Barahona, 376 F. App’x at
397); see also Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., 466 F. Supp.
2d 899, 907 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding no evidence of
fraud where defendants knew of a relationship between
the arbitrator and opposing counsel and with the
exercise of due diligence could have uncovered the
relationships of which they now complain). Finally,
Affordable Care provides no basis, in fact or law, for
its position that an attorney-client relationship exists
between Arbitrator Holton and Paul Sun.
Affordable Care has not offered any arguments as
to why even the first prong required to prove fraud has
been met. As to the second prong, if Affordable Care
had performed its due diligence, all of these connections
were discoverable in the public domain during the
arbitration. See Morgan Keegan & Co., 495 F. App’x
at 447 (holding the plaintiff could not meet its “burden
of proof” under the second prong because the grounds
for fraud were discoverable by due diligence before or
during the arbitration); Matter of Arb. Between Trans
Chem. Ltd. and China Nat’l Machinery Import and
Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 305-06 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(“CNMC also fails to meet . . . the three-part test for
showing fraud or undue means . . . because it has not
App.23a
shown that TCL’s allegedly improper behavior was
not discoverable by due diligence before or during the
arbitration hearing.”). Even if the evidence supported
a finding of fraud, which it does not, this prong is
unsatisfied and Affordable Care’s motion to vacate on
this ground is denied.
B. Evident Partiality
The Court next considers Affordable Care’s contention that the award must be vacated under § 10(a)(2)
based on the evident partiality of Arbitrator Holton.
Under the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitration
award “where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators.” Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v.
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)). “[A]n arbitrator’s nondisclosure must
involve a ‘reasonable impression of bias’ stemming
from ‘a significant compromising connection to the
parties’ in order for vacatur to be warranted under
§ 10(a)(2).” OOGC Am., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Expl.,
L.L.C., 975 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg.
Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 282-83 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
However, the standard for assessing evident partiality
is not the mere appearance of bias. See Positive
Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 285 (“[T]he ‘mere
appearance’ standard would make it easier for a losing
party to challenge an arbitration award for nondisclosure than for actual bias . . . ” and “hold arbitrators
to a higher ethical standard than federal Article III
judges”).
“Evident partiality is a ‘stern standard.’” WestEnd
Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d at 545 (quoting Positive
Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 281). “The statutory
App.24a
language . . . seems to require upholding arbitral awards
unless bias was clearly evident in the decisionmakers.”
Id. Thus, for the arbitration award to be vacated,
Affordable Care “must produce specific facts from
which a reasonable person would have to conclude
that the arbitrator was partial to” the Defendants. See
Householder Grp. v. Caughran, 354 F. App’x 848, 852
(5th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). This is an “onerous burden,” because the
urging party must demonstrate that the “alleged
partiality was direct, definite, and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative.”
Householder Grp., 354 F. App’x at 852 (quoting Weber
v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F.
Supp. 2d 545, 550 (N.D. Tex. 2006)) (citation and
internal quotations omitted).
1. Relationship with Counsel
When challenging an arbitration award based
upon nondisclosure of an arbitrator’s relationship with
the parties, it must be shown that the arbitrator had
a “significant compromising connection to the parties.”
Ameser. v. Nordstrom, Inc., 442 F. App’x 967, 970 (5th
Cir. 2011). In nondisclosure cases, an award may not
be vacated because of a trivial or insubstantial prior
relationship between the arbitrator and the parties to
the proceeding. Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F. 3d
at 283. The “reasonable impression of bias” standard
is interpreted practically rather than with the utmost
rigor. Id.
The question before the Court is whether Affordable Care has sustained its burden to establish
“specific facts from which a reasonable person would
have to conclude that the arbitrator was partial to its
App.25a
opponent.” OOGC Am., L.L.C., 975 F.3d at 453 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Court
concludes that it has not.
Affordable Care’s claim that there was “evident
partiality” fails for two reasons. First, Affordable Care
waived the objection because it waited until after the
arbitration award was issued to raise its claim of
evident partiality. See Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v.
Michael Motor Co., 485 F. App’x 724, 727 (5th Cir.
2012) (“A party seeking to vacate an arbitration based
on an arbitrator’s evident partiality generally must
object during the arbitration proceedings. Its failure
to do so results in wavier of its right to object.”). And
what Affordable Care has shown are a few professional
connections, the existence of which were readily
discoverable to anyone who chose to look. See Fidelity
Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306,
1313 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a party waives later
challenges if it “either knew or should have known of
the facts indicating partiality”); Matter of Andros
Compania Maritima, S.A., 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978)
(refusing to vacate the award where one party alleged
a “close personal and professional relationship” between
the arbitrator and the president of firm that owned
the vessel involved in the arbitration where basis of
relationship was that the arbitrator and the executive
had served together on 19 arbitration panels and no
other concrete support was given for the characterization that the two were “close personal friends”). All
the “connections” described by Affordable Care were
fairly discoverable. By waiting until the completion of
the arbitration proceedings—and after it received an
unfavorable ruling—Affordable Care waived its “objection” of evident partiality.
App.26a
Second, it is clear that neither the facts nor the
law support a finding of evident partiality on the part
of Arbitrator Holton. Significantly, Affordable Care
has not cited a single case that would support the
conclusions it draws from the professional connections
of Arbitrator Holton, Paul Sun, and the Winters Law
Firm. Nor does Affordable Care offer any specific facts
to contradict Arbitrator Holton’s disclosure that he
has not seen or had any communications with Paul
Sun in over ten years. The most Affordable Care does
is put forward conclusory assertions of partiality towards
the Defendants.
The cases that Affordable Care relies upon to argue
vacatur under Section 10(a)(2) involve business and
financial relationships between the arbitrator and one
of the parties. For example, in Thomas Kinkade Co. v.
White, 711 F.3d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 2013), the arbitration award was vacated because the neutral arbitrator’s law firm had accepted a business engagement
from one of the parties to the arbitration. And in
Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994), the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment to
vacate the award where one of the arbitrators failed
to disclose that his law firm had represented the parent
company of a party to the arbitration in 19 cases over
35 years.
Affordable Care is correct that “[c]ourts have
found that a reasonable impression of partiality is
established when the arbitrator has had a direct
business or professional relationship with one of the
parties to an arbitration.” Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (N. D.
Tex. 2006); see also Thomas Kinkade Co. v. White, 711
App.27a
F.3d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[w]hen the neutral arbitrator engages in or attempts to engage in mid-arbitration business relationships with non-neutral part icipants, it jeopardizes what is supposed to be a partystructured dispute resolution process.”).
However, there is no allegation or evidence of a
financial or business relationship between Arbitrator
Holton and Paul Sun or the Winters Law Firm. Also,
the unsubstantiated, conclusory allegation that an
attorney-client relationship exists between Arbitrator
Holton and Paul Sun is not supported by the evidence.
Affordable Care does not provide any relevant law to
support its conclusion that by virtue of Paul Sun and
the Winter Law Firm’s representation of Duke University, and on occasion some of its faculty members, an
attorney-client relationship exists between Paul Sun and
Arbitrator Holton, a professor at Duke Law School.4
While Affordable Care cites Rule 1.13 of the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct in support, it
fails to cite the comment to that rule which states,
“[t]his does not mean, . . . , that constituents of an
organizational client are the clients of the lawyer.”
N.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 1.15 cmt. According to
Arbitrator Holton’s disclosure—which was not
objected to by Affordable Care—he had not seen or
communicated with Paul Sun in over ten years. And
4 In support of its claim that an attorney-client relationship exists
between Arbitrator Holton and Paul Sun, Affordable Care sites
to Rule 1.13 of North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct and
an unpublished Connecticut district court case (Metcalf v. Yale
Univ., No. 15-cv-1696, (D. Conn. Dec. 27, 2017)—neither of which
are persuasive authority for this Court as neither suggest that
an attorney for an organization has an attorney-client relationship
with every employee of the organization it represents. [18] at 20.
App.28a
Affordable Care does not provide any legal support for
its contention that because Arbitrator Holton previously
did legal work for Duke University, and Paul Sun
currently does legal work for Duke University, there
is a conflict of interest. See Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace,
668 F.2d 1140, 1149-50 (10t h Cir. 1982) (affirming
denial of vacatur where the arbitrator and law firm
representing a party had clients in common and
finding that requiring vacatur under such facts would
“request that potential neutral arbitrators sever all
their ties with the business world”). Nor is there any
authority to support Affordable Care’s position that
every attorney who has represented Duke University
has an attorney-client relationship with each of the
thousands of employees at Duke—including the faculty
of Duke Law School and Duke Medical School. See
Liquor Bike, LLC v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cnty., 959
N.W.2d 693, 697 (Iowa 2021) (“[A] lawyer’s representation of an organization does not necessarily mean the
lawyer also represents the owners, employees, or other
constituents of the organization.”).
And Courts have refused vacatur where the
undisclosed connections are much stronger.5 For
5 See ANR Coal Co, Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173
F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding vacatur improper where arbitrator’s law firm represented company that indirectly caused the
dispute in the arbitration by buying less from the defendant, who
in turn sought to buy less from the plaintiff); Al-Harbi v.
Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying
vacatur where arbitrator’s former law firm represented party to
the arbitration on unrelated matters); Lifecare Int’l, Inc. v. CD
Med. Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 432-34 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming
denial of vacatur where arbitrator failed to disclose that he became
“of counsel” to a law firm the prevailing party had interviewed
for the purpose of obtaining representation in the instant dispute
and finding that this, at best, showed a remote, uncertain, and
App.29a
example, in Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1993), the arbitrator
failed to disclose his law partner’s representation of
one of the parties to the arbitration. Id. at 145. The
partner had done the work while working for a
different law firm and had not brought the client with
him when he joined the arbitrator’s firm. Id. The court
found that the partner’s prior representation of the
party was not sufficient grounds for finding evident
partiality by the arbitrator where the arbitrator was
not involved in the litigation between the parties. Id.
at 146. And in Lummus Global Amazonas, S.A. v.
Aguaytia Energy del Peru, 256 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D.
Tex. 2002), the arbitrator disclosed that his law firm
and a former law partner (Carolyn Goode) had done
work for a party to the arbitration and for a company
(El Paso Energy) that owned a minority interest in
that party. Lummus Global, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
After the arbitrator issued his ruling, Lummus
discovered “new evidence” of the relationship between
the arbitrator’s law firm and El Paso Energy. Id. at
621. Another former law partner of the arbitrator
(John Hushon) left the law firm to become President
of El Paso Energy. Id. John Hushon retained his
former law firm and Carolyn Goode who did substantial
legal work on a financing project involving Aguaytia
Energy. Id. The court found that the arbitrator’s
alleged nondisclosure did not require vacatur, noting
that the disclosure put Lummus “‘on notice’ of the
speculative partiality); Health Services Mgm’t Corp. v. Hughes,
975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding relationship “minimal”
and insufficient to vacate where arbitrator knew one of the
parties, had worked in the same office with him twenty years
ago, and saw him once a year since that time).
App.30a
circumstances they now
disqualifying.” Id. at 626.
allege
are
potentially
Unlike the arbitrators in Peoples and Lummus —
whose law partners actually did legal work for a party
to the arbitration—there is no allegation or evidence
that Arbitrator Holton or his law firm had ever done
legal work for the Defendants. Arbitrator Holton and
Paul Sun, as Arbitrator Holton disclosed to the
parties, had cases together in the past. And while the
arbitrator in Peoples did not make any disclosure
about the work his law partner had done for a party
to the arbitration, Arbitrator Holton disclosed that he
knew Paul Sun from previously having cases with or
against him. Affordable Care did not object to this
disclosure which put it “on notice.” See Lummus Global,
256 F. Supp. 2d at 626. And while both Arbitrator
Holton and Paul Sun represented Duke University at
different times, case law supports this Court’s finding
that denial of vacatur is appropriate because this is
the kind of “trivial former business” relationship, that
does not require disclosure. See Positive Software
Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476
F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that vacatur
was not warranted where arbitrator and counsel for a
party to the arbitration worked on the same litigation
for six years but had not spoken to each other prior to
the arbitration and describing this relationship as a
“trivial former business relationship”); Uhl v. Komatsu
Forklift Co., 512 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming
denial of vacatur where arbitrator did not disclose
that he had served as co-counsel with counsel for one
party on two occasions six years earlier); Apperson v.
Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1360 (6th Cir. 1989)
(declining to vacate where arbitrator adjudicated a
App.31a
case involving former law partners—whose practice
he had left two-and-ah
- alf years earlier—since there
was an absence of evidence of a personal interest in
the arbitration or prior knowledge of the substance of
the arbitration).
Finally, Affordable Care points to the fact that
Paul Sun taught a “Wintersession 2021” class at Duke
Law where Arbitrator Holton is a full-time law
professor. First, the Court notes that while Paul Sun
is listed as an instructor for “Wintersession 2021,”
Arbitrator Holton is not included in that list. As
Affordable Care points out in its brief, this class was
taught “during the weekends of Friday, February 19 –
Sunday, February 21, and Friday, March 12 – Sunday,
March 14.” [39] at 7. Affordable Care offers no
arguments or case law to support its conclusory claim
of evident partiality based on the fact that Paul Sun
taught a class as an adjunct professor at the same
university that employed Arbitrator Holton. In Midwest
Generation EME, LLC v. Continuum Chemical Corp.,
768 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 2010), Continuum’s
“evidence” of arbitrator bias included contacts between
the arbitrator and counsel for the prevailing party. Id.
at 949. These contacts included: (1) presenting together
at seminars for the College of Commercial Arbitrators,
(2) co-authoring various law journal articles, (3)
serving as past-presidents (at different times) of a
professional organization, (4) holding membership in
the ABA Real Estate Advisory Board, and (5) developing
continuing education programs. Id. at 949. The court
noted that “these particulars reveal nothing beyond
the kind of professional interactions that one would
expect of successful lawyers in the area where [the
arbitrator] and [plaintiff’s counsel] functioned.” Id.
App.32a
As the Sixth Circuit cautioned in Uhl:
We will not rush to conclude that an arbitrator is evidently partial. Arbitrators are
often chosen for their expertise and community involvement, so ‘[t]o disqualify any arbitrator who had professional dealings with
one of the parties (to say nothing of a social
acquaintanceship) would make it impossible,
in some circumstances, to find a qualified
arbitrator at all.’
Uhl, 512 F.3d at 308 (internal citations omitted). See
also Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 286
(“Neither the FAA nor the Supreme Court, nor predominant case law, nor sound policy countenances
vacatur of FAA arbitral awards for nondisclosure by
an arbitrator unless it creates a concrete, not
speculative impression of bias.”); Merit Ins. Co. v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“Notwithstanding the broad language of Section 18
[of the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules], no one
supposes that either the Commercial Arbitration
Rules or the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators requires
disclosure of every former social or financial relationship with a party or a party’s principals.”).
Accordingly, Affordable Care has not met its burden
of showing a significant compromising connection
exists between Arbitrator Holton and Paul Sun that
would merit vacatur. Amser v. Nordstrom, Inc., 442 F.
