Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Faith Townsend, Petitioner v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.

Supreme Court briefMar 29, 2023

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APPENDIX A

No. 22-3244

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FAITH TOWNSEND

Plaintiff-appellant,

)

ORDER

Entered Jan 5, 2023

)

ROCKWELL

AUTOMATION, INC.

Defendant-Appellee.

)

BEFORE: GRIFFIN, NALBANDIAN, AND

READLER, Circuit Judges.

The court received a petition for rehearing en

banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition

for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in

the petition are fully considered upon the original

submission and decision of tlie case. The petition

then was circulated to the full court. No judge has

requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en

banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY THE ORDER OF THE COURT

s/Deborah S. Hunt. Clerk

App 2

APPENDIX B

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 22-3.244

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Issue Date Oct. 25, 2022

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF OHIO

FAITH TOWNSEND, Plaintiff

ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC.

ORDER

BEFORE^

GRIFFIN, NALBANDIAN, and READLER, Circuit

Judges.

Faith Townsend, proceeding pro se, appeals a

district court’s judgment dismissing a second

employment-discrimination suit that she filed

pursuant to the title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

App 3

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to 2000e-17, against her former

employer, Rockwell Automation, Inc. Claim preclusion

was a partial basis for the dismissal. This case has

been referred to a panel of the court that, upon

examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument

is not needed. See Fed R. App. P. 34(a).

Townsend, an African American woman, was

employed by Rockwell from 1996 until 2018. During

the latter half of her time at Rockwell, she worked at

its technical support call center.

On October 6, 2017, Townsend filed a charge of

race discrimination against Rockwell with the Ohio

Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”) based on events

between 2007 and June 2017. The Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), issued a right-tosue letter a few weeks later. In 2018, Townsend filed

a second OCRC charge of race discrimination against

Rockwell, premised on events between June 2017 and

August 2018. Townsend submitted her notice of

resignation on or about August 7, 2018. The EEOC

issued a right to sue letter on September 25, 2018.

In November 2018, Townsend filed her first

Title VII action, raising claims of disparate treatment,

hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and

retaliation based on her race and gender. For the time

period prior to her 2017 OCRC charge, Townsend

alleged, among other things, that coworkers made

racial slurs about nooses and watermelon; Rockwell

failed to adequately investigate the comments and an

incident in which a coworker accosted her; supervisors

purchased equipment for coworkers but no her;

Rockwell refused to pay her for overtime work;

“incorrect statistics” had a negative effect on her pay,

she did not receive equal training; a supervisor said, “I

don’t know why they don’t educate their kids”; she was

demoted from a team leader position; a supervisor

App 4

changed the call tracking policy to favor the rest of her

team?' and a supervisor appeared at her son’s funeral

uninvited.

For the time period after the 2017 OCRC

charge, Townsend alleged that she (l) could not order

new equipment after reporting discrimination to

Rockwell, (2) was assigned to 20 call management

queues while other team members were assigned to

one, (3) was suspended due to her email blast to the

entire department about unfair treatment, (4)received

text messages with racial slurs, (5) was forced to

resign due to unsafe work environment, and (6) was

wrongfully denied unemployment compensation.

Rockwell moved for summary judgment.

Townsend filed a response, newly arguing that

Rockwell had cancelled her health insurance while she

was on leave in 2018 and that she received lower merit

increases and bonuses compared to her white male

coworkers after she reported harassment.

The district court dismissed claims based on

events occurring prior to October 6, 2017, as untimely

and granted summary judgement to Rockwell on the

remaining claims. Townsend v. Rockwell Automation,

Inc., No. l:l8-cv-02742, 2020 WL 95189 (N.D. Jan. 8,

2020). The court declined to consider Townsend’s

allegations of cancellation of health insurance and

disparate pay structures because she had not raised

these claims in her complaint. We affirmed the

district court’s judgement and decline to review

Townsend’s perfunctory arguments asserting pretrial

error. Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., F.

App’x 1011, 1017 (6th Cir. 2021) (order). Specifically,

she had argued that the district court erred by setting

the deadline for amending the complaint before the

conclusion of discovery, which had revealed additional

discrimination; that Rockwell did not timely provide

App 5

discovery; and that the district court erred by not

entering her evidence into the record until the entry of

the judgement.

Several months later, Townsend filed a second

Title VII action against Rockwell on the grounds of

race and gender discrimination. As to the period

preceding her 2017 OCRC charge, Rockwell reiterated

her allegations regarding racial slurs, being denied

equipment, being denied overtime compensation, false

statistics on her performance review and supervisor’s

statement about educating children, changes in work

policy to favor male coworkers, and her supervisor’s

attendance at her son’s funeral. As to the period after

the 2017 OCRC charge, Rockwell reiterated her

allegation regarding her assignment to 20 callmanagement queues, her . suspension, and the

wrongful denial of unemployment compensation.

Last, she reiterated and expanded on the allegations

from her summary-judgement response that Rockwell

had canceled her health insurance while she was on

leave and that her merit increases and bonuses had

been lower than those of five white men after she

reported harassment.

Rockwell moved to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Townsend thereafter tendered an amended complaint,

additionally alleging that Rockwell had breached her

employment

contract

divert

monetary

compensation and had committed embezzlement by

depriving her of her wages. '

The district i court dismissed the complaint on

the grounds that Townsend had failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies before filing her second suit,

that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the action,

and that the state law claims also failed as a matter of

App 6

law. The court thereafter denied Townsend’s motion

for reconsideration.

On appeal, Townsend challenges the dismissal

of her claims regarding the cancellation of her health

insurance, disparate pay structures, breach of

contract, and embezzlement. She also argues that she

could not have amended the complaint in her prior suit

because the deadline to do so had passed before the

completion of discovery, Rockwell1 had withheld

discovery, and the district court did not enter her

evidence until after rendering a judgment. Townsend

further argues that her 2017 and 2018 OCRC charges

satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

We review de novo a district court’s judgment

dismissing a complaint pursuant to federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6^. Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d

421, 428 (6th Cir. 2015). We likewise review de novo a

district court’s application of the doctrine of claim

preclusion, sometimes referred to as res judicata. See

Bragg v Flint B. of Educ., 570 F 3d 775, 776 (6th Cir.

2009).

“[Cllaim preclusion prevents parties from

raising issues that could have been raised and decided

in a prior action-even if they were not actually

litigated.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v Marcel

Fashions Grp, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (2020).

Claim preclusion applies when there is

A final decision on the merits by a court

(1)

of competent jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action

between the same parties or their “privies”; (3) an

issue in the subsequent action which was

litigated or which should have been litigated in

the prior action; (4) an identity tof the causes of

action.

Bragg, 570 F3d at 776 (quoting Bittinger v. Tecumseh

Prods. Co., 123 F3d 877, 880 (6th Cir 1997))

wrn

I*.

■ i

App:7

The district: court properly concluded th^x the

claim preclusion barred Tqwnsend’s current claims.

First, the grant of summary judgement to Rockwell in

the prior action constituted!a final judgement on the

merits. See Stemler v. Florence, 350 F 3d 578, 587 (6th

Cir. 2003) (“A summary judgement order is a decision

on the merits”). Second, the Current aiction is between

the same parties-Townsend and Rockwell. Third,

Townsend raises issues regarding pay discrimination,

and it is of no moment that she may not have been able

to discover the before the deadline to amend her

complaint had passed. A plaintiff ; may amend a

complaint after the pleading ^deadline with the judge’s

consent and upon demonstrating good cause for not

seeking leave earlier. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(£);

Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972 F.3d 853, 879 (6th Cir.

2020). Fourth, there is an identity of the causes of

action because Townsend alleged the same

discriminatory acts in both cases. See Bragg, 570 F.3d

at 776-77. Because claim preclusion applies, we need

not reach the matter of exhaustion.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment.;

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

s/ Deborah S. Hunt. Clerk

•:<

;

}

(

■v

t'.

App 8

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN

DISVIION

Case No. I*21-cv02226

Issue date 02/22/22

Judge J. Philip Calabrese

Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Parker

FAITH TOWNSEND, plaintiff

vs.

■

ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC, defendant

OPION AND ORDER

On November 22 2021, pro se Plaintiff Faith

Townsend filed a complaint against Defendant

Rockwell Automation, Inc. (ECF No. l) Plaintiff

alleges that the Defendant discriminated against her

based on sex and race in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964. Defendant moves to dismiss

for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 3) In response,

Plaintiff opposes (ECF No. 6) and seeks to amend her

App9

complaint (ECF No. 7) and Defendant’s motion to

dismiss (ECF No. 3)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as

true and construing them in plaintiff s favor, as the

court must on the motion before it, Plaintiff bases her

claim on the following facts.

The Complaint

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Rockwell

Automation paid her substantially less than five

white men in her department, even though three of

them began their employment many years after she

did. 9ECF No. 1, PagelD #L ECF No. 16, PagelD

#114.)

Rockwell Automation employed Faith

Townsend, an African-American woman, from 1996

to 2018. (ECF No. 1, PageID#2; ECF No. 16,

PagelD# 114.) For ten years, she worded in the

technical support call center, during which time she

was promoted to senior engineer. (ECF No. 1 PagelD

#2; ECF No. 16, PagelD #114.) Notwithstanding her

promotion, she was in salary. (ECF No. 1 PagelD #2;

ECF No. 16, PagelD #114.) In 2005, Mrs. Townsend

transferred to the afterhours weekend support group

and became the team lead. (ECF No. 1 PagelD #2;

ECF No. 16, PagelD #114.) Still, she did not receive

a pay increase, though one was promised. (ECF No.

1, PagelD #2; ECF No 16, PagelD #114.)

After her promotion, Mrs. Townsend

experienced racial harassment from her five white

male colleagues, which reported on multiple

occasions to the human resources department. (ECF

App 10

No. 1, PageID#2i ECF No. 16, PageID#114.) She

complains that she was subject to “[s]tories about

hangings, nooses, guns, watermelon[s].” (ECF No. 1,

PagelD #2; ECF No. 16, PageID#114.) Plaintiff

alleges that, follow the first report, she experienced

adverse treatment in her job, including a decrease in

merit incentive pay, an increase in her workload, and

deprivation of certain equipment needed for her

position. (ECF No. 1 PagelD #21 ECF No. 16,

PagelD# 114.) Still, in 2010, 2011, 2012, Mrs.

Townsend Received good job reviews, though her pay

lagged that of her colleagues. PagelD #2; ECF No.

16, PagelD# 115.) When a new supervisor started, she

made another report to the new supervisor. (ECF No.

1, PagelD #2; ECF No. 16, PageID#115.)

On investigation, Plaintiff believed she was

underpaid for overtime by about $700, but her

supervisor disputed that she was owed for the

overtime. (ECF No. 1, PagelD #2; ECF No. 16,

PageID#116.) In 2013 and 2014, Plaintiff alleges

that she experienced lower merit pay increases,

which were lower as she stepped up her complaints.

(ECF No. 1, PagelD #2; ECF No. 16, PagelD# 116.)

In 2015, Plaintiff allege that a new supervisor

took over her group and replaced her as team lead

with one of her underperforming and less qualified

male colleagues. (ECF No. 1, PagelD #2-3; ECF No.

16, PagelD# 116.) According to the complaint, her

supervisor dedicated her male colleagues to providing

support for one specific product but required Mrs.

Townsend to support as many a twenty varied

products, which had a negative effect on her

performance. (ECF No. 1, PagelD #3> ECF No. 16,

PagelD# 116-17.) In 2017, her supervisor allegedly

made a derogatory statement that black people “do

App 11

not educate their children” in plaintiffs presence.

(ECF No. 1, PagelD #3; ECF No. 16, PageID#117.)

Later in 2017, Mrs. Townsend filed a

complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission and received a right-to-sue letter. (ECF

No. 1, PagelD #3; ECF No. 16, PagelD# 117.) The

complaint acknowledges that Plaintiff did not file

suit, due the Mrs. Townsend’s mental state following

the death of her son. ECF No. 1, PagelD #3; ECF No.

16, PagelD# 117.)

When Mrs. Townsend returned to work

following the death of her son, her difficult working

conditions continued. ECF No. 1, PagelD #3>" ECF No.

16, PageID#117.) She went to a corporate

ombudsman, but did not receive an adequate

response. ECF No. 1, PagelD #3>' ECF No. 16,

PageID#117.) In February 2018, Mrs. Townsend was

suspended after she emailed her entire department

with complaints. ECF No. 1, PagelD #35 ECF No. 16,

PagelD# 117.) As a result, Mrs. Townsend alleges

that she was under such great stress that she was

hospitalized. ECF No. 1, PagelD #3; ECF No. 16,

PagelD# 118.) In retaliation, Rockwell Automation

allegedly canceled her insurance while Mrs.

Townsend was on medical leave. ECF No. 1, PagelD

#3; ECF No. 16, PagelD# 118:) In these

circumstances, Mrs. Townsend resigned, though she

alleges that Rockwell Automation reported that she

had returned to work to interfere with her receipt of

unemployment benefits. ECIf No. 1, PagelD #3>* ECF

No. 16, PagelD# 118)

Later in 2018, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit. ECF

No. 1, PagelD #3; ECF No. 16, PagelD# 118.)

Information discovered in that lawsuit led Mrs.

App 12

Townsend to believe that the racial discrimination of

which she complains was perpetrated not only by her

five white male colleagues buy also by management.

ECF No. 1, PagelD #4; ECF No. 16, PageID#118.)

Plaintiff seeks $10 million in damages, plus $1

million in punitive damages. ECF No. 1, PagelD #4\

ECF No. 16, PagelD# 119.)

B. Amendment

Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state

claim. (EFC No. 3.) In response, Plaintiff timely

moved to amend. (ECF No. &) In that amendment,

Plaintiff adds two claims under State law- One for

embezzlement, and one for breach of contract. {Id)

As for the latter, Plaintiff alleges that discrimination

in violation of federal law breaches the employment

agreement between the parties,(Id) Additionally, she

may assert this breach of contract claim under

various federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §1658

and 1981. (Id., PagelD #63.)

Because Plaintiff seeks to amend her

complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Rule

15(a)(1)(B) in response to Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, the Court Grants that motion. For that

reason, the summary of the allegations in the

complaint set forth above contains parallel citations

to the complaint and the amendment. In the interest

of judicial economy and to conserve the resources of

the parties, the Court reads Defendant’s motion to

dismiss as applying with equal force to the amended

complaint.

ANALYSIS

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court can dismiss

a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is “a

test of the plaintiffs cause of action as stated in the

App 13

complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiffs factual

allegations. “Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3rd

950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005). Dismissal is proper if the

complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required

element necessary to obtain relief. Craighead v. E.F.

Hutton & Co., Inc., 899 F.2d 485, 489*90 (6th Cir.

1990). When determining whether the plaintiff has

stated a claim upon which relief can tje granted, the

Court must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual

allegations as true, and determine whether the

complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plaintiffs

obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do” Id at 555.

Although the pleadings and documents pro se

litigants file are liberally construed and held to less

stringent standards than the formal pleadings of

lawyers, Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712(6th Cir.

2004), pro se litigants are not exempt from the

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir 1989). At

this stage of the proceedings that means that even a

pro se complaint must “Contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face”” to avoid dismissal.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Failure to Exhaust^Administrative

Remedies

Before filing a suit under Title VTI, a plaintiff must

bring claims to the EEOC to provide the agency an

opportunity to investigate and decide if it wants to

App 14

pursue charges on behalf of the federal government.

See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery and Crafts, Inc., 177

F.3d 448-56 (6th Cir. 1999). “[F]or 180 days after the

filing of a charge the EEOC retains ‘exclusive

jurisdiction over the subject matter of that charge [,]”

a period that is “crucial to the statutory scheme.” Id.

at 456 (quoting EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462,

466 (5th Cir. 1997).

Under the law of this Circuit, the lack of a right to

sue letter does not deprive a district court of

jurisdiction, but instead constitutes a condition

precedent to filing suit that is curable (by receiving a

right-to-sue letter) or waivable (by the parties or the

Court). Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236

F.3d 299, 309, (6th Cir. 2000)(NOTING IT would be

“unduly harsh... to deny Plaintiff his day in court as

to his ADA claim” based on not having a right to sue

letter at the time he filed the complaint); Rivers v.

Barberton Bd. Of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir.

1998) (holding a right to sue letter is a condition

precedent, not a jurisdictional requirement).

However, district courts retain discretion to dismiss

claims or action without prejudice where a plaintiff

fails to obtain a right to sue letter before filing. See

Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 820 n.10 (6th Cir.

2003); accord Lott v. Kmart, No. 2‘13-cv228, 2013 WL

3927617, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 2013) (dismissing

without prejudice).

Here, the complaint makes clear that Plaintiff,

though proceeding pro se, knbws she must obtain a

right to sue letter. So far as the Court can tell,

Plaintiff does not have one. Defendant has not

waived the requirement that'Mrs. Townsend present

the claims to the agency before fifing suit. Because

obtaining a right-to-sue letter is a condition

precedent to fifing suit, and there is no record

App 15

Plaintiff received one, the Court dismisses this action

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The

Court need not decide whether that dismissal is with

or without prejudice because of Defendants argument

for dismissal on the basis of res judicata.

II.

