Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Danny Richard Rivers, Petitioner v. Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Supreme Court briefJun 24, 2024

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 23-

In the Supreme Court of the United States

___________

DANNY RICHARD RIVERS, PETITIONER

v.

BOBBY LUMPKIN, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

___________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

___________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

___________

Peter A. Bruland

Counsel of Record

Benjamin M. Mundel

Cody M. Akins

Hundley H. Poulson

David H. Kinnaird

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

pbruland@sidley.com

Counsel for Petitioner

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner “always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction,” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S.

504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all

attempts to file a “second or successive habeas corpus

application.” Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

The circuits are intractably split on whether

§ 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth,

Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold

that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all secondin-time habeas filings made after the district court

enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees,

applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts

appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third

and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or

satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

The question presented is:

Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate

review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time

habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some

second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner’s success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Ex parte Rivers, WR-84,550-01 & 84,550-02 (Tex.

Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016) (remanding for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law)

Rivers v. State, No. 08-12-00145-CR (Tex. Ct. App.

Jan. 4, 2017) (findings of fact and conclusions of

law following Oct. 5, 2016 remand)

Ex parte Rivers, WR-84,550-01 & 84,550-02 (Tex.

Ct. Crim. App. July 7, 2017) (affirming Jan. 4.,

2017 Texas Court of Appeals judgment)

Rivers v. Davis, No. 7:17-cv-00124 (N.D. Tex. Sept.

17, 2018) (denying habeas relief)

Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.

Aug. 11, 2021) (deeming Feb. 2021 filing “second

or successive and recommending transfer)

Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.

Sept. 23, 2021) (adopting recommendation)

Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 18-11490 (5th Cir. May 13,

2022) (affirming district court’s Sept. 17, 2018 order denying initial habeas petition)

Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 22-6688 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2023)

(denying petition for a writ of certiorari)

Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 21-11031 (5th Cir. Apr. 15,

2024) (affirming district court’s Sept. 23, 2021,

order; decision below here)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ...................................

i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS.................................

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

vi

INTRODUCTION .................................................

1

OPINIONS BELOW .............................................

4

JURISDICTION....................................................

4

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED .............

4

STATEMENT ........................................................

5

A. Legal background ....................................

5

B. Factual and procedural background.......

6

1. Rivers is tried and convicted .............

7

2. Rivers seeks postconviction relief......

9

3. While his habeas appeal is pending,

Rivers obtains exculpatory evidence.

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...

13

I. The courts of appeals are split four ways

over what triggers § 2244(b)(2), and only

this Court can resolve the conflict. ...............

13

A. In the Second Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) does

not apply until appellate review of the

first habeas petition is exhausted...........

14

B. In the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,

Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,

§ 2244(b)(2) applies when the district

court enters final judgment or shortly

after. .........................................................

15

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—CONTINUED

C. In the Tenth Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) applies after a first-in-time petition is

filed, unless the petitioner satisfies a

seven-factor test. .....................................

Page

19

D. In the Third Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) toggles on and off depending on who wins

the initial appeal. ....................................

20

II. The question presented is critically

important and recurring. ..............................

22

III.

The decision below is wrong. ........................

24

A. Section 2244(b)(2) does not apply until

appellate review of the first habeas application is exhausted..............................

25

1. Courts historically analyzed abuses

of the writ by reference to appellate

review, not final judgment.................

24

2. Treating filings like Rivers’s as “second or successive” would frustrate

AEDPA’s aims. ...................................

27

B. The Fifth Circuit’s decision cannot be

squared with this Court’s cases. .............

30

IV. This case is an excellent vehicle. ..................

31

CONCLUSION......................................................

31

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS—CONTINUED

Page

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Court of appeals opinion,

Rivers v. Lumpkin (5th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024) ......

1a

APPENDIX B: Magistrate judge’s findings,

conclusions, and recommendations,

Rivers v. Lumpkin (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2021) ... 12a

APPENDIX C: Order accepting findings, conclusions, and recommendations,

Rivers v. Lumpkin (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021) .. 18a

vi

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

552 U.S. 214 (2008)......................................

30

Atkins v. United States,

2023 WL 1765536 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2023) .

23

Balbuena v. Sullivan,

970 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2020)......................

2

Balbuena v. Sullivan,

980 F.3d 619 (9th Cir. 2020)................. . 16, 17, 21

Banister v. Davis,

590 U.S. 504 (2020)....... .2, 5, 6, 22, 27, 29, 30, 31

Bollinger v. Gittere,

2023 WL 2242444 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2023) .

23

Boumediene v. Bush,

553 U.S. 723 (2008)......................................

22

Ching v. United States,

298 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2002) ..................... 2, 14, 15

Ex parte Cuddy,

40 F. 62 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1889)....................... 25, 26

Curry v. United States,

507 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2007).........................

23

Daly v. Oliver,

2024 WL 2092997 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2024) ..

23

Douglas v. Workman,

560 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2009).................... 19, 20

Frank v. Mangum,

237 U.S. 309 (1915)......................................... 26

Fuller v. United States,

815 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2016) ..........................

15

Garcia v. Superintendent of Great Meadow

Corr. Facility, 841 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016) ..

15

Gonzalez v. Crosby,

545 U.S. 524 (2005)...................................... 16, 22

Gonzalez v. Thaler,

565 U.S. 134 (2012).......................................

5

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Hernandez v. Macomber,

2023 WL 2992172 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2023)

23

Herrera v. United States,

2024 WL 218964 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2024) .

23

Jacobs v. Thornell,

2024 WL 810443 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2024) ....

23

Jones v. Bradshaw,

46 F.4th 459 (6th Cir. 2022) .........................

19

Ex parte Kaine,

14 F. Cas. 78 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853)................

25

Moreland v. Robinson,

813 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2016)........................ 18, 19

Munchinski v. Wilson,

694 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2012) ..........................

28

N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino,

413 U.S. 405 (1973) ......................................

30

Ochoa v. Sirmons,

485 F.3d 538 (10th Cir. 2007).......................

19

Parry v. Kerestes,

2013 WL 6002358 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2013)

29

Perpall v. United States,

2023 WL 2016836 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2023)

23

Phillips v. United States,

668 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2012) ................ 17, 18, 19

Price v. Johnston,

334 U.S. 266 (1948).......................................

28

Rivers v. Davis,

2018 WL 4443153

(N.D. Tex. July 27, 2018) .............................. 10, 31

Rivers v. Lumpkin,

2022 WL 1517027 (5th Cir. May 13, 2022) ..

11

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Ex parte Rivers,

2016 WL 5800277

(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016) ......................

9

Ex parte Rivers,

2017 WL 3380491

(Tex. Crim. App. June 7, 2017) ....................

