Reply Brief — American Petroleum Institute, et al., Petitioners v. Minnesota

Supreme Court briefNov 8, 2023

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 23-168

In the Supreme Court of the United States

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

STATE OF MINNESOTA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

WILLIAM A. BURCK

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART

& SULLIVAN, LLP

1300 I Street, N.W.,

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20005

BRIAN D. SCHMALZBACH

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

Gateway Plaza

800 East Canal Street

Richmond, VA 23219

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM T. MARKS

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

(additional counsel on signature page)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. The decision below implicates a conflict

among the courts of appeals ................................................... 3

B. The decision below is incorrect .............................................. 6

C. The question presented is important

and warrants the Court’s review in this case ..................... 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011) .......................................................... 6, 7

Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,

539 U.S. 1 (2003) .................................................................. 5

Bernhard v. Whitney National Bank,

523 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2008) ............................................... 4

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) ............... 8

City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP,

No. SCAP-22-429, 2023 WL 7151875

(Haw. Oct. 31, 2023) .......................................................... 11

City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp.,

45 F.4th 699 (3d Cir. 2022),

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2483 (2023) ................................... 2

City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,

993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ........................................2, 5, 11

Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

83 F.4th 122 (2d Cir. 2023) ......................................... 2, 4, 5

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue

Engineering & Manufacturing,

545 U.S. 308 (2005) .............................................................. 3

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee:

406 U.S. 91 (1972) ................................................................ 3

731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ............................................. 11

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) .......................................................... 6, 7

(I)

II

Page

Cases—continued:

National Farmers Union Insurance Cos.

v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1972).................................... 3

National Pork Producers Council v. Ross,

598 U.S. 356 (2023) .............................................................. 9

Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,

414 U.S. 661 (1974) .............................................................. 8

Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,

117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997) ........................................... 2-5

Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,

451 U.S. 630 (1981) ........................................................ 9, 10

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-168

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

STATE OF MINNESOTA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

The decision below deepens an existing conflict on the

exceedingly important question of whether federal removal jurisdiction exists over claims necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common law but labeled as

arising under state law. Since the Court had the opportunity to address that question last Term, the need for the

Court’s review has only grown: the conflict has not

abated, the question continues to arise as new climatechange cases are filed, and climate-change cases are now

proceeding full speed ahead in state courts across the

country.

(1)

2

Respondent’s attempts to whittle away the conflict fall

woefully short. Respondent cannot reconcile the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,

117 F.3d 922 (1997), with the decisions of other circuits affirming the remand of climate-change cases similar to this

one. Indeed, the Third Circuit recognized that the Fifth

Circuit’s decision supports the removal of climate-change

claims and expressly declined to follow it. See City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp., 45 F.4th 699, 708 (2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2483 (2023). And although the Second Circuit recently indicated in Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil

Corp., 83 F.4th 122 (2023), that the decision in City of New

York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021), recognized only a preemption defense in this context, the decision in Connecticut did not address whether the wellpleaded complaint rule permits petitioners’ specific

ground for removal here.

Respondent’s arguments on the merits fare no better.

As Judge Stras recognized in his concurrence below, respondent’s purported state claims are a blatant “attempt

to set national energy policy through its own consumerprotection laws[,] * * * effectively overrid[ing] the policy choices made by the federal government and other

states.” Pet. App. 24a (internal quotation marks, citation,

and alteration omitted). Those claims are exclusively governed by federal common law and thus removable to federal court—as the United States recognized before it

switched positions after a change in presidential administration.

Only this Court can provide much-needed clarity on

the important jurisdictional question presented here. Absent the Court’s intervention, plaintiffs will continue to

pursue claims for climate-change-related injuries in state

court, and questions of jurisdiction over these lawsuits

3

will continue to proliferate. The Court’s review is warranted.

A. The Decision Below Implicates A Conflict Among The

Courts Of Appeals

The courts of appeals remain divided on the question

of how the well-pleaded complaint rule applies to claims

necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common

law. See Pet. 12-17. Respondent’s attempts to wave away

that conflict do not withstand scrutiny.

1. Respondent primarily argues (Br. in Opp. 14-16)

that no conflict exists concerning the well-pleaded complaint rule because the decisions cited by petitioners were

early applications of the “substantial federal question”

doctrine that this Court subsequently synthesized in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &

Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005). But as respondent

recognizes (Br. in Opp. 14-15), in Sam L. Majors, the

Fifth Circuit did not cite any of the precursors to Grable

when concluding that federal jurisdiction was present.

