Amicus Curiae Brief — Nancy Williams, et al., Petitioners v. Greg Reed, Secretary, Alabama Department of Workforce

No. 23-191

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

NANCY WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

FITZGERALD WASHINGTON,

ALABAMA SECRETARY OF LABOR

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

ALABAMA SUPREME COURT

BRIEF FOR THE STATES OF TENNESSEE,

IDAHO, INDIANA, IOWA, KANSAS, LOUISIANA,

MISSISSIPPI, NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA,

OHIO, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA,

TEXAS, UTAH, AND WEST VIRGINIA, AND THE

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

Office of Tennessee

Attorney General

and Reporter

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, TN 37202

(615) 532-5596

Gabriel.Krimm@ag.tn.gov

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

J. MATTHEW RICE

Solicitor General

GABRIEL KRIMM

Assistant Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of Tennessee

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities .................................................... ii

Interest of Amici Curiae .............................................. 1

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 2

Argument ..................................................................... 3

I.

This case concerns the extent of an

Alabama court’s judicial power

under Alabama law. .......................................... 3

II.

Congress cannot dictate a state

court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a

federal claim...................................................... 6

III.

Congress has not provided state

courts jurisdiction to adjudicate the

claims in this case. .......................................... 16

Conclusion .................................................................. 19

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS,

594 U.S. 758 (2021) ............................................... 17

Alden v. Maine,

527 U.S. 706 (1999) ................................... 1, 7, 8, 16

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,

310 U.S. 469 (1940) ............................................... 17

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.,

575 U.S. 320 (2015) ............................................... 12

Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette,

239 U.S. 199 (1915) ............................................... 10

BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp.,

511 U.S. 531 (1994) ............................................... 16

Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc.,

140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) ........................................... 14

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007) ................................................. 6

Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,

47 So. 2d 449 (Ala. 1950)..................................... 4, 5

Bond v. United States (Bond I),

564 U.S. 211 (2011) ............................................... 16

iii

Bond v. United States (Bond II),

572 U.S. 844 (2014) ......................................... 16, 17

Brown v. Davenport,

596 U.S. 118 (2022) ................................................. 7

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co.,

486 U.S. 750 (1988) ............................................... 14

Claflin v. Houseman,

93 U.S. 130 (1876) ............................................... 2, 7

Danford v. State,

197 A.D.3d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) .................... 8

Douglas v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co.,

279 U.S. 377 (1929) ......................................... 10, 13

FERC v. Mississippi,

456 U.S. 742 (1982) ......................................... 11, 12

FTC v. Bunte Bros.,

312 U.S. 349 (1941) ............................................... 17

Felder v. Casey,

487 U.S. 131 (1988) ............................................... 10

In re Fordiani,

120 A. 338 (Conn. 1923) ...................................... 7, 8

Giles v. Harris,

189 U.S. 475 (1903) ......................................... 17, 18

iv

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991) ............................... 3, 16, 17, 18

Grubb v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,

281 U.S. 470 (1930) ....................................... 2, 6, 12

Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235 (1958) ................................................. 7

Haywood v. Drown,

556 U.S. 729 (2009) ............... 2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14

Herb v. Pitcairn,

324 U.S. 117 (1945) ..................................... 7, 13, 14

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

570 U.S. 693 (2013) ................................................. 6

Holmgren v. United States,

217 U.S. 509 (1910) ................................................. 9

Houston v. Moore,

18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820) ............... 2, 9, 10, 12, 15

Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356 (1990) ................................... 11, 12, 13

Johnson v. Ala. Sec’y of Labor,

--- So. 3d ---, 2023 WL 4281620 (Ala. 2023) ............ 1

Johnson v. Fankell,

520 U.S. 911 (1997) ........................... 2, 6, 12, 13, 15

v

Jones v. Hendrix,

599 U.S. 465 (2023) ................................................. 6

Jones v. United States,

529 U.S. 848 (2000) ............................................... 17

Ex parte Knowles,

5 Cal. 300 (1855).................................................. 7, 9

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc.,

572 U.S. 118 (2014) ............................................... 19

Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,

297 U.S. 266 (1936) ............................................... 14

McConnell v. Thomson,

8 N.E.2d 986 (Ind. 1937) ....................................... 10

McNett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry.,

292 U.S. 230 (1934) ............................................... 10

Ex parte McNiel,

80 U.S. 236 (1871) ................................................... 7

Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R.,

315 U.S. 698 (1942) ............................................... 17

Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis,

241 U.S. 211 (1916) ......................................... 10, 14

Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. v. Mayfield,

340 U.S. 1 (1950) ............................................. 13, 18

vi

Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor,

266 U.S. 200 (1924) ........................................... 7, 10

Missouri v. Lewis,

101 U.S. 22 (1879) ................................................... 7

Mondou v. New York, New Haven, &

Hartford Railroad Co.,

223 U.S. 1 (1912) ........................... 11, 12, 13, 14, 15

Montana v. Wyoming,

563 U.S. 368 (2011) ..................................... 5, 12, 15

Morgan v. Dudley,

57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 693 (1857) ............................. 10