10

Rotkiske v. Klemm,

589 U.S. 8 (2019) ..........................................

27

Salinger v. Loisel,

265 U.S. 224 (1924)...................................... 25, 26

Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473 (2000)...................................... 22, 31

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,

523 U.S. 637 (1998)...................................... 22, 31

Thomas v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

2023 WL 2837521 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2023) .

23

United States v. Espinoza-Saenz,

235 F.3d 501 (10th Cir. 2000).......................

19

United States v. Pickard,

396 F. App’x 568 (10th Cir. 2010) ................

20

United States v. Santarelli,

929 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2019) ...................... 2, 20, 21

United States v. Terrell,

141 F. App’x 849 (11th Cir. 2005) ...............

18

In re Will,

970 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2020).........................

28

Williams v. Norris,

461 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2006).........................

18

Whab v. United States,

408 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2005) .........................

14

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

STATUTES

Page

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..........................................

4

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)...................................... 5, 28

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)..................................... 4, 5, 6

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).................................

28

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).................................

5

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B).................................

27

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).................................

5

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4)......................................

5

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 .............................................

Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 ..........................................

18

29

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Rachel Brown et al., Is Unpublished Unequal? An Empirical Examination of the

87% Nonpublication Rate in Federal Appeals, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2021) ..............

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Statistics...................

N. King et al., Final Technical Report:

Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts

(2007).............................................................

Prison Pol’y Initiative, Appendix: State and

Federal Prison Populations 2019-2023 ........

U.S. Courts, Civil Statistical Tables For the

Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2023) ................

Page

23

22

23

22

23

INTRODUCTION

This case presents an acknowledged circuit split

over an important procedural question: whether 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)’s rules for “second or successive”

habeas petitions apply to a habeas filing made after

the district court has denied an initial petition but

before an appellate court has weighed in. Nine circuits have split four ways over that question, and only this Court can resolve the conflict.

1. This case is about the hurdles that a prisoner

must clear before a court will hear him out. Petitioner

Danny Rivers sought habeas relief, arguing that his

counsel had failed to investigate his case and had

shown up to trial drunk. The district court denied the

petition, finding that Rivers couldn’t explain what his

lawyer should have done differently or why that

would have changed things. But the answer soon

emerged. After fighting for years to obtain his counsel’s records, Rivers finally received them while his

initial petition was up on appeal. Among the files,

Rivers found an exculpatory report suggesting that

he was wrongly convicted—evidence that his lawyers

never once mentioned at trial.

New evidence in hand, Rivers raced to court—only

to find the doors barred. Applying § 2244(b)(2), the

district court reasoned that it was “without jurisdiction to entertain” the new evidence because Rivers’s

filing counted as a “second or successive” petition.

Pet. App. 19a. (Never mind that his first petition was

still pending on appeal and would be for nearly a

year.) The Fifth Circuit affirmed, explaining that “filings introduced after a final judgment that raise habeas claims” are “deemed successive.” Pet. App. 10a.

2

2. The Fifth Circuit’s decision deepens a circuit conflict over when § 2244(b)(2) kicks in. In the Second

Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) doesn’t apply until a prisoner

has exhausted appellate review of his initial habeas

petition—leaving district courts free to consider a filing like Rivers’s. As then-Judge Sotomayor put it,

that approach guarantees “one full opportunity to

seek collateral review.” Ching v. United States, 298

F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 2002). But the Fifth Circuit expressly “decline[d] … to embrace” that rule. Pet. App.

10a. Instead, it joined the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,

Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in applying § 2244(b)(2)

after the district court enters final judgment. That

approach effectively grants “one full opportunity to

seek collateral review in the district court.” United

States v. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 104 (3d Cir. 2019)

(cleaned up). Meanwhile, the Third and Tenth Circuits follow their own unique approaches, holding

that § 2244(b)(2) sometimes applies between final

judgment and exhaustion and sometimes doesn’t.

Three circuits have already denied rehearing en banc,

and the rest show no sign of rethinking their views.

In short: the circuits are intractably split, the conflict won’t disappear on its own, and this Court’s

guidance is badly needed. See Balbuena v. Sullivan,

970 F.3d 1176, 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2020) (Fletcher,

J., concurring in the result) (“urg[ing] the Supreme

Court to recognize” and “resolve the conflict”).

3. The decision below is also wrong. In Banister v.

Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020), this Court explained that

the phrase “second or successive” is a term of art that

doesn’t simply refer to every second-in-time habeas

filing. Instead, the Court has looked to historical

practice and statutory aims when determining

whether § 2244(b)(2) applies. But the Fifth Circuit

3

didn’t even cite Banister, let alone follow its guidance.

Had it done so, the court would have realized that its

rule doesn’t square with history. Early courts analyzing abuses of the writ treated appellate review—not

final judgment—as the relevant inflection point.

The Fifth Circuit’s approach will also frustrate

§ 2244(b)(2)’s aims. At bottom, the question is not

whether prisoners like Rivers will try to bring new

evidence to the courts’ attention. (They will—no matter what rule this Court adopts.) The question instead is which court will consider that evidence first.

Under the Second Circuit’s approach, a filing like

Rivers’s would have gone to the district court that

just denied the initial petition: the single member of

Article III most familiar with the case. That judge

could then have weighed the new evidence and decided whether to issue an indicative ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. By contrast, the Fifth

Circuit’s rule requires Rivers to ask a brand-new

three-judge panel for permission to ask the district

court to consider whether or not to reach the merits.

It’s hard to squeeze that rule from the statutory

text—and harder still to attribute it to a Congress focused on judicial economy, efficiency, and finality.

4. The question presented is important, and this

case is an ideal vehicle. Until this Court weighs in, at

least some states and prisoners will be living under

the wrong rule, and those in the outstanding circuits

will have to guess which rule applies. The interests

on both sides are too critical to leave up to geographical chance. The split is also outcome-determinative

here: if Rivers were incarcerated in New York instead

of Texas, courts would have considered the new evidence, giving him a meaningful path to relief.

The Court should grant review.

4

OPINIONS BELOW

The court of appeals’ opinion is reported at 99 F.4th

216 and is reproduced in the appendix to this petition

at Pet. App. 1a–11a. The district court’s opinion is

unpublished but is available at 2021 WL 4319670 and

is reproduced at Pet. App. 12a–17a.

JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit issued its judgment on April 15,

2024. Pet. App. 1a. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 2244(b)(2) of Title 28, U.S. Code, provides:

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that

was not presented in a prior application shall be

dismissed unless—

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on

a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;

or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could

not have been discovered previously through

the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven

and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,

would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional

error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

5

STATEMENT

A. Legal background

1. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 creates a dual-track system for federal

habeas relief. One path is for first-time petitioners.

“Under AEDPA, a state prisoner always gets one

chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction.” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020).

This path begins in the district court. If that court

denies relief, the prisoner may request a “certificate

of appealability”—initially from the district court,

and then from the court of appeals. See Gonzalez v.

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140 & n.5 (2012). The path ends

only when the prisoner has exhausted the chance to

appeal and seek certiorari.