Rather, it relied on two of this Court’s cases involving federal common law on which petitioners also rely. See 117

F.3d at 926 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.

91, 100 (1972), and National Farmers Union Insurance

Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 850 (1972)); see Pet. 25,

27.

In any event, even if respondent’s characterization of

the court of appeals cases were correct, it is merely a matter of labeling; it would not eliminate the conflict. Either

way, those cases would still permit removal of respondent’s claims. After all, another way to characterize petitioners’ argument that respondent’s claims are federal in

nature is to say that federal substantive law governs every

element of respondent’s claims, such that each element

presents a substantial question of federal law. And in the

4

proceedings below, petitioners consistently argued that

respondent’s claims present a “substantial federal question” because they are necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common law. See Pet. C.A. Br. 35; Pet.

C.A. Reply Br. 13-14.

Respondent attempts to distinguish Sam L. Majors on

the ground that the claims there were “clearly established” under federal common law. Br. in Opp. 16. But

the same is true here where, as a matter of constitutional

structure, federal law necessarily and exclusively governs. See Pet. Br. 24-26. Under Sam L. Majors, this case

“arises under federal common law” and thus belongs in

federal court. 117 F.3d at 929.

Respondent’s fallback position (Br. in Opp. 15) is that

Sam L. Majors is no longer good law. But the Fifth Circuit precedent respondent cites in support of that argument did not involve federal common law or discuss Sam

L. Majors. See Bernhard v. Whitney National Bank, 523

F.3d 546 (2008). It is also irrelevant that Sam L. Majors

and the other decisions on which petitioners rely did not

“involve[] congressionally displaced federal common

law.” Br. in Opp. 13. That is a distinction without a difference, and a conflict would remain in any event because

several courts of appeals, including the court below, have

held that federal common law cannot constitute an independent ground to remove a putative state-law claim. See

Pet. 14-17.

2. Respondent heavily relies on the Second Circuit’s

recent decision in Connecticut to argue that there is no

conflict on the question presented. See Br. in Opp. 17-19.

But that decision did not “reject[] the exact arguments petitioners advance” here, as respondent suggests. Id. at 17.

In Connecticut, the court determined that the appellant (petitioner Exxon Mobil Corporation) had failed to

preserve the argument that federal common law can have

5

the same effect as a completely preemptive federal statute. See 83 F.4th at 138 n.4. In this case, however, petitioners have unquestionably argued that federal common

law entirely displaces state law and thus permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, even where the “federalcommon-law cause of action [is] concealed by state-law labels.” Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 10; see Pet. C.A. Br. 27-30; Pet.

28, 30. That is the very same effect that a completely

preemptive federal statute has. See Beneficial National

Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).

In addition, the Second Circuit recognized that, “[i]f

taken at face value,” the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sam L.

Majors would “provide support for [the] view” that putative state-law actions “governed by federal common law”

are removable on federal-question grounds. Connecticut,

83 F.4th at 137 (citations omitted). But the Second Circuit

declined to take the decision at face value, because the

Fifth Circuit emphasized that its holding was limited to

claims against an interstate air carrier for property lost

or damaged in shipping. See ibid. The Fifth Circuit made

those statements, however, in the context of answering

the question whether federal common law governed—not

the discrete question whether federal jurisdiction would

lie if it did. See Sam L. Majors, 117 F.3d at 929.

The Second Circuit’s decision in Connecticut also did

not disturb that court’s earlier holding in City of New

York that claims seeking redress for injuries caused by

global greenhouse-gas emissions “must be brought under

federal common law.” 993 F.3d at 92, 95. To be sure, the

Second Circuit interpreted City of New York to decide

that question only as a matter of “ordinary preemption,”

Connecticut, 83 F.4th at 138 n.4, accepting the position

taken by other courts of appeals that City of New York

does not address the question of federal jurisdiction. See

6

Pet. 19-21. But that does not eliminate the conflict concerning the well-pleaded complaint rule, because the

court did not foreclose petitioners’ specific theory of removal. See p. 5, supra.

B. The Decision Below Is Incorrect

The court of appeals erred by declining to permit removal. Respondent’s contrary arguments (Br. in Opp. 2029) lack merit.

