Respondents Brief — Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al., Petitioners v. Texas, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 15, 2025
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Nos. 23-1300 & 23-1312
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
AND
INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS, LLC,
Petitioners,
v.
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
__________
On Writs of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
__________
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
FASKEN LAND AND MINERALS, LTD.
__________
ALLAN KANNER
ANNEMIEKE M. TENNIS
KANNER & WHITELEY, L.L.C.
701 Camp Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 524-5777
MONICA RENEE PERALES
FASKEN LAND AND
MINERALS, LTD.
6101 Holiday Hill Road
Midland, TX 79707
(432) 687-1777
January 15, 2025
DAVID C. FREDERICK
Counsel of Record
SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH
CHRISTOPHER C. GOODNOW
MATTHEW J. WILKINS
RYAN M. FOLIO
KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,
FIGEL & FREDERICK,
P.L.L.C.
1615 M Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 326-7900
(dfrederick@kellogghansen.com)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(“NRC”) exceeded its authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by licensing a private company to
store 5,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel in the
Permian Basin.
2. Whether NRC can insulate its license grant
from judicial review under the Hobbs Act by rejecting
on the merits objections to its asserted licensing authority and denying intervenor status to indisputably
interested persons opposing that license application
before the agency.
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. is a
non-governmental corporate party with no parent
corporations. Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. is a
limited partnership organization existing under the
laws of Texas. No publicly held corporation owns
10% or more of its stock.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .......................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
STATEMENT .............................................................. 2
A. Statutory And Regulatory Background .......... 2
1. The Atomic Energy Act............................... 2
2. The government’s response to the
reprocessing industry’s collapse ................. 3
a. NRC promulgated new regulations ........ 3
b. Congress enacted the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, a comprehensive
short- and long-term storage plan
for spent nuclear fuel ............................ 5
3. The Hobbs Act ............................................. 7
B. Factual And Procedural Background .............. 8
1. The Permian Basin ..................................... 8
2. ISP’s application for a license to store
spent fuel in the Permian Basin ................ 8
3. Fasken opposed ISP’s license application............................................................... 9
4. The Fifth Circuit vacated NRC’s license
grant .......................................................... 12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 14
ARGUMENT ............................................................. 17
iv
I. NRC LACKS AUTHORITY TO LICENSE
PRIVATELY OWNED, AWAY-FROMREACTOR STORAGE FOR SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL........................................... 17
A. NRC’s Assertion Of Authority Contradicts Congress’s Comprehensive
Program For Storing Spent Nuclear
Fuel............................................................ 17
1. The NWPA creates a detailed
program for storing spent nuclear
fuel that excludes private, offsite
storage.................................................. 17
2. NRC’s asserted authority flouts
the NWPA’s Interim Storage
Program ............................................... 20
B. Petitioners Misinterpret The NWPA ....... 21
C. The AEA Does Not Authorize NRC
To License Offsite Storage For Spent
Fuel............................................................ 24
1. The AEA’s explicit provisions
concerning spent nuclear fuel do
not authorize storage licenses............. 24
2. NRC’s authority to license source,
special nuclear, and byproduct
materials does not add up to
authority to license spent fuel
storage.................................................. 26
3. Interim spent fuel storage facilities
do not satisfy the AEA’s licensing
regimes for source, special nuclear,
or byproduct materials ........................ 29
v
4. NRC’s remaining arguments about
the “other” clauses are unpersuasive ....................................................... 31
D. Petitioners’ Remaining Arguments Are
Unpersuasive ............................................ 33
1. The AEA does not implicitly authorize licensing of spent-nuclearfuel storage .......................................... 33
2. NRC’s past practice and regulations do not support its claims to
authority .............................................. 35
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAD JURISDICTION ............................................................... 37
A. Fasken Is A “Party Aggrieved” Under
The Hobbs Act ........................................... 37
1. Fasken satisfied statutory judicialreview requirements ........................... 37
2. The Fifth Circuit properly rejected
petitioners’ atextual arguments ......... 38
3. Text, precedent, and purpose confirm the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation ....................................................... 39
4. Petitioners’ remaining arguments
fail ........................................................ 42
B. Jurisdiction Exists To Review Ultra
Vires Agency Action .................................. 43
1. American courts long have exercised jurisdiction to review ultra
vires action ........................................... 43
2. The Hobbs Act does not abolish
traditional ultra vires review .............. 45
vi
3. Petitioners’ criticisms of the ultra
vires rule are unfounded ..................... 47
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 48
ADDENDUM ...................................................... Add. 1
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967) ........................................................ 44-45, 48
Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357
(11th Cir. 2002) .................................................... 39
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. ICC, 673 F.2d
82 (5th Cir. 1982)................................................. 45
AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67
(2021) .............................................................. 36-37
Baros v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 400 F.3d 228
(5th Cir. 2005)...................................................... 47
Board of Governors v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S.
