Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Danny Richard Rivers, Petitioner v. Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
Supreme Court briefJun 24, 2024
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No. 23-
In the Supreme Court of the United States
___________
DANNY RICHARD RIVERS, PETITIONER
v.
BOBBY LUMPKIN, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
___________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________
Peter A. Bruland
Counsel of Record
Benjamin M. Mundel
Cody M. Akins
Hundley H. Poulson
David H. Kinnaird
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
pbruland@sidley.com
Counsel for Petitioner
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner “always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction,” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S.
504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all
attempts to file a “second or successive habeas corpus
application.” Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.
The circuits are intractably split on whether
§ 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold
that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all secondin-time habeas filings made after the district court
enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees,
applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts
appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third
and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or
satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).
The question presented is:
Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate
review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time
habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some
second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner’s success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.
ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Ex parte Rivers, WR-84,550-01 & 84,550-02 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016) (remanding for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law)
Rivers v. State, No. 08-12-00145-CR (Tex. Ct. App.
Jan. 4, 2017) (findings of fact and conclusions of
law following Oct. 5, 2016 remand)
Ex parte Rivers, WR-84,550-01 & 84,550-02 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. July 7, 2017) (affirming Jan. 4.,
2017 Texas Court of Appeals judgment)
Rivers v. Davis, No. 7:17-cv-00124 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
17, 2018) (denying habeas relief)
Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 11, 2021) (deeming Feb. 2021 filing “second
or successive and recommending transfer)
Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 23, 2021) (adopting recommendation)
Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 18-11490 (5th Cir. May 13,
2022) (affirming district court’s Sept. 17, 2018 order denying initial habeas petition)
Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 22-6688 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2023)
(denying petition for a writ of certiorari)
Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 21-11031 (5th Cir. Apr. 15,
2024) (affirming district court’s Sept. 23, 2021,
order; decision below here)
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ...................................
i
RELATED PROCEEDINGS.................................
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
vi
INTRODUCTION .................................................
1
OPINIONS BELOW .............................................
4
JURISDICTION....................................................
4
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED .............
4
STATEMENT ........................................................
5
A. Legal background ....................................
5
B. Factual and procedural background.......
6
1. Rivers is tried and convicted .............
7
2. Rivers seeks postconviction relief......
9
3. While his habeas appeal is pending,
Rivers obtains exculpatory evidence.
10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...
13
I. The courts of appeals are split four ways
over what triggers § 2244(b)(2), and only
this Court can resolve the conflict. ...............
13
A. In the Second Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) does
not apply until appellate review of the
first habeas petition is exhausted...........
14
B. In the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
§ 2244(b)(2) applies when the district
court enters final judgment or shortly
after. .........................................................
15
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—CONTINUED
C. In the Tenth Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) applies after a first-in-time petition is
filed, unless the petitioner satisfies a
seven-factor test. .....................................
Page
19
D. In the Third Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) toggles on and off depending on who wins
the initial appeal. ....................................
20
II. The question presented is critically
important and recurring. ..............................
22
III.
The decision below is wrong. ........................
24
A. Section 2244(b)(2) does not apply until
appellate review of the first habeas application is exhausted..............................
25
1. Courts historically analyzed abuses
of the writ by reference to appellate
review, not final judgment.................
24
2. Treating filings like Rivers’s as “second or successive” would frustrate
AEDPA’s aims. ...................................
27
B. The Fifth Circuit’s decision cannot be
squared with this Court’s cases. .............
30
IV. This case is an excellent vehicle. ..................
31
CONCLUSION......................................................
31
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—CONTINUED
Page
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Court of appeals opinion,
Rivers v. Lumpkin (5th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024) ......
1a
APPENDIX B: Magistrate judge’s findings,
conclusions, and recommendations,
Rivers v. Lumpkin (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2021) ... 12a
APPENDIX C: Order accepting findings, conclusions, and recommendations,
Rivers v. Lumpkin (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021) .. 18a
vi
CASES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214 (2008)......................................
30
Atkins v. United States,
2023 WL 1765536 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2023) .
23
Balbuena v. Sullivan,
970 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2020)......................
2
Balbuena v. Sullivan,
980 F.3d 619 (9th Cir. 2020)................. . 16, 17, 21
Banister v. Davis,
590 U.S. 504 (2020)....... .2, 5, 6, 22, 27, 29, 30, 31
Bollinger v. Gittere,
2023 WL 2242444 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2023) .
23
Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008)......................................
22
Ching v. United States,
298 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2002) ..................... 2, 14, 15
Ex parte Cuddy,
40 F. 62 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1889)....................... 25, 26
Curry v. United States,
507 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2007).........................
23
Daly v. Oliver,
2024 WL 2092997 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2024) ..
23
Douglas v. Workman,
560 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2009).................... 19, 20
Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309 (1915)......................................... 26
Fuller v. United States,
815 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2016) ..........................
15
Garcia v. Superintendent of Great Meadow
Corr. Facility, 841 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016) ..
15
Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524 (2005)...................................... 16, 22
Gonzalez v. Thaler,
565 U.S. 134 (2012).......................................
5
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
Hernandez v. Macomber,
2023 WL 2992172 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2023)
23
Herrera v. United States,
2024 WL 218964 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2024) .
23
Jacobs v. Thornell,
2024 WL 810443 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2024) ....
23
Jones v. Bradshaw,
46 F.4th 459 (6th Cir. 2022) .........................
19
Ex parte Kaine,
14 F. Cas. 78 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853)................
25
Moreland v. Robinson,
813 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2016)........................ 18, 19
Munchinski v. Wilson,
694 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2012) ..........................
28
N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405 (1973) ......................................
30
Ochoa v. Sirmons,
485 F.3d 538 (10th Cir. 2007).......................
19
Parry v. Kerestes,
2013 WL 6002358 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2013)
29
Perpall v. United States,
2023 WL 2016836 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2023)
23
Phillips v. United States,
668 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2012) ................ 17, 18, 19
Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266 (1948).......................................
28
Rivers v. Davis,
2018 WL 4443153
(N.D. Tex. July 27, 2018) .............................. 10, 31
Rivers v. Lumpkin,
2022 WL 1517027 (5th Cir. May 13, 2022) ..
11
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
Ex parte Rivers,
2016 WL 5800277
(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016) ......................
9
Ex parte Rivers,
2017 WL 3380491
(Tex. Crim. App. June 7, 2017) ....................
10
Rotkiske v. Klemm,
589 U.S. 8 (2019) ..........................................
27
Salinger v. Loisel,
265 U.S. 224 (1924)...................................... 25, 26
Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473 (2000)...................................... 22, 31
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
523 U.S. 637 (1998)...................................... 22, 31
Thomas v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
2023 WL 2837521 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2023) .
23
United States v. Espinoza-Saenz,
235 F.3d 501 (10th Cir. 2000).......................
19
United States v. Pickard,
396 F. App’x 568 (10th Cir. 2010) ................
20
United States v. Santarelli,
929 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2019) ...................... 2, 20, 21
United States v. Terrell,
141 F. App’x 849 (11th Cir. 2005) ...............
18
In re Will,
970 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2020).........................
