Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pamela Quinlan, Petitioner v. Joseph P. Lopinto, III, Sheriff, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, et al.

NO. ____________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

PAMELA QUINLAN,

V.

PETITIONER,

JOSEPH P. LOPINTO, III, SHERIFF, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY; ROBERT F. STOLTZ, JR., DEPUTY

____________________

RESPONDENTS.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

APPENDIX

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

____________________

CLAIBORNE W. BROWN

Counsel of Record

1070-B West Causeway Approach

Mandeville, LA 70471

(985) 845-2824

cwbrown@cwbrownlaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page (Appx.)

APPENDIX A: Decision under Review,

Conclusions of Law, Quinlan v. Lopinto, et

al., 23-30490 (5th Cir. 1/9/24)………………………..1

APPENDIX B: Order and Reasons of The

District Court in Quinlan v. Jefferson

Parish Sheriff’s Office, et al., No. 22-cv-889

(E.D. La. 4/25/23)…………………………………..…3

APPENDIX C:

Denial of Rehearing in

Quinlan v. Lopinto, et al., 23-30490 (5th

Cir. 3/26/24)…………………………………………. 21

APPENDIX D: Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions…………………………………………….23

APPENDIX E:

Amended Complaint in

Quinlan v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s

Office, et al., No. 22-cv-889 (E.D. La)…………….25

i

[APPENDIX A : Decision

Conclusions of Law]

under

[Case: 23-30490

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 01/09/2024]

Review;

Page: 1

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

________________

No. 23-30490

________________

Pamela Quinlan

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Joseph P. Lopinto, III, Sheriff, in his

official capacity; Robert F. Stoltz, Jr.,

Deputy,

Defendants—Appellees.

____________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:22-CV-889

_______________________________________________

Before Smith, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit

Judges. Per Curiam: *

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R.

47.5.

Appx. 1

AFFIRMED. Appellant has not identified any

reversible error of law with the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. See 5th Cir. R. 47.6.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 9, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

Appx. 2

[APPENDIX B:

Order and Reasons of the

District Court in Quinlan v. Lopinto, et al.,

U.S.D.C. E.D. La. No. 22-cv-889]

[23-30490.629:

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Document 30 Filed 04/25/23 Page 1 of 19]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN

DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PAMELA QUINLAN

VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 22-889

JEFFERSON PARISH

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, ET AL.

SECTION “R” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendants’ motion to

dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) or, in the

alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. 1 Plaintiff opposes the motion. 2 For the

following reasons, the Court grants defendants’

motion.

I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from plaintiff’s alleged

unlawful arrest at the hands of defendants. Plaintiff

and her daughter, Chardonnay Houlette, co-owned an

automotive repair shop named “Roadrunner Tires

Plus, L.L.C.” with Deborah Hudson, an acquaintance

1 R. Doc. 19.

2 R. Doc. 25.

Appx. 3

of plaintiff. 3 Plaintiff asserts that she and

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Hudson had a “falling out” pertaining to the

operation of the business. 4 Plaintiff contacted law

enforcement on February 4, 2018, alleging that

Hudson had improperly evicted plaintiff from the

operating premises of their

business

and

misappropriated over $6,000 in assets belonging to

the business. 5 Her complaint was referred to

defendant Robert Stoltz, a detective at the Jefferson

Parish Sheriff’s Office. 6 At the conclusion of the

investigation, Detective Stoltz declined to refer the

theft allegations against Hudson for prosecution. 7

During the course of the investigation, however,

plaintiff also accused Hudson of forging plaintiff’s

signature on a contract with a credit card processing

company called TranzVia, L.L.C., making plaintiff

personally liable for the obligation. 8 Detective Stoltz

decided to refer the forgery accusation for prosecution,

but the District Attorney’s Office for Louisiana’s 24th

Judicial District ultimately decided not to pursue

criminal charges against Hudson. 9 Stoltz then began

investigating plaintiff for falsely accusing Hudson of

crimes in violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:126.1, which

criminalizes “false swearing for the purpose of

violating public health

3 R. Doc. 25-2 at ¶ 2 (Affidavit of Pamela Quinlan).

4 Id. ¶ 5.

5 Id. ¶ 18.

6 Id.

7 R. Doc. 25-7 at 28.

8 R. Doc. 25-2 at ¶ 19 (Affidavit of Pamela Quinlan).

9 R. Doc. 25-7 at 28.

Appx. 4

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or safety,” and La. Rev. Stat. 14:133, which proscribes

“filing or maintaining false public records.”

