Amicus Curiae Brief — Food and Drug Administration, et al., Petitioners v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 1, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Nos. 23-235 and 23-236
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
————
DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,
Petitioner,
v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
————
On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
————
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AND
BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE OF FORMER
COMMISSIONERS OF THE U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
————
WILLIAM B. SCHULTZ
Counsel of Record
MARGARET M. DOTZEL
ALYSSA M. HOWARD
ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
1800 M St. NW
Ste. 1000
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 778-1800
wschultz@zuckerman.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
No. 23-235
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
___________
No. 23-236
DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C., ET AL., PETITIONER
v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
___________
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF OF FORMER FDA COMMISSIONERS
AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
___________
Former commissioners and acting commissioners of
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Former FDA
Commissioners)1 respectfully request leave to submit a
brief as amici curiae in support of Petitioners.
Although Former FDA Commissioners recognize
that such motions are not favored, proposed Amici
respectfully submit that the unusual circumstances
here merit the Court’s consideration. Pursuant to
1 Former FDA Commissioners are: David A. Kessler, M.D.; Jane
E. Henney, M.D.; Margaret Hamburg, M.D.; Michael A. Friedman,
M.D.; Joshua M. Sharfstein, M.D.; Stephen Ostroff, M.D.; and
Norman E. “Ned” Sharpless, M.D.
2
Supreme Court Rule 25.1, Petitioners’ merits briefs
were due on January 29, 2024, meaning that amicus
briefs supporting Petitioners would have been due on
February 5 if Petitioners had filed on the deadline. See
S. Ct. R. 37.3. However, Petitioners filed their briefs six
days early, on January 23, and counsel for Amici did
not become aware of this until January 31, 2024. While
counsel for other amici who filed briefs during the
Court’s consideration of the petitions for writs of
certiorari received electronic notice of the filing of
Petitioners’ briefs, Former FDA Commissioners did not
file a brief as amici curiae before the merits stage, and
accordingly, counsel did not receive such electronic
notice. The Court’s acceptance of Former FDA
Commissioners’ amicus brief also will not prejudice any
party, as this proposed brief is filed just two days after
it was due under the Court’s Rules, giving Respondents
ample time to respond to any point raised in the amicus
brief.
Further, Former FDA Commissioners’ proposed
brief draws on their expertise and provides important
information about FDA’s role in monitoring the safety
and efficacy of drugs to help inform the Court’s
consideration
of
the
merits.
Former
FDA
Commissioners are uniquely positioned to explain the
onerous requirements imposed on manufacturers
seeking to market new drugs as well as FDA’s nuanced
approach to considering New Drug Applications and
subsequent modifications to conditions of use. As
physicians, Former FDA Commissioners are also
qualified to explain why FDA’s rigorous scientific
review of mifepristone’s initial approval and
subsequent modifications to its conditions of use merit
deference. Additionally, the amicus brief of Former
FDA Commissioners sets forth the potential
3
catastrophic consequences to public health that would
ensue if the Fifth Circuit’s decision were upheld.
Accordingly,
Former
FDA
Commissioners
respectfully ask the Court to grant them leave to file
this brief as amici curiae.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM B. SCHULTZ
Counsel of Record
MARGARET M. DOTZEL
ALYSSA M. HOWARD
ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
1800 M St. NW, Ste. 1000
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 778-1800
wschultz@zuckerman.com
mdotzel@zuckerman.com
ahoward@zuckerman.com
February 1, 2024
Counsel for Amici Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iii
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE ...................... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................. 3
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 5
I.
Congress granted FDA broad authority to
approve drugs and to modify the applicable
postmarketing restrictions. ................................... 5
A. The Agency’s drug approval process
requires rigorous review of available
scientific evidence. ........................................... 6
B. After a drug’s approval, FDA continues
to monitor safety data and retains the
authority to restrict its distribution
through REMS. ................................................ 9
II. After careful review confirming the safety
and efficacy of mifepristone, FDA approved
the drug in 2000. ................................................. 10
III. Consistent with the FDCA and FDA
regulations and mifepristone’s improved
safety profile, FDA amended the drug’s
postmarketing restrictions in 2016 and 2021. ....13
IV. Under the proper standard of review,
which requires significant deference
to FDA’s scientific experts, the challenges
to FDA’s decisions must be rejected. .................. 15
ii
V. FDA’s 2016 changes to mifepristone’s
REMS were not arbitrary and capricious. .......... 18
VI. FDA’s decision not to enforce the
in-person dispensing requirement in 2021
was not arbitrary and capricious. ....................... 21
VII. Allowing the Fifth Circuit’s decision
to stand would upend FDA’s drug approval
system and harm patients. ................................. 22
CONCLUSION ........................................................... 24
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC,
462 U.S. 87 (1983) .................................................. 16
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
592 U.S. 414 (2021) ...........................................15, 22
FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
141 S. Ct. 578 (2021) ................................. 3-4, 17, 20
Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743 (2015) ...........................................19, 20
Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett,
570 U.S. 472 (2013) .................................................. 5
NRDC v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,
823 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir. 2016)................................. 16
Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA,
373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004)............................... 16
Pharm. Mfg. Rsch. Servs., Inc. v. FDA,
957 F.3d 254 (D.C. Cir. 2020)................................. 17
Schering Corp. v. FDA,
51 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1995) ...................................... 17
Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala,
158 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1998)..........................16, 17
iv
Shrimpers & Fishermen of the RGV v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs,
56 F.4th 992 (5th Cir. 2023) ................................... 16
Troy Corp. v. Browner,
120 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1997)................................. 16
ViroPharma, Inc. v. Hamburg,
898 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2012)............................. 17
Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) ................................................... 8
Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016) .................................. 16
STATUTES
21 U.S.C. § 355(d)..................................................... 5, 6
21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(7) .................................................... 5
21 U.S.C. § 355-1 .......................................................... 9
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)........................................................9
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(h)...................................................... 9
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, Tit. IX, 121 Stat. 922:
§ 901, 121 Stat. 922 .............................................. 9
§ 909(b), 121 Stat. 950-951 (21 U.S.C. note) ........ 9
v
REGULATIONS
21 C.F.R. § 201.56 ........................................................ 5
21 U.S.C. § 201.57 ........................................................ 5
21 C.F.R. § 314.50 ........................................................ 5
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) ...................................... 8
21 C.F.R. § 314.80......................................................... 7
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b) .................................................... 7
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)..................................................... 8
21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) .................................................. 5
21 C.F.R. § 314.126 ...................................................... 5
21 C.F.R. § 314.500 .................................................. 8, 9
21 C.F.R. § 314.520 ...................................................... 9
Final Rule: New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological
Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval,
57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992) ......................... 9
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Claudia Diaz Olavarrieta et al., Nurse versus
physician-provision of early medical abortion
in Mexico: a randomized controlled
non-inferiority trial, 93 Bull World Health
Organ 249 (2015) .................................................... 20
vi
Cong. Budget Off., Research and Development
in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Apr. 2021).......... 24
Daniel Grossman et al., Effectiveness and
Acceptability of Medical Abortion Provided through
Telemedicine, 118 Obstetrics & Gynecology 296
(2011)........................................................................18
Rachel K. Jones et al.,
The Public Health Implications of the FDA
Update to the Medication Abortion Label,
Guttmacher Inst. (June 30, 2016) ............................ 8
Elizabeth G. Raymond et al.,
The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced
Abortion and Childbirth in the United States,
119 Obstetrics & Gynecology 215 (2012) ............... 18
Rachel Roubein et al.,
Abortion Pill Fight May Have
Broader Implications for FDA Drug Approval,
Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2023) ...................................... 7
Gilda Sedgh et al.,
Mifepristone for Abortion in a Global Context:
Safe, Effective and Approved in Nearly 100
Countries, Guttmacher Inst. .................................. 12
Katie Thomas,
The Unseen Survivors of
Thalidomide Want to Be Heard,
New York Times (Mar. 23, 2020) ............................. 3
U.S. Food & Drug. Admin.,
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS)
vii
Single Shared System for Mifepristone
200 mg (Jan. 2023)...................................................15
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Food and Drug
Administration: Approval and
Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex,
GAO-08-751 (Aug. 2008).............................. 10, 11, 12
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Food and Drug
Administration: Information on Mifeprex
Labeling Changes and Ongoing Monitoring Efforts,
GAO-18-292 (Mar. 2018) .............................18, 19, 21
U.S. Gov’t Pub’g Off., RU-486: Demonstrating a Low
Standard for Women’s Health?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Just., Drug Pol’y, & Hum. Res.
of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong.
(2006) ...................................................................... 11
Paul M. Wax,
Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
122 Annals Internal Med. 456 (1995) ...................... 2
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
No. 23-235
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
___________
No. 23-236
DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C., ET AL., PETITIONER
v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
___________
BRIEF OF FORMER FDA COMMISSIONERS
AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
___________
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici served as commissioners and acting
commissioners of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA or the Agency) and place a high
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, counsel for Amici
certify that: No party’s counsel authored this amicus brief in whole
or in part; no party or party’s counsel contributed money that was
intended to fund preparing or submitting this amicus brief; and
no person or entity, other than Amici or their counsel, contributed
money intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
amicus brief. This brief represents the views of the individual
Amici and not necessarily of their organizations.
1
2
value on the regulatory framework that provides
patients access to critical drugs and vaccines. By
second-guessing FDA’s evaluation of scientific data,
the Fifth Circuit’s decision threatens to undermine the
complex, evidence-based drug approval process that
Amici oversaw during their time leading the Agency
and that exists today. As experts in the drug approval
process, Amici are qualified to explain how the Fifth
Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the science of
FDA’s approval and subsequent actions with respect to
mifepristone. Amici will also describe how the Fifth
Circuit’s decision, if allowed to stand, would harm
patients that rely on FDA-approved drugs to treat
serious diseases by allowing courts to second-guess
FDA’s evaluation of scientific evidence supporting the
approval of new drug applications or modifications of
those approvals.
