Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jarius Brown, Petitioner v. Javarrea Pouncy, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 18, 2024
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No. _______
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
––––––––––––––––
JARIUS BROWN,
v.
Petitioner,
JAVARREA POUNCY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
––––––––––––––––
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
––––––––––––––––
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
––––––––––––––––
David D. Cole
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
915 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Nora Ahmed
ACLU FOUNDATION OF
LOUISIANA
1340 Poydras Street
Suite 2160
New Orleans, LA 70112
Lauren Willard Zehmer
Counsel of Record
Michael X. Imbroscio
Sameer Aggarwal
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
850 Tenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 662-6000
lzehmer@cov.com
Caleb M. W. Ellis
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018
Counsel for Petitioner
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not itself provide a
statute of limitations, federal courts have borrowed
from state law to determine the timeliness of Section
1983 claims, so long as those state limitations periods
are consistent with federal law and policy. In Owens
v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989), this Court expressly reserved the question of whether a one-year state
limitations period would be inconsistent with the federal interests underlying Section 1983. This petition
squarely presents that question. It also provides this
Court the chance to revisit the fifty-state borrowing
framework that allows states to frustrate plaintiffs’
access to federal courts to litigate their federal civil
rights claims.
Petitioner Jarius Brown was attacked by DeSoto
Parish Sheriff’s officers—suffering such severe injuries that he was hospitalized—and the two officers
responsible have since pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges. The courts below, however, held his
federal civil rights claim was time barred under Louisiana’s one-year residual limitations period.
The questions presented are:
1. Is the application of a one-year residual personal
injury statute of limitations to Section 1983 claims too
short to be consistent with the federal interests underpinning the statute?
2. In looking for a “suitable” statute of limitations
analogy for Section 1983 claims, does 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658’s uniform federal limitations period more faithfully serve the federal interests underpinning Section
1983 than the current patchwork of fifty state laws?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner (plaintiff-appellant below) is Jarius
Brown.
Respondents (defendants-appellees below) are
Javarrea Pouncy, and John Does #1 and #2.
iii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from the following proceedings:
Brown v. Pouncy, et al., No. 22-30691 (5th
Cir. Feb. 19, 2024) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss)
Brown v. Pouncy, et al., No. 21-cv-3415
(W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2022) (granting motion
to dismiss)
There are no other proceedings in state or federal
trial or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to this case within the meaning of this Court’s
Rule 14.1(b)(iii).
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ......................... ii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS....... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... vi
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ............. 1
OPINION BELOW ...................................................... 4
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 5
RELEVANT PROVISIONS......................................... 5
STATEMENT .............................................................. 5
A.
Statutory Background ........................... 5
B.
Factual Background............................... 8
C.
Procedural Background ....................... 10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 13
I.
This Court Should Grant Certiorari
to Decide Whether a One-Year State
Limitations Period Is Inconsistent
with the Federal Interests of Section
1983............................................................ 13
II.
The Four-Year Catchall Statute of
Limitations Provided Under Section
1658 Gives This Court the Federal
Solution It Lacked When Owens Was
Decided. ..................................................... 21
v
III.
The Application of Fifty Different
State Statutes of Limitations Creates
a Lack of Uniformity and Inequal
Access to Federal Civil Rights Claims. .... 28
IV.
This Case Provides an Excellent Vehicle
to Resolve Important Questions That
This Court Will Have Limited
Opportunities to Hear. .............................. 30
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 32
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alamo-Hornedo v. Puig,
745 F.3d 578 (1st Cir. 2014) ................................ 20
Arnold v. Duchesne Cnty.,
26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994) ................................ 19
Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
49 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2022) .............................. 20
Burnett v. Grattan,
468 U.S. 42 (1984) ........ 2–3, 6, 8, 15–17, 21–22, 27
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 144 (1944) .............................................. 26
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151 (1983) .............................................. 23
Dibrell v. City of Knoxville,
984 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir. 2021) .............................. 19
Hardin v. Straub,
490 U.S. 536 (1998) ........................................ 14–15
Johnson v. Garrison,
805 F. App'x 589 (10th Cir. 2020) ....................... 15
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454 (1975) .............................................. 22
vii
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968) .............................................. 22
McDonald v. Salazar,
831 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D.D.C. 2011) ...................... 16
Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972) ................................................ 1
O’Sullivan v. Felix,
233 U.S. 318 (1914) .............................................. 22
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,
432 U.S. 355 (1977) ........................................ 23, 29
Okure v. Owens,
816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987) ............................... 7, 17
Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235 (1989) ................... 1–3, 5, 7–8, 14–17,
............................................................ 20, 25–26, 31
Stucker v. Louisville Metro Gov't,
No. 23-5214, 2024 WL 2135407
(6th Cir. May 13, 2024) ........................................ 20
United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787 (1966) .............................................. 29
Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985) ....................... 1, 3, 5–6, 20, 22,
.................................................................. 24–26, 29
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 242 .......................................................... 10
viii
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ...................................................... 5
28 U.S.C. § 1658 ............................................ 3, 5, 8, 21
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...................................................... 1, 5
42 U.S.C. § 1988 .................................... 3, 5, 21–22, 27
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140 ............................. 19, 28
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492................................. 5, 10
2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 ....................... 13, 18
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2) ........................ 19, 28
Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-3-104 ............................... 19, 28
Other Authorities
Martin S. Greenberg & R. Barry
Ruback, After the Crime: Victim
Decision Making, 9 Perspectives in
Law & Psychology (1992) ..................................... 18
Dani Kritter, The Overlooked Barrier to
Section 1983 Claims: State Catch-All
Statutes of Limitations, Cal. L. Rev.
Online (Mar. 2021) ............................................... 18
Kimberly Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A
Limitation Period with Real
Limitations, 69 Ind. L.J. 477 (1994) .................... 25
Joseph E. Worcester, A Dictionary of the
English Language (1860) ..................................... 23
1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Section 1983 “provides ‘a uniquely federal remedy
against incursions under the claimed authority of
state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and
laws of the Nation.’” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
271–72 (1985) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972)). Because Section 1983 does not itself include an express statute of limitations, this Court has
directed courts to borrow from state law “so long as
the chosen limitations period was consistent with federal law and policy.” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,
239 (1989).