On October 18, 2020, plaintiff was contacted by

Det. Stoltz and advised that a warrant had been

issued for her arrest for violations of La. Rev. Stat.

14:126.1 and 14:133. 10 Plaintiff was arrested,

processed, and subsequently released on bond on

November 4, 2020. 11 Plaintiff alleges that upon her

release, she was subject to specific bail obligations

including that she consent to random drug testing,

make an appearance in court on December 18, 2020,

and remain in the jurisdiction absent permission from

the 24th Judicial District Court to leave Louisiana. 12

She asserts that she made “multiple appearances” in

court between December 18, 2020 and May 17, 2021. 13

On May 17, 2021, the District Attorney’s Office for

Louisiana’s 24th Judicial District sent a letter to

plaintiff notifying her that the state would not pursue

criminal charges. 14

Plaintiff filed this action against Detective

Stoltz and the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office on

April 4, 2022, alleging that defendants violated 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and are also liable for malicious

prosecution under Louisiana

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10 R. Doc. 3 ¶ 5 (Amended Complaint).

11 Id. ¶ 9.

12 R, Doc, 25-2 ¶ 28 (Affidavit of Pamela Quinlan).

13 Id.

14 R. Doc. 3 ¶ 11 (Amended Complaint).

Appx. 5

Law. 15 Now defendants move for judgment on the

pleadings or summary judgment in the alternative. 16

Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion. 17 For the

following reasons, the Court grants defendants’

motion.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court

typically must limit itself to the pleadings and their

attachments. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,

224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). “If, on a motion

under 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings

are presented to and not excluded by the court, the

motion must be treated as one for summary judgment

under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But a court may

also consider documents attached to a motion to

dismiss without converting it to a summary judgment

motion if the documents are referred to in the

complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.

Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d

285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Because

the parties have submitted, and the Court refers to,

materials outside the pleadings that were not

explicitly referred to in plaintiff’s complaint, the Court

will treat defendants’ motion as one for summary

judgment.

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15 See generally R. Doc. 1.

16 R. Doc. 19.

17 R. Doc. 25.

Appx. 6

Summary judgment is warranted when “the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075

(5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When

assessing whether a dispute to any material fact

exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the

record but refrain[s] from making credibility

determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta &

Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530

F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable

inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party,

but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting

forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of

law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a

motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision

Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985)

(quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983));

see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. “No genuine dispute

of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th

Cir. 2014).

If the dispositive issue is one on which the

moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the

moving party “must come forward with evidence

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which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the

evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l

Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65

Appx. 7

(5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755

F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)). “[T]he nonmoving

party can defeat the motion” by either countering with

evidence sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact,” or by “showing that

the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not

persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict

in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing

out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with

respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must,

by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific

facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at

324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings,

but must identify specific facts that establish a

genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37

F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make

a showing sufficient to establish the

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existence of an element essential to that party's case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).

III.

DISCUSSION

A.

Plaintiff’s Federal Claims

Appx. 8

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that

defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights and are therefore liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action

for plaintiffs whose federal rights are violated under

the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Doe v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998).

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must

first show a violation of the Constitution or of federal

law, and then show that the violation was committed

by someone acting “under color of state law.” Id. The

qualified-immunity defense to such claims shields

government officials who perform discretionary

functions from suit and liability under section 1983,

“unless their conduct violates clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Babb v.

Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity may

“be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”

Nguyen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Cosmetology, No.

14-80, 2015 WL 1281959, at *1

[23-30490.636:

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(M.D. La. Mar. 20, 2015). At the motion-to-dismiss

stage, the Court looks to “defendant’s conduct as

alleged in the complaint” to determine whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Behrens

v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996).