Amici are:
David A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner
(1990–1997)
Jane E. Henney, M.D., Commissioner
(1999–2001)
Margaret Hamburg, M.D., Commissioner
(2009–2015)
Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Acting
Commissioner (1997–1999)
Joshua M. Sharfstein, M.D., Acting
Commissioner (2009)
3
Stephen Ostroff, M.D., Acting
Commissioner (2015–2016, 2017)
Norman E. “Ned” Sharpless, M.D.,
Acting Commissioner (2019)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
For more than 60 years, Congress has trusted FDA
to ensure that companies demonstrate the safety and
efficacy of new drugs before they reach the market. And
for good reason. Congress first passed the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 after more than
100 people died due to toxic ingredients in elixir
sulfanilamide. This tragedy illustrated the dangers of
an unregulated drug market and led Congress to
empower FDA to serve as a gatekeeper requiring that
new drugs be proven safe before they can be marketed.2
Nearly 25 years later (in 1962) after the drug
thalidomide caused serious birth defects, Congress
expanded FDA’s authority by requiring drug
companies to prove to FDA that their drugs are
effective.3
Today, every FDA decision to approve a drug is
supported by hundreds of scientific judgments made by
a team of experts, which includes physicians, chemists,
Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 122 Annals Internal Med.
456 (1995).
2
Katie Thomas, The Unseen Survivors of Thalidomide Want to
Be
Heard,
New
York
Times
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/health/thlidomide-survirosusa.html.
3
4
biologists, pharmacologists, and statisticians. To
determine whether a drug meets the standard
established by Congress, these experts typically must
review a massive quantity of data submitted by the
sponsor of the New Drug Application (NDA), including
complex clinical studies. The Agency’s final decision
regarding whether to approve any drug results from
this careful process—often occurring over several years
and always involving numerous scientific judgments by
experts. Once a drug is approved, its sponsor and FDA
both continue to monitor safety and efficacy data to
determine if any changes in the conditions of approval
are warranted.
This case does not involve FDA’s interpretation of
applicable law, and there is no dispute about the legal
standard that FDA applied in approving the drug at
issue here. Instead, the dispute involves FDA’s
evaluation of the scientific data submitted to support
the approval of a new drug application. As this Court
has recognized, judicial review of an administrative
agency’s action based on the agency’s evaluation of
technical evidence is extremely deferential, and a court
may not second-guess an agency’s judgment unless the
agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious. In
applying this standard, the court’s role is to determine
whether the agency’s decision was “reasonable and
reasonably explained.” See FCC v. Prometheus Radio
Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021); see also FDA v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578,
579 (2021) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
In this case, instead of reviewing FDA’s 2016 and
2021 modifications to mifepristone’s postmarketing
restrictions under this firmly established standard, the
5
Fifth Circuit substituted its own opinions about the
scientific data for the expert judgments of FDA
clinicians and scientists, and on that basis overturned
FDA’s reasoned, evidence-based decisions.
This unprecedented decision turns Congress’s
desired regulatory scheme on its head and opens the
door to constant legal challenges of drug approval
decisions. If permitted to stand, the Fifth Circuit’s
approach would allow courts to substitute their lay
analysis for FDA’s scientific expertise and to overturn
the Agency’s approval and conditions of use for drugs—
even after they have been on the market for decades.
The resulting uncertainty would threaten the
incentives for drug companies to undertake the timeconsuming and costly investment required to develop
new drugs and ultimately hinder patients’ access to
critical remedies that prevent suffering and save lives.
ARGUMENT
I.
Congress granted FDA broad authority to
approve drugs and to modify the applicable
postmarketing restrictions.
FDA is the expert agency that Congress has tasked
with reviewing and approving drugs according to
established scientific principles. FDA reviewers
include doctors, pharmacologists, chemists, biologists,
and statisticians—all with advanced degrees in their
respective disciplines—who review every aspect of an
NDA submitted by a sponsor. Through FDA’s
consideration of each NDA, its reviewers make
hundreds of scientific judgments that lead the Agency
to an ultimate decision whether to approve or deny the
6
application. Further, once an NDA is approved, the
Agency continues to monitor the drug’s safety and
efficacy.
A.
The Agency’s drug approval process
requires rigorous review of
available scientific evidence.
In order for a new drug to be approved, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) directs FDA to
determine whether the sponsor’s application contains
evidence demonstrating that the drug is safe and
effective for its intended use, based on “adequate and
well-controlled investigations.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 314.105(c). FDA has promulgated
regulations describing the requirements for clinical
investigations that meet the statutory standard and
the labeling requirements for approved drugs. See 21
C.F.R. §§ 201.56, 201.57, 314.50, 314.126. Congress
requires that FDA conduct a careful risk-benefit
analysis in considering each NDA “to facilitate the
balanced consideration of benefits and risks, a
consistent and systematic approach to the discussion
and
regulatory
decisionmaking,
and
the
communication of the benefits and risks of new drugs.”
