Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ronald Preston Harper, Petitioner v. North Carolina

Exhibit A

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-630

No. COA21-752

Filed 20 September 2022

Pitt County, No. 19 CRS 056608

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

RONALD PRESTON HARPER

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 June 2021

by Judge Thomas D. Haigwood in Pitt County Superior

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 August 2022.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant

Attorney General Juliane L. Bradshaw, for the State.

Hynson Law, PLLC, by Warren D. Hynson, for

defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Ronald Preston Harper (“Defendant”) appeals from

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judgment entered upon a jury’s verdict finding him guilty of

willingly resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer.

We find no error.

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I.

Background

Winterville Police Officers Jordan Cruse (“Officer

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Cruse”) and Jordan Fuquay (“Officer Fuquay”) were

dispatched to a Sam’s Club gas station in Winterville on 14

September 2019 at approximately 2:40 p.m. The dispatch

was in response to a caller reporting an individual “cursing

and using profanity towards” the caller.

Prior to the officers’ arrival, Defendant was talking

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to the caller at the gas station about a “blue line” bumper

sticker located on the caller’s car and race relations. The

Defendant and the caller disagreed over policing practices

within the United States. No physical confrontation or

altercation occurred between Defendant and the caller.

Upon arrival, Officer Cruse and Officer Fuquay

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observed the caller seated inside a vehicle parked at a gas

pump. Defendant’s vehicle was parked behind the caller’s

vehicle at another gas pump. The officers located the caller,

who stated Defendant was bothering him. At that time,

Defendant was arguing with the gas station attendant over

the gas pump, which was spilling fuel due to the hose being

over extended.

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Officer Cruse and Officer Fuquay requested to

speak with Defendant about the reason for the dispatch

call. Defendant refused to speak with the officers, stating

he was “attending to his pumping duties.” Officer Cruse

continued to request Defendant to speak with him, whereby

Defendant asked if he was under arrest. Officer Cruse

responded, “[n]o, you’re not free to leave right now.”

Defendant added, “So I’m under arrest. What statute in

North Carolina are you coming to talk to me about?” Officer

Cruse responded to Defendant that he was being detained

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for “causing a disturbance.” Officer Cruse reiterated, “[t]he

reason that I am talking to you is because we had a

gentleman call, complaining that you were harassing

him ...That’s all I’m here to talk to you about.” Defendant

replied, “[wjell, I’m not talking to you about it.”

The exchange continued until Officer Cruse

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requested Defendant provide identification. Defendant

reached into his shirt pocket and produced a card

purportedly containing Defendant’s name with initials,

title, a telephone number, and a quote from City of Houston

v. Hill. 482 U.S. 451, 462-63, 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 412-13 (1987)

(“The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge

police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the

principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free

nation from a.police state.”). Defendant asserted he had

previously worked as an “investigative journalist” for

twenty years.

V

Officer Cruse continued to request Defendant’s

identification several times to complete the investigation

and dispatch report. Defendant continued to refuse to

produce any identification other than the card. Defendant

again tried to hand Officer Cruse the same card, requesting

Officer Cruse to read the card because the encounter was “a

constitutional issue.”

18

Soon thereafter, Defendant responded to yet

another request for identification, stating it was located

inside his vehicle. Officer Cruse escorted Defendant over to

his vehicle where Defendant grabbed his card holder

attached to his cell phone. Defendant again tried to give

Officer Cruse the card, stating “I’m not giving you nothing

until you take this. Take that!” When Officer Cruse refused,

Defendant offered the card to Officer Fuquay.

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Officer Cruse handcuffed Defendant and

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requested Officer Fuquay retrieve Defendant’s card, out-ofstate driver’s license, and cell phone. Defendant’s license

identified him as “Ronald Preston Harper Jr. from

Pennsylvania.” Defendant was placed under arrest for

obstructing Officer Cruse’s investigation by refusing to

provide identification and charged with resisting, delaying,

or obstructing a public officer.

