Reply Brief — American Petroleum Institute, et al., Petitioners v. Minnesota
Supreme Court briefNov 8, 2023
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No. 23-168
In the Supreme Court of the United States
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
STATE OF MINNESOTA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
WILLIAM A. BURCK
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
1300 I Street, N.W.,
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20005
BRIAN D. SCHMALZBACH
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
Gateway Plaza
800 East Canal Street
Richmond, VA 23219
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM T. MARKS
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
(additional counsel on signature page)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A. The decision below implicates a conflict
among the courts of appeals ................................................... 3
B. The decision below is incorrect .............................................. 6
C. The question presented is important
and warrants the Court’s review in this case ..................... 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) .......................................................... 6, 7
Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,
539 U.S. 1 (2003) .................................................................. 5
Bernhard v. Whitney National Bank,
523 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2008) ............................................... 4
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) ............... 8
City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP,
No. SCAP-22-429, 2023 WL 7151875
(Haw. Oct. 31, 2023) .......................................................... 11
City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp.,
45 F.4th 699 (3d Cir. 2022),
cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2483 (2023) ................................... 2
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ........................................2, 5, 11
Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
83 F.4th 122 (2d Cir. 2023) ......................................... 2, 4, 5
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Engineering & Manufacturing,
545 U.S. 308 (2005) .............................................................. 3
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee:
406 U.S. 91 (1972) ................................................................ 3
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ............................................. 11
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) .......................................................... 6, 7
(I)
II
Page
Cases—continued:
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos.
v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1972).................................... 3
National Pork Producers Council v. Ross,
598 U.S. 356 (2023) .............................................................. 9
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661 (1974) .............................................................. 8
Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,
117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997) ........................................... 2-5
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981) ........................................................ 9, 10
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-168
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
STATE OF MINNESOTA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
The decision below deepens an existing conflict on the
exceedingly important question of whether federal removal jurisdiction exists over claims necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common law but labeled as
arising under state law. Since the Court had the opportunity to address that question last Term, the need for the
Court’s review has only grown: the conflict has not
abated, the question continues to arise as new climatechange cases are filed, and climate-change cases are now
proceeding full speed ahead in state courts across the
country.
(1)
2
Respondent’s attempts to whittle away the conflict fall
woefully short. Respondent cannot reconcile the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,
117 F.3d 922 (1997), with the decisions of other circuits affirming the remand of climate-change cases similar to this
one. Indeed, the Third Circuit recognized that the Fifth
Circuit’s decision supports the removal of climate-change
claims and expressly declined to follow it. See City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp., 45 F.4th 699, 708 (2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2483 (2023). And although the Second Circuit recently indicated in Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 83 F.4th 122 (2023), that the decision in City of New
York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021), recognized only a preemption defense in this context, the decision in Connecticut did not address whether the wellpleaded complaint rule permits petitioners’ specific
ground for removal here.
Respondent’s arguments on the merits fare no better.
As Judge Stras recognized in his concurrence below, respondent’s purported state claims are a blatant “attempt
to set national energy policy through its own consumerprotection laws[,] * * * effectively overrid[ing] the policy choices made by the federal government and other
states.” Pet. App. 24a (internal quotation marks, citation,
and alteration omitted). Those claims are exclusively governed by federal common law and thus removable to federal court—as the United States recognized before it
switched positions after a change in presidential administration.
Only this Court can provide much-needed clarity on
the important jurisdictional question presented here. Absent the Court’s intervention, plaintiffs will continue to
pursue claims for climate-change-related injuries in state
court, and questions of jurisdiction over these lawsuits
3
will continue to proliferate. The Court’s review is warranted.
A. The Decision Below Implicates A Conflict Among The
Courts Of Appeals
The courts of appeals remain divided on the question
of how the well-pleaded complaint rule applies to claims
necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common
law. See Pet. 12-17. Respondent’s attempts to wave away
that conflict do not withstand scrutiny.
1. Respondent primarily argues (Br. in Opp. 14-16)
that no conflict exists concerning the well-pleaded complaint rule because the decisions cited by petitioners were
early applications of the “substantial federal question”
doctrine that this Court subsequently synthesized in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005). But as respondent
recognizes (Br. in Opp. 14-15), in Sam L. Majors, the
Fifth Circuit did not cite any of the precursors to Grable
when concluding that federal jurisdiction was present.