28
Williams v. Norris,
461 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2006).........................
18
Whab v. United States,
408 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2005) .........................
14
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
STATUTES
Page
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..........................................
4
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)...................................... 5, 28
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)..................................... 4, 5, 6
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).................................
28
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).................................
5
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B).................................
27
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).................................
5
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4)......................................
5
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 .............................................
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 ..........................................
18
29
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Rachel Brown et al., Is Unpublished Unequal? An Empirical Examination of the
87% Nonpublication Rate in Federal Appeals, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2021) ..............
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Statistics...................
N. King et al., Final Technical Report:
Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts
(2007).............................................................
Prison Pol’y Initiative, Appendix: State and
Federal Prison Populations 2019-2023 ........
U.S. Courts, Civil Statistical Tables For the
Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2023) ................
Page
23
22
23
22
23
INTRODUCTION
This case presents an acknowledged circuit split
over an important procedural question: whether 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)’s rules for “second or successive”
habeas petitions apply to a habeas filing made after
the district court has denied an initial petition but
before an appellate court has weighed in. Nine circuits have split four ways over that question, and only this Court can resolve the conflict.
1. This case is about the hurdles that a prisoner
must clear before a court will hear him out. Petitioner
Danny Rivers sought habeas relief, arguing that his
counsel had failed to investigate his case and had
shown up to trial drunk. The district court denied the
petition, finding that Rivers couldn’t explain what his
lawyer should have done differently or why that
would have changed things. But the answer soon
emerged. After fighting for years to obtain his counsel’s records, Rivers finally received them while his
initial petition was up on appeal. Among the files,
Rivers found an exculpatory report suggesting that
he was wrongly convicted—evidence that his lawyers
never once mentioned at trial.
New evidence in hand, Rivers raced to court—only
to find the doors barred. Applying § 2244(b)(2), the
district court reasoned that it was “without jurisdiction to entertain” the new evidence because Rivers’s
filing counted as a “second or successive” petition.
Pet. App. 19a. (Never mind that his first petition was
still pending on appeal and would be for nearly a
year.) The Fifth Circuit affirmed, explaining that “filings introduced after a final judgment that raise habeas claims” are “deemed successive.” Pet. App. 10a.
2
2. The Fifth Circuit’s decision deepens a circuit conflict over when § 2244(b)(2) kicks in. In the Second
Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) doesn’t apply until a prisoner
has exhausted appellate review of his initial habeas
petition—leaving district courts free to consider a filing like Rivers’s. As then-Judge Sotomayor put it,
that approach guarantees “one full opportunity to
seek collateral review.” Ching v. United States, 298
F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 2002). But the Fifth Circuit expressly “decline[d] … to embrace” that rule. Pet. App.
10a. Instead, it joined the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in applying § 2244(b)(2)
after the district court enters final judgment. That
approach effectively grants “one full opportunity to
seek collateral review in the district court.” United
States v. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 104 (3d Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). Meanwhile, the Third and Tenth Circuits follow their own unique approaches, holding
that § 2244(b)(2) sometimes applies between final
judgment and exhaustion and sometimes doesn’t.
Three circuits have already denied rehearing en banc,
and the rest show no sign of rethinking their views.
In short: the circuits are intractably split, the conflict won’t disappear on its own, and this Court’s
guidance is badly needed. See Balbuena v. Sullivan,
970 F.3d 1176, 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2020) (Fletcher,
J., concurring in the result) (“urg[ing] the Supreme
Court to recognize” and “resolve the conflict”).
3. The decision below is also wrong. In Banister v.
Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020), this Court explained that
the phrase “second or successive” is a term of art that
doesn’t simply refer to every second-in-time habeas
filing. Instead, the Court has looked to historical
practice and statutory aims when determining
whether § 2244(b)(2) applies. But the Fifth Circuit
3
didn’t even cite Banister, let alone follow its guidance.
Had it done so, the court would have realized that its
rule doesn’t square with history. Early courts analyzing abuses of the writ treated appellate review—not
final judgment—as the relevant inflection point.
The Fifth Circuit’s approach will also frustrate
§ 2244(b)(2)’s aims. At bottom, the question is not
whether prisoners like Rivers will try to bring new
evidence to the courts’ attention. (They will—no matter what rule this Court adopts.) The question instead is which court will consider that evidence first.
Under the Second Circuit’s approach, a filing like
Rivers’s would have gone to the district court that
just denied the initial petition: the single member of
Article III most familiar with the case. That judge
could then have weighed the new evidence and decided whether to issue an indicative ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. By contrast, the Fifth
Circuit’s rule requires Rivers to ask a brand-new
three-judge panel for permission to ask the district
court to consider whether or not to reach the merits.
It’s hard to squeeze that rule from the statutory
text—and harder still to attribute it to a Congress focused on judicial economy, efficiency, and finality.
4. The question presented is important, and this
case is an ideal vehicle. Until this Court weighs in, at
least some states and prisoners will be living under
the wrong rule, and those in the outstanding circuits
will have to guess which rule applies. The interests
on both sides are too critical to leave up to geographical chance. The split is also outcome-determinative
here: if Rivers were incarcerated in New York instead
of Texas, courts would have considered the new evidence, giving him a meaningful path to relief.
The Court should grant review.
4
OPINIONS BELOW
The court of appeals’ opinion is reported at 99 F.4th
216 and is reproduced in the appendix to this petition
at Pet. App. 1a–11a. The district court’s opinion is
unpublished but is available at 2021 WL 4319670 and
is reproduced at Pet. App. 12a–17a.
JURISDICTION
The Fifth Circuit issued its judgment on April 15,
2024. Pet. App. 1a. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Section 2244(b)(2) of Title 28, U.S. Code, provides:
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that
was not presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed unless—
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on
a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;
or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could
not have been discovered previously through
the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven
and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
5
STATEMENT
A. Legal background
1. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 creates a dual-track system for federal
habeas relief. One path is for first-time petitioners.
“Under AEDPA, a state prisoner always gets one
chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction.” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020).
This path begins in the district court. If that court
denies relief, the prisoner may request a “certificate
of appealability”—initially from the district court,
and then from the court of appeals. See Gonzalez v.
Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140 & n.5 (2012). The path ends
only when the prisoner has exhausted the chance to
appeal and seek certiorari.
