Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Doug Smith, et al., Petitioners v. Richard Stillie, Jr., in His Official Capacity as Chair, Alaska Public Offices Commission, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 13, 2024

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. _________

IN THE

___________

DOUG SMITH, ROBERT GRIFFIN, ALLEN VEZEY, ALBERT

HAYNES, TREVOR SHAW, FAMILIES OF THE LAST

FRONTIER, AND ALASKA FREE MARKET COALITION,

PETITIONERS,

RICHARD STILLIE, JR., SUZANNE HANCOCK, ERIC

FEIGE, LANETTE BLODGETT, AND DAN LASOTA, in their

official capacities as members of the Alaska Public

Offices Commission,

RESPONDENTS.

___________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

__________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

Craig W. Richards

Law Offices of

Craig Richards

810 N Street, Ste. 100

Anchorage, Alaska

99501

crichards@alaska

professionalservices.com

June 13, 2024

Jacob Huebert

Counsel of Record

Reilly Stephens

LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER

13341 W. U.S. Highway 290

Building 2

Austin, Texas 78737

512-481-4400

jhuebert@ljc.org

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does Alaska’s requirement that individual donors

file duplicative reports of their political

contributions within 24 hours of making them—on

pain of thousands of dollars in fines—violate the

First Amendment?

2. Do

Alaska’s

extensive

on-ad

disclosure

requirements, which monopolize a majority of a

given advertisement with government-mandated

messages including the public naming of individual

donors, violate the First Amendment?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners, Doug Smith, Robert Griffin, Allen

Vezey, Albert Haynes, and Trevor Shaw are natural

persons and residents of the state of Alaska.

Petitioners Families Of The Last Frontier and

Alaska Free Market Coalition are independent

expenditure committees registered in Alaska who

raise and spend money in Alaska elections.

Respondents Richard Stillie Jr., Suzanne Hancock,

Eric Feige, Lanette Blodgett, and Dan Lasota are

natural persons and members of Alaska Public Offices

Commission.1

Intervenor-Defendant Respondent Alaskans For

Better Elections, Inc. is a nonprofit advocacy group

that sponsored the challenged ballot measure.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioners Doug Smith, Robert Griffin, Allen

Vezey, Albert Haynes, and Trevor Shaw are natural

persons for whom no corporate disclosure is required

under Rule 29.6.

Petitioners Families Of The Last Frontier and

Alaska Free Market Coalition are independent

expenditure committees who do not issue stock or have

any parent or subsidiary entitles.

1 Respondents Eric Feige and Lanette Blodgett are substituted

for previous official capacity Respondents Anne Helzer and Van

Lawrence, who served on the Commission when the case was

pending below. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

The proceedings in other courts that are directly

related to this case are:

• Smith v. Helzer, 22-35612, United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judgment

entered March 15, 2023.

• Smith v. Helzer, No. No. 3:22-cv-00077-SLG,

United States District Court for the District of

Alaska. Order denying preliminary injunction

entered July 14, 2022.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED....................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................ ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .......................................... ii

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ....................iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vi

INTRODUCTION........................................................ 1

OPINIONS BELOW.................................................... 2

JURISDICTION .......................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ............... 2

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ....................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................. 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................... 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 8

I. The decision below creates a division of

authority among the circuits as to both the

donor disclosure and duplicative reporting

requirements. ........................................................ 8

II. Ballot Measure 2’s Duplicative Donation is

not narrowly tailored. ...................................... 10

III. Ballot Measure 2’s on-air disclaimer

requirements are compelled speech and

should be subject to strict scrutiny. ............. 18

CONCLUSION........................................................... 30

APPENDIX

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, Opinion, March 15, 2024

.......................................................................... App. 1

United States District Court for the District of

Alaska, Order, July 14, 2022

........................................................................ App. 57

Alaska’s Better Elections Initiative Prohibiting

the Use of Dark Money

...................................................................... App. 102

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004)

....................................................................................24

Am. Bev. Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749

(9th Cir. 2019) ...................................................... 7, 26

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 41 S.

Ct. 2373 (2021)......................................... 6, 12, 16, 24

Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.

Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) ...................................20

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ..................... 16, 30

Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v.

Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) ...............15

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) ........ 7, 30

Delaware Strong Families v. Attorney General of

Delaware, 793 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2015) ...................10

Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) ................................25

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238

(1986) .........................................................................13

FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 142 S. Ct. 1638 (2022) ...6

Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2014) ....22

Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 79 (1st Cir. 2021)

......................................................................................9

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) ..................30

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of

Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) ............................ 18, 21, 22

Indep. Inst. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 216 F. Supp. 3d

176 (D.D.C. 2016) .....................................................10

Indep. Inst. v. Williams, 812 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2016)

......................................................................................9

Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d

576 (8th Cir. 2013)....................................................10

Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004) ...........28

vii

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) ........... 12, 23

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334

(1995) ............................................................ 22, 23, 24

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.

241 (1974) ..................................................................21

Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson,

692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012) ....................................10

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ..................16

Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights, Inc. v. Mangan, 933 F.3d

1102 (9th Cir. 2019)............................................. 7, 16

National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.

Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)..... 7, 18, 19

Nordstrom v. Lyon, 35 A.3d 710, 716 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 2012) .........................................................14

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of

California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) ...................................20

Peltz-Steele v. Umass Faculty Fed'n, 60 F.4th 1 (1st

Cir. 2023) .....................................................................2

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205

(D.C. Cir. 2012) .........................................................26

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155 (2015)

................................................................................ 7,19

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) .....20

Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc.,

547 U.S. 47 (2006) ....................................................18

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) .....................21

Thompson v. Hebdon, 7 F.4th 811 (9th Cir. 2021)

............................................................................... 8, 28

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)

....................................................................................19

Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016)......8

Vote Choice v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993) ..24

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624

(1943) .........................................................................18

viii

Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019)

....................................................................................22

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) ...................18

Wyo. Gun Owners v. Gray, 83 F.4th 1224 (10th Cir.

2023) ............................................................................9

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .............................................................2

AS § 15.13.040 ................................................. 10, 15, 18

AS § 15.13.090 ..............................................................23

AS § 15.13.110 ....................................................... 11, 17

AS § 15.13.135 ..............................................................23

INTRODUCTION

Speech about elections, candidates, and issues lies

at the core of the First Amendment’s protection for the

marketplace of ideas. For that reason, any attempt by

the government to stifle or control such speech

deserves the strongest judicial scrutiny. This is a

burden Alaska’s Ballot Measure 2 cannot survive.

Ballot Measure 2, passed in November 2020, places

unprecedented burdens on citizens’ right to speak

about matters of public concern. The law requires that

donors to political campaigns redundantly report

contributions—within 24 hours of making them—to

avoid incurring thousands of dollars in fines. It

demands that speakers fill their advertisements with

extensive disclaimers for huge portions of their run

time, converting such ads from communications about

candidates to communications about the speaker’s

contributors.

This law is an outlier among all state and federal

campaign finance rules. It is not narrowly tailored; it

discourages everyday citizens from participating in

the public square, commandeers more of an

advertisement’s space with compelled speech, and

imposes substantial costs on speakers in exchange for

marginal information gains. And the Ninth Circuit’s

decision upholding the law is also an outlier,

inconsistent with rulings from at least the Eighth,

Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.

This Court should grant this Petition, resolve the

inconsistent rulings among different circuits, and hold

that Alaska’s regime cannot withstand First

Amendment scrutiny.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit is reported at Smith v. Helzer, 95

F.4th 1207 (9th Cir. 2024), and reproduced at App. 1.

The opinion of the United States District Court for

the District of Alaska is reported at Smith v. Helzer,

614 F. Supp. 3d 668(D. Alaska 2022) reproduced at

App. 57.

JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit issued its opinion and judgment

on March 15, 2024. This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Ballot Measure 2, including the challenged

provisions of Alaska law, is included in the Petitioner

Appendix beginning at App. 102 et seq.

The First Amendment provides that “Congress

shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech . . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress, except

that in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In November 2020, Alaska voters approved Ballot

Measure 2, the most sweeping overhaul of election

procedures in the State’s history, and the most speechrestrictive state campaign finance law in the country.

Petitioners challenge two aspects of the scheme to

ensure their rights in advance of this November’s

crucial elections.

First, Ballot Measure 2 requires donor disclosure,

not only by the political committees and other groups

that receive them, but also simultaneously by the

donors themselves. Section 7 provides that anyone

who contributes as little as $2,000 in the aggregate in

a calendar year to any group that makes independent

expenditures or is “likely to make independent

expenditures” in the current election cycle, must

themselves file a report with the commission within 24

hours of the donation. App. 108. Under Section 15,

anyone who neglects to file this immediate disclosure

is subject to civil fines of up to $1,000 per day, whether

the oversight is intentional or out of ignorance—

notwithstanding state law’s requirement that

recipient independent expenditure groups also report

the contributions themselves. App. 113.

Second, Ballot Measure 2 imposes multiple

extensive disclaimer requirements on political

advertising. Under Section 11, television and internet

advertisements must include, for the entirety of the

ad, a disclaimer detailing (1) the individual or entity

who paid for the ad along with the funder’s city and

state of principal place of business and (2) the name

and city and state of residence of the three largest

contributors to the speaker. App. 110. Section 12 also

requires that any ad funded with out-of-state

donations state on screen, in all capital letters, for its

entirety:

A MAJORITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO

(OUTSIDE-FUNDED

ENTITY’S

NAME)

CAME FROM OUTSIDE THE STATE OF

ALASKA.

App. 111.

A third pillar of Ballot Measure 2, which

Petitioners challenge below but do not seek relief from

in this preliminary appeal, is the “true source”

requirement. This provision requires that each donor

to an independent expenditure group report the “true

source” of the donated funds, which the law defines as

the individual person or corporation that earned the

funds. App. 108.

For instance, if the Alaska Chamber of Commerce

donated $5,000 to an independent expenditure entity

supporting Governor Dunleavy’s reelection, the

Chamber would have to report that contribution

within 24 hours—and its report would have to include

not only the date and amount of its donation, but also

a list of the Chamber’s own donors. If one of those

donors was also an association rather than a

corporation—say, the Alaska Realtors Association—

then the state chamber would have to somehow obtain

a list of the Realtors Association’s donors. And if the

Realtors Association’s donors, in turn, included a local

realtors association, then the Chamber would have to

include a list of that organization’s members—and so

on, all the way back to the so-called “true source,”

meaning the original person or corporation who earned

the funds eventually donated. Alaska is the only state

in the nation that demands this level of disclosure,

wherein the genealogy of every dollar is reported.