Palmer v. Massachusetts,

308 U.S. 79 (1939) ................................................. 17

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) ......................................... 18, 19

Poling v. Goins,

713 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1986) .................................. 8

Powers v. Ohio,

499 U.S. 400 (1991) ................................................. 6

Quick v. Utotem of Ala., Inc.,

365 So. 2d 1245 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) .................... 4

Ex parte Reed,

100 U.S. 13 (1879) ................................................... 7

vii

Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362 (1976) ............................................... 18

Robb v. Connolly,

111 U.S. 624 (1884) ................................................. 9

Saenz v. Roe,

526 U.S. 489 (1999) ............................................... 16

Seminole Tribe v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44 (1996) ................................................... 1

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs,

531 U.S. 159 (2001) ............................................... 16

Stern v. Marshall,

564 U.S. 462 (2011) ................................................. 6

Swisher v. Brady,

438 U.S. 204 (1978) ................................................. 6

Tafflin v. Levitt,

493 U.S. 455 (1990) ............................................... 10

Tenn. Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons,

15 S.W.3d 843 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ............... 1, 18

Terrell v. City of Bessemer,

406 So. 2d 337 (Ala. 1981)....................................... 5

Testa v. Katt,

330 U.S. 386 (1947) ............................. 11, 12, 13, 14

viii

Todd v. United States,

158 U.S. 278 (1895) ................................................. 6

U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n,

590 U.S. 604 (2020) ............................................... 16

United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers

of Am. v. Wisc. Emp. Rels. Bd.,

351 U.S. 266 (1956) ......................................... 16, 17

United States v. Bass,

404 U.S. 336 (1971) ............................................... 17

United States v. Five Gambling Devices, Labeled in

Part “Mills,” & Bearing Serial Nos. 593-221,

346 U.S. 441 (1953) ............................................... 17

United States v. Jones,

109 U.S. 513 (1883) ............................................... 10

Wainwright v. Goode,

464 U.S. 78 (1983) ......................................... 2, 6, 12

Ward v. Jenkins,

51 Mass. (10 Metcalf) 583 (1846) .................... 10, 19

West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,

311 U.S. 223 (1940) ..................................... 5, 12, 15

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58 (1989) ............................. 3, 4, 16, 17, 18

Williamson v. Berry,

49 U.S. 495 (1850) ............................................. 7, 12

ix

Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908) ................................................. 4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. VII ............................................. 12

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ........................................ 12

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 .................................... 2, 15

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ......................................... 9

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 .................................... 2, 6, 8, 9

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ............................... 13, 15

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ...................................... 11, 12

Ala. Const. art. VI, § 139(a) ........................................ 2

Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 1 ............................................... 7

Colo. Const. art. VI, § 1 ............................................... 7

Mich. Const. art. VI, § 1 .............................................. 7

Or. Const. art. VII, § 1 ................................................. 7

S.C. Const. art. V, § 1 .................................................. 7

Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 1 .............................................. 7

x

Tenn. Const. art VI, § 3 ............................................... 9

CODE PROVISIONS

28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 ................................................... 15

28 U.S.C. § 132(a) ...................................................... 15

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................ 15

28 U.S.C. chs. 83, 85 .................................................... 7

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................ 3, 4, 17

Ala. Code § 25-4-91 ................................................ 5, 15

Ala. Code § 25-4-92(a), (b) ..................................... 5, 15

Ala. Code § 25-4-95 ................................................ 5, 15

Rev. Stat. § 1979 ........................................................ 17

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-101 to 113 ........................... 8

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-101 to 115 ........................... 8

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-501 to 505 ........................... 8

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-102 ...................................... 8

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 ...................................... 8

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-108 ...................................... 8

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The State of Alabama is not a “mere province[] or

political corporation[].” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,

715 (1999). It is “a sovereign entity,” Seminole Tribe

v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996), “with the dignity

and essential attributes inher[ent]” to sovereignty,

Alden, 527 U.S. at 714. Our legal traditions recognize

“judicial power” as one of those attributes, with each

sovereign State having purview to distribute its own

judicial power at its discretion.