“Once a defendant invokes the qualified

immunity defense, the plaintiff carries the burden of

demonstrating its inapplicability.” Floyd v. City of

Kenner, 351 F. App’x 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing

Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th

Appx. 9

Cir. 2009)). To satisfy that burden at the motion-todismiss stage, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient

to demonstrate (1) that the defendant violated a

constitutional right, and (2) that the violated right

was “clearly established” at the time of defendants’

alleged actions. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009). Thus, an “officer will be entitled to

qualified immunity if no constitutional violation

occurred or if the conduct ‘did not violate law clearly

established at the time.’” Davis v. Hodgkiss, 11 F.4th

329, 333 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1127

(2022). It is within the Court’s discretion to decide

which prong to address first. Whitley v. Hanna, 726

F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009)).

Here, plaintiff asserts claims based on

purported Fourth Amendment violations pursuant to

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), as well as

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liability for malicious prosecution. She has failed to

press any other potential claims in opposition to

defendants’ motion, and has therefore abandoned all

but her Franks and malicious prosecution claims. See

Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1

(5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that plaintiff’s failure to

defend a claim in response to the defendant’s motion to

dismiss constituted abandonment of the claim). The

Court addresses the Franks and malicious

prosecution claims below.

1.

Plaintiff’s Franks Claim

Defendants move for summary judgment on the

Appx. 10

basis that plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. 18

Although section 1983 does not contain a statute of

limitations, “district courts use the forum state’s

personal injury limitations period.” Moore v.

McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1 994). Because

section 1983 claim is best characterized as a tort

under Louisiana law, it is governed by the one-year

prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by

Louisiana Civil Code article 3492. See Taylor v. Bunge

Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1985); Parrino v.

Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 1990 WL

136764, at *1 (E.D.La. Sept. 13, 1990) (collecting

cases). Here, the parties dispute when the one-year

prescriptive period began to run.

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In opposing defendants’ motion, plaintiff points

to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which

suggested that a malicious prosecution claim does not

accrue until the criminal proceeding terminates in

favor of the accused. Id. at 484. But while this may be

true as to the malicious prosecution claim, the Franks

claim—to the extent that plaintiff presses such a

freestanding claim— is of a different nature than

malicious prosecution and accrues at a different time.

The Fifth Circuit “has recognized two different

kinds of claims against government agents for alleged

Fourth Amendment violations in connection with a

search or arrest warrant: (1) claims under Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),” and “(2) claims

under Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).”

Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 270 (5th Cir. 2017)

18 R. Doc. 19-1 at 10-13.

Appx. 11

(en banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Wilson v.

Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 206 (5th Cir. 2022) (analyzing

plaintiffs’ “two alternative” Fourth Amendment

claims, “one premised on Malley . . . and the other

premised on Franks”).

Under the first type of claim, known as Franks

liability, “a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are

violated if (1) the affiant, in support of the warrant,

includes ‘a false statement knowingly and

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth’

and (2) ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to

the finding of probable cause.’” Winfrey v. Rogers,

901 F.3d

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483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at

155-56). The Fifth Circuit has likewise held that “the

intentional or reckless omission of material facts from

a warrant application [or affidavit] may amount to a

Fourth Amendment violation.” Kohler v. Englade, 470

F.3d 1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 2006).

But a Franks claim stemming from an alleged

unlawful seizure is essentially a type of false arrest

claim. Cf. Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494 (5th

Cir. 2018) (“Here, the clearly established

constitutional right asserted by [the Franks plaintiff]

is [the right] to be free from police arrest without a

good faith showing of probable cause.”); Terwilliger v.

Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Functionally,

the holding of Franks is an exception to the

independent intermediary doctrine, which provides

that ‘if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an

independent intermediary such as a magistrate or

grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the

Appx. 12

chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the

initiating party.’” (quoting Cuadra v. Houston Indep.

Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010))).

Further, the Supreme Court has explained that

“[f]alse arrest and false imprisonment overlap [such

that] the former is a species of the latter.” Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Accordingly, the

applicable prescriptive period is congruent with that

of a claim for false imprisonment,

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which begins to run “when the alleged false

imprisonment ends.” Id. Here, it is undisputed that

plaintiff was released from custody on November 4,

2020. Accordingly, whatever Franks claim that

plaintiff may have had as a result of her arrest

prescribed on November 4, 2021, five months before

plaintiff filed her complaint initiating this matter.