1. Respondent focuses first on the issue of whether

federal common law governs its claims. Respondent argues that this Court’s decisions in International Paper

Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), and American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), “make

clear that federal common law ceases to exist after it has

been displaced by a statute, leaving the statute as the sole

basis for preempting or control[ling] a plaintiff ’s state-law

claims.” Br. in Opp. 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is incorrect.

In Ouellette, the question was whether a suit for injury

allegedly caused by interstate water pollution could proceed under the law of the State of injury, rather than the

law of the source State, after the Clean Water Act displaced the remedy previously available under federal

common law. See 479 U.S. at 483-484. The Court held

that the suit could not proceed under the law of the State

of injury. See id. at 497. The Court noted that, while the

Act sought to “establish an all-encompassing program of

water pollution regulation,” it contained a saving clause

that “negate[d] the inference that Congress left no room

for state causes of action.” Id. at 492 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). At the same time, the Court

concluded that Congress’s “pervasive regulation” of interstate water pollution, and “the fact that the control of interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law,”

7

meant that “the only state suits that remain available are

those specifically preserved by the Act.” Ibid. Ouellette

is thus consistent with the principle that federal law continues exclusively to govern actions concerning interstate

pollution, even after a statute has displaced any remedy

under federal common law.

American Electric Power reinforced Ouellette’s conclusion with respect to nuisance claims alleging injury

from greenhouse-gas emissions. See 564 U.S. at 418.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg reiterated that federal common law “undoubtedly” governs

claims involving “air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects.” Id. at 421 (citation omitted). Later in the

opinion, the Court stated that, “[i]n light of [its] holding

that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the

availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia,

on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.” Id. at 429.

But in support of that proposition, the Court cited Ouellette’s holding that “the Clean Water Act does not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a ‘nuisance

claim pursuant to the law of the source State.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted). The decision in American Electric Power

thus stands for the same proposition as Ouellette: federal

law exclusively governs actions concerning interstate pollution, except where Congress has authorized state law to

operate.

2. Respondent attempts to avoid the application of

federal common law (Br. in Opp. 22) by characterizing its

claims as garden-variety state-law tort and consumerprotection claims. But as Judge Stras rightly observed in

his concurrence below, “[t]here is no hiding the obvious,

and [respondent] does not even try: it seeks a global remedy for a global issue.” Pet. App. 21a. As Judge Stras

noted, the complaint alleges that “energy production has

8

‘caused a substantial portion of global atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations,’ ” which in turn “ha[s] resulted

in ‘climate change’—a label that appears in the complaint

over 200 times.” Ibid.

The remedies respondent is seeking are also not limited to economic harm to consumers who would allegedly

have purchased fewer fossil-fuel products in the absence

of the alleged deception (as in the typical consumer-deception case). Instead, respondent is seeking redress for

injuries alleged to have been caused by global climate

change: for example, flooding, harm to forests and infrastructure, and personal injuries. Pet. C.A. App. 30-31, 7585. Because respondent seeks relief for injuries allegedly

caused by interstate emissions, federal common law governs its claims.

3. Respondent next argues (Br. in Opp. 23-26) that

the artful-pleading principle is limited to the context of

complete statutory preemption. Respondent is wrong

again.

This Court has never limited the artful-pleading principle to the context of complete statutory preemption.

And the Court has already recognized that federal common law can function in the same way as a completely

preemptive statute, in the context of a “state-law complaint that alleges a present right to possession of Indian

tribal lands.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,

393 n.8 (1987) (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of

Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974)). The same principle applies where, as here, the constitutional structure requires

the exclusive application of federal law to respondent’s

claims. See Pet. 24-27.

Drawing a line between statutory claims and claims

necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common

law would lead to bizarre results. Because the latter

would proceed in state court under the decision below,

9

state judges would be tasked with developing the substantive content of federal common law in the first instance,

subject only to ultimate review by this Court. Through

artful pleading and venue selection, plaintiffs could effectively prevent the federal judiciary from developing the

federal common law in areas implicating “uniquely federal

interests,” including “interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States.” Texas

Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,

640-641 (1981).

Respondent takes issue with the notion that federal

courts would have authority to “craft common law rules

with complete preemption’s extraordinary pre-emptive

power.” Br. in Opp. 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But petitioners are not arguing that federal judges have the independent authority to create completely preemptive common-law rules. Instead, the constitutional structure already prohibits the application of

state law in certain contexts, such that any claim asserted

in such a context is necessarily and exclusively federal in

nature. See Pet. 24-27. Respondent denigrates reliance

on constitutional structure (Br. in Opp. 26), but, as this

Court reaffirmed as recently as earlier this year, it “has

long consulted original and historical understandings of

the Constitution’s structure and the principles of ‘sovereignty and comity’ it embraces” in order to “resolve disputes about the reach” of state law. National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 376 (2023) (citation

omitted).