Appx 967, 970 (5th Cir. 2011) (an arbitrator’s nondisclosure of prior service in an earlier arbitration
involving one of the parties did not meet the “high
threshold” necessary for vacating an award based on
evident partiality). “The draconian remedy of vacatur
is only warranted upon nondisclosure that involves a
App.33a
significant compromising relationship.” Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 286. This case does not
come close to meeting that standard when Affordable
Care has not disputed that Arbitrator Holton and
Paul Sun have not seen each other or communicated
in over ten years. Affordable Care’s motion for vacatur
on this ground is denied.
2. Arbitrator Holton’s Actions During the
Arbitration Proceedings
Affordable Care further seeks vacatur of the award
under Section 10(a)(2) on the ground that Arbitrator
Holton displayed evident partiality and bias by granting
the Defendants certain procedural advantages.
First, Affordable Care asserts that the Defendants
were given an advantage by Arbitrator Holton granting
a continuance of the Arbitration hearing, seven weeks
before the hearing was scheduled to take place. As
Affordable Care points out in its brief, Paul Sun “had
been in an accident on July 31, 2020 and was
recovering from his injuries.” [18] at 10. Affordable
Care does not cite any case law to support its assertion
that Arbitrator Holton’s grant of a continuance to a
party whose attorney was injured in an accident is
evidence of a procedural advantage. Nor does Affordable Care assert or offer evidence that Paul Sun was
not actually injured in an accident. There is no merit
to the argument that the Arbitrator Holton was giving
the Defendants an advantage when a continuance was
granted because Paul Sun was recovering from
physical injuries sustained in an accident. Furthermore,
Arbitrator Holton allowed Affordable Care additional
time to present evidence and provide arguments after
the final arbitration hearing and closing arguments
App.34a
had been made. [16-38] at 2-3. Affordable Care appears
to argue that Arbitrator Holton’s grant of a continuance
based on physical injuries sustained by the Defendants’
attorney was more of “a procedural advantage” than
allowing Affordable Care to make arguments and
submit evidence after the final arbitration hearing.
Affordable Care is wrong.
Next, Affordable Care argues that Arbitrator
Holton gave the Defendants an advantage by allowing
Defendants to take a different position during the
arbitration than they took on a similar issue that was
raised in a separate federal civil action related to a
separate contract. To clarify, the Court notes that the
parties to the civil action (1:19-cv-827-HSO-RPM)
referred to by Affordable Care are Affordable Care
and JNM Office Property, LLC. JNM Office Property
is owned by Raeline McIntyre and her husband, Neil
McIntyre. In that action, Affordable Care sought a
declaratory judgment that it was not in default of a
lease agreement that the parties entered into in 2013.
The parties to the instant action are Affordable Care,
Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, and Raeline K. McIntyre,
DMD, P.C., and the subject of this action is the
management services contract entered by the parties
in 2002. Affordable Care offers no legal support for its
position that Arbitrator Holton was bound by the
decision of a federal district court in a different state
in a different matter involving different contracts or
that failure to follow that district court ruling constitutes bias or misconduct justifying vacatur of the
arbitration award. Significantly, pursuant to the arbitration agreement, the interpretation and performance
of the contract were governed by North Carolina law.
App.35a
In Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C. v. Rainier Cap. Mgm’t,
L.P., 828 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2016), the Fifth Circuit
considered a claim of arbitrator bias where the arbitrator and the district court reached the same
conclusion on cases with similar issues and the same
parties. Id. at 364-65. The court st ated that “the fact
that the arbitrator and the district court reached the
same result regarding the meritlessness of the Investors’
claim is not itself evidence of improper bias,” noting
that the arbitrator’s award did not reference the
district court’s summary judgment and nothing in the
award suggested that it as not the product of an
independent evaluation by the arbitrator. Id.
Affordable Care has not shown that Arbitrator
Holton gave the Defendants such an advantage to
justify vacatur when deciding what weight to give a
ruling in an action in a different state that involved
different contracts. Therefore, vacatur is not appropriate on this ground under Section 10(a)(2).
C. Arbitrator’s Misconduct
Affordable Care argues that vacatur is merited
under Section 10(a)(3) because Arbitrator Holton
engaged in “misconduct” when he “refused to consider
evidence of the arguments and summary judgment on
the issue of waiver.” [18] at 22. The Defendants assert
that this “summary judgment evidence” is from a
separate civil action involving a lease between parties
who were not subject to this arbitration. [29] at 1-2.
The arbitrator accepted into the hearing record the
summary judgment ruling from that civil lawsuit
between Affordable Care and JNM Office Property, LLC,
1:19-cv-827-HSO-JCG, and allowed oral argument on
the matter. [1-2] at 2-3.
App.36a
Each of the parties to an arbitration must be
given an “adequate opportunity to present its evidence
and arguments.” Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 300 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
However, “an arbitrator is not bound to hear all of the
evidence tendered by the parties.” Id. “Every failure of
an arbitrator to receive relevant evidence does not
constitute misconduct requiring vacatur of an arbitrator’s award.” Id. at 301. “A federal court may vacate
an arbitrator’s award only if the arbitrator’s refusal to
hear pertinent and material evidence prejudices the
rights of the parties to the arbitration proceedings”
such that “the exclusion of relevant evidence deprives
a party of a fair hearing.” Id.
Affordable Care alleges that Arbitrator Holton
did not consider the summary judgment ruling from a
separate civil action involving a lease agreement
between Affordable Care and JNM Property, LLC—
an entity that was not a party to the instant arbitration.
However, Affordable Care’s statement that the arbitrator did not “consider” the summary judgment ruling
from Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-827-HSO-JCG does not
line up with the record. In fact, oral arguments were
allowed on the matter—after closing arguments were
made—and the summary judgment ruling was received
into the record. [16-38] at 2-3. Clearly, Arbitrator
Holton did not refuse to hear or exclude this evidence.
And as the Court just stated, Affordable Care cites to
no authority that suggests that the arbitrator was
bound by a district court ruling in a separate action in
another state, involving different contracts, or that
failure to follow that ruling constitutes bias or
misconduct justifying vacatur of the arbitration award.
App.37a
Whether or not Arbitrator Holton decided to give
weight to a particular piece of admitted evidence has
no bearing on the issue of whether misconduct occurred
meriting vacatur. See Vantage Deepwater Co. v.
Petrobras Am. Inc., 4:18-CV-02246, 2019 WL 2161037,
at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019).
On these facts, Affordable Care has not shown
that Arbitrator Holton denied it an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and arguments. Accordingly, the Court finds that Affordable Care did not
carry its burden of demonstrating that it was deprived
of a fair hearing. Therefore, vacatur is not appropriate
under Section 10(a)(3).
D. Arbitrator Exceeding His Powers
Finally, Affordable Care argues that the final
award, which included attorney’s fees and costs,
requires vacatur under Section 10(a)(4). [18] at 23.
The Defendants note that the arbitration hearing
lasted six days, including additional time granted to
Affordable Care to provide more evidence and to make
additional arguments. [29] at 4. Defendants further
argue that Arbitrator Holton’s 115 page opinion was
supported by the record and that vacatur of this
matter is not warranted. Id. at 5-6.
Section 10(a)(4) authorizes a federal court to set
aside an arbitration award “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.” BNSF R. Co. v. Alstom
Transp. Inc., 777 F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2015). “An
argument for vacatur under Section 10(a)(4) must be
balanced against the parties’ agreement to have the
arbitrators interpret their agreement, which means
that ‘an arbitral decision even arguably construing or
applying the contract must stand, regardless of a
App.38a
court’s views of its (de)merits.’” Vantage Deepwater
Co. v. Petrobras Am., Inc., 966 F.3d 361, 375 (5th Cir.
2020) (quoting Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter,
569 U.S. 564, 569, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113
(2013)). “A party seeking relief under that provision
bears a heavy burden.” Oxford Health Plans, LLC, 569
U.S. at 569. “It is not enough . . . to show that the
[arbitrator] committed an error – or even a serious
error.” Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 176 L.
Ed. 2d 605 (2010)). Under Section 10(a)(4), the Court
looks at “whether the arbitrator’s award was so
unfounded in reason and fact, so unconnected with the
wording and purpose of the [contract] as to manifest
an infidelity to the obligation of an arbitrator.” Timegate
Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., 713 F.3d
797, 802-03 (5th Cir. 2013). “The substantive question
of whether an arbitrator has exceeded its powers is a
function of [a] highly deferential standard of review in
such cases: an arbitrator has not exceeded his powers
unless he has utterly contorted . . . the essence of the
contract.” Vantage Deepwater Co., 966 F.3d at 375
(quoting Timegate Studios, Inc., 713 F.3d at 802-03).
“In other words, the arbitrator exceeds his authority
where he acts ‘contrary to an express contractual
provision.’” Id. (quoting PoolRe Ins. Corp. v. Org.
Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2015)). The
Court “resolve[s] any doubts in favor of arbitration.”
Id. (citing Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips
Co., 674 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2012)).
Affordable Care argues that Arbitrator Holton
exceeded his powers by granting an award of attorneys’
fees and costs, “which were never claimed by Defendants.” [18] at 23. Contrary to Affordable Care’s
App.39a
assertion that Defendants did not request costs and
attorneys’ fees, Defendants clearly sought such an
award in their Answer to Affordable Care’s Amended
Demand for Arbitration. See [16-29] at 34 (Respondents
“pray that the Amended Demand for Arbitration be
dismissed with prejudice, taxing all costs of this action
to Claimant and awarding Respondents reasonable
attorneys’ fees against Affordable, and that a judgment
be entered in the Respondents’ favor, together with
costs incurred herein”).
Further, the Final Award set forth the basis for
award, and that is all that is necessary. See Leeward
Constr. Co. v. Am. Univ. of Antigua-Coll. of Med. , 826
F.3d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A reasoned award sets
forth the basic reasoning of the arbitral panel on the
central issue or issues raised before it. It need not
delve into every argument made by the parties.”).
After analyzing each of Affordable Care’s seventeen
causes of action, Arbitrator Holton addressed “attorneys’
fees and expenses.” [16-38] at 110-114. At the outset,
the Final Award states:
AAA Commercial Rule 47(d)ii authorizes an
award of attorneys’ fees ‘if all parties have
requested such an award or it is authorized
by law or in their arbitration agreement.’
Both parties seek attorneys’ fees in this
matter. Rule 47 also provides that the arbitrator ‘shall assess’ fees and expenses.
Id. at 110.6 Arbitrator Holton outlined the factors
considered in determining what attorneys’ fees and
6 The Service Contract at issue expressly incorporates the rules
of the AAA. See [21-1] at 9 (“Any controversy or dispute . . . will be
settled by arbitration in Raleigh, North Carolina in accordance
App.40a
expenses to assess and the basis for the ultimate
award. Id. at 110-115. It is clear that Arbitrator
Holton concluded that the parties both requested
attorneys’ fees and expenses, and that he was required
by Rule 47 to award them.
Affordable Care has not met its burden to show
that “the arbitrator’s award was so unfounded in reason
and fact, so unconnected with the wording and purpose
of the [contract] as to manifest an infidelity to the
obligation of an arbitrator.” See Timegate Studios, 713
F.3d at 802; Forsythe Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of
Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Parties to
voluntary arbitration may not superimpose rigorous
procedural limitations on the very process designed to
avoid such limitations . . . Submission of disputes to
arbitration always risks an accumulation of procedural
and evidentiary shortcuts that would properly frustrate
counsel in a formal trial”). Arbitrator Holton did not
exceed his powers by issuing an award of attorneys’
fees and costs to the Defendants.
Accordingly, the Court finds that vacatur under
Section 10(a)(4) is not appropriate.
III. MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
Affordable Care additionally requests a period of
“limited discovery related to the Arbitrators’ bias,
partiality, and conflicts of interest, specifically related
to Arbitrator Holton’s relationship with Paul Sun and
the Winters Firm.” [17-2] at 8. The Defendants
contend that post-arbitration discovery, including deposing Arbitrator Holton is improper. The Defendants
with the then existing rules of the American Arbitration
Association applicable to commercial arbitration.”).
App.41a
also argue that Arbitrator Holton’s disclosure with
regard to his connection to Paul Sun was not objected
to by the Plaintiffs, and Affordable Care’s late request
for discovery on the arbitrator is an attempt to “freeze
the confirmation proceedings.” [25] at 3.
“District courts occasionally allow discovery in
vacatur and confirmation proceedings.” Vantage Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras Am., Inc., 966 F.3d 361, 372
(5th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B)). The
Fifth Circuit has endorsed “a flexible inquiry for
district courts to use when assessing discovery requests
in the context of such proceedings: ‘the court must weigh
the asserted need for hitherto undisclosed information
and assess the impact of granting such discovery on
the arbitral process.’” Id. (quoting Karaha Bodas Co.,
L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bimi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 305 (5th Cir. 2004)
(internal citations omitted)). The Court should focus
on “specific issues raised by the party challenging the
award and the degree to which those issues implicated
factual questions that cannot be reliably resolved
without some further disclosure.” Id. “The party
seeking discovery bears the burden of showing its
necessity.” Id. (quoting Freeman v. United States, 556
F.3d 326, 341 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Moreover, ‘[t]he loser
in arbitration cannot freeze the confirmation proceedings in their tracks and indefinitely postpone judgment
by merely requesting discovery.’” Id. (quoting Imperial
Ethiopian Gov’t v. Baruch-Foster Corp. , 535 F.2d 334,
337 (5th Cir. 1976)).
It has been observed that the deposition of
arbitrators has been “repeatedly condemned” by courts.
Legion Ins. Co. v. Ins. General Agency, Inc., 822 F.2d
541, 543 (5th Cir. 1987). See Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc.,
App.42a
343 F.3d 57, 68 (2nd Cir. 2003), abrogated on other
grounds by Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008);
Woods v. Saturn Dist. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 430 (9th Cir.
1996); O.R. Securities, Inc. v. Pro. Plan. Assocs., Inc.
857 F.2d 742, 748 (11th Cir. 1988). See also Lyeth v.
Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891, 899 (2nd Cir. 1991)
(affirming district court’s denial of Chrysler’s request
to depose the individual arbitrator where Chrysler did
not present any clear evidence of impropriety and
finding district court did not err in its finding that
Chrysler was simply “engaging in a fishing expedition
in an attempt to determine if there is some basis,
however farfetched, to prosecute a claim of bias.”).
In support of its request to conduct discovery,
Affordable Care cites district court cases out of New
Jersey and New York where courts held that discovery
requests may be granted where the “discovery is
plainly relevant to colorable claims of arbitral bias.”
See Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Bettman, No.
93-CIV-5769, 1994 WL 38130, at *2 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 4,
1994); Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr., LTD, v. 1199
SEIU United Healthcare Workers East, Civ. Act. No. 130621 (DMC), 2013 WL 6050138, at *5 (D. N.J. Nov. 13,
2013); Cable Sys. Installations Corp. v. Int’l Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 351 , Civ. No.