In the order under review, the Alabama Supreme

Court affirmed dismissal because Alabama’s judges

“have no power” under state law to render a binding

judgment on the claims at bar. Pet. App. 12a; Johnson

v. Ala. Sec’y of Labor, --- So. 3d ---, 2023 WL 4281620,

at *4 (Ala. 2023). The Question Presented asks only

whether such claims can be brought prior to administrative exhaustion. But in answering that question,

this Court will also necessarily decide whether the liability-imposing terms of the Civil Rights Act somehow “tamper with or alter [the] jurisdiction of [Alabama’s] courts.” Tenn. Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons, 15

S.W.3d 843, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

The States of Tennessee, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,

Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,

Utah, and West Virginia, and the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania all have a self-evident and significant

interest in protecting their sovereign prerogative to

dictate their own courts’ jurisdiction, notwithstanding

any act of Congress.

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. The Alabama Supreme Court decision under review interprets an Alabama law through which the Alabama legislature has distributed “the judicial power

of [Alabama]” among Alabama’s state courts. Ala.

Const. art. VI, § 139(a). This Court must take the Alabama Supreme Court’s jurisdictional analysis as a

“binding” determination of state law. Wainwright v.

Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983); see Johnson v. Fankell,

520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997); Grubb v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,

281 U.S. 470, 477 (1930). The question before this

Court thus cannot simply be whether the Civil Rights

Act “require[s]” the “exhaustion of state administrative remedies.” Pet. Br. i. The question must be

whether the Civil Rights Act confers judicial power, or

compels Alabama’s state courts to exercise (unpossessed) judicial power, over the claims at issue.

II. The answer to that question must be no, because the U.S. Constitution neither confers state judicial power nor empowers Congress to do the same. See

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1; Houston v.

Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 67 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting). This Court has said so repeatedly for over

two centuries, see, e.g., Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at

27–28 (majority opinion); Claflin v. Houseman, 93

U.S. 130, 136 (1876), and nothing in the text of, or jurisprudence on, the Supremacy Clause could justify a

contradictory holding here, see infra at 11–16; cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742–77 (2009) (Thomas,

J., dissenting) (tracing the text and precedent).

3

III. Even if Congress could control state courts’ jurisdiction, it has not done so in the Civil Rights Act.

This Court’s precedents construe only the most “unmistakably clear [statutory] language” to impose on

the traditional spheres of state sovereignty. Gregory

v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).

The Civil Rights Act’s substantive right-of-action provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contains no language regarding jurisdiction, much less clear language dictating

the distribution of state judicial power.

ARGUMENT

I.

This case concerns the extent of an Alabama

court’s judicial power under Alabama law.

This Court has granted review to decide

“[w]hether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under [the Civil Rights

Act] in state court.” Pet. Br. i. But the Court should

not lose sight of the reason that question arose: The

Alabama courts have definitively determined they

lack jurisdiction to render judgment in this case.

This case was brought by a group of Alabamians

who “appli[ed] for unemployment benefits” but “experienced delays in the handling of their applications.”

Pet. App. 2a. Before the State could fully process all

their applications, the Applicants went to court seeking an order “compel[ling] the Alabama Secretary of

Labor . . . to improve the speed and manner” of the

benefits-claim process. Id. And to justify such relief,

the Applicants asserted claims under the federal Civil

4

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See JA42; Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908).

Yet despite asserting federal rights of action

within the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction,

see Will, 491 U.S. at 66, the Applicants chose to sue in

the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama,

see JA14. They need not disclose (or have) a reason for

that decision. But they must accept its consequences—including those that flow from the limits Alabama has placed on its courts’ judicial power.

Those limits, and those limits alone, proved dispositive below. The Alabama Supreme Court held

that “the [Alabama] Legislature ha[d] prohibited [Alabama’s] courts from exercising jurisdiction over [the]

claims” the Applicants were pursuing. Pet. App. 6a.

The court explained that conclusion clearly and in

detail. To begin, the Applicants had no “traditional

private right” to unemployment compensation. Id. at

7a. Instead, the benefits they sought through an expedited executive process were “‘creature[s] of statute’

alone,” which the Alabama Legislature created and

“‘completely governed.’” Id. (quoting Quick v. Utotem

of Ala., Inc., 365 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Ala. Civ. App.