Res Judicata

“Res judicata” is an overarching term encompassing

both the issue and claim preclusion. See Hutcherson

v. Lauderdale Cnty., 326 F.3d 747, 758 n.3(6th Cir.

2003)(citing Charles Ala Wright, The Law ofFederal

Cbnrte§100A, at 722-23 (5*h ed. 1994); Black’s Law

Dictionary 1312 97th ed. 1999). Res judicata

promotes “the finality of judgments and thereby

increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and

conserve judicial resources.” Stolmayer v. McCarthy,

171 F. Supp. 3d 690, 694(N.D. Ohio 2016).

Claim preclusion prevents “parties from

raising issues that could have been raised and

decided in prior action-even if they were not actually

litigated.” Lucky Brand Dungaree, Inc. V. Marcel

Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589. 1954 (2020). “If

a later suit advances the same claim as an earlier

suit between the same parties, the earlier suit’s

judgment prevents litigation of all grounds for, or

defenses to, recovery that were previously available

to the parties, regardless of whether they were

asserted in the prior preceding.”” If. (quoting Brown

v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127. 131(1979)).

To prevail on this defepse, a party must

demonstrate- (1) a prior and final decision of the

merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a

second action involving the same parties, or their

App 16

privities, as the first; (3) a second action arising from

the claims that were or could have been litigated in

the first action! and (4) a second action arising out of

the transaction or occurrence that was the subject

matter of the previous action. Martin v. JBS Techs.,

LLQ 443 F. Supp 2d 962, 965 (S.D. Ohio 2006)

(cleaned up). Because res judicata constitutes a

defense, Defendant bears “the burden of pleading and

providing and proving each element.” ,

II.A. Prior Litigation Between These Parties

Plaintiffs complaint alleges that she filed a

previous lawsuit in 2018. See also Townsend v.

Rockwell Automation Inc., No. l-18-cv-2742 (N.D.

Ohio). Although a court’s analysis on a motion to

dismiss is ordinarily limited to the complaint,

matters of pubhc record, orders, items appearing in

the record of the case, and exhibits attached to or

made part of the complaint may also be taken into

account. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259, F.3d 493, 502

(6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court considers the

record from the earlier lawsuit between the parties

both because it is a matter of pubhc record and

because Plaintiff references it in her complaint.

In the earlier litigation, the amended

complaint alleged that Mrs. Townsend’s supervisor,

who also named as a defendant there but is not here,

ignored complaints of harassment by co-workers,

failed to investigate misuse of company property by

the Plaintiffs co-workers and other violations of

company policy, and treated her more unfavorably

than her co-workers based on her race. Further, the

amended complaint in the first lawsuit claims that

Plaintiff did not receive overtime pay, had her

performance reviews negatively affected by incorrect

App 17

statistics about call volumes, and was suspended for

airing her grievances to all employee at her location.

See generally Townend, no. 18-C-2742, ECF No. 13

(Apr. 5, 2019).

In the earher lawsuit, the court entered

summary judgement in favor to the defendants. That

ruhng came after the parties engaged in discovery.

First, the court determined that various factual

claims on which Plaintiff relied for her claims were

time-barred because Plaintiff failed to file suit within

90 days of receiving a right-to-suit letter, leaving her

to complain only of alleged discrimination occurring

after November 17, 2017. Additionally, the court

concluded that Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of

estabhshing a Title VII claim or that she was subject

to a hostile work environment, constructively

discharge, or subject to unlawful retaliation. See

generally Townend' no. 18-cv-2742, ECF No. 66 (Jan.

8, 2020). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Affirmed.

Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,852 F, App’x

1011, 1013-17(6thCir. 2021).

II.B. Claim Preclusion

With the benefit of the prior lawsuit Mrs.

Townsend brought in federal court against Rockwell

Automation raising substantially similar claims

based on many of the same material allegations,

Defendant has an easy time carrying its burden of

estabhshing that res judicata bars this suit. In the

first suit between the parties the Norther District of

Ohio reached a decision on the merits on summary

judgment, which was affirmed on appeal; the parties

in this action are the same as in the first action!

Plaintiffs discrimination claims were litigated in the

first action! and this action arises out of and relates

App 18

to the same transaction or occurrence at issue in the

first suit.

Two other issues merit a brief mention, but

need not detain the Court long. First, to the extent

Plaintiff s amends complaint in this case alleges facts

occurring after the first lawsuit, she might argue that

reclusion doctrine does no bar this suit. Such an

argument would fail. Res judicata bars not just any

claim actually litigated, but also any claim that could

have been asserted in the first action. See, e.g.,

Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 12.7, 131 (1979)

(recognizing that preclusion doctrine encompasses

that “we previously available to the parties,

regardless of whether they were asserted or

determined in the first proceeding”). In her first suit

and here, Plaintiffs claims arose from a set of facts

culminating in her separation from employment with

Rockwell Automation. For that reason, any cause of

action Plaintiff might wish to assert could have -and

should have-been raised in her first suit and is barre

now.

Second, even if that were not the case,

Plaintiffs new State-law causes of actionembezzlement and breach of contract-fail as a matter

of law. In effect, her breach of contract claim restates

Plaintiffs Title VII cause of action, perhaps to avoid

the procedural bar of preclusion doctrine. As for

embezzlement, Plaintiff attempts to state a claim in

Ohio’s criminal statute proscribing embezzlement.

Enforcement of that statute rests with a county

prosecutor, no Plaintiff. To the extent her

allegations, liberally construed, state a civil claim for

criminal conduct under Section 2307.60 of the Ohio

Revised Code, a one-year statute of limitation

applies, barring any such claim here.

App 19

!■

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs motion to amend (ECF No. 7)and

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 3). Further,

the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment

accordingly.

SO, ORDERED.

Dated- February 22, 2022 I

s/ J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Norther District of Ohio

App 20

APPENDIX D

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0226n.06 No. 20-3079

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT '

FAITH TOWNSEND

Plaintiff-Appellant

) ON APPEAL FROM

) THE UNITED STATES

) DISTRICT COURT FOR

ROCKWELL

) THE NORTHERN

AUTOMATION INC. et al ) DISTRICT OF OHIO

Defendant-Appellee.

ISSUED 04/27/2021

ORDER

Before: GUY, CLAY, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

Faith Townsend, proceeding pro se, appeals a

district court’s judgment dismissing her employmentdiscrimination suit filed pursuant to Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to

2000e-17. This case has been referred to a panel of the

Court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees

that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a).

Townsend, an African American, worked

for many years for defendant Rockwell

Automation, Inc. (“Rockwell”) in its Technical

Support Center on the “After Hours Team,” a group

App 21

that consisted of five engineers and a supervisor.

Team members handled weekend customer service

calls and worked remotely except for one shift per

week in the office. Robert Rodriguez was the team’s

supervisor from 2014 through 2018. In June 2017,

Townsend’s son died, leading her to take an extended

leave of absence. On October 6, 2017, while still on

leave, she filed a charge of race discrimination against

Rockwell with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission

(“OCRC”). After an investigation, the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

concluded Townsend’s allegations, if proven, would

not violate any antidiscrimination statutes. The

EEOC nonetheless issued her a right-to-sue letter

on October 17, 2017, which required

Townsend to file suit within ninety days. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(£)(l). Despite the notice provided in

her right-to-sue letter, Townsend did not file suit until

November 28, 2018, more than 9 months past the

statute of limitations.

Townsend returned to work at Rockwell on the

same day that she received her right-to-sue letter. In

February 2018, Rodriguez sent the team an email

regarding proper use of the “cell phone escalation

process,” a protocol requiring use of a designated cell

phone to obtain assistance with difficult customer

service calls and tracking of the calls by sending

emails to supervisors. Townsend responded with an

email blast to hundreds of Rockwell employees,

alleging race discrimination at Rockwell, prior unfair

application of the call-tracking policy,! and assignment

of a disproportionately high volume,of calls to her.

Rockwell suspended Townsend with pay until an

internal investigation concluded that her email had

App 22

violated company policy and that there was no merit to

her allegations of race discrimination, save for one

improper remark made years before , by a coworker.

Townsend received a written warning from Rodriguez

on April 11, 2018.

After the conclusion of the investigation,

Rodriguez attempted to arrange Townsend’s return to

work. But the stress of the situation had caused

Townsend to be hospitalized for a few days, prompting

her to take a few weeks ofj paid leave, followed by

additional unpaid leave. Townsend never returned to

work and submitted notice of her resignation on or

about August 7, 2018. Her application for state

unemployment benefits was denied.

On September 13, 2018, Townsend filed a

second OCRC charge of race discrimination against

Rockwell. The EEOC issued a right-tcrsue letter on

September 25, 2018.

On November 28, 2018, Townsend filed her

employment-discrimination suit, naming Rockwell

and Rodriguez as defendants and raising claims of

discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

beginning in 2007. For the time period prior to her

2017 EEOC charge, Townsend alleged verbal

harassment, Rockwell’s failure to adequately

investigate discrimination, unfounded criticism of her

work, denial of payment for overtime, lack of equal

training opportunities, demotion from a team leader

position, a change in the call-tracking policy to favor

the rest of her team, and Rodriguez’s uninvited

attendance at her son’s funeral. For the time period

after the 2017 EEOC charges, Townsend alleged that

she had been- (l) unable to Ofder new equipment since

reporting discrimination to Rockwell; (2) assigned to

twenty call management queues while other team

App 23

members were assigned to one; (3) suspended due to

her email blast;

(4) sent text messages with racial slurs during her

post-suspension leave; (5) forced to resign due to an

unsafe work environment; and (6) denied

unemployment compensation because Rockwell

falsely reported that she had worked for two days

immediately prior to her resignation. The defendants

moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other

things, that the complaint failed to state a claim.

The district court initially granted the motion

in part, dismissing the § 1983 claims and dismissing

Rodriguez as a defendant. Townsend amended her

complaint to withdraw her § 1983 claims. Upon

further consideration, the district court dismissed as

untimely Townsend’s Title VII claims arising from

alleged discrimination occurring prior to her 2017

EEOC charge and dismissed for lack of exhaustion her

claims asserting later discrimination.

Protesting that she had exhausted her claims,

Townsend filed a copy of her 2018 right-to- sue letter.

After the district court reopened the case, Townsend

moved the court to reconsider its dismissal of her older

claims as untimely. She contended that she had been

unable to file a timely lawsuit because she had

suffered continuing mental trauma from the uninvited

appearance of Rodriguez and others at her son’s

funeral. The district court denied Townsend’s motion,

concluding that equitable tolling was not appropriate

because she had waited about a year to file suit and

because emotional distress from discrimination was

not unusual.

Rockwell moved for summary judgment. Upon

consideration of the motion and the responsive

pleadings, the district court granted summary

App 24

judgment in Rockwell’s favor, concluding that

Townsend’s claims were time-barred, were without

merit, or were not properly raised.

On appeal, Townsend reasserts her claims that

Rockwell discriminated against her, subjected her to a

hostile work environment, retaliated against her, and

constructively discharged her. She argues that the

untimeliness of her claims : should

be excused

under

the doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable

estoppel. She further asserts that the district court

committed errors at the case management and pretrial

conferences.

In response to Rockwell’s summary judgment

motion, Townsend raised further claims regarding

disparate merit increases and the cancellation of her

health insurance. We decline to consider issues not

raised in her original or amended complaint because

they have not been properly pleaded. See J.H. v.

Williamson County, 951 F.3d 709, 722 (6th Cir. 2020).

We also note that Townsend has attached an

unauthorized appendix to her brief on appeal. See 6

Cir. R. 30(a)(1). We will not consider any evidence in

the appendix that is not part of the district court

record. See Adams v. Holland, 330 F.3d 398, 406 (6th

Cir. 2003).

Likewise, Townsend did not raise her

argument for equitable estoppel below. We grant

equitable estoppel only if Plaintiff can demonstrate:

“(l) misrepresentation by the party against whom

estoppel is asserted; (2) reasonable reliance on the

misrepresentation by the party asserting estoppel;

and (3) detriment to the party asserting

estoppel.”Michigan Exp., Inc. v. United States, 374

F.3d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2004). Townsend now argues

that Rockwell misled her with a promise of a fair

.fiApp 2,5

investigation into her complaints and caused hergiot

to pursue her right to sue byallowing jfche time to"

expire during the internal investigation. But

Rockwell never encouraged Townsend to abandon her

suit. And a promise to conduct a fair investigation

is not a misrepresentation that would cause us to

grant this rarely invoked procedure “reserved for

truly exceptional circumstances ” Newberry v. Serv.

Experts Heating & Air Conditioning, LLC, 806 F.

App'x 348, 360 (6th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, even on

the merits, we find invoking equitable estoppel for

Townsend’s time-barred claims to be unwarranted.

Townsend next contends that the district court

committed errors at the case management and pretrial

conferences. She asserts that the court erred by setting

the pleading amendment cutoff date as the day of the

case management conference?' ndt permitting

discussion of the deadline?’ holding the pretrial

conference despite her receipt of discovery only

eighteen hours earlier; and not discussing discovery

with her. However, Townsend does not cite any

authority supporting her assertion ,that the court

erred, and she does not explain how the court’s

actions prejudiced her.

We find these arguments to be without merit.

We review a grant of summary judgment de

novo. Peeples v. City ofDetroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630

(6th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is proper “if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.? Fed. R.!Civ. P. 56(a).

Upon consideration of a motion for suinmary

judgment, the district court’s function is not to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

App 26

matters asserted, but to determine whether there is

a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., All U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The movant bears

the initial burden of establishing an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

The district court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, who must

present sufficient evidence ^uch that a rational

jury might find in its favor. Anderson, All U.S. at

255, 256-575 see also Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743

F.3d 1025, 1038 (6th Cir. 2014). “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of

the plaintiffs position will be insufficient.”

Anderson, All U.S. at 252.

To pursue a Title VII action, a plaintiff must file

a timely charge of employmerit discrimination with the

EEOC or the appropriate state agency, obtain a rightto-sue letter from the EEOC, and file a timely

complaint in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1), 0(1); Peeples, 891 F.2d at 633. Where, as here,

the alleged discrimination occurred in a “deferral

state,” i.e., a state such as Ohio which has enacted its

own employment discrimination laws, the plaintiff

must file a charge within 300 days of the alleged

unlawful act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(e)(1); Amini

v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2001).

After receiving the right-to-sue letter,, the plaintiff has

ninety days to file a federal complaint. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2OOOe-50(l).

Townsend filed her complaint within ninety

days of receipt of her second right-to-sue letter.

However, the complaint is timely only yvith respect to

alleged discrimination occurring on or after November

17, 2017, i.e., within the 300-day period before

App 27

Townsend filed her

September 13, 2018.

second

EEOC

charge

Both time limits are subject to waiver, estoppel,

and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-98 (1982) (300-day limit);

Graham -Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of

Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir, 2000) (ninetyday limit). Townsend argues her inability to meet

the filing deadline should be excused for equitable

tolling. Where the facts regarding equitable tolling

“are undisputed or the district court rules as a matter

of law that equitable tolling is unavailable, we apply

the de novo standard of review to a district court’s

refusal to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling; in

all other cases, we apply the abuse of discretion

standard.” Amini, 259 F.3d at 500 (quoting Dunlap v.

United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1007 n.2 (6th Cir.

2001)). Similar to our review of petitions for equitable

estoppel, “this circuit has repeatedly cautioned that

equitable tolling relief should be granted only

sparingly.” Id. In consideration of this claim, we

consider several factors including (l) the plaintiffs

lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the

plaintiffs lack of constructive knowledge of the filing

requirement; (3) the plaintiff s diligence in pursuing

her rights; (4) an absence of prejudice to the

defendant; and (5) the plaintiff s reasonableness in

remaining ignorant of the legal requirement. Jackson

v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 719 (6th Cir. 2014).

Townsend claims she was unable to bring her claims

in a timely fashion because the discrimination she

faced in her workplace impacted her mental health.

This assertion, alone, is insufficient to warrant

tolling and we thus decline to equitably toll the

limitations period for her claims.

App 28

Townsend’s timely allegations of race

discrimination are that she was assigned more calls

than other team members, that she alone did not

receive new equipment, and that she was suspended.

In support of her claim, she provided a screen shot from

her phone, allegedly showing that on October 2, 2017,

she was assigned to twenty call queues while other

team members were assigned to one queue. Her email

blast also contained screenshots for queues on

December 2, 2017.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful “for an employer

. . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.’” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). A plaintiff may prove discrimination by direct

or circumstantial evidence. See Peeples, 891 F.3d at

633.

The Supreme Court established a three-part

framework for the allocation of proof in employment

discrimination cases where there is an absence of

direct evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 800-03 (1973). The complainant in a

Title VII action carries the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.

at 802. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff

must show that: (l) she is a member of a protected

class;

(2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she

experienced an adverse employment action; and

(4) her employer replaced her with someone outside of

the protected class or treated her differently from

similarly situated non-protected employees. See id.I

App 29

Peeples, 891 F.3d at 634. Adverse actions include “a

termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by

a decrease in wage or salary, a less (distinguished

title, a material loss of benefits, significantly

diminished material responsibilities, or other indices

that might be unique to a particular situation. “Kuhn

v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612, 625 (6th Cir.

2013) (quoting Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs.

Corp., 496

F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,

the burden of production shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

the adverse action taken against the employee.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.