12-7407-JHR-KMW, 2014 WL 1291926 6, at *3 (D. NJ.
Jun. 6, 2014). As stated above, the standard in the
Fifth Circuit for assessing “evident partiality” is not
the “mere appearance of bias.” Positive Software Sols.,
Inc., 476 F.3d at 285. Rather, Affordable Care must
establish that “a reasonable person would have to
conclude that the arbitrator was partial” to the
App.43a
Defendants. Householder Grp., 354 F. App’x at 852
(quoting Weber, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 550).
Not only do the cases cited by Affordable Care
apply a different standard than that of the Fifth
Circuit, but they are further distinguishable by their
facts and holdings. For example, in both Cable Sys.
Installations and Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n,
the courts found that the plaintiffs had set forth some
basis for supporting the requests for discovery where
there was evidence that the arbitrator had decided the
outcome of the case prior to the hearing. See Cable
Sys. Installations, 2014 WL 12919266, at *4; Nat’l
Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, 1994 WL 38130, at *4.
Affordable Care has only presented mutual connections
in the legal community between Arbitrator Holton and
Paul Sun that were discoverable during the arbitration.
And Affordable Care has offered no evidence to refute
Arbitrator Holton’s disclosure that he has not seen or
communicated with Paul Sun in at least ten years.
Nor has Affordable Care even suggested that Arbitrator
Holton was being dishonest in his disclosure. Certainly,
no evidence has been offered to suggest that the
matter was determined prior to the arbitration hearings.
Finally, in Hamilton Park Health Care Center, LTD.,
the court found that the plaintiff “failed to make a
showing sufficient to justify an order compelling
discovery.” Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr., LTD.,
2013 WL 6050138, at *6.
Affordable Care has provided no evidence that a
reasonable person would have to conclude that
Arbitrator Holton was partial to the Defendants. See
Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., 512 F.3d 294 (6th Cir.
2008) (denying discovery on arbitrator after denying
vacatur on the basis of evident partiality where plaintiff
App.44a
failed to provide evidence that a reasonable person
would have to conclude that the arbitrator was partial
based on the fact that the arbitrator’s former law
partner was counsel in the arbitration). Both Arbitrator
Holton’s timely disclosure as well as the evidence
provided by Affordable Care suggest that the relationship between Arbitrator Holton and Paul Sun was
purely professional and more than ten years ago. See
Matter of Andros Compania Maritima, S.A., 579 F.2d
691, 701-02 (2nd Cir. 1978) (affirming denial of
discovery into relationship between arbitrator and
principal where record showed extent of relationship
was purely professional); Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929
F.2d 891, 899 (2nd Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of
discovery where party had failed to show that arbitrator had any financial or personal stake in the
outcome); Lummus Global Amazonas, S.A. v. Aguaytia
Energy del Peru, 256 F. Supp. 2d 594, 626-27 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) (denying discovery for alleged bias of arbitrator based on arbitrator’s former law partners’
representation of owner and investor in owner where
record was adequate to permit court to determine the
issue); Midwest Generation EME, LLC v. Continuum
Chem. Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946-47 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (holding that sufficient evidence that would
justify subjecting the arbitrator to discovery was not
presented where all that was shown was “a series of
public, almost exclusively parallel contacts involving
lecturing and writing on construction related matters”
and “these endeavors were ‘no secret,’” and their
existence . . . was readily available to anyone who chose
to look”).
Accordingly, Affordable Care’s motion for discovery
is denied.
App.45a
IV. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Defendants have also asked the Court to sanction
[33] Affordable Care for filing a motion to vacate “for
the purpose of delay.” [34] at 2. Affordable Care’s
Response includes emails between counsel and a
seventeen page brief. Affordable Care requests reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, associated
with responding to the motion, in accordance with Rule
11(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [38]
at 1.
Rule 11 authorizes a court to impose sanctions on
a party who files a pleading if the claims or defenses
of the signer are not supported by existing law or by a
good faith argument for an extension or change in
existing law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2); or the allegations
and other factual statements lack evidentiary support
or are unlikely to do so after a reasonable opportunity
for investigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(3). The purpose
of the rule is to “deter baseless filings in district
court,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp, 496 U.S. 384,
404, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990), and to
ensure that “victims of frivolous lawsuits do not pay
expensive legal fees associated with defending such
lawsuits.” Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988). After notice and
opportunity to respond, courts finding a Rule 11(b)
violation may impose appropriate sanctions. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 (c)(1). These may include monetary and
injunctive sanctions, Farguson v. MBank Houston,
N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1986), and even
dismissal, see Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical
Coll., 321 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2003). Courts have a
duty to impose the least severe sanction that is
sufficient to deter future conduct. Mendoza v. Lynaugh,
App.46a
989 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
(c)(4).
The Fifth Circuit has noted that “[a]n attorney
may escape sanctions under [R]ule 11 if he had to rely
on a client for information about the facts underlying
the pleadings.” St. Amant v. Bernard, 859 F.2d 379,
383, n.15 (5th Cir. 1988). In St. Amant, the court
summarized the three duties that Rule 11 places on
attorneys:
(1) counsel must make reasonable inquiry
into the factual basis of any pleading, motion,
or other paper; (2) counsel must make a
reasonable inquiry into the law; and (3)
counsel must not file a pleading, motion, or
other paper intended to delay proceedings,
harass another party, or increase the cost of
litigation.
Id. at 382 (citing Thomas, 836 F.2d at 874).
The Court is within its discretion to deny the
Defendants’ request for sanctions. See Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp, 496 U.S. 384, 404, 110 S. Ct. 2447,
110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990) (stating that a district court
has broad discretion in determining whether any
sanction is warranted and, if so, what it should be);
Lulirama, Ltd. v. Axcess Broadcast Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d
872, 884 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s
refusal to impose sanctions); Matta v. May, 118 F.3d
410, 416 (5th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court’s order
imposing sanctions because plaintiff’s libel claims
were well grounded in fact and law).
Rule 11 requires the movant to “describe the
specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(2). “Under Rule 11(b)(2), [s]anctions
App.47a
are appropriate if counsel submits a legally indefensible
filing, and [a] filing is legally indefensible if it is not
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument.” M2 Techn., Inc. v. M2 Software, Inc., 748 F.
App’x 588, 589 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Snow Ingredients,
Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir.
2016)) (internal quotations omitted). Defendants assert
that Affordable Care’s motion to vacate is frivolous
and that it should be sanctioned for its bad conduct.
[34] at 3, 7.
However, Defendants have failed to meet their
burden under Rule 11 of showing that these claims
were frivolous. While Affordable Care’s case is weak
and the Court ultimately denied the motion to vacate,
Defendants have not shown that the filings were
“legally indefensible.” M2 Techn., 748 F. App’x at 589
(citing Snow Ingredients, Inc., 833 F.3d at 528) (internal
quotations omitted). See Greenblatt v. Richard Potasky
Jeweler, Inc., 19 F. App’x 307, 310 (6th Cir. 2001)
(denying costs where the plaintiff’s appeal “though
weak, is not frivolous”); Brandt v. Magnificent Quality
Florals Corp., 371 F. App’x 994, 995 (11th Cir. 2010)
(affirming denial of sanctions where “Plaintiffs’ case
[was] weak at best”); We Shall Overcome Fdn. v.
Richmond Org., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 3d 960, 968 (S.D.
N.Y. 2018) (holding that while defense proffered was
weak, it was not frivolous).
In support of its Motion to Vacate, Affordable
Care filed a twenty-seven page brief citing cases in an
effort to support its arguments. See Auto Mech. Local
0
7 1 v. Joe Mitchell Buick, Inc. , 930 F.2d 576, 579 (7th
Cir. 1991) (cross motions for sanctions denied because
arguments made were not “devoid of arguable merit”).
While the Court finds that all of Affordable Care’s
App.48a
bases for vacatur are unavailing, the Court cannot say
that bringing forward these grounds was frivolous or
done in bad faith. See Teamsters Local Union No. 430
v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 68 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(reversing monetary sanctions because while legal
theory espoused was novel, it was not plainly unreasonable); Allied Indus. Workers of Am. Local 232 v.
Briggs & Stratton Corp., 837 F.2d 782, 788-89 (7th
Cir. 1988) (affirming district court’s denial of sanctions
because Briggs & Stratton had not resisted arbitration in bad faith).
In its seventeen page memorandum in Response
to Defendants’ motion for sanctions, Affordable Care
describes its efforts to comply with Rule 11’s
requirement to make reasonable inquiry into the facts
supporting its claims. [39] at 10-14. Affordable Care
outlines its discovery of connections of which it claimed
showed “evident partiality” as well as its efforts to
ascertain more about the contacts between Arbitrator
Holton and Paul Sun. Affordable Care researched the
issues and attempted to find some case law to support
its position. And while this Court finds those cases
distinguishable from this case and Affordable Care’s
position in moving to vacate is unpersuasive and quite
weak, the Court does not find their arguments were
so frivolous as to warrant Rule 11 sanctions. Similarly,
there is a lack of evidence of “improper purpose, such
as harassment or delay.” Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co.,
512 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying sanctions
where, although Komatsu’s case was weak, there was
no evidence of improper purpose or delay behind the
appeal).
Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for sanctions
is denied. The Court further denies Affordable Care’s
App.49a
request for attorney’s fees associated with the motion.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“If warranted, the court
may award to the prevailing party the reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred for the
motion). Affordable Care’s case is flimsy, and the Court
declines to award sanctions to either side. See Walker
v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 1999)
(motions for sanctions by both parties denied because
both parties contributed to “disharmony in the
proceedings” and filed briefs that “were long on hyperbole and personal attacks”).
V.
CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s [16] Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award is DENIED and Defendants’ [20]
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award is GRANTED.
The Defendants are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees
in the amount of $379,168 plus costs in the amount of
$14,430.75 from the Plaintiff as provided in the
Arbitration Award entered on March 19, 2021. The
Court rules as follows with respect to the remaining
motions:
1. Plaintiff’s [17] Motion for Discovery is DENIED;
2. Defendants’ [33] Motion for Sanctions is
DENIED;
3. Plaintiff’s [12] Ex Parte Motion for Case
Management Conference is DENIED AS MOOT;
4. Defendants’ [13] Motion to Dismiss is DENIED
AS MOOT;
5. Plaintiff’s [26] Motion for Leave to File
Substitute Exhibit 28 is GRANTED; and
App.50a
6. Plaintiff’s [35] Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Conduct Limited
Discovery is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The motion is GRANTED to the extent the Court
allows the filing of the Motion and considered it in its
rulings but DENIES the motion as to the relief
requested.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 31st
day of March, 2022.
/s/ Taylor B. McNeel
United States District Judge
App.51a
DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING,
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
(JUNE 22, 2023)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________________
AFFORDABLE CARE, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD;
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD, P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
No. 22-60245
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:21-CV-85
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before: ELROD and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a
petition for panel rehearing (5TH CIR. R. 35 I.O.P.), the
petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Because no
member of the panel or judge in regular active service
App.52a
requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc
(FED. R. APP. P. 35 and 5TH CIR. R. 35), the petition for
rehearing en banc is DENIED.
App.53a
ARBITRATOR FINAL DECISION AND AWARD
(MARCH 19, 2021)
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
________________________
AFFORDABLE CARE, LLC,
Claimant,
v.
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD AND
RAELINE K. MCINTYRE, DMD, P.C.,
Respondents.
________________________
AAA NO. 01-19-0003-4957
Arbitrator: Charles R. Holton
FINAL DECISION AND AWARD
1. This matter comes before the undersigned
Arbitrator after a final hearing in the above-captioned
matter.
2. Claimant Affordable Care, LLC (“Affordable”)
filed its initial Demand for Arbitration on November
1, 2019, against Respondents Raeline K. McIntyre,
DMD, and Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, PC (the “PC”).
Affordable later filed an Amended Demand for
Arbitration (the “Demand”), asserting seventeen claims
for relief against Respondents, and seeking damages
and attorneys’ fees. Respondents denied that Affordable
App.54a
is entitled to any relief. Respondents also contend that
they are entitled to set off sums due to the PC against
any award to Affordable, and that they are entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees and costs.
3. A final arbitration hearing was held by
videoconference from December 1, 2020, to December
4, 2020, and on December 14 and 15, 2020. Affordable
and Respondents were each represented by counsel.
4. Affordable and Respondents each presented
an opening statement. In its case, Affordable called as
witnesses Karol Twilla, Affordable’s senior vice
president for field operations, 12/1/2020 Tr. 75:10-13,
Respondent Dr. Raeline McIntyre, her husband Dr.
Neil McIntyre, 12/14/2020 Tr. 5:11-13, and Kevin
Hudi, vice president of Affordable Dentures Dental
Laboratories, Inc. (“ADDL”), 12/4/2020 Tr. 392:45
- .
Respondents called Dr. Raeline McIntyre and Dr. Neil
McIntyre to testify in their case. Affordable called Ms.
Twilla and Mr. Hudi as rebuttal witnesses. Both sides
offered documentary exhibits.1 Following the hearing,
Affordable and Respondents each submitted a posthearing brief, as well as proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.2 After receiving the post-hearing
submissions of the parties, the Arbitrator heard
closing arguments.
5. On March 4, 2021, Affordable filed a Request
for Judicial Notice of the Summary Judgment Decision
1 Joint Exhibits are referred to as “Joint. Ex.” and the exhibit
number; Affordable’s exhibits are re ferred to as “Cl. Ex.” and the
exhibit number; and Respondents’ exhibits are referred to as
“Resp. Ex.” and the exhibit number.
2 Affordable’s post-hearing brief is referred to as “Cl. Br.”;
Respondents’ post-heari ng brief is referred to as “Resp. Br.”
App.55a
and Transcript of a lawsuit pending in the Southern
District of Mississippi between Affordable Care and
JNM Office Property LLC, 1:19-cv-827-HSO-JCG and,
thereafter, requested further oral argument regarding
the significance of that decision to this arbitration.
Additional oral argument was held on March 11, 2021.
At that time the undersigned Arbitrator accepted into
the arbitration hearing record said Summary
Judgment Decision and Hearing Transcript, along
with Affordable Care’s Second Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and JNM’s Second Amended and
Supplemental Complaint, all filed in that case.
The Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement of the
parties and having been duly sworn makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law
based on the evidence and authorities presented at
the final hearings along with the legal briefs and
arguments of counsel.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The Parties:
6. Affordable is a dental practice management
company, also known as a dental support organization.
12/1/2020 Tr. 76:81
- 4. Affordable enters into contractual
affiliations to manage dental practices across the
country, and has affiliated practices in forty different
states. Id. 82:12-17. Affordable owns Affordable
Dentures Dental Laboratories, Inc. (“ADDL”). Id.
76:15-19. Through ADDL, Affordable provides in-house
dental laboratory services to each affiliated practice.