1979)). Under Alabama law, “when a statutory

scheme gives rise to entitlements or other franchises

unknown at common law, the ordinary presumption in

favor of judicial review for claims related to those benefits does not apply.” Id. at 8a (citing Birmingham

Elec. Co. v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 47 So. 2d 449, 452

(Ala. 1950)). Instead, Alabama law effectively flips

5

that presumption, causing Alabama courts to “construe [their] jurisdictional grants narrowly and jurisdictional limitations broadly.” Id. (citing Birmingham

Elec., 47 So. 2d at 452).

Applying that standard to the Alabama unemployment-benefits statute, the court concluded that the

Applicants’ claims fell outside of the Alabama courts’

jurisdiction, at least until the benefits applications

had percolated through the State’s Department of Labor. See id. at 8a–9a, 12a. This jurisdictional limitation did not apply specifically to federal Civil Rights

Act claims; it applied to “all ‘disputed claims and other

due process cases’ involving the . . . administration of

unemployment benefits.” Id. at 8a (emphasis added)

(quoting Ala. Code § 25-4-92(a)–(b)). And it did not

bar such claims outright; it merely channeled them

through the Department’s claim “examiner[s]” and

“appeals tribunals” as a prerequisite to any state court

adjudication. Id. (quoting Ala. Code §§ 25-4-91, 25-492(b)) (citing Ala. Code § 25-4-95). That Alabama

courts can hear and decide most federal Civil Rights

Act claims therefore did not matter. See Terrell v. City

of Bessemer, 406 So. 2d 337, 340 (Ala. 1981). Because

the claims asserted in this case fell into a universally

applicable exhaustion exception to jurisdiction, they

could not yet proceed in the Alabama courts under Alabama law.

This Court has no basis to review the Alabama Supreme Court’s reading of Alabama law, see Montana v.

Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 377 n.5 (2011) (citing West v.

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1940)), regardless of what this Court may wish to say about the

6

Civil Rights Act. Instead, this Court must take the

Alabama Supreme Court’s jurisdictional analysis as a

“binding” determination. Wainwright, 464 U.S. at 84;

see Johnson, 520 U.S. at 916; Grubb, 281 U.S. at 477.

That means the question before this Court cannot

merely be whether the Civil Rights Act “require[s]” the

“exhaustion of state administrative remedies.” Pet.

Br. i. Rather, the question must be whether the Civil

Rights Act allows—or more precisely, compels—Alabama’s state courts to ignore the state-law limits imposed on their judicial power.

II. Congress cannot dictate a state court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a federal claim.

The answer to this question must be no, because

the U.S. Constitution neither confers, nor empowers

Congress to confer, jurisdiction on any state court.

A “court” is one or more government officers

(judges) imbued with at least some portion of a sovereign’s “judicial power.” See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III,

§ 1; Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278, 284 (1895).

And “judicial power” is a very specific thing: It is the

power to merge “claims” into “judgments.” See Jones

v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 487 (2023); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494 (2011); Swisher v. Brady, 438

U.S. 204, 209 (1978). A “claim” is the assertion of a

right to some individualized form of government coercion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554

(2007); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693,

708 (2013) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410

(1991)). And a “judgment” is the manifestation of sov-

7

ereign power that legitimizes and authorizes the coercive relief sought in the claim. See Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235, 246 & n.12 (1958).

It follows that when courts talk about “jurisdiction,” they are referring to the existence and scope of

judicial power, outside of which a given court’s “decision[s] amount[] to nothing.” Williamson v. Berry, 49

U.S. 495, 543 (1850). That is, jurisdiction identifies

the set of claims that a court can merge into binding

judgment. See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879),

abrogation on other grounds recognized in Brown v.

Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 129 n.1 (2022). But whereas

claims and the rights beneath them can spring from

any source of law, see Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. &

M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1924); Ex parte

McNiel, 80 U.S. 236, 243 (1871), a court’s jurisdiction

must derive from the sovereign whose judicial power

that court exercises, see Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136; Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 27–28; Ex parte Knowles, 5

Cal. 300, 302 (1855).

Each of the States is its own “sovereign[] . . . participant[] in the governance of the Nation,” Alden, 527

U.S. at 748, with its own courts wielding its own state

judicial power, see, e.g., Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 1; Ariz.

Const. art. VI, § 1; Colo. Const. art. VI, § 1; Mich.