Petitioners are individuals and organizations

subject to Ballot Measure 2. Two plaintiffs are

independent expenditure groups—Families of the Last

Frontier and the Alaska Free Market Coalition. As

such, they will be responsible for complying with the

disclaimer requirements of Ballot Measure 2. The

other plaintiffs are individual donors with proven

track records of supporting independent expenditure

groups and

other political and

charitable

organizations at levels greater than $2,000 in a

calendar year. As such, they will be subject to the

disclosure requirements and their names may be

included among the top three donors required in the

disclaimer requirement.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint challenging the

various aspects of Ballot Measure 2 in April 2022, and

sought a preliminary injunction ahead of the 2022

election. The District Court denied Plaintiffs’

preliminary injunction motion, finding that Plaintiffs

had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the

merits of their claim, at which point Plaintiffs

instituted this interlocutory appeal. App. 101. The

Ninth Circuit heard argument, and then later stayed

the case pending the outcome of a case challenging a

similar on-ad disclosure regime from San Francisco.

The Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the San

Francisco scheme, and a Petition for Certiorari

seeking review of that decision is currently pending

before this Court. No on E v. Chiu, No. 23-926.

The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district

court, finding that Ballot Measure 2’s impositions on

speech were subject to only exactly scrutiny, and under

that standard upheld both the duplicative contributing

reporting and on-air donor disclosures as insufficiently

burdensome and sufficiently tailored. App. 26.

Petitioners now ask this court to review that decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court has repeatedly criticized the

“prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach” that typifies

much of campaign finance law. FEC v. Ted Cruz for

Senate, 142 S. Ct. 1638, 1652 (2022). This is the

approach Alaska takes here, requiring individual and

organizational donors to report their donations to

independent expenditure entities within 24 hours,

even as the entities themselves must also report those

same donations. This duplicative, audit-andaccounting mindset failed exacting scrutiny in

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 41 S.

Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021). The State argues it is necessary

to discover secondary donors (itself a constitutional

problem), but this is not narrowly tailored as to most

donors.

Not only must individual donors report their

contributions to independent expenditure committees

within 24 hours, but also they must report with similar

promptitude their donations to any group that has

made independent expenditures in the past two years,

or that the donor thinks is likely to do so in the future.

This is utterly unfair to donors: “The First Amendment

does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a

campaign finance attorney . . . .” Citizens United v.

FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010). Moreover, disclosure

requirements must be “tied with precision to specific

election periods” and “carefully tailored to pertinent

circumstances.” Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights, Inc. v.

Mangan, 933 F.3d 1102, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2019). These

requirements are not tied with precision or carefully

tailored; instead, they invade the privacy of non-profit

groups without justification.

If the onerous reporting were not enough, the State

of Alaska precisely prescribes in statute exactly what

an independent expenditure entity must say in its

television ads. This is literally a “a governmentscripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement.”

National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.

Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2377 (2018). Because it is

compelled, content-altering speech, strict scrutiny

applies. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163,

165 (2015). The Ninth Circuit erred when it found that

exacting, rather than strict, scrutiny applies to the

compelled speech requirements.

And even if only exacting scrutiny applies to the onad donor-disclaimer requirements, they constitute a

tremendous burden on speakers, consuming a

substantial portion of the ad. The minor gain in the

convenience of information for voters is not narrowly

tailored to the significant burden on speakers. See Am.

Bev. Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 754

(9th Cir. 2019). And what’s more, the out-of-state

disclaimer not only has all the failings of the top-donor

disclaimer, but also unconstitutionally discriminates

against out-of-state speakers. Thompson v. Hebdon, 7

F.4th 811, 824 (9th Cir. 2021).

These decisions are wrong and conflict with

decisions of other circuits. This Court should therefore

grant the petition and resolve these questions once

and for all.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision below creates a division of

authority among the circuits as to both the

donor disclosure and duplicative reporting

requirements.

The Ninth Circuit’s rulings below are in conflict

with other Circuits as to both the compelled disclosure

requirements and the requirement that donors make

redundant, unnecessary reports of their donations.

First, as to the donor disclosure, in Van Hollen v.

FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the D.C.

Circuit rejected a claim that FEC regulations should

require the sort of on-air ad disclaimer that Alaska

requires, agreeing with the FEC—and Petitioners—

that because “some individuals who contribute to a

union or corporation’s general treasury may not

support that entity’s electioneering communications,”

the sort of “robust disclosure rule” Alaska employs

“would thus mislead voters as to who really supports

the communications.” The court explained:

Imagine the following not unlikely scenario. A

Republican donates $5,000 to the American

Cancer Society (ACS), eager to fund the ongoing

search for a cure. Meanwhile, Republicans in

Congress, aware of a growth in private

donations to ACS, push for fewer federal grants

to scientists studying cancer in order to reduce

the deficit. In response to their push, the ACS

runs targeted advertisements against those

Republicans, leading to the defeat of several

candidates in the upcoming election. Wouldn’t

a rule requiring disclosure of ACS’s Republican

donor, who did not support issue ads against

her own party, convey some misinformation to

the public about who supported the

advertisements?

Id. This is precisely the argument—intuitive as

Petitioners and the D.C. Circuit both find it—that the

Ninth Circuit rejected below.

The Tenth Circuit likewise recently struck down

Wyoming’s donor disclosure rules as applied to an

independent expenditure group under exacting

scrutiny. Wyo. Gun Owners v. Gray, 83 F.4th 1224,

1250 (10th Cir. 2023); Cf. Indep. Inst. v. Williams, 812

F.3d 787, 797 & n.12 (10th Cir. 2016) (upholding

disclosure where the speaker “need[ed] only disclose

those donors who have specifically earmarked their

contributions for electioneering purposes.”).