The second path is “rockier.” Banister, 590 U.S. at
509. A prisoner who wants to file a “second or successive habeas corpus application,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2), must first ask the court of appeals for
“an order authorizing the district court to consider
the application,” id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The appellate
court may oblige only if the prisoner makes a “prima
facie showing,” id. § 2244(b)(3)(C), that the petition
“relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional
law” or “alleges previously undiscoverable facts that
would establish … innocence,” Banister, 590 U.S. at
509 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). If so, the petition
goes to the district court, which must decide for itself
whether the petition “satisfies the requirements” of
§ 2244. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). At the same time, because any claim “presented in a prior application”
must be dismissed, § 2244(b)(1), both courts must
carefully compare the new petition to all prior petitions to determine precisely what “claims” the prison-
6
er has brought. Only then—after all that is done—
may the district court reach the merits.
The upshot is that much rides on whether
§ 2244(b)(2) applies—that is: on whether a filing is
deemed “part and parcel of the first habeas proceeding,” Banister, 590 U.S. at 507, or instead a “second
or successive habeas corpus application,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2).
2. The phrase “second or successive” is a “term of
art” that does not refer simply to “all habeas filings …
following an initial application.” Banister, 590 U.S. at
511 (first quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
486 (2000), then quoting Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332
(2010)). To determine when § 2244(b)(2) applies, “this
Court has looked for guidance in two main places.”
Id. at 512. First, the Court has considered history:
“whether a type of later-in-time filing would have
constituted an abuse of the writ” under the Court’s
“pre-AEDPA cases.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Panetti
v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 (2007)). Second, the
Court has looked to “AEDPA’s own purposes”: conserving judicial resources, reducing piecemeal litigation, and achieving finality “within a reasonable
time.” Id. (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945–46).
B. Factual and procedural background
Danny Rivers has spent the last twelve years
fighting to prove his innocence. Along the way, he
discovered that exculpatory evidence had been sitting
in his trial counsel’s files all the while—evidence that
his lawyers could have used to clear his name. If Rivers is right, then he not only received ineffective assistance but was also wrongly convicted. This case is
about the procedural hurdles that Rivers must clear
before a court will hear him out.
7
1. Rivers is tried and convicted
In 2012, a Texas jury convicted Rivers of sexually
abusing his children and possessing child pornography. He is currently serving a 38-year sentence.
a. This case began amidst a bitter divorce. In 2008,
a Texas judge awarded Rivers temporary custody of
his 9-year-old daughter. Rivers v. Lumpkin, No. 7:21cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 11-14 (“R-1”), at 156, 164.
The court also granted Rivers sole use of the family
home, ordered his ex-wife to pay child support, and
denied her request for alimony. Id. Dkt. 11-15 (“R-2”),
at 15. In response, Rivers’s ex-wife “punish[ed]” him
by “not letting him see” his 12-year-old stepdaughter,
whom he had raised as his own. R-2, at 16.
The following year, with custody arrangements unchanged, Rivers’s ex-wife drove the children to the
police station while Rivers was away for work. Both
girls met with officers and accused Rivers of sexually
abusing them. R-2, at 18, 129. Police then searched
Rivers’s home, seized the family laptop, and launched
a monthslong forensic examination, eventually identifying “two files of interest” that “appeared to be child
pornography.” Id. at 26, 28; id. Dkt. 11-10 (“R-3”), at
13, 31, 73; id. Dkt. 11-16, at 15, 66–67.
b. A Wichita County, Texas grand jury indicted
Rivers for continuous sexual abuse, indecency with a
child, and two counts of possessing child pornography. R-3, at 8–15. Rivers, who had no prior criminal
history, R-2, at 161, pleaded not guilty.
With his trial looming, Rivers moved to sever the
child-pornography counts, arguing that they might
color the jury’s views on the other charges. R-1, at 15.
The state opposed severance. Because its case had
“no DNA or physical evidence,” Texas argued that the
8
alleged child pornography was “necessary” to establish Rivers’s “motive” and “attraction to young girls.”
Id. at 14–15. The court refused to sever. Id. at 23.
c. At trial, Rivers’s daughter and stepdaughter alleged a staggering pattern of sexual abuse. R-1, at
142, 145–146, 167–168. They further claimed that
Rivers had shown them child pornography at least
seventy times, testifying that he had “downloaded
multiple videos” and played different films on different occasions. Id. at 153, 172. Rivers’s daughter also
accused her father of secretly recording images in the
shower. R-1, at 170. (No hidden cameras were ever
found.) All told, the girls alleged over 200 instances of
shocking abuse, many of which reportedly took place
in common areas of the home while their mother, uncle, or cousin were also present in the house. R-1, at
139, 147, 152–53, 156, 158, 166; R-2, at 12, 90. No
other witnesses saw the alleged abuse, and no physical evidence corroborated the story. R-2, at 34, 64.
Given the lack of supporting evidence, the alleged
child pornography was a key issue at trial. The prosecution called multiple witnesses to testify about the
two files—a single image and a single video—that
Rivers was charged with possessing. R-2, at 19, 28,
44, 74, 84, 100. While the trial judge had granted a
continuance so the defense could obtain its own forensic experts, R-3, at 31, 40, counsel did not do so.
R-2, at 112. Instead, the defense called only a single
witness, who testified that Rivers was out of town
when the files were allegedly downloaded. R-2, at
113–114, 131.
d. The jury convicted Rivers on all charges, Pet.
App. 2a. It rejected the prosecution’s call for a 169year sentence, however, and recommended that the
court sentence Rivers to 42 years instead. R-3, at
9
213–14, 221–29. The court went lower still: 38 years
behind bars, all counts considered—just three years
above the minimum. Pet. App. 13a. The Texas Court
of Appeals affirmed.
2. Rivers seeks postconviction relief
a. In 2013, Rivers began asking his lawyers to send
him his client file. He explained: “I don’t know what
all it contains, but it looks like I’m going to have to do
this thing pro se, so I need everything I can get.”
No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.) Dkt. 15-11, at 67.
Counsel “never responded to [his] request,” and two
years later, Rivers was still trying. Id. at 68–69. He
eventually resorted to filing a formal grievance with
the Texas state bar.
Meanwhile, Rivers pressed forward with what records he had. In 2016, he sought state postconviction
relief based on ineffective assistance, among other
grounds. Relevant here, he argued that his trial
counsel had failed to “perform an objectively reasonable investigation” or “verify the ages of the persons”
in the alleged child pornography. No. 7:21-cv-00012
(N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 12-21, at 9. He added that his lead
counsel was “inebriated” at the trial. Id. at 11.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that
Rivers had “alleged facts that, if true, might entitle
him to relief.” Ex parte Rivers, 2016 WL 5800277, at
*1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016). It remanded for
further factfinding, ordering the court to appoint
counsel if it “elect[ed] to hold a hearing.” Id. Judge
Alcala wrote separately to urge the appointment of
counsel “regardless of whether the trial court holds a
hearing.” Id. (Alcala, J., concurring).