This case presents the question this Court explicitly left open in Owens: whether a state’s one-year
statute of limitations is too short to be consistent with
the federal law and policy animating Section 1983.
This case also provides the Court with an opportunity
to revisit the wisdom of the current disparate fiftystate borrowing framework now that Congress’ enactment of Section 1658 provides a more predictable and
uniform alternative for setting the limitations period
for the Nation’s central federal civil rights statute.
In September 2019, Jarius Brown was severely
beaten by DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s deputies after being
taken into custody for nonviolent traffic offenses. The
attack necessitated Mr. Brown’s hospitalization and
resulted in significant physical and mental trauma.
Within two years of the attack, Mr. Brown sought redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the principal federal
remedy for holding state actors to account for the violation of his civil rights. Had Mr. Brown brought this
action in almost any state other than Louisiana, his
federal civil rights claims would have been timely. But
2
because Mr. Brown was attacked in Louisiana, he had
only a single year to bring suit. Only two other states
impose such a short statute of limitations.
Under this Court’s decision in Wilson, because Section 1983 does not include its own statute of
limitations, courts have been directed to borrow the
state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
In Owens, the Court further clarified that, where a
state has more than one potentially applicable statute
of limitations for personal injury actions, the court
should borrow the state’s general, or “residual,” personal injury statute of limitations. Louisiana is
currently joined by only Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Puerto Rico in limiting federal civil rights plaintiffs to
a single year to bring claims under their personal injury or residual limitations period—the shortest such
period in the Nation. For this reason, based solely on
the fact that Mr. Brown was attacked in Louisiana,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his claim as
time barred.
This Court has recognized, however, that there
must be some limits on states’ authority to constrain
Section 1983 claims. Indeed, in Owens, the Court reserved the precise question this petition now presents:
whether a one-year statute of limitations is too short
to vindicate Section 1983’s federal interests. Owens,
488 U.S. at 251 n.13.
Owens recognized there is some minimum amount
of time that states must provide for victims of civil
rights offenses to bring Section 1983 claims. As the
Court has explained, Section 1983 actions, as a matter
of course, require plaintiffs to marshal the resources
necessary to prepare what are often complex federal
3
civil rights claims. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42,
50–51 (1984). In addition, plaintiffs who have been
victimized by law enforcement—as is the case in many
Section 1983 actions—face additional hurdles, including the need to process physical and mental trauma,
navigate parallel criminal proceedings and incarceration, and overcome the fear of retaliation from the
officers that abused them.
Because of these barriers, Louisiana’s one-year residual personal injury statute of limitations has the
practical effect of obstructing plaintiffs’ ability to
bring otherwise meritorious federal civil rights claims
in a manner that Congress never countenanced. As a
result, the one-year residual statute of limitations applied to Mr. Brown’s civil rights claim is inconsistent
with the federal interests underpinning Section 1983.
While the courts below were “sympathetic to the
dilemma [Mr. Brown] and similarly situated plaintiffs
face in Louisiana,” App 24a, they determined that
they were bound by Owens’ general framework, concluding that “[o]nly the Supreme Court . . . can clarify
how lower courts should evaluate practical frustration
without undermining [Owens’] solution.” App. 15a.
But that conclusion does not account for a significant change in federal law that bears on the
appropriate statute of limitations for Section 1983
claims. Two years after Owens was decided, Congress
passed 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which provides a prospective
four-year catchall limitations period for federal civil
actions that lack their own express statute of limitations. Before Section 1658, the three-part test outlined
in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 forced the Court to adopt the statelaw borrowing scheme that exists today. See Burnett,
4
468 U.S. 42; Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267–68; Owens, 488
U. S. at 239. Lacking an alternative federal standard
at the time, the Court directed courts to borrow from
state law despite the many apparent flaws with this
system, including that it permits states to restrict federal remedies under a statute designed to shield
citizens from state officers’ misconduct. But because
Congress has now enacted a general catchall statute
of limitations in Section 1658, this Court can eliminate the fifty-state patchwork approach and replace it
with a suitable federal solution that is uniform across
the country and faithful to the federal interests underpinning Section 1983.
Because the application of Louisiana’s one-year residual personal injury statute of limitations
impermissibly curtailed Mr. Brown’s civil rights, this
Court should take this opportunity to answer the
question left open in Owens—and to avail itself of the
federal solution now available through Section 1658.
In doing so, this Court can ensure that victims across
all states have a fair opportunity to vindicate their
federal civil rights.
OPINION BELOW
The February 19, 2024, decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (App. 1a–
15a) is reported at 93 F.4th 331. The district court’s
September 29, 2022, memorandum ruling granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss (App. 16a–28a) is reported at 631 F. Supp. 3d 397.
5
JURISDICTION
The Fifth Circuit entered judgment on February
19, 2024. App. 1a. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
The relevant U.S. statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, are reproduced at App. 29a–32a. Louisiana’s residual
personal injury prescriptive statute that was applied
to Mr. Brown’s claim, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492, is
reproduced at App. 33a.
STATEMENT
A. Statutory Background
The provision now codified as Section 1983 was
adopted as the central enforcement mechanism of the
Ku Klux Klan Act in the wake of the Civil War. See
Owens, 488 U.S. at 249 n.11. Section 1983 provides a
cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” by any person acting “under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed, Section 1983
“provides ‘a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon
rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.’” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 261 (citation omitted).
Since its enactment, Section 1983 has been the primary vehicle through which individuals hold state
actors who have violated their civil rights accountable. But federal courts have often struggled with
6
Section 1983’s lack of an express limitations period.
This Court provided guidance on this issue in a trilogy
of cases decided in the 1980s.