Rather, it relied on two of this Court’s cases involving federal common law on which petitioners also rely. See 117
F.3d at 926 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 100 (1972), and National Farmers Union Insurance
Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 850 (1972)); see Pet. 25,
27.
In any event, even if respondent’s characterization of
the court of appeals cases were correct, it is merely a matter of labeling; it would not eliminate the conflict. Either
way, those cases would still permit removal of respondent’s claims. After all, another way to characterize petitioners’ argument that respondent’s claims are federal in
nature is to say that federal substantive law governs every
element of respondent’s claims, such that each element
presents a substantial question of federal law. And in the
4
proceedings below, petitioners consistently argued that
respondent’s claims present a “substantial federal question” because they are necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common law. See Pet. C.A. Br. 35; Pet.
C.A. Reply Br. 13-14.
Respondent attempts to distinguish Sam L. Majors on
the ground that the claims there were “clearly established” under federal common law. Br. in Opp. 16. But
the same is true here where, as a matter of constitutional
structure, federal law necessarily and exclusively governs. See Pet. Br. 24-26. Under Sam L. Majors, this case
“arises under federal common law” and thus belongs in
federal court. 117 F.3d at 929.
Respondent’s fallback position (Br. in Opp. 15) is that
Sam L. Majors is no longer good law. But the Fifth Circuit precedent respondent cites in support of that argument did not involve federal common law or discuss Sam
L. Majors. See Bernhard v. Whitney National Bank, 523
F.3d 546 (2008). It is also irrelevant that Sam L. Majors
and the other decisions on which petitioners rely did not
“involve[] congressionally displaced federal common
law.” Br. in Opp. 13. That is a distinction without a difference, and a conflict would remain in any event because
several courts of appeals, including the court below, have
held that federal common law cannot constitute an independent ground to remove a putative state-law claim. See
Pet. 14-17.
2. Respondent heavily relies on the Second Circuit’s
recent decision in Connecticut to argue that there is no
conflict on the question presented. See Br. in Opp. 17-19.
But that decision did not “reject[] the exact arguments petitioners advance” here, as respondent suggests. Id. at 17.
In Connecticut, the court determined that the appellant (petitioner Exxon Mobil Corporation) had failed to
preserve the argument that federal common law can have
5
the same effect as a completely preemptive federal statute. See 83 F.4th at 138 n.4. In this case, however, petitioners have unquestionably argued that federal common
law entirely displaces state law and thus permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, even where the “federalcommon-law cause of action [is] concealed by state-law labels.” Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 10; see Pet. C.A. Br. 27-30; Pet.
28, 30. That is the very same effect that a completely
preemptive federal statute has. See Beneficial National
Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
In addition, the Second Circuit recognized that, “[i]f
taken at face value,” the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sam L.
Majors would “provide support for [the] view” that putative state-law actions “governed by federal common law”
are removable on federal-question grounds. Connecticut,
83 F.4th at 137 (citations omitted). But the Second Circuit
declined to take the decision at face value, because the
Fifth Circuit emphasized that its holding was limited to
claims against an interstate air carrier for property lost
or damaged in shipping. See ibid. The Fifth Circuit made
those statements, however, in the context of answering
the question whether federal common law governed—not
the discrete question whether federal jurisdiction would
lie if it did. See Sam L. Majors, 117 F.3d at 929.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Connecticut also did
not disturb that court’s earlier holding in City of New
York that claims seeking redress for injuries caused by
global greenhouse-gas emissions “must be brought under
federal common law.” 993 F.3d at 92, 95. To be sure, the
Second Circuit interpreted City of New York to decide
that question only as a matter of “ordinary preemption,”
Connecticut, 83 F.4th at 138 n.4, accepting the position
taken by other courts of appeals that City of New York
does not address the question of federal jurisdiction. See
6
Pet. 19-21. But that does not eliminate the conflict concerning the well-pleaded complaint rule, because the
court did not foreclose petitioners’ specific theory of removal. See p. 5, supra.
B. The Decision Below Is Incorrect
The court of appeals erred by declining to permit removal. Respondent’s contrary arguments (Br. in Opp. 2029) lack merit.
1. Respondent focuses first on the issue of whether
federal common law governs its claims. Respondent argues that this Court’s decisions in International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), and American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), “make
clear that federal common law ceases to exist after it has
been displaced by a statute, leaving the statute as the sole
basis for preempting or control[ling] a plaintiff ’s state-law
claims.” Br. in Opp. 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is incorrect.