Defendants are therefore entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiff’s Franks claim. 19

2.

Federal Malicious Prosecution Claim

Defendants move for summary judgment on the

basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Because the Fifth Circuit did not recognize a

freestanding claim for malicious prosecution under §

1983 at the time of the facts underlying this case, the

Court finds that defendants are entitled to qualified

19 To the extent that plaintiff marshals Franks as a basis for her

malicious prosecution claim, that claim is dismissed for the

reasons discussed in Section III.A.2, infra.

Appx. 13

immunity.

The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have

recently recognized “that litigants may bring Fourth

Amendment malicious prosecution claims under §

1983.” Wallace v. Taylor, No. 22-20342, 2023 WL

2964418, at *6 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2023) (citing

Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022)).

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Indeed, just two months ago, the Fifth Circuit

reaffirmed that the elements for a section 1983

malicious prosecution claim are as follows:

(1) the commencement or continuance of

an original criminal proceeding; (2) its

legal causation by the present defendant

against plaintiff who was defendant in

the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide

termination in favor of the present

plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable

cause for such proceeding; (5) malice;

and (6) damages.

Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023)

(citing Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir.

2002)). But such a claim was not recognized by the

Fifth Circuit at the time of plaintiff’s arrest and

alleged malicious prosecution. Cf. Morgan v.

Chapman, 969 F.3d 238, 251 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Under

this circuit’s precedents, there is no constitutional

right to be free from abuse of process or malicious

prosecution.”). In 2003, the Fifth Circuit held that

malicious prosecution, “standing alone[,] is no

violation of the United States Constitution.”

Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942 (5th Cir.

2003) (en banc). The en banc court thereby overruled

Appx. 14

previous authorities recognizing federal malicious

prosecution claims pursuant to section 1983. See, e.g.,

Gordy, 294 F.3d at 727. Thus, there was no cause of

action for malicious prosecution in the Fifth Circuit

from the time that Castellano was decided in 2003

until the Supreme Court’s 2022 Thompson decision.

Wallace, 2023 WL 2964418, at *6. All of the conduct

plaintiff complains of terminated by May 17, 2021,

when the District Attorney notified

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plaintiff that the state would not pursue criminal

charges against her. Clearly, there was no cause of

action for malicious prosecution at the time of the

conduct challenged here. Defendants are therefore

entitled to qualified immunity, as a claim that is

“expressly not recognized is the antithesis of a clearly

established one.” Watts v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist.,

37 F.4th 1094, 1096 (5th Cir. 2022). Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is granted as to

plaintiff’s federal malicious prosecution claim.

B.

Plaintiff’s Pendent State-Law Claim

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), when federal-law

claims that serve as the basis of subject matter

jurisdiction are dismissed, and only state-law claims

based on supplemental jurisdiction remain, a district

court has broad discretion to decline jurisdiction over

the remaining claims. See Brown v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,

901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen there is

a subsequent narrowing of the issues such that the

federal claims are eliminated and only pendent state

claims remain, federal jurisdiction is not

Appx. 15

extinguished, [and] the decision as to whether to

retain the pendent claims lies within the sound

discretion of the district court.”). In deciding whether

to hear any remaining state-law claims, courts are to

“analyze the statutory and common law factors that

are relevant to the question of its jurisdiction

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over pendent state law claims.” Enochs v. Lampasas

Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011). The

relevant statutory factors are those found in section

1367, including “(1) whether the state claims raise

novel or complex issues of state law; (2) whether the

state claims substantially predominate over the

federal claims; (3) whether the federal claims have

been dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional

circumstances or other compelling reasons for

declining jurisdiction.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).

The common law factors include judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). The “general

rule” is for courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over

remaining state-law claims when all federal claims

have been dismissed prior to trial. Smith v. Amedisys

Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2002).

As to the first statutory factor, the state-law

malicious prosecution claim raises unresolved issues

of Louisiana law. Indeed, the parties cite conflicting

authorities regarding whether a plaintiff may bring a

claim for malicious prosecution when no criminal

prosecution was formally “instituted” by indictment

or information. Compare Edmond v. Hairford, 539 So.