The second path is “rockier.” Banister, 590 U.S. at

509. A prisoner who wants to file a “second or successive habeas corpus application,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2), must first ask the court of appeals for

“an order authorizing the district court to consider

the application,” id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The appellate

court may oblige only if the prisoner makes a “prima

facie showing,” id. § 2244(b)(3)(C), that the petition

“relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional

law” or “alleges previously undiscoverable facts that

would establish … innocence,” Banister, 590 U.S. at

509 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). If so, the petition

goes to the district court, which must decide for itself

whether the petition “satisfies the requirements” of

§ 2244. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). At the same time, because any claim “presented in a prior application”

must be dismissed, § 2244(b)(1), both courts must

carefully compare the new petition to all prior petitions to determine precisely what “claims” the prison-

6

er has brought. Only then—after all that is done—

may the district court reach the merits.

The upshot is that much rides on whether

§ 2244(b)(2) applies—that is: on whether a filing is

deemed “part and parcel of the first habeas proceeding,” Banister, 590 U.S. at 507, or instead a “second

or successive habeas corpus application,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2).

2. The phrase “second or successive” is a “term of

art” that does not refer simply to “all habeas filings …

following an initial application.” Banister, 590 U.S. at

511 (first quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

486 (2000), then quoting Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332

(2010)). To determine when § 2244(b)(2) applies, “this

Court has looked for guidance in two main places.”

Id. at 512. First, the Court has considered history:

“whether a type of later-in-time filing would have

constituted an abuse of the writ” under the Court’s

“pre-AEDPA cases.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Panetti

v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 (2007)). Second, the

Court has looked to “AEDPA’s own purposes”: conserving judicial resources, reducing piecemeal litigation, and achieving finality “within a reasonable

time.” Id. (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945–46).

B. Factual and procedural background

Danny Rivers has spent the last twelve years

fighting to prove his innocence. Along the way, he

discovered that exculpatory evidence had been sitting

in his trial counsel’s files all the while—evidence that

his lawyers could have used to clear his name. If Rivers is right, then he not only received ineffective assistance but was also wrongly convicted. This case is

about the procedural hurdles that Rivers must clear

before a court will hear him out.

7

1. Rivers is tried and convicted

In 2012, a Texas jury convicted Rivers of sexually

abusing his children and possessing child pornography. He is currently serving a 38-year sentence.

a. This case began amidst a bitter divorce. In 2008,

a Texas judge awarded Rivers temporary custody of

his 9-year-old daughter. Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 7:21cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 11-14 (“R-1”), at 156, 164.

The court also granted Rivers sole use of the family

home, ordered his ex-wife to pay child support, and

denied her request for alimony. Id. Dkt. 11-15 (“R-2”),

at 15. In response, Rivers’s ex-wife “punish[ed]” him

by “not letting him see” his 12-year-old stepdaughter,

whom he had raised as his own. R-2, at 16.

The following year, with custody arrangements unchanged, Rivers’s ex-wife drove the children to the

police station while Rivers was away for work. Both

girls met with officers and accused Rivers of sexually

abusing them. R-2, at 18, 129. Police then searched

Rivers’s home, seized the family laptop, and launched

a monthslong forensic examination, eventually identifying “two files of interest” that “appeared to be child

pornography.” Id. at 26, 28; id. Dkt. 11-10 (“R-3”), at

13, 31, 73; id. Dkt. 11-16, at 15, 66–67.

b. A Wichita County, Texas grand jury indicted

Rivers for continuous sexual abuse, indecency with a

child, and two counts of possessing child pornography. R-3, at 8–15. Rivers, who had no prior criminal

history, R-2, at 161, pleaded not guilty.

With his trial looming, Rivers moved to sever the

child-pornography counts, arguing that they might

color the jury’s views on the other charges. R-1, at 15.

The state opposed severance. Because its case had

“no DNA or physical evidence,” Texas argued that the

8

alleged child pornography was “necessary” to establish Rivers’s “motive” and “attraction to young girls.”

Id. at 14–15. The court refused to sever. Id. at 23.

c. At trial, Rivers’s daughter and stepdaughter alleged a staggering pattern of sexual abuse. R-1, at

142, 145–146, 167–168. They further claimed that

Rivers had shown them child pornography at least

seventy times, testifying that he had “downloaded

multiple videos” and played different films on different occasions. Id. at 153, 172. Rivers’s daughter also

accused her father of secretly recording images in the

shower. R-1, at 170. (No hidden cameras were ever

found.) All told, the girls alleged over 200 instances of

shocking abuse, many of which reportedly took place

in common areas of the home while their mother, uncle, or cousin were also present in the house. R-1, at

139, 147, 152–53, 156, 158, 166; R-2, at 12, 90. No

other witnesses saw the alleged abuse, and no physical evidence corroborated the story. R-2, at 34, 64.

Given the lack of supporting evidence, the alleged

child pornography was a key issue at trial. The prosecution called multiple witnesses to testify about the

two files—a single image and a single video—that

Rivers was charged with possessing. R-2, at 19, 28,

44, 74, 84, 100. While the trial judge had granted a

continuance so the defense could obtain its own forensic experts, R-3, at 31, 40, counsel did not do so.

R-2, at 112. Instead, the defense called only a single

witness, who testified that Rivers was out of town

when the files were allegedly downloaded. R-2, at

113–114, 131.

d. The jury convicted Rivers on all charges, Pet.

App. 2a. It rejected the prosecution’s call for a 169year sentence, however, and recommended that the

court sentence Rivers to 42 years instead. R-3, at

9

213–14, 221–29. The court went lower still: 38 years

behind bars, all counts considered—just three years

above the minimum. Pet. App. 13a. The Texas Court

of Appeals affirmed.

2. Rivers seeks postconviction relief

a. In 2013, Rivers began asking his lawyers to send

him his client file. He explained: “I don’t know what

all it contains, but it looks like I’m going to have to do

this thing pro se, so I need everything I can get.”

No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.) Dkt. 15-11, at 67.

Counsel “never responded to [his] request,” and two

years later, Rivers was still trying. Id. at 68–69. He

eventually resorted to filing a formal grievance with

the Texas state bar.

Meanwhile, Rivers pressed forward with what records he had. In 2016, he sought state postconviction

relief based on ineffective assistance, among other

grounds. Relevant here, he argued that his trial

counsel had failed to “perform an objectively reasonable investigation” or “verify the ages of the persons”

in the alleged child pornography. No. 7:21-cv-00012

(N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 12-21, at 9. He added that his lead

counsel was “inebriated” at the trial. Id. at 11.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that

Rivers had “alleged facts that, if true, might entitle

him to relief.” Ex parte Rivers, 2016 WL 5800277, at

*1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016). It remanded for

further factfinding, ordering the court to appoint

counsel if it “elect[ed] to hold a hearing.” Id. Judge

Alcala wrote separately to urge the appointment of

counsel “regardless of whether the trial court holds a

hearing.” Id. (Alcala, J., concurring).