32 (1991) .............................................................. 46
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) .................... 48
Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ...... 39
Comuni-Centre Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 856 F.2d
1551 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ........................................... 40
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) ...... 38
Don’t Waste Michigan v. NRC, 2023 WL 395030
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2023) .............................. 12-13, 41
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) ................... 27
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Tr. v. United States,
263 U.S. 143 (1923) ............................................. 44
FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463
(1984) ................................................................... 46
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ........................................22, 25
viii
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729 (1985) ............................................................ 41
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987) ........... 28
ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S.
270 (1987) ............................................................ 46
Idaho v. DOE, 945 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1991) ........... 2-3
Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206
(7th Cir. 1982)........................................................ 2
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) .................. 45-46
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) .................................. 39
Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) ....................... 41
Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516 (1st Cir.
1989)..................................................................... 41
Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d
911 (5th Cir. 1993) ............................................... 47
NARUC v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ...... 20
National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. FERC,
6 F.4th 1044 (9th Cir. 2021) ................................ 41
New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. NRC, 59 F.4th
1112 (10th Cir. 2023) ........................................... 13
New York v. NRC:
681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ..............................2, 26
824 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................. 5
Ohio Nuclear-Free Network v. NRC, 53 F.4th 236
(D.C. Cir. 2022) .................................................... 41
PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 588 U.S. 1 (2019) .................38, 42, 44
ix
Posadas v. National City Bank of New York,
296 U.S. 497 (1936) ............................................. 22
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024) ......... 26
Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.
1985)..................................................................... 48
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) .......... 29
Simmons v. ICC, 716 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ......... 43
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S.
557 (1919) ............................................................ 44
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011) .............. 41
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 144 S.
Ct. 1414 (2024)................................................39, 42
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) ........... 43
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) .......... 22
United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New
York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009).................................... 41
United States ex rel. Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.S.
397 (1917) ............................................................ 41
Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302
(2014) ................................................................... 33
Wales Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
1984)................................................................45, 47
Water Transp. Ass’n v. ICC, 819 F.2d 1189
(D.C. Cir. 1987) .................................................... 41
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) .... 25, 32-34
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)........ 30-31
x
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
General Elec. Co., In re:
15 N.R.C. 530, 1982 WL 43396 (Mar. 2, 1982) .........5
22 N.R.C. 851, 1985 WL 57012 (Nov. 4, 1985) .........4
Interim Storage Partners LLC, In re:
90 N.R.C. 31 (Aug. 23, 2019) ................ 8, 11-12, 37
90 N.R.C. 181 (Nov. 18, 2019) ........................ 11-12
92 N.R.C. 491 (Dec. 17, 2020) ............................. 12
2021 WL 8087739 (N.R.C. Jan. 29, 2021)........... 12
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208
(Urgent Deficiencies Act) ...................................... 7
§ 1:
38 Stat. 219-20 ................................................. 7
38 Stat. 220 ...................................................... 7
Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295,
§ 204(a), 94 Stat. 780, 787 ..................................... 3
Administrative Orders Review Act, ch. 1189,
64 Stat. 1129 (1950) (28 U.S.C. § 2341 et
seq.) (Hobbs Act) ............................... 7-8, 13-14, 16,
37-39, 41, 43-45, 48
28 U.S.C. § 2342 .............................................. 7, 45
28 U.S.C. § 2342(1)-(7) .......................................... 7
28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) ................................................ 7
28 U.S.C. § 2344 ...................................7, 16, 37, 45
28 U.S.C. § 2346 .................................................. 13
28 U.S.C. § 2348 .................................................. 39
xi
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701
et seq. ................................................................... 43
5 U.S.C. § 702 ...................................................... 43
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703,
68 Stat. 919 (42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.) ..... 2-4, 12-13,
15-16, 21-29, 32-35,
37-39, 42-43, 45, 47
Ch. 6, 68 Stat. 929-32 ...............................................28
Ch. 7, 68 Stat. 932-35 ...............................................28
Ch. 8, 68 Stat. 935 ....................................................28
42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) .......................................... 2, 31
42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) .............................................. 2