2d 815, 817 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1989) (“With regard to the

tort of malicious prosecution the trial judge correctly

Appx. 16

found that plaintiff failed to show the commencement

or continuation of an original criminal proceeding

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[ . . .] because no information or indictment was ever

filed.”), with Winn v. City of Alexandria, 685 So. 2d

281, 285 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1996) (stating that “where a

grand jury has returned a no bill, there is a

presumption of want of probable cause with the result

that, in a suit for malicious prosecution based on that

discharge, the burden of showing that he acted on

probable cause and without malice is upon the

defendant.” (quoting Robinson v. Rhodes, 300 So. 2d

249, 251 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1974))). Therefore, the first

factor favors dismissal. Likewise, because no federal

claims remain, the second and third factors favor

dismissal. Lastly, the fourth factor is neutral as there

are no exceptional circumstances here.

On balance, the common-law factors favor

dismissal as well. The common-law factor of comity

“demands that the ‘important interests of federalism

and comity’ be respected by federal courts, which are

courts of limited jurisdiction and ‘not as well equipped

for determinations of state law as are state courts.’”

Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160 (quoting Parker & Parsley

Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587

(5th Cir. 1992)). Given that only a state-law claim

remains in this case, the adjudication of which would

require resolving contested issues of Louisiana law,

the factor of comity weighs in favor of dismissal.

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Appx. 17

The judicial economy factor is less

straightforward. This case commenced over a year

ago, and requiring the plaintiff to re-file her

remaining claim in state court when trial is scheduled

in three weeks is certainly a hardship. But by the

same token, only minimal adjudication of this matter

has occurred. Case-dispositive motions were not filed

prior to the instant motion, and the Court has not yet

considered the merits of plaintiff’s state-law claim.

Further, the parties recently moved for a continuance

and represented that they needed additional time to

conduct discovery. 20 On balance, the Court finds that

this factor is neutral.

The convenience factor, on the other hand,

favors dismissal. The state court that would likely

hear this matter would be the 24th Judicial District

Court in Jefferson Parish. It is a more convenient

forum than the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana in Orleans Parish. The

underlying events occurred in Jefferson Parish and

most of the witnesses are located there. Cf. Enochs,

641 F.3d at 160 (“[I]t is certainly more convenient for

the case to have been heard in the Texas state court . .

. where all of the parties, witnesses, and evidence

were located.”). Accordingly, the convenience factor

favors declining jurisdiction.

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As to fairness, the parties do not identify any

reasons why a state court would be unlikely to fairly

resolve the remaining claim. And, although trial is

rapidly approaching, courts routinely remand cases

20 R. Doc. 14.

Appx. 18

near the trial date when all federal claims have been

dismissed. See Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.,

et al., No. 20-836, R. Doc. 228 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2022)

(granting motion for remand filed less than three

weeks before trial); Danos, et al. v. Huntington

Ingalls, Inc., et al., No. 20-847, R. Doc. 328 (E.D. La.

Oct. 14, 2022) (granting motion for remand filed one

month before trial).

In sum, three of the four statutory factors weigh

in favor of declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction,

and, on balance, the common-law factors favor

declining jurisdiction. The Court thus finds no reason

to depart from the “general rule” that federal courts

should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state-law claim when all federal claims

have been dismissed prior to trial is warranted here.

Smith, 298 F.3d at 446-47. The Court dismisses

plaintiff’s state-law malicious prosecution claim

without prejudice.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS

defendants’ motion for summary judgment IN PART.

Plaintiff’s federal claims are DISMISSED

[23-30490.646:

Case 2:22-cv-00889-SSV-KWR

Document 30 Filed 04/25/23 Page 19 of 19]

WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s state-law malicious prosecution

claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of April, 2023.

Appx. 19

__________/s/_________

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Appx. 20

[APPENDIX C: Denial of Rehearing in Quinlan

v. Lopinto, et al., 23-30490 (5th Cir. 3/26/24)]

[Case: 23-30490 Document: 37-2 Page: 1 Date Filed:

03/26/2024]

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________________

No. 23-30490

____________________

Pamela Quinlan,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Joseph P. Lopinto, III, Sheriff, in his official

capacity; Robert F. Stoltz, Jr., Deputy,

Defendants—Appellees.