Officer Cruse was conducting unrelated thirdt 10

party traffic stops or investigations post-arrest when

Defendant appeared at three locations on 22 October 2019

and twice on 17 December 2019. Defendant moved within

10 feet of the stop and recorded Officer Cruse. Defendant

next appeared at a stop Officer Cruse was conducting on 17

December 2019. He came near the officer and stated, “I am

watching you Jordan, you A-hole.” During the second stop

on 17 December 2019, Defendant drove by and gestured

with a hand motion resembling a gun pointed at Officer

Cruse. Officer Cruse charged Defendant with

communicating threats. The two charges were joined and

tried together. Defendant was convicted by a jury of

resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer but was

acquitted of communicating threats. Defendant appeals.

II.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C.

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Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(l), 15A-1444(a) (2021).

III. Issues

Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1)

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whether the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion

to dismiss the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a

public officer; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing

Defendant to waive counsel and represent himself in

superior court after Defendant had signed a waiver of

24

counsel in district court; and, (3) whether the trial court

erred by failing to instruct the jury on justification or

excuse for the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a

public officer.

IV.

Motion to Dismiss

At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant

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moved to dismiss the obstructing a public officer charge.

Following the defense’s evidence, the trial court renewed

sua. sponte Defendant’s motion to dismiss and the motion.

The issue is preserved for review by this Court. N.C. R.

App. P. 10(a)(3).

A. Standard of Review

Where a defendant properly preserves a motion

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to dismiss, this Court reviews the denial of a motion to

dismiss de novo. State v. Parker,274 N.C. App. 464

, 469,852 S.E.2d 638, 644 (2020) (citation omitted). Under

de novo review, this Court “considers the matter anew and

freely substitutes its own judgment” for that of the trial

court. In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship,

356 N.C. 642, 647,576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (citation

omitted).

B. Analysis

In ruling on a motion to dismiss criminal charges,

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the question is “whether there is substantial evidence (1) of

each essential element of the offense charged and (2) of

defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.” State v.

Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75,430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993) (citation

omitted).

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Whether the State presented substantial evidence

of each essential element of the offense is a question of law

25

this Court reviews de novo. State u. Colder, 374 N.C. 238

, 250, 839 S.E.2d 782, 790 (2020) (citation omitted). In

ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court views all evidence

in the light most favorable to the State and draws all

reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. Id.

The elements of the offense of resisting, delaying,

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or obstructing a public officer are: (1) “the victim was a

public officer”; (2) “the defendant knew or had reasonable

grounds to believe the [officer] was a public officer”; (3) “the

[officer] was [lawfully] discharging or attempting to

discharge a duty of his office”; (4) “the defendant resisted,

delayed, or obstructed the [officer] in discharging or

attempting to discharge a duty of his office”; and, (5) “the

defendant acted willfully and unlawfully, that is

intentionally and without justification or excuse.” State v.

Peters,255 N.C. App. 382, 387,804 S.E.2d 811, 815 (2017)

(explaining the essential elements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14223 (2021)).

Defendant does not challenge the first two

1 18

elements on appeal. Officer Cruse was a public officer in

uniform responding to a dispatched call in a marked

vehicle, identified himself, announced the reason for his

presence on the scene, and requested Defendant to identify

himself. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2021).

1. Lawful Discharge of Duties

Defendant first asserts the trial court erred in

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denying his motion to dismiss the charge of resisting,

delaying, or obstructing a public officer because the initial

contact with Defendant was not a lawful discharge of the

officer’s duties. To succeed in a motion to dismiss,

substantial evidence must tend to show Officer Cruse was

either not discharging or attempting to discharge his duties

or was doing so unlawfully. This element “presupposes

26

lawful conduct of the officer in discharging or attempting to

discharge a duty of his office.” State v. Sinclair, 191 N.C.

App. 485, 489, 663 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2008).

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“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals

‘against unreasonable searches and seizures,’ [under] U.S.

Const, amend. IV, and the North Carolina Constitution

provides similar protection, [under] N.C. Const, art. I, § 20.”