Thereafter, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

establish that the employer’s stated reason was a

pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. Although the

burden of production shifts, the burden of persuasion

remains at all times with the plaintiff. Tex. Dep’t of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)>*

Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d

497, 504 (6th Cir. 2014).

We conclude that Townsend failed to

demonstrate that she was subjected to an adverse

action. As to the higher call volume, the October

screenshot occurred before the date encompassed by

the second EEOC charge. And, even when considered

with the later screenshots, Townsend has only

presented snapshots of days from her work schedule.

The snapshots cannot, without complete data of

Rockwell’s call logs, demonstrate a pattern of

subjecting Townsend to a higher call volume compared

to her peers. With respect to the alleged denial of new

App 30

equipment, Townsend did not identify any equipment

that she had not received and merely made a

conclusory allegation that other team members had

new equipment in their work areas. Last, before she

resigned, Rockwell placed Townsend on paid leave

because she sent an email that violated her

workplace’s email acceptable use policy. We have held

that a paid suspension does riot constitute an adverse

action. See Sensabaugh v. Halliburton, 937 F.3d 621,

629 (6th Cir. 2019), cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 1116 (2020).

Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on this claim was proper.

Townsend’s timely allegations of a hostile work

environment include the increased call volume, lack of

new equipment, and text messages sent by her

coworkers during her post- suspension leave.

Townsend did not consider it appropriate for

coworkers to text her while she was on leave, and she

construed one text message as suggesting that she had

been discharged by Rockwell. She newly alleges that

a human resources representative at an April 2018

meeting appeared to have a gun.

To establish a Title VII hostile-workenvironment claim, a plaintiff must provide evidence

of harassment that “unreasonably interfered] with

her work performance and creatted] an objectively

intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.”

Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 678 (6th Cir. 2008);

see also Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d

359, 362 (6th Cir. 2010). In determining whether the

workplace is subjectively and objectively hostile, a

court should consider the totality of the

circumstances, which may include “the frequency of

the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it

is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

■ *2

■r-

. v:

:■?

• f:

App 3,1

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with anjemployee|| work performancefHarris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. F7, 22-23

(1993). “An employer is subject to vicarious liability

to a victimized employee fbrian actionable hostile

environment created by a supervisor.” Faragher

v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.§>. 775, 80.7 (1998).

■w

;

: «;■

*?•

Townsend has failed to establish a hostile work-environment claim.

To begin, her allegation regarding thfe gun is raised

for the first time on appeal and will not be

considered. See Durden, 448 F.3d at 922. In

regards to her text communications with

coworkers, Townsend received two text messages

between coworkers as part of a group chat.

But they were text messages that no reasonable

person would find physically threatening,

humiliating, or even offensive. See Harris, 510 U.S.

at 22-23. Further, as discussed above, the

allegations of an increased call volume and lack of

new equipment are not supported by the evidence?.

Nor do these same allegations, analyzed in a hostile

workplace context, represent harassment that would

create “an objectively intimidating, hostile, or

offensive work environment.” Grace, 521 F.3d at 678.

Townsend also asserts that Rockwell retaliated

against her after she reported discrimination within

the company and filed EEOC charges. Her timely

allegations of retaliation include thp increased call

volume, lack of new equipment, her suspension, the

text messages, and Rockwell’s interference with her

application for unemployment benefits by issuing her

App 32

a paycheck which purportedly suggested that she had

returned to work and then resigned.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

Title VII, the plaintiff must show that(l) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2)

the defendant knew of the protected activity;

(3) the defendant thereafter took an adverse

employment action against the plaintiff; and (4) a

causal connection existed between' the protected

activity and the adverse employment action. Montell,

757 F.3d at 504. Protected activities include filing an

EEOC charge and opposing discriminatory practices

by making complaints to management. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a); EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d

1057, 1067 (6th Cir. 2015).

Townsend engaged in protected activities by

filing an EEOC charge and reporting alleged

discrimination to Rockwell. But again, she has not

shown that Rockwell took an adverse employment

action against her- 1) her allegations of increased call

volume and lack of new equipment were unsupported

in the evidence, 2) none of the text messages she

received from her coworkers could be construed as

offensive, and 3) being placed on paid leave is not an

adverse employment action. Additionally, her

allegation that Rockwell interfered with her

unemployment benefits is not supported by the record.

Townsend was denied benefits because she resigned

from her position after going on unpaid leave, rather

than because Rockland simply provided her a

paycheck for her last date of employment.

Finally, Townsend contends that Rockwell

constructively discharged her, and she reasserts her

above allegations of discrimination. Constructive

f..

■*

App 33

discharge occurs where the discrimination suffered by

an employee was so intolerable that a reasonable

person would feel compelled to resign and the

employee did so. Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769,

1776-77 (2016). When determining whether a

constructive discharge occurred, courts consider

the same types of circumstances as for a hostilework-environment claim. See Goldmeier v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing

Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Additionally, we consider

whether an employee is subjected to- (l) demotion; (2)

reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job

responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or

degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a

younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or

humiliation by the employer calculated to

encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7) offers of

early retirement or continued employment on terms

less favorable than the employee’s former status.'

Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir.

2001).

Although Townsend in fact resigned, for the

reasons previously stated, she has not demonstrated

that she suffered discrimination that would support

her claim. None of the actions she alleges, including a

higher call volume, the text messages she received

from coworkers, or a lack of new equipment, can be

considered “so intolerable that a reasonable person

would feel compelled to resign.” Green, 136 S. Ct. at

1776-77.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

App 34

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

s/Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

;

App 35

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

FAITH TOWNSEND

Plaintiff,

• Case No. F18*cv02742

: OPINION & ORDER

: . [ResolvingDoc.33]

ROCKWELL

AUTOMATION INC. et al,

Defendants.

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE: Order issued January 8, 2020

Pro se Plaintiff Faith Townsend claims her employer

discriminated against her, created a hostile work

environment based on her race, constructively

discharged her, and retaliated against her.

Defendant Rockwell Automation (Rockwell) moves for

summary judgment, claiming that Rockwell should

receive judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion.

Background

This case deals with a limited employment period.

Although Townsend worked for Rockwell from 1996 to

2018, she did not timely sue on claims before October 6,

2017.

App 36

Because she did not sue for earlier claims, this case deals

only with claims after October 6, 2017.

Defendant Rockwell employed Plaintiff Townsend

between 1996 and 2018.1 Townsend worked at

Rockwell’s Technical Support Call Center during

weekend shifts. The weekend team worked Saturday

and Sunday from 7am-7pm, and worked an additional

weekday shift. Five Rockwell employees worked on this

weekend shift. Townsend says that she is the only

African American in this call center group.

On October 6, 2017, Plaintiff Townsend had

filed earlier charges with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In her earlier

October 6, 2017, charge, Townsend alleged that she

had been subjected to

discrimination.2 On October 17, 2017, the EEOC sent

Townsend a right-to*sue letter that gave Plaintiff

Townsend 90 days to file a lawsuit based on the October

6, 2017, charge.3

Townsend never filed the lawsuit within the right-to-sue

time period and therefore gave up claims for events

before October 6, 2017.

a. Alleged Harassment After October 6, 2017

On October 21, 2017, Townsend returned to work after

taking leave following her son’s death.4 She claims her

supervisor harassed her by assigning her a

disproportionately large call volume to her upon her

return. Rockwell denies that Townsend received a

disproportionate work load.

In February 2018, Townsend’s supervisor sent an email

to the five call team members. The email discussed a

call tracking policy.

Townsend responded to the email by sending an email

App 37

to her team and to “hundreds of [other] Rockwell

employees.” Townsend sent the email to Rockwell

employees who had nothing to do with the call

tracking policy. In her email to the substantial number

of Rockwell employees she claimed that the call-tracking

policy was biased and that her supervisor had joined the

“self-proclaimed KKK.”5 Her email also made a

colloquial reference to a female co-employee as “a

beard”

Because Townsend had copied the other Rockwell

employees, Rockwell investigated whether Rockwell

should discipline Townsend. Rockwell’s Ombudsman

did the review. During the Ombudsman’s

investigation, Rockwell

put Townsend on paid administrative leave for seven

weeks.6 Townsend’s compensation continued during

the paid leave.

After the review, the Ombudsman found that

Townsend’s email violated Rockwell’s email acceptable

use policy.7 The Ombudsman also found that

Townsend’s email allegations were not true except for

an incident the human resources department had

addressed years ago.8

2 Doc. 33-1.

3 Id

4 Doc. 36 at 4.

57Doc. 33-4 at 2.

6 Doc. 33~4 at 2.

7 Id at 1213.

3 Id

APP38

Rockwell gave Townsend a written warning but did not

otherwise discipline Townsend or dock her pay in any

way.

Rockwell scheduled Plaintiff Townsend to return from

her paid leave on April 11, 2018. Townsend did not

appear for work on April 11, 2018. Instead, Rockwell

took short- term disability leave from April 14, 2018 to

May 7, 2018. She then went on unpaid leave.9

Plaintiff resigned on August 7, 2018.10 Plaintiff claims,

however, that Rockwell listed her final day of

employment as August 8, 2018. Plaintiffs

unemployment benefits claim was denied.11

On September 13, 2018 Plaintiff Townsend filed a

second EEOC charge, alleging discrimination and

retahation after first EEOC charge and before her

August 7, 2018 resignation.12

She alleged that she “was subjected to different terms

and conditions of employment” when she was given a

greater call load than her co-workers.13 She also

alleged that she had been demoted, and that her coworkers had sent harassing texts.14 She described her

paid leave and claimed that she had been

constructively discharged.15

On September 25, 2018, the EEOC sent Townsend a

right-to-sue letter informing Townsend that it did not

find a violation but she could sue on her own.16 She

timely moved to amend her complaint to include the

claims in the September 13, 2018, EEOC charge.17

9 Doc. Mil at 25.

10 Doc. 31~1, Exhibit 2019.

11 Doc. 33-6

,12 Doc. 3M213 Id

“Id

15 Id

16 Id” Doc. 13.

APP39

Procedural History

On November 28, 2018, Plaintiff Townsend filed this

suit.18 On May 1, 2019, the Court dismissed

Townsend’s claims relating to her first EEOC charge as

untimely.19 The Court also dismissed the Townsend’s

claims postdating the October 6,2017, EEOC charge

because Townsend had not obtained a right-to-sue

letter for Rockwell’s alleged actions after the time period

after the first EEOC charge.20

On May 9,2019, Townsend moved to reopen the case,

and on June 17, 2019, the Court reopened the case “for

those claims authorized by the September 25, 2018

EEOC

right*to*sue letter.”21

On October 7, 2019, Rockwell filed the pending motion

for summary judgment.22

II.

Discussion

The Court grants summary judgment if the movant

demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of

material fact and she is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.23 A genuine issue of material fact exists if

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non

moving party 24 The Court views the evidence, and

draws all reasonable inferences, in the fight most

favorable to the non-moving party.25

18 Doc. 1.

19 Doc. 17 at 3.

2°Id

21 Doc. 2122 Doc. 33. Plaintiff timely opposed. Doc.36.

23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

24 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

APP41

Scope of Plaintiff s Claims

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426 requires

employees alleging discrimination or retaliation to file

administrative charges with the EEOC before bringing

litigation.27 While “a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring

claims in a lawsuit that were not included in his EEOC

charge,” the Sixth Circuit interprets pr6 se employees’

EEOC charges liberally “so that courts may also

consider claims that are reasonably related to or grow

out of the factual allegations in the EEOC charge.”28

“[T]he general rule in this circuit [is] that the judicial

complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC

investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the

charge of discrimination.”29 ’

Plaintiff Townsend’s 2018 EEOC charge alleges racial

discrimination, retaliation, and constructive

discharge.30 Because a claim for hostile work

environment is reasonably related, the Court considers

all four claims.31

26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, etseq.

27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e*5(e)(l). See Barrow v. City of Cleveland, 773 F.

App’x. 254, 260 (6th Cir. 2019).

28 Barrow, 773 F. App’x at 260 (quoting Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines,

Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010)).

29 Id (alterations in original) (quoting Dixon v. Ashcrolt, 392 F.3d

212, 217 (6th Cir. 2004)).

30 Doc. 33-2.

31 The parties have represented to the Court that these four claims

form the basis for the legal questions at issue in trial. Doc. 56, 57. .

APP42

Plaintiffs Barred Factual Claims

Defendant Rockwell argues that Plaintiff Townsend’s

claims before the September 18, 2018, charge are timebarred.32 In particular, it claims that two of Townsend’s

2018 EEOC charge alleged discriminatory acts

occurred in the before the 2017 EEOC charge period.

Rockwell argues that, because Townsend did not

timely file a lawsuit from the 2017 EEOC charge, these

acts cannot be used for Townsend’s claims in this

lawsuit.

A party alleging a Title VII claim must file a lawsuit

within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-tosue letter.33 Townsend received her first EEOC rightto-sue letter in September 2017. She did not file a

lawsuit within ninety days but filed this lawsuit in

November 2018.34 This Court held that Townsend’s

“Title VII claims arising from her first EEOC charge

[are] untimely.”35

The question, then, is whether any Townsend’s second

charge claims refer to events involved with her 2017

charge. Rockwell argues that Townsend’s claim about

her increased October 2017 call volume occurred

earlier in 2017.36 And Rockwell says that Townsend’s

demotion claim occurred in 2015.37

32 Doc. 33 at 9.

33 Mayers v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 101 F. App’x 591, 593

(6th Cir. 2004).

34 Doc. 17.

35 Id

36 Doc. 33 at 9-10.

37 Id at 10.

APP43

Rockwell supports its timing argument with

Townsend’s deposition testimony. In that deposition,

Plaintiff Townsend testified that she took on more work

than her co-workers <£[p]rior to [her] 2017 FMLA

absence.” The FMLA leave occurred in June 2017.38

Townsend also stated that “[tlhere was no official demotion

date,” but that she learned of hey demotiqp in 2015.39

Townsend’s briefing does not contradict Rockwell’s

timing for the alleged demotion, but says Townsend

had a higher October 2017 call volume.40 To support

this argument, Townsend offers only one October 22,

2017, screenshot to support her claim. The screenshot

appears to be two Rockwell internal webpages.41

Townsend says that this evidence shows that she “had

been assigned to 20 [phone] queues while [her co

workers] were only assigned to one.”42

Rockwell disputes that Townsend receiyed

disproportionate call volume. Rockwell cites to

Investigator Edward Blakemore’s phorie volume

review43. Blakemore found that any difference between

Townsend’s daily call volume was not

disproportionate .u

“A party asserting that a fact. . . is genuinely disputed

must support the assertion by... citing to particular parts

of materials in the record.”45 Plaintiff, as the non

moving party, “must show sufficient evidence to create a

genuine issue of material fact.”46 “The showing of a mere

scintilla of evidence is insufficient; ‘there must be

evidence on which the iurv could

38 Doc. 33 at 10 (citing Doc. 31~1 at 49).

39 Id (citing Doc. 31~1 at 39" 40).

40 See Docs. 36, 53.

41 Doc. 36~ 1. Exhibit 1014.

42 Doc. 36 at 4.

43 Doc. 33 at 4.

44 Doc. 33-4 at 1018.

■ ’

I i

APP44

45 F.R.C.P. 56(c)(1).

46 Kleper v First Am. Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1990).

reasonably find for the plaintiff.”’47

The record does not contain sufficient evidence to

support Townsend’s theory that

the demotion and increased volume of calls occurred

during the 2018 charge period. In a fight most

favorable to her, the screenshots show the status of the

phone queues for one day. The screenshot does not

show day or week workloads. The screenshot, at best,

shows call loads at one time point.

Also, the screenshots do not include any indication of

what search terms she used tn generate the data.

Townsend give insufficient evidence to support her

theory that she was subjected to any materially higher

call volume during the period covered by the September

18, 2018, charge.

There is, therefore, is no genuine issue of material fact

as to whether, dining the 2018 charge’s period,

Rockwell demoted Townsend or assigned her an

increased number of calls. Townsend cannot rely on

these events to form a basis for her claims in this

litigation.

Throughout briefing for summary judgment,

Townsend’s filings have alleged other factual

misconduct, including the cancellation of her health

insurance and disparate pay structures.48 Townsend

did not make these claims in her complaint and cannot

use them 49 Townsend cannot rely on these events to

form a basis for her claims in this litigation either. Title

VII Violations

’

47 Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477-U.S. 242, 252 (1986)

See, e.g., Docs. 36 at 6, 53.

?■

APP45

49 See Tucker v. Union ofNeedle trades, Indus. & Textile Emp., 407

F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005).

a. Racial Discrimination and Disparate Treatment

Townsend alleges that Rockwell discriminated against

her based on her race in violation of section 2000e-2(a)

of Title VII.50 Plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination

may

prove their case based on direct or circumstantial

evidence.51 When relying on circumstantial evidence,

courts apply the three-part test articulated in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green.52

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework, a plaintiff must first show that l) she

belongs to a racial minority; 2) she suffered an adverse

employment action; 3) she was qualified for the position;

and 4) she was treated differently from similarly situated

members of the unprotected class.53 If the plaintiff proves

the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant

to describe a non-discriminatory reason for the action.54

If the defendant gives a non-discriminatory reason, the

plaintiff has the burden of showing that the reason is

pretextual. “A reason cannot be proved to be a pretext

for discrimination unless it is shown both that the

reason was false, and that discrimination was the real

reason. ”55

Plaintiff Townsend provides only circumstantial

evidence to support her claim of racial discrimination.