Id. 76:42
- 2; 12/4/2020 Tr. 390 :12-391:19. Affordable
and ADDL provide what Affordable calls “economy
App.56a
denture” services. 12/1/2020 Tr. 76:23-77:13. Affordableaffiliated dental practices provide extractions, dentures,
and implants. 12/3/2020 Tr. 43:91
- 2. Affordable advertises that its affiliated practices provide same-day
service, meaning that a patient can have teeth extracted
and receive a denture on the same day. 12/4/2020 Tr.
323:20-21; id. 397:22-398:2.
7. Respondent Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, is a
dentist licensed to practice in Mississippi. 12/14/2020
Tr. 4:21-23.
8. Dr. Raeline McIntyre is the sole shareholder
and president of Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, PC.
12/2/2020 Tr. 210:71
- 0.
Affiliation Between the PC and Affordable:
9. In 2001, as she was finishing dental school at
the University of Mississippi Medical Center Dental
School in Jackson, Mississippi, Dr. Raeline McIntyre
received several calls from a recruiter associated with
Affordable.3 12/14/2020 Tr. 4:15-20;
id. 5:17-61
: 2.
Although Affordable managed dental practices,
Affordable did not own practices—only a licensed
dentist could own a practice. See 12/2/2020 Tr.127:212. The recruiter encouraged Dr. McIntyre to consider
owning an Affordable-affiliated dental practice.
12/14/2020 Tr. 6:51
- 2.
10. While she was not initially interested in
Affordable’s offer, eventually Dr. Raeline McIntyre
3 On October 22, 2015, Affordable Care, Inc., converted to a
limited liability company and became Affordable Care, LLC. See
Cl. Ex. 40. References to “Affordable” in these findings and
conclusions mean Affordable Care, Inc., prior to its conversion,
and Affordable Care, LLC, after the conversion.
App.57a
agreed to travel to North Carolina to meet with representatives of Affordable. 12/14/2020 Tr. 6:13-75
: .
Affordable explained that it could handle the management of the dental practice, such as human resources,
taxes, payroll, marketing, and advertising, while she
could focus on practicing dentistry. Id. 9:11-21. Dr.
Raeline McIntyre would be a general dentist, but her
practice would be limited to extractions, dentures, and
implants. Id. 11:71
- 4.
11. During the recruiting process, Affordable
asked Dr. Raeline McIntyre if she could “fill in” at an
Affordable-affiliated dental practice in Gulfport,
Mississippi, while Affordable was working to get a
licensed dentist to purchase the practice. 12/14/2020
Tr. 13:61
- 6. She agreed, and began working at the
practice in Gulfport in or around February 2002. Id.
13:17-23.
12. Dr. Raeline McIntyre continued to work at
the Affordable-affiliated prac tice in Gulfport on a
temporary basis until around August 2002. 12/14/2020
Tr. 19:38
- . After working as a temporary employee,
Dr. Raeline McIntyre agreed to own a dental practice
managed by Affordable. Id. 19:91
- 2.
13. Affordable sent Dr. Raeline McIntyre a packet
of materials to sign to set up a professional corporation
in her name. 12/14/2020 Tr. 22:51
- 6. Dr. Raeline
McIntyre signed the papers, and Affordable set up the
PC, with Dr. Raeline McIntyre as the sole owner of the
PC. Id. 22:17-22.
Professional Assets Purchase Agreement:
14. On November 1, 2002, pursuant to a Professional Assets Purchase Agreement (Joint Ex. 6), the
App.58a
PC purchased the assets of James A. Poe, DDS, P.C.
(the “Poe PC”), a dental practice owned by Dr. James
Poe and managed by Affordable. 12/1/2020 Tr. 95:1217.
15. Either Affordable or its outside legal counsel
drafted the Professional Assets Purchase Agreement.
12/2/2020 Tr. 177:15-21.
Services Agreement:
16. Also on November 1, 2002, the PC entered
into a Management Services Agreement (the “Agreement” or “MSA”) (Joint Ex. 3) with Affordable. 12/14/
2020 Tr. 20:23-21.6. Affordable also drafted this Agreement. Id. 21:78
- . Dr. Raeline McIntyre did not think
that the standard terms of the Agreement were negotiable; however, she was able to negotiate her salary
from the PC, 12/4/2020 Tr. 457:92
- 0, which was reflected
in the Managing Dentist Employment Agreement
(Joint Ex. 5).
17. Under the MSA, Affordable agreed to act as
the PC’s agent to “manage the business aspects of the
Practice on PC’s behalf and in the PC’s name.” MSA
§ I(A); id. § VI(B). According to the MSA, Affordable
was “granted all necessary authority and discretion to
that end, understanding that at all times [Affordable]
is obligated to manage the Practice with the PC’s best
interest in mind.” Id. § I(A). Affordable also agreed to
perform the services listed in Exhibit B to the MSA.
Id. § I(C).
18. Under Exhibit B, Affordable agreed to lease
office space and equipment to the PC under a separate
lease, provide an in-center dental laboratory through
ADDL, assist the PC with recruitment, staffing, and
App.59a
pay, provide a centralized purchasing system for supplies, assist the PC in obtaining legal services, develop
and implement marketing plans, provide financial
services, and procure certain insurance. See id.
19. Pursuant to the “Financial Services” section
of Exhibit B, Affordable established a checking account
in the PC’s name, called the “[d]epository checking
account.” MSA at 17. The PC was required to deposit
all money received from its operations into the
depository checking account. Id. According to the Agreement, withdrawals could be made only by employees
of the PC after notice to Affordable, or “by [Affordable’s]
transfers from this account to the operating checking
account.” Id.
20. Also under Exhibit B, Affordable established
another account, called the “[o]perating checking
account.” MSA at 17. Affordable deposited funds from
the depository checking account into the operating
checking account. Id. Affordable agreed that “[a]ll
expenses incurred in the operation of the PC and
approved by the PC shall be paid by checks drawn on
this account by [Affordable’s] designated employees.”
Id.
21. The PC and Affordable also agreed on certain
business policies and procedures, set forth in Exhibit
A to the MSA. MSA § I(B) & MSA Ex. A. The PC
adopted the policies outlined in Exhibit A to the MSA,
and reserved the right to “delete, supplement or
modify any of the business policy guidelines” with
advance written notice to Affordable. MSA § I(B).
22. The parties agreed that the PC would pay
Affordable the fees set forth in Exhibit C to the Agreement. MSA § III(A).
App.60a
23. Exhibit C to the MSA is the “Summary of
Management Fees.” Exhibit C states that the PC
“shall pay to [Affordable] the listed fees “[m]onthly.”
MSA at 19.
24. Pursuant to Exhibit C, the PC was required
to pay to Affordable each month the “actual cost,
including an allocation of related overhead, of Practice
Expenses purchased by [Affordable] from unaffiliated
vendors.” MSA Ex. C ¶ 1. “Practice Expenses” are
defined in Exhibit C to the Agreement. Id. at 20-21.
25. Pursuant to Exhibit C, the PC was required
to pay to Affordable each month a “Central Office
Services Fee,” defined to include certain “specific
services.” MSA Ex. C ¶ 2. The Agreement permits
Affordable to modify the “Central Office Services Fee”
on a prospective basis upon notice to the PC. Id. Ex. C
¶ 4. If the PC notifies Affordable that it objects to the
modification, Affordable must reinstate the “Central
Office Services Fee” previously in effect. Id. The
evidence shows that over time, Affordable did increase
the “Central Office Services Fee.” Compare id. Ex. C ¶ 2
(monthly “Central Office Services Fee” total of $1,680)
with Cl. Ex. 9 at 34 (reflecting “Management Service
Fees” for December 2017 of $2,250).
26. Pursuant to Exhibit C, the PC was required
to pay to Affordable a “Management Services Fee.”
MSA Ex. C ¶ 3.
4 Affordable offered the PC’s financial statements from 2017, 2018,
and 2019 into evidence as Claimant’s Exhibits 9, 10, and 11. The
financial statements do not have page numbers. Pinpoint citations are to the page cited counting from the first page of the
exhibit.
App.61a
27. The “Management Services Fee” includes a
one-time payment of $100,000 by the PC upon execution
of the Agreement. Id. ¶ 3.1. Dr. Raeline McIntyre
testified that the PC paid this fee. 12/14/2020 Tr.
39:22-40:6.
28. The “Management Services Fee” section of
Exhibit C requires the PC to pay one-half of the “Net
Operating Margin,” “[b]eginning the first month after
all accounts payable to [Affordable] from PC under
Section III(C) are repaid.” MSA Ex. C ¶ 3.2. “Net
Operating Margin” is defined in Exhibit C as “Net
Collected Patient Fees less Practice Expenses.” Id. at
21. “Net Collected Patient Fees” is defined in Exhibit
C as “the total fees charged to patients less any
uncollected amounts and refunds.” Id. at 20.
29. The “Management Services Fee” section of
Exhibit C requires the PC to pay “in addition” to the
other Management Services Fees listed, “$25,000 plus
50% of net operating margin annually” once, in the
first calendar year after all accounts payable to
Affordable from the PC under section III(C) of the
Agreement have been repaid. MSA Ex. C ¶ 3.3. For
each year after the year when the PC was required to
pay $25,000 plus one-half of the net operating margin,
the PC was required to pay “annually” “$50,000 plus
50% of net operating margin.” Id. Affordable paid
itself this “Management Services Fee” monthly, and
not annually. 12/3/2020 Tr. 104:13-105:10; 12/15/2020
Tr. 108:22-109:20.
30. Exhibit C to the MSA defined “Practice Expenses” as “costs, accounted for on a cash basis, directly
related to the operation of the Practice.” MSA at 20.
These costs included “[f]acility and equipment lease
expenses under the Lease Agreement and related
App.62a
maintenance and repair expenses,” dental laboratory
expenses, marketing expenses, clinical and office supplies expenses, employee compensation, utilities, professional fees, insurance, and other expenses. Id. at
20-21.
31. Section III(B) of the MSA is entitled
“MINIMUM CASH BALANCE.” This section provided:
At all times during the term hereof, a minimum cash balance shall be maintained in
the PC checking account equal to (1) sum of
all current and unpaid invoices (both those
received and those pending), note or installment payments, payrolls, rents, expenses,
and other charges incident to the operation
of the PC which are currently due or will
become due over the next thirty (30) day
period, plus (2) an amount deemed necessary
by Manager to be adequate for contingencies.
Should the cash balance fall below the minimum amount as set forth in this section at
any time for any reason, Manager shall
notify PC and PC shall agree to payment of
Practice Expenses (defined in Exhibit C) by
Manager in accordance with the terms of
Section (C) following or PC’s shareholder(s)
shall provide a loan or a capital contribution
sufficient to pay Practice Expenses and
restore the minimum cash balance. If PC and
Manager do not agree to one of the foregoing
options, either party may terminate this
Agreement immediately in which case
Manager shall use all remaining funds to
pay unpaid obligations.
MSA § III(B).
App.63a
32. Section III(B) is silent as to which party to
the MSA was responsible for maintaining the minimum
cash balance. MSA § III(B). It is also unclear where
that balance is to be maintained. The term “PC
checking account” is not defined in section III(B) or
elsewhere in the MSA.
33. Section III(C) of the MSA is entitled “DISCRETIONARY MANAGER PAYMENTS.” This
section provided:
If the PC’s Net Collected Patient Fees (as
defined in Exhibit C) are insufficient to pay
Practice Expenses and maintain the minimum
cash balance referenced in (B) above, Manager
may, in its discretion, with the approval of
the PC, pay up to Three Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($300,000.00) of Practice Expenses
on behalf of the PC. PC shall record such
payments by Manager as accounts payable
to Manager and use all, if any, future Net
Collected Patient Fees in excess of Practice
Expenses to pay such accounts payable to
Manager until same are paid in full.
MSA § III(C).
34. The MSA also contained an indemnification
provision regarding acts or omissions occurring during
the term of the MSA:
The PC shall indemnify, hold harmless and
defend Manager, its officers, directors, shareholders and employees, from and against any
and all liability, loss, damage, claim, causes
of action, and expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees), whether or not covered
by insurance, caused or asserted to have been
App.64a
caused (directly or indirectly) by, resulted
from, or arisen out of the performance of
medical or dental services or the performance of any intentional acts, negligent acts or
omissions by the PC and/or its affiliates, its
shareholders, agents, employees and/or subcontractors (other than Manager) during the
term hereof. Manager shall indemnify, hold
harmless and defend the PC, its directors,
shareholders and employees, from and against
any and all liability, loss, damage, claim,
causes of action, and expenses (including
reasonable attorneys’ fees), caused or asserted
to have been caused (directly or indirectly)
by, resulted from, or arisen out of the performance of any intentional acts, negligent acts or
omissions by Manager and/or its shareholders,
agents, employees and/or subcontractors
during the term of this Agreement.
MSA § IV(B).
35. The parties agreed that the term of the MSA
would be twenty years from the date of execution on
November 1, 2002, “unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions” of the MSA. MSA § V(A).
Section V(B) of the MSA provided that either party
could terminate the Agreement “for cause,” as defined
in section V(B). Cause for termination included the
following occurrences:
(2) A breach by either party of any material
provision of this Agreement or any other
agreement between PC and Manager or an
affiliate of Manager; provided, that, if such
breach is subject to cure, the breaching party
shall have a reasonable period (not to exceed
App.65a
thirty (30) days) after notice of such breach
from the other party to cure such breach, and
if such breach is cured, then such breach
shall not be grounds for termination unless
repeated;
***
(9) Any termination of any lease between
Manager and PC or the Agreement To Provide
Dental Laboratory Services between PC and
Affordable Dentures Dental Laboratories,
Inc.
MSA § V(B)(2), (5), (9).
36. The parties further agreed that “[i]n the event
of the termination of this Agreement for any reason,”
the PC would “not solicit for employment any employees
of Manager or any affiliate of Manager, including
employees of Affordable Dentures Dental Laboratories,
Inc.” MSA § V(C). There is no time limitation on the
non-solicitation covenant. Ther e is also no geographic
limitation.
37. The MSA contained the following provision
regarding confidential information:
The PC and its shareholders agree not to use
or disclose any confidential information or
trade secrets of Manager except in connection with operating the Practice during the
term of this Agreement. Such confidential
information and trade secrets are agreed to
include all procedures used by Manager in
the operation of the business aspects of the
Practice, all business and patient forms supplied by Manager and used by the Practice,
App.66a
all software supplied by the Manager and used
by the Practice, and any other materials or
proprietary knowledge which the Manager
treats as confidential. Such confidential information shall not include any material in the
public domain (whether or not listed above)
or any patient records. The PC further
agrees: (i) to keep stri ctly confidential and
hold in trust all confidential information and
not disclose confidential information to any
third party, including its affiliates without
the express prior written consent of Manager;
and (ii) to impose this obligation of confidentiality on its affiliates, partners, shareholders, employees and independent contractors. The PC acknowledges that the disclosure
of confidential information to it by Manager
is done in reliance upon its representations
and covenants in this Agreement. Upon
expiration or termination of this Agreement
by either party for any reason whatsoever,
the PC shall immediately return and shall
cause its affiliates, partners, shareholders,
employees and independent contractors to
immediately return to Manager all confidential information, and the PC will not, and
will cause its affiliates, partners, shareholders,
employees and independent contractors not
to, thereafter use, appropriate, or reproduce
such confidential information.