On remand, the trial court neither held a hearing

nor appointed counsel. Instead, it chiefly relied on af-

10

fidavits in which trial counsel defended their performance, denied any drunkenness, and claimed that

Rivers had “admitted to [them] that he engaged in

sexual acts with the victims.” Rivers v. Davis, 2018

WL 4443153, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2018); see also

No. 7:17-cv-00124 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 24-1, at 24. Rivers

responded with his own affidavit, categorically “deny[ing] making such admissions.” Id. at 2. He also

submitted a text message from one of the lawyers’

spouses, confirming that counsel “showed up intoxicated for court,” id. at 25, and a news report showing

that his lead counsel was arrested six months before

the trial “after showing up at a woman[’]s house naked and drunk,” id. at 33 (cleaned up) (quoting Texoma, Local Attorney Sentenced to Two Years Probation (Mar. 18, 2015), bit.ly/Barber-Arrest). The trial

court nonetheless “concluded that counsel were not

ineffective,” and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Ex parte Rivers, 2017 WL 3380491, at *1

(Tex. Crim. App. June 7, 2017).

b. Rivers sought federal habeas relief in August

2017, raising the same ineffective-assistance claims,

among other grounds. No. 7:17-cv-00124 (N.D. Tex.),

Dkt. 1, at 6. The district court denied Rivers’s habeas

petition and declined to grant a certificate of appealability. Pet. App. 2a. Rivers then sought a certificate

of appealability from the Fifth Circuit.

3. While his habeas appeal is pending,

Rivers obtains exculpatory evidence

a. While his case was pending on appeal, Rivers finally received the client file that he first requested in

2013. Pet. App. 2a. In it, he found a state investigator’s report analyzing the two files underlying his

child-pornography conviction. The report called the

video merely “of interest,” without further comment.

11

Meanwhile, the image was labeled “NOT CHILD

PORN.” No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 15-11, at

75–77. The report also listed a number of other files

found on the family laptop. Next to one—entitled

“reallyunderagekiddieporn”—the state investigator

had written: “although the title indicated it to be

child porn,” it “is not.” Id. at 75. Another, whose title

included phrases like “pre-teen tiny children” and

“incest sex porn underage,” was also marked “NOT

CHILD PORN.” Id. Most telling of all, these files

and the video “of interest” were not saved under Rivers’s name; they were instead recovered from a download folder bearing the name of Rivers’s ex-wife.

After discovering the investigator’s report, Rivers

moved to supplement the appellate record. See

No. 18-11490 (5th Cir.), Dkt. 27. He also filed an affidavit stating that he had never seen the report and

noting that his lawyers had “failed to raise this exculpatory evidence” that had been “in [their] possession” all along. Id. at 5, 10–11. The affidavit added

that Rivers’s “estranged wife had access to the house

and did in fact enter the house, against court orders,

while [Rivers] was out of town during the time frame

the alleged child porn was downloaded,” id. at 7—one

explanation for why the “child pornography” appeared under her username, not his.

The Fifth Circuit denied Rivers’s motion to supplement the record but granted a certificate of appealability for the ineffective-assistance claim. Id. Dkt. 34,

at 2. Rivers later asked the court either to stay his

appeal or to remand so he could seek relief in the district court without creating “piecemeal litigation.” Id.

Dkt. 61, at 5–6. The Fifth Circuit refused, id. Dkt. 78,

and ultimately affirmed, see Rivers v. Lumpkin, 2022

12

WL 1517027 (5th Cir. May 13, 2022), cert. denied, 143

S. Ct. 1090 (2023).

b. In February 2021, while his appeal was still

pending, Rivers used the standard § 2254 petition

template provided to pro se litigants to bring the new

evidence to the district court’s attention. No. 7:21-cv00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 2, at 7. While the filing also

raised several new claims, Rivers chiefly argued that

trial counsel’s “fail[ure] to present exculpatory evidence” violated his right to effective assistance. Id.

Dkt. 10, at 24.

The same magistrate judge who reviewed Rivers’s

initial habeas petition recommended that the new filing be deemed a “second or successive” petition and

transferred to the Fifth Circuit for lack of jurisdiction. See Pet. App. 3a–4a. Rivers objected to the recommendation, No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 27,

and “move[d] the court to consider an interlocutory

review,” id. Dkt. 26, at 5. The district court adopted

the recommendation and denied Rivers’s motion as

moot. See Pet. App. 18a–19a

Rivers appealed the transfer order, urging the court

to construe the February 2021 filing as an amendment to his initial petition, instead of a second or successive petition. Pet. App. 3a–4a. The Fifth Circuit

affirmed. Id. at 1a–2a. It reasoned that § 2244(b)(2)

applies to “filings introduced after a final judgment

that raise habeas claims, no matter how titled.” Id. at

10a. Here, the February 2021 filing was “second-intime” and “attack[ed] the same conviction that [Rivers had] challenged” in his initial habeas proceeding,

so it counted as “second or successive.” Id. at 6a. The

court’s opinion acknowledged that eight other circuits

had splintered on the question. Id. at 8a.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The courts of appeals are intractably split over

whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to a habeas filing made

after the district court has denied an initial petition

but before an appellate court has weighed in. That

question is critically important to states and prisoners alike, and it arises too often to leave up to geographical happenstance. The decision below is also

wrong. It ignores this Court’s guidance in Banister,

flies in the face of historical practice, and frustrates—

rather than furthers—AEDPA’s aims. Finally, this

case is an ideal vehicle for the Court to offer muchneeded guidance. The issue is cleanly presented and

outcome-determinative: only the Fifth Circuit’s mistaken reading of § 2244(b)(2) stands between Rivers

and a meaningful path to relief. The Court should

grant the petition.

I. The courts of appeals are split four ways

over what triggers § 2244(b)(2), and only

this Court can resolve the conflict.

Nine circuits have split four ways over the question

presented. In the Second Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) does

not apply until the petitioner exhausts appellate review of his first habeas petition. The Fifth, Sixth,

Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits disagree, holding that § 2244(b)(2) applies as soon as, or

shortly after, the district court enters final judgment.

(Even they can’t agree on the precise trigger.) Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit applies § 2244(b)(2) even

earlier—except when the petitioner satisfies a sevenfactor test. And in the Third Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) toggles on and off depending on whether the petitioner

wins or loses on appeal. Respondent acknowledged

the split below, see No. 21-11031 (5th Cir.), Dkt. 52,

at 15–24, and only this Court can resolve it.

14

A. In the Second Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) does

not apply until appellate review of the

first habeas petition is exhausted.

In Whab v. United States, the Second Circuit held

that § 2244(b)(2) does not apply while “appellate proceedings following the district court’s dismissal of the

initial petition remain pending.” 408 F.3d 116, 118

(2d Cir. 2005).