She alleges that she was treated differently from her co

workers when she was assigned a greater call volume.56

As discussed above, Townsend does not show a

disproportionate call volume during the 2018 charge

period.

But even if she could, this treatment does not qualify as

’

APP46

an adverse employment action.

“Adverse employment actions are typically marked by a

‘significant change in employment status/ including

“hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision

causing a significant change in benefits.”’57 “It must be

‘more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or alteration

of job responsibilities.’”58

While Townsend’s responsibilities may have partially

changed, they were not significantly different. In these

circumstances, Rockwell did not take an adverse

employment action by allegedly increasing Townsend’s

workload.

In contrast, Rockwell’s placement of Townsend on

administrative leave in February 2018 is an adverse

employment action.59 But Townsend has not

demonstrated that she was treated differently from

similarly situated members of the unprotected class.

She provides no comparator evidence that Rockwell

treated other similarly-situated employees differently.

Townsend does not give evidence that other employees

have sent similar emails to Rockwell’s staff who were

not disciplined.

Even if Plaintiff had established the similarly-situated

element, her claim of race discrimination based on that

action would still fail. Rockwell offers a,legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for placing Townsend on paid

leave. She failed to follow proper reporting procedures

and violated Rockwell’s code of conduct.60 Townsend

offers no evidence that this reason was a pretext for

discrimination.

Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff Townsend alleges that Rockwell subjected her

to a racially hostile work environment. To succeed on

APP47

such a claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that' (l) she

belonged to a protected group; (2) she was subject to

unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based

on race; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and

create an abusive working environment; and (5) the

defendant knew or should have known about the

harassment and failed to act.6!

While a plaintiff may provide evidence of past

harassment as background, she must also identify acts

contributing to the harassment that occurred during the

charge period.62 The plaintiff must also “show that the

work environment was both subjectively and objectively

hostile; in other words, that the plaintiff not only

perceived the work environment as hostile, but that a

reasonable person would have found it hostile or abusive

as well.”63

50 Section 2000e-2(a) provides^ “It shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer—

(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—2(a)(1)

51 See Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).

52 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.

1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as later clarified

by, Tex. Dep f of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101

S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

53 Chattman v. Toho TenaxAm., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 347 (6th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’Inti Union, 177 F.3d 394,

404-05 (6th Cir. 1999)).

54 Id

55 Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotation omitted) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)).

56 Doc. 36 at 10.

APP48

57 Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 391 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting White v Burlington N & Santa FeRy. Co., 364F.3d 789,

798 (6th Cir. 2004)). See also White v. Baxter Uealthcare Corp.,

533 F.3d 381, 402 (6th Cir. 2008).

58 Vaughn v. Louisville Water Co., 302 F. App’x 337, 345 (6th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Serv.

Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007)).

59 See Smith v. City ofSalem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566j 575 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“Examples of adverse employment actions include . . . suspensions

”).

Townsend’s complaint alleges that she experienced

harassment when her co- workers sent her texts while

she was on leave.64

This is not objectively sufficient harassment. The content

of the text is not hostile.65 And no reasonable person

would find it hostile or abusive for a co-worker to

message her while she was on leave.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was subjected to

a hostile work environment during the period identified

in her 2018 charge. Plaintiff Townsend alleges that

Rockwell constructively discharged her: ‘To

demonstrate a constructive discharge, the plaintiff must

show that (l) the employer deliberately created

intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a

reasonable person,"

(2) the employer did so with the intention of forcing the

employee to quit; and (3) the employee actually quit.”66

When considering the first prong of the constructive

discharge inquiry, the Sixth Circuit reviews factors such

as- “(1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in

job responsibilities; (4) reassignment tdmenial or

degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a

younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or

humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage

the employee's resignation; or (7)

APP49

60 6k? Doc. 33 at 16; Doc. 33A at 1213.

61 See Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir.

2011) (citing Moore v. KUKA WeldingSys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d

1073, 1078-79 (6th Cir. 1999)).

62 See Natl R.R Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122

(2002).

63 Smith v. Rock'Tenn Servs., Inc., 813,F.3d 298, 309 (6th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)).

64 Doc. 13_at 1119, 22.

65 Doc. 36~ 1 (Exhibit 1018).66 Lee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 676 F.

App'x 488, 495 (6th Cir. 2017)

Constructive Discharge

offers of early retirement or continued employment on

terms less favorable than the employee's former

status.”67

Plaintiffs only allegation that could support a theory

that Rockwell created intolerable working conditions is

the increased volume of calls assigned to her in October

2017. But as discussed above, the increase in volume

occurred prior to the period the 2018 EEOC covers.

Plaintiff has not shown that she was constructively

discharged.

Retaliation

Title VII prohibits retaliatory actions against

employees who oppose, report, or participate in

investigations involving conduct that allegedly violates

Title VII.68 Plaintiff Townsend alleges that Rockwell

retaliated against her after she filed her 2017 EEOC

charge.

i'.

APP50

Claims of retaliation are analyzed using the threepart test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green.69 “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation a

plaintiff must establish that: (l) she engaged in a

protected activity ; (2) her exercise of such protected

activity was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the

defendant took an action that was ‘materially adverse’ to

the plaintiff and (4) a causal connection existed between

the protected activity and the materially adverse

action.”70

(quoting Hurtt v Int’lServ., Inc., 627 F. App’x 414, 420 96th Cir.

2015)).

67 Logan v. Denny % Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001).68 See

42U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

69 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.

1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as later clarified

by, Tex. Dep't ofCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101

S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); see also rogers v. Henry Ford

Health System, 897 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2018) (applying

McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claim).

70 Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 775 (6th Cir. 2018)

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Laster

v. City ofKalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014)).

To demonstrate that the defendant took a materially

adverse action, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially

adverse, which in this context means it well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.”71

Townsend argues that Rockwell retaliated against her

by assigning her a larger call volume than her peers

when she returned.to work in October 2017 and by

cancelling her health insurance.72 But as noted above,

APP50

Claims of retaliation are analyzed using the threepart test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green.69 “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation a

plaintiff must establish that- (l) she engaged in a

protected activity! (2) her exercise of such protected

activity was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the

defendant took an action that was ‘materially adverse’ to

the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between

the protected activity and the materially adverse

action.”70

(quoting Hurtt v. IntlServ., Inc., 627 F. App’x 414, 420 96th Cir.

2015)).

67 Logan v. Denny % Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001).68 See

42U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

69 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.

1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as later clarified

by, Tex. Dep't ofCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,101

S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); see also rogers v. Henry Ford

Health System, 897 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2018) (applying

McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claim).

79 Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 775 (6th Cir. 2018)

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Laster

v. City ofKalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014)).

To demonstrate that the defendant took a materially

adverse action, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially

adverse, which in this context means it well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.”71

Townsend argues that Rockwell retaliated against her

by assigning her a larger call volume than her peers

when she returned to work in October 2017 and by

cancelling her health insurance.72 But as noted above,

APP51

there is insufficient evidence to show that any change

in call volume occurred during the 2018 charge period.

And as Townsend did not include the health insurance

claim in her complaint, she cannot rely on that

allegation now.

Plaintiff has therefore failed to demonstrate that Rockwell

retaliated against her.

III.

Conclusion

Defendant Rockwell has shown that there are no

genuine disputes of material facts.

And Plaintiff Townsend has not demonstrated that

Rockwell’s actions during the charge period violated

Title VII.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

73 Id at 776 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe By. Co. v. White, 548

U.S. 53, 64 (2006)).

72 Doc. 36 at 10.

(

APP52

Dated- January 8,2020 s/James S. Gwin

JAMES S. GWIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APP53

Statutory Provisions

Rule 60(b)(1). (2). and (3)

provides that the court may relieve a party

from a finaljudgment and sets forth the

following six categories ofreasons for which

such reliefmay be granted•' (l) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,'

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due

diligence could not have been discovered in

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59,' (3)

fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an

adverse party,' (4) circumstances under which

a judgment is void,' (5) circumstances under

which a judgment has been satisfied, released,

or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which

it is based has been reversed or otherwise

vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the

judgment should have prospective application,'

or (6) any other reason justifying relieffrom

the operation of the judgment FR. C.P. Rule

60(b)(1)-(b)(6). To be entitled to relief, the

moving party must establish facts within one

of the reasons enumerated in Rule 60(b).

Fed. Civ. R. 15(C)(1)(b)

(l) When an Amendment Relates Back. An

amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of

the original pleading when(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of

limitations allows relation back;

APP54

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that

arose out of ths conduct, transaction, or occurrence

set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original

pleading;

FRCP. 37(b)(2)(A)vi

(b) Failure to Comply with a Court Order.

(2) Sanctions Sought in the District Where the

Pending.

Action Is

(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order

(vi) rendering a default judgment

against the disobedient party

FRCP 56(0

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting

that a fact

cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the

assertion by:

(A) citing to pa rticular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that

an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence

to support the fact.

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by

Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the

material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be

presented in a form that would be admissible in

evidence.

APP55

(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only

the cited materials, but it may consider other

materials in the record.

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or

declaration used to support or oppose a motion must

be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that

would be admissible in evidence, and show that the

affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the

matters stated.

FRCP Rule 79. Records Kept by the Clerk

(a) CIVIL DOCKET.

•

(1) In General. The clerk must keep a record known

as the “civil docket” in the form and manner

prescribed by the Director of the Administrative

Office of the United States Courts with the approval

of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The

clerk must enter each civil action in the docket.

Actions must be assigned consecutive file numbers,

which must be noted in the docket where the first

entry of the action is made.

(2) Items to be Entered. The following items must be

marked with the file number\ and entered

chronologically in the docket!

JCUS-APR 73

Canon 2- A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the

Appearance of Impropriety in all Activities (A)

Respect for Law. A judge should respect and comply

with the law and should act at all times in a manner

that promotes public confidence in the integrity and

impartiality of the judiciary. !

Lilly Ledbetter Fair pay act 2009

APP56

An act to amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967, and to modify the operation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, to clarify that a discriminatory

compensation decision or other practice that is

unlawful under such Acts occurs each time

compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory

compensation decision or other practice, and for other

purposes.

123 Stat. 5, 6 and 7

United States Code Citations

29 U.S.C. 621, 626, 633a, 791, 794 and 794a

42U.S.C. 12111, 12117, 12203, 1981a, 2000d, 2000e,

2000e-16 and 2000e*5

42uscl983 Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory; decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes

APP57

of this section, any Act of Congress applicable

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

42USC1981. Equal rights under the law

(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,

and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,

and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "make and

enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of the contractual relationship.

The rights protected by this Section are protected

against impairment by nongovernmental

discrimination and impairment under color of State

law.

Short Title of 1991 Amendment

APP58

Pub. L. 102-166. SI. Nov. 21. 1991. 105 Stat. 1071.

provided that: "This Act [enacting section 1981a of

this title and sections 601 and 1201 to 1224 of Title 2

The Congress, amending this section and sections

1988, 2000e, 2000e-l, 2000e-2, 2000e-4, 2000e-5,

2000e-16, 12111, 12112, and 12209 of this title, and

section 626 of Title 29, Labor; and enacting

provisions set out as notes under this section and

sections 2000e and 2000e-4 of this title, and section

la-5 of Title 16, Conservation] may be cited as the

'Civil Rights Act of 1991'."

42USC1981a Damages in cases of intentional

discrimination in employment

(a) Right of recovery

(l) Civil rights

In an action brought by a complaining party under

section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42

U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a respondent who

engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not

an employment practice that is unlawful because of

its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703,

704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3,

2000e-16], and provided that the complaining party

cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the

complaining party may recover compensatory and

punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in

addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, referred to in subsec.

(d)(1)(A), is Pub. L. 88-352. July 2. 1964. 78 Stat.

APP59

241. Title VII of the Act is classified generally to

subchapter VI (§2000e et seq.) of this chapter. For

complete classification of this Act to the Code, see

Short Title note set out under section 2000a of this

title and Tables.

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, referred

to in subsec. (d)(1)(B) is Pub. L. 101-336. July 26.

1990. 104 Stat. 327. Title I of the Act is classified

generally to subchapter I (§12111 et seq.) of chapter

126 of this title. For complete classification of this Act

to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section

12101 of this title and Tables.

42USC1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the

premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,

either directly or indirectly, any person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of

equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or

for the purpose of preventing or hindering the

constituted authorities of any State or Territory from

giving or securing to all persons within such State or

Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or

more persons conspire to preyent by fprce,

intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully

entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy

in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of

any lawfully qualified person as an elector for

President or Vice President, or as a Member of

Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen

APP60

in person or property on account of such support or

advocacy*' in any case of conspiracy set forth in this

section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or

cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object

of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his

person or property, or deprived of having and

exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the

United States, the party so injured or deprived may

have an action for the recovery of damages

occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any

one or more of the conspirators.

(R.S. §1980.)

42USC1986. Action for neglect to prevent

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the

wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in

section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed,

and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the

commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do,

if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to

the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all

damages caused by such wrongful act, which such

person by reasonable diligence could have prevented;

and such damages may be recovered in an action on

the case; and any number of persons guilty of such

wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as

defendants in the action; and if the death of any

party be caused by any such wrongful act and

neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased

shall have such action therefor, and may recover not

exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of

the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if

there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of

APP61

kin of the deceased. But no action und,er the

provisions of this section shall be sustained which is

not commenced within one year after the cause of

action has accrued.

(R.S. $1981.)

42USC2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices

(a) Employer practices

Pub. L. 88-352. title VII. $703. July 2. 1964. 78 Stat.

255; Pub. L. 92-261. S8(a). (b). Mar. 24. 1972. 86

Stat. 109; Pub. L. 102-166. title I. SS 105(a). 106.

107(a). 108. Nov. 21. 1991. 105 Stat. 1074-1076.)

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer—

(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or

applicants for employment in any way which would

deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

employment opportunities or, otherwise, adversely

affect his status as an employee, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991

APP62

TITLE I - FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES

DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL

DISCRIMINATION

(b) COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

"(1) DETERMINATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. A complaining party may recover punitive damages

under this section against a respondent (other than a

government, government agency or political

subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates

that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory

practice or discriminatory practices with malice or

with reckless indifference to the federally protected

rights of an aggrieved individual.

"(2) EXCLUSIONS FROM COMPENSATORY

DAMAGES. • Compensatory damages, awarded under

this section shall not include backpay, interest on

backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under

section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

"(3) LIMITATIONS. - The sum of the amount of

compensatory damages awarded under this section

for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering

inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of

life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount

of punitive damages awarded under this section,

shall not exceed, for each complaining party "(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than

14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or

.t:-

(

i ■

&V!

APP63

v*;’

■i

•*•

more calendar weeks in the current or ^preceding

calendar year, $50,000;

■

‘ ■ .*

"(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than

100 and fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or

more calendar weeks in the current oi> preceding

calendar year, $100,000; and

"(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than

200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or

more calendar weeks in the current oip preceding

calendar year, $200,000; andy

"(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than

500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks

in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.

"(4) CONSTRUCTION. - Nothing in this section shall

be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief

available under, section 1977 of the Revised Statutes

(42 u.s.c. 1981).

123 STAT. 5PUBLIC LAW 111-2-JAN. 29, 2009

Public Law 111-2

111th Congress

An Act

To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967, and to modify the ,

operation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, to clarify that a

discriminatory compensation decision or other

practice that is unlawful under

such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid

APP64

pursuant to the discriminatory

compensation decision or other practice, and for other

purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Lilly Ledbetter Fair

Pay Act

of 2009”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following(1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire

& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), significantly

impairs statutory protections against discrimination

in compensation that Congress established and that

have been bedrock principles of American law for

decades. The Ledbetter decision undermines

those statutory protections by unduly restricting the

time period in which victims of discrimination can

challenge and recover for discriminatory

compensation decisions or other practices,

contrary to the intent of Congress.

(2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing

of discriminatory compensation claims ignores the

reality of wage discrimination and is at odds with the

robust application of the civil rights laws that

Congress intended.

(3) With regard to any charge of discrimination under

any law, nothing in this Act is intended to preclude or

limit an aggrieved person’s right to introduce

evidence of an unlawful employment practice that

has occurred outside the time for filing a charge of

discrimination.

(4) Nothing in this Act is intended to change current

I'A

&.•

APP65

# 0 '

law treatment of when pension distributions are"

considered paid.

SEC. 3. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION

BECAUSE OF RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.

Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42

U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)) is amended by adding at the end

the following:

“(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to

discrimination in compensation in violation of this

title, when a discriminatory compensation decision

or other practice is adopted/when an individual

becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation

decision or other practice, or 42 USC 2000e-5 note.

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. 42 USC 2000a

note. Jan. 29, 2009 [S. 181] VerDate Nov 24 2008

06:22 Feb 03, 2009 Jkt 079139 PO 00Q02 Frm 00001

Fmt 6580 Sfmt 6581 E:\PUBLAW\PUBL002.

123 STAT. 6 PUBLIC LAW 111-2-JAN. 29, 2009

when an individual is affected by application of a

discriminatory compensation decision or other

practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other

compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in

part from such a decision or other practice.