The first case was Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42
(1984), where the Court underscored that the “central
objective of § 1983” is “ensur[ing] that individuals
whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are
abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive
relief.” Id. at 55. While the Court did not supply a concrete rule addressing Section 1983’s limitations period
in all circumstances, it interpreted Section 1988 to
prescribe a “three-step process.” Id. at 47. Under that
approach, federal courts first “look to the laws of the
United States ‘so far as such laws are suitable to carry
[the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.’” Id. at 48. Second, “[i]f no suitable federal rule
exists,” courts consider “application of state ‘common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes’ of the forum State.” Id. Third, to ensure “the
predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not ‘inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.’” Id.
But Burnett did not resolve the lower courts’ confusion, prompting this Court to return to the issue in
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). There, the
Court held that Section 1983’s statute of limitations
was a federal question, and that all Section 1983 actions should be categorized as personal injury actions
for the purpose of determining the appropriate limitations period. See id. at 268–69, 276. In doing so,
Wilson sought to “minimize[] the risk that the choice
of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve
the federal interests vindicated by § 1983.” Id. at 279.
7
Nonetheless, lower courts continued to struggle
with the fact that many states had multiple statutes
of limitations for personal injury actions, any number
of which could apply depending upon the nature of the
federal claim. Confusion about which statute of limitations should govern Section 1983 claims persisted.
The Court therefore returned to this question in
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). There, the Court
considered whether a Section 1983 claim brought in
New York and arguably subject to a one-year statute
of limitations for assault should instead be measured
against New York’s residual catchall personal injury
statute of limitations of three years. The Second Circuit applied the residual limitations period,
recognizing that a three-year limitations period “more
faithfully represents the federal interest in providing
an effective remedy for violations of civil rights than
does the restrictive one year limit.” Okure v. Owens,
816 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1987). The court observed that
“[i]njuries to personal rights” are not “necessarily apparent to the victim at the time they are inflicted”
because “[e]ven where the injury itself is obvious, the
constitutional dimensions of the tort may not be.” Id.
at 48.
This Court unanimously affirmed that decision
and explained that, where a state law provides multiple statutes of limitation for personal injury actions,
courts generally should borrow the general or residual
personal injury statute of limitations. Id. at 250.
While the Court endorsed the Second Circuit’s decision to use the three-year residual limitations
period, it expressly noted that it “need not address [respondent’s] argument that applying a 1-year
8
limitations period to § 1983 actions would be inconsistent with federal interests.” Id. at 251 n.13. The
Court thus signaled that there could be circumstances
in which a state’s statute of limitations is too short to
be consistent with the federal interests underlying
Section 1983, and it explicitly reserved the question of
whether a one-year limitations period is too short.
In 1990, after Owens was decided, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which adopted for the first
time a federal catchall statute of limitations. Although
Section 1658’s four-year statute of limitations applies
prospectively by its own force, nothing in the statute
prevents courts from looking to Section 1658 as a
“suitable” federal analogue under the three-step test
in Section 1988 and Burnett. See Burnett, 468 U.S. at
47–48.
B. Factual Background
On September 27, 2019, Mr. Brown was arrested
by Louisiana State Police for nonviolent traffic offenses, after which he was transported to the DeSoto
Parish Sheriff’s office for booking. App. 39a. As a part
of that process, Officers Javarrea Pouncy and DeMarkes Grant—one of the John Does in this case—
(together, the “Officers”) ordered Mr. Brown to disrobe
and squat for a strip search. App. 40a. After complying with this order and undressing, Mr. Brown was
violently attacked by the Officers, who, using excessive force, repeatedly punched Mr. Brown in the head,
face, and stomach. App. 40a. Mr. Brown did not provoke the attack, nor did he pose a threat to the
Officers. App. 41a.
Mr. Brown suffered severe injuries from the attack, including an orbital fracture on the left side of
9
his face, a fracture to his nose, and abrasions on his
left eyelid. App. 42a. In the immediate aftermath, the
Officers left Mr. Brown unattended in an unoccupied
cell for several minutes. App. 40a–41a. Thereafter,
Mr. Brown was transported to Ochsner LSU Health
Shreveport-LA to receive medical care. App. 42a. The
Officers remained present with Mr. Brown throughout his hospitalization. App. 42a. As a result of this
attack, Mr. Brown suffered both physical and emotional trauma, and he has struggled to readjust to
society ever since. App. 35a.
Subsequently, the Civil Rights Department of the
U.S. Department of Justice investigated the attack
against Mr. Brown. Following its investigation, the
Government brought federal criminal charges against
both Mr. Pouncy and Mr. Grant. Indictment, United
States v. Pouncy, No. 5:23-cr-00210-SMH-MLH (W.D.
La. Sept. 6, 2023), ECF 1; Bill of Information, United
States v. Grant, No. 5:23-cr-00207-SMH-MLH (W.D.
La. Aug. 28, 2023), ECF 1.
While Mr. Brown’s appeal was pending, Mr. Grant
pleaded guilty to one count of obstruction of justice in
connection with the attack. Plea Agreement at 1–2,
United States v. Grant, No. 5:23-cr-00207-SMH-MLH
(W.D. La. Sept. 5, 2023), ECF 9. As a part of his plea
agreement, Mr. Grant corroborated the factual account in Mr. Brown’s complaint—acknowledging that
the Officers repeatedly punched Mr. Brown using “lethal” force. Factual Basis for Plea at 3, United States
v. Grant, No. 5:23-cr-00207-SMH-MLH (W.D. La.
Sept. 5, 2023), ECF 9-2.
10
Most recently, on April 10, 2024, Mr. Pouncy also
pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. Plea
Agreement at 1–2, United States v. Pouncy, No. 5:23cr-00210-SMH-MLH (W.D. La. Apr. 10, 2024), ECF
27. In the accompanying factual basis for his plea—
which also corroborated the facts alleged by Mr.
Brown—Mr. Pouncy confirmed that the Officers used
“lethal” force during the attack, and that this use of
force was “unjustified.” Factual Basis for Plea at 2–3,
United States v. Pouncy, No. 5:23-cr-00210-SMHMLH (W.D. La. April 10, 2024), ECF 27-2.
C. Procedural Background
On September 24, 2021, less than two years after
the attack, Mr. Brown brought a civil suit against the
Officers in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana under Section 1983 and La. Rev.