_______________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:22-CV-889

_______________________________________

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before Smith, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit

Judges. Per Curiam:

Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a

petition for panel rehearing (5th Cir. R. 35 I.O.P.), the

Appx. 21

petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Because no

member of the panel or judge in regular active service

requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc

(Fed. R. App. P. 35 and 5th Cir. R. 35), the petition for

rehearing en banc is DENIED.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 26, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

Appx. 22

[APPENDIX D:

Provisions]

Constitutional and Statutory

Constitutional and statutory provisions under

consideration are as follows:

1. United States Constitution:

Amendment IV (1791)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

§1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States

or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in

any action brought against a judicial officer for an act

or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief

was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any

Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District

Appx. 23

of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the

District of Columbia.

Appx. 24

[APPENDIX E: Amended Complaint in Quinlan v.

Lopinto, et al., U.S.D.C. E.D. La. No. 22-cv-889]

[23-30490.16:

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2:22-cv-00889-SSV-KWR

Document 3 Filed 04/18/22 Page 1 of 9]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PAMELA QUINLAN

Plaintiff

Versus

CIVIL ACTION NO.:

2:22-cv-00889

SECTION: “R”

JUDGE: Sarah R.

Vance

JEFFERSON PARISH

SHERIFF’S OFFICE and MAGISTRATE: (3)

ROBERT F. STOLTZ, Jr. Magistrate Dana M.

Douglas

Defendants

AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned

counsel, comes plaintiff, Pamela Quinlan, a person of

the full age of majority and a citizen of the State of

Mississippi, and respectfully amends her Complaint

pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE:

1.

This Honorable Court has jurisdiction pursuant

Appx. 25

to Title 28, United States Code Sections 1331 and

1367 (and, alternatively, as to plaintiff’s state law

claim under Section 1332).

2.

Venue is proper within this judicial district

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section

1391.

[23-30490.17:

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Document 3 Filed 04/18/22 Page 2 of 9]

3.

Made defendants herein are:

a.

JEFFERSON

PARISH

SHERIFF’S

OFFICE

(“JPSO”), a body corporate

political subdivision of the State

of Louisiana capable of suing and

being sued in this Court;

b.

ROBERT F. STOLTZ, JR.

(“Dep. Stoltz”), a person of the

full age of majority, residing

within the parish of Jefferson and

the Eastern District of Louisiana,

serving, at all relevant times, as a

Deputy Sheriff with the JPSO.

Plaintiff alleges that Dep. Stoltz,

at all relevant times was acting

under cover of law and within his

capacity as an employee, agent,

representative, and servant of the

JPSO. Dep. Stoltz is sued herein

in his individual capacity.

Appx. 26

BACKGROUND FACTS:

4.

At all times relevant hereto, plaintiff is the

owner/operator of a cleaning company that performs

cleaning services on a contract basis for residential

and commercial premises.

5.

On or about October 18, 2020, plaintiff was

contacted by Det. Stoltz and advised that a warrant

had been issued for her arrest for violations of La. R.S.

14:126.1, False Swearing for Purpose of Violating

Public Health or Safety and La. R.S. 14:133, Filing or

Maintaining False Public Records.

6.

The violation of La. R.S. 14:126.1, False

Swearing for Purpose of Violating Public Health or

Safety is a felony which carries a maximum sentence

of five years at hard labor and a one thousand dollar

fine.

[23-30490.18:

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7.

The violation of La. R.S. 14:133, Filing or

Maintaining False Public Records is a felony which

carries a maximum sentence of five years at hard

labor and a five thousand dollar fine.

8.

At some time between October 18, 2020 and

April of 2021, Dep. Stoltz referred the charges of

Appx. 27

violations of La. R.S. 14:126.1 and La. R.S. 14:133, to

the Office of the District Attorney for the 24th Judicial

District (“24th JDDA”) for prosecution. The 24th JDDA

initiated a prosecution of plaintiff at that time.

9.

On or about November 4, 2020, plaintiff was

arrested by the JPSO based upon the actions of Dep.