“(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section

1977A of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a),

liability may accrue and an aggrieved person may

obtain relief as provided in subsection (g)(1),

including recovery of back pay for up to two years

preceding the fifing of the charge, where the unlawful

employment practices that have occurred during the

charge fifing period are similar or related to unlawful

employment practices with rfegard to discrimi

nation in compensation that occurred.;outside the

V ' I

1.' '

APP66

time for filing a charge.”.

SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION

BECAUSE OF AGE.

Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(d)) is

amended—

(1) in the first sentence— ;

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (l) and (2) as

subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and

(B) by striking “(d)” and inserting “(d)(1)”;

(2) in the third sentence, by striking “Upon” and

inserting the following“(2) Upon”; and (3) by adding at the end the

following: “(3) For purposes of this section, an

unlawful practice occurs, with respect to

discrimination in compensation in violation of this

Act, when a discriminatory compensation decision or

other practice is adopted, when a person becomes

subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or

other practice, or when a person is affected

by application of a discriminatory compensation

decision or other practice, including each time wages,

benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in

whole or in part from such a decision or other

practice.”.

SEC. 5. APPLICATION TO OTHER LAWS.

(a) AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF

1990.—The amendments made by section 3 shall

apply to claims of discrimination in compensation

brought under title I and section 503 of the Ameri

cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et

seq., 12203), pursuant to section 107(a) of such Act

(42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), which adopts the powers,

remedies, and procedures set forth in section

706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-

»; .•

APP67

5). (b) REHABILITATION ACT OF 1?73.—The

amendments made by section 3 shall apply to claims

of discrimination in compensation brought under

sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 (29 U.S.C. 791, 794), pursuant to—(1) sections

501(g) and 504(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 791(g),

794(d)), respectively, which adopt theistandards

applied under title.I of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 for determining whether a

violation has occurred in a complaint alleging

employment discrimination; and (2) paragraphs (l)

and (2) of section 505(a) of such Act (29 U.S.C.

794a(a)) (as amended by subsection (c)).

(1) REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973.—Section

505(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C.

794a(a)) is amended—42 USC 2000e-5 note.

42 USC 2000e-5 note.

VerDate Nov 24 2008 06:22 Feb 03, 2009 Jkt 079139

PO 00002 Frm 00002 Fmt 6580 Sfmt 6581

E:\PUBLAW\PUBL002.111:APPS06 PsN: PUBL002

dkrause on GSDDPC29 with PUBLIC LAWS

123 STAT. 7PUBLIC LAW 111-2—JAN. 29, 2009

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 181 (H.R. 11): ,

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 155 (2009):

Jan. 15, 21, 22, considered and passed Senate.

Jan. 27, considered and passed House.

DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL

DOCUMENTS (2009):

Jan. 29, Presidential remarks.

M (A) in paragraph (l), by inserting after “(42 U.S.C.

2000e-5 (f) through (k))” the 'following: “(and the

application of section 706(e)(3) (42 U.S.C. 2000e—

5(e)(3)) to claims of discrimination in compensation)”;

APP68

and (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after “1964”

the following: “(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in

subsection (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C.

2000e-5), applied to claims of discrimination in

compensation)”. (2) CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.—

Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.

2000e-16) is amended by adding at the end the

following: “(£) Section 706(e)(3) shall apply to

complaints of discrimination in compensation under

this section.”.

(3) AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

ACT OF 1967.—Section 15(f) of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(f)) is amended by striking “of

section” and inserting “of sections 7(d)(3) and”. SEC.

6. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Act, and the

amendments made by this Act, take effect

as if enacted on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims

of discrimination in compensation under title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.),

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.), title I and section 503 of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and sections

501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that

are pending on or after that date. Approved January

29, 2009.

APP 69

APPENDIX F

The Performance and Development Review (PADR) rating, merit increase percentage and

Annual Employee Incentive Program (AEIP) bonus percentage for the requested employees

from the years 2009 through 2018 have been compiled from available records.

There are 3 possible PADR ratings-Needs Improvement, Achievement and Highest

Achievement.

Merit increase and AEIP bonus percentages vary based on business conditions and

performance as well as individual contributions. In 2009, due to business conditions and

performance, no employees received a merit increase or AEIP bonus. In 2016, due to

business performance, no employees received an AEIP bonus.

ROCKWELLTOWNSEND-001732

APP 70

APPENDIX F

2009

Employee Name % Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend N/A

N/A

Steve Kikeli

N/A

Jason Bernard

N/A

Renata Santos

N/A

Daniel Aichele

Employee

Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

% Merit

Increase

4.8

Salary

Increase

N/A

2010

Salary

Increase

3148.41

3655.62

3446.87

N/A

PADR

Rating

N/A

N/A.

N/A

AEIP

Rating

No data found

11.8

PADR

Rating

Achievement

AEIP

Rating

N/A

:n/a ..

APP71

APPENDIX F

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

4.8

3134.53

3208.13

11.8

11.4

Achievement

ROCKWELL-TOWNSEND001733

2011

Employee

Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

% Merit

Increase

3.1

2.4

2.7

2.5

Salary

Increase

2200.00

2000.00

2100.00

1750.00

1800.00

AEIP

Rating

9.3

8.7

9.3

PADR

Rating

Achievement

APP 72

APPENDIX F

2012

Employee

Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

% Merit

Increase

Salary

Increase

2.6

2200.00

2.9

2.8

2400.00

2100.00

PADR

Rating

Achievement

3.8

ROCKWELLTOWNSEND-001734

AEIP

Rating

APP 73

APPENDIX F

2013

Salary

Increase

1640.20

2493.26

2448.15.

1619.80

1658.48

2014

AEIP

Rating

4.7

PADR

Rating

Achievement

Salary

Increase

1523.90

2500.00

4202.66

1504.94

2.5

2000.00

AEIP

Rating

5.6

5.7

5.6

PADR

Rating

Achievement

Employee

Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

% Merit

Increase

Employee

Name,

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

% Merit

Increase

2.2

2.8

APP 74

APPENDIX F

ROCKWELL-TOWNSEND-001735

2015

Employee Name % Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend 2.5

2.6

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

2.7

Renato Santos

2.7

Daniel Aichele

Salary

Increase

% Merit

Increase

1.5

2.5

Salary

Increase

1195.78

2335.60

Employee Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

2000.00

2456.13

2382.91

2072.32

2134.19

2016

AEIP

Rating

2.5

PADR

Rating

Data not found

AEIP

Rating

N/A

PADR

Rating

Achievement

Highest Achievement

APP 75

APPENDIX F

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

1.6

1.7

1500.00

1261.19

1420.62

Achievement

N/A

Achievement

N/A

Achievement

N/A

ROCKWELLTOWNSEND-001736

2017

Employee Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

% Merit

Increase

2.7

4.5

2.7

2.6

2.9

Employee Name % Merit

Salary

Increase

2200.00

4309.18

2579.88

2122.27

2477.96

2018

AEIP

Rating

5.2

5.7

5.2

Salary

AEIP

PADR

Rating

Achievement

Highest Achievement

Achievement

PADR

APP 76

Increase

Faith Townsend 1.9

3.5

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

1.9

Renato Santos

1.9

Daniel Aichele

Increase

1662.29

3502.41

1894.37

1644.16

1701.53

Rating

5.3

6.5

6.4

ROCKWELL^ TOWNSEND-001737

- .

APP 77

APPENDIX G

The Performance and Development Review (PADR) rating, merit increase percentage and

Annual Employee Incentive Program (AEIP) bonus percentage for the requested employees

from the years 2009 through 2018 have been compiled from available records.

There are 3 possible PADR ratings-Needs Improvement, Achievement and Highest

Achievement.

Merit increase and AEIP bonus percentages vary based on business conditions and

performance as well as individual contributions:' In 2009, due to business conditions and

performance, no employees received a merit increase or AEIP bonus. In 2016, due to

business performance, no employees received an AEIP bonus.

ROCKWELLTOWNSEND-001209

APP 78

APPENDIX G

2009

Employee Name

% Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend... N/A

N/A

Steve Kikeli

N/A

Jason Bernard

N/A

Renato Santos

N/A

Daniel Afchele

Employee Name

Faith Townsend

% Merit

Increase

4.8

AEIP

Rating

N/A

2010

AEIP

Rating

No Data found

PADR

Rating

N/A

PADR

Rating

Achievement

APP 79

APPENDIX G

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

4.8

Achievement

ROCKWELLTOWNSEND001210

11.8

11.4

2011

Employee Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

% Merit

Increase

3.1

2.4

2.7

2.5

AEIP

Rating

9.3

8.7

9.3

PADR

Rating

Achievement

APP 80

APPENDIX G

2012

2.9

AEIP

Rating

2.8

3.8

Employee Name

% Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

2.6

PADR

Rating

Achievement

ROCKWELL-TOWNSEND-001211

2013

Employee Name

% Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

2.2

2.8

AEIP

Rating

4.7

PADR

Rating

Achievement

APP81

APPENDIX G

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

2.8

Achievement

4.7

2014

Employee Name

% Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

2.8

001212

2.5

AEIP

Rating

5.6

5.7

5.6

PADR

Rating

Achievement

Achievement *

Achievement

ROCKWELLTOWNSEND-

APP 82

APPENDIX G

2015

% Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend 2.5

Steve Kikeli

2.6

Jason Bernard

2.7

.2.7

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

2.7

AEIP

Rating

2.5

2016

Employee Name

AEIP

Rating

N/A

Employee Name

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

% Merit

Increase

1.5

2.5

1.6

PADR

Rating

Data not found

D ata not found „

Data not found

PADR

Rating

Achievement

Highest Achievement

Achievement

APP 83

APPENDIX G

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

1.6

1.7

N/A

Achievement

ROCKWELL-TOWNSEND-001213

2017

Employee Name

% Merit

Increase

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

2.7

Employee Name

% Merit

Increase

4.5

2.7

2.6

2.9

AEIP

Rating

5.2

5.7

5.2

2018

PADR

Rating

Achievement

Highest Achievement

Achievement

.>Achievement

Achievement

AEIP

Rating

PADR

Rating

APP 84

APPENDIX G

Faith Townsend

Steve Kikeli

Jason Bernard

Renato Santos

Daniel Aichele

1.9

3.5

1.9

5.3

6.5

6.4

ROCKWELL-TOWNSEND-001214

APP 85

APPENDIX H

Exhibit 700 detailing Fraud in discovery document 58

EXHIBIT 700

If year 2009 of the chart is examined states and shows no one received a merit increase.

Plaintiff provided paystub from dec 2008 and 2009 that shows no merit increases resulted

for the performance reviews of 2008, not as it is display on the chart of 2009.

Base salaries can be calculated from the chart by dividing the increase amount by the % of

increase. Let us test the calculation using the 2017 merit announcement. The increase

based on 2% is 1662.29. If divided by .02(2%) the result is 83,114.50 which is the current

base salary. And when the two are added you get the next years base salary.

APP 86

APPENDIX H

ROCKWELL

AUTOMATION

Dec 11, 2017

Dear Faith Townsend

Thank you for your contributions for our team and to our company so that we can all

support our customers and drive our strategy to bring the Connected Enterprise to life.

Here are the details of your merit award for year 2018Current Annual Base PayNew Annual Base PayAmount IncreasePercent Increase

USD 83,114.65

USD 84,776.94

1,662.29

2.00%

APP 87

APPENDIX H

Now apply his to the year 2009 on the chart. Remember the year has been offset so you will

be looking at the entry for 2010.

The increase amount is 3148.41 divided by 4.8% (.048) = 65,591.87 reported as 2010 base

salary. This is not correct if it is applied to 2009. The 2009 pay stub indicate a base salary

of 32.90 per hour which equal 68432 per year. This is the same as 2008 proving there was

no increase for 2008 performance, not 2009.

Now take the calculated yearly salary for 2010(per the chart) 65591.87 and divide it by 52

weeks in the year, then divide it by 40 hours in 1 week you get 31.53. Then compare it to

the 12/21/2009 pay stub, the hourly rate was decrease and the merit increase was

calculated based on the lesser amount, reducing her merit increase. If no one received a ~

merit increase in 2009(per the chart), where did the 4.8% come from? Since the years of

the chart have been shifted, it could only come from 2008 when the plaintiff was told there

was no merit increases or bonuses for anyone. It appears she was the only employee in the

group that did not receive any merit or bonus.

APP 88

APPENDIX H

So far with pay stubs for 2009 we have established that 68,432 is the base salary and with

the paystub for 2010 showing 33.73 per hour. 32.90 divided by 33.73 Is a 2.46% merit

increase.

For each year whether the merit percentage column represents the current year or the

previous year the calculation of the salary increase is not correct. Based on the plaintiffs

records paystubs, bank records and merit announcement letters.

The entire document is an attempt to conceal how Rockwell embezzled 2,000 to 3,000

dollars from the plaintiffs pay per year.

Lets look at 2016, The US Bank statement shows there was no bonus deposited in Dec

2022. Bonuses are always after Performance reviews in November and comes

approximately 1 week before Christmas.

APP 89

APPENDIX H

MERIT

SALARY

2008/2009 INCREASE Increase

AEIP

BONUS

PADR RATING

Faith

Townsend N/A

N/A

“N/A

ACHIEVE-MENT.

Steve

Kikeli

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

Jason

Bernard

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

•

. •- A

■ . -- r

Renato

Santos

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

Daniel

Aichele

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

APP 90

Townsend ACTUAL Base Salary 2008 68.432

MERIT

Corrected

INCREASE

AEIP

SALARY

2009/2010

FROM

BONUS

Increase

calculation

YEAR

Faith

Townsend

4.8

Increase

calc'd at

3148.41 31.39

PADR RATING

DATA

NOT

FOUND ACHIEVEMENT

REPORTED

INCRESE

65,591.87

APP91

APPENDIX H

Steve

Kikeli

4.8

3655.62

11.8 ACHIEVEMENT

Jason

Bernard

4.8

3446.87

11.8 ACHIEVEMENT

71,809.79

Renato

Santos

4.8

3134.53

11.8 ACHIEVEMENT

65,302.71

Daniel

Aichele

4.8

3208.13

11.8 ACHIEVEMENT

66,836.00

76.158.75

Townsend ACTUAL Base Salary 2009 Per Pavstub is 68.432-End of year MERIT

INCREASE 2.58%-AEIP BONUS 0.0

APP 92

APPENDIX H

MERIT

INCREASE

Corrected

AEIP

SALARY

FROM

2010/2011

BONUS

Increase

calculation

YEAR

PADR RATING

CURRENT

SALARY

Faith

Townsend

3.1

2200

2033.34

9.3 ACHIEVEMENT

68,307.16

Steve

Kikeli

2.4

2000

1827.81

8.7 ACHIEVEMENT

77,986.56

Jason

Bernard

2.7

2100

1938

9.3 ACHIEVEMENT

73,748.65

APP 93

APPENDIX H

Renato

Santos

2.5

1750

1632.56

9.3 ACHIEVEMENT

66,935.27

Daniel

.Aichele

2.5

1800

1670,9

9.3 ACHIEVEMENT

70,044.13

* VS

Townsend ACTUAL Base Salary Per 2010 navstub is 70.262.40-End of Year MERIT

INCREASE 2.1%

_ ..V .

MERIT

Corrected

INCREASE

AEIP

SALARY

PADR RATING

2011/2012

FROM

BONUS

Increase

calculation

YEAR

Faith

4 ACHIEVEMENT

2200

2049.21

Townsend

70,356.37

APP 94

APPENDIX H

Steve

Kikeli

2.6

2200

2027.65

4 ACHIEVEMENT

80,014.21

Jason

Bernard

2400

2212.46

4 ACHIEVEMENT

75,961.11

Renato

Santos

2.9

2100

1941.12

4 ACHIEVEMENT

68,876.39

Daniel

Aichele

2.8

2100

1961.23

3.8 ACHIEVEMENT

72,005.23

Townsend’s Actual calculated End of Year Merit increase for 2011 2.1%

APP 95

APPENDIX H

MERIT

SALARY

2012/2013

INCREASE Increase

Corrected

AEIP

BONUS

calculation

PADR RATING

Faith

Townsend

2.2

1640.2

1547.84

4.7 ACHIEVEMENT

71,904.21

Steve

Kikeli

2.8

2493.26

2240.4

4.7 ACHIEVEMENT

82,254.61

Jason

Bernard

2448.15

2278.83

5 ACHIEVEMENT

78,238.83

Renato

Santos

2.8

1619.8

1928.54

4.7 ACHIEVEMENT

70,804.93

APP 96

APPENDIX H

Daniel

Aichele

2.8

1658.48

2016.15

4.7 ACHIEVEMENT

74,021.38

Townsend’s Actual calculated End of Year Merit increase for 2012 1.9%

MERIT

SALARY

2043/2014

INCREASE Increase

Faith

Townsend

Steve

Kikeli

Corrected

AEIP

BONUS

calculation

PADR RATING

1523.9 .

1438.08

5.6 ACHIEVEMENT

73,342.29

2.8

2500

2303.12

5.6 ACHIEVEMENT

84,557.74

APP 97

APPENDIX H

Jason

Bernard

4202.66

3811.94

5.7 ACHIEVEMENT

82,150.77

Renato

Santos

1504.94

1416.09

5.6 ACHIEVEMENT

72,221.03

Daniel

Aichele

2.5

2000

1850.53

5.6 ACHIEVEMENT

75,871.91

Townsend’s Actual calculated End of Year Merit increase for 2013 2,43%

APP 98

APPENDIX H

2014/2015

Faith

Townsend

Corrected

AEIP

MERIT

SALARY

INCREASE Increase

BONUS

calculation

.-tv?!