State v. Styles,362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439

(2008). Our Supreme Court has stated that “the police can

stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes

if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by

articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even

if the officer lacks probable cause.” Id. at 423-24,

665 S.E.2d at 445.

Reasonable suspicion requires “[t]he stop must be

1121

based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the

rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the

eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his

experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437

, 441-42,446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than

probable cause and requires a showing considerably less

than preponderance of the evidence.” Styles, at 414, 665

S.E.2d at 439 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

1122

The State’s evidence tends to show Officer Cruse

established reasonable suspicion through articulable facts

prior to approaching and detaining Defendant. Officers

knew the description of the parties from the call reporting a

disturbance. Upon the officers’ arrival at the scene, the

caller immediately identified Defendant as the person who

had caused the disturbance. Officer Cruse also testified he

observed Defendant “yelling and fussing” at the gas station

attendant upon his arrival. The

27

basis for the call and subsequent investigation was

substantiated prior to Defendant

being approached and detained. Watkins,

337 N.C. at 442

446 S.E.2d at 70

When reviewing the reasonableness of a

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warrantless detention, this Court considers the totality of

circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion

exists to make an investigatory detention. See State v.

Sanchez, 147 N.C. App. 619, 623, 556 S.E.2d 602, 606

(2001) (citations omitted).

This Court determined officers had “‘a reasonable

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basis to stop [the] defendant and require him to identify

himself to ascertain whether he was the named subject in

their arrest warrants.” State v. Washington, 193 N.C. App.

670, 680, 668 S.E.2d 622, 628 (2008) (citations omitted).

By doing so, “the officers were lawfully discharging a duty

of their office .’’Id. An officer may briefly detain a suspect

when responding to and observing activity reasonably

calculated to be criminal activity. See State v. Harrell,

67 N.C. App. 57, 63, 312 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1984) (holding an

officer briefly seizing a driver to ask for his driver’s license

to determine his identity and employment status was

proper).

The State need only show Officer Cruse

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reasonably believed some criminal activity may be

occurring based on articulable facts to survive Defendant’s

motion to dismiss. Viewing evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, Officer Cruse could have reasonably

believed Defendant was the subject of the disturbance

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dispatch, verified that information with the caller, and

observed and articulated facts sufficient to approach

Defendant to request identification.

126

Upon arrival, Officer Cruse initially spoke with

the caller who had reported Defendant was harassing him.

The caller specifically identified Defendant as that person.

Defendant was observed engaging in aggressive behaviors

toward the gas station attendant. When Officer Cruse

approached Defendant in the investigation of the

disturbance call, reasonable suspicion existed. Officer

Cruse was lawfully discharging his law enforcement duties

and within his rights to confront and request Defendant’s

identity.

127

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the State, substantial evidence was presented tending to

show and for the jury to find the third element, that the

officer was lawfully discharging or attempting to discharge

duty of his office, sufficient to overcome Defendant’s motion

to dismiss. See Peters, 255 N.C. App.at 387, 804 S.E.2d at

815 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223). 2. Resisting, Delaying,

or Obstructing

128

Defendant next asserts the trial court erred in

denying his motion to dismiss the charge of resisting,

delaying, or obstructing a public officer because the actions

by Defendant did not rise beyond mere criticism.

129

Defendant wrongfully relies upon case law

attempting to attribute Defendant’s breach of the peace and

harassing and threatening conduct with that of mere

questioning or criticism. See State v. Leigh, 278 N.C. 243

, 251,179 S.E.2d 708, 713 (1971); State v. Humphreys,

275 N.C. App. 788, 789,853 S.E.2d 789, 791 (2020)

Defendant argues his actions merely apprised the officers of

his constitutional rights. See Leigh, 278 N.C. at 251 179

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S.E.2d at 713 (explaining that “criticizing or questioning an

officer while he is performing his duty, when done in an

orderly manner, does not amount to obstructing or delaying

an officer”). We disagree.

130

Defendant has no right to breach the peace on

private or public property or to harass others to

constitutionally “express himself.” Also, Defendant’s

harassing customers, arguing with employees, and spilling

flammable fuel on private property are independent

grounds for other potential charges and crimes to warrant

the officers’ request for identification.