Stat. 14:35. App. 18a.
On January 31, 2022, Mr. Pouncy moved to dismiss Mr. Brown’s Section 1983 claim as time barred
under Louisiana’s one-year residual personal injury
statute of limitations period for personal injury actions. App. 18a. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492.
Invoking Owens, Mr. Pouncy asserted that Mr.
Brown’s Section 1983 claim should be governed by
Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations, which had
already run. App. 19a. In response, Mr. Brown noted
that Owens expressly declined to determine whether
a state’s one-year residual statute of limitations is so
short that it contravenes the federal interest underlying Section 1983. App. 23a. Additionally, Mr. Brown
asserted that, under the three-part framework provided by Section 1988 and Burnett, Section 1658’s
11
four-year catchall statute of limitations serves as a
“suitable” rule for Section 1983 claims and should
therefore provide the controlling limitations period.
App. 23a–24a.
On September 29, 2022, the district court granted
Mr. Pouncy’s motion to dismiss, largely because it believed it was bound by Owens. App. 25a–26a. Even
though Owens ostensibly controlled, the court explained that Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period
is “a relative outlier” and that it was “sympathetic to
the dilemma Brown and similarly situated plaintiffs
face in Louisiana.” App. 24a. Under this system, the
victim of a state-defined “crime of violence” has two
years to bring a state claim, but only one year to bring
a federal claim for the same conduct, even though both
claims rely on Louisiana’s statutes of limitations. App.
21a–22a.
Mr. Brown timely appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
raising the question left open in Owens: whether Louisiana’s one-year residual personal injury statute of
limitations impermissibly contravened federal interests. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 23–31, Brown v.
Pouncy, No. 22-30691 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023), ECF
24-1. Mr. Brown maintained that Louisiana’s oneyear residual statute of limitations is inconsistent
with the federal interests underpinning Section 1983
because it does not properly account for the practicalities of bringing a federal civil rights claim, especially
police misconduct claims, which are at the heart of
what Section 1983 was enacted to address. Id.
Mr. Brown also argued that Section 1988 and this
Court’s decision in Burnett instruct federal courts to
first look to federal analogues or when state law does
12
not supply an adequate rule of decision. Id. at 31–35.
Accordingly, Section 1658’s four-year federal residual
limitations period—which had not yet been enacted
when Owens was decided—would properly accommodate Mr. Brown’s and other Louisianans’ civil rights
claims, promoting the uniformity and predictability
interests the Supreme Court has long prioritized. Id.
At oral argument before the Fifth Circuit, Judge
Ho asked whether employing Section 1658’s four-year
catchall statute of limitations to Section 1983 claims
would constitute a “more textual” approach. Specifically, he noted that “replacing the state by state
strangeness with a uniform four year [limitations period]” would “seem[] to be more textual” than the
patchwork approach supplied by Owens. Oral Argument at 15:30–16:58, Brown v. Pouncy, No. 22-30691
(5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023).1 He acknowledged that this
case is a vehicle for “the Supreme Court to get back to
the text” of Sections 1988 and 1658. Id. at 12:56–
13:00.
On February 19, 2024, in a published opinion, the
Fifth Circuit held that “precedent requires [it] to affirm” the district court’s decision. App. 2a. While the
court “read Supreme Court precedent, and our cases
applying that precedent, to foreclose Brown’s position,” it acknowledged that, “[o]nly the Supreme
Court, having already solved the problem of uncertainty in the absence of a federal limitations period for
Section 1983 claims, can clarify how lower courts
should evaluate practical frustration without undermining that solution.” App. 15a (emphases added).
1 https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/22/22-30691_
10-4-2023.mp3.
13
Consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, Mr.
Brown’s petition seeks the clarity that “[o]nly the Supreme Court” can supply.
On June 3, 2024, Louisiana enacted Act No. 423
(“Act 423”), which will replace the state’s one-year residual statute of limitations with a two-year period.
See 2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315)
(West). Importantly though, Act 423 will only apply
prospectively to injuries suffered after its effective
date of July 1, 2024. That means that the Section 1983
claims brought by Mr. Brown—and those brought by
similarly-situated civil rights plaintiffs in Louisiana
as well as plaintiffs in Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Puerto Rico—are still subject to a one-year limitations
period. Louisiana’s belated legislative amendment
also does not address the fundamental problem that
plaintiffs across the country remain beholden to state
legislatures to determine their ability to bring federal
civil rights claims.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
This Court Should Grant Certiorari to
Decide
Whether
a
One-Year
State
Limitations Period Is Inconsistent with the
Federal Interests of Section 1983.
In the trio of cases ending with Owens, this Court
addressed the issues raised by Section 1983’s lack of
an express limitations period by borrowing from state
law. But the Court cautioned that a state limitations
period could be so short as to be “inconsistent with
[the] federal interests” that underpin Section 1983,
and it noted that it was reserving the question of
14
whether a one-year period fit within that category.
Owens, 488 U.S. at 251 n.13.
Louisiana’s one-year period that applied to Mr.
Brown’s Section 1983 claim is indeed an outlier. Presently, only Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Puerto Rico require Section 1983 plaintiffs to file their
claims within a single year. By granting review here,
this Court can address a substantial and important
question of federal law: whether a one-year state statute of limitations impermissibly undermines Section
1983 by practically frustrating federal civil rights
claims. Absent resolution, plaintiffs will remain subject to differential and disadvantaged access to the
country’s core federal civil rights remedy. Not to mention those who remain at the whim of state
legislatures that have the ability to substantively affect federal constitutional rights if they decide to
shorten the residual personal injury statute of limitations.
1. Mr. Brown’s case gives this Court an opportunity to resolve the question it expressly reserved in
Owens: whether a one-year limitations period is inconsistent with federal interests, as it does not properly
account for the practicalities of preparing and filing a
federal civil rights claim—a reality illustrated by Mr.
Brown’s own experience.