42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc) ............................................... 3
42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee) ............................................ 26
42 U.S.C. § 2021b(9)(A)(i) .................................... 24
42 U.S.C. § 2065(c)(3) .......................................... 24
42 U.S.C. § 2073 .............................................28, 35
42 U.S.C. § 2073(a) ................................................ 2
42 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1)-(3) .................................... 30
42 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(4) .......................................... 30
42 U.S.C. § 2093 .............................................28, 35
42 U.S.C. § 2093(a)(1)-(3) .................................... 30
42 U.S.C. § 2093(a)(4) .....................................30, 32
42 U.S.C. § 2111 .............................................28, 35
42 U.S.C. § 2111(a) .............................................. 30
42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2134................................... 23-24
42 U.S.C. § 2160(f ) .............................................. 24
xii
42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) .............................................. 29
42 U.S.C. § 2210h(a)(2)(B)................................... 24
42 U.S.C. § 2210i ............................................24, 27
42 U.S.C. § 2239 .................................................... 7
42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) ................................................ 7
42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) ......................8, 10, 16, 37
42 U.S.C. § 2239(b)(1) ............................................ 8
42 U.S.C. § 2284(a)(3) .......................................... 24
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a),
48 Stat. 1064, 1093 ................................................ 7
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
§ 656(a), 119 Stat. 594, 813-14 .............................. 3
Federal Trade Commission Act, §13(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(b) ................................................................... 36
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, (21 U.S.C. § 301
et seq. ................................................................... 44
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C.
§ 10101 et seq. ........................................... 1, 3, 5-6,
12-15, 17-27, 29,
31-32, 34, 37, 45, 47
42 U.S.C. § 10101(23) .......................................... 26
42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2) .................................... 5, 25
42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(7) ........................................ 25
42 U.S.C. § 10132 .................................................. 5
42 U.S.C. § 10134 .................................................. 5
42 U.S.C. § 10134(b) .............................................. 5
42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) ........................................ 5, 23
42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10155.................................... 31
xiii
42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10157.................................... 17
42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(1) ...............................6, 17, 24
42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(2) .......................................... 6
42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(3) ........................................ 17
42 U.S.C. § 10151(b)(1) ........................ 17-18, 20-21
42 U.S.C. § 10151(b)(2) ...............................6, 18, 21
42 U.S.C. § 10152 ...........................................18, 20
42 U.S.C. § 10153 .....................................18, 21, 23
42 U.S.C. § 10154 ................................................ 18
42 U.S.C. § 10155 ................................................ 19
42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1) ...................................18, 21
42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(A) ................................... 19
42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(A)-(C) ............................... 6
42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(B) ................................... 19
42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(C) ................................... 19
42 U.S.C. § 10155(b)(1)(A) ............................... 6, 19
42 U.S.C. § 10155(b)(1)(B) ................................... 19
42 U.S.C. § 10155(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) .......................... 6
42 U.S.C. § 10155(h) ....................... 6, 20, 23, 32, 39
42 U.S.C. § 10172 .................................................. 5
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930,
ch. 436, §§ 10-11, 46 Stat. 531, 535....................... 7
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-408, § 4(b), 102 Stat. 1066, 1069 .... 3, 24
28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(1) ............................................... 13
xiv
10 C.F.R.:
§ 2.309(a) .............................................................. 38
§ 2.309(d)(1)(iii)...................................................... 8
§ 2.309(f )(1)(vi) ................................................ 8, 38
§ 2.335(b) ................................................................ 8
§ 72.3 .................................................................... 27
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
To Provide for the Review of Certain Orders:
Hearings on H.R. 5487 Before the Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong.
(1950) ..................................................................... 7
ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS
Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear
Future: Report to the Secretary of Energy
(Jan. 2012), https://www.energy.gov/ne/
articles/blue-ribbon-commission-americasnuclear-future-report-secretary-energy.......... 2, 20
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n:
Environmental Impact Statement for Interim
Storage Partners LLC’s License Application
for a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
for Spent Nuclear Fuel in Andrews County,
Texas: Final Report, NUREG-2239 (July
2021),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2120/
ML21209A955.pdf ............................................... 25
Final Rule, Licensing Requirements for the
Storage of Spent Fuel in an Independent
Fuel Spent Storage Installation, 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,693 (Nov. 12, 1980) .............. 3-4, 27, 33, 35
xv
Notice, Spent Fuel Storage, 40 Fed. Reg.