21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(7); see also Mutual Pharm. Co. v.
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 476 (2013) (“In order for the
FDA to consider a drug safe, the drug’s ‘probable
therapeutic benefits must outweigh its risk of harm.’”).
FDA imposes complex, rigorous standards in its
review of NDAs and requires drug sponsors to
demonstrate the drug’s safety and efficacy through
rigorous scientific studies, including laboratory and
pre-clinical testing as well as three separate phases of
7
clinical studies (with the later phase studies usually
including several thousand patients). Further, drug
sponsors must demonstrate that the methods used in,
and the facilities used for, the manufacturing,
processing, and packaging of the drug are adequate to
“preserve its identity, strength, quality, and purity.” 21
U.S.C. § 355(d). FDA’s scientific and medical experts
receive information from and confer with the drug
sponsor throughout the development and approval
process. Because of the high statutory standard, many
NDAs are never approved.
Under the FDCA and FDA regulations, the
conditions and indications on a drug’s approved label
are not required to be identical to the conditions under
which the drug was studied. Further, as FDA has
explained, “[m]any clinical trial designs are more
restrictive * * * than will be necessary or recommended
in post-approval clinical use; this additional level of
caution is exercised until the safety and efficacy of the
product is demonstrated.” J.A. 265. Consistent with
scientific best practices and medical ethics, conditions of
use for approved drugs frequently differ from clinical
trial protocols. For example, although biopsies were
required in clinical trials for menopause hormonal
therapy drugs to protect trial participants until safety
was established, once FDA approved those drugs as
safe and effective, such mandated biopsies were no
longer required and would have been impractical. J.A.
265.
Industry members and consumers around the world
regard FDA’s rigorous review of NDAs as the “gold
8
standard” in ensuring drug safety and efficacy.4 For
this reason, FDA’s approval of a new drug promotes its
uptake and acceptance. Drug companies look to the
consistency, clarity, and predictability of FDA’s drug
review and approval processes to inform future
investments in developing new drugs and vaccines.
After a product is approved and used by larger
numbers of people, its safety profile may change.
Accordingly, the NDA sponsor is required to monitor
the drug’s safety and report adverse events to FDA. See
21 C.F.R. § 314.80. Specifically, the drug sponsor “must
promptly review all adverse drug experience
information obtained or otherwise received by
the applicant from any source, foreign or domestic,
including information derived from commercial
marketing experience,
postmarketing
clinical
investigations, * * * reports in the scientific literature,
and unpublished scientific papers.” Id. § 314.80(b).
Further, the regulation requires that the drug sponsor
“develop written procedures for the surveillance,
receipt, evaluation, and reporting of postmarketing
adverse drug experiences to FDA.” Id. The regulation
also requires that sponsors, manufacturers, packers,
and distributors report serious, unexpected adverse
experiences to FDA within 15 days and submit
quarterly adverse drug experience reports. Id. §
314.80(c).
See Rachel Roubein, Laurie McGinley & David Ovalle,
Abortion Pill Fight May Have Broader Implications for FDA Drug
Approval,
Wash.
Post
(Mar.
15,
2023),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2023/03/15/abortion-pillfda/.
4
9
Thus, the law places considerable responsibility on
manufacturers to assure the continued safety of their
drugs. For example, when new information about the
safety of a drug becomes available, FDA’s regulations
permit the manufacturer to add information to the
drug’s label without the Agency’s approval. See 21
C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555 (2009). In addition, FDA regularly evaluates the
safety reports it receives. Sometimes after reviewing
new safety data, FDA requires that a drug be
withdrawn from the market. Sometimes (as with
mifepristone) the safety profile of the drug improves.5
B.
After a drug’s approval, FDA
continues to monitor safety data and
retains the authority to restrict its
distribution through REMS.
In 1992, FDA promulgated regulations for drugs
intended to treat “serious or life-threatening illnesses”
that “provide[d] meaningful therapeutic benefit to
patients over existing treatments.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.500,
Subpart H. The Subpart H regulations authorized FDA
See Rachel K. Jones & Heather D. Boonstra, The Public
Health Implications of the FDA Update to the Medication Abortion
Label,
Guttmacher
Inst.
(June
30,
2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2016/06/public-healthimplications-fda-update-medication-abortion-label
(explaining
that FDA’s 2016 changes to mifepristone’s conditions of use were
supported by substantial evidence gathered since the drug’s initial
approval in 2000).
5
10
to impose conditions needed “to assure safe use,”
including distribution restrictions.6
In 2007, Congress ratified and expanded on Subpart
H. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
(FDAAA) of 2007, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1; see FDAAA, Pub.
L. No. 110-85, Tit. IX, § 901, 121 Stat. 922. These
amendments authorized the Agency to require a “risk
evaluation and mitigation strategy” (REMS) when it
finds that restrictions on use are necessary to meet
FDA’s safety and efficacy standards, which apply to
every drug. Id.