In Ouellette, the question was whether a suit for injury
allegedly caused by interstate water pollution could proceed under the law of the State of injury, rather than the
law of the source State, after the Clean Water Act displaced the remedy previously available under federal
common law. See 479 U.S. at 483-484. The Court held
that the suit could not proceed under the law of the State
of injury. See id. at 497. The Court noted that, while the
Act sought to “establish an all-encompassing program of
water pollution regulation,” it contained a saving clause
that “negate[d] the inference that Congress left no room
for state causes of action.” Id. at 492 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). At the same time, the Court
concluded that Congress’s “pervasive regulation” of interstate water pollution, and “the fact that the control of interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law,”
7
meant that “the only state suits that remain available are
those specifically preserved by the Act.” Ibid. Ouellette
is thus consistent with the principle that federal law continues exclusively to govern actions concerning interstate
pollution, even after a statute has displaced any remedy
under federal common law.
American Electric Power reinforced Ouellette’s conclusion with respect to nuisance claims alleging injury
from greenhouse-gas emissions. See 564 U.S. at 418.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg reiterated that federal common law “undoubtedly” governs
claims involving “air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects.” Id. at 421 (citation omitted). Later in the
opinion, the Court stated that, “[i]n light of [its] holding
that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the
availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia,
on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.” Id. at 429.
But in support of that proposition, the Court cited Ouellette’s holding that “the Clean Water Act does not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a ‘nuisance
claim pursuant to the law of the source State.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted). The decision in American Electric Power
thus stands for the same proposition as Ouellette: federal
law exclusively governs actions concerning interstate pollution, except where Congress has authorized state law to
operate.
2. Respondent attempts to avoid the application of
federal common law (Br. in Opp. 22) by characterizing its
claims as garden-variety state-law tort and consumerprotection claims. But as Judge Stras rightly observed in
his concurrence below, “[t]here is no hiding the obvious,
and [respondent] does not even try: it seeks a global remedy for a global issue.” Pet. App. 21a. As Judge Stras
noted, the complaint alleges that “energy production has
8
‘caused a substantial portion of global atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations,’ ” which in turn “ha[s] resulted
in ‘climate change’—a label that appears in the complaint
over 200 times.” Ibid.
The remedies respondent is seeking are also not limited to economic harm to consumers who would allegedly
have purchased fewer fossil-fuel products in the absence
of the alleged deception (as in the typical consumer-deception case). Instead, respondent is seeking redress for
injuries alleged to have been caused by global climate
change: for example, flooding, harm to forests and infrastructure, and personal injuries. Pet. C.A. App. 30-31, 7585. Because respondent seeks relief for injuries allegedly
caused by interstate emissions, federal common law governs its claims.
3. Respondent next argues (Br. in Opp. 23-26) that
the artful-pleading principle is limited to the context of
complete statutory preemption. Respondent is wrong
again.
This Court has never limited the artful-pleading principle to the context of complete statutory preemption.
And the Court has already recognized that federal common law can function in the same way as a completely
preemptive statute, in the context of a “state-law complaint that alleges a present right to possession of Indian
tribal lands.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
393 n.8 (1987) (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974)). The same principle applies where, as here, the constitutional structure requires
the exclusive application of federal law to respondent’s
claims. See Pet. 24-27.
Drawing a line between statutory claims and claims
necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common
law would lead to bizarre results. Because the latter
would proceed in state court under the decision below,
9
state judges would be tasked with developing the substantive content of federal common law in the first instance,
subject only to ultimate review by this Court. Through
artful pleading and venue selection, plaintiffs could effectively prevent the federal judiciary from developing the
federal common law in areas implicating “uniquely federal
interests,” including “interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States.” Texas
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
640-641 (1981).
Respondent takes issue with the notion that federal
courts would have authority to “craft common law rules
with complete preemption’s extraordinary pre-emptive
power.” Br. in Opp. 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But petitioners are not arguing that federal judges have the independent authority to create completely preemptive common-law rules. Instead, the constitutional structure already prohibits the application of
state law in certain contexts, such that any claim asserted
in such a context is necessarily and exclusively federal in
nature. See Pet. 24-27. Respondent denigrates reliance
on constitutional structure (Br. in Opp. 26), but, as this
Court reaffirmed as recently as earlier this year, it “has
long consulted original and historical understandings of
the Constitution’s structure and the principles of ‘sovereignty and comity’ it embraces” in order to “resolve disputes about the reach” of state law. National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 376 (2023) (citation
omitted).