On remand, the trial court neither held a hearing
nor appointed counsel. Instead, it chiefly relied on af-
10
fidavits in which trial counsel defended their performance, denied any drunkenness, and claimed that
Rivers had “admitted to [them] that he engaged in
sexual acts with the victims.” Rivers v. Davis, 2018
WL 4443153, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2018); see also
No. 7:17-cv-00124 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 24-1, at 24. Rivers
responded with his own affidavit, categorically “deny[ing] making such admissions.” Id. at 2. He also
submitted a text message from one of the lawyers’
spouses, confirming that counsel “showed up intoxicated for court,” id. at 25, and a news report showing
that his lead counsel was arrested six months before
the trial “after showing up at a woman[’]s house naked and drunk,” id. at 33 (cleaned up) (quoting Texoma, Local Attorney Sentenced to Two Years Probation (Mar. 18, 2015), bit.ly/Barber-Arrest). The trial
court nonetheless “concluded that counsel were not
ineffective,” and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Ex parte Rivers, 2017 WL 3380491, at *1
(Tex. Crim. App. June 7, 2017).
b. Rivers sought federal habeas relief in August
2017, raising the same ineffective-assistance claims,
among other grounds. No. 7:17-cv-00124 (N.D. Tex.),
Dkt. 1, at 6. The district court denied Rivers’s habeas
petition and declined to grant a certificate of appealability. Pet. App. 2a. Rivers then sought a certificate
of appealability from the Fifth Circuit.
3. While his habeas appeal is pending,
Rivers obtains exculpatory evidence
a. While his case was pending on appeal, Rivers finally received the client file that he first requested in
2013. Pet. App. 2a. In it, he found a state investigator’s report analyzing the two files underlying his
child-pornography conviction. The report called the
video merely “of interest,” without further comment.
11
Meanwhile, the image was labeled “NOT CHILD
PORN.” No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 15-11, at
75–77. The report also listed a number of other files
found on the family laptop. Next to one—entitled
“reallyunderagekiddieporn”—the state investigator
had written: “although the title indicated it to be
child porn,” it “is not.” Id. at 75. Another, whose title
included phrases like “pre-teen tiny children” and
“incest sex porn underage,” was also marked “NOT
CHILD PORN.” Id. Most telling of all, these files
and the video “of interest” were not saved under Rivers’s name; they were instead recovered from a download folder bearing the name of Rivers’s ex-wife.
After discovering the investigator’s report, Rivers
moved to supplement the appellate record. See
No. 18-11490 (5th Cir.), Dkt. 27. He also filed an affidavit stating that he had never seen the report and
noting that his lawyers had “failed to raise this exculpatory evidence” that had been “in [their] possession” all along. Id. at 5, 10–11. The affidavit added
that Rivers’s “estranged wife had access to the house
and did in fact enter the house, against court orders,
while [Rivers] was out of town during the time frame
the alleged child porn was downloaded,” id. at 7—one
explanation for why the “child pornography” appeared under her username, not his.
The Fifth Circuit denied Rivers’s motion to supplement the record but granted a certificate of appealability for the ineffective-assistance claim. Id. Dkt. 34,
at 2. Rivers later asked the court either to stay his
appeal or to remand so he could seek relief in the district court without creating “piecemeal litigation.” Id.
Dkt. 61, at 5–6. The Fifth Circuit refused, id. Dkt. 78,
and ultimately affirmed, see Rivers v. Lumpkin, 2022
12
WL 1517027 (5th Cir. May 13, 2022), cert. denied, 143
S. Ct. 1090 (2023).
b. In February 2021, while his appeal was still
pending, Rivers used the standard § 2254 petition
template provided to pro se litigants to bring the new
evidence to the district court’s attention. No. 7:21-cv00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 2, at 7. While the filing also
raised several new claims, Rivers chiefly argued that
trial counsel’s “fail[ure] to present exculpatory evidence” violated his right to effective assistance. Id.
Dkt. 10, at 24.
The same magistrate judge who reviewed Rivers’s
initial habeas petition recommended that the new filing be deemed a “second or successive” petition and
transferred to the Fifth Circuit for lack of jurisdiction. See Pet. App. 3a–4a. Rivers objected to the recommendation, No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 27,
and “move[d] the court to consider an interlocutory
review,” id. Dkt. 26, at 5. The district court adopted
the recommendation and denied Rivers’s motion as
moot. See Pet. App. 18a–19a
Rivers appealed the transfer order, urging the court
to construe the February 2021 filing as an amendment to his initial petition, instead of a second or successive petition. Pet. App. 3a–4a. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed. Id. at 1a–2a. It reasoned that § 2244(b)(2)
applies to “filings introduced after a final judgment
that raise habeas claims, no matter how titled.” Id. at
10a. Here, the February 2021 filing was “second-intime” and “attack[ed] the same conviction that [Rivers had] challenged” in his initial habeas proceeding,
so it counted as “second or successive.” Id. at 6a. The
court’s opinion acknowledged that eight other circuits
had splintered on the question. Id. at 8a.
13
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The courts of appeals are intractably split over
whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to a habeas filing made
after the district court has denied an initial petition
but before an appellate court has weighed in. That
question is critically important to states and prisoners alike, and it arises too often to leave up to geographical happenstance. The decision below is also
wrong. It ignores this Court’s guidance in Banister,
flies in the face of historical practice, and frustrates—
rather than furthers—AEDPA’s aims. Finally, this
case is an ideal vehicle for the Court to offer muchneeded guidance. The issue is cleanly presented and
outcome-determinative: only the Fifth Circuit’s mistaken reading of § 2244(b)(2) stands between Rivers
and a meaningful path to relief. The Court should
grant the petition.
I. The courts of appeals are split four ways
over what triggers § 2244(b)(2), and only
this Court can resolve the conflict.
Nine circuits have split four ways over the question
presented. In the Second Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) does
not apply until the petitioner exhausts appellate review of his first habeas petition. The Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits disagree, holding that § 2244(b)(2) applies as soon as, or
shortly after, the district court enters final judgment.
(Even they can’t agree on the precise trigger.) Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit applies § 2244(b)(2) even
earlier—except when the petitioner satisfies a sevenfactor test. And in the Third Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) toggles on and off depending on whether the petitioner
wins or loses on appeal. Respondent acknowledged
the split below, see No. 21-11031 (5th Cir.), Dkt. 52,
at 15–24, and only this Court can resolve it.
14
A. In the Second Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) does
not apply until appellate review of the
first habeas petition is exhausted.
In Whab v. United States, the Second Circuit held
that § 2244(b)(2) does not apply while “appellate proceedings following the district court’s dismissal of the
initial petition remain pending.” 408 F.3d 116, 118
(2d Cir. 2005).
Usama Whab filed a pro se habeas petition. Id. at
117. The district court denied the petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Id. at
118. Whab then sought a certificate of appealability
from the Second Circuit, which the court ultimately
denied. Id. While that motion was still pending, however, Whab asked the Second Circuit for permission
to file a “second or successive” petition. Id. at 119.