MSA § II(B).
38. Dr. Raeline McIntyre, as the sole shareholder
of the PC, agreed to guarantee the PC’s performance
of its obligations in the MSA, “except for PC’s financial
App.67a
obligations to Manager for loans and management
fees, which obligations shall be nonrecourse to shareholder(s) except to the extent of the assets and income
generated by the Practice.” MSA § VI(A).
39. The parties also agreed that “[t]his Agreement
contains the entire agreement between the parties in
regard to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement
may not be modified, or any provisions hereof waived,
except by a written instrument executed by the parties
hereto.” MSA § VI(E).
40. The parties agreed that the validity, interpretation, and performance of the MSA would be
governed by North Carolina law, “except that issues
concerning the practice of dentistry shall be governed
by the laws of the State where the Center is located.”
MSA § V(G).
The 2002 Lease:
41. Also on November 2, 2002, Affordable and
the PC entered into a lease agreement (the “2002
Lease”) (Joint Ex. 2). The 2002 Lease stated that
Affordable “owns or leases the premises located at
15441 Orange Grove Road, Highway 49 North,
Gulfport, Mississippi 39502, comprised of a fully
furnished and equipped Affordable Dentures Center
(the ‘Premises’).” 2002 Lease at 1.
42. Affordable did not own the Premises.
12/1/2020 Tr. 164:33-165:1. Rath er, Affordable leased
the Premises from Ship Island Properties, Inc.,
pursuant to a lease agreement dated October 23, 2000
(the “Ship Island Lease”) (Joint Ex. 1). The Ship
Island Lease had a five-year term, commencing on
November 1, 2005, and terminating on October 31,
App.68a
2005, unless terminated sooner pursuant to the lease
terms. Ship Island Lease § II.
43. In the 2002 Lease, Affordable agreed to lease
the Premises to the PC. Regarding the term of the
lease, the 2002 Lease provided:
The term of this Lease shall commence on
November 1, 2002, and shall continue for a
period of twenty (20) years unless and until
earlier terminated. Absent a default hereunder, neither Landlord nor Tenant may
terminate this Lease except in connection with
the termination of that certain Agreement to
Provide Management Services to a Dental
Practice between Landlord and Tenant of
even date herewith. Termination of said
Agreement will result in automatic termination of this Lease. In addition, if Landlord
does not own the Premises, this Lease shall
terminate automatically when Landlord’s
lease of the Premises expires or is terminated.
In the event that this Lease is terminated
pursuant to the immediately preceding
sentence, Landlord shall use its reasonable
best efforts to obtain equivalent office space
and lease such premises to Tenant under
terms and conditions (including, without
limitation, rental terms) substantially identical to those of this Lease.
2002 Lease § 2. Nothing in the 2002 Lease required
the PC to agree to lease office space from Affordable if
Affordable obtained “equivalent office space.” See id.
App.69a
Managing Dentist Employment Agreement:
44. Also on November 1, 2002, Dr. Raeline McIntyre entered into a Managing Dentist Employment
Agreement (“Employment Agreement” or “MDEA”)
with the PC, under which she agreed to work for the
PC. Joint Ex. 5. Affordable is not a party to the
Employment Agreement. See Joint Ex. 5 at 1 (listing
parties). Although the Employment Agreement was
between the PC and Dr. Raeline McIntyre, Dr. Raeline
McIntyre testified that she negotiated with Affordable
over two provisions of the Employment Agreement:
her salary and her ability to work for her husband’s
practice in Mendenhall, Mississippi. 12/4/2020 Tr.
458:24
- 60:1; see 12/3/2020 Tr. 180:18-181:3.
45. The Employment Agreement contained a nonsolicitation provision stating that “[i]n the event of
termination of the Agreement for any reason, the
Dentist agrees that he or she will not solicit for
employment any employees of the [PC], Affordable
Care, Inc., or its subsidiaries or affiliates.” MDEA ¶ 8.
46. There is no time limitation on the nonsolicitation covenant in paragraph 8 of the Employment
Agreement. See MDEA ¶ 8. There is also no geographic
limitation on the non-solicitation covenant in paragraph
8 of the Employment Agreement. See id.
47. According to paragraph 11 of the Employment
Agreement, the parties acknowledged that Affordable
was a third-party beneficiary “of certain provisions of
this Agreement.” MDEA ¶ 11. Nothing in the
Employment Agreement specified which provisions
were intended to benefit Affordable. See id.
48. Mississippi law applies to the Employment
Agreement. MDEA ¶ 10.
App.70a
The ADDL Agreement:
49. On November 1, 2002, the PC and ADDL
entered into an Agreement to Provide Dental Laboratory Services (the “ADDL Agreement”) (Joint Ex.
4).
50. In the ADDL Agreement, ADDL agreed to
perform laboratory work for the PC at an in-house
laboratory within the PC’s office. Joint Ex. 4.
Operation of the PC from 2002 to 2019:
51. Following the execution of the MSA in 2002,
the PC operated an Affordable-affiliated dental practice.
12/1/2020 Tr. 79:36
- ; 12/14/202 0 Tr. 20:19-21:6. At
that time, the Affordable practice in Gulfport had a
potentially wide geographic market: the closest
Affordable practices were in Jackson, Mississippi,
New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mobile, Alabama.
12/14/2020 Tr. 13-22.
52. Dr. Raeline McIntyre and her husband Dr.
Neil McIntyre, also a licensed dentist, practiced
dentistry at the PC. 12/3/2020 Tr. 177:16-21;
id.
179:13-180:17; 12/ 4/2020 Tr. 517: 17-20; 12/14/2020
Tr. 5:11-13. The PC also hi red an oral surgeon, Dr.
Carroll Palmore, who practiced dentistry at the PC.
12/4/2020 Tr. 517:21-23.
53. Dr. Raeline McIntyre was a general dentist
when she was affiliated with Affordable, but her
practice was limited to extractions, dentures (including
partial dentures), and implants. 12/14/2020 Tr. 11:714. Affordable appeals to patients who may be reluctant
to visit, or generally do not have a relationship with a
dentist, but have a particular dental problem they need
addressed, and getting the need addressed through
App.71a
the necessary extractions and dentures in one day is
important. 12/14/2020 Tr. 8: 24-91
: 0; 12/15/2020 Tr.
88:15-89:14. Dr. McIntyre explained how she would
treat a patient that came to Affordable’s Gulfport
location, treating the “whole patient,” determining the
patient’s chief complaint, presenting treatment options,
and upon the patient’s selection of a treatment option,
beginning the work with the patient that would lead
to the patient getting dentures the same day. 12/14/2020
Tr. 15:17-19:2. Dr. McIntyr e further explained how
she interacted with the dental lab at the Gulfport
location and why the relationship with the lab was
critical to the success of the practice. 12/14/2020 Tr.
16:18-19:2; id. 26:9-27:22.
54. The practice grew under Dr. Raeline McIntyre’s leadership, and served more than 37,000
patients. 12/14/2020 Tr. 42:24-43:11; id. 109:13-18. As
the practice grew, the PC’s revenues grew. See
12/14/2020 Tr. 65:71
- 8. In 2017, the PC’s revenue
peaked at $3.2 million. Cl. Ex. 11A.
Affordable’s Financial Control Over the PC:
55. Affordable exercised significant control and
influence over the PC’s business. Among other things,
Affordable controlled all monies received by the PC.
56. The PC deposited all monies collected from
patients into the depository checking account on a
daily basis. 12/14/2020 Tr. 32:21-33:14. The PC did
not withdraw money from the account. Id. 33:15-34:3.
Affordable swept money out of the depository checking
account on a daily or near-daily basis. Id. 34:41
- 2. The
bank statements for the depository checking account
were addressed to Affordable. Id. 34:13-35:4.
App.72a
57. Affordable was entrusted to pay its own
management fees, to pay invoices approved by the PC,
to handle the PC’s payroll, to prepare budgets and
financial reports, and to coordinate the preparation of
tax returns. MSA Ex. B; id. Ex. C.
58. During the time the PC was an affiliated
practice, Affordable produced monthly and year-end
financial statements. E.g., Cl. Exs. 9, 10, 11. The
financial statements for the PC reflect the payment of
Management Fees. Id.
59. Affordable introduced the PC’s financial
statements in evidence through the testimony of Karol
Twilla. 12/1/2020 Tr. 131:71
- 39:7. Ms. Twilla testified
that in her position at Affordable and in discharging
her duties, she would have received the financial statements of the PC, as well as the financial statements of
other affiliated practices. Id. 137:22-138:2.
60. Ms. Twilla testified that the PC was a “very,
very successful practice.” 12/1/2020 Tr. 89:22-23. Ms.
Twilla identified 2017, 2018, and 2019 as the “really
good years for Dr. McIntyre.” Id. 89:23-24. According
to Ms. Twilla, “[t]owards the end of about the fourth
quarter of 2019 is when her practice really started to
suffer from a revenue standpoint.” Id. 89:24-90:1. She
described the PC as a “growing practice.” Id. 167:3.
Ms. Twilla described 2019 as “a good year up until the
fourth quarter, and then the fourth quarter the
revenues started to really decline, which put it into a
negative cash balance position.” Id. 168:1-6. She
identified the fourth quarter as October, November, and
December 2019. Id. 168:71
- 0. Ms. Twilla testified that
after “the initial communication from Dr. McIntyre”
terminating the Agreement took place, “[t]hat’s when
the [PC’s] revenue started to decline,” and a minimum
App.73a
cash balance deficiency started to grow. 12/2/2020 Tr.
99:61
- 1. Ms. Twilla attributed this decline to Dr.
McIntyre’s attention being diverted to starting a new
practice. Id. 99:12-25. Ms. Twilla testified that Affordable’s expectation for Dr. Raeline McIntyre’s practice
in 2020 was that “she could continue to grow.” Id.
103:2.
61. As described above, 2017 was the PC’s best
year financially, with revenue in the amount of $3.2
million, but the PC’s revenue declined in 2018 to $2.9
million, Cl. Ex. 10, and further declined in 2019 to
$2.2 million, Cl. Ex. 11. See 12/3/2020 Tr. 88:19-23.
62. The PC’s revenue in 2019 declined as compared to its 2018 revenue throughout most of the year;
May 2019 was the only month in which the PC earned
more revenue than it did in the corresponding month
in 2018. Cl. Ex. 11 at 5.5 By the end of the third
quarter of 2019, before the time period during which
Ms. Twilla said the PC’s revenue started to decline,
the PC’s revenue was already 18.93% less than the
PC’s revenue for 2018 for the first three quarters of
the year. Id.; see 12/3/2020 Tr. 90:11-18. By the end of
2019, the PC’s revenue was 23.38% less than the
revenue the PC earned in 2018; contrary to Ms.
Twilla’s testimony, most of the loss occurred in the
first three quarters of the year, as opposed to the
fourth quarter of the year. Cl. Ex. 11. The PC’s revenue
did decline significantly in the fourth quarter of 2019
as compared to the fourth quarter of 2018, but the
PC’s revenue was less in each quarter of 2019 than the
5 The financial statements that Affordable prepared are not
paginated, but the information discussed is on the fifth page of
Claimant’s Exhibit 11.
App.74a
respective quarter of 2018, and decline accelerated
from the first to the second quarter, and from the
second to the third quarter, which was comparatively
the worst quarter of 2019 for the PC. Id.
63. As discussed above, pursuant to Exhibit C of
the Agreement, Affordable was entitled to 50% of the
PC’s Net Operating Margin; Dr. Raeline McIntyre as
the PC’s sole shareholder, was entitled to the PC’s
profit that was not payable to Affordable, and thus she
was entitled to the other 50% of the Net Operating
Margin.
64. The financial statements reflect a figure called
“Practice Owner Bonus.” See Cl. Exs. 9, 10, 11. The
“Practice Owner Bonus” reflects the payment by
Affordable to Dr. Raeline McIntyre of an amount for
her share of the PC’s operating profit. 12/1/2020 Tr.
126:18-127:22; 12/2/2 020 Tr. 139:13-140:1.
65. The financial statements reflect a figure called
“Variable Bonus Fee.” See Cl. Exs. 9, 10, 11. The
“Variable Bonus Fee” reflects the payment to Affordable
of its share of the PC’s operating profit. Cl. Exs. 9, 10,
11.
66. In the financial statements 2017, 2018, and
2019 that were admitted in evidence at the final
hearing, the amounts for “Practice Owner Bonus”
(paid to Dr. Raeline McIntyre) and “Variable Bonus
Fee” (paid to Affordable) are not equal. In each of those
years, the “Variable Bonus Fee” paid to Affordable, as
reflected in the financial statements, is greater than
the “Practice Owner Bonus.” Cl. Exs. 9, 10, 11.
67. Dr. Neil McIntyre testified that the pattern
that the amount of the “Variable Bonus Fee” exceeded
the amount of the “Practice Owner Bonus” was
App.75a
reflected in the financial statements for the PC for
years other than 2017, 2018, and 2019. 12/14/2020 Tr.
226:92
- 27:14. Dr. McIntyre test ified that this pattern
existed in every year for which he reviewed the
financial statements. Id. 226:17-227:14. The Arbitrator
finds that Affordable failed to provide a satisfactory
explanation for these discrepancies.
68. Further, as noted hereinabove, Karol Twilla
testified that Affordable pays out its Variable Bonus
Fee solely on a monthly basis notwithstanding that
part of Exhibit C 3.3 that references payment of the
Variable Bonus Fee on an annualized basis. 12/3/2020
Tr. 105:21
- 0; 12/15/ 2020 Tr. 108:31
- 09:20;
id. 113:919. The predictable result of this practice is that if the
PC has one or more months during a year when it is
not profitable, Affordable will pay itself more than
50% of the Net Operating Margin for the year: In
months when the PC is profitable, Affordable pays
itself 50% of the Net Operating Margin, but in months
when the PC is not profitable, there is no evidence
that Affordable pays or returns any amount of money
to the practice. According to Ms. Twilla, Affordable
does not on an annual basis reconcile or “true up” the
amount Affordable is entitled to under the terms of the
Agreement. 12/3/2020 Tr. 104: 13-105:10. This financial
management practice of Affordable is contrary to its
duty to manage the Practice with the PC’s best
interest in mind, as per Art. I (A) of the MSA.
69. Affordable’s financial control of the PC and
its cash management had an additional predictable
and consequential effect. Affordable could effectively
determine for itself whether the PC could pay for
equipment, itself, or would have to use Affordable’s
cash for equipment purchases, with the result that
App.76a
Affordable would own the equipment and lease it to
the PC. After payment of the PC’s regular monthly
expenses, Affordable paid out available cash so it
received on a monthly basis its Variable Bonus Fee,
and Dr. Raeline McIntyre received her Practice Owner
Bonus. 12/1/2020 Tr. 127:71
- 4. According to Karol
Twilla, Affordable’s regular practice was to use its
cash to pay for an affiliated practice’s equipment, and
then lease that equipment to the practice. 12/1/2020 Tr.