These disclosure regimes are proliferating—the

question of their constitutionality arises again and

again, and will not go away. See, e.g., Gaspee Project v.

Mederos, 13 F.4th 79 (1st Cir. 2021) (upholding Rhode

Island’s disclosure requirement); Delaware Strong

Families v. Attorney General of Delaware, 793 F.3d 304

(3d Cir. 2015) (upholding Delaware’s); Indep. Inst. v.

Fed. Election Comm’n, 216 F. Supp. 3d 176, 191

(D.D.C. 2016), aff ’d, 580 U.S. 1157 (2017) (three-judge

panel upheld mandatory disclosure of donors where

the donation was “for the specific purpose of

supporting the advertisement”). This Court should

resolve the issue sooner rather than later.

The Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of Alaska’s

duplicative reporting requirements is likewise in

conflict with decisions of other courts. Indeed, one of

the cases on which the Ninth Circuit expressly relied,

App. 19, in fact holds to the contrary: in Iowa Right to

Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker, the Eighth Circuit

struck down Iowa’s requirement that groups file

redundant

and

duplicative

reports

unconstitutionally burdensome. 717 F.3d 576, 597 (8th

Cir. 2013); see also Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life,

Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2012)

(striking down Minnesota’s regime as overly

burdensome).

This Court should grant the petition, and resolve

these important questions that have created disparate

outcomes below.

II. Ballot Measure 2’s Duplicative Disclosure is

not narrowly tailored.

Ballot Measure 2 requires donors to independent

expenditure groups to report donations to the Alaska

Public Offices Commission within 24 hours—even

though the law already requires the recipients of such

donations to report exactly the same information. §

15.13.040(r) (donors) & (d) (recipients). The Ninth

Circuit and the parties agree that this disclosure

requirement is subject to exacting scrutiny. App. 11.

Ballot Measure 2’s requirement of near-instantaneous

duplicative reporting fails exacting scrutiny because it

is not narrowly tailored, especially given the burden it

places on donors.

Before Ballot Measure 2, Alaska law already

required independent expenditure entities to promptly

report their donors. AS § 15.13.110(a)-(b). Ballot

Measure 2 extends that reporting requirement to

donors. The Respondents offered only one reason for

this below: that only the donor knows, or can discover,

the “true source” of the donation. In other words, if the

Alaska Chamber receives money from the Anchorage

Chamber, only the Anchorage Chamber knows its

members that it must now report as the true sources

of its funds.

But this is not narrowly tailored. Petitioner donors

are all individuals who are themselves always the true

source of their donations. It would be an illegal straw

donation for an individual to accept funds from

someone else and give it in their name, 2 AAC

50.258(a), and no one would report to Respondents

that they are breaking the law. Moreover, all

independent expenditure donations by corporations

that earned the funds donated are the “true source” of

their own donations; again, it would be an illegal straw

donation for a corporation to accept funds from

someone else and then donate those funds in their own

name. 2 AAC 50.258(a). Finally, many organizations

that do not themselves earn income nevertheless

report publicly their donors to other public authorities,

such as the Alaska Public Offices Commission, the

Internal Revenue Service, or the Federal Election

Commission (for instance, a 527 entity or a federal

campaign or political action committee).

In each of these three ways, the State could have

crafted a more narrowly tailored statute that still

would have served the State’s asserted purpose of

discovering “true sources” without burdening

everyday Americans. Indeed, even the District Court

acknowledged that “the donor disclosure requirement

in Section 7 overlaps with, but is not completely

duplicative of, the reporting requirements for

independent expenditure entities.” App. 75. This

marginal amount of additional information does not

justify Alaska casting “a dragnet for sensitive donor

information . . . even though that information will

become relevant in only a small number of cases.”

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S.

Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021).

That overlap, where individuals, corporations, and

registered political committees are reporting

information that adds nothing new beyond what the

recipient is already reporting, is proof of that lack of

narrow tailoring. Alaska “is not free to enforce any

disclosure regime that furthers its interests. It must

instead demonstrate its need for universal production

in light of any less intrusive alternatives.” AFPF, 141

S. Ct. at 2386. It cannot make such a demonstration

here: the less intrusive alternative is obvious, but was

not the law the State enacted.

Both courts below dismissed Petitioners’ reliance

on the McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)

“‘prophylaxis-upon- prophylaxis’ analysis,” on the

theory that McCutcheon addressed limits on

contributions and expenditures, whereas this case

addresses disclosure. App. 16, 77. This is a legal error.

McCutcheon did concern a different type of campaignfinance rule, but its discussion of prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis bears on the nature of the exacting

scrutiny test. The point of this portion of McCutheon,

readopted in Cruz, is that a law is not narrowly

tailored when it layers safeguard atop safeguard,

whatever the underlying problem being guarded

against. Here, requiring duplicative reporting from

everybody when the informational gain is quite

narrow is a layering approach that fails exacting

scrutiny.

Meanwhile, the burden on everyday Americans is

great. Filing requirements that are onerous and

unduly burdensome are unconstitutional. FEC v.

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254

(1986) (plurality) (when a law imposes “[d]etailed

record-keeping and disclosure obligations” and other

“administrative costs that many small entities may be

unable to bear,” it is unconstitutional). Under Ballot

Measure 2, anyone donating as little as $2,000 must

meet the sort of compliance burdens typically reserved

for sophisticated parties who have the expertise—and

the lawyers—to ensure they are following the rules.