Respondent is thus incorrect that allowing removal

here would “radically expand federal courts’ substantive

and jurisdictional lawmaking authority.” Br. in Opp. 26.

Both sides agree that federal common law plays only a

“modest role” in our constitutional scheme, id. at 25 (cita-

10

tion omitted), and it applies only to certain narrow categories of claims that implicate “uniquely federal interests.” Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640-641 (citation

omitted). It just so happens that claims seeking redress

for interstate pollution have long been one such category

of claims. See Pet. 24-25.

4. Finally with respect to the merits, respondent goes

to great lengths to defend the propriety of the wellpleaded complaint rule. See Br. in Opp. 26-29. But as just

explained, the Court does not need to jettison that rule in

order to permit removal in this case. Instead, the Court

need only hold that federal jurisdiction exists over the

narrow category of claims necessarily and exclusively

governed by federal common law, and that the artfulpleading principle does not permit a plaintiff to avoid federal jurisdiction over such claims by dressing them in

state-law garb.

C. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants

The Court’s Review In This Case

The question presented is recurring and exceptionally

important, and this case is a suitable vehicle for the

Court’s review. See Pet. 31-33. Respondent’s contrary

arguments ring hollow.

1. Respondent contends that the petition is not worthy of review because it “does not present any questions

of recurring importance.” Br. in Opp. 29. Not so. The

question presented is of vital importance in the nearly two

dozen climate-change cases—seeking sweeping relief

from the energy industry—currently pending in courts

across the country. It is likewise critically important to

the economic growth, energy independence, and national

security of the United States.

Respondent notes (Br. in Opp. 2) that this Court denied review on similar questions presented in petitions

11

filed last Term, after the United States changed positions

on the question in response to this Court’s call for the

views of the Solicitor General. Of course, that change in

position itself demonstrates the need for clarity from this

Court. See Pet. 21-23. In addition, new cases seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the contribution of

greenhouse-gas emissions to global climate change continue to be filed. See California v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. CGC-23-609134 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 15, 2023);

County of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct. filed June 22, 2023). Absent this

Court’s intervention, the question of federal jurisdiction

over such actions will continue to arise.

In the meantime, state courts are galloping ahead with

these lawsuits. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court

recently held that federal law did not displace or preempt

the plaintiffs’ climate-change claims, in the process rejecting the federal decisions in City of New York and Illinois

v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984). See

City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. SCAP-22429, 2023 WL 7151875, at *19 n.9, *21-*22 (Haw. Oct. 31,

2023). This Court’s guidance is thus urgently needed on

the question whether federal common law governs climate-change claims, and this case presents the Court with

an opportunity to provide that guidance.

2. Respondent separately argues (Br. in Opp. 32) that

this case is a poor vehicle for deciding the question presented because the court of appeals did not decide

whether federal common law governs respondent’s

claims. But this Court would not be acting as a court of

“first view” if it addressed that question. Id. (citation

omitted). Several courts of appeals have addressed that

issue. And should the Court grant review, it would also

have the option of addressing only the issue concerning

the well-pleaded complaint rule and remanding for the

12

court of appeals to decide in the first instance whether

federal common law governs respondent’s claims.

In sum, respondent offers no good reason why the

Court should decline to review the exceedingly important

jurisdictional question presented by this case. To the contrary, the Court’s review is amply warranted.

*

*

*

*

*

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM A. BURCK

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART

& SULLIVAN, LLP

1300 I Street, N.W.,

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20005

MICHELLE SCHMIT

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART

& SULLIVAN, LLP

191 North Wacker Drive,

Suite 2700

Chicago, IL 60606

Counsel for Petitioners

Koch Industries; Flint Hills

Resources LP; and Flint Hills

Resources Pine Bend LLC

BRIAN D. SCHMALZBACH

MCGUIRE WOODS LLP

Gateway Plaza

800 East Canal Street

Richmond, VA 23219

Counsel for Petitioner

American Petroleum Institute

NOVEMBER 2023

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

WILLIAM T. MARKS

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

Counsel for Petitioners

Exxon Mobil Corporation

and ExxonMobil Oil

Corporation

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.