Under the FDAAA, any conditions needed “to assure
safe use” established under Subpart H were
automatically converted to a REMS with the same
restrictions. Id. § 909(b), 121 Stat. at 950-51 (21 U.S.C.
§ 331 note). When FDA determines that new
requirements are needed to assure safe use or that
existing requirements are no longer necessary, FDA
may modify a drug’s approved REMS. Id. §§ 355-1(g),
(h).
II.
After careful review confirming the safety
and efficacy of mifepristone, FDA approved
the drug in 2000.
In 2000—after an intensive review spanning more
than four years, at least 92 submissions by the drug
sponsor, and a unanimous advisory committee vote in
favor of approval—FDA approved mifepristone (under
the brand name Mifeprex®) as safe and effective to
Final Rule: New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product
Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,958
(Dec. 11, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500, 314.520).
6
11
terminate pregnancy through the first seven weeks of
gestation. J.A. 224–232. Pursuant to its authority
under Subpart H, FDA placed restrictions on the drug’s
distribution, including a requirement that mifepristone
be dispensed in person by or under the supervision of a
physician with specified qualifications. Ibid.
Mifepristone’s approval complied with the statute’s
evidentiary standard. FDA scientific and medical
experts comprehensively reviewed the totality of
scientific evidence and concluded that, with those
distribution restrictions in place, the benefits of
mifepristone outweighed its risks. In reaching this
conclusion, FDA experts performed an exhaustive
review of large volumes of clinical trial data across
three rounds of review over the course of more than
four years.7 Mifepristone’s approval was carried out
using the process Congress created and FDA has been
implementing since its enactment more than 60 years
ago. If anything, the external pressure and sensitivity
surrounding the approval of mifepristone resulted in
FDA taking particular care because the Agency knew
that the drug’s approval would face scrutiny.8 In 2008,
See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Food and Drug
Administration: Approval and Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex,
GAO-08-751 (Aug. 2008) (“GAO-08-751”).
7
FDA was correct to assume that its approval of mifepristone
would be scrutinized. Immediately after the 2000 Approval,
several groups filed a citizen petition seeking reversal of the
decision. See J.A. 201–223. In 2006, there was a Congressional
hearing on the approval. See U.S. Gov’t Publ’g Off., RU-486:
Demonstrating a Low Standard for Women’s Health?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just., Drug Pol’y, & Hum. Res. of
the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. (2006). In 2008, the
8
12
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
confirmed that FDA’s review and approval of
mifepristone was consistent with the processes for
other Subpart H drugs, recognizing that the details of
FDA’s approval depended on the unique risks and
benefits of each drug.9
In its initial review, FDA compared the results of
three mifepristone clinical trials—two from France and
one from the United States—to reliable, welldocumented data on pregnancy, including rates of
miscarriage.10 These trials included more than 4,000
patients across the different studies.11
FDA also convened an advisory committee of
reproductive health drug experts to evaluate the data
on mifepristone.12 That committee voted six to zero,
with two abstentions, that the benefits of mifepristone
U.S. Government Accountability Office issued its comprehensive
review of the 2000 approval and oversight of mifepristone,
concluding that there were no irregularities. See GAO-08-751.
9
GAO-08-751 at 6.
Id. at 15–16. By the time FDA approved mifepristone in 2000,
the drug had already been approved for use in many other
countries. Mifepristone had been approved in France, China, and
the United Kingdom in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and by
1999, nearly a dozen more countries had followed suit. Today,
mifepristone is available in at least 94 other countries. See Gilda
Sedgh & Irum Taqi, Mifepristone for Abortion in a Global Context:
Safe, Effective and Approved in Nearly 100 Countries, Guttmacher
Inst., https://www.guttmacher.org/2023/07/mifepristone-abortionglobal-context-safe-effective-and-approved-nearly-100-countries.
10
11
Id.
12
Id. at 16–17.
13
outweigh its risks and seven to zero, with one
abstention, that mifepristone is safe.13
As is often the case, FDA did not approve
mifepristone after the sponsor’s initial submission.
Instead, FDA denied approval twice to require and
evaluate additional data and information from the
drug sponsor. After completing those evaluations, FDA
concluded, based on its own comprehensive review of
the
data
and
the
advisory
committee’s
recommendations, that mifepristone was safe and
effective for use in terminating early-stage pregnancies
subject to certain distribution restrictions.
III.
Consistent with the FDCA and FDA
regulations and mifepristone’s improved
safety profile, FDA amended the drug’s
postmarketing restrictions in 2016 and 2021.
The subsequent modifications to mifepristone’s
approved conditions of use were also driven by a
straightforward and thorough application of the expert
scientific review process that Congress entrusted to
FDA. In May 2015, Danco Laboratories, L.L.C.
(“Danco”), the drug’s sponsor, submitted a
supplemental new drug application proposing changes
to mifepristone’s conditions of use, which was approved
by the Agency in March 2016, following a
comprehensive scientific review by numerous FDA
scientific and medical experts who examined 16 years
of experience with mifepristone, guidelines from
professional organizations here and abroad, and
clinical trials that had been published in the peer13
Id.