“The average citizen cannot be expected to master on

his or her own the many campaign financial-disclosure

requirements set forth” by Ballot Measure 2. Sampson

v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1259 (10th Cir. 2010). “The

First Amendment does not permit laws that force

speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney . . . ”

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010).

Everyday citizens who make modest donations face

three burdens. First, they must know whether the

group they are supporting is engaged in independent

expenditures. Of course the recipient entity knows if it

is engaged in independent expenditures; it is subject

to a bevy of rules if so. See AS Ch. 15. But there is no

reason a businessman who decides to donate $2,000 to

the Alaska Chamber of Commerce would necessarily

know whether the Chamber is or is not actively

sponsoring independent expenditure advertisements

at the moment. And if the Chamber sends him a

thank-you letter with a note to make sure to file his

APOC report, it will arrive after the 24-hour period,

too late to prevent him from violating the law.

Second, even if the donor knows the recipient is

engaged in an independent expenditure, he must also

know of his obligation to report his donation. Anyone

familiar with Alaska’s previous campaign-finance

rules, the laws of other states, and the rules for federal

campaigns would assume that the recipient entity is

the only one obligated to report its donors.

Third, the donor who does know must suspend

whatever else he is doing and complete the required

forms within 24 hours every time he makes a donation.

Filing requirements that are counted in hours rather

than weeks or months are often reserved for the

periods shortly before an election, where regular

quarterly reporting would not serve the informational

interest in a timely way. See, e.g., Nordstrom v. Lyon,

35 A.3d 710, 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“a

48-hour reporting requirement for donations greater

than $1200 within the last thirteen days prior to an

election”). Imposing

such a

near-immediate

turnaround on everyday citizens regardless of the

proximity of the election is not narrowly tailored.

The District Court dismissed this all because the

State introduced “seven screen shots of the relevant

Statement of Contributions Form 15-5, which appears

to be a straightforward document.” App. 73. The Ninth

Circuit similarly dismissed the “reporting mechanism

[as] relatively simple and ‘straightforward.’” App. 19.

But the problem is not the complexity of document

itself; rather, the problem is the burden on the

individual donor to know about the recipient entity’s

activities, know of the requirement, and to comply

with it instantaneously—keeping in mind that most

donors are ordinary individual Americans, not

professional political operatives. “It is easy to suppose

these reporting and filing requirements are slight.

They may be so for a large enterprise. They are caredemanding and time-consuming” for a single

individual. Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E.

Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir.

2009) (Noonan, J., concurring).

Ballot Measure 2 requires both encyclopedic and

prophetic knowledge of Alaska independent

expenditure groups. Under Section 7 of Ballot Measure

2, a donor must report not only a contribution to an

active independent expenditure group, but also a

contribution to any group that has made independent

expenditures in the past two years or that she has

reason to believe is likely to do so in the future. AS §

15.13.040(r).

This is, again, not narrowly tailored for at least two

reasons. First, it is unfair to the donors. Again, a donor

should not have to hire a campaign finance attorney to

research whether the group she is supporting engaged

in an independent expenditure eighteen or more

months ago. Second, it is an unconstitutional invasion

of privacy as to the recipient groups. As this court has

repeatedly held, nonprofit organizations are entitled to

keep their donors private from the prying eyes of the

state. AFPF, 141 S. Ct. at 2382. “The government may

regulate in the First Amendment area only with

narrow specificity, and compelled disclosure regimes

are no exception. When it comes to a person’s beliefs

and associations, broad and sweeping state inquiries

into these protected areas discourage citizens from

exercising rights protected by the Constitution.” Id. at

2384 (cleaned up); See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357

U.S. 449 (1958).

Because the baseline is privacy for nonprofit

groups, narrow tailoring (or narrow specificity) to the

state interest is necessary. Here, the state interest is

knowing who funds election advocacy. Hence,

disclosure requirements must be “tied with precision”

and “carefully tailored” to actual election advocacy.

Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights, 933 F.3d at 1117-18. The

government’s only interest is in the disclosure of

dollars “that [are] unambiguously campaign related.”

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976).

The Respondents and the courts below

“acknowledge that the disclosure law ‘might sweep in

some excess information at the margins’ as it applies

to contributions made during a current election cycle

to an entity that has not made any expenditures in the

current cycle, but did make them in the past cycle.”

App. 77. The District Court found such excess does not

violate narrow tailoring because “requiring the

disclosure of donations made to independent

expenditure entities in the previous election cycle and

[to entities that] are likely to make independent

expenditures in the current election cycle helps ensure

that voters will promptly have access to complete

information regarding the source of independent

expenditures in advance of an election, and prevents

donors from sidestepping disclosure requirements by

strategically donating in the final stretch of an election

cycle.” App. 79. The Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that

“the

individual-donor

contribution-reporting

requirement works in concert with the recipient

independent-expenditure organizations’ disclosures to

the Commission, helping to ensure that the

information received by voters is reliable and

accurate.” App. 15.

This is a phantom fear; such sidestepping is

impossible under current Alaska law. A full report is

due to APOC seven days before an election for all

activity up to three days before the due date, i.e., ten

days before the election. AS § 15.13.110(a)(2). And for

the “final stretch” after that last full report, any

contribution over $250 must be reported by the

recipient entity within 24 hours. AS § 15.13.110(b).