Usama Whab filed a pro se habeas petition. Id. at

117. The district court denied the petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Id. at

118. Whab then sought a certificate of appealability

from the Second Circuit, which the court ultimately

denied. Id. While that motion was still pending, however, Whab asked the Second Circuit for permission

to file a “second or successive” petition. Id. at 119.

The court held that Whab’s “subsequent petition

was not ‘second or successive’ within the meaning of”

AEDPA. Id. at 118. Citing then-Judge Sotomayor’s

rationale in Ching v. United States, it explained that

a petition can’t be “second or successive” unless it is

filed after “the conclusion of a proceeding that counts

as the first.” 298 F.3d at 177. And the first proceeding

isn’t over until the “opportunity to seek review in the

Supreme Court has expired.” Whab, 408 F.3d at 120.

Because Whab’s first proceeding was still pending

when he filed his subsequent petition, § 2244(b)(2)

did not apply. Id. at 119.

Of course, that doesn’t mean that anything goes.

“Traditional doctrines, such as abuse of the writ, continue to apply.” Id. at 119 n.2. So even if a filing is

not “second or successive” under § 2244(b)(2), prisoners do not get a “free pass” to “file numerous petitions

before an initially filed petition is finally adjudicated

15

on the merits.” Id.; see also Ching, 298 F.3d at 179–

80 (“Courts are not obliged to entertain needless or

piecemeal litigation; nor should they adjudicate a motion or petition whose purpose is to vex, harass, or

delay.”) Neither can prisoners “prevent the adjudication of an initial habeas petition from ever becoming

final by extending the first habeas proceedings

through an infinite number of new petitions.” Fuller

v. United States, 815 F.3d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 2016).

Section 2244(b)(2) kicks in “when the time to file a

petition for certiorari … expire[s]”—whether or not a

follow-up petition is still pending. Id.

Since Whab, the Second Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed this workable approach. E.g., Garcia v. Superintendent of Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 841

F.3d 581, 582 (2d Cir. 2016); Fuller, 815 F.3d at 113.

B. In the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,

Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,

§ 2244(b)(2) applies when the district

court enters final judgment or

shortly after.

Six circuits have expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s approach, holding that § 2244(b)(2) is triggered

at (or around) the time that the district court enters

final judgment. Yet even these courts can’t agree on

exactly what triggers the statute.

1. In the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, § 2244(b)(2) applies as soon as the district court enters final judgment.

a. The Fifth Circuit below recognized the split and

“decline[d] … to embrace” the Second Circuit’s rule,

holding instead that § 2244(b)(2) applies after the entry of final judgment. Pet. App. 10a–12a.

16

The district court denied Danny Rivers’s pro se habeas petition and entered final judgment. Pet.

App. 2a. The Fifth Circuit then granted a certificate

of appealability as to Rivers’s ineffective-assistance

claim. Id. While that appeal was pending, Rivers

sought further relief in the district court. Applying

§ 2244(b)(2), the district court deemed Rivers’s filing

a “second or successive” petition, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

According to the Fifth Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) covers

“filings introduced after a final judgment that raise

habeas claims.” Pet. App. 10a. The court derived that

rule from this Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby,

545 U.S. 524 (2005). The prisoner in Gonzalez “did

not file for rehearing or review” in his first habeas

proceeding and then sought Rule 60(b) relief a year

later. Id. at 527. This Court held that § 2244(b)(2) did

not apply because the prisoner’s Rule 60(b) motion

did not raise habeas claims. The Fifth Circuit read

Gonzalez to stand for the “underlying principle” that

§ 2244(b)(2) applies after final judgment, lest prisoners use “post-judgment motions” to evade AEDPA.

But see Balbuena, 970 F.3d at 1200 (Fletcher, J., concurring in the result) (“Gonzalez does not answer the

question whether [a petition] is a ‘second or successive’ habeas application under § 2244(b).”).

b. The Ninth Circuit also applies § 2244(b)(2) as

soon as the district court has “adjudicated [a] habeas

petition on the merits.” Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980

F.3d 619, 642 (9th Cir. 2020).

While the denial of Alexander Balbuena’s habeas

petition was still pending on appeal, Balbuena sought

additional relief in the district court. Id. at 628, 639.

The district court deemed Balbuena’s subsequent filing “an unauthorized second or successive petition,”

17

and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 628. Citing circuit precedent, it held that § 2244(b)(2) applied because Balbuena “sought to add a new claim after the

district court denied his petition.” Id. at 636–37.

Along the way, the Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged—and “decline[d] to follow”—the Second Circuit’s contrary approach. Id. at 637.

Judge Fletcher wrote separately to “urge the Supreme Court to recognize the circuit split and adopt”

the Second Circuit’s rule. Id. at 642 (Fletcher, J., concurring in the result). In his view, the Ninth Circuit

“made a mistake” both “as a matter of ordinary language” and “as a practical matter.” Id. at 644. As to

text, he reasoned that § 2244(b)(2) applies “only once

an appeal has been finally adjudicated.” Id. And as to

consequences, he explained that the Second Circuit’s

rule “will not result in a flood of late and procedurally

abusive claims.” Id. He closed by “encourag[ing]” this

Court to “resolve the conflict in the circuits” and expressing “optimis[m]” that it would “agree with” the

Second Circuit “rather than” the Ninth. Id. at 645.

c. The Seventh Circuit also holds that final judgment triggers § 2244(b)(2). See Phillips v. United

States, 668 F.3d 433, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2012). While

the Seventh Circuit was reviewing his habeas denial,

David Phillips asked the district court to consider

newly discovered evidence. Id. at 434. The district

court denied that motion on the merits, but the Seventh Circuit approached things differently. It held

that the new filing was not “properly before the district court” in the first place because it was a secondor-successive petition. Id. That was so (reasoned the

court) because “[f]inal judgment marks a terminal

point,” and “[t]reating motions filed during appeal as

18

part of the original application” would undermine

AEDPA’s “time-and-number limits.” Id. at 435.

d. The Eighth Circuit follows a similar approach.

See Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2006).

After the district court denied Frank Williams’s habeas petition, it failed to enter a separate final judgment. Id. at 1000–01. In the brief period before the

order became final, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, Williams

moved to amend the judgment and sought relief from

it. 461 F.3d at 1000–01. The district court denied

both motions as second-or-successive habeas petitions. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that

the district court had intended to “dispose of Williams’s petition on the merits,” so his later filings

were

“postjudgment”—and

thus

subject

to

§ 2244(b)(2). Id. at 1002.

e. The Eleventh Circuit also applies § 2244(b)(2) after final judgment. See United States v. Terrell, 141

F. App’x 849, 851–52 (11th Cir. 2005). Shortly after

George Terrell asked the Eleventh Circuit to review

the denial of his initial habeas petition, he sought additional habeas relief in the district court. Id. at 850–

51. The district court applied § 2244(b)(2), deeming

his motion an unauthorized second-or-successive application. Id. at 851. The Eleventh Circuit agreed,

emphasizing that “the district court had already denied” Terrell’s initial habeas petition. Id. at 852.