Const. art. VI, § 1; Or. Const. art. VII, § 1; S.C. Const.

art. V, § 1. And just like the national government, see

28 U.S.C. chs. 83, 85, each State can and does distribute that power among its courts by “parcel[ing] out

the[ir] jurisdiction . . . at its discretion,” Missouri v.

Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1879); see, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120–21 (1945); In re Fordiani, 120

8

A. 338, 339 (Conn. 1923); see also, e.g., Tenn. Code

Ann. §§ 16-10-101 to 113 (Circuit and Criminal

Courts); id. §§ 16-11-101 to 115 (Chancery Courts); id.

§§ 16-15-501 to 505 (General Sessions Courts); id.

§§ 16-16-102, 107, 108 (County Courts).

For some state courts, that jurisdiction includes a

presumptive power to adjudicate claims derived from

the national Constitution and the laws of Congress.

See Poling v. Goins, 713 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tenn. 1986).

But that does not mean all state courts have the power

to adjudicate any federal claim, under the Civil Rights

Act or otherwise. See, e.g., Danford v. State, 197

A.D.3d 913, 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021). And to the extent any state court lacks such adjudicatory power,

there is nothing Congress can do about it. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 742, 747 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Indeed, “[i]f Congress could displace a State’s allocation of [judicial] power . . . , the judicial branch of the

State, whose legitimacy derives from fidelity to the

law, would be compelled to assume a role not only foreign to its experience but beyond its competence as defined by the very [state] Constitution from which its

existence derives.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 752.

That is not our system of government.

Instead, when Congress confers jurisdiction, it distributes “[t]he judicial Power of the United States.”

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. And state judges cannot exercise that power for a host of fundamental reasons.

Their “Courts” are not “ordain[ed]” or “establish[ed]”

by Congress. Id. They are not “nominate[d]” by the

9

President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. They may, and often do, lack

life tenure or salary protection. Compare id. art. III,

§ 1, with Tenn. Const. art VI, § 3. And most fundamentally, this Court has deemed it “perfectly clear”—

for over two centuries—that Congress has no power to

“confer jurisdiction upon” state courts because they do

not “exist under the constitution and laws of the

United States.” Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) at 27.

“The Constitution having thus fixed where the judicial

power shall be vested, it cannot be vested elsewhere”

by congressional act (or judicial say-so). Knowles, 5

Cal. at 301.

Put differently, “the right to create courts for the

[S]tates does not exist in Congress,” Holmgren v.

United States, 217 U.S. 509, 517 (1910), and the “authority” to “compel a [state court] to convene and sit

in judgment on” a federal claim “is no where confided

to [Congress] by the constitution” either, Houston, 18

U.S. (5 Wheat) at 67 (Story, J., dissenting). Instead,

“[t]he [federal government] may organize its own tribunals” to adjudicate federal claims. Id. (emphasis

added). And “[i]f” Congress “do[es] not choose to organize such tribunals, [that] is its own fault.” Id.

This Court has never wavered from that position,

and the courts of each State have taken it to heart.

Courts throughout our federal system have recognized

that, although Congress can supersede state-court jurisdiction over some federal subject matter, see Robb

v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 636 (1884), and delineate

“substantive” federal rights as “enforceable only in a

10

federal court,” Taylor, 266 U.S. at 208, or only as limited by certain procedural rules, see Felder v. Casey,

487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915), Congress “can not” do

the obverse and “compel [state courts] to entertain jurisdiction” over federal claims, Morgan v. Dudley, 57

Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 693, 715 (1857); see United States v.

Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 520 (1883); Houston, 18 U.S. (5

Wheat.) at 27; McConnell v. Thomson, 8 N.E.2d 986,

991 (Ind. 1937). Instead, a “federal right is enforceable in a state court” only when the state court’s “jurisdiction [a]s prescribed by local laws is appropriate to

the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those

laws.” Taylor, 266 U.S. at 208; see Tafflin v. Levitt,

493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990); Douglas v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.

Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387–88 (1929).

In other words, the power to merge a federal claim

into judgment must be “conferred upon [a] court[] by

the authority, state or nation, creating [that court].”

Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.

211, 221 (1916); see Haywood, 556 U.S. at 749

(Thomas, J., dissenting). And when a state court “exercise[s]” such power, it does so “not upon the ground

of a judicial authority conferred . . . by a law of the

United States, but” through its “ordinary jurisdiction”

under state law, which may include the power to adjudicate “legal rights . . . created . . . by the legislation of

congress.” Ward v. Jenkins, 51 Mass. (10 Metcalf) 583,

589 (1846) (citing Justice Story’s treatise and Chancellor Kent’s commentaries).