The requirement that donors disclose contributions

to groups that are not actively engaged in independent

expenditures places an unreasonable burden on

donors and an unconstitutional invasion of the

recipient group’s privacy. If the group chooses to

become an independent expenditure group again in

this current cycle, it will have to disclose all of its

donors who gave over $100 for the calendar year per

existing disclosure law. AS § 15.13.040(b)(2). But if it

does not become an independent expenditure entity

this cycle, either because it never intended to or

because it changes its mind, then its privacy will have

been invaded without cause. This requirement is not

narrowly tailored to election activity.

III. Ballot Measure 2’s on-air disclaimer

requirements are compelled speech and

should be subject to strict scrutiny.

Alaska’s requirement that Petitioners list their topdonor information on their advertisements is a

“government-drafted script” whose exact wording is

set by statute. National Institute of Family & Life

Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2377

(2018).

The First Amendment protects “both the right to

speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at

all.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). The

general rule is that the government may not compel a

person “to utter what is not in his mind.” W. Va. State

Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).

Compelled speech on the government’s behalf is

impermissible because it “affects the message

conveyed.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &

Bisexual Grp. Of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). Put

another way, the government violates a speaker’s First

Amendment rights by “interfer[ing] with the

[speaker’s] ability to communicate its own message.”

Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547

U.S. 47, 64 (2006).

“Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute

speech bearing a particular message are subject to the

same rigorous scrutiny” as other content-based laws.

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642

(1994). “Content-based laws—those that target speech

based

its

communicative

content—are

presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified

only if the government proves that they are narrowly

tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v.

Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). In

other words, such laws are “subject to strict scrutiny.”

Id. at 165.

This Court recently applied these settled principles

in NIFLA, which considered a California statute that

compelled clinics licensed to serve pregnant women to

post a notice about abortion rights. Unlicensed clinics

were required to post a notice that they were not

licensed to provide medical services.

The Court concluded that the required notices for

licensed clinics were compelled speech. Those clinics

had to “provide a government-drafted script about the

availability of state-sponsored services, as well as

contact information for how to obtain them.” Id. at

2371 (cleaned up). “By compelling individuals to speak

a particular message,” this requirement “alter[ed] the

content of their speech.” Id. (cleaned up). And though

the Court focused on the unlicensed clinic

requirement’s lack of tailoring, the Court

characterized this requirement as “a governmentscripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement.” Id. at

2377.

Similarly,

the

Alaska

donor

disclaimer

requirement forces Petitioners to alter their

advertisements that seek to inform or convince people

on a particularly political issue, to also encourage

viewers or listeners to consider Petitioners’ own

donors. If anything, the speech alteration here is even

more severe, for instead of merely having to post a

government-provided notice, Petitioners must change

their own speech—one third of an advertisement—to

accommodate the government’s message. Alaska’s

intrusion on speech is even more offensive to the First

Amendment because it pertains to speech about

elections—an area “integral to the operation of our

system of government,” where the First Amendment

should have “its fullest and most urgent application.”

Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,

564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011) (cleaned up).

The on-ad donor disclaimer here is content-based

and thus subject to strict scrutiny because compelled

speech is content-altering. “Mandating speech that a

speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters

the content of the speech.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind,

487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988). “Since all speech inherently

involves choices of what to say and what to leave

unsaid,” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n

of California, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (plurality), the

compelled speech requirement here harms Petitioners

in multiple ways, both restricting their ability to speak

their preferred message and forcing them to speak a

message they do not want to voice.

First, Petitioners cannot use those portions of their

advertisements that the government commandeers.

Such a feature has been recognized in other contentbased compelled speech cases as a “penalty” on speech.

For instance, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.

Tornillo, considering a statute that granted political

candidates equal space in a newspaper to reply to

criticism, the Court noted that this “compelled

printing” imposed a “penalty” on publishers, including

“the cost in printing and composing time and materials

and in taking up space that could be devoted to other

material the newspaper may have preferred to print.”

418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). Here, similarly, the

government’s speech consumes ad time that displaces

Petitioners’ preferred speech.

The requirement here also forces organizations to

speak the government’s own message. Petitioners

believe strongly in the right to privacy and would not

include their donors’ information in their

advertisements if Alaska’s law did not force them to do

so. D. Alaska Dkt. 18-6 (Shaw Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, & 9); Dkt.

21 (Strait Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5 & 7). Forcing an organization

committed to limited government and personal

freedom to announce the names of its donors in

advertisements is similar to forcing pro-life groups to

share information about abortion access. “[W]hen

dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced

upon a speaker intimately connected with the

communication advanced, the speaker’s right to

autonomy over the message is compromised.” Hurley,

515 U.S. at 576. Donors may be less likely to support

groups that appear to violate their own principles. And

listeners’ rights are harmed, too, as the government’s

interference distorts Petitioners’ message. Cf. Stanley

v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“[T]he

Constitution protects the right to receive information

and ideas.”). Rather than hearing the information the

speaker wants to convey, listeners must hear the

information the government says the speaker must

convey.

The requirement also forces Petitioners to change

the subject of their advertisements, from informing or

trying to convince listeners about a political issue to

talking about Petitioners’ donors. The government’s

forced speech about the speaker’s funding distracts the

listener from the speaker’s intended message. Wash.

Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2019)

(“many political advocates today also opt for

anonymity in hopes their arguments will be debated

on their merits rather than their makers,” or in this

instance their makers’ funders).