PADR RATING

2.5

2000

1833.56

2.5 ACHIEVEMENT

75,175.85

Steve

Kikeli

2.6

2456.13

2198.5

2.5 ACHIEVEMENT

86,756.24

Jason

Bernard

2.7

2382.91

2218.07

2.5 ACHIEVEMENT

84,368.84

Renato

Santos

2.7

2072.31

1949.97

2.5 ACHIEVEMENT

74,171.00

APP 99

APPENDIX H

Daniel

Aichele

2.7

2134.19

2.5 ACHIEVEMENT

2048.54

77,920.45

Townsend ACTUAL Base Salary Per 2014 Merit Announcement Letter 77.718.77- End of

Year MERIT INCREASE 1.25%

2015/2016

Faith

Townsend

MERIT

SALARY

INCREASE Increase

1.5

1195.76

Corrected

. AEIP

BONUS

calculation

N/A

PADR RATING

ACHIEVEMENT

APP 100

APPENDIX H

Steve

Kikeli

2.5

2335.6

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

Jason

Bernard

1.6

1500

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

Renato

Santos

1.6

1261.19

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

Daniel

Aichele

1.7

1420.62

N/A

ACHIEVEMENT

. M

Townsend ACTUAL Base Salary for 2015 Per the 2014 End of year Merit

Announcement Letter 79.718.77

APP 101

APPENDIX H

2016/2017

Faith

Townsend

Corrected

AEIP

MERIT

SALARY

INCREASE Increase calculation BONUS

2.7

PADR RATING

2200

5.2 ACHIEVEMENT

Steve

Kikeli

4.5

4309.18

HIGHEST

5.7 ACHIEVEMENT

Jason

Bernard

2.7

2579.88

5.2 ACHIEVEMENT

Renato

Santos

2.6

2122.27

5.2 ACHIEVEMENT

APP 102

2017/2018

Daniel

Aichele

2.9

Faith

Townsend

1.9

Steve

Kikeli

5.2 ACHIEVEMENT

2477.96

5.3

ACHIEVEMENT

3.5

6.5

ACHIEVEMENT

Jason

Bernard

1.9

6.4

ACHIEVEMENT

Renato

Santos

1.9

6.4

ACHIEVEMENT

Daniel

Aichele

1.9

6.4

ACHIEVEMENT

1662.29

APP 103

APPENDIX I

Paycheck Information

Faith Townsend — 10026840 ENGR SR,

TECHNICAL SUPPORT, 8144, MVI - USMayfield Village, Currency displayed in USD.

Funds are not available until your actual day

date. Net amount for

12-19-2008Jj Redisplay

Current

3,055.17

Net Distribution

Year to Date

51,667.39

APP 104

APPENDIX I

Amount

3,055.17

Account Number

Type

XXXX2039

Checking Account

Choose Delivery Preference

Details

Year to

Hours/Units Rate

Earnings

Regular Pay

OT Straight

Overtime 2x

Imputed Income

EIP BONUS

Subtotal (Gross Pay)

80.00

24.00

32.9056

32.9054

65.8108

Current

Date

2,632.45 68,443.70

789.73 1,184.60

1,579.46 9,608.44

5.61

145.86

0.00 2,600.86

5,007.25 81,983.46

APP 105

APPENDIX I

Paycheck Information

Faith Townsend - 10026840 ENGR SR,

TECHNICAL SUPPORT, 8144, MVI - USMayfield Village, Net Amount for

01-16-2009

Red^P|ay Current

Year to Date

5,607.27

3,942.36

Net Distribution

Type

Account Number

Amount

Checking Account

XXXX2039

3,942.38

APP 106

APPENDIX

Choose Delivery reference

Details

Hours/Units Rate

Year to

Date

Current

Earnings

Regular Pay

80.00

32.9056

2,632.45

5,264.90

APP 107

APPENDIX I

OT Straight

40.00

32.9055

1,316.22

Overtime 2x

40.00

65.8110

2,632.44

Imputed Income

Subtotal (Gross

Pay)

Before *Tax

Deductions

6.02

12.04

6,587.139,225.60

APP 108

APPENDIX J

Uni-Statement

USBANK

Account Number- Village, Currency 2039

P.O. Box 1800

Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101*0800

9155

TRN

stoi m

Statement PeriodNov. 25, 2009

through

Dec. 22, 2009

Page 1 of 2

l|||||,i|||||||lli||i||ll,|ilil,l||l||ll|||||l||l|l|li,|n,i|,i||

To Contact U.S. Bank

000047494 1 SP

By Phone:

106481437051782 S

FAITH TOWNSEND 803 E 155TH ST

CLEVELAND OH 44110-3032

1-800-US BANKS

(1-800-872-2657)

APP 109

APPENDIX J

Cincinnati Metro Area-'

Telecommunications Device for the Deaf

Internet•

513-6324141

1-800-685

5065

usbank.com

NEWS FOR YOU

Give the perfect gift! The U.S. Bank VisaO Gift Card. Available at usbank.com/gift

or any U.S. Bank branch.

Order your Annual Check Card Summary today! The summary provides a comprehensive

record of all your 2009 transactions organized into categories for easy identification. It's a

great tool for household budgeting, tax preparation and expense management. Tb order,

Siiiiiiiii

Hr:-22sHr~jw:-5S:

APP 110

APPENDIX J

at usbank.com, select your check card account from "My Accounts" and click

"Order 2009 Annual Account Summary" by December 31, 2009.

INFORMATION YOU SHOULD KNOW

Effective February 16, 2010, the Express Delivery Fee (for a new or replacement

check or ATM card) will be $25.

FREE CHECKING

--- -

----- ---:

:: ;

jf>

I i-5: A:

Account Number xxxxx-2039

Number of Days in Statement Period

U.S. Bank National Association

Account Summary

Beginning Balance on Nov. 25

Deposits / Credits

Other Withdrawals.

Checks Paid

^ MemberFDIC

1,325.16

5,731.35

4,158.00100.00-

APP 111

APPENDIX J

Ending Balance on Dec. 22, 2009 $

2,798.51

Deposits / Credits

Date

Description of Transaction RefNumber

Nov. 27 Electronic Deposit

Amount

From US TREASURY

624.42

220

REF=09328003863683 N

TAX

REFUND3111036170

5028502285

Nov. 30 Deposit

656.54

Dec. 3 Electronic Deposit

From ADJUSTMENT

175.00

APP 112

APPENDIX J

REF=09337013746390

Y PROV CR TIME

PROV CR

WARNER

5911111111

From Rockwell

Dec. 4 Electronic Deposit

Automat

REF=09336009143922 N

PAYROLL

8601886104

From Rockwell

Dec. 18 Electronic Deposit

Automat

PAYROLL

REF=09351008575183 N

8601886104

Total

Deposits/ Credits

1,476.88

2,798.51

5.731.35

APP 113

APPENDIX K

Paycheck Information

Faith Townsend - 10026840 ENGR SR, TECHNICAL SUPPORT, 20507, MVI - USMayfield

Village, OH-MVL

Currency displayed in USD.

Funds are not available until your actual pay date.

Current

1,544.02

Type

Checking Account

Year to Date

47,176.78

Amount

Account Number

1,544.02

XXXX2039

APP 114

APPENDIX K

Hours/Units

Earnings

Regular Pay

OT Straight

Overtime 2x

Imputed Income

Subtotal (Gross Pay)

... Before-Tax Deductions

Medical

Dental

STD - Pretax

401K-BT PRIM 1

Subtotal

Taxes

80.00

Rate

Current

Year to Date

0.00

67,896.47

2,446.33

4,892.66

156.52

2,511.36

75,391.98

0.00

25.11

1,934.50

97.00

96.25

678.86

25.11

2,806.61

31.3920 2,511.36

APP 115

APPENDIX K

Federal W/H Tax

FICA-HI

FICA-OASDI

Mayfield Villag (OH)

Ohio (OH)

319.33

36.41

155.70

37.67

109.26

10,297.11

1,062.33

4,542.38

1,098.91

3,296.73

Subtotal

After-Tax Deductions

Imputed Income

40 IK-LOAN 1

AD&D

LTD

Cafe MayfLd Hts

Current

United Way

658.37

20,297.46

V:\v

0.00

156.52

4,568.36

55.50

264.00

56.49

0.38

Year to Date

10.26

0.00

283.48

APP 116

APPENDIX K

Subtotal

Net Amount

Federal

Ohio

283.86

5,111 13

1,544.02 47,176.78

Filing Status

Exemptions

Single or Married, but

withhold at higher Single

4 rate

Same as Federal

Pay Period Start 12-212009

Pay Period End 01-03-2010

Check Number 91344764

XXXXX-9223

Add! Tax

25.00

Townsend, Faith

1422 Som Center,

Name

Address

Mayfield Hts, OH

SSN/National ID

Pay Frequency Biweekly

APP 117

APPENDIX K

44124

Employer Name RCH - Rockwell

Automation, Inc.

Employer 1201 S Second Street,

Address

Milwaukee, WI 53204 US

»v* • •« *

APP 118

APPENDIX L

USBANK

Account Number

xxxx-2039

Statement Periods

Nov 24, 2011

Through

Dec 22, 2011

P.O. BOX 1800

St. Paul Minnesota 55101*0800

9155

TRN

ST01

Page 1 of 4

To Contac U.S. Bank

By Phone: 1-80Q-USBANKS

1-800-872-2657

Metro Area:

Cincinnati

513-632-4141

APP 119

Telecommunications device

1-800-685-5065

For the def

usbank.com

Internet

APP 120

APPENDIX M

Paycheck Information

Faith Townsend - 10026840 ENGR SR, TECHNICAL SUPPORT, 20507, MVI - USMayfield Village, OH-MVL Currency displayed in USD. Funds are not available until

your actual pay date

Net Amount for

| 09 24 2010

Redisplay |

View Previous View Next

Current

Year to Date

1,740.86

35,447.29

Manage Accounts Net Distribution

APP 121

Type

Account Number

Amount

Checking Account

XXXX2039

1,740.86

APP 122

APPENDIX M

Choose Delivery Prefe rence

Details

Rate

Hours/Units

Current

Year to

Date

Earnings

OT Straight

2,698.26

50,411.41

0.00 1,579.47

Overtime 2x

0.00 3,948.67

Regular Pay

Lump Sum Award

80.00

33.7283

0.00 855.55

APP 123

APPENDIX M

Group Term Life

Subtotal (Gross Pay)

5.61 106.59

2,703.87

56,901.69

Before-Tax

Deductions

Medical

17.92

440.45

Dental

4.19

79.61

STD - Pretax

3.85

73.15

401K-BT PRIM 1

26.98

504.04

APP 125

APPENDIX N

Account Number

xxxxx-2039

Statement PeriodNov 24. 2016

through

Dec 22, 2016

USBANK

PO. Box 1800

Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101*0800

9155 TRN X ST01

liriri1!- riniiini1!* lHiiiiiiiii'mii'hi* n* niii* • i* *n*i

000044405 01 SP 106481822759662E

FAITH TOWNSEND

803 E 155TH ST

CLEVELAND OH 44110*3032

To Contact U.S. Bank

1-800USBANKS

By Phone

(1*800*872*2657)

Cincinnati

Metro Area-

513*632*4141

APP 126

APPENDIX N

Telecommunication

Device for the deaf

Internet

1-800-686-5065

usbank.com

NEWS FOR YOU

Protecting your accounts is our highest priority. As a security precaution,

we may close Debit Cards and ATM Cards after 12 months of inactivity.

Please call us with any questions at 800-USBANKS (800-872*2657).

-r _

EASY CHECKING

U.S. Bank National Association

Account Summary

APP 127

APPENDIX N

Account Number xxxxx-2039

Beginning Balance on Nov 24 $349.5

4,877.47

Deposits / Credits

2,963.47Card Withdrawals

781.22Other Withdrawals

Checks Paid

25.00Ending.Balance on

Dec 22, 2016$

1,457.31

Number of Days in Statement Period 29

$1,816.13

Average Account Balance

All

APP 128

APPENDIX N

Protection

The following account(s) are linked to your checking account

for Overdraft Protection. The account(s) are listed in the order

that they would be Used to transfer funds to your checking

account if the available account balance is negative. If you

wish to make changes to your Overdraft

protection account order," log in to your account at usbank.com,

visit your local'U.S. Bank branch or call U.S. Bank 24-Hour

Banking at the

umber listed above.

1st Position^ Standard Savings account ending in 5768

Deposits / Credits

Date Description of Transaction

Electronic Deposit

Nov 25

RefNumber

From Rockwell

Automat

PAYROLL

REF=163270178959 8601886104

Amount

5 1,864.97

APP 129

Dec 9

Dec 19

800N00

Electronic Deposit

From Rockwell

Automat

REF=163430007190 PAYROLL

740N00 8601886104

Debit Purchase Ret - On 121516 EUCLID

OH1010191340

VISA

THE HOME DEPOT# REF#

7461043635101019134

0US1

Total Deposits/ Credits

2,975.07

37.43

$4,877.47

APP 130

APPENDIX O

ROCKWELL

AUTOMATION

Robert Rodriguez

Monday, December 11,

From:

Sent:

2017 10:49 AM

Faith Townsend

Thank you for your

Subject:

contributions for our team and to our company

To:

Faith,

Here are you Merit and Incentive letters.

Congratulations!

ROCKWELL

AUTOMATION

December 11, 2017

Dear Faith Townsend

Thank you for your contributions for our team and to

our company so that we can all support our

customers and drive our strategy to bring the

Connected Enterprise to life.

Here are the details of your merit award for FY 2018:

Current Annual Base pay

83,114.65

New Annual Base Pay

84,776.94

Amount increase

1,662.29

Percent increase

2.00 %

APP 131

APPENDIX O

This award will appear on the first pay period of

January 2018. Pleas be aware that the actual

amount may vary based to rounding

ROCKWELL

AUTOMATION

December 11, 2017

Dear Faith Townsend,

Rockwell Automation achieved a solid year of

performance for FY 2017, thank you for your

contribution. You helped enable our company to

drive our priorities and serve our customers as we

bring the Connected Enterprises to life.

In recognition of your efforts, I am pleased to share

your incentive for FY 2017 based on• AEIP AND CP&S SSB & CSM NA

•

Your AEIP incentive payout is USD

4226.38

Together we succeed when each of us bring our best

to our company every day, for our company and each

other. Lets continue to stay focused for a successful

FY 2018.

Sincerely, Robert Rodriguez, PMP

Rockwell Automation

Supervisor, Remote Technical Support

6680 Beta Drive, Mayfield Village, Ohio 44143 USA

Emails rodriguez@ra.rockwell.com

Office: 440-646-6888, Mobile: 440-804-6358

APP 132

APPENDIX Q

Hi Faith,

FYl:

December 15 2014

Dear Faith Townsend,

Congratulation! I’m happy to share the results of your

merit award. Your merit increase reflects your

individual performance and contribution to our

Growth and Performance strategy.

Here are the details:

Current Annual Base Pay: USD 77,718.87

USD 79,718.87

New Annual Base Pay:

USD 2,000.00

Amount Increase:

USD 2.57%

Percent Increase:

This award will appear on the first pay period in

January 2015. Please be aware that the actual

amount may vary slightly, based on rounding.

Thank you for brining your best to help Rockwell

Automation achieve another strong year.

Let’s

continue to focus on delivering results for a successful

FY 2015.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to

contact me.

Brian Murphy, Rockwell Automation

Application Supervisor, Remote Technical Support

66680 Beta Drive, Mayfield Village, Ohio 44143

Email- bmumhv@ra.rockwell.com

Office: 440-646-7549

APP 133

APPENDIX R

Phone- Service Level Metrics: Achieve a Support

Center Average Max Time • 16 min with Average

Range of 8 min

10/01/2009

Start Date

09/30/2009

End Date

Self Rating

Manager Rating- (3) Met

Comments

Mid-year^ The center currently has an Average Max

wait time of 13:39 minutes——EOY: The center

achieved an average Max Waith Time of 10.3 minutes

with an average range of 7.1 min.

(l) business

Goal Type

Deliverables of the Goal

13.39

1.4 Goal

Phone: Service Level Metrics: Achieve an availability

level = to 80% of the logged in time (12 hours).

10/01/2009

Start Date

09/30/2009

End Date

Self Rating

Manager Rating and Met

comments

lower than the group abating (3)

Mid-Year: Faith’s availability was 6.26% below the

group average which equates to approximately 28

minutes,—==EOY: Faith’s availability was 5.23%

lower than the group average but was within the 10%

goal. In addition, Faith is the acting Team Leader for

the group which requires her at times to get engaged

in other business activities.

Goal Type (l) Business

Dehverables of the Goal

APP 134

Availability is the sum of available, hold. Auxin,

AuxOut, and talk time measured on the phone switch

while the engineer is logged into the ACD system, as

APPENDIX R

measured by the ACD system, engineers will log in at

assigned time and answer calls in an appropriate and

efficient manner. Taking approx. 50% mor calls to

other group members Taking approx. 50% more calls

to other group members

Achieve an availability level within 10% of the group

average.