The few cases cabining this principle do nothing to

undercut its fundamental premises. Beginning with

11

Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912), this Court has held that

state courts possessing jurisdiction to render judgment on federal claims must do so, regardless of how

state and federal “policy” may seem to be in conflict,

id. at 57; see also Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740; McNett v.

St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233–34 (1934) (applying Mondou). And under Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.

386 (1947), this Court has held that when a State

grants a court jurisdiction over a class of state-law

claims, the court is “not free to refuse” to adjudicate

federal claims of “th[e] same type,” id. at 394, even if

a purportedly jurisdictional state law directs that result, see Haywood, 556 U.S. at 741–42; see also Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990)

(applying the principle); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.

742, 760 (1982) (same). Yet both strains of jurisprudence should be read narrowly for several reasons.

First, neither Mondou nor Testa has much basis in

constitutional text. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 750–55

(Thomas, J., dissenting). Both decisions ostensibly

flow from the Supremacy Clause, see Howlett, 496 U.S.

at 373, which says “the Judges in every State shall be

bound []by” federal law, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2.

But to say state “Judges” must adjudicate federal

claims under that language just begs the question. A

“Judge” is a person exercising the judicial power of

some specific sovereign. See supra at 6–7. A state

“Judge” exercises judicial power conferred and delimited by state law. See supra at 7–8. This Court does

12

not exposit state law, see Montana, 563 U.S. at 377 n.5

(citing West, 311 U.S. at 236–37); Wainwright, 464

U.S. at 84; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 916; Grubb, 281 U.S.

at 477, so this Court cannot deem a person to be a state

“Judge . . . bound” to adjudicate federal claims, U.S.

Const. art. VI, cl. 2, if under state law that person’s

“decision” on those claims would “amount[] to nothing,” Williamson, 49 U.S. at 543.

Second, neither the language of the Supremacy

Clause nor the analysis in Mondou or Testa establishes a federal power to confer jurisdiction on state

courts. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 922 & n.13. Unlike

other portions of the Constitution, the Supremacy

Clause does not speak of “Power[s],” U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 1, or “right[s],” id. amend VII. It pronounces “a

rule of decision[ for] Courts,” telling them to disregard

“state laws that conflict with federal laws.” Armstrong

v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324

(2015). Yet no case in the Mondou-Testa line ever explains how a Congress lacking the power to “confer jurisdiction upon [state] Courts” could pass a law that

conflicts with any state law restricting the jurisdiction

of state courts. Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 27.

At the same time, these cases purport to carry forward and apply the basic precepts laid down in earlier

precedent. In particular, the Mondou-Testa line of jurisprudence presupposes that the decision under review came from a state court possessing “jurisdiction

adequate and appropriate under established local law

to adjudicate” the federal claims at issue. Testa, 330

U.S. at 394; see Haywood, 556 U.S. at 739–40 & n.6;

Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378–79; FERC, 456 U.S. at 760;

13

Mondou, 223 U.S. at 55–56. And while the Supremacy

Clause may permit (and even require) this Court to

snuff out substantive and procedural rules “hiding behind a jurisdictional label,” Haywood, 556 U.S. at 771

(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. (discussing Howlett, 496 U.S. at 359, 381), the precedent never justifies

a review of state law going any deeper than that. If a

state supreme court construes a state statute as jurisdictional—not just in name, but in function—that

“choice” must be respected as “one [this Court] ha[s no]

authority to” contradict. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918.

It is thus anyone’s guess how this Court could

deem a state-law jurisdictional grant “adequate and

appropriate” for adjudicating a federal claim without

contradicting a state court on matters of “local law.”

Testa, 330 U.S. at 394. But of course, “[n]either this

Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority

to place a construction on a state statute different

from the one rendered by the highest court of the

State.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 916. In fact, to do so

would exceed “the limitations of [this Court’s] own jurisdiction,” Herb, 324 U.S. at 125; see U.S. Const. art.

III, § 2, cl. 1; Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340

U.S. 1, 4 (1950); Douglas, 279 U.S. at 387, rendering

this Court’s opinion on the issue highly suspect.

These cases also fail to explain, or even attempt to

explain, their proffered solution to the preemption defect. That is, they never explain why this Court must

prohibit the application of a state-law jurisdictional

limit to federal claims, rather than negate the jurisdictional grant over “th[e] same type” of state-law

14

claims. Testa, 330 U.S. at 394. Answering that question would seem to require a “severability” analysis,

Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct.