125:51
- 1. Although Afford able would amortize the
cost of any equipment leased to a practice over five
years, the PC did not “rent to own” the equipment;
rather, through the equipment’s useful life, Affordable
owned the equipment. 12/2/2020 Tr. 187:13-17; id.
188:51
- 0. Upon questioning from the Arbitrator, Ms.
Twilla agreed it might be possible for a practice like
the PC to accumulate enough cash at some point during
a given month to purchase costly equipment, id.
203:22
- 05:2, but that was not Affordable’s regular
practice. In the absence of an arrrangement like the
Agreement, a business owner like Dr. Raeline McIntyre
would have the choice whether to use available cash
to make an equipment purchase, which would leave
less cash available to be paid out to herself as the
business owner, or instead lease equipment, which
would mean that the PC would not own the equipment
and would pay some regular amount as a lease
payment, but would have more cash available to pay
out to herself as the business owner. Under the Agreement, as Ms. Twilla agreed, the PC retained the right
to purchase equipment if it chose to do so. 12/1/2020
Tr. 125:22-24; 12/2/2020 Tr. 188:21-25. But Affordable’s financial control and cash management limited
if not precluded Dr. Raeline McIntyre from making
that choice.
App.77a
70. Other business practices of Affordable also
disadvantaged the PC. Affordable produced promotional
mailers for affiliated practices that advertised services
available, prices, and offered discounts available at a
specific Affordable location or locations. E.g., Resp.
Exs. 4, 5; 12/14/2020 Tr. 58:96
- 0:23;
id. 84:31
- 0. The
evidence at the final hearing showed that Affordable
sent promotional mailers to patients of the PC that
identified not the Gulfport location, but rather a
different Affordable practice in Covington, Louisiana.
Resp. Ex. 4; 12/14/2020 Tr. 84 3
: 2
- 4; 12/15/2020 Tr. 8:2411:12. Affordable explained that it sent promotional
mailers for a particular practice to residents within
certain identified zip codes rather than sorting the
mailing list so that patients of a given Affordable
practice would receive promotional mailers for that
practice. 12/15/2020 Tr. 10:3 2
- 4. Affordable’s approach
would disadvantage a practice like the PC that had
drawn patients from a geographic area that, based on
Affordable’s decision to later open another affiliated
practice, would be closer to the new Affordable practice.
Affordable benefitted from the profit-sharing arrangement with its affiliated practices whether a former
patient of the PC returned for more dental care to the
PC or went to a different affiliated practice, but the
PC would lose potential revenue of a former patient
seeking additional dental services who was enticed to
go to a different practice based on the promotions
Affordable was marketing for that different practice.
Affordable chose a marketing approach that did not
honor the dentist-patient relationship for the PC and
was contrary to the PC’s financial interest, but would
make it easier for Affordable to avoid sorting the
mailing list and would support Affordable’s financial
interest.
App.78a
71. Using its financial control, Affordable repeatedly attempted to interfere with Dr. Raeline McIntyre’s
professional decision making, by trying to discourage
the PC from spending money on appropriate equipment
and dentist salaries. Although Ms. Twilla admitted
that the PC always had the right under the Agreement to purchase whatever equipment Dr. McIntyre
requested, 12/1/2020 Tr. 172:20-23; 12/2/2020 Tr. 131:24133:1, Affordable refused to honor that right. When Dr.
Raeline McIntyre requested that Affordable purchase
imaging equipment necessary for patient care, Affordable refused for three years to allow the PC to make
the purchase. 12/4/2020 Tr. 486:18- 487:20; id. 487:25488:6. As outlined above, Affordable had a financial
interest in minimizing the PC’s costs, and thus
maximizing Affordable’s management fees based on
the PC’s net operating margin.
72. The Agreement gave the PC the sole authority
to set salaries for associate dentists. MSA at 15
(Staffing). Ms. Twilla admitted that the PC could pay
associate dentists “anything that they want.” 12/1/2020
Tr. 174:21-22. However, when Dr. Raeline McIntyre
informed Affordable of desired salary increases,
Affordable refused and/or delayed putting increases
into effect. 12/4/2020 Tr. 488:91
- 3. Dr. Raeline McIntyre
testified that this occurred multiple times throughout
the PC’s affiliation with Affordable. Id. Dr. Raeline
McIntyre also testified that she did not remember a
time that she requested an increase when it was
granted in the amount and within the time that she
requested. Id. 488:18-21. Again, Affordable had a
financial incentive to suppress associate dentist
salaries, because those salaries were practice expenses
App.79a
that would reduce the net operating margin, and in
turn reduce Affordable’s management fees.
73. The MSA required Affordable to provide a
centralized purchasing system for the PC to purchase
supplies. MSA at 15 (Inventory and Supplies). However,
Affordable failed to maintain current paid-up accounts
with suppliers necessary to allow the PC to purchase
supplies. 12/4/2020 Tr. 489:31
- 0. In the late summer
or early fall of 2019, Dr. Raeline McIntyre attempted
on several occasions to purchase dental implants; she
was told that Affordable had not paid its account, and
that she could not purchase the implants on her own
credit card. Id. 489:31
- 7. Affordable’s failure to promptly
pay bills interfered with Dr. Raeline McIntyre’s efforts
to obtain implants necessary to care for a patient. See
id.
Termination of 2002 Lease and the PC’s move to
505 Cowan Road:
74. As required under the Agreement and the
2002 Lease, Affordable also leased office space to the
PC. See MSA at 15. The PC operated at the Premises
beginning in 2002. 12/1/2020 Tr. 164:8-10. There is no
evidence that, after October 31, 2005, Affordable
extended its lease of the Premises. See 12/2/2020 Tr.
163:11-14; 12/3/2020 Tr. 131:1517. However, the PC
continued to operate at the Premises, and pay rent to
Affordable until 2013 or 2014. Id. 253:21-254:5.
75. In 2013, JNM Office Property, LLC (“JNM”),
a company ultimately owned by Dr. Raeline McIntyre
and Dr. Neil McIntyre, purchased property at 505
Cowan Road. 12/3/2020 Tr. 287:13
- .
App.80a
76. On July 24, 2013, JNM entered into a lease
agreement with Affordable to lease 505 Cowan Road
to Affordable (the “JNM Lease”) (Joint Ex. 7). See
12/3/2020 Tr. 255:71
- 6.
77. JNM constructed an office building at 505
Cowan Road. 12/14/2020 Tr. 68:81
- 3.
78. Meanwhile, the owner of the Premises sold
the property, and in 2014, the Premises were destroyed.
12/3/2020 Tr. 254:19-255:1. Th e Ship Island Lease
terminated. See 12/2/2020 Tr. 165:92
- 3. According to
its terms, the 2002 Lease terminated automatically
when Affordable’s lease of the Premises terminated,
and no later than 2014. See 2002 Lease § 2.
79. In August 2014, the PC moved its operations
to 505 Cowan Road. 12/3/2020 Tr. 255:26
- . Affordable
entered into a written lease with JNM for the Cowan
Road property. Affordable then subleased the Cowan
Road property to the PC, but there was no written
sublease and no identifiable terms and conditions for
the sublease other than the payment of agreed-upon
rent. The PC began paying monthly rent to Affordable
for office space at 505 Cowan Road. 12/1/2020 Tr.
162:14-18.
Maintenance and Upkeep of 505 Cowan Road:
80. According to the JNM Lease, Affordable was
responsible for maintaining the building and the
grounds at 505 Cowan Road. See JNM Lease ¶ 6(B)(1);
12/4/2020 Tr. 361:16
- . However, Affordable did not
properly maintain grounds to the satisfaction of the
PC. 12/4/2020 Tr. 362:59
- . The PC took on the work of
landscaping and maintaining the grounds at the 505
App.81a
Cowan Road office without any objection from
Affordable. Id. 361:83
- 62:4; id. 363:12-16.
81. The PC engaged Bravo Lawn and Design LLC
(“Bravo Lawn”) to manage and perform landscaping
and related services at 505 Cowan Road. See 12/2/2020
Tr. 45:31
- 0; 12/4/2020 Tr. 361: 8-12. Bravo Lawn is
ultimately owned by the McIntyres. 12/3/2020 Tr.
286:19-287:3. Dr. Raeline McIntyre approved invoices
from Bravo Lawn and forwarded them for Affordable
to cause the invoices to be paid as practice expenses.
12/2/2020 Tr. 35:18-36:2. Dr. Neil McIntyre testified
that Affordable operations consultants who visited
505 Cowan Road would have seen that outside
maintenance work was being performed. 12/4/2020
Tr. 386:13-387:20. Although Affordable influenced
and often resisted decisions by the PC to incur expenses,
Affordable never raised a question about the invoices
for Bravo Lawn, 12/4/2020 Tr. 388:21
- 0. Affordable
never asked Dr. Raeline McIntyre concerning the
ownership of Bravo Lawn, and never suggested that
the invoices were too high for the services provided.
See id. 386:13-18; id. 388:21
- 0. Nothing in the Agreement prevented the PC from retaining a landscaping
service and paying for the service as a practice expense.
Nothing in the Agreement prevented the PC from
selecting a landscaping service ultimately owned by
the McIntyres.
82. The PC engaged SparklePro LLC (“SparklePro”) to manage and provide cleaning services at 505
Cowan Road. See 12/2/2020 Tr. 45:31
- 0. SparklePro is
ultimately owned by the McIntyres. 12/3/2020 Tr.
286:19-287:3. Dr. Raeline McIntyre approved invoices
from SparklePro and forwarded them for Affordable
to cause the invoices to be paid as practice expenses.
App.82a
12/2/2020 Tr. 26:20-27:1;
see 12/1/2020 Tr. 118:11-19.
Jan Boatright, an operations consultant for Affordable,
knew that the PC had hired an outside cleaning
service. 12/4/2020 Tr. 387:18- 388:1. Although Affordable influenced and often resisted decisions by the PC
to incur expenses, Affordable never raised a question
about the invoices from SparklePro. 12/3/2020 Tr.
145:13-18. Affordable never asked Dr. Raeline McIntyre
concerning the ownership of SparklePro, and never
suggested that the invoices were too high for the
services provided. 12/4/2020 Tr. 388:21
- 0. Nothing in
the Agreement prevented the PC from retaining a
cleaning service and paying for the service as a
practice expense. While the Business Policy Guidelines
Exhibit A to the Agreement stated that the practice
facility would be cleaned by the PC’s employees each
day, and that “[o]utside cleaning services should be
utilized only for periodic carpet shampoos, waxing,
etc.,” MSA at 13, the PC had the unilateral right to
modify the Business Policy Guidelines, id. § I(B).
Further, Affordable offered no credible evidence that
SparklePro provided more than “periodic” services.
See id. When directed to the provision in the Business
Policy Guidelines specifically referring to outside
cleaning services, Ms. Twilla testified that she thought
periodic meant on a quarterly basis, “or at least every
other month.” 12/3/2020 Tr. 144:25-12. However, she
admitted that until she learned of the ownership of
SparklePro, Affordable never raised any concern about
the frequency of billings for cleaning services. See id.
145:13-18. Finally, the PC agreed to give notice to
Affordable of any changes to the Business Policy
Guidelines. MSA § I(B). To the extent that retaining
SparklePro represents a change to the Guidelines,
Affordable received written notice every time it received
App.83a
and caused to be paid an invoice for cleaning services.
See 12/2/2020 Tr. 31:31
- 4; id. 33:19-34:22.
83. Karol Twilla testified that she first learned
that SparklePro and Bravo Lawn were owned by the
McIntyres in late February or early March of 2020.
12/2/2020 Tr. 55:81
- 7. Affordable offered no evidence
that it had any concerns about the PC making
payments for cleaning and landscaping services, or
the amounts of those payments, before Affordable
learned of the ownership of SparklePro and Bravo
Lawn. E.g., 12/3/2020 Tr. 145:13-18.
Property and equipment at 505 Cowan Road:
84. At the hearing, Karol Twilla testified that
when Affordable affiliates with a dental practice,
“Affordable Care would own the property, would own
the equipment, the furnishings, and the dental space.”
12/1/2020 Tr. 86:19-21. She also testified that Affordable’s practice was to lease the equipment to the
practice. Id. 86:12-87:11. Affordable introduced no
documentation of any lease of any equipment.
85. Ms. Twilla first testified that “[t]here is a
sublease” between Affordable and the PC regarding
the alleged lease of furnishings and equipment. 12/1/
2020 Tr. 129:25-130:7. However, Affordable’s counsel
later acknowledged that “[t]here was no written sublease.” Id. 159:17. Ms. Twilla then testified that Affordable’s position was that when the PC moved to 505
Cowan Road, “[t]hat the lease continue[d] as it’s written
in” the 2002 Lease. 12/2/2020 Tr. 10:10-15. Although
the 2002 Lease terminated automatically when
Affordable’s lease of the Premises ended, Ms. Twilla
App.84a
testified that the 2002 Lease was the controlling sublease for the 505 Cowan Road property. 12/2/2020 Tr.
157:81
- 5.
86. Through Ms. Twilla’s testimony, Affordable
introduced a list of equipment that Ms. Twilla said
represented items at 505 Cowan Road that Affordable
owned. See 12/3/2020 Tr. 123:23-124:14; Cl. Ex. 36.
Ms. Twilla later admitted that she did not prepare the
list and had no other knowledge of its specific contents.
12/3/2020 Tr. 156:17- 157:8. Affordable offered no
documentation to support the list, such as invoices or
receipts to show that it purchased the listed property
with its funds.
87. Dr. Neil McIntyre testified that he and Dr.
Raeline McIntyre purchased furnishings and equipment
for the 505 Cowan Road office with the McIntyres’
personal funds. 12/14/2020 Tr. 213:10-214: 18. Evidence
produced in discovery and introduced at the hearing
showed that the McIntyres purchased at least $124,853
in property for the 505 Cowan Road office with
personal funds. 12/14/2020 Tr. 215:17-22; Resp. Ex. 8. 6
88. Although Ms. Twilla testified in response to
Affordable’s counsel’s questions that Affordable owns
all the property and equipment at affiliated practices,
12/1/2020 Tr. 86:19-21, Ms. Tw illa admitted on crossexamination that she had no personal knowledge of
what equipment Affordable owned at 505 Cowan Road.
12/3/2020 Tr. 101:2-10. Ms. Twilla also testified that
she did not know whether any of the equipment set up
6 Respondents’ Exhibit 8 is misidentified in some parts of the
hearing transcript as Exhibit A. See 12/14/2020 Tr. 215:10; id.
216:15.
App.85a
at the Premises was moved to 505 Cowan Road. Id.
132:23-133:5.