Section 1983 “provides a uniquely federal remedy
against incursions upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation, and is to be accorded a
sweep as broad as its language.” Hardin v. Straub,
490 U.S. 536, 539 n.5 (1998) (cleaned up). In Owens
itself, the Court explained that the statute “was the
product of congressional concern about the Ku Klux
15
Klan-sponsored campaign of violence and deception in
the South . . . . [and, even more so,] the state officials
who tolerated and condoned them.” Owens, 488 U.S.
at 249 n.11.
This Court has made clear that state procedural
rules—such as statutes of limitations—cannot operate in a way that contravenes Section 1983’s primary
legislative purpose. See id.; Burnett, 468 U.S. at 53
(“To the extent that particular state concerns are inconsistent with, or of marginal relevance to, the
policies informing the Civil Rights Act, the resulting
state statute of limitations may be inappropriate for
civil rights claims.”). While certain state statutes of
limitations may adequately safeguard the federal interests at stake, courts will not apply a state’s
limitations period if doing so “defeat[s] either § 1983’s
chief goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and federalism.” Hardin,
490 U.S. at 539; see also Johnson v. Garrison, 805 F.
App’x 589, 593 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that Oklahoma’s lack of a tolling provision for Section 1983
cases was contrary to Section 1983’s goals and the
practicalities involved in litigating federal civil rights
claims).
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided
Owens and determined that the operative limitations
period for Section 1983 claims is the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations. While
the Court stressed that the patchwork solution it fashioned would “promote predictability in all 50 states,”
it did so only in the absence of a viable federal solution. Owens, 488 U.S. at 243. To ensure that states
could not use this borrowing scheme to undercut federal interests, the Court reserved its ability to assess
16
whether a state limitations period might be too short
to accommodate federal interests. Id. at 251 n.13.
In reserving this question, the Court recognized
that, so long as Section 1983 depends upon state procedural rules, federal courts—and, in particular, this
Court—must act as a check on impermissible state legal regimes. Otherwise, states would be free to
undermine the scope and efficacy of Section 1983, limiting federal civil rights plaintiffs’ ability to seek
redress from the very state actors that statute is designed to hold accountable. Owens, 488 U.S. at 249
n.11. Put differently, the “predictability” promoted by
Owens was never meant to vitiate the requirement
that a state statute of limitations “afford a reasonable
time to the federal claimant.” Id. at 251 n.13 (quoting
Burnett, 468 U.S. at 61).
The one-year limitations period applied to Mr.
Brown presents these exact concerns. In Burnett, this
Court explained that “[a] state law is not ‘appropriate’
if it fails to take into account practicalities that are
involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and
policies that are analogous to the goals of the Civil
Rights Acts.” 468 U.S. at 50; see also McDonald v. Salazar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A
proper limitations provision must account for the
characteristics of litigation under the analogous federal statute, including the policies underlying and the
practicalities involved in litigating the federal cause
of action.”). Under that standard, a one-year residual
personal injury statute of limitations, like the one Mr.
Brown faces, simply does not provide claimants
enough time to marshal the resources necessary to
prepare a federal civil rights suit. Indeed, when the
17
Second Circuit decided between a three-year limitations period and a one-year period, it held that the
three-year timeframe “more faithfully represents the
federal interest in providing an effective remedy for
violations of civil rights than does the restrictive one
year limit.” Okure, 816 F.2d at 49.
Federal civil rights plaintiffs face myriad practical
hurdles to bringing a Section 1983 action. As this
Court has recognized, “[l]itigating a civil rights claim
requires considerable preparation.” Burnett, 468 U.S.
at 50. At the outset, a plaintiff must “recognize the
constitutional dimensions of his injury,” “obtain counsel, or prepare to proceed pro se,” “conduct enough
investigation to draft pleadings that meet the requirements of federal rules,” “establish the amount of his
damages, prepare legal documents, pay a substantial
filing fee or prepare additional papers to support a request to proceed in forma pauperis, and file and serve
his complaint.” Id. at 50–51. And these steps all take
time because injuries to civil rights are not “necessarily apparent to the victim at the time they are
inflicted,” and “even where the injury itself is obvious,
the constitutional dimensions of the tort may not be.”
Okure, 816 F.2d at 48.
As further evidenced here, many Section 1983
plaintiffs, including those in police misconduct cases,
face additional hurdles—such as recovering from
physical and mental trauma, navigating parallel
criminal proceedings while incarcerated, and fear of
18
retaliation from their abusers.2 Where a state law limitations period is too short for police misconduct
claims brought under Section 1983—perhaps the paradigmatic such claim—it can hardly be seen as
sufficient for Section 1983 claims more generally.
2. The application of Louisiana law to Mr. Brown’s
federal action also underscores the challenges associated with allowing myriad, ever-changing state
statutes of limitations to govern Section 1983 claims.
Because state legislatures can change their personal
injury limitations period at any time, civil rights
plaintiffs are subject to the whims of their state legislatures’ views of the proper sweep of their federal civil
rights. Absent meaningful guidance from this Court,
states are free to choose whichever limitations period
they see fit without any limiting principles on their
discretion.
Recent changes in Louisiana law highlight the
shortcomings of the current system in which each
state has complete autonomy to decide the operative
limitations period that will apply to federal civil rights
claims. While Louisiana extended the residual limitations period for future plaintiffs, the extension does
not apply to Mr. Brown or any similarly situated
2 See Martin S. Greenberg & R. Barry Ruback, After the Crime:
Victim Decision Making, 1–15, in 9 Perspectives in Law & Psychology (1992) (noting that victims of abuse struggle to report
subsequent to victimization); Dani Kritter, The Overlooked Barrier to Section 1983 Claims: State Catch-All Statutes of
Limitations,
Cal.
L.
Rev.
Online
(Mar.
2021),
https://perma.cc/T645-PYPW (explaining that these symptoms
are heightened for victims of police brutality).
19
plaintiffs who were injured prior to July 1, 2024. See
2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423, § 4.
By deciding to not apply Act 423 retroactively,
Louisiana is refusing to provide relief for many civil
rights plaintiffs, like Mr. Brown, who have already
been injured and now seek to vindicate their federal
rights. In fact, Louisiana’s belated recognition that its
limitations period was too short underscores that applying a one-year limitations period to Mr. Brown’s
Section 1983 claim was inconsistent with federal interests from the outset.