2335, 2349 (2020), which would itself have to be

grounded in state law, see City of Lakewood v. Plain

Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988) (citing

Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274

(1936)). And “if [a dismissal would still] be rendered

by the state court after” conducting that state-law severability analysis, this Court’s “review” of the Supremacy Clause question “could amount to nothing more

than an advisory opinion.” Herb, 324 U.S. at 126.

Yet even putting aside those lurking issues, one

component of the Mondou-Testa cases remains clear:

They merely require the exercise of jurisdiction (supposedly) already “conferred upon [a] court[] by the . . .

[S]tate . . . [that] creat[ed it].” Bombolis, 241 U.S. at

221. They do not say the Supremacy Clause can grant

state courts jurisdiction those courts would otherwise

lack—nor could these cases have any textual basis for

saying that.

Moreover, whatever Mondou, Testa, and their

progeny say or mean, they do not apply here. The Alabama courts did not “decline cognizance” of this case

because the Civil Rights Act “is not in harmony with

[Alabama public] policy,” Mondou, 223 U.S. at 55–57,

or because Alabama deems these claims “frivolous and

vexatious,” Haywood, 556 U.S. at 742. Nor has anyone

“conceded that this same type of claim arising under

[Alabama] law would be enforced by [Alabama] courts”

without exhaustion. Testa, 330 U.S. at 394. Put

15

simply, Alabama’s administrative exhaustion requirement “does not target civil rights claims against the

State.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918 n.9; see also id.

(deeming a similar rule “neutral”).

On the contrary, the Alabama Supreme Court held

that the Montgomery County Circuit Court lacked

original subject-matter jurisdiction over “all ‘disputed

claims and other due process cases’ involving the . . .

administration of unemployment benefits,” at least

until administrative review was exhausted. Pet. App.

8a (emphasis added) (quoting Ala. Code § 25-4-92(a)–

(b)) (citing Ala. Code §§ 25-4-91, 25-4-95). The Circuit

Court’s judicial power, “as prescribed by local laws,”

was thus not “appropriate to the occasion.” Mondou,

233 U.S. at 57. And that being the law of Alabama,

this Court has no “judicial Power” to override the Alabama Supreme Court on this issue. U.S. Const. art.

III, § 2, cl. 1; see Montana, 563 U.S. at 377 n.5 (citing

West, 311 U.S. at 236–37).

Of course, none of this in any way threatens the

Applicants’ ability to have their federal rights protected through binding judgment, even before their

unemployment claims are fully processed. At most, it

simply requires Congress “[t]o constitute [federal] Tribunals” for adjudicating the federal claims at issue.

U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 9; see Houston, 18 U.S. (5

Wheat) at 67 (Story, J., dissenting). And to no one’s

surprise, Congress has done exactly that, see 28 U.S.C.

§§ 132(a), 1331, both in Alabama and in every other

State, see id. §§ 81–131. This Court should thus re-

16

frain from any ruling that would reach beyond its legitimate purview and attempt to undermine the

States’ power to control their own courts.

III. Congress has not provided state courts jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims in this case.

Even setting aside the building blocks of “split[]

. . . sovereignty” discussed above, Alden, 527 U.S. at

751 (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17

(1999)), this Court still should not read the Civil

Rights Act to compel the Alabama courts to adjudicate

the Applicants’ claims.

This Court has long presumed that Congress does

not legislate with intent to upset “the constitutional

balance [of power] between” the States and the federal

government. Bond v. United States (Bond II), 572 U.S.

844, 862 (2014) (quoting Bond v. United States (Bond

I), 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011)). Precedent thus construes

only the most “unmistakably clear [statutory] language” to impose on the traditional spheres of state

sovereignty. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (quoting Will,

491 U.S. at 65); see U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture

River Pres. Ass’n, 590 U.S. 604, 621–22 (2020).

That precept applies across the full range of legislative subject matter. It applies to statutes that implicate property rights and natural resources. See

Cowpasture, 590 U.S. at 621–22; Solid Waste Agency

of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.

159, 174 (2001); BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531,

544 (1994). It applies to statutes governing transportation and labor relations. See United Auto., Aircraft

& Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Wisc. Emp. Rels.

17

Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274–75 (1956); Apex Hosiery Co. v.

Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940); Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 84 (1939). It applies to statutes imposing criminal punishment. Bond II, 572 U.S. at

857–60; Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858

(2000); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349–50

(1971). It applies to statutes empowering federal

agencies. See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S.