89. Ms. Twilla’s testimony that Affordable owns
all the property and equipment at 505 Cowan Road
was not credible and does not support a finding that
Affordable owned the property and equipment.
90. Other than Ms. Twilla’s testimony, which
the Arbitrator does not credit, Affordable offered no
evidence that it purchased the property and equipment
located at 505 Cowan Road. Instead, the credible
evidence showed that the McIntyres and the PC
purchased and owned the property and equipment.
Affordable failed to show that it owned any particular
piece of property or equipment located at 505 Cowan
Road. Further, by failing to ever provide a lease or
leases regarding the furnishings and equipment at the
Cowan Road property, Affordable violated its contract
duties under Exbibit B 1 of the MSA.
ADDL laboratory staffing issues:
91. Under the Agreement, Affordable agreed to
provide an in-house dental laboratory to serve the
needs of the PC’s patients. MSA at 15.
92. An adequately staffed laboratory was critical
to the PC’s ability to provide timely patient care, and
essential to the financial success of the PC. See
12/14/2020 Tr. 93:14-94:4; see also 12/15/2020 Tr. 97:2098:3 (Mr. Hudi’s testimony th at number of lab employees
varies in relation to practice’s revenue). Affordable
advertised both to the managing dentists who owned
practices managed by Affordable, and to patients, that
it provided same-day dent ure service. 12/14/2020 Tr.
App.86a
81:25-92:12. The in-house ADDL laboratory was essen tial to providing same-day service. 12/3/2020 Tr. 118:1624.
93. Affordable and ADDL mismanaged the
Gulfport laboratory. ADDL Gulfport laboratory employees were overworked and underpaid, resulting in
significant staff attrition. 12/4/2020 Tr. 383:384:25;
12/14/2020 Tr. 85:7-13. When the PC had its most
profitable years, the laboratory was staffed with four
full technicians to timely meet patient needs. 12/14/
2020 Tr. 94:24-95:1. However, by 2019, only one full
technician remained in the laboratory. Id. 94:21-95:3;
Resp. Ex. 7. In many cases, the PC could no longer
offer same-day denture servic e due to the deficiencies
in laboratory staffing. 12/14/2020 Tr. 81:19-24; id.
86:9-16; id. 109:19-22; id. 208:22
- 10:10.
94. When problems in dental laboratory staffing
negatively impacted the PC’s patient service and
productivity, Affordable failed to adequately address
the problems. Dr. Raeline McIntyre raised the
laboratory staffing issues with Affordable and ADDL,
making clear that the practice was in dire need of a
fully staffed laboratory. 12/14/2020 Tr. 90:11-95:3;
Resp. Ex. 7. Rather than listen to Dr. Raeline McIntyre’s
concerns about the laboratory, Affordable tried to
force the PC to make do with the laboratory staffing it
had, refused to increase pay for overworked laboratory
staff, and failed to recruit and hire adequate staff.
12/14/2020 Tr. 88:27
- ;
id. 97:16-98:2. Ms. Twilla
admitted that Dr. Raeline McIntyre raised concerns
about the staffing of the ADDL laboratory prior to the
termination letter in September 2019. Id. 181:4-22.
95. Kevin Hudi testified that in February 2019,
Dr. Raeline McIntyre declined to allow ADDL to
App.87a
require Gulfport laboratory staff to participate in a
productivity data collection program that ADDL
implemented, known as “Smart sheet.” 12/4/2020 Tr.
414:13-415:5; 12/15/2020 Tr. 53 9
: 5
- 5:3. Dr. McIntyre
told Mr. Hudi that her laboratory manager, Russell
Dukes, was already too busy, and the laboratory was
understaffed. 12/4/2020 Tr. 415: 6-15. She also told Mr.
Hudi that she did not think the data collection effort
would be useful. Id. 415:12-15. Mr. Hudi admitted that
ADDL discontinued the “Smart sheet” program after
realizing that “[i]t turned out to be more work, on our
side, capturing data and running reports.” 12/15/2020
Tr. 76:39
- . Mr. Hudi testified that “the labor was more
than the data was providing.” Id. 76:10-13.
96. Consistent with Mr. Hudi’s testimony, Dr.
Raeline McIntyre testified that she called Mr. Hudi
and said that the laboratory employees were overwhelmed, and adding another requirement would be
more than they could handle. 12/4/2020 Tr. 502:15503:3. Dr. Raeline McIntyre testified that the ADDL
employees were already submitting the same data
ADDL was requesting, but in a different format. Id.
503:4-9.
Termination of the Services Agreement:
97. After repeatedly complaining to Affordable
about its mismanagement of the PC, and particularly
the problems caused by the inadequate laboratory
staffing, Dr. Raeline McIntyre decided to terminate
the Agreement between Affordable and the PC. See
12/14/2020 Tr. 101:19-104:10.
98. On September 18, 2019, Dr. Raeline McIntyre,
on behalf of the PC, sent a letter to Affordable
terminating the Agreement for cause. Joint Ex. 8 at 1-
App.88a
2. Dr. McIntyre explained in the letter that there were
at least two grounds to terminate for cause: (1) Affordable’s breach of its promise to manage in the best
interests of the PC was a breach of a material term,
giving rise to cause for termination under section
V(B)(2) of the Agreement; and (2) the termination of
the 2002 Lease gave rise to cause for termination
under section V(B)(9) of the Agreement. Id. Dr.
McIntyre requested that Affordable respond and
provide “its plan for an orderly disaffiliation within 10
days so that we can make the necessary and appropriate
decisions related to our practice, and the continuing
care of our patients, following disaffiliation from
Affordable.” Id. at 2; 12/14/2020 Tr . 104:21-105:9. Dr.
McIntyre proposed that disaffiliation be completed by
November 4, 2019. Joint Ex. 8; 12/14/2020 Tr. 106:1418.
99. Also on September 18, 2019, the PC sent a
letter to Affordable and ADDL giving notice that the
PC was terminating the ADDL Agreement. Joint Ex.
8 at 3-4; 12/14/2020 Tr. 106: 5-20. In the letter, Dr.
Raeline McIntyre explained that ADDL was in breach
of the ADDL Agreement because it was no longer
performing the work contemplated under the ADDL
Agreement in the time and manner required. Joint Ex.
8 at 3. Dr. McIntyre also explained that the ADDL
Agreement was automatically terminated because of
the PC’s termination of the Services Agreement. Id. at
3-4.
100. Dr. Neil McIntyre met with the staff of the
PC and the Gulfport ADDL laboratory on September
18, 2019 to inform them that the PC had terminated
its Agreement with Affordable. 12/3/2020 Tr. 276:1525. After the meeting, staff members, including ADDL
App.89a
employees, approached Dr. Neil McIntyre to ask for
employment following the disaffiliation from Affordable.
Id. 277:14-18; id. 278:11-13. Dr. Neil McIntyre told
the employees who asked that he did not know what
the future held, but he would do his best to employ
them. Id. 277:61
- 2.
101. Karol Twilla responded to the September 18,
2019 termination letters by letter dated September 27,
2019. Joint Ex. 9. Ms. Twilla denied that there was
cause to terminate the Agreement, and asserted that
Affordable had complied with the Agreement and had
not interfered with the PC’s professional decision
making. Id. Ms. Twilla did not offer a plan for disaffiliation. Id.; see 12/14/2020 Tr. 107:23-108:2.
102. Affordable never provided a plan for disaffiliation from the PC. 12/14/2020 Tr. 105:19-25; id.
106:24-25.
Initiation of Arbitration and Court Proceedings:
103. Instead, on November 1, 2019, Affordable filed
its initial Demand for Arbitration. Joint Ex. 10.
Affordable alleged that there was no cause for termination of the Agreement, and sought declaratory
judgment that the Agreement was not terminated. See
id.
104. Also on November 1, 2019, Affordable sued
JNM in federal court seeking declaratory judgment
that Affordable was not in default on the lease
between JNM and Affordable for the 505 Cowan Road
office, as a result of Affordable’s failure to make
certain rent payments to JNM. Cl. Ex. 14.
105. On November 20, 2019, Respondents answered the Demand and denied Affordable’s allegations,
App.90a
thus reasserting that the PC had terminated the
Agreement for cause. Joint Ex. 11.
106. On November 24, 2019, Karol Twilla sent
another letter to the PC, this time notifying the PC
that Affordable believed there was a minimum cash
balance deficiency based on October 31, 2019 financial
statements. Joint Ex. 12. Ms. Twilla stated that the
PC had two options to remedy the deficiency and, if
the parties did not agree on either option, either party
could terminate the Agreement immediately. Id. In
the letter, Ms. Twilla purported to enclose the financial
statement on which she relied to calculate a minimum
cash balance deficiency. Id. The copy of Ms. Twilla’s
letter introduced at the hearing has no enclosures. Id.
Although Ms. Twilla testified about the letter, she did
not explain whether an enclosure was missing or what
it contained. 12/2/2020 Tr. 50:92
- 2.
107. Prior to the November 25, 2019 letter, Affordable had never given the PC notice of a minimum cash
balance deficiency. 12/14/2020 Tr. 108:15-18.
108. By February 2020, Affordable still failed to
cooperate in disaffiliation from the PC.
109. Because Affordable retained control of all
revenues of the PC and refused to relinquish that
control despite the termination of the Agreement, the
PC could not disaffiliate from Affordable. See 12/14/2020
Tr. 170:51
- 8. In order to set up a bank account that
Affordable did not control, so that Affordable could not
continue to sweep revenues earned after the termination
of the Agreement, Dr. Raeline McIntyre formed a new
entity, Dr. Raeline K. McIntyre, DMD, PLLC (“Raeline
PLLC”), and set up a bank account in the name of the
new entity. 12/3/2020 Tr. 252:36
- ; 12/14/2020 Tr.
App.91a
170:51
- 8. Dr. Raeline McIntyr e was the sole owner of
Raeline PLLC. 12/4/2020 Tr. 471:10.
February 24, 2020 Letter and Further Litigation:
110. On or about February 24, 2020, the PC
delivered a second letter to Affordable, stating that
the PC was terminating the Agreement immediately
under section III(B). Joint Ex. 13. In the letter, Dr.
Raeline McIntyre explained that the PC did not agree
to either option to remedy the cash balance deficiency,
and therefore invoked its right to terminate the Agreement immediately. Id. Again, in the interest of
continuity of patient care, Dr. McIntyre asked Affordable to work with the PC to provide “an orderly
transition.” Id.
111. In response to the February 24, 2020 letter,
Affordable took immediate action to interfere with the
McIntyres’ ability to continue to practice dentistry. On
or about February 26, 2020, Affordable cut off the
computer system in the office so that the McIntyres
could not access their patient records or take X-rays
or images. 12/4/2020 Tr. 526:25-527:10; id. 526:12-21.
Affordable also directed ADDL employees not to return
to work. 12/2/2020 Tr. 108:19-20.
112. All of the ADDL employees at the Gulfport
laboratory resigned from employment with ADDL.
12/2/2020 Tr. 108:20-22.
113. Although the evidence showed that Affordable
ceased performing services for the PC on February 24,
2020, supra, Ms. Twilla testified that the current
status of the Agreement between the PC and Affordable
is “[t]hat it is still in existence, that we still have
affiliation.” 12/1/2020 Tr. 110:14-15.
App.92a
114. During the week of February 24, 2020, Raeline
PLLC began to operate a dental practice at 505 Cowan
Road. 12/4/2020 Tr. 464:36
- . Dr. Raeline McIntyre, Dr.
Neil McIntyre, and Dr. Palmore practiced under
Raeline PLLC. Id. 471:24-472:6;
id. 517:17-23. The
McIntyres removed signage and indications that the
practice was affiliated with Affordable. 12/4/2020 Tr.
522:12-20; id. 524:21
- 1; id. 525:11-13. Raeline PLLC
hired the former ADDL Gulfport laboratory employees,
after they contacted Dr. Neil McIntyre to ask for
employment. 12/3/2020 Tr. 277:14-24; id. 278:14-22;
12/4/2020 Tr. 517:12-16.
115. On February 27, 2020, Respondents secured
a temporary restraining order that prohibited Affordable from interfering with their ability to practice
dentistry. Cl. Ex. 17.
116. On February 28, 2020, Affordable sought leave
to amend its Demand for Arbitration. Cl. Ex. 45.7
117. In its Amended Demand for Arbitration
(“Demand”) (Joint Ex. 14), Affordable brought seventeen
claims for relief: (1) declaratory relief pursuant to the
Agreement; (2) attorneys’ fees and indemnification
pursuant to the Agreement; (3) declaratory relief
pursuant to the 2002 Lease and “the sublease”; (4)
breach of contract—“minimum cash balance”; (5)
breach of contract—“failure to vacate the premises”;
(6) breach of contract—“failure to pay all debts”; (7)
7 Affordable was granted to leave file its Amended Demand for
Arbitration. AAA Scheduling Order 2
# . Although Affordable did
not actually file the Amended Demand for Arbitration until June
3, 2020, Joint Ex. 14, the Amended Demand it ultimately filed
was submitted with its motion for leave on February 28, 2020,
Cl. Ex. 45.
App.93a
breach of contract—confidentiality; (8) breach of
contract—“solicitation of Claimant’s employees”; (9)
breach of contract—“taking of Claimant’s property
and equipment”; (10) breach of contract—“failure to
allow Claimant access to the Premises”; (11) misappropriation of trade secrets; (12) tortious interference
with “business relations”; (13) tortious interference with
“business relationships”; (14) unfair acts or practices
in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; (15) unjust
enrichment—“Claimant’s property and equipment”;
(16) unjust enrichment—“the Premises”; and (17)
conversion. Demand ¶¶ 95-261. Affordable alleged
that there was no cause for the PC to terminate the
Agreement. Id. ¶ 20. Affordable also alleged that the
PC breached the Agreement by failing to remedy the
alleged minimum cash balance deficiency, id. ¶ 138;
failing to vacate 505 Cowan Road upon termination of
the Agreement, id. ¶¶ 148-69; allegedly taking Affordable’s property and equipment, id. ¶¶ 191-92; soliciting
ADDL employees, id. ¶¶ 181-82, and using Affordable’s confidential information, id. ¶ 172. Affordable’s
tort and statutory claims arise from the same facts as
the breach of contract claims. See id. ¶¶ 204-61.
118. Raeline PLLC continued to operate at 505
Cowan Road, and continued to serve the McIntyres’
patients. 12/3/2020 Tr. 272: 23-273:19. Respondents
did not pay rent during the month of March 2020. Id.
273:17-274:8. Affordable offered no evidence of the fair
market value of the 505 Cowan Road property during
that time.
119. Affordable filed a motion in federal court in
the JNM case seeking to enforce a joint stipulation
between JNM and Affordable that was intended to
preserve the status quo during litigation. Cl. Ex. 43 at
App.94a
9; Cl. Ex. 44. At the hearing on the motion to enforce
the stipulation, Affordable asked the court to order
the McIntyres to vacate 505 Cowan Road. 12/14/2020
Tr. 236:81
- 0. Affordable represented to the court that
it was ready to start operating with a new affiliated
practice immediately. Id. 236:11-17. On March 17,
2020, Affordable obtained a court order requiring the
McIntyres and their practice to vacate 505 Cowan
Road no later than March 27, 2020. Cl. Ex. 1.