14
reviewed medical literature since the drug’s approval.
J.A. 284–291.
Relying on safety and efficacy data from more than
20 studies, FDA increased the gestational age limit
from seven to ten weeks. J.A. 283–291, 298–300, 450–
456. Relying on an additional dozen studies, FDA also
reduced the number of required in-person clinical visits
from three to one, allowing patients to self-administer
misoprostol at home. J.A. 300–302, 456–457. Based on
five studies including more than 3,000 patients, FDA
modified the REMS to allow the sponsors to distribute
the drug to a broader set of healthcare providers,
rather than only physicians, to prescribe and dispense
mifepristone. J.A. 309–310, 461–462.
Finally, FDA modified a prior requirement that
prescribers of mifepristone report certain non-fatal
adverse events such as hospitalizations and blood
transfusions to Danco. J.A. 319. After considering 15
years of adverse event reporting since mifepristone’s
approval in 2000, which demonstrated the drug’s
safety, FDA found that the reporting of serious adverse
events other than death could instead be “collected in
the periodic safety update reports and annual reports”
submitted by the drug’s sponsor to FDA as it generally
requires for other prescription drugs. Ibid. This change
did not impact reporting requirements for Danco,
which remain unchanged, supra Part I.A; instead it
eliminated some, but not all, of the reporting
requirements for prescribers, which typically are not
required for prescription drugs.
In 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic public
health emergency, after conducting a thorough review
15
of the relevant data, FDA exercised its enforcement
discretion with respect to the in-person dispensing
requirement in mifepristone’s REMS. FDA determined
that the available data and information, including
studies regarding the use of telehealth, supported
modification of the REMS to reduce the burden on the
health care delivery system and to ensure that the
benefits of the product outweighed its risks. J.A. 377.
Then, following another thorough review by multiple
scientists, FDA amended mifepristone’s REMS on
January 3, 2023 to remove the in-person dispensing
requirement.14
IV.
Under the proper standard of review, which
requires significant deference to FDA’s
scientific experts, the challenges to FDA’s
decisions must be rejected.
In reviewing FDA’s approval of mifepristone, the
courts below did not review FDA’s interpretation of a
law. Instead, they reviewed FDA’s scientific evaluation
of the studies and other data supporting the Agency’s
modifications of mifepristone’s conditions of use in
2016 and 2021. In finding that Respondents were likely
to prevail on the merits of their APA claims, the Fifth
Circuit misapplied the well-established arbitrary and
capricious standard and failed to give FDA the
requisite deference. See, e.g., Prometheus, 592 U.S. at
423. Under this standard, the courts’ role is to
14
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) Single Shared System for
Mifepristone
200
mg
(Jan.
2023),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifepristo
ne_2023_01_03_REMS_Full.pdf.
16
ascertain whether agency decisions were “reasonable
and reasonably explained.” Id. As long as “the agency
has acted within a zone of reasonableness,” the
administrative action must be upheld. Id.
The scope of judicial review in assessing an
agency’s evaluation of data is even narrower when an
agency action is based on its analysis of scientific
evidence. Where a court reviews an agency’s decision
based on “scientific data within its technical expertise,”
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is
“extreme[ly] deferential.” Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v.
EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted); see also Shrimpers & Fishermen of the RGV
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 56 F.4th 992, 1001 (5th
Cir. 2023)
The reason for this deference is clear: Courts ensure
agencies’ compliance with the law, but they are illequipped to second-guess the technical judgments of an
agency within the scope of its subject-matter expertise.
Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (citation omitted) (explaining that courts “review
scientific judgments of the agency not as the chemist,
biologist, or statistician that we are qualified neither
by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing
court exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding
agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality”)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In
other words, judges are not “scientists independently
capable of assessing the validity of the agency’s
determination.” Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d
1313, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Balt. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); NRDC v. U.S.
Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 823 F.3d 641, 649 (D.C. Cir.
17
2016); Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d
654, 668 (7th Cir. 2016).
Here, “judgments as to what is required to ascertain
the safety and efficacy of drugs fall squarely within the
ambit of the FDA’s expertise and merit deference” from
reviewing courts. See Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d
390, 399 (3d Cir. 1995); see also FDA v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578, 579
(2021) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[C]ourts owe
significant deference to the politically accountable
entities with the ‘background, competence, and
expertise to assess public health.’”); Pharm. Mfg. Rsch.
Servs., Inc. v. FDA, 957 F.3d 254, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Serono is instructive. 158 F.3d at 1327. In that case,
the D.C. Circuit rejected the district court’s reversal of
FDA’s drug approval, explaining that, in evaluating a
technical decision of an agency based on scientific data,
the court’s role was limited to “holding [FDA] to the
standards of rationality required by the Administrative
Procedure Act.” Id. Indeed, insofar as can be
determined, no court has ever restricted access of an
FDA-approved
drug
by
invalidating
FDA’s
modification of a drug approval, as the Fifth Circuit did
here. See, e.g., ViroPharma, Inc. v. Hamburg, 898 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 5, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Serono, 158
F.3d at 1327) (“To the best of the parties’ and the
Court’s knowledge, the extraordinary relief that
[plaintiff] seeks is unprecedented in this jurisdiction.”).