758, 764 (2021) (per curiam); United States v. Five

Gambling Devices, Labeled in Part “Mills,” & Bearing

Serial Nos. 593-221, 346 U.S. 441, 450 (1953); FTC v.

Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941). And most pertinent for present purposes, it applies to the Civil

Rights Act. See Will, 491 U.S. at 65.

Of course, few attributes of state sovereignty have

a more robust pedigree than the prerogative to distribute state judicial power. See supra at 6–9. And were

Congress to intend a displacement of that prerogative,

the Civil Rights Act’s substantive imposition of

“liab[ility],” 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would be an odd and unnatural mechanism for “[s]uch [a] drastic inroad[]

upon [state] authority,” Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 315

U.S. 698, 713 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

That provision does not speak of jurisdiction or administrative exhaustion—much less in “unmistakably

clear” terms. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (quoting Will,

491 U.S. at 65). “The words are, ‘shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceedings for redress.’” Giles v. Harris,

189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (quoting Rev. Stat. § 1979).

18

“They allow suit . . . only when that is the proper proceeding for redress, and they refer to existing standards to determine what is a proper proceeding.” Id.

To read this language as conferring judicial power,

and not just granting a private right of action, would

“blur[] accepted usages . . . in the English language in

a way which would be quite inconsistent with the

words Congress chose in [the Civil Rights Act].” Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376 (1976). And “[w]hen the

frame of reference moves from a unitary court system

. . . to a system of federal courts . . . subsisting side by

side with [fifty] state judicial . . . branches, appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of” legal process. Id. It follows that “[b]y the enactment of”

this substantive liability provision, “Congress did not

intend nor attempt to tamper with or alter jurisdiction

of state courts,” whether “federalism would have prevented” that or not. Tenn. Downs, 15 S.W.3d at 846;

cf. Mayfield, 340 U.S. at 5 (reaching a similar holding

regarding the Federal Employers’ Liability Act).

Nor does this language “clear[ly]” preempt state

jurisdictional rules requiring administrative exhaustion. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (quoting Will, 491 U.S.

at 65). Even in “stat[ing] categorically that exhaustion

is not a prerequisite to an action under” the Civil

Rights Act, this Court has never based its interpretation in any clear text. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S.

496, 500–01 (1982). Instead, it has considered the issue of exhaustion under the rubric of “defer[ring] the

exercise of jurisdiction” actually possessed. Id. at 502.

19

And it has rejected such “prudential” abstention as inconsistent with the statute’s legislative history.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,

572 U.S. 118, 125 (2014); see Patsy, 457 U.S. at 502.

Yet whatever “the tenor of [congressional] debates”

may have been, Patsy, 457 U.S. at 502, or what “recurring themes” they may have touched on, id. at 503,

they yielded a statutory text that says nothing about

exhaustion, not a word about jurisdiction, and certainly no clear statement attempting to preempt state

jurisdictional laws.

* * *

For the Court to reverse, it must ignore several

core tenants of federalism. It must invent legislative

powers neither possessed nor wielded by Congress,

and it must contradict some our Constitution’s most

celebrated expositors.

See Ward, 51 Mass. (10

Metcalf) at 589 (citing Justice Story’s treatise and

Chancellor Kent’s commentaries).

And for what? If the Applicants here have colorable claims under the Civil Rights Act, they can take

those claims to their local federal courthouse. They do

not need a ruling from this Court telling their State

how to distribute its own sovereign judicial power.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court

should be affirmed.

20

Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

J. MATTHEW RICE

Solicitor General

GABRIEL KRIMM

Assistant Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

State of Tennessee

Office of the Attorney General

and Reporter

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, TN 37202

(615) 532-5596

Gabriel.Krimm@ag.tn.gov

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

State of Tennessee

JULY 2, 2024

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

Raúl R. Labrador

Attorney General

State of Idaho

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General

State of Indiana

Brenna Bird

Attorney General

State of Iowa

Kris W. Kobach

Attorney General

State of Kansas

Liz Murrill

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

Lynn Fitch

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

Michael T. Hilgers

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

Drew H. Wrigley

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

Dave Yost

Attorney General

State of Ohio

Michelle A. Henry

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania

Alan Wilson

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

Marty J. Jackley

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

Ken Paxton

Attorney General

State of Texas

Sean D. Reyes

Attorney General

State of Utah

Patrick Morrisey

Attorney General

State of West Virginia