The compelled disclosure is no less offensive

because it compels statements of fact rather than

statement of opinion: the “general rule that the

speaker has the right to tailor the speech[] applies not

only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement,

but equally to statements of fact.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at

573. The problem is the government-mandated change

in the content of one’s speech, not whether the new

content is neutral, factual, or otherwise nonideological. Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1206

(9th Cir. 2014) (“the right against compelled speech is

not, and cannot be, restricted to ideological messages.”

Rather, “compelled statements of fact, like compelled

statements of opinion, are subject to First Amendment

scrutiny.” (cleaned up)). Thus, Alaska’s mandate is a

regulation of “pure speech”—not merely a regulation

of “the mechanics of the electoral process.” McIntyre v.

Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995).

Here is the disclaimer Alaska law now requires of

Families of the Last Frontier. On a radio ad: “Paid for

by Families of the Last Frontier, 123 Main Street,

Anchorage, Alaska 56789. This notice to voters is

required by Alaska law. We certify that this

advertisement is not authorized, paid for, or approved

by any candidate. The top contributors of Families of

the Last Frontier are Tim Smith, Sally Jones, and

Jane Doe.” AS § 15.13.090(a) & (d) and AS §

15.13.135(b)(2). And one cannot rush reading this

announcement: “[T]he . . . statements must be read in

a manner that is easily heard.” AS § 15.13.090(d).

In a television ad, the message must include a video

statement: “I am Steve Strait, president of Families of

the Last Frontier, and I approved this message.” AS §

15.13.090(a)(2)(B). On the screen there must be text

reading: “Paid for by Families of the Last Frontier, 123

Main Street, Anchorage, Alaska 56789. This notice to

voters is required by Alaska law. We certify that this

advertisement is not authorized, paid for, or approved

by any candidate. The top contributors of Families of

the Last Frontier are Tim Smith of Anchorage, Alaska,

Sally Jones of Fairbanks, Alaska, and Jane Doe of

Wasilla, Alaska. A MAJORITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS

TO FAMILIES OF THE LAST FRONTIER CAME

FROM OUTSIDE THE STATE OF ALASKA.” AS §

15.13.090(a), (c), & (g) and AS § 15.13.135(b)(2). The

statement must be “easily discernible” and must

“remain onscreen throughout the entirety of the

communication.” AS § 15.13.090(c) & (g).

As a matter of precedent, “[t]he simple interest in

providing voters with additional relevant information

does not justify a state requirement that a writer make

statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit,”

so the government’s “informational interest is plainly

insufficient.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49.

Second, all the information conveyed by the on-ad

donor disclaimer is already available to the public

under the law’s other provisions, “at the click of a

mouse.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 224. Narrow

tailoring requires more than a marginal gain in

convenience or efficiency. California made the same

type of argument trying to survive exacting scrutiny in

AFPF: “the up-front collection of Schedule B

information improves the efficiency and efficacy of the

Attorney General’s important regulatory efforts.” 141

S. Ct. at 2385. California said other measures, such as

subpoenas or audit letters for specific investigations,

“are inefficient and ineffective compared to up-front

collection” of information. Id. at 2386. This Court

rejected this rationale, saying “the prime objective of

the First Amendment is not efficiency.” Id. at 2387.

Once again, Alaska’s law is prophylaxis-atopprophylaxis. Not content to make this information

available to voters on the Internet, we must now beam

it into their homes and force them receive it.

Third, the on-ad sponsor disclaimer (the name of

the independent expenditure committee) alone easily

satisfies any informational interest that might exist.

Who sponsored the ad “will signify more about the

candidate’s loyalties than the disclosed identity of an

individual contributor will ordinarily convey.” Vote

Choice v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1993). “That

a certain, unknown individual supplied the [funds]

involved in producing a given communication ‘adds

little, if anything, to the reader’s ability to evaluate the

document.’” ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 994

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-49).

Indeed, conveying the top-three donors on the ad may

decrease viewers’ information by giving them a

distorted view of the organization’s overall donors.

Fourth, the State’s claim lacks any limiting

principle. If the State can require the city and state of

residence for the top three donors to be included on an

ad, why not whether they are registered as

Republicans or Democrats? That could be more useful

to voters than their names and cities—a voter in

Anchorage viewing an ad may not know who Sally

Jones of Fairbanks is but know that he likes

Democrats and opposes Republicans. Certainly Sally

Jones’s party affiliation would help him know whether

“Citizens for Alaska” is a front for Republican or

Democrat interests. Because different voters find

different information important as they consider an

advertisement, the State could serve the informational

interest Respondents have asserted by requiring

donors to “disclose all kinds of demographic

information, including the signer’s race, religion,

political affiliation, sexual orientation, ethnic

background, and interest-group memberships.” Doe v.

Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 207 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).

Or the State could require ads to include not only

donors names and cities, but also their phone numbers

or e-mail addresses to “more easily enable members of

the voting public to contact them and engage them in

discussion.” Id. The “informational interest” is not a

blank check for the State to require disclosure and now

disclaimer of any and all information it wants.

On the other side of the balance sheet, the

imposition on the speaker and donors is considerable.

First, the speaker must speak a message he does not

wish to say. The District Court discounted this, saying

[T]he burden here on independent expenditure

entities is much lower than in NIFLA, where

pro-life pregnancy crisis centers were required

to ‘inform women how they can obtain statesubsidized abortions,’ which was ‘the very

practice that [they] are devoted to opposing.’