The court held that Whab’s “subsequent petition
was not ‘second or successive’ within the meaning of”
AEDPA. Id. at 118. Citing then-Judge Sotomayor’s
rationale in Ching v. United States, it explained that
a petition can’t be “second or successive” unless it is
filed after “the conclusion of a proceeding that counts
as the first.” 298 F.3d at 177. And the first proceeding
isn’t over until the “opportunity to seek review in the
Supreme Court has expired.” Whab, 408 F.3d at 120.
Because Whab’s first proceeding was still pending
when he filed his subsequent petition, § 2244(b)(2)
did not apply. Id. at 119.
Of course, that doesn’t mean that anything goes.
“Traditional doctrines, such as abuse of the writ, continue to apply.” Id. at 119 n.2. So even if a filing is
not “second or successive” under § 2244(b)(2), prisoners do not get a “free pass” to “file numerous petitions
before an initially filed petition is finally adjudicated
15
on the merits.” Id.; see also Ching, 298 F.3d at 179–
80 (“Courts are not obliged to entertain needless or
piecemeal litigation; nor should they adjudicate a motion or petition whose purpose is to vex, harass, or
delay.”) Neither can prisoners “prevent the adjudication of an initial habeas petition from ever becoming
final by extending the first habeas proceedings
through an infinite number of new petitions.” Fuller
v. United States, 815 F.3d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 2016).
Section 2244(b)(2) kicks in “when the time to file a
petition for certiorari … expire[s]”—whether or not a
follow-up petition is still pending. Id.
Since Whab, the Second Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed this workable approach. E.g., Garcia v. Superintendent of Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 841
F.3d 581, 582 (2d Cir. 2016); Fuller, 815 F.3d at 113.
B. In the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
§ 2244(b)(2) applies when the district
court enters final judgment or
shortly after.
Six circuits have expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s approach, holding that § 2244(b)(2) is triggered
at (or around) the time that the district court enters
final judgment. Yet even these courts can’t agree on
exactly what triggers the statute.
1. In the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, § 2244(b)(2) applies as soon as the district court enters final judgment.
a. The Fifth Circuit below recognized the split and
“decline[d] … to embrace” the Second Circuit’s rule,
holding instead that § 2244(b)(2) applies after the entry of final judgment. Pet. App. 10a–12a.
16
The district court denied Danny Rivers’s pro se habeas petition and entered final judgment. Pet.
App. 2a. The Fifth Circuit then granted a certificate
of appealability as to Rivers’s ineffective-assistance
claim. Id. While that appeal was pending, Rivers
sought further relief in the district court. Applying
§ 2244(b)(2), the district court deemed Rivers’s filing
a “second or successive” petition, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
According to the Fifth Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) covers
“filings introduced after a final judgment that raise
habeas claims.” Pet. App. 10a. The court derived that
rule from this Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524 (2005). The prisoner in Gonzalez “did
not file for rehearing or review” in his first habeas
proceeding and then sought Rule 60(b) relief a year
later. Id. at 527. This Court held that § 2244(b)(2) did
not apply because the prisoner’s Rule 60(b) motion
did not raise habeas claims. The Fifth Circuit read
Gonzalez to stand for the “underlying principle” that
§ 2244(b)(2) applies after final judgment, lest prisoners use “post-judgment motions” to evade AEDPA.
But see Balbuena, 970 F.3d at 1200 (Fletcher, J., concurring in the result) (“Gonzalez does not answer the
question whether [a petition] is a ‘second or successive’ habeas application under § 2244(b).”).
b. The Ninth Circuit also applies § 2244(b)(2) as
soon as the district court has “adjudicated [a] habeas
petition on the merits.” Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980
F.3d 619, 642 (9th Cir. 2020).
While the denial of Alexander Balbuena’s habeas
petition was still pending on appeal, Balbuena sought
additional relief in the district court. Id. at 628, 639.
The district court deemed Balbuena’s subsequent filing “an unauthorized second or successive petition,”
17
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 628. Citing circuit precedent, it held that § 2244(b)(2) applied because Balbuena “sought to add a new claim after the
district court denied his petition.” Id. at 636–37.
Along the way, the Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged—and “decline[d] to follow”—the Second Circuit’s contrary approach. Id. at 637.
Judge Fletcher wrote separately to “urge the Supreme Court to recognize the circuit split and adopt”
the Second Circuit’s rule. Id. at 642 (Fletcher, J., concurring in the result). In his view, the Ninth Circuit
“made a mistake” both “as a matter of ordinary language” and “as a practical matter.” Id. at 644. As to
text, he reasoned that § 2244(b)(2) applies “only once
an appeal has been finally adjudicated.” Id. And as to
consequences, he explained that the Second Circuit’s
rule “will not result in a flood of late and procedurally
abusive claims.” Id. He closed by “encourag[ing]” this
Court to “resolve the conflict in the circuits” and expressing “optimis[m]” that it would “agree with” the
Second Circuit “rather than” the Ninth. Id. at 645.
c. The Seventh Circuit also holds that final judgment triggers § 2244(b)(2). See Phillips v. United
States, 668 F.3d 433, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2012). While
the Seventh Circuit was reviewing his habeas denial,
David Phillips asked the district court to consider
newly discovered evidence. Id. at 434. The district
court denied that motion on the merits, but the Seventh Circuit approached things differently. It held
that the new filing was not “properly before the district court” in the first place because it was a secondor-successive petition. Id. That was so (reasoned the
court) because “[f]inal judgment marks a terminal
point,” and “[t]reating motions filed during appeal as
18
part of the original application” would undermine
AEDPA’s “time-and-number limits.” Id. at 435.
d. The Eighth Circuit follows a similar approach.
See Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2006).
After the district court denied Frank Williams’s habeas petition, it failed to enter a separate final judgment. Id. at 1000–01. In the brief period before the
order became final, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, Williams
moved to amend the judgment and sought relief from
it. 461 F.3d at 1000–01. The district court denied
both motions as second-or-successive habeas petitions. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that
the district court had intended to “dispose of Williams’s petition on the merits,” so his later filings
were
“postjudgment”—and
thus
subject
to
§ 2244(b)(2). Id. at 1002.
e. The Eleventh Circuit also applies § 2244(b)(2) after final judgment. See United States v. Terrell, 141
F. App’x 849, 851–52 (11th Cir. 2005). Shortly after
George Terrell asked the Eleventh Circuit to review
the denial of his initial habeas petition, he sought additional habeas relief in the district court. Id. at 850–
51. The district court applied § 2244(b)(2), deeming
his motion an unauthorized second-or-successive application. Id. at 851. The Eleventh Circuit agreed,
emphasizing that “the district court had already denied” Terrell’s initial habeas petition. Id. at 852.