42,801 (Sept. 16, 1975) ...............................2, 28, 35
Proposed Rule, Storage of Spent Fuel in an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), 43 Fed. Reg. 46,309 (Oct. 6,
1978)......................................................... 3-4, 32-33
Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities: Report to Congress on Extending the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Licensing
or Regulatory Authority to Federal Radioactive Waste Storage and Disposal Activities,
NUREG-0527 (Sept. 1979), available at
https://www.google.com/books/edition/
Regulation_of_Federal_Radioactive_Waste/
ERpSAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. ..........................3
Off. of Nuclear Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste
Inventory (Dec. 2024)............................ 4-5, 7, 9, 36
Petition of Permian Basin Land and Royalty
Organization and Fasken Land and Minerals for Intervention and Request for
Hearing, In re Interim Storage Partners,
Docket No. 72-1050 (N.R.C. Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1830/ML18302
A412.pdf ............................................................... 10
OTHER MATERIALS
App. to Pet. for a Writ of Cert., NRC v. Fasken
Land & Minerals, Ltd., No. 23-1341 (U.S.
June 25, 2024)...................................................... 14
Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) ..................... 40
xvi
Br. for Resp. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
Bullcreek v. NRC, Nos. 03-1018 & 03-1022,
2003 WL 25588879 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2003) ....... 35
Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Pet’r, Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser
Gypsum Co., No. 22-1079 (U.S. Dec. 14,
2023)..................................................................... 39
Pet. for a Writ of Cert.:
Holtec Int’l v. NRC, No. 23-1352 (U.S. June
25, 2024) ............................................................... 14
NRC v. Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd.,
No. 23-1341 (U.S. June 25, 2024) ....................... 14
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
(2012) ..................................................22, 27, 31, 34
Richard B. Stewart & Jane B. Stewart, Solving
the Spent Nuclear Fuel Impasse, 21 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 1 (2014) ................................................ 4
7 The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) .................. 40
The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language (1967) ............................................. 40-41
Webster’s New International Dictionary of the
English Language (2d ed. 1957) ......................... 32
INTRODUCTION
Until the 1970s, the government and the nuclear
industry planned to reprocess spent fuel from nuclear
reactors. Congress therefore did not specifically
address where to store spent fuel until the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 (“NWPA”). The NWPA’s
detailed regime for interim storage does not permit
private, offsite storage.
Here, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”)
relied on pre-NWPA regulations to license a massive,
privately owned interim storage facility far from the
reactors that generated the spent fuel. Until this
license, essentially all spent fuel has been stored
onsite at nuclear reactors. Petitioner ISP’s proposed
storage facility instead would be in West Texas, far
from any reactor and atop the nation’s largest hydrocarbon reserves. NRC’s licensing process precluded
all interested parties except the licensee from fully
participating. NRC then contested appellate jurisdiction against those it shut out of the administrative
process.
NRC’s arbitrary actions are especially problematic
given the massive economic and social significance of
spent fuel storage plans. When Congress intended to
empower NRC to address storage, it did so in the
NWPA, which speaks directly to where spent fuel can
be stored on an interim basis. But NRC largely
ignores that Act. Instead, NRC justifies its power
flex from the penumbras and emanations of statutes
enacted during an era when no one thought interim
storage was needed because spent fuel would be reprocessed.
The Fifth Circuit correctly saw NRC’s gambit as a
lawless exercise of power in direct contravention of
Congress’s will. Because the judiciary must check
agency actions divorced from statutory authority, that
judgment should be affirmed.
2
STATEMENT
A. Statutory And Regulatory Background
1. The Atomic Energy Act
Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(“AEA”) “to encourage widespread participation in
the development and utilization of atomic energy.” 42
U.S.C. § 2013(d). Under the AEA, NRC may license
private parties to acquire and use nuclear material,
including the enriched uranium that fuels nuclear
reactors. See id. § 2073(a); id. § 2014(aa).
Nuclear fuel is “spent” once “it can no longer
efficiently produce energy.” Blue Ribbon Commission
on America’s Nuclear Future: Report to the Secretary
of Energy 10 (Jan. 2012) (“Blue Ribbon Commission”).
“[S]pent fuel[ ] remain[s] radioactive for thousands of
years,” id. at 14, and “poses a dangerous, long-term
health and environmental risk,” New York v. NRC,
681 F.3d 471, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
From “the early days of the nuclear power industry,”
utilities and legislators believed spent fuel would be
“reprocessed” into “fresh reactor fuel.” 40 Fed. Reg.
42,801, 42,801 (Sept. 16, 1975). Those “operating
nuclear reactors were largely unconcerned