Further, the only two district courts to overturn FDA
drug approvals were each reversed by the D.C. Circuit
and Fifth Circuit, respectively. See Serono, 158 F.3d at
1327; Pet. App. 1a–110a.
18
Here, in finding that Respondents would likely
prevail in their challenges to the 2016 and 2021
changes to mifepristone’s REMS, the Fifth Circuit
ignored important parts of the administrative record
and the correct standard of review. When the proper
standard of review is applied, the challenges to FDA’s
decisions must be dismissed.
V.
FDA’s 2016 changes to mifepristone’s REMS
were not arbitrary and capricious.
The Fifth Circuit erred in finding that FDA’s
modifications of the mifepristone’s REMS in 2016—
increasing the gestational age limit, reducing the
number of required clinic visits, expanding the types of
providers who could prescribe, and removing the
requirement that prescribers report non-fatal adverse
events to FDA—were likely arbitrary and capricious.
Before approving the changes to mifepristone’s
conditions of use and relabeling the drug, Agency
experts reviewed more than 20 years of data from
around the world demonstrating mifepristone’s safety
and efficacy.15 These studies, which included more
than 45,000 patients, demonstrated the efficacy and
safety of the proposed changes to mifepristone’s
labeling.16 For example, a literature review of 87
studies concluded that home use of misoprostol did not
lead to increased rates of treatment failure or serious
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Food and Drug Administration:
Information on Mifeprex Labeling Changes and Ongoing
Monitoring Efforts at 16, GAO-18-292 (Mar. 2018) (“GAO-18292”).
15
16
Id. at 12–16.
19
complications.17 Additional studies confirmed that the
risk associated with taking mifepristone was very
low.18 FDA also reviewed 15 years of adverse event
reporting from the drug’s approval in 2000 through
November 17, 2015. During that time period, there
were 17 reported deaths associated with mifepristone,
eight of which were associated with sepsis.19 Further,
this data showed that “the rates of hospitalizations,
severe infections, blood loss requiring transfusion, and
complications related to ectopic pregnancy remained
stable and acceptably low.”20
Although the Fifth Circuit correctly recognized that
FDA was not required to rely on studies with matching
conditions of use to those set forth in the 2016 REMS,
supra Part I.A, the court effectively imposed such a
requirement when it found that the 2016 changes
likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act
because FDA failed to consider the effect of all the
changes “as a whole.” Pet. App. 53a. The Fifth Circuit’s
analysis misapprehends the applicable legal standard
and ignores the administrative record. First, the Fifth
Circuit adopted the erroneous reasoning of the district
court opinion, which cited Michigan v. EPA, a case
Id. at 14 (citing Elizabeth G. Raymond and David A. Grimes,
The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion and Childbirth
in the United States, 119 Obstetrics & Gynecology 215 (2012)).
17
18
See id. (citing Daniel Grossman et al., Effectiveness and
Acceptability of Medical Abortion Provided through Telemedicine,
118 Obstetrics & Gynecology 296 (2011)).
GAO-18-292 at 17 (explaining that “[s]even of the 8 sepsis
cases were associated with vaginal use of misoprostol, which was,
but no longer is, a common practice, according to FDA”).
19
20
Id.
20
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its enabling
statute—not the agency’s evaluation of scientific
evidence before it. 576 U.S. 743 (2015). The scope of
judicial review that this Court articulated in Michigan
v. EPA is distinct from the extremely deferential
standard that applies to an agency’s evaluation of
scientific data. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. at 579 (2021) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (“[C]ourts owe significant deference to the
politically accountable entities with the ‘background,
competence, and expertise to assess public health.’”).
Further, the Fifth Circuit ignored the portions of
the record which showed that FDA did consider the
cumulative effect of the changes through at least three
studies that implemented multiple changes at once.21
This demonstrates that FDA did consider the
cumulative safety of the amendments to mifepristone’s
REMS.
The Fifth Circuit likewise erred in finding that
FDA’s 2016 removal of the non-fatal adverse event
reporting requirement for prescribers was likely
arbitrary and capricious. A review of the
administrative record confirms that this change was
also supported by ample evidence. As GAO recognized
in a review of mifepristone’s labeling changes and
FDA’s continuous safety monitoring in 2018, the
See, e.g., J.A. 299 n.1, 3, 4 (citing studies applying at least
three of the challenged 2016 changes). One cited study
implemented all changes except the removal of the FAERS
reporting requirement. See J.A. 299 n.4 (citing Claudia Diaz
Olavarrieta et al., Nurse versus physician-provision of early
medical abortion in Mexico: a randomized controlled noninferiority trial, 93 Bull World Health Organ 249 (2015)).
21
21
Agency relied on 15 years of periodic adverse event
reports as well as studies demonstrating that the
proposed changes did not significantly change
mifepristone’s risk profile.22
VI.