131

A defendant commits the offense of resisting,

delaying, or obstructing a public officer by “willfully and

unlawfully resisting], delay[ing] or obstructing] a public

officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of

his office[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223. This Court has

previously held the failure by an individual to provide

personal identifying information during a lawful stop

constitutes resistance, delay, or obstruction within the

meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223. See State v. Friend,

237 N.C. App. 490, 493, 768 S.E.2d 146, 148 (2014).

1 32

Actions or even language which cause delays or

obstruction in an officer’s investigation can constitute this

offense. See Leigh, 278 N.C. at 249,

179 S.E.2d at 711. Defendant was not a mere bystander

present in a public place, but rather an identified subject of

the complaint that initiated the dispatch call and the

reason for the investigation.

1 33

Defendant’s actions prevented and obstructed

Officer Cruse from conducting a proper and prompt

investigation into the alleged disturbance. Defendant

refused to provide verifiable identification and delayed the

officers’ ability to promptly investigate and resolve the call.

30

While Defendant did in fact attempt to give Officers Cruse

and Fuquay a card with purported information, that was

not immediately verifiable as accurate. The officers were

unable to ensure accurate information was presented to

investigate the disturbance dispatch, close out the call, and

complete their report.

Together with the totality of all the evidence,

1 34

Defendant’s refusal to provide verifiable identification to

law enforcement is for a jury to decide whether his conduct

amounted to resisting, delaying, or obstructing the officers.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223; see State v. Powell,299 N.C. 95

, 99,261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980) (stating “contradictions and

discrepancies of fact are for the jury to resolve and do not

warrant dismissal”). Defendant’s conduct and refusals tend

to show the investigation was obstructed or delayed the

release of other witnesses as Officer Cruse was unable to

conduct a lawful investigation and complete the call. Id.

As noted, Officer Cruse arrived in uniform,

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identified himself, and was properly investigating and

lawfully conducting a complaint of Defendant’s actions

breaching the peace on private property, by threatening

and harassing others. By refusing to identify himself and

cooperate with Officer Cruse’s investigation, sufficient

evidence of this element was presented tending to show and

for the jury to find Defendant resisted, delayed, or

obstructed the officer in discharging or attempting to

discharge a duty of his office to survive Defendant’s motion

to dismiss. See Peters, 255 N.C, App. at 387, 804 S.E.2d at

815 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223). Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State, substantial

evidence supports the fourth element that Defendant

resisted, delayed, or obstructed the officer in discharging or

attempting to discharge a duty of his office to overcome

amotion to dismiss. Id. Defendant’s argument is without

merit.

31

3. Willful and Unlawful Conduct

136

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying

his motion to dismiss the charge of resisting, delaying, or

obstructing a public officer because his actions were

justified and not willful. “Willful” is defined as “the

wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or

the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in

violation of law.” State v. Brackett, 306 N.C. 138, 142, 291

S.E.2d 660, 662 (1982) (internal citation omitted).

1137

As noted, Officer Cruse was properly dispatched

to and was investigating a disturbance call, wherein

Defendant was identified as the suspect, and he lawfully

conducted a brief detention to identify Defendant. “Those

[communications) intended to hinder or prevent an officer

from carrying out his duty admittedly are discouraged by

[N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-223].” State v. Singletary,73 N.C. App.

612, 615,327 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1985) (citation omitted).

Again, Defendant wrongfully rests his arguments

on the detention being unlawful, as well as offering the card

to justify his belligerency, conduct, and failure to provide

verifiable identification. Defendant correctly points out

the Court in Friend does not require a government-issued

identification, although officers may require defendants to

present verifiable identification. Friend, 237 N.C. App. at

493, 768 S.E.2d at 148.

1 38

139

As the State correctly argues, Defendant’s card

did not provide a legal name, photo, date of birth, address,

or any other identifying information, other than initials and

a last name. Defendant’s vehicle also displayed out-of-state

license plates preventing officers from immediately

verifying identity and ownership, until his out-of-state

driver’s license was retrieved from inside the vehicle.

32

1140

The State’s evidence also tends to show

Defendant was the identified subject of the investigation,

was observed harassing others, spewing profanities and

verbal bile, spilling gasoline on private property, and being

uncooperative by refusing to offer information to delay and

prolong the officers’ investigation. Singletary, 73 N.C. App.

at 615, 327 S.E.2d at 13 Defendant was the subject of the

investigation and not a mere bystander in a public place.