2. The Sixth Circuit follows a slightly different rule,
tying § 2244(b)(2) to the opportunity for appeal—not
the entry of final judgment.
Samuel Moreland’s initial habeas petition was still
pending on appeal when Moreland sought further
habeas relief in the district court. Moreland v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Cir-
19
cuit deemed Moreland’s filings “second or successive
habeas petitions.” Id. at 319. But instead of pegging
§ 2244(b)(2) to the entry of final judgment, like the
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
the Sixth Circuit focused on the window for appeal.
In its view, a motion that “seeks to raise habeas
claims” is a “second or successive habeas petition”
when filed “after the petitioner has appealed the district court’s denial of his original habeas petition or
after the time for the petitioner to do so has expired.”
Id. at 325. In other words, courts in the Sixth Circuit
ask whether “the district court has … lost jurisdiction
of the original habeas petition.” Jones v. Bradshaw,
46 F.4th 459, 479–81 (6th Cir. 2022). This means that
a petitioner who would be out of luck in the other circuits could get relief in the Sixth Circuit while the
window to appeal is still open.
C. In the Tenth Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) applies
after a first-in-time petition is filed, unless the petitioner satisfies a sevenfactor test.
The Tenth Circuit applies § 2244(b)(2) whenever a
second-in-time petition raises “separate and distinct”
claims—even if the first-in-time petition is still pending before the district court. United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 503, 505 (10th Cir. 2000).
That rule puts the Tenth Circuit at odds with not only the Second Circuit, see Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d
538, 540–41 (10th Cir. 2007) (“declin[ing]” to follow
the Second Circuit’s rule), but also with other circuits
that allow amendments before final judgment, e.g.,
Phillips, 668 F.3d at 435.
But petitioners in the Tenth Circuit can avoid this
otherwise strict rule when “justice” demands. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009).
20
While the denial of his first habeas petition was
pending on appeal, Yancy Douglas asked the Tenth
Circuit for permission to file a second application asserting that prosecutors had concealed information
about a key witness. Id. at 1160, 1167–68. The Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that, under Ochoa, it “would
not ordinarily permit a habeas petitioner to supplement his habeas petition in this way.” Id. at 1189.
But this was no ordinary case. Rather, based on “seven factors”—including that Douglas’s initial habeas
petition remained pending, that the new claim related closely to his pending claims, the prosecutor’s conduct, that Douglas faced the death penalty, and disparity between Douglas and his codefendant—the
court decided to “deem” the later petition “a supplement to the previously asserted” petition, rather than
a second-or-successive petition. Id. at 1189–96. The
upshot is that courts in the Tenth Circuit don’t apply
§ 2244(b)(2) under circumstances when courts in the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits would have to. See also United States v.
Pickard, 396 F. App’x 568, 572 (10th Cir. 2010).
D. In the Third Circuit, § 2244(b)(2) toggles
on and off depending on who wins the
initial appeal.
Finally, the Third Circuit follows its own unique
rule. It agrees with the Second Circuit that
§ 2244(b)(2) does not automatically apply to a “subsequent habeas petition” filed before “exhaustion of appellate remedies with respect to the denial of [the]
initial habeas petition.” Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 104–
05. But prisoners in Delaware, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania face a twist that those in Connecticut,
New York, and Vermont don’t. When a prisoner in
the Third Circuit seeks further habeas relief while
21
his initial petition is pending on appeal, the applicability of § 2244(b)(2) depends on the outcome of that
appeal. See id. at 104 n.5 (Even if a “subsequent habeas petition” is “not ‘second or successive’ at the time
of filing,” it “could later be construed as a ‘second or
successive’ habeas petition.”).
Here’s the Third Circuit’s logic. While the first petition is up on appeal, the petitioner has not had “one
full opportunity to seek collateral review.” Id. at 105
(citation omitted). So a subsequent petition filed during that period should be “construed as a motion to
amend” the first petition. Id. at 105–06. That motion
belongs “in the district court in the first instance.” Id.
at 106. Yet the district court lacks jurisdiction while
the appeal is pending, so the motion to amend must
stay on ice. Id. Now for the twist. If the Third Circuit
“vacates or reverses … and remands the matter,” the
district court “would again be vested with jurisdiction
to consider” the motion. Id. When that happens,
§ 2244(b)(2) doesn’t apply. On the other hand, if the
prisoner “exhausts her appellate remedies to no
avail,” she has “expended the ‘one full opportunity to
seek collateral review’ that AEDPA ensures.” Id. (citation omitted). In that case, § 2244(b)(2) does apply
and—presto!—the “motion to amend” becomes a “second or successive” habeas petition. Id.
*
*
*
Only this Court can “resolve the conflict in the circuits,” Balbuena, 980 F.3d at 642 (Fletcher, J., concurring in the result), and there is no reason to wait.
Three circuits have already denied rehearing en
banc—and one of them has done so twice. See Order,
Phillips v. United States, Nos. 10-2154 & 11-1498
(7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012); Order, Williams v. Norris,
No. 04-3485 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007); Order, Balbuena
22
v. Sullivan, Nos. 12-16414, 18-15432 (9th Cir. Nov.
17, 2020); Order, Jacobs v. Thornell, No. 22-16822
(9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2024). The others show no sign of rethinking their positions. Nor is there any need for
more percolation. The nine circuits that have already
weighed in cover roughly 88% of all federal and state
prisoners. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Statistics,
bit.ly/Federal-Prisons; Prison Pol’y Initiative, Appendix: State and Federal Prison Populations 2019-2023,
bit.ly/State-Prisons. All positions are staked out, and
this Court now has the benefit of numerous opinions
on the issue. The Court should grant review.
II. The question presented is critically important and recurring.
A. The question presented is too important to punt.
Since 1996, AEDPA cases have become a fixture of
this Court’s docket. In fact, the Court has repeatedly
granted cert to resolve conflicts over this very provision. See, e.g., Banister, 590 U.S. at 511 (5-3 split);
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 524 (2005); Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473 (2000) (3-4 split); Stewart v. MartinezVillareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998) (1-1 split). That
alone suggests certworthiness—even apart from the
fact that this split is deeper than those.
The issue is also critically important to parties on
both sides. Until this Court weighs in, at least some
states and prisoners will be living under the wrong
rule, and those in the outstanding circuits will have
to guess which rule applies. For states, that uncertainty turns AEDPA’s promise of “finality” on its
head. Banister, 590 U.S. at 512. But the stakes are
even higher for prisoners. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008) (calling habeas “one of the
few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution
that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights”). “Federal
23
postconviction law is complex, and few prisoners understand it well.” Curry v. United States, 507 F.3d
603, 604 (7th Cir. 2007). So the last thing they need
when seeking to navigate AEDPA’s procedural thicket is uncertainty over which thicket they are in.