FDA’s decision not to enforce the in-person
dispensing requirement in 2021 was not
arbitrary and capricious.
FDA also acted reasonably in 2021 when it relied on
available data to remove mifepristone’s in-person
dispensing requirement. Just as it had before re-labeling
mifepristone in 2016, the Agency undertook a rigorous
analysis of the evidence before changing the drug’s
REMS. FDA required data from mifepristone’s sponsors
to support its decision and also relied on “an extensive
review of the published literature,” which was
summarized in the administrative record. See J.A. 399–
408. Further, FDA concluded from its review of the
available data that there was no evidence of “a difference
in adverse events when in-person dispensing was and
was not enforced.” J.A. 399; see J.A. 398–408.
The Fifth Circuit compounds its error by deeming
FDA’s analysis of adverse event data insufficient to
support the 2021 change due to the “uncontested
limitations” of the FDA Adverse Event Reporting
System (FAERS) database. See Pet App. 59a. The court
incorrectly suggested that there was no mandatory
adverse event reporting system for mifepristone after
2016. Pet. App. 59a–63a. To the contrary, the 2016
changes implemented for mifepristone the same
reporting system required for all other approved drugs.
22
See GAO-18-292 at 17.
22
Accordingly, since 2016, FDA has continually received
and monitored data about serious adverse events
through the FAERS database for mifepristone. This is
confirmed by the fact that, as the Fifth Circuit pointed
out, “Danco’s data was exactly the same as the data FDA
obtained from FAERS.” Pet. App. 61a. Further, as
previously explained, supra Part III, the 2016 REMS
only removed prescribers’ requirement to report nonfatal adverse events to FDA. The Fifth Circuit’s
questions about the reliability of FAERS data are far
beyond the scope of judicial review of an agency’s
evaluation of scientific data and amount to an
inappropriate attempt to “substitute its own policy
judgment for that of the agency.” See Prometheus, 592
U.S. at 423.
VII.
Allowing the Fifth Circuit’s decision to stand
would upend FDA’s drug approval system
and harm patients.
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion flips Congress’s chosen
scheme on its head—subjecting scientific decisions by
FDA’s expert doctors, pharmacologists, chemists,
biologists, and statisticians to unscientific secondguessing by courts. Every time FDA modifies the
postmarketing restrictions for an approved drug, it is
the product of hundreds of scientific judgments,
including analysis of clinical trial data, examination of
experimental controls, and interpretation of adverse
event reports. Opening each of these judgments up to
fresh review by courts would supplant this rational,
evidence-based drug regulatory scheme with a chaotic
patchwork susceptible to endless legal challenges and
inconsistent outcomes.
23
Further, adopting the Fifth Circuit’s approach—
which expands the scope of judicial review to allow
courts to upend the scientific judgments of Agency
experts—would open the door to the re-litigation of
drug approvals by many interested parties. Drug
companies seeking to protect their investments and
potential future profits could challenge the approval of
a competitor’s drug by challenging one of the many
scientific judgments that go into each drug approval.
After the denial of an NDA, companies could also use
the courts to obtain reversal of FDA’s scientific
judgments. Interest groups that question the use of
drugs for certain conditions could sue to have their
approval revoked or to require application of
unnecessary restrictions. Organizations representing
patients who experience rare adverse events could
challenge FDA’s risk-benefit analyses and attempt to
bar access to safe and effective remedies for others who
need them.
This new paradigm would take a significant toll on
public health. Successful litigation challenging drug
approvals could threaten patient access to necessary
drugs and vaccines. It would also adversely impact the
effectiveness of healthcare providers who rely on FDA
approval when making critical treatment decisions. At
the same time, drug companies unhappy with FDA’s
denial of their new drug applications could seek court
rulings that would risk allowing the introduction of
unsafe drugs into the market.
Further, this new patchwork system for evaluating
drug safety and efficacy would chill crucial investment
in pharmaceutical research and the development of
new medications. As it is, drug development is a risky,
24
cost-intensive proposition: Research and development
costs for each new drug can reach upwards of $2 billion,
and only about 12% of drugs that undergo clinical trials
are ultimately approved.23 As a result of the Fifth
Circuit’s approach, even the relatively few drugs that
attain FDA approval would be perpetually susceptible
to legal challenges to applicable conditions of use—
discouraging companies from investing in new lifesaving remedies. The Fifth Circuit’s approach upends
the regulatory framework designed by Congress that
has produced essential drugs for more than 60 years.
Patients in need will ultimately bear the catastrophic
consequences of the resulting instability.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit’s
judgment.
See Cong. Budget Off., Research and Development in the
Pharmaceutical
Industry
at
2
(Apr.
2021),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57126.
23
25
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM B. SCHULTZ
Counsel of Record
MARGARET M. DOTZEL
ALYSSA M. HOWARD
ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
1800 M St. NW, Ste. 1000
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 778-1800
wschultz@zuckerman.com
mdotzel@zuckerman.com
ahoward@zuckerman.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
February 1, 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.