1.5 Goal

Instruct a minimum of 2 knowledge transfer sessions

for the year

10/01/2009

Start Date

09/30/2009 ;

End Date

Self Rating

Manager Rating and

Comments

Goal Type

(1) business

Accomplishments of the Goal

1.6 Goal

Knowledge Centered Support (KCS) use

Start Date

10/01/2009

End Date

09/30/2009

Page 2 of 8

Rockwell-Townsend 001186

APP 135

APPENDIX S

UNKNOWN

From: Robert Rodrigues

Sent: Friday, July 14, 2017

To: Jeffery Cicero, Thabet Y. Malkawi, Mark Bizily,

Simon R. Medina, John D Redella Martin T. Hughes

Cc: RA TSC NA After Hours

Subject: Additional Staffing Schedules for July 15/16 &

July 22/23

Saturday July 15

•Jeff Cicero & Thabet Malkawi

-Mark Bizily & John Redella

7am-lpm

lpm-7pm

Sunday July 16

■Jeff Cicero & Thabet Malkawi

-Mark Bizily & Simon Medina

-Marty Hughes

7am-lpm

lpm-7pm

Saturday July 22

■Jeff Cicero & Mark Bizily

-Thabet Malkawi & John Redella

-Marty Hughes

7am-lpm

lpm-7pm

Sunday July 23

-John Redella & Thabet Malkawi

-Mark Bizily & Simon Medina

-Marty Hughes

7am-lpm

lpm-7pm

Please let me know if there are any questions.

APP 136

Regards,

Robert Rodriguez, PMP

Rockwell Automation, Supervisor, Remote Technical

Support,6680 Beta Drive,

Mayfield Village, Ohio 44143 USA

APPENDIX S

From: Robert Rodriguez

Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2017 11:56

To: Efran Ahmad< eahmad@ra.rockwell.com> I

Jeffery cicero <icicero@ra.rockwell.com > Mark

bizily< mbizilv@ra.rockwell.com >1 Philip

Micech<pmicech@ra.rockwell.com > Joseph

Gutierrez<igutierrez@ra.rockwell.com >',

Thabet Y. Malkawi< tmalkawi@ra.rockwell.com

>; Simon R. Medina< smedina@ra.rockwell.com

>; Martin T Hughes<

mhughes@ra.rockwell.com >

Subject: Need of coverage the weekend of July 7/8,

14/15, 21/22

Gentlemen,

Faith has taken a leave of absence and we are in need of

some coverage during these upcoming weekends, please

let me know if you are able to work any of these days, I

will try to accommodate everyone, even if splitting into

half days, Note: the expectation is that you are logged in

fielding all calls the entire time scheduled and if

necessary, engage the correct engineer if necessary.

Robert Rodriguez, PMP

Rockwell Automation

Supervisor, Remote Technical Support

6680 Beta Drive

APP 137

Mayfield Village, Ohio 44143 USA

Email- rodriguez@ra.rockwellxom

Office: 440-646-6888

Mobile: 440-804-6358

APPENDIX S

Unknown

From: Steven P. Kikeli

Sent:

Saturday, October 07, 2017 7:32 AM

To:

RATSCMA After Hours

From: Robert Rodriguez

Sent: Friday, October 06, 2017 3:13 pm

John D. Redella <idredella@ra.rockwell.com >,

Philip J. Micech<pimicech@ra.rockwell.com >;Martin

T. Hughes<mthughes@ra.rockwell.com >; Joseph A.

Gutierrez<itgutierrez@ra.rockwell.com >;Mark

BizilyCmbizily @ra.rockwell.com >,"Thabet Y.

Malkawi<tmalkawi@ra.rockwell.com >;Jeffery

Cicero<jcicero @ra.rockwell.com Simon R.

Medina<srmedina@ra.rockwell.com >,* Jon J.

Heideman< iiheideman@ra.rockwell.com >

To:

Subject: REMINDER: Weekend Support Oct 7/8

Schedules

Importance: High

Sat Oct 7 SAP will be unavailable from Friday.

October 6 beginning at 9 n.m. through Sunday.

October 8 at approximately 12 p.m. Central Time.

APP 138

John Redella

Phil Michech

Marty Hughes

EST. Tinie

Name

■y

lpm-7pm ■

lpm* 7pm ;

7 am* lpm

;;

APP 139

APPENDIX S

Jose Gutierrez

Mark Bizily

Thabet Jalkawi

7am-lpm

Sun Oct 8 SAP will be unavailable from Friday,

October 6 beginning at 9 p.m. through Sunday,

October 8 at approximately 12 p.m. Central Time.

Jeff Cicero

Simon Medina

Jose Gutierrez

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

Phil Micech

Jon Heideman

lpm-7pm

7am-lpm

lpm-7pm

7am-lpm

lpm-7pm

7am-lpm

Anyone that will be working this weekend will need to use

RightNow console to create service tickets (SAP planned

outage). Please, make sure you can log into your

RightNow account prior to this weekend. If you have any

issues, please contact Kurt Helfrich. Attached is the

process for creating Service Tickets in RightNow. Steve

has also added a link to SharePoint site.

https7/rockwellautomation.sharepoint.com/teamsCPS CA

M RSS/NA/ layouts/15/WoplFrame. aspx?sourcedoc%7BFC805749 FFDC-4E36-8852EDC75CEB923F%7D&fileRNT%20SOP%20V2.DQC&action=default

Best Regards.

APP 140

APPENDIX S

Steve Kilili

Sr. Technical Support Engineer

Rockwell Automation

6680 Beta Dr.

Mayfield Village, OH 44143

www.rockwellautomation.com

Email: 8nkikeli@ra.rockwell.com

Phone:+l 440-646-3434

Unknown

From:

Robert Rodriguez

Sent:

Wednesday, October 18, 2017 3:59 PM

To:

Philip Micech, Joseph A. Gutierrez’ Jeffery

Cicero, Mark Bizily, Thabet Y. Malkawi,

Martim T Hughes, John D Redella, Simon R.

Media’ Jon J. Heideman, Robert A. Cheney

Jr. .

Cc:

RA TSC NA After Hours, Steven Sweiven,

Ethan Frounfelker, Coman Young Melissa

Boskocevic, Misty R. Marchica, John T.

Ciszewski

Subject: Weekend supplemental staffing schedule for

Oct 21/22, Oct 28/29, Nov 4/5, Nov 11/12

Importance: High

Thank you all again for volunteering to assist the

Afterhours team. Below is the schedule for Oct

21/22, Oct 28/29, Nov 4/5, Nov 11/12

APP 141

APPENDIX S

Sat Oct 21 Afterhours Stem (Steve, Faith, Jason,

Ren, Dan) will also be taking chats for Katowice this

weekend.

Name

Phil Micech

Jose Gutierrez

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

EST. Time

lpm~7pm

lpm-7pm

7am~7pm

7am-lpm

Sun Oct 22 Afterhours Stem (Steve, Faith, Jason,

Ren, Dan) will also be taking chats for Katowice this

weekend.

Name

Jeff Cicero

Jose Gutierrez

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

Marty Hughes

EST. Time

lpm~7pm

7am~7pm

7am-7pm

7am-lpm

7am~7pm

Sat Oct 28

Name

John Redella

Jon Heideman

Marty Hughes

Jose Gutierrez

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

EST. Time

7am~ lpm

lpnr7pm

7am-7pm

lpm-7pm

7am~ lpm

APP 142

APPENDIX S

Oct 29

John Re della

Simon Medina

Robert Cheney

Jose Gutierrez

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

Phil Micech

Marty Hughes

lam-7pm „

7am-lpm

lam-7pm

7am-lpm

lam~7pm

7am-lpm

Nov 4

Name

Phil Micech

Jeff Cicero

Marty Hughes

Robert Cheney

Jose Gutierrez

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

EST. Time

lam-7pm

7am-lpm

lam-7pm

lam~7pm

7am-lpm

Nov 5

Name

Jeff Cicero

Simon Medina

Robert Cheney

Jose Gutierrez

Thabet Malkawi

Phil Micech

Marty Hughes

Est. Time

lam~7pm

7am-lpm

lam-7pm

7am-lpm

lam~7pm

7am~ lpm

APP 143

APPENDIX S

Nov 11

Name

Jon Heideman

Jeff Cicero

John Redella

Marty Hughes

Jose Gutierrez

Robert Cheney

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

EST. Time

lam-7pm

7am-lpm

lam~7pm

7am~ lpm

lam~7pm

7am~ lpm

lam-7pm

7am~ lpm

Nov 12

Name

Jeff Cicero

Simon Medina

Jose Gutierrez

Robert Cheney

Mark Bizily

Thabet Malkawi

Phil Micech

Marty Hughes

EST. Time

lam~7pm

7 am-lpm

lam-7pm

7am~ lpm

lam-7pm

7am-lpm

lam-7pm

7am~ lpm

Regards,

Robert Rodriguez, PMP

Rockwell Automation

Supervisor, Remote Technical Support

6680 Beta Drive

Mayfield Village, Ohio 44143 USA

Email: rodriguez@ra.rockwell.com

Office: 440-646-6888

Mobile: 440-804-6358

APP 144

APPENDIX T

Faith Townsend

From- Steven P. Kikeli

Sent: Thursday, October 06, 2016 4:28pm

To: RA TSC NA After Hours

Cc: Robert Rodriguez, Martin T. Hughes

Subject: Steve Vacation Saturday 8-October-2016 2pm to

7pm Marty Hughes is Covering.

Thank you,

Steve Kikeli

Sr. Technical Support Engineer

Rockwell Automation

6680 Beta Drive

Mayfield Village OH 44143

www.rockwellautomation.com

Email spkikeli@ra.rockwell.com

Phone: +1 440-646-3434

APP 145

APPENDIX U1

Received

Oct 10 2017

EEOCCLFO

EEOC FORM

Charge of Discrimination Charge presented to

FEPA

This form is affected by

EEOC

the privacy act of 1964.

'See enclosed privacy act

Agency(ies) charge No(s)

statement and other

846-2017-35978

information before

completing this form

Home phone (incl.

Name (indicate Mr. Ms. Mrs.)

area code)

216-647 1697

Ms. Faith Townsend

City, State and Zip Code

Street Address

803 E. 155th Street Cleveland, OH 44110

Date of birth

1961

APP 146

APPENDIX U1

Named is the Employer, Labor Organization Employment Agency, Apprenticeship Committee, or

State or Local Government Agency That I Believe Discriminated Against Me or Others. (If more than

two, list under PARTICULARS below)

Name

No. Employees Phone no. Incl. Area

Members

Code

(440)646-7900

Rockwell Automation

500 or more

Street Address

City, State and Zip Code

1201 South Second Street, Milwaukee, WI 53204

Name

No. Employees

Members

Street Address

City, State and Zip Code

Phone no. Incl. Area

Code

APP 147

DISCRIMINATION BASE ON (check appropriate box(es)

■ RACE □ COLOR DSEX □RELIGION ^NATIONAL

ORIGIN

□ RETALIATION DAGE □ DISABILITY^ GENETIC

INFO.

□ OTHER

Date(s)

DISCRIMINATION

TOOK PLACE

Latest

Earliest

01/02/2017 08/24/2017

THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional paper is needed attach extra sheet(s))

On or about April 1, 19961 was hired by Rockwell Automation (Respondent) as an

Engineering Analyst.

On or about January of 2017 my supervisor made a comment about why don’t black people

educate their kids. On or about April of 2017 during a performance review with my

Supervisor, I complained about racial tension within the team and nothing has been done.

I believe I am being discriminated against because of my race (African American), in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended

APP 148

APPENDIX U1

I want this charge filed with the EEOC and

the State or Local Agency if any. I will

advise the agencies if I change my address

or phone number and will cooperate fully

with them in the processing of my charge in

accordance with their procedures

I declare under penalty of perjury that the

above is true and correct.

10/6/2017 s/Faith Townsend

Notary — When necessary for State and

Local Agency Requirements

APP 149

APPENDIX U2

RECEIVED

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

SEP 07 2017

INTAKE QUESTIONAIRE

EEOCCLFO

Please immediately complete the entire form and return it to the U.S. Equal Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”)- REMEMBER, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed

within the time limits imposed by law, generally within 180 days or in some places 300 days

of the alleged discrimination. Upon receipt, this form will be reviewed to determine EEOC

coverage. Answer all question as completely as possible, and attach additional pages if

needed to complete your response(s). If you do not know the answer to a question, answer by

stating ‘Unknown”. If a question is not applicable, write n/a. Please print.

Person Information

Mi:

First Name: Faith

Last Name- Townsend

Street or Mailing Address: 803 E. 155th

State: Ohio

Zip: 44110

County: Cuvahoga

City: Cleveland

Work:440-646-6856

Phone Numbers Home: 216-647-1697

APP 150

APPENDIX U2

EmailCell: 216-647-1697

Date of Birth: 8/11/1961

sex- MaleQ Female^ Do you have a disability? Yes® No|

Please answer each of the next three questions. I. Are you Hispanic or Latino QYes |No

II. What is your race? Please choose all that apply. □American Indian or Alaska Native

□ Asian □White JBBlack or African American [^Native Hawaiian or other Pacific

Islander. IILWhat is your National Origin?(Country of origin or ancestry)? USA

Please Provide The Name Of A Person We Can Contact If We Are Unable To Reach You.

Relationship • Daughter

Name: Dana Townsend

City-Cleveland State- OH

Zip Code- 44110

' Address :803K155

Home Phone- (216) 3362 Other Phone- ( )-_____:

2. I believe I was discriminated against by the following organizations■ Employer

I Union

[^Employment Agency I I Other (Please Specify)

Organization Contact Information (if the organization is an employer provide the address

where you actually worked. If you worked from home, check here[□ and provide the address

of the office to which you reported). If more than one employer is involved attach additional

sheets.

APP 152

APPENDIX U2

SIDE 1A

Job Title Applied For

If Job Applicant, What Date Did You Apply For The Job.

4. What is the reason (basis) for you claim of employment discrimination?

FOR EXAMPLE, If you feel you were treated worse than someone else because of race you

should check the box next to race. If you feel you were treated worse for several reasons such

as your sex, religion, and natural origin you should check all that apply. If you complained

about discrimination, participated in someone else’s complaint, or filed a charge of

discrimination and a negative action was threatened or taken you should check the box next to

Retaliation.

■Race □

Religion

□

□Age

NQural

liability

Origin

Retaliation [] Pregnancy

Color(typically a difference is skin shade within the same race)

choose which type(s) of genetic information is involved[~~] i. Genetic testing

I |ii. Family medical history

means counseling education or testing)

I Genetic Information,

I iiii. genetic service (genetic service

APP151

APPENDIX U2

Organization Name- Rockwell Automation

County- Cuyahoga

Address: 6680 Beta Drive

Zip- 44124 Phone- {__ 1

City* Mayfield Village State- OH

Type of Business- Automation Job Location if different from Org. Address'.

Human Resource Director or Owner-_____________________________

Number of Employees at all Locations. Please check one.

I I Fewer than 15 [H] 15-100 []]]l01-200 O201*500

MMore than 500

3. Your Employment Date (Complete as many items as you can) Are you a Federal

Employee? I [Yes

HNo

Job Title At Hire: Engineering Analyst

Date Hired- April 1. 1996

Last or Current Pay Rate:72K per year

Pay Rate When Hired: 36K per year

Job Title at Time of Alleged Discrimination: Sr. Eng. Analyst Date Quit or Discharged:

Name and Title of Immediate Supervisor : Robert Rodriguez/Supervisor

APP 153

If you checked color, religion or national origin, please specify*.

APPENDIX U2

Other reason (basis) for discrimination (Explain) _____________________________________

What happened to you that you believe was discriminatory? Include the dates of harm,

the action(s) and the name (s) and (titles) of the person(s) who you believe discriminated

against you. Please attach additional pages if needed.

(Example-10/02/06 discharged bvMr. John Sota. Production Supervisor)__________________

A.) 11/2016

Action^ Made negative statement about all black people. Attempted to

created circumstances with would cause my termination

Name and Title of Person(s) responsible:

Robert Rodriguez/Supervisor

6. Why do you believe these actions were discriminatory? Please attach addition pages if

needed. Because of the alhance with other employees that have made racial remarks which

APP 154

were reported to HR in the past Supervisors and department has a history ofracial

problems and statements he has made.

7. What reasons were given to you for the acts you consider discriminatory? By whom? His or

Her Job Title? I was told that the coach that was assigned to me could be difficult but the

APPENDIX U2

proofIprovided that she was deliberate savataging. I was refused a coach reassignment, 2

wks after this coach was on eternity lea ve 2 other coaches looked over previous work and

certified me.

8. Describe who was in the same or similar situation as you and how they were treated. For

example, who else applied for the same job you did, who else had the same attendance record,

~ or who else had the same performance? Provide the race, sex,-age, national origin, religion,

or disability of these individuals, if know and if it relates to you claim of discrimination. For

the sex of each person- and so on. Use additional sheet if needed.

Of the persons in the same or similar situation as you, who was treated than you?

Job Title

Race, sex, age, national

A. Full Name

origin, religion, or disability

Sr. Eng. Analyst

Luella Westerfield

Black/African American_____________________

Description of TreatmentFired without cause

. •'f-'jt-of.