Defendant argues nothing to grant a pre-emptive dismissal

based on any justification or lack of willfulness.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

1(41

to the State, substantial evidence tends to show the fifth

element that Defendant acted willfully and unlawfully and

was intentional and without justification or excuse to

overcome Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Peters, 255

N.C. App. at 387, 804 S.E.2d at 815 (citing

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223).

Officer Cruse reasonably believed Defendant was

1 42

the subject of the complaint, properly conducted an

investigatory detention, and lawfully requested Defendant’s

verifiable identification to conduct and complete an

investigation. Substantial evidence was presented of each

essential element of the offense charged, and of Defendant

being the perpetrator of such offense. Id. The trial court did

not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. His

argument is without merit and overruled.

V.

Waiver of Counsel

143

Defendant argues the trial court erred when it

allowed Defendant to waive counsel and represent himself

in superior court after Defendant signed a waiver of counsel

in district court.

A. Standard of Review

33

This court reviews the sufficiency of a trial court’s

H 44

statutory inquiry concerning a defendant’s waiver of his

rights to counsel de novo. State v. Watlington, 216 N.C.

App. 388, 393-94,716 S.E.2d 671, 675 (2011) (citations

omitted).

B. Analysis

1f 45

Both the Constitution of the United States and

the North Carolina Constitution recognize criminal

defendants have a right to assistance of counsel. U.S.

Const. Amend. VI; N.C. Const. Art. I, §§ 19, 23; see also

State v. Montgomery, 138 N.C. App. 521, 524,v530 S.E.2d

66, 68 (2000). Defendants also have the right to waive

counsel, represent themselves, and handle their case

without assistance of counsel. State v. Mems,281 N.C. 658

, 670-71,190 S.E.2d 164, 172 (1972).

Before a defendant is allowed to waive the right

If 46

to counsel, a trial court must conduct a statutorily-required

colloquy to determine that “constitutional and statutory

standards are satisfied.” State v. Moore, 362 N.C. 319

, 322, 661 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2008). Courts “must determine

whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily waives the right to in-court representation by

counsel.” Id.

If 47

The procedure to waive counsel is codified in N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (2021).Courts may only enter an

order to allow defendants to waive their right to counsel

after being satisfied the movant: (1) has been clearly

advised of his rights to the assistance of counsel, including

his right to the assignment of appointed counsel when he is

so entitled; (2) understands and appreciates the

consequences of this decision; and, (3) comprehends the

nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of

34

permissible punishments. Id.

The record indicates Defendant executed a

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written disclosure and waiver of counsel on 3 October 2020

in open court during district court proceedings. Written

waivers of counsel, certified by the trial court, create a

rebuttable presumption that the waiver was executed

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pursuant to N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242; State v. Kinlock,152 N.C. App. 84,

89,566 S.E.2d 738, 741 (2002), affd per curiam,357 N.C.

48,577 S.E.2d 620 (2003). Once a written waiver of counsel

is executed and certified by the trial court, subsequent

waivers or inquiries are not necessary before further

proceedings. State v. Watson, 21 N.C. App. 374, 378,204

S.E.2d 537, 540 (1974).

Once the initial waiver of counsel was executed,

1 49

it was not necessary for successive written waivers to be

executed, nor for additional inquiries to be made by the

district or superior court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § ISA1242. The record on appeal contains no transcript of the

proceedings challenging or surrounding the October 2020

waiver. The only evidence in the record before this Court

regarding the waiver is the signed waiver and certification

made by the district court judge that a proper inquiry and

disclosure was made in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. §

15A-1242.

An executed waiver creates a “rebuttable

1 50

presumption” of sufficiency and the record provides no

grounds for rebuttal. The record indicates Defendant

executed multiple waivers attesting he understood his

rights, “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” elected to

waive counsel and no evidence contra exists the initial

waiver was statutorily or constitutionally insufficient. The

trial court did not err when it allowed Defendant to waive

counsel and represent himself in subsequent proceedings.

35

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242.