2. The Sixth Circuit follows a slightly different rule,

tying § 2244(b)(2) to the opportunity for appeal—not

the entry of final judgment.

Samuel Moreland’s initial habeas petition was still

pending on appeal when Moreland sought further

habeas relief in the district court. Moreland v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Cir-

19

cuit deemed Moreland’s filings “second or successive

habeas petitions.” Id. at 319. But instead of pegging

§ 2244(b)(2) to the entry of final judgment, like the

Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,

the Sixth Circuit focused on the window for appeal.

In its view, a motion that “seeks to raise habeas

claims” is a “second or successive habeas petition”

when filed “after the petitioner has appealed the district court’s denial of his original habeas petition or

after the time for the petitioner to do so has expired.”

Id. at 325. In other words, courts in the Sixth Circuit

ask whether “the district court has … lost jurisdiction

of the original habeas petition.” Jones v. Bradshaw,

46 F.4th 459, 479–81 (6th Cir. 2022). This means that

a petitioner who would be out of luck in the other circuits could get relief in the Sixth Circuit while the

window to appeal is still open.

C. In the Tenth Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) applies

after a first-in-time petition is filed, unless the petitioner satisfies a sevenfactor test.

The Tenth Circuit applies § 2244(b)(2) whenever a

second-in-time petition raises “separate and distinct”

claims—even if the first-in-time petition is still pending before the district court. United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 503, 505 (10th Cir. 2000).

That rule puts the Tenth Circuit at odds with not only the Second Circuit, see Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d

538, 540–41 (10th Cir. 2007) (“declin[ing]” to follow

the Second Circuit’s rule), but also with other circuits

that allow amendments before final judgment, e.g.,

Phillips, 668 F.3d at 435.

But petitioners in the Tenth Circuit can avoid this

otherwise strict rule when “justice” demands. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009).

20

While the denial of his first habeas petition was

pending on appeal, Yancy Douglas asked the Tenth

Circuit for permission to file a second application asserting that prosecutors had concealed information

about a key witness. Id. at 1160, 1167–68. The Tenth

Circuit acknowledged that, under Ochoa, it “would

not ordinarily permit a habeas petitioner to supplement his habeas petition in this way.” Id. at 1189.

But this was no ordinary case. Rather, based on “seven factors”—including that Douglas’s initial habeas

petition remained pending, that the new claim related closely to his pending claims, the prosecutor’s conduct, that Douglas faced the death penalty, and disparity between Douglas and his codefendant—the

court decided to “deem” the later petition “a supplement to the previously asserted” petition, rather than

a second-or-successive petition. Id. at 1189–96. The

upshot is that courts in the Tenth Circuit don’t apply

§ 2244(b)(2) under circumstances when courts in the

Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh

Circuits would have to. See also United States v.

Pickard, 396 F. App’x 568, 572 (10th Cir. 2010).

D. In the Third Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) toggles

on and off depending on who wins the

initial appeal.

Finally, the Third Circuit follows its own unique

rule. It agrees with the Second Circuit that

§ 2244(b)(2) does not automatically apply to a “subsequent habeas petition” filed before “exhaustion of appellate remedies with respect to the denial of [the]

initial habeas petition.” Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 104–

05. But prisoners in Delaware, New Jersey, and

Pennsylvania face a twist that those in Connecticut,

New York, and Vermont don’t. When a prisoner in

the Third Circuit seeks further habeas relief while

21

his initial petition is pending on appeal, the applicability of § 2244(b)(2) depends on the outcome of that

appeal. See id. at 104 n.5 (Even if a “subsequent habeas petition” is “not ‘second or successive’ at the time

of filing,” it “could later be construed as a ‘second or

successive’ habeas petition.”).

Here’s the Third Circuit’s logic. While the first petition is up on appeal, the petitioner has not had “one

full opportunity to seek collateral review.” Id. at 105

(citation omitted). So a subsequent petition filed during that period should be “construed as a motion to

amend” the first petition. Id. at 105–06. That motion

belongs “in the district court in the first instance.” Id.

at 106. Yet the district court lacks jurisdiction while

the appeal is pending, so the motion to amend must

stay on ice. Id. Now for the twist. If the Third Circuit

“vacates or reverses … and remands the matter,” the

district court “would again be vested with jurisdiction

to consider” the motion. Id. When that happens,

§ 2244(b)(2) doesn’t apply. On the other hand, if the

prisoner “exhausts her appellate remedies to no

avail,” she has “expended the ‘one full opportunity to

seek collateral review’ that AEDPA ensures.” Id. (citation omitted). In that case, § 2244(b)(2) does apply

and—presto!—the “motion to amend” becomes a “second or successive” habeas petition. Id.

*

*

*

Only this Court can “resolve the conflict in the circuits,” Balbuena, 980 F.3d at 642 (Fletcher, J., concurring in the result), and there is no reason to wait.

Three circuits have already denied rehearing en

banc—and one of them has done so twice. See Order,

Phillips v. United States, Nos. 10-2154 & 11-1498

(7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012); Order, Williams v. Norris,

No. 04-3485 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007); Order, Balbuena

22

v. Sullivan, Nos. 12-16414, 18-15432 (9th Cir. Nov.

17, 2020); Order, Jacobs v. Thornell, No. 22-16822

(9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2024). The others show no sign of rethinking their positions. Nor is there any need for

more percolation. The nine circuits that have already

weighed in cover roughly 88% of all federal and state

prisoners. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Statistics,

bit.ly/Federal-Prisons; Prison Pol’y Initiative, Appendix: State and Federal Prison Populations 2019-2023,

bit.ly/State-Prisons. All positions are staked out, and

this Court now has the benefit of numerous opinions

on the issue. The Court should grant review.

II. The question presented is critically important and recurring.

A. The question presented is too important to punt.

Since 1996, AEDPA cases have become a fixture of

this Court’s docket. In fact, the Court has repeatedly

granted cert to resolve conflicts over this very provision. See, e.g., Banister, 590 U.S. at 511 (5-3 split);

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 524 (2005); Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473 (2000) (3-4 split); Stewart v. MartinezVillareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998) (1-1 split). That

alone suggests certworthiness—even apart from the

fact that this split is deeper than those.

The issue is also critically important to parties on

both sides. Until this Court weighs in, at least some

states and prisoners will be living under the wrong

rule, and those in the outstanding circuits will have

to guess which rule applies. For states, that uncertainty turns AEDPA’s promise of “finality” on its

head. Banister, 590 U.S. at 512. But the stakes are

even higher for prisoners. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush,

553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008) (calling habeas “one of the

few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution

that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights”). “Federal

23

postconviction law is complex, and few prisoners understand it well.” Curry v. United States, 507 F.3d

603, 604 (7th Cir. 2007). So the last thing they need

when seeking to navigate AEDPA’s procedural thicket is uncertainty over which thicket they are in.