120. The next day, on March 18, 2020, Dr. Neil
McIntyre set up Neil McIntyre, DMD, PLLC (“Neil
PLLC”). Cl. Ex. 46. Dr. Neil McIntyre is the sole owner
of Neil PLLC. 12/4/2020 Tr. 537:5-10.
Events Following March 27, 2020:
121. The McIntyres complied with the court order
and vacated 505 Cowan Road on March 27, 2020.
12/2/2020 Tr. 83:68
- . Raeline PLLC ceased operating
on March 27, 2020. 12/3/2020 Tr. 273:11-13. Dr. Raeline
McIntyre stopped practicing dentistry at that time.
12/3/2020 Tr. 281:24-282:2; 12/4/2020 Tr. 536:25-4.
122. Despite Affordable’s representation in federal
court, supra, an Affordable-affiliated practice did not
begin operating at 505 Cowan Road until October 5,
2020. 12/14/2020 Tr. 237:31
- 1.
123. Upon leaving 505 Cowan Road, the McIntyres
did not take any dental equipment. 12/3/2020 Tr.
280:8-10. They did not take any property owned by
Affordable. Id. 280:11-14; see 12/2/2020 Tr. 83:25
- . Dr.
Neil McIntyre took only some of his personal
belongings. 12/3/2020 Tr. 280:15-281:5. The McIntyres
left behind property and equipment that they purchased
in order to avoid any question that they had fully
App.95a
complied with the federal court’s order. 12/4/2020 Tr.
348:81
- 3.
124. Dr. Neil McIntyre continued to practice
dentistry under Neil PLLC at 382 Courthouse Road in
Gulfport. 12/14/2020 Tr. 237:12-15. Neil PLLC hired
the former ADDL employees who had worked for
Raeline PLLC and set up a dental laboratory. 12/4/
2020 Tr. 538:31
- 2.
125. Neil PLLC continues to operate a dental
practice in Gulfport, Mississippi. 12/4/2020 Tr. 324:1719; 12/14/2020 Tr. 237:12-15; id. 239:18-23.
126. In its Demand and at the hearing, Affordable
raised a variety of complaints about the events
following the termination of the Agreement in
September 2019, and the events following the February
24, 2020 letter.
Access to 505 Cowan Road:
127. On examination by Affordable’s counsel, Ms.
Twilla testified that Affordable was denied access to
505 Cowan Road after February 24, 2020. 12/3/2020
Tr. 149:71
- 0. On cross-examination Ms. Twilla admitted
that she was never denied access to 505 Cowan Road,
and she was not aware that Affordable actually sent
anyone to the building to attempt to access it. Id.
167:11-168:4.
128. The Arbitrator does not credit Ms. Twilla’s
testimony that Affordable was denied access to 505
Cowan Road. She appeared to agree with Affordable’s
litigation position, despite her admitted lack of knowledge to support that position.
App.96a
129. Affordable did not offer any evidence to
support the allegations in its Demand that “Respondents have locked Claimant out of the Premises,”
Demand ¶ 199, even assuming that Affordable is
referring to 505 Cowan Road rather than the
Premises. There is no credible evidence that Affordable was denied access to 505 Cowan Road at any
time.
Competition by Neil PLLC:
130. Ms. Twilla testified that the PC had the
ability to stop Dr. Neil McIntyre from competing with
the PC, and to seek an injunction and/or damages.
12/2/2020 Tr. 93:51
- 6. However, Dr. Neil McIntyre
testified that he had no employment agreement with
the PC. 12/3/2020 Tr. 187:12-13; id. 189:59
- . Affordable
offered as evidence a document purporting to amend
an employment agreement between Dr. Neil McIntyre
and the PC. Id. 188:11
- 3; Cl. Ex. 5. Dr. Neil McIntyre
explained that he signed the amendment in 2006
because he was at an Affordable seminar with other
dentists, and the “corporate people” from Affordable
had a table of amendments at the front door to the
room. 12/3/2020 Tr. 189:13-190:1. The Affordable
corporate personnel said all the dentists had to sign
the amendments before they left; Dr. Neil McIntyre
testified that he signed the amendment so he could
leave. Id. Affordable failed to prove that Dr. Neil
McIntyre had a written employment agreement with
the PC and failed to offer any evidence that Dr. Neil
McIntyre was subject to a restrictive covenant with
the PC. Affordable also offered no evidence that Dr.
Neil McIntyre was a party to any agreement with
Affordable.
App.97a
131. Ms. Twilla testified that the Agreement
requires associate dentists of the PC to sign employment agreements, and that the Agreement sets minimum requirements for those employment agreements.
12/1/2020 Tr. 145:11-21; id. 155:14-18. Ms. Twilla
testified that the Agreement required Dr. Raeline
McIntyre to have Dr. Neil McIntyre execute an employment agreement with the PC. Id. 154:48
- .
132. In the Agreement, the PC agreed to enter
into an employment agreement with “each dentist who
is a shareholder in the PC.” MSA § II(D). Regarding the
employment of other dentists, the Agreement stated:
The terms and conditions of an Employment
Agreement with a dentist who is not a
shareholder in the PC may be such as the PC
determines to be prudent, provided, however
that all such Employment Agreements must
contain provisions substantially identical to
those of Paragraphs 6 (Prohibited Marketing
Practices), 7 (Confidential Information), 8
(Nonsolicitation of Employees) and 11 (Third
Party Beneficiary) of the sample Associate
Dentist Employment Agreement attached
hereto as Exhibit D-2.
Id. Nothing in the Agreement required the PC to enter
into an employment agreement with a dentist who
was not a shareholder. See id. Affordable did not offer
evidence that a sample Associate Dentist Employment Agreement was attached to the Agreement.
133. The terms of the Agreement contradict Ms.
Twilla’s testimony that the PC was required to have
Dr. Neil McIntyre sign an employment agreement. Ms.
Twilla’s interpretation of the Agreement, unsupported
App.98a
by the plain language of the Agreement, has no evidentiary weight.
134. On August 5, 2002, Dr. Neil McIntyre signed
a temporary employment agreement with the Poe PC.
12/3/2020 Tr. 192:11-24; Cl. Ex. 4. The temporary
employment agreement contained a covenant not to
compete with the practice for two years after the
termination of the agreement. Cl. Ex. 4 ¶ 5. As noted
above, the PC purchased the assets of the Poe PC on
November 1, 2002. In the bill of sale, the Poe PC agreed
to assign to the PC its “rights, benefits and interest
under those certain contracts and agreements, written
or oral, relating to the operations of the Practice
defined as ‘Assigned Contracts’ under the Professional
Assets Purchase Agreement.” Joint Ex. 6 at 9-10.
However, nothing in the Professional Assets Purchase
Agreement lists “Assigned Contracts.” See id. at 1-6.
Therefore, there is no evidence that Dr. Neil McIntyre’s
temporary employment agreement with the Poe PC
was assigned to the PC.
Hiring of Former ADDL Employees:
135. Ms. Twilla testified that as of February 2020,
ADDL employed Caleb Cantrell, Rachel Dykes, Russell
Dykes, and Christina Hodge at the Gulfport location.
12/2/2020 Tr. 109:15-110:8. Ms. Twilla testified that
these four employees resigned on or about February
24, 2020 and were hired by Dr. Raeline McIntyre. Id.
110:91
- 5.
136. Ms. Twilla also testified that Dr. Raeline
McIntyre and Dr. Neil McIntyre were prohibited by
contract from soliciting ADDL employees. 12/2/2020
Tr. 107:24-108:6. Ms. Twilla te stified that Affordable
and ADDL had a non-solicitation provision because
App.99a
there was “a lot of work” that goes into recruiting and
training laboratory staff members. Id. 112:17-113:4.
137. Ms. Twilla testified that Affordable has affiliated locations in about forty states across the United
States. 12/2/2020 Tr. 126:69
- . She also testified that
ADDL has a laboratory at each affiliated location, and
therefore ADDL had laboratories in about forty states.
Id. 126:10-15.
138. As noted hereinabove, the non-solicitation
provision in the MSA contains no time limitation. It
prohibits solicitation of any employees of Affordable
and all its affiliates. Therefore, on its face, the nonsolicitation provision prevents solicitation for employment of employees who work in approximately forty
states.
139. Dr. Neil McIntyre testified that in February
2020, he hired former ADDL employees to work for
Raeline PLLC, when those employees asked him for a
job. 12/3/2020 Tr. 277:14-24; id. 278:14-22. He also
testified that he later hired former ADDL employees
to work for Neil PLLC. Id. 197:16-199:11.
Alleged Confidential Information and Trade
Secrets:
140. Ms. Twilla also testified that Affordable
maintained confidential information and trade secrets.
12/2/2020 Tr. 111:22
- 0; id. 113:14-114:12. She testified
that the confidential information at issue in Affordable’s
breach of contract claim was the same information
Affordable contended was a trade secret. 12/3/2020 Tr.
55:21-58:4.
141. In response to questions about what Affordable considered a trade secret, Karol Twilla testified:
App.100a
So as a support service that we offer, you
know, when you think about a business asset
and you think about servicing patients, in this
instance there are forms that are created and
recommended.
Now, the doctor has the ability to say no, that
they don’t want to use them or to alter them;
but the templates of those forms, the format
of those forms, how those forms are communicated to patients, how those forms are
processed throughout the patient’s visit, you
know, the office, how the office runs, how they
answer phones, how they utilize the Dentrix,
the operating system and, you know, making
sure that a schedule is optimized, all of those
are certainly, you know, trade secrets.
12/2/2020 Tr. 113:21-114:10. Ms. Twilla also testified
that “the manner in which we train office staff” was a
trade secret. 12/3/2020 Tr. 54:11-21. Ms. Twilla
testified that if an unaffiliated practice hired former
employees of an affiliated practice, the employees
would be “light years ahead as far as the way that they
talk to patients, the way they schedule patients, the
way that they, you know, create ASAP lists.”
12/2/2020 Tr. 115:62
- 4.
142. On cross-examination , Ms. Twilla admitted
that the Affordable template patient form was
accessible to tens of thousands of patients who were
under no obligation to keep the form confidential.
12/3/2020 Tr. 58:56
- 2:7. Immediately after acknowledging this fact, she persisted in testifying that the
form was secret. Id. 61:20-23.
App.101a
143. Ms. Twilla also admitted that patients and
other visitors to the practice, as well as ADDL and PC
staff members, had the opportunity to observe how the
office operated, including how staff answered the
phones and how patients were scheduled. 12/3/2020 Tr.
58:75
- 9:4. Affordable offered no evidence that any of
the PC staff members who observed how the PC
operated were restricted from disclosing that
information, or subject to post-employment covenants.
144. Ms. Twilla testified that the Dentrix operating
system was customized for Affordable’s affiliated
practices, and that the operating system is considered
confidential and is a trade secret. 12/3/2020 Tr.
120:10-18. However, Dr. Raeline McIntyre testified that
Dentrix was not a proprietary program of Affordable;
rather, it was a third-party provider that licensed
software to dental practices. 12/4/2020 Tr. 522:15
- ; id.
556:3-6; see id. 557:71
- 4. The Arbitrator does not
credit Ms. Twilla’s conclusory testimony that the
Dentrix operating system is proprietary to Affordable.
145. Affordable also did not offer evidence that
Respondents used or disclosed any aspect of the
customized Affordable Dentrix system. Dr. Raeline
McIntyre testified that after February 24, 2020, her
new practice used the computer system only to identify
the number associated with a patient’s hard copy file.
12/4/2020 Tr. 526:12-21. Dr. Ra eline McIntyre explained
that the hard copy files were organized by numbers;
in order to locate a hard copy file, staff had to search
in the computer to find the patient number associated
with a patient’s name. Id. 531:91
- 6. Dr. Raeline
McIntyre testified that they did not use the Dentrix
software system. Id. 527:11-14.
App.102a
146. When asked what Affordable considered a
trade secret “with respect to the laboratory,” Ms.
Twilla responded:
If you compare an ADDL laboratory with a
commercial lab, the processes and even the
materials used and how they’re used in an
ADDL lab are significantly different and they
are done so in order to still have a quality
product in a quicker time frame, enabling
the client dentist to service their patients in
a same day service.
12/2/2020 Tr. 111:82
- 0.
147. ADDL employees and the PC’s staff could
also observe the materials and processes used in the
laboratory, and there was no evidence that those
employees were subject to confidentiality agreements
or post-employment rest rictions. 12/4/2020 Tr. 439:316. Instead, there was evidence that ADDL employees
left to work for competitors. 12/14/2020 Tr. 85:16-24.
148. Although Ms. Twilla testified that providing
same-day denture service wa s “unique,” she admitted
that she was not saying that ADDL was the only dental
laboratory offering same-day service. 12/3/2020 Tr.
153:11-15. Ms. Twilla admi tted that there were
competitors in the market and testified she did not
know whether they provided same-day service. See id.
153:16-154:25. She acknowledg ed knowing of at least
one company that advertised same-day denture
service. Id. 154:59
- .
149. Kevin Hudi testified that the ADDL
employees had valuable training. See 12/4/2020 Tr.
399:13-400:9. However, Mr. Hudi later admitted that
he lacked knowledge of any training that Affordable
App.103a
or ADDL provided to Caleb Cantrell, Rachel Dykes,
Russell Dykes, or Christina Hodge. Id. 440:25-442:3.
150. On the fourth day of the hearing, Dr. Neil
McIntyre testified that when he was setting up the
laboratory at Neil PLLC, he consulted with Russell
Dykes, and looked at a list of equipment provided to
him in 2013 or 2014 by Affordable’s director of
purchasing. 12/4/2020 Tr. 328:22-330:1. The Affordable
employee who provided the list did not ask Dr. Neil
McIntyre to keep the list confidential. Id. 330:19-20.
Dr. Neil McIntyre also testified that the dental
laboratory at Neil PLLC did not have the same layout
as the laboratory at 505 Cowan Road. 12/14/2020 Tr.
238:16-239:7.
151. After Dr. Neil McIntyre testified, Kevin Hudi
testified that ADDL had a “standard equipment order”
and a particular layout for its laboratories, and that
the equipment list was “extremely valuable.” 12/4/2020
Tr. 400:10-401:8. Affordable di d not introduce a copy
of the equipment list during this testimony. See id.
152. After the hearing recessed on December 4,
2020, and before it resumed on December 14, 2020, Dr.
Neil McIntyre searched his files and located the list to
which he had referred in his testimony. 12/14/2020 Tr.
218:72
- 21:9; Resp. Ex. 9. Dr . McIntyre testified that
the list he had referred to in his prior testimony was
a series of six items in an email from Minnie Whaley
forwarded to Dr. McIntyre by T.J. Thomas. 12/14/2
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.