Mr. Brown and his fellow Louisianans are not the
only citizens whose federal civil rights are unduly restricted. All civil rights plaintiffs in Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Puerto Rico face the same fate as they
too are constrained by a one-year limitations period.
See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140 (2021); Tenn. Code.
Ann. § 28-3-104 (2021);3 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§ 5298(2). Absent guidance from this Court, federal
3 Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations expressly carves out
a separate limitations period for civil actions “brought under the
federal civil rights statutes.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-3104(a)(1)(B) (2021). Courts of appeals have struck down similar
statutes from other states, recognizing that “[w]hile Congress
permits federal courts to borrow state limitations periods, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has authorized states to
create limitations periods and exclusively applicable to section
1983 actions.” Arnold v. Duchesne Cnty., 26 F.3d 982, 989 (10th
Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit has upheld the application of this
specialized statute to Section 1983 claims because Tennessee’s
residual period is also one year. See Dibrell v. City of Knoxville,
984 F.3d 1156, 1161 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Because this statute also
sets a one-year period, we need not consider which statute would
apply if the two limitations periods differed.”).
20
courts will continue to defer to these state limitations
periods that fail to adequately serve Section 1983’s
federal interests. See, e.g., Stucker v. Louisville Metro
Gov’t, No. 23-5214, 2024 WL 2135407, at *2 (6th Cir.
May 13, 2024) (applying Kentucky’s one-year statute
of limitations to Section 1983 claim); Bannister v.
Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000, 1008 (6th Cir.
2022) (applying Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations to Section 1983 claim); Alamo-Hornedo v.
Puig, 745 F.3d 578, 581 (1st Cir. 2014) (applying
Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations to Section
1983 claim). This Court’s review will therefore be important not just to Mr. Brown but also to millions of
others whose federal civil rights are subject to an inadequate state-law limitations period.
Even when borrowing state statutes of limitations,
this Court has explained that the controlling standard
“is ultimately a question of federal law.” Wilson, 471
U.S. at 269. While Owens sought to simplify the approach to Section 1983’s statute of limitations
question by designating a particular state-law provision, there are still fifty different legislatures and fifty
different statutes that determine the amount of time
plaintiffs have to bring their federal claims. Despite
this patchwork system applying federal rights inconsistently, this Court has yet to provide guidance about
the minimum limitations period for a Section 1983
claim. See Owens, 488 U.S. at 251 n.13. As such, there
is nothing stopping the outlier states from continuing
to apply a one-year limitations period; nor is there anything to prevent other states from reducing the
amount of time Section 1983 claimants have to file
their lawsuits. Federal civil rights plaintiffs therefore
21
face the perpetual risk that their home state can manipulate state procedural law to restrict their access
to the federal courts for claims against state officials.
Current Section 1983 plaintiffs in Louisiana, like
Mr. Brown, and all Section 1983 plaintiffs in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico, are bearing the
brunt of their states’ unfettered discretion. By granting certiorari, the Court can clarify that there are
federal limitations on the states’ ability to block access
to federal courts for meritorious Section 1983 claims.
II. The
Four-Year
Catchall
Statute
of
Limitations Provided Under Section 1658
Gives This Court the Federal Solution It
Lacked When Owens Was Decided.
This case also provides an opportunity to adopt a
uniform federal statute of limitations for the federal
remedy supplied by Section 1983. When Burnett, Wilson, and Owens were decided, federal law provided no
adequate procedural rule that could have supplied a
limitations period for Section 1983 claims. But in
1990, the year after Owens was decided, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which provides a four-year
catchall statute of limitations period for all newly enacted federal causes of action that lack their own
specific limitations period.
This case presents the Court with the opportunity
to recognize that this change in law should also
change the controlling limitations period for Section
1983 claims. When the Court previously evaluated
Section 1983’s limitations period, it explained that
Section 1988 “direct[s] federal courts to follow a threestep process” to supply the appropriate rule of decision. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
22
Under Section 1988, courts first “look to the laws of
the United States ‘so far as such laws are suitable to
carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into
effect.’” Id. at 48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (alteration
in original).
If federal law is “suitable,” then federal law controls and the court’s job is done. See id.; see also
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268 (explaining steps two and
three of Section 1988’s framework “should not be undertaken before principles of federal law are
exhausted”). Only if “no suitable federal rule exists”
do courts proceed to the next steps: considering the
application of the forum state’s common law and determining whether state law “is not ‘inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
At the time of the Court’s decision in Burnett, there
was no “suitable” federal law to provide a limitations
period for Section 1983 claims. 468 U.S. at 48–49. For
instance, the Court held that twentieth century civilrights laws cannot supply the limitations period for
Section 1983 claims because those laws have “independen[t]” “remedial scheme[s].” Id. at 49 (discussing
O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324–25 (1914),
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
459–61 (1975), and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 416–17 & n.20 (1968)). Because no federal
law could supply the appropriate limitations period,
Burnett, Wilson, and Owens interpreted Section 1988
to require that courts borrow from state law limitations periods to decide what is otherwise clearly a
federal question. See id.; Wilson, 471 U.S. at 270.
23
Section 1658 now provides a federal solution to
this problem. The enactment of this provision calls for
a reevaluation of the central analysis under Section
1988, and conducting that analysis demonstrates that
Section 1658 provides the limitations period for all
Section 1983 claims across the Nation. It is far more
consistent with the federal interests of Section 1983 to
fill its missing gap with a uniform federal catchall
statute of limitations than to borrow from a patchwork of fifty different states’ residual personal injury
limitations periods providing wildly divergent time
periods for bringing suit. As the Court has explained,
“[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind. . . .” Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). As a
result, “state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law.”
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
161 (1983).
While Section 1658 does not apply to Section 1983
claims by its own force, Section 1988 does not require
that a federal statute be directly applicable. Indeed,
the premise of the inquiry under Section 1988 is that
there is no such directly applicable federal statute.