Here, while Plaintiffs may hold broad

ideological concerns about privacy, the on-ad

top-three-donor disclaimer does not require

them to convey a message that is directly

contrary to whatever political statement they

seek to make in their electioneering

communications.

App. 89. Actually, however, the burden on Petitioners

is greater than the burden on the clinics in NIFLA:

instead of merely having to post a governmentprovided notice, Petitioners must change their own

speech to say the government’s message with their

own mouths. And it is not a court’s role to say that the

pregnancy resource centers’ opposition to abortion is

any less fervent or important than Petitioners’

opposition to government control of otherwise free

speech.

Moreover, the restriction is especially onerous

because the required disclaimers will take up a

significant portion of the advertisement. In the

commercial context, various circuits have struck down

mandatory warnings as compelled speech in situations

where the requirement was only that the “warning

occupy at least 20% of the advertisement.” Am. Bev.

Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 754 (9th

Cir. 2019); accord R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA,

696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down

tobacco warning labels that took up 20% of the

packaging). But the extensive disclaimers here cover

far more—requiring not just the names but also

identifying information for three different donors, and

on top of that the State’s all-caps warning about

donations from out-of-state, for the entirety of the ad,

commandeering even more speech than the health

warnings in those cases. This burden is even more

pronounced in a radio ad, where the names of

contributors must be read aloud. The significant

amount of space taken up by the State’s mandated

scripts exacerbates the compelled speech problem.

As with the “top three” disclaimer requirement,

this Court should also find that Ballot Measure 2’s

disclaimer requirement for out-of-state contributions

fails heightened scrutiny. Section 12 of the law

requires that any independent expenditure entity that

receives more than 50% of its aggregate contributions

from “true sources” with their principal place of

business outside Alaska must include as a part of their

speech the government authored statement: “A

MAJORITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO [THIS

GROUP] CAME FROM OUTSIDE THE STATE OF

ALASKA.” Petitioner Families of the Last Frontier has

received more than 50% of its contributions in the past

from contributors outside Alaska and alleged in the

Complaint that it intended to solicit contributions

outside Alaska in 2022. First Amend. Compl. at ¶45.

This Court should likewise find that Petitioners are

likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the

out-of-state disclaimer requirement violates the First

Amendment.

Courts routinely invalidate out-of-state campaign

contribution restrictions like Alaska’s. The Ninth

Circuit previously struck down Alaska’s nonresident

aggregate limit, which barred candidates from

accepting more than $3,000 per year from nonAlaskans. As the court there recognized, “[a]t most, the

law aim[ed] to curb perceived ‘undue influence’ of outof-state contributors—an interest that is no longer

sufficient after” this Court’s decisions in McCutcheon

and Citizens United. Thompson v. Hebdon, 7 F.4th

811, 824 (9th Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit rejected

Alaska’s asserted interest in avoiding the appearance

of undue out-of-state influence, pointing out that the

only relevant inquiry was whether the state could

show an interest in preventing actual corruption, and

that Alaska’s argument “sa[id] nothing about

corruption.” Id. Likewise, in Landell v. Sorrell, the

Second Circuit held that Vermont’s law prohibiting

candidates, political parties, and political action

committees from receiving more than twenty-five

percent of their donations from out-of-state donors

violated the First Amendment. 382 F.3d 91, 146 (2d

Cir. 2004). That court recognized “that many nonresidents have legitimate and strong interests in

Vermont and have a right to participate, at least

through speech, in those elections.” Id. at 147. The

court thus held that Vermont had “no sufficiently

important

governmental interest”

justify

“disproportionately curtailing the voices of some, while

giving others free rein, because it questions the value

of what they have to say.” Id. at 146, 148.

Section 12 impermissibly burdens the protected

speech of both donors and groups by compelling them

to speak the government’s message implying that outof-state funding is somehow suspect or disreputable.

The disclaimer serves no anti-corruption interest—the

donors to independent expenditure groups are already

disclosed to the state, and to the public on the state’s

website, so one can easily determine whether any

particular group draws its support from outside

Alaska—and rival groups can point out this supposed

foreign influence in their own speech if they think it

will matter to Alaska’s voters. Compared to this

traditional give-and-take of politics, Section 12’s

disclaimer requirement is more likely to mislead than

enlighten: including the government’s required

message will only imply that there’s something shady

about a groups funding, devoid of any context by which

voters could make a reasoned judgment.

Nor is Alaska’s supposed interest narrowly tailored

to its claimed interest. Section 19 defines “outsidefunded entity” as a group that takes donations from a

true source with a principal place of business outside

Alaska. But one’s principal place of business is a poor

proxy for one’s interest in Alaska’s elections. Indeed, a

donor could have significant operations in Alaska,

even a majority of its operations, while happening to

be headquartered elsewhere. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v.

Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (noting corporation’s

principal place of business was in New Jersey even

though its biggest market was California).

The State, through the mandated disclaimer is

telling voters which ads to listen to and which ads to

ignore based on who supported the sponsor of the ad.

This goes against the Supreme Court’s admonition

that the “the Government may commit a constitutional

wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred

speakers.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. The

Government should not “deprive[] the disadvantaged

person or class of the right to use speech to strive to

establish worth, standing, and respect for the

speaker’s voice.” Id. To permit the government to

“restrict the speech of” out-of-state supporters “to

enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign

to the First Amendment.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should

grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,