B. The need for review is all the more pressing because this issue arises so often. Two circuits have
confronted the question presented in the last four
months. See Pet. App. 1a; Jacobs v. Thornell, 2024
WL 810443 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2024). But that’s nothing compared to the district courts. See, e.g., Daly v.
Oliver, 2024 WL 2092997, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 9,
2024), appeal docketed, No. 24-2070 (3d Cir. June 18,
2024); Herrera v. United States, 2024 WL 218964, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2024); Hernandez v. Macomber,
2023 WL 2992172, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2023);
Thomas v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2023 WL
2837521, at *9–11 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2023); Bollinger
v. Gittere, 2023 WL 2242444, at *1–3 (D. Nev. Feb.
24, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-99002 (9th Cir.
March. 28, 2023); Perpall v. United States, 2023 WL
2016836, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2023) (acknowledging the split); Atkins v. United States, 2023 WL
1765536, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2023) (same).
And those are just (some of) the cases available on
Westlaw. The federal courts received over 14,000 habeas petitions last year. See U.S. Courts, Civil Statistical Tables For the Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2023),
bit.ly/2023-Statistics. Since one in ten habeas cases
involves an amended petition, see N. King, et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts 34 (2007), bit.ly/Habeas-Report, the real
numbers are likely far higher. Cf. Rachel Brown, et
al., Is Unpublished Unequal? An Empirical Examination of the 87% Nonpublication Rate in Federal Ap-
24
peals, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 62 (2021) (finding that
pro se, non-capital habeas cases are “published at less
than one-third of the overall rate”).
III. The decision below is wrong.
The Fifth Circuit thought that § 2244(b)(2) required
the district court to dismiss “for lack of jurisdiction”
because Rivers’s 2021 filing was “introduced after a
final judgment” and “raise[d] habeas claims.” Pet.
App. 10a–11a. That is wrong. Banister showed how
courts should determine “what qualifies as second or
successive,” 590 U.S. at 512, and its logic favors Rivers here. But the Fifth Circuit didn’t even cite Banister—let alone engage in the proper analysis—and its
rule doesn’t square with this Court’s holdings either.
A. Section 2244(b)(2) does not apply until
appellate review of the first habeas application is exhausted.
The phrase “second or successive application” is a
“term of art” that is “not self-defining.” Banister, 590
U.S. at 511 (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 486). To determine when § 2244(b)(2) applies, “this Court has
looked for guidance in two main places.” Id. at 512.
First, history: “whether a type of later-in-time filing
would have constituted an abuse of the writ, as that
concept is explained” in this Court’s “pre-AEDPA cases.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at
947). Second, “AEDPA’s own purposes”: conserving
judicial resources, reducing piecemeal litigation, and
achieving finality “within a reasonable time.” Id. (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945–46). Here, both factors
align. Early courts applied abuse-of-the-writ rules in
light of appellate review, not final judgment, and applying § 2244(b)(2) to filings like Rivers’s would frustrate, not further, AEDPA’s aims.
25
1. Courts historically analyzed abuses of
the writ by reference to appellate review, not final judgment.
The abuse-of-the-writ doctrine was a nineteenthcentury innovation. “[B]y the common law of England, as it stood at the adoption of the constitution,”
the denial of habeas relief was “no bar to the issuing
of a second or third or more writs, by any other court
or magistrate having jurisdiction of the case.” Ex
parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78, 80 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853).
Instead, “courts and judges were accustomed to exercise an independent judgment on each successive application, regardless of the number.” Salinger v.
Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924). Only later, once “a
right to an appellate review was given,” did American
courts pare back this practice. Id. When they did,
they tied abuse-of-the-writ rules to the completion of
appellate review—not the entry of final judgment.
Ex parte Cuddy, one of the earliest abuse-of-thewrit cases, is a good example. 40 F. 62, 66 (C.C.S.D.
Cal. 1889) (Field, J.). A district court denied Thomas
Cuddy’s habeas petition, and this Court affirmed. Id.
at 63 (citing Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280 (1889)).
Cuddy then sought habeas relief from Justice Field,
riding circuit. Justice Field ordered the writ dismissed, reasoning that “a second application upon the
same facts … should not be heard,” absent “leave to
make a new application.” Id. at 66.
Along the way, Justice Field emphasized two
things. First, “action … on the second application”
should turn on the “character of the court or officer to
whom the first application was made, and the fullness of the consideration given to it.” Id. In Cuddy,
for example, Justice Field rejected the petition because the prisoner sought further relief “after invok-
26
ing the judgment of the appellate court” and “failing
therein.” Id. at 64. In other words: the abuse-of-thewrit doctrine applied after this Court weighed in—
not after the district court entered final judgment. In
fact, had the prisoner not “appealed from the refusal
of the district court,” he could have “applied to the
circuit judge” for the same relief. Id. at 66. Second,
Justice Field “refer[red], of course,” only to “cases
where a second application is made upon the same
facts presented, or which might have been presented”
in the initial application. Id. In his view, things
would be “entirely different” if “subsequent occurring
events” offered “new” grounds for consideration. Id.
This Court’s abuse-of-the-writ cases followed the
same approach. Take Salinger, 265 U.S. at 230–32,
which involved a serial habeas petitioner. Citing
Cuddy, the Court explained that an appellate court’s
“prior refusal” to grant a “like application” carries
weight “when a later application is being considered.”
Id. at 230–31. Since the “prior refusal” in Salinger
was “affirmed in a considered opinion by a Circuit
Court of Appeals,” with “no attempt to obtain” further
review, an abuse-of-the-writ dismissal “would have
been well exercised.” Id. at 226–27, 232. Here again,
what mattered was that an appellate court had
weighed in—not that a district court had denied the
first petition and entered final judgment.
All of that boils down to this. When early courts
applied abuse-of-the-writ rules, they asked whether
an appellate decisionmaker had spoken—not whether
a district court had entered final judgment. That
makes sense, since this Court has long understood
“proceedings in the appellate tribunal” to be part of
the “process of law” by which prisoners test the legality of confinement. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
27
327 (1915) (discussing appellate review of conviction).
Against that backdrop, a rule that treats final judgment as the relevant inflection point is “bad wine of
recent vintage.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14
(2019) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37
(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
2. Treating filings like Rivers’s as “second or successive” would frustrate
AEDPA’s aims.
Banister’s other source of guidance—“AEDPA’s own
purposes”—points the same way. 590 U.S. at 512.