Rather, Section 1988 directs courts to survey federal
law more broadly to determine whether a “suitable”
limitations period exists. And Section 1658 qualifies
as a “suitable” federal provision because it represents
Congress’ determination of the appropriate balance
between providing federal plaintiffs sufficient time to
bring their claims and ensuring that all claims are
brought in a timely manner. See Joseph E. Worcester,
A Dictionary of the English Language 1444 (1860) (defining “suitable” as “[f]itting; fit; meet; conformable;
24
proper; appropriate; becoming; agreeable; answerable; convenient”).4
As Judge Ho suggested at oral argument in the
court below, relying on Section 1658 would be the
“more textual” approach to determining the appropriate statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims.
Judge Ho observed that “replacing the state by state
strangeness with a uniform four year [limitations period]” would “seem[] to be more textual” than the
current regime. Oral Argument, supra, at 15:30–
16:58. As such, he recognized this case provides a vehicle for “the Supreme Court to get back to the text”
of Sections 1988 and 1658. Id. at 12:56–13:00.
While federal courts currently employ a state-law
borrowing regime based on steps two and three of Section 1988, the Court has always recognized that
borrowing state law is an imperfect, second-best solution. As the Court has noted, “Congress surely did not
intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and
characterizing the essential elements of a federal
cause of action.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269. The state4 Under the current system, state limitations periods do not ap-
ply to Section 1983 claims by their own terms either. Wilson, 471
U.S. at 269 (“Even when principles of state law are borrowed to
assist in the enforcement of this federal remedy, the state rule is
adopted as a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired.” (cleaned up)). Instead, they only apply
because, before the enactment of Section 1658, they provided
what this Court determined to be one “suitable,” albeit imperfect,
limitations period under Section 1988’s and Burnett’s framework. But now, Section 1658 provides a far more “suitable”
period.
25
borrowing scheme is a particularly odd fit for Section
1983 actions given that Section 1983 provides “‘a
uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the
claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by
the Constitution and laws of the Nation,” and operates
to “override certain kinds of state laws.’” Id. at 271–
72 (citations omitted); see also Kimberly Norwood, 28
U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitation Period with Real Limitations, 69 Ind. L.J. 477, 513–14 (1994) (“If . . . the
ineffectiveness of state law was the reason for § 1983’s
enactment, there is little logic in allowing state law to
govern how long the federal claim should survive.”).
In other words, the state-borrowing scheme empowers
states to unduly restrict the sweep of Section 1983—
the federal cause of action that itself serves as a check
on state officials’ exercise of their authority.
The years since Burnett, Wilson, and Owens have
demonstrated that the state-borrowing scheme is a
poor fit for Section 1983 claims. Federal courts initially struggled to determine the proper state-law
analogue for Section 1983 claims. See Owens, 488 U.S.
at 241–42. While Owens curbed some of the chaos by
instructing that a state’s residual statute of limitations periods governing personal injury actions
controls, see id. at 245–48, it maintained a system in
which access to Section 1983 varies from state to
state.
This Court has previously stressed the virtue of
the uniform application of federal law—including in
the Section 1983 context—stating that “the federal interest in uniformity and the interest in having ‘firmly
defined, easily applied rules,’ support the conclusion
that Congress intended the characterization of § 1983
26
to be measured by federal rather than state standards.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 270; see also Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944) (“It
is, of course, true that uniform operation of a federal
law is a desirable end, and other things being equal,
we often have interpreted statutes to achieve it.”) (collecting cases).
Applying Section 1658 as the appropriate reference point would ensure federal uniformity. And in
light of Section 1658, courts are no longer forced to
perpetuate an imperfect regime in which citizens in
Maine and North Dakota have six years to vindicate
their federal rights under Section 1983 while citizens
in Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico
have only one year. Similarly, Plaintiffs (and defendants) would no longer be forced to navigate the
differences and complexity of state law to determine
what statute of limitations applies to their federal
claims, including determining whether their state has
a single or multiple personal injury limitations periods. The four-year residual limitations period that
Congress provided in Section 1658 enhances predictability—“a primary goal of statutes of limitations,”
Owens, 488 U.S. at 240—while maintaining the national interest in the uniform application of federal
law.
Despite Section 1658’s status as a “suitable” federal solution under Section 1988, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that it could not apply Section 1658 to Section 1983 claims without further direction from this
Court. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, under Burnett and Owens, it was bound to continue applying the
state-law borrowing framework because Burnett (decided before the enactment of Section 1658) “held that,
27
at Step One, federal law does not provide a statute of
limitations for Section 1983 claims.” App. 5a. Until
this Court clarifies that Section 1658 now provides a
“suitable” federal rule of decision for Section 1983
claims, the outdated interpretation of Section 1988
will continue to control across the Nation.
At a minimum, Section 1658 provides an alternative that courts can apply where a state’s residual
period fails the third step of Section 1988 because it is
“‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.’” Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1988). Where, as here, a state’s residual personal injury limitations period is either practically too
short or discriminatory, courts need to find a more
suitable alternative. Rather than search for yet another state limitations period, the answer is clear:
Section 1658.
As explained above, one year does not provide federal plaintiffs with sufficient time to vindicate their
federal rights—especially for a claim at the core of
Section 1983 like Mr. Brown’s. As a result, after analyzing Section 1988 under Burnett and Owens, a court
would still be left without a limitations period to apply
to these plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims. In these circumstances, Section 1658 represents Congress’
determination of the appropriate limitations period
where federal law has not otherwise provided a statute of limitations. Section 1658 thus serves as the
correct limitations period and failsafe for plaintiffs,
who have been stymied by a restrictive state law provision, to vindicate their important federal civil
rights.
28
III. The Application of Fifty Different State
Statutes of Limitations Creates a Lack of
Uniformity and Inequal Access to Federal
Civil Rights Claims.