B. The need for review is all the more pressing because this issue arises so often. Two circuits have

confronted the question presented in the last four

months. See Pet. App. 1a; Jacobs v. Thornell, 2024

WL 810443 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2024). But that’s nothing compared to the district courts. See, e.g., Daly v.

Oliver, 2024 WL 2092997, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 9,

2024), appeal docketed, No. 24-2070 (3d Cir. June 18,

2024); Herrera v. United States, 2024 WL 218964, at

*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2024); Hernandez v. Macomber,

2023 WL 2992172, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2023);

Thomas v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2023 WL

2837521, at *9–11 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2023); Bollinger

v. Gittere, 2023 WL 2242444, at *1–3 (D. Nev. Feb.

24, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-99002 (9th Cir.

March. 28, 2023); Perpall v. United States, 2023 WL

2016836, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2023) (acknowledging the split); Atkins v. United States, 2023 WL

1765536, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2023) (same).

And those are just (some of) the cases available on

Westlaw. The federal courts received over 14,000 habeas petitions last year. See U.S. Courts, Civil Statistical Tables For the Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2023),

bit.ly/2023-Statistics. Since one in ten habeas cases

involves an amended petition, see N. King, et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts 34 (2007), bit.ly/Habeas-Report, the real

numbers are likely far higher. Cf. Rachel Brown, et

al., Is Unpublished Unequal? An Empirical Examination of the 87% Nonpublication Rate in Federal Ap-

24

peals, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 62 (2021) (finding that

pro se, non-capital habeas cases are “published at less

than one-third of the overall rate”).

III. The decision below is wrong.

The Fifth Circuit thought that § 2244(b)(2) required

the district court to dismiss “for lack of jurisdiction”

because Rivers’s 2021 filing was “introduced after a

final judgment” and “raise[d] habeas claims.” Pet.

App. 10a–11a. That is wrong. Banister showed how

courts should determine “what qualifies as second or

successive,” 590 U.S. at 512, and its logic favors Rivers here. But the Fifth Circuit didn’t even cite Banister—let alone engage in the proper analysis—and its

rule doesn’t square with this Court’s holdings either.

A. Section 2244(b)(2) does not apply until

appellate review of the first habeas application is exhausted.

The phrase “second or successive application” is a

“term of art” that is “not self-defining.” Banister, 590

U.S. at 511 (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 486). To determine when § 2244(b)(2) applies, “this Court has

looked for guidance in two main places.” Id. at 512.

First, history: “whether a type of later-in-time filing

would have constituted an abuse of the writ, as that

concept is explained” in this Court’s “pre-AEDPA cases.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at

947). Second, “AEDPA’s own purposes”: conserving

judicial resources, reducing piecemeal litigation, and

achieving finality “within a reasonable time.” Id. (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945–46). Here, both factors

align. Early courts applied abuse-of-the-writ rules in

light of appellate review, not final judgment, and applying § 2244(b)(2) to filings like Rivers’s would frustrate, not further, AEDPA’s aims.

25

1. Courts historically analyzed abuses of

the writ by reference to appellate review, not final judgment.

The abuse-of-the-writ doctrine was a nineteenthcentury innovation. “[B]y the common law of England, as it stood at the adoption of the constitution,”

the denial of habeas relief was “no bar to the issuing

of a second or third or more writs, by any other court

or magistrate having jurisdiction of the case.” Ex

parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78, 80 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853).

Instead, “courts and judges were accustomed to exercise an independent judgment on each successive application, regardless of the number.” Salinger v.

Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924). Only later, once “a

right to an appellate review was given,” did American

courts pare back this practice. Id. When they did,

they tied abuse-of-the-writ rules to the completion of

appellate review—not the entry of final judgment.

Ex parte Cuddy, one of the earliest abuse-of-thewrit cases, is a good example. 40 F. 62, 66 (C.C.S.D.

Cal. 1889) (Field, J.). A district court denied Thomas

Cuddy’s habeas petition, and this Court affirmed. Id.

at 63 (citing Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280 (1889)).

Cuddy then sought habeas relief from Justice Field,

riding circuit. Justice Field ordered the writ dismissed, reasoning that “a second application upon the

same facts … should not be heard,” absent “leave to

make a new application.” Id. at 66.

Along the way, Justice Field emphasized two

things. First, “action … on the second application”

should turn on the “character of the court or officer to

whom the first application was made, and the fullness of the consideration given to it.” Id. In Cuddy,

for example, Justice Field rejected the petition because the prisoner sought further relief “after invok-

26

ing the judgment of the appellate court” and “failing

therein.” Id. at 64. In other words: the abuse-of-thewrit doctrine applied after this Court weighed in—

not after the district court entered final judgment. In

fact, had the prisoner not “appealed from the refusal

of the district court,” he could have “applied to the

circuit judge” for the same relief. Id. at 66. Second,

Justice Field “refer[red], of course,” only to “cases

where a second application is made upon the same

facts presented, or which might have been presented”

in the initial application. Id. In his view, things

would be “entirely different” if “subsequent occurring

events” offered “new” grounds for consideration. Id.

This Court’s abuse-of-the-writ cases followed the

same approach. Take Salinger, 265 U.S. at 230–32,

which involved a serial habeas petitioner. Citing

Cuddy, the Court explained that an appellate court’s

“prior refusal” to grant a “like application” carries

weight “when a later application is being considered.”

Id. at 230–31. Since the “prior refusal” in Salinger

was “affirmed in a considered opinion by a Circuit

Court of Appeals,” with “no attempt to obtain” further

review, an abuse-of-the-writ dismissal “would have

been well exercised.” Id. at 226–27, 232. Here again,

what mattered was that an appellate court had

weighed in—not that a district court had denied the

first petition and entered final judgment.

All of that boils down to this. When early courts

applied abuse-of-the-writ rules, they asked whether

an appellate decisionmaker had spoken—not whether

a district court had entered final judgment. That

makes sense, since this Court has long understood

“proceedings in the appellate tribunal” to be part of

the “process of law” by which prisoners test the legality of confinement. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,

27

327 (1915) (discussing appellate review of conviction).

Against that backdrop, a rule that treats final judgment as the relevant inflection point is “bad wine of

recent vintage.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14

(2019) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37

(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).

2. Treating filings like Rivers’s as “second or successive” would frustrate

AEDPA’s aims.

Banister’s other source of guidance—“AEDPA’s own

purposes”—points the same way. 590 U.S. at 512.