Respondent is thus incorrect that allowing removal
here would “radically expand federal courts’ substantive
and jurisdictional lawmaking authority.” Br. in Opp. 26.
Both sides agree that federal common law plays only a
“modest role” in our constitutional scheme, id. at 25 (cita-
10
tion omitted), and it applies only to certain narrow categories of claims that implicate “uniquely federal interests.” Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640-641 (citation
omitted). It just so happens that claims seeking redress
for interstate pollution have long been one such category
of claims. See Pet. 24-25.
4. Finally with respect to the merits, respondent goes
to great lengths to defend the propriety of the wellpleaded complaint rule. See Br. in Opp. 26-29. But as just
explained, the Court does not need to jettison that rule in
order to permit removal in this case. Instead, the Court
need only hold that federal jurisdiction exists over the
narrow category of claims necessarily and exclusively
governed by federal common law, and that the artfulpleading principle does not permit a plaintiff to avoid federal jurisdiction over such claims by dressing them in
state-law garb.
C. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants
The Court’s Review In This Case
The question presented is recurring and exceptionally
important, and this case is a suitable vehicle for the
Court’s review. See Pet. 31-33. Respondent’s contrary
arguments ring hollow.
1. Respondent contends that the petition is not worthy of review because it “does not present any questions
of recurring importance.” Br. in Opp. 29. Not so. The
question presented is of vital importance in the nearly two
dozen climate-change cases—seeking sweeping relief
from the energy industry—currently pending in courts
across the country. It is likewise critically important to
the economic growth, energy independence, and national
security of the United States.
Respondent notes (Br. in Opp. 2) that this Court denied review on similar questions presented in petitions
11
filed last Term, after the United States changed positions
on the question in response to this Court’s call for the
views of the Solicitor General. Of course, that change in
position itself demonstrates the need for clarity from this
Court. See Pet. 21-23. In addition, new cases seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the contribution of
greenhouse-gas emissions to global climate change continue to be filed. See California v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. CGC-23-609134 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 15, 2023);
County of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct. filed June 22, 2023). Absent this
Court’s intervention, the question of federal jurisdiction
over such actions will continue to arise.
In the meantime, state courts are galloping ahead with
these lawsuits. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court
recently held that federal law did not displace or preempt
the plaintiffs’ climate-change claims, in the process rejecting the federal decisions in City of New York and Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984). See
City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. SCAP-22429, 2023 WL 7151875, at *19 n.9, *21-*22 (Haw. Oct. 31,
2023). This Court’s guidance is thus urgently needed on
the question whether federal common law governs climate-change claims, and this case presents the Court with
an opportunity to provide that guidance.
2. Respondent separately argues (Br. in Opp. 32) that
this case is a poor vehicle for deciding the question presented because the court of appeals did not decide
whether federal common law governs respondent’s
claims. But this Court would not be acting as a court of
“first view” if it addressed that question. Id. (citation
omitted). Several courts of appeals have addressed that
issue. And should the Court grant review, it would also
have the option of addressing only the issue concerning
the well-pleaded complaint rule and remanding for the
12
court of appeals to decide in the first instance whether
federal common law governs respondent’s claims.
In sum, respondent offers no good reason why the
Court should decline to review the exceedingly important
jurisdictional question presented by this case. To the contrary, the Court’s review is amply warranted.
*
*
*
*
*
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
WILLIAM A. BURCK
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
1300 I Street, N.W.,
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20005
MICHELLE SCHMIT
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
191 North Wacker Drive,
Suite 2700
Chicago, IL 60606
Counsel for Petitioners
Koch Industries; Flint Hills
Resources LP; and Flint Hills
Resources Pine Bend LLC
BRIAN D. SCHMALZBACH
MCGUIRE WOODS LLP
Gateway Plaza
800 East Canal Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Counsel for Petitioner
American Petroleum Institute
NOVEMBER 2023
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
WILLIAM T. MARKS
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Counsel for Petitioners
Exxon Mobil Corporation
and ExxonMobil Oil
Corporation
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