Stoltz for the purported violations of La. R.S. 14:126.1

and La. R.S. 14:133. Plaintiff was released that day

on a signature bond. Upon execution of her signature

bond, plaintiff became subject to the supervision and

jurisdiction of the 22nd Judicial District Court for the

State of Louisiana (“24th JDC”) during the pendency

of the charges initiated and refer to the 24th JDDA by

Dep. Stoltz.

10.

As conditions of her bond, plaintiff was subject

to the following restrictions during the pendency of

the charges against her: 1) plaintiff was generally

required to “appear at all stages of the proceedings in

[the 24th JDC]”; 2) plaintiff was specifically required

to appear at the 24th JDC on December 18, 2020; 3)

plaintiff was prohibited from leaving the State of

Louisiana without permission of the 24th JDC; and

plaintiff was subject to submission to mandatory

random drug testing at the sole discretion of the 24th

JDC.

[23-30490.19:

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Document 3 Filed 04/18/22 Page 4 of 9]

11.

Based upon the actions of Dep. Stoltz in

referring the purported violations of La. R.S. 14:126.1

Appx. 28

and La. R.S. 14:133, the 24th JDDA maintained a

prosecution against plaintiff which consisted of initial

screening of said charges, which prosecution was

maintained until on or about May 17, 2021. Plaintiff’s

bond restrictions remained in effect until that time.

12.

On or about May 17, 2021 the 24th JDDA

terminated the prosecution against plaintiff by

informing her by written correspondence that it was

declining to further prosecute the charges referred to

it by Dep. Stoltz and the JPSO.

13.

On or about December 4, 2021, plaintiff

tendered a public records request to the JPSO seeking

to obtain any and all documentation pertaining to the

charges of La. R.S. 14:126.1 and La. R.S. 14:133 for

which she was arrested by the JPSO and for which a

prosecution was initiated and maintained by the 24th

JDDA. As a result of said public records request, the

JPSO did not have possession of any investigative

report regarding the purported charges against

plaintiff, no copies of any probable cause affidavit

executed by Dep. Stoltz or anyone else, nor any valid

arrest warrant.

14.

Defendant, Dep. Stoltz knew that the charges

of violations of La. R.S. 14:126.1 and La. R.S. 14:133

made against plaintiff for which he caused the JPSO

to arrest her on or about November 4, 2020 and for

which he referred to the 24th JDDA for prosecution,

were not only utterly false and baseless, but

completely non-existent.

Appx. 29

[23-30490.20:

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Document 3 Filed 04/18/22 Page 5 of 9]

15.

The actions of Dep. Stoltz in bringing

knowingly false criminal charges against plaintiff

were specifically reviewed by supervisors either with

policymaking authority within the JPSO or to ensure

that the actions of Dep. Stoltz were in compliance with

JPSO policy. Said supervisors approved the actions of

Dep. Stoltz after review of same. The circumstances

of the arrest and referral for prosecution of utterly

baseless and non-existent charges by Dep. Stoltz, as a

deputy of the JPSO, are of such a nature as to

establish that such actions were in accordance with

established policy and/or custom of the JPSO.

CLAIMS:

Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution: Seizure of Person

without Probable Cause; Deprivation of Liberty

Interest without Due Process of Law:

16.

Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers paragraphs 1

through 15.

17.

By virtue of his conduct, Dep. Stoltz violated

plaintiff’s rights against unreasonable seizure under

the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, as averred in the following nonexclusive particulars:

Appx. 30

a) by wrongfully initiating or causing to be initiated

felony charges against plaintiff, without probable

cause, which violation did not become actionable until

those charges were dismissed on May 17, 2021 by the

24th JDDA, per Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1984);

[23-30490.21:

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18.

By virtue of his conduct, Dep. Stoltz violated

plaintiff’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, as averred in the following nonexclusive particulars:

a)

by wrongfully initiating or causing to be

initiated felony charges against plaintiff, referring or

causing to be referred said charges to the 24th JDDA

for prosecution, then maintaining or causing said

prosecution to be maintained until it was dismissed

on May 17, 2021 by the 24th JDDA; which resulted in

the pendency of a felony prosecution that caused

substantial impairment to plaintiff’s liberty interests.

19.

On information and belief, the violations of

plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by

Dep. Stoltz, as noted above are part of a persistent,

widespread practice of JPSO officials such that said

violations are so common and well settled as to

constitute a custom that fairly represents JPSO policy

and for which the JPSO is therefore liable.