Treating filings like Rivers’s as “second or successive”
would have baleful “implications for habeas practice,”
making it unlikely that “Congress would have viewed
[them] as successive.” Id. at 512–13.
a. Judicial resources. So far as the lower courts
are concerned, the question is not whether prisoners
like Rivers will seek further relief while their initial
petitions are on appeal. The question instead is which
court will review those filings first. Everyone agrees
that “a three-judge panel of the court of appeals” is
the first port of call for petitions filed after a prisoner
exhausts appellate review of his initial application.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B). But Congress had little
reason to channel filings like Rivers’s down that
path—and good reason to treat them as part and parcel of the initial habeas application.
i. If section 2244(b)(2) is a “rock[y]” path for prisoners, that goes double for courts. Banister, 590 U.S. at
509. When the court of appeals receives a “second or
successive” petition, three appellate judges have to
decide—from square zero, and often without adversarial briefing—whether the new evidence could have
been “discovered previously through the exercise of
28
due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Then they
have to examine “the evidence as a whole” and determine whether “the facts underlying the claim, if
proven,” would be “sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence” that “no reasonable factfinder”
would have convicted but for constitutional error. Id.
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). That, in turn, means considering
the state’s “theory of the case,” the evidence “support[ing]” that theory, and the counterfactual effect of
the “newly-discovered evidence,” including how it
would have undermined the state’s evidence and influenced the theories—and even “alternative theories”—that both sides could have “offered the jury.”
Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 335–37 (3d Cir.
2012). One recent authorization case was pending before the Fifth Circuit for almost three years, and the
opinion features a two-column, sixteen-row chart that
spans three pages of the Federal Reporter. See In re
Will, 970 F.3d 536, 544–46 (5th Cir. 2020). And that’s
just the first step. Even when the appellate court authorizes a “second or successive” petition, the district
court must still “conduct its own thorough review” to
ensure “the requirements of § 2244(b)(2) have been
satisfied.” Id. at 543 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Still more: because any claim “presented in
a prior application” must be dismissed, § 2244(b)(1),
both courts must carefully compare the “second or
successive” petition to all prior petitions and determine precisely what “claim[s]” have been brought. Id.
at 541. That can be especially challenging when the
courts confront an “inartistically drawn [pro se] petition,” Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948).
ii. Now consider the alternative. When Rivers
sought further relief in February 2021, he went before the same magistrate judge and district court
judge who denied his initial petition. Had those judg-
29
es reached the merits, they—better than anyone—
would have known whether his new evidence was
worth the candle. If not: game over. If so, the court
could have issued an indicative ruling under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. E.g., Parry v. Kerestes,
2013 WL 6002358 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2013). Either
way, a judge “familiar with a habeas applicant’s
claims” would likely make “quick work” of a filing like
this. Banister, 590 U.S. at 517. That’s good reason to
think that a Congress concerned about judicial resources “would have viewed” such filings as “part and
parcel of the first habeas proceeding.” Id. at 507, 513.
b. Reducing piecemeal litigation. The latter
path would serve AEDPA’s second aim too—and this
case is Exhibit A. New evidence in hand, Rivers
asked the Fifth Circuit to remand so that he could
seek relief on “all [his] claims rather than revisiting
this case in piecemeal litigation.” No. 18-11490 (5th
Cir.) Dkt. 61, at 5–6. When that failed, he asked the
district court to “consider an interlocutory review” to
“prevent unnecessary litigation and to preserve judicial resources.” No. 7:21-cv-00012 (N.D. Tex.), Dkt.
26, at 5. Instead, the court transferred the matter to
the Fifth Circuit, which opened a brand new proceeding, where Rivers must convince three judges to authorize a fourth judge to consider whether or not to
consider the new evidence.
c. Finality. Finality cuts the same way. Suppose
that the state investigator’s report that Rivers discovered in his client file isn’t the bombshell that Rivers reckons. In that case, the way to “lend[] finality”
to Rivers’s conviction “within a reasonable time”
would have been for the district court to say so in
September 2021. Banister, 590 U.S. at 512. Had it
done that, this case would be over. Instead, the lower
30
courts sent Rivers and Texas down a path that could
prolong this case—and leave the validity of Rivers’s
conviction up in the air—for years to come.
*
*
*
Had Congress wanted all post-judgment habeas filings to count as second or successive petitions, “it easily could have written” such a law. Ali v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227 (2008). But it’s hard to
squeeze that rule from the text of § 2244(b)(2) and the
history against which it was written. And it’s even
harder to attribute the consequences to a Congress
focused on judicial resources, efficiency, and finality.
See N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413
U.S. 405, 419–20 (1973) (“We cannot interpret federal
statute to negate their own stated purposes.”).
B. The Fifth Circuit’s decision cannot be
squared with this Court’s cases.
The Fifth Circuit addressed none of this. It did not
ask whether Rivers’s filing “would have constituted
an abuse of the writ, as that concept is explained in
[this Court’s] pre-AEDPA cases.” Banister, 590 U.S.
at 512 (cleaned up) (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at 947).
It did not explain how its approach would “conserv[e]
judicial resources” or “streamlin[e] habeas cases.” Id.
at 515, 517. And while it offered vague generalities
about evading AEDPA’s limitations, it said not a
word about finality, let alone whether its rule would
hasten or hinder that objective here. In fact, the court
didn’t even cite Banister—even through both parties
relied on that case in their briefs.
Nor does the Fifth Circuit’s approach square with
this Court’s holdings. Gregory Banister’s Rule 59(e)
motion came “after a final judgment” and raised “habeas claims,” Pet. App. 10a, but this Court still held
31
that it was “part and parcel of the first habeas proceeding,” Banister, 590 U.S. at 507. Likewise, the
prisoner in Slack filed a post-final-judgment habeas
petition, and this Court allowed that to proceed too.
Slack, 529 U.S. at 487. And the same was true in
Stewart, where the prisoner’s post-final-judgment
habeas application “was not a ‘second or successive’
petition’ under § 2244(b).” 523 U.S. at 643–45.
IV. This case is an excellent vehicle.
This case is an ideal vehicle to finish what Banister
started. The question presented raises a pure legal
issue that was fully briefed and squarely decided below. There are no preservation problems, alternative
holdings, or factual disputes that would frustrate review. And the split is outcome-determinative. The
Fifth Circuit declined to consider Rivers’s new evidence because it thought § 2244(b)(2) required that
result. Yet if Rivers were held in Buffalo, New York,
instead of Beeville, Texas, § 2244(b)(2) would have
been no barrier, and the lower courts could have
reached the merits. In other words, if this Court reverses and adopts the Second Circuit’s rule, Rivers
will have a meaningful path to relief. The lower
courts denied Rivers’s initial petition largely because
he could not pinpoint what his counsel should have
done differently or how that might have changed
things. See Rivers, 2018 WL 4443153, at *4. But the
new evidence puts those questions to rest. Now all
that stands between Rivers and a fighting chance is
the Fifth Circuit’s mistaken reading of § 2244(b)(2).
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition.
32
Respectfully submitted,
Peter A. Bruland
Counsel of Record
Benjamin M. Mundel
Cody M. Akins
Hundley H. Poulson
David H. Kinnaird
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
pbruland@sidley.com
June 24, 2024
Counsel for Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.