The Court should grant review because all fifty
states (and federal territories) are effectively split
about the appropriate statute of limitations for federal
civil rights claims. Louisiana’s current one-year residual personal injury statute of limitations exposes the
reality that, under Owens, federal civil rights plaintiffs are afforded different access to a federal remedy
for federal rights violations based solely on where they
live. The current one-year period in Louisiana is tied
for the shortest in the Nation. See also Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 413.140 (2021); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-3-104
(2021); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2). These limitations periods are a stark outlier from the nationwide
median of three years, and mode of two years. See
App. 44a–48a. If Mr. Brown had been attacked in almost any other state, he would have been given the
opportunity to litigate his federal civil rights claim.
This lack of uniformity in the application of a federal remedy for the infringement of federal rights can
only be corrected by this Court. For no reason other
than geography, federal civil rights plaintiffs in the
outlier states face an unreasonably short limitations
period that effectively thwarts their ability to bring
meritorious Section 1983 claims. That is true even
though these plaintiffs face the same practical hurdles
to bring their claims as their counterparts in nearly
every other state.
There is no good reason that plaintiffs’ access to a
foundational federal cause of action should turn on
29
the benevolence of their state legislatures. See Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 367 (“State
legislatures do not devise their limitations periods
with national interests in mind.”). As the Court has
explained, “[t]he high purposes of [Section 1983] make
it appropriate to accord the statute ‘a sweep as broad
as its language.’” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272 (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). Indeed, it was designed to “override certain kinds of
state laws”—not be constrained by them. Id. Instead
of continuing to perpetuate the unjust and unnecessary split, the Court can use this case as a vehicle to
recognize that federal law now provides a more “suitable” uniform statute of limitations for Section 1983
claims under Section 1658.
At minimum, all federal civil rights plaintiffs—regardless of geography—are entitled to a reasonably
sufficient time to bring their claims. As almost all
states have recognized, two years is the bare minimum necessary for such claims. While states can
choose to provide longer limitations period, they must
at least provide a limitations period that satisfies the
threshold federal interests underlying Section 1983.
Louisiana cannot escape this requirement by extending the statute of limitations for some classes of
citizens while leaving others, like Mr. Brown, without
any recourse to vindicate their federal civil rights
claims. By granting review here, the Court can ensure
the availability of Section 1983 to all Americans by
recognizing a two-year floor beneath which outlier
states may not curtail their residents’ federal civil
rights.
30
IV. This Case Provides an Excellent Vehicle to
Resolve Important Questions That This
Court Will Have Limited Opportunities to
Hear.
Mr. Brown’s petition is an ideal vehicle to address
the questions presented. The applicability of the oneyear statute of limitations was the only issue raised in
Mr. Brown’s case and presented on appeal. There
were no separate grounds to dismiss his claim. Moreover, there is not even a dispute as to the underlying
facts now that both Defendants have since pleaded
guilty to federal criminal charges arising from this attack. Plea Agreement, United States v. Grant, No.
5:23-cr-00207-SMH-MLH (W.D. La. Sept. 5, 2023),
ECF 9; Plea Agreement, United States v. Pouncy, No.
5:23-cr-00210-SMH-MLH (W.D. La. April 10, 2024),
ECF 27. Mr. Brown has been unable to pursue his
claim for damages solely because his claim is subject
to Louisiana’s outlier statute of limitations. This case
therefore leaves no doubt that meritorious Section
1983 claims are squeezed out under a one-year limitations period.
This case is also a clean vehicle to review the applicability of Section 1658. The question of Section
1658’s reach was clearly presented to and considered
by the district court and Fifth Circuit. See Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant at 31-35, Brown v. Pouncy, No. 2230691 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023), ECF 24–1. As Judge
Ho observed at oral argument, Section 1658 is the
“more textual” answer to Section 1988’s framework.
Oral Argument, supra, at 15:30–16:58. But only the
Supreme Court can provide that solution. App. 15a.
31
Critically, the Court is unlikely to have many additional opportunities to address these questions.
Because state law currently controls, only plaintiffs
hailing from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico
can bring challenges to the viability of a one-year residual personal injury statute of limitations as applied
to their Section 1983 claims. As such, only the First
and Sixth Circuits could even have a future opportunity to consider whether a one-year period is
consistent with the federal interests underpinning
Section 1983.
Even if the other Circuits confront Owens’ open
question, they may very well encounter the same challenge the Fifth Circuit faced where it recognized that
the state law in question creates practical challenges
for federal plaintiffs but concluded that “[o]nly the Supreme Court . . . can clarify how lower courts should
evaluate practical frustration without undermining
[Owens’] solution.” App. 15a. As a result, it is exceedingly unlikely that the courts of appeals will ever
disagree about Owens’ open question—even though
this Court has expressed skepticism that a one-year
limitations period can satisfactorily promote the federal interests underpinning Section 1983. See Owens,
488 U.S. at 251 n.13.
To be clear, the fact that the issue raised by Mr.
Brown is unlikely to present itself in another cert-worthy vehicle does not diminish the importance of the
issue at stake. Currently, more than 16 million citizens in Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto
Rico are uniquely disadvantaged in their ability to litigate their meritorious federal civil rights claims.
With the opinion below serving as binding precedent
in the Fifth Circuit and persuasive authority in the
32
First and Sixth Circuits, it is unlikely that future
plaintiffs will be able to mount successful challenges
to the outlier statutes of limitations absent this
Court’s intervention.
For these reasons, Mr. Brown’s case presents a
rare opportunity to resolve the question left open in
Owens and to address whether Section 1658 supplies
a more appropriate limitations period for Section 1983
claims. This Court can ensure that all federal civil
rights victims, regardless of state, are guaranteed access to Section 1983’s “uniquely federal remedy.”
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
David D. Cole
Lauren Willard Zehmer
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES Counsel of Record
Michael X. Imbroscio
UNION FOUNDATION
915 Fifteenth Street, NW Sameer Aggarwal
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
Washington, DC 20005
850 Tenth Street, NW
Nora Ahmed
Washington, DC 20001
ACLU FOUNDATION OF
(202) 662-6000
LOUISIANA
lzehmer@cov.com
1340 Poydras Street
Suite 2160
Caleb M. W. Ellis
New Orleans, LA 70112
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018
Counsel for Petitioner
June 18, 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.