20.

Appx. 31

On information and belief, defendant, Dep.

Stoltz acted with reckless and callous indifference to

plaintiff’s federally protected rights under the Fourth

Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment when he knowingly initiated

a baseless prosecution against plaintiff on October 18,

2020, which he actively referred to the 24th JDDA for

prosecution and caused same to be maintained until

May 17, 2021.

[23-30490.22:

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Document 3 Filed 04/18/22 Page 7 of 9]

Claim Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315:

Malicious Prosecution:

21.

Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers paragraphs 1

through 20.

22.

Defendant, Dep. Stoltz is liable to plaintiff for

malicious prosecution of plaintiff, a recognized cause

of action under Louisiana law, La. C.C. Article 2315,

for 1) commencing or causing to be commenced, on or

about October 18, 2020; 2) a criminal prosecution by

the 24th JDDA; 3) which prosecution was terminated

in plaintiff’s favor on May 17, 2021; 4) which

prosecution was initiated by Dep. Stoltz without any

probable cause; which prosecution was initiated and

maintained wrongfully and with malice by Dep.

Stoltz.

23.

The JPSO is liable for damages resulting from

the malicious prosecution caused by Dep. Stoltz under

Appx. 32

the doctrine of respondeat superior.

DAMAGES:

24.

Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers paragraphs 1

through 23.

25.

As a result of the actions of the JPSO and Dep.

Stoltz in wrongfully initiating and maintaining a

baseless prosecution; plaintiff has sustained

substantial economic loss as a result of damage to her

reputation and business, as well as the specific

inability to acquire business contracts from certain

customers as a result of the mere fact that the

prosecution occurred.

[23-30490.23:

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26.

As a result of the actions of the JPSO and Dep.

Stoltz in wrongfully initiating and maintaining a

baseless prosecution; plaintiff has sustained

substantial embarrassment, humiliation and mental

anguish, for which the JPSO and Dep. Stoltz are

liable.

27.

The wrongful actions of Dep. Stoltz in

knowingly and wrongfully initiating and maintaining

a baseless prosecution against plaintiff constituted

reckless and callous indifference to plaintiff’s

federally protected rights under the Fourth

Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the

Appx. 33

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. As such, plaintiff is entitled to recovery

of punitive damages from defendant, Dep. Stoltz, for

such wrongful conduct.

28.

As a result of the actions of the JPSO and Dep.

Stoltz in wrongfully initiating and maintaining a

baseless prosecution, which actions resulted in the

deprivation of plaintiff’s right against seizure of her

person without probable cause in violation of her

rights under the Fourth Amendment and deprivation

of plaintiff’s liberty interests in violation of her rights

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment; plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

29.

Alternatively, plaintiff avers that her economic

loss and mental anguish damages arising from the

wrongful initiation and maintenance of the baseless

prosecution, actionable under La. C.C. 2315, exceeds

$75,000.00.

30.

Plaintiff hereby requests trial by jury.

[23-30490.24:

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Document 3 Filed 04/18/22 Page 9 of 9]

WHEREFORE, plaintiff, Pamela Quinlan,

prays that defendants, Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s

Office and Robert F. Stoltz, Jr. be duly cited to

appear and answer this Amended Complaint and that

after all legal delays and due proceedings are had,

that there be judgment in favor of Pamela Quinlan,

Appx. 34

and against the defendants, Jefferson Parish

Sheriff’s Office and Robert F. Stoltz, Jr. for all

damages in such amounts as are reasonable in the

premises, including a declaration that defendants’

conduct violated the Fourth Amendment and the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, past and future lost

economic loss and damages for mental anguish, as

well as attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and

punitive damages as to defendant, Robert F. Stoltz,

Jr., together with legal interest thereon from date of

judicial demand until paid, and for all costs of these

proceedings, as well as for all general and equitable

relief. Plaintiff further requests trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted,

_________________/s/__________________

CLAIBORNE W. BROWN (25594)

1070-B West Causeway Approach

Mandeville, LA 70471

Telephone: (985) 845-2824

Facsimile: (985) 246-3199

cwbrown@cwbrownlaw.com

Appx. 35