■ --‘"■S3

APP 155

Race, sex, age, national

origin, religion, or disability

Black

Description of Treatment: Demoted without cause

B. Full Name

Ester Hovis

Job Title

Eng. Analyst

APPENDIX U2

Side IB

My situation has been ongoing for 8 yrs. In 20091reported an incident to the HR

department Since then I was slowly demoted from my Team lead position. No Supervisor

would interact with me as the team Leader. Then finally the title was changed to team

coordination and the person whom I replaced as team leader was returned essentially to the

team lead position.

The original incident centered around 2 employee that mad direct racial comments 1 of which

I have in an email. Since I reported to HR the following has occurred.

1. Received email that all merit pay increases would be base on performance, but when

my performance was best in my department, I was asked by my superviser Brian -Do

you want me to take from the other white men's increase and give it to you?

2. Paid a different rate than anyone else for the same job/special task.

3. Ignored by H.R. when I expressed not feehng safe in special event with my co-workers

APP 156

4. Deliberately left out of equipment orders and more.

APPENDIX U2

Of the persons in the same or similar situation as you, who was treated worse than you?

Job Title

Race, sex, age, national

A. Full Name

origin, religion, or disability

Description of Treatment

B. Full Name

Race, sex, age, national

origin, religion, or disability

Job Title

Description of Treatment

Of the persons in the same or similar situation as you who was treated the same as you?

Job Title

Race, sex, age, national

A. Full Name

origin, religion, or disability

APP 157

Description of Treatment

B. Full Name

Race, sex, age, national

origin, religion, or disability

Job Title

Description of Treatment

APPENDIX U2

Answer questions 9*11 only if you are claiming discrimination based on disability. If not, skip

to question 13. Please tell us if you have more than one disability. Please add additional

---- pages if needed.- 9. Please check all that apply

- •*

- *.**

| | Yes, I have a disability

I 1 I do not have a disability now but I did

—

have one

| | No disability but the organization treats

me as If I am disabled

v.'

APP 158

10. What is the disability that you believe is the reason for the adverse action taken against

you? Does this disability prevent or limit you from doing anything? (e.g. lifting, sleeping,

breathing, walking or taking care of yourself, working, etc.)

11. Do you use medication, medical equipment, or anything else to lessen or eliminate the

symptoms of your disability?

D-

APPENDIX U2

If "Yes” what medication, medical equipment or other assistance do you use?

12. Did you ask your employer for any changes or assistance to do your job because of your

disability?

□ Yes

□ No

If “yes” what did you ask?

How did you ask? (verbally or in writing)?

Who did you ask? (Provide full name and job title of person)

Describe the changes or assistance that you asked for

APP 159

How did your employer respond to your request?

APPENDIX U2

SIDE 2A

13. Are there any witnesses to the alleged discriminatory incidents? If yes, please identify

them below and tell us what they will say. (Please attach additional pages if needed to

complete your response.)__________________________ ________________________________

Address and Phone

Job Title

Full Name

Sr. Eng. Analyst

Gary Walker

What do you believe this person will tell us?

As much as possible, He knows there was a racial incident and since then I was demoted

APP 160

14. Have you filed a charge previously in this matter with the EEOC or another agency?

■ No

□ Yes

15. If you have filed a complaint with another agency provide name of agency and date of

filings

APPENDIX U2

16. Have you sought help about this situation from a union an attorney or any other

source?

■ No Provide name of organization, name of person you spoke with

□ Yes

and date of contact, Results, if any?

Please check on of the boxed below to tell us what you would like us to do with the

information you are providing on this questionnaire. If you would like to file a charge of

job discrimination, you must do so either within 180 days from the day you knew about the

discrimination or within 300 days from the day you knew about the discrimination if the

employer is located in a place where a state or local government agency enforces laws

similar to EEOC’s laws. If you do not file a charge of discrimination within the time limits

APP 161

you will lose your rights. If you would like more information before filing a charge or you

have concerns about EEOC’s notifying the employer, union or employment agency, you

may wish to check box 1. If you want to file a charge, you should check box 2.

1 I want to talk to an EEOC employee before deciding whether to file a charge.

Box 1

I understand that by checking this box, I have not filed a charge with the

EEOC. I also understand that I could lose my rights if I do not file a charge in

time.

I want to file a charge of discrimination, and I authorize the EEOC to look

Box 2

into the discrimination I described above. I understand that the EEOC must

give the employer, union, or employment agency that I accuse of discrimination

the information about the charges including my name. I also understand the can

only accept job discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin,

disability, age, genetic information, or retaliation for opposing discrimination.

8/7/2017

s!Faith Townsend

Today's Date

Signature

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: This form is covered by the Privacy Act of 1974: Public Law

93*579. Authority for requesting personal data and the uses thereof are:

l.FORM NUMBER/TITLE DATE: EEOC Intake Questionnaire(9/2008).

APP 162

•-O''.'

2. AUTHORITY: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 211, 29 U.S.C. § 626 42 U.S.C. 12117(a),

42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6

3. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE. The purpose of this questionnaire is to solicit information about

claims of employment discrimination, determine whether the EEOC has jurisdiction over

those claims and provide charge filing counseling as appropriate. Consistent with 29 CFR

1626.8(c ). This questionnaire may serve as a charge if it meets the elements of a charge.

4. ROUTINE USES: EEOC may disclose information from this form to other state, local and

federal agencies as appropriate or necessary to carry out the congressional offices in response

to inquiries from parties to the charge to disciplinary committees investigating complaints

against attorneys representing the parties to the charge or federal agencies inquiring about

hiring or security clearance matters.

5. WHETHER DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUTARY AND EFFECT ON

INDIVTUAL FOR NOT PROVIDING INFORMTION. Pending of this information in

voluntary but the failure to do so may hamper the Commisioner’s investigation of a charge. It

is not mandatory that this form be used to provide the requested information.

APP 163

APPENDIX U2

SIDE 2B

My work environment is isolated. I work weekend with 4 white men and occasionally the

supervisor might stop in. Mr. Gary Walker just happened to be someone I confided in when I

was upset about their racial remark, but he can verify that I was team leader and for some

unknown reason I was no longer team leader.

APP 164

APPENDIX U3

EEOC Form 5 (11/09)

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION

This form is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974.

See enclosed Privacy Act Statement and other

information before completing this form.

Charge Presented ToCharge No(s)-

Agency(ies)

□FEPA

[x]eeoc

Ohio Civil Rights Commission

532-201802669

and EEOC

APP 165

Sta te or local Agency, ifany

Name (indicate Mr., Ms., Mrs.)

Ms. Faith Townsend

City, State and ZIP Code 803 East 155th

Street Address

Street, Cleveland, OH 44110

Date of Birth

Home Phone

(Incl. Area Code)

1961

(216) 647 1697

Named is the Employer, Labor Organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticeship Committee, or

State or LocarGovernment Agency That I Believe Discriminated Against Me or Others. {Ifmore

than two, list under PARTICULARS below)

Phone No.

No.

Name

(Include Area

Employees,

Code)

Members

(440) 646-6800

500 or More

ROCKWELL AUTOMATION

City, State and ZIP Code 6680 Beta Drive,

Street Address

Mayfield Village, OH 44143

APP 166

No.

Employees,

Members

Name

Street Address

Phone No.

(Include Area

Code)

City, State and ZIP Code

DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es)J

ijRACEQ COLOR Q SEX Q RELIGION [^NATIONAL

ORIGIN. ......

DATE(S)

DISCRIMINATION

TOOK PLACE

Latest

Earliest

08-07-2018

APP 167

D AGE [H DISABILITY ^retaliation

in GENETIC

INFORMATION

OTHER (Specify)

| |C0NTINUING

ACTION

APP 168

THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional paper is needed, attach

extra sheet(s))I began employment with Respondent in or around April 1996. My most recent position was

Senior Engineering Analyst in the After Hours dept. I previously filed EEOC Charge #846‘201735978. During my employment, I was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment,

including, but not limited to, being placed in all of the phone queues, 20 queues, while my four

White male co*workers were only assigned to one queue, placing an unfair work load onto me

and creating an unfair positive advantage for the rest of my work group. I have been demoted

since my original complaint to Respondent concerning racial slurs and harassment from these co*

workers. I believe this queue assignment is another instance of the harassment since my current

-supervisor has also participated in making derogatory racial remarks. Even after filing the

EEOC charge mentioned above the harassment has continued and progressed to the co-workers

contacting me by text. Subsequently, I was suspended. On or about August 7, 2018,1 was

constructively discharged.

I believe that I was discriminated against because of my race, Black, and in retaliation for

engaging in

I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the

NOTARY — When necessary for State and

Local Agency Requirements

State or local Agency, if any. I will advise the

APP 169

agencies if I change my address or phone number and

I will cooperate fully with them in the processing of

I swear or affirm that I have read the

my charge in accordance with their procedures.

above charge and that it is true to the best

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is

of my knowledge, information and belief.

true and correct.

SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE

ME THIS DATE

{month, day, year)

Date

Charging Party Signa ture

EEOC Form 5 (11/09)

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION

Charge Presented To: Agency(ies) Charge

No(s):

APP 170

This form is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974.

See enclosed Privacy Act Statement and other

information before completing this form.

rjFEPA

[x]eeoc

532-201802669

Ohio Civil Rights Commission

Sta te or local Agency, ifany

protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

and EEOC

APP 171

NOTARY - When necessary for State and

I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and

the State or local Agency, if any. I will advise the Local Agency Requiremen ts

agencies if I change my address or phone number

and I will cooperate fully with them in the

I swear or affirm that I have read the above

processing of my charge in accordance with their

charge and that it is true to the best of my

procedures.___________________________________ knowledge, information, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT

true and correct.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE

ME THIS DATE

{Month, day, year)

Date

Charging Party Signa ture

APP 172

APPENDIX UZ

Notes from CMC meeting July 30th 2017

Faith Townsend <ftownsend2009@hotmail.com>

Tue 8/20/2019 10:04 am

To: Faith Townsend (via Google Drive) <ftownsend2009@gmail.com>

I asked, while being seated, If I could use my recorder? Judge Gwin answered “No”. Judge

Gwin immediately informed me that the 2017 EEOC filing would be “Time Barred” meaning

the majority of my evidence would not be heard. Then he proceeded to ask me about the length of time I was suspended and how much my wages were and proceeded to calculate how

much money would have been made during that suspension. I informed him the suspension

was paid. Afterwards he inquired into my current employment status, asking if I am

currently employed, I replied “No”, then he asked if I was applying, I replied ”No”. Then he

proceeded to ask if I believed Robert Rodriguez attended my son’s funeral with mahintent? I

replied ”yes”.

The Rockwell Automation Lawyer then spoke about Rockwell’s position on the case

uninterrupted. Afterwards the judge asked me why I didn’t have a lawyer. I explained most

APP 173

APPENDIX UZ

lawyers aren’t interested in a case where the employee resigned. I was then informed I was

going to have a hard time proving constructive termination and that I would need to

construct a demand letter and provide it to the defendant. The judge then asked if anything

else happened in the 07/17/2017 to 8/18/2018 time frame. Since the rug had essentially been

pulled out from under my case, I briefly mentioned that Rockwell put money into my bank _

account as pay for 8/6 and 8/7/2018 and reported to the unemployment agency that I worked

those days and provided false information on how I departed my employment there. Also, that

during the meeting at Rockwell in March 2018 I suspected that Steve Ostrom was armed. He

asked me if I saw the gun? I answered No. The Judge then asked me about the email (case

document) that caused my suspension the attorney said she had a copy but did not provide it

at that time.

Judge Gwin and the Rockwell Attorney then proceeded to quietly discuss the-deadline for

amending the complaint, discovery etc...I heard him tell her “I will set this for today-for you”.

I advised him I could not hear, I said “I am missing some of those dates” He replied “you will

get them in the filing”. Afterwards the meeting was dismissed and the Rockwell attorney and

Steve Ostrom remained in the room to speak with the judge in private, myself and the interns

left.

APP 174

APPENDIX UZ

Mandatory participants for the meeting were not there. Rockwell only provided the Attorney

In Son Loving and Steve Ostrom. The court provided a tall man with black hair that seem to

be taking notes for the court and two interns. Later that day I logged into Pacer so see the

filing at the end of the day only the Notice that the meeting had been held was there. When I

checked the next day, the Filing showing the Deadline dates was posted showing that the

deadline to amend the complaint was July 30th, the same day as the CMC meeting. Given

the opportunity I would have included the false information provided to the insurance

company. Rockwell informed the insurance company that I left May 22 2018 which blocked

any FLMAT was entitled to and later falsified insurance payments.

HTTPV/outlook.hve.com/mail/O/serch/id/AQQkADAwATZiZmYAZClhYjdhLWRKAGeXLTAw

AiOwAOAEABYiFDYJfrmjlWAAIMSOOZcw% 3D% 3D

APP 175

APPENDIX UZ

Case l:l8-cv-02742-JG Dock# 28 Filed 07/31/19 1 of 1. PagelD #:129

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRIC COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Faith Townsend

Plaintiff

•vs-

Rockwell Automation Inc.

Defendant

)

Case no. U18-cv*02742

)

JUDGE- James S. Gwin

Mag. Judged Jonathan D. Greenberg

)

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant’s Answer and Motion to Dismiss

)

The Court has determined the portion of the complaint outlined in the September 2017 EEOC

filing #846-2017-35978 will be time barred. I would like some understanding from the court.

To understand that although I was able to go to the eeoc office I was in no condition to think

APP 176

clearly. My mental state was indescribable., and I could barely speak when it was time to

explain what was going on with my employer. The trauma of the actions of Robert Rodriguez

and the other people who showed up at my Sons funeral was too much to handle and I would

break down in tears when confronted with the recollection of that day, because as I sat there

with my son, hate showed up. Even as I construct this response I struggle.

I didn’t follow through with a lawsuit simply because I didn’t have the mental fortitude

to do so. It was all I could do at the time to make it through each day and try to get back to

normal which involved going back to work, where the harassment started again immediately

upon my return.

The portion of the complaint that the court has barred, demonstrates the severity of the

racism I suffered at Rockwell Automation and the lengths it would go to reject any mention

that its employees caters to it. In the CMC meeting I mentioned that Mr. Ostrom was armed

at the meeting held at Rockwell Automation. This is not something I am brining up all of a

sudden; I have attached a copy of my resignation letter.

I Pray that you will reconsider your position on this matter an consider the

unprecedented circumstances of this case. You have the power to waive the time restriction.

I Pray for Fairness and justice

s/Faith Townsend/ProSe

APP 177

APPENDIX UZ

Mail-Faith Townsend - Outlook

EMPLOYMENT

Faith Townsend

Tue 8/7/2018 7:22 am

To: Stconti@ra.rockwell.com

Hi Sal,

I am contacting you because I have no interest in further conversation with Steve Ostrom. It

is difficult to end a position that for many years you have enjoyed, have excelled at and have

been proud to do, because there are people who simply do not want people like you there.

There are many reasons why I would want to continue the fight to stay there but there is only

that I will not.

Twice has been reported, my concern about my safety to the HR department. The

meeting with Mr. Blakemore and Ostrom made it clear that I need to understand and accept

that No One at Rockwell Automation will admit y that there is a “cancer” in the Tech Support

department. It became clear that everyone has confessed to their actions and that Mr.

Blakemore and Ostrom helped them construct new lies, then created a situation that would

cause Mr. Ostrom to take extreme precaution for the investigation overview meting as if I

APP 178

was a threat. I guess one would be scared to call someone a liar when it’s clear that they

know you are not but choose to collaborate with the people you complained about in an effort

to disprove everything you have said, instead of acknowledging the evidence and construction

a solution. I thought I was safe, at least on the premises, but now the game is “She’s Angry I

feared for my safety”. And I should be angry, but I have never threatened anyone, cursed, or

even raised my voice to anyone. I reported people that has done these things toward me, now

here I am. The snide insinuating remarks that I complained about are now coming to my cell

phone which is proof that when Mr. Ostrom said “nothing would change” he meant it and

expressed that to all concerned. Now the people who I complained about can use that “She’s

Angry, I feared for my safety” excuse a well. When someone express that they want to use

their guns against people like you, and “The good thing about using a gun is that you don’t

leave any witnesses, you should take them seriously. And now I know if they follow through,

Rockwell’s INVESTIGATION will be no different. I stand by everything I have said. To have

some of your employees harassing others, then injecting themselves into their personal lives

because of information they were able to get from the internet or because someone has gained

access to their Rockwell email makes a situation dangerous. You will address this cancer, in

no voluntary, involuntary like all cancers.

APP 179

My financial well being is a concern to me, no different form anyone else, which has

cause me to struggle with my decision, but my Safety and Health out ways that. So I will not

return to work for you complaint.

I will contact the HR department for my exit instructions,

Faith Townsend

Sr. Engineering Analyst/Rockwell Automation

HTTPy/outlook.live.com/mail/O/serch/id/AQQkADAwATZiZmYAZClhYidhLWRKAGeXLTAw

AiOWAOwMAoARGAAA%2Fn63vZ5HWlltGRQi8QRL8HAFXmw...

APP 180

APPENDIX W

Rockwell Automation

PERIOD

BEGINNING

01-11-99

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.