Any asserted inadequacy in a court’s further

1151

inquiry into Defendant’s waiver is immaterial, provided the

original waiver was compliant with the statute and was

certified by the trial court. Any successive inquiry beyond

the original waiver would serve only to determine whether

Defendant desired to withdraw his waiver. The record is

devoid of any objection, request to withdraw the waiver, or

a request for counsel. Defendant failed to show the initial

disclosure and waiver he executed and, which was certified

in district court, failed to satisfy the statute. N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 15A-1242 (2021). We find no prejudicial or reversible

error. Defendant’s argument is overruled.

VI. Jury Instruction on Justification or Excuse

11 52

Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing

to instruct the jury on justification or excuse for the charge

of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer. N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2021).

A. Standard of Review

Trial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on all

If 53

substantial features of the case arising from the evidence

and “must properly instruct the jury as to all essential

elements of the offense charged.” State v. Hairr,

244 N.C. 506, 509,94 S.E. 2d 472, 474 (1956). Errors in jury

instructions are “preserved for appellate review, even

without objection, ‘when the trial court deviates from an

agreed-upon pattern instruction.’” State v. Clagon,279 N.C.

App. 425, 432,865 S.E.2d 343, 348 (2021) (internal citation

omitted).

B. Analysis

36

f 54

Defendant failed to object to jury instruction at

trial both during the charge conference and when asked by

the trial court following the delivery of instruction to the

jury. No evidence in the record indicates Defendant

objected to the jury instructions agreed upon at the charge

conference. After delivering the instructions to the jury, the

trial court held the following colloquy with the parties:

THE COURT: Before sending the verdict

sheets to the jury and allowing them to

begin their deliberations, I will hear at

this time any objections or corrections to

the Court’s charge to the jury. First from

the State?

STATE: No, sir.

THE COURT: From the Defendant?

DEFENDANT: No, sir.

Defendant’s failure to request, to object prior to or

1 55

after the instructions were given to the jury, along with his

express agreement after the instructions were given to the

jury, constitutes invited error. Defendant’s invited error

waived any “right to all appellate review concerning the

invited error, including plain error review.” State v.

Barber,147 N.C. App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001)

(citation omitted).

We find instructive and precedential our Supreme

t 56

Court’s determination in State v. White,349 N.C. 535,508

S.E.2d 253 (1998). The Court examined defense counsel’s

involvement in jury instructions in a capital murder-death

penalty case. Jd.The Court held: “Counsel . . . did not object

when given the opportunity either at the charge conference

37

or after the charge had been given,

In fact, defense

counsel affirmatively approved the instructions during the

charge conference. Where a defendant tells the trial court

that he has no objection to an instruction, he will not be

heard to complain on appeal.” Id. at 570, 508 S.E.2d at 275

(citation omitted).^

57

The record shows the jury instructions: (1) were

agreed upon at the charge conference; (2) were not objected

to at the charge conference; (3) were not objected to when

provided to the jury; or, (4) when Defendant was given a

further opportunity to object by the trial court before the

jury retired. No deviations from the agreed-upon jury

instructions were made by the trial court. By failing to

object at trial and expressly agreeing to the jury

instructions as given, Defendant waived any right to appeal

this issue. Defendant’s argument is barred as invited error.

Id. Defendant’s argument is dismissed.

VII.

Conclusion

Upon de novo review, the trial court did not err in

II 58

denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Substantial

evidence of each essential element of the charged offense of

resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer, and of

Defendant being the perpetrator of such offense, was

presented to submit the charge to the jury. Officer Cruse

was lawfully discharging his duties in responding to a

breach of the peace and disturbance call and was within his

rights to require Defendant, the identified subject, to

provide verifiable identification.

59 With the totality of the circumstances and evidence

introduced and admitted, Defendant’s failure to provide the

requested identification was sufficient to submit the charge

and evidence to the jury for their consideration and

38

resolution.

160

Defendant was apprised of his rights to counsel

and expressly waived his right to assistance of counsel

during district court proceedings. Defendant’s waiver was

certified by the trial court and sufficient to waive his right

to counsel in further proceedings. Nothing in the record

indicates the court failed to statutorily comply with

apprising Defendant of his rights prior to Defendant

waiving counsel in district court. The superior court was

not required to further apprise Defendant of his right to

counsel and to undertake another statutory colloquy

without request or objection.