Treating filings like Rivers’s as “second or successive”

would have baleful “implications for habeas practice,”

making it unlikely that “Congress would have viewed

[them] as successive.” Id. at 512–13.

a. Judicial resources. So far as the lower courts

are concerned, the question is not whether prisoners

like Rivers will seek further relief while their initial

petitions are on appeal. The question instead is which

court will review those filings first. Everyone agrees

that “a three-judge panel of the court of appeals” is

the first port of call for petitions filed after a prisoner

exhausts appellate review of his initial application.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B). But Congress had little

reason to channel filings like Rivers’s down that

path—and good reason to treat them as part and parcel of the initial habeas application.

i. If section 2244(b)(2) is a “rock[y]” path for prisoners, that goes double for courts. Banister, 590 U.S. at

509. When the court of appeals receives a “second or

successive” petition, three appellate judges have to

decide—from square zero, and often without adversarial briefing—whether the new evidence could have

been “discovered previously through the exercise of

28

due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Then they

have to examine “the evidence as a whole” and determine whether “the facts underlying the claim, if

proven,” would be “sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence” that “no reasonable factfinder”

would have convicted but for constitutional error. Id.

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). That, in turn, means considering

the state’s “theory of the case,” the evidence “support[ing]” that theory, and the counterfactual effect of

the “newly-discovered evidence,” including how it

would have undermined the state’s evidence and influenced the theories—and even “alternative theories”—that both sides could have “offered the jury.”

Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 335–37 (3d Cir.

2012). One recent authorization case was pending before the Fifth Circuit for almost three years, and the

opinion features a two-column, sixteen-row chart that

spans three pages of the Federal Reporter. See In re

Will, 970 F.3d 536, 544–46 (5th Cir. 2020). And that’s

just the first step. Even when the appellate court authorizes a “second or successive” petition, the district

court must still “conduct its own thorough review” to

ensure “the requirements of § 2244(b)(2) have been

satisfied.” Id. at 543 (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Still more: because any claim “presented in

a prior application” must be dismissed, § 2244(b)(1),

both courts must carefully compare the “second or

successive” petition to all prior petitions and determine precisely what “claim[s]” have been brought. Id.

at 541. That can be especially challenging when the

courts confront an “inartistically drawn [pro se] petition,” Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948).

ii. Now consider the alternative. When Rivers

sought further relief in February 2021, he went before the same magistrate judge and district court

judge who denied his initial petition. Had those judg-

29

es reached the merits, they—better than anyone—

would have known whether his new evidence was

worth the candle. If not: game over. If so, the court

could have issued an indicative ruling under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. E.g., Parry v. Kerestes,

2013 WL 6002358 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2013). Either

way, a judge “familiar with a habeas applicant’s

claims” would likely make “quick work” of a filing like

this. Banister, 590 U.S. at 517. That’s good reason to

think that a Congress concerned about judicial resources “would have viewed” such filings as “part and

parcel of the first habeas proceeding.” Id. at 507, 513.

b. Reducing piecemeal litigation. The latter

path would serve AEDPA’s second aim too—and this

case is Exhibit A. New evidence in hand, Rivers

asked the Fifth Circuit to remand so that he could

seek relief on “all [his] claims rather than revisiting

this case in piecemeal litigation.” No. 18-11490 (5th

Cir.) Dkt. 61, at 5–6. When that failed, he asked the

district court to “consider an interlocutory review” to

“prevent unnecessary litigation and to preserve judicial resources.” No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt.

26, at 5. Instead, the court transferred the matter to

the Fifth Circuit, which opened a brand new proceeding, where Rivers must convince three judges to authorize a fourth judge to consider whether or not to

consider the new evidence.

c. Finality. Finality cuts the same way. Suppose

that the state investigator’s report that Rivers discovered in his client file isn’t the bombshell that Rivers reckons. In that case, the way to “lend[] finality”

to Rivers’s conviction “within a reasonable time”

would have been for the district court to say so in

September 2021. Banister, 590 U.S. at 512. Had it

done that, this case would be over. Instead, the lower

30

courts sent Rivers and Texas down a path that could

prolong this case—and leave the validity of Rivers’s

conviction up in the air—for years to come.

*

*

*

Had Congress wanted all post-judgment habeas filings to count as second or successive petitions, “it easily could have written” such a law. Ali v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227 (2008). But it’s hard to

squeeze that rule from the text of § 2244(b)(2) and the

history against which it was written. And it’s even

harder to attribute the consequences to a Congress

focused on judicial resources, efficiency, and finality.

See N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413

U.S. 405, 419–20 (1973) (“We cannot interpret federal

statute to negate their own stated purposes.”).

B. The Fifth Circuit’s decision cannot be

squared with this Court’s cases.

The Fifth Circuit addressed none of this. It did not

ask whether Rivers’s filing “would have constituted

an abuse of the writ, as that concept is explained in

[this Court’s] pre-AEDPA cases.” Banister, 590 U.S.

at 512 (cleaned up) (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at 947).

It did not explain how its approach would “conserv[e]

judicial resources” or “streamlin[e] habeas cases.” Id.

at 515, 517. And while it offered vague generalities

about evading AEDPA’s limitations, it said not a

word about finality, let alone whether its rule would

hasten or hinder that objective here. In fact, the court

didn’t even cite Banister—even through both parties

relied on that case in their briefs.

Nor does the Fifth Circuit’s approach square with

this Court’s holdings. Gregory Banister’s Rule 59(e)

motion came “after a final judgment” and raised “habeas claims,” Pet. App. 10a, but this Court still held

31

that it was “part and parcel of the first habeas proceeding,” Banister, 590 U.S. at 507. Likewise, the

prisoner in Slack filed a post-final-judgment habeas

petition, and this Court allowed that to proceed too.

Slack, 529 U.S. at 487. And the same was true in

Stewart, where the prisoner’s post-final-judgment

habeas application “was not a ‘second or successive’

petition’ under § 2244(b).” 523 U.S. at 643–45.

IV. This case is an excellent vehicle.

This case is an ideal vehicle to finish what Banister

started. The question presented raises a pure legal

issue that was fully briefed and squarely decided below. There are no preservation problems, alternative

holdings, or factual disputes that would frustrate review. And the split is outcome-determinative. The

Fifth Circuit declined to consider Rivers’s new evidence because it thought § 2244(b)(2) required that

result. Yet if Rivers were held in Buffalo, New York,

instead of Beeville, Texas, § 2244(b)(2) would have

been no barrier, and the lower courts could have

reached the merits. In other words, if this Court reverses and adopts the Second Circuit’s rule, Rivers

will have a meaningful path to relief. The lower

courts denied Rivers’s initial petition largely because

he could not pinpoint what his counsel should have

done differently or how that might have changed

things. See Rivers, 2018 WL 4443153, at *4. But the

new evidence puts those questions to rest. Now all

that stands between Rivers and a fighting chance is

the Fifth Circuit’s mistaken reading of § 2244(b)(2).

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition.

32

Respectfully submitted,

Peter A. Bruland

Counsel of Record

Benjamin M. Mundel

Cody M. Akins

Hundley H. Poulson

David H. Kinnaird

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

pbruland@sidley.com

June 24, 2024

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.