Defendant invited any purported error by failing

161

to object to the agreed-upon jury instructions at the charge

conference or during and after delivery to the jury. No

evidence suggests any deviation from the agreed-upon

instructions.

62

Defendant received a fair trial, free from

prejudicial errors he preserved or argued. We find no error

in the jury’s verdict or in the judgment entered thereon. It

is so ordered.

NO ERROR

Judge GORE concurs

Judge INMAN concurs in the result.

39

Exhibit B

No. 324P22

THREE-A DISTRICT

Supreme Court of North Carolina

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

V

RONALD PRESTON HARPER

From N.C. Court of Appeals

(21-752)

From Pitt

( 19CRS56608)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 25th of Octo­

ber 2022 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary re­

view of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals

pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered

and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Ap­

peals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of

March 2023."

s/ Allen, J.

For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of

North Carolina, this the 8th day of March 2023.

40

Grant E. Buckner

Clerk, Supreme Court of North Carolina

M. C. Hackney

Assistant Clerk, Supreme Court of North Carolina

Copy to:

North Carolina Court of Appeals

Mr. Warren D. Hynson, Attorney at Law, For Harper,

Ronald Preston ■ (By Email)

Ms. Juliane L. Bradshaw, Assistant Attorney General, For

State of North Carolina - (By Email)

Hon. Faris Dixon, District Attorney

Hon. Sarah Beth Rhodes, Clerk

West Publishing - (By Email)

Lexis-Nexis - (By Email)

41

Exhibit C

On 10/22/2019, I conducted a traffic stop on Reedy Branch

Rd in the PVA of the Angus Grill parking lot. While on the

traffic stop, I observed a white male subject shouting at me,

cursing, and recording the stop. I recognized the subject as

Ronald Preston Harper Jr.

I know Harper through a previous encounter where I had

arrested him for resisting public officer. Harper was

recording the stop very closely to the suspect vehicle,

shouting curse words such as “fuck you”, “you asshole” and

calling me by my first name. Harper also called me a “slave

driver for arresting black people”. Harper was also delaying

my traffic stop by taking my attention away from my

suspect vehicle to deal with him. Harper was causing a

disturbance and causing a crowd to form at the traffic stop.

He was being disorderly and cursing in public at officers.

On 12/17/2019, at approximately 1256 hours I conducted a

vehicle stop on Reedy Branch Rd in the PVA of the Angus

Grill parking lot. Upon completion of my stop I observed

Harper standing around the corner of the building, he

yelled “I’m watching you Jordan, you asshole”. I got back

into my patrol vehicle and left the traffic stop. I was

traveling south bound on Reedy Branch Rd near Warren

Drive. I observed Harper’s vehicle following behind me.

Harper drives a white in color Ford Van, with decals on the

side “Official Observer” with Pennsylvania plates. He

followed me through the Reedy Branch Rd/Davenport Farm

Rd intersection. He continued behind me up to Forlines Rd.

I turned right onto Forlines Rd and Harper continued to

follow me. I turned into South Central High School in an

attempt to lose Harper. I observed him drive past South

Central High School.

I left the school and conducted another traffic stop at

approximately 1320 hours the same day on Forlines Rd at

42

Dial Music Company. Upon completion of the stop, I was

exiting the driveway of Dail Music Company. I observed

Harper again drive by and point through his window

towards me his finger in the manner resembling a

handgun. At that time I reported the incident to my

supervisor Sgt. Santiago. I believe Harper to be a credible

threat and fear that he will do bodily harm to me if

provided the opportunity. During my several encounters

with Harper I believe him to be erratic and not of sane

mind.

On 12/20/2019, at approximately 1555 hours Mr. Harper

Showed up at my doctor’s office at Wintergreen Medical

Center, while I was off and harassed me and my father,

saying to my father “your son is a slave driver, I see the

apple doesn’t fall far from the tree” “Jordan it’s a small

world isn’t it”. He had papers in his hand but did not go

inside the doctor’s office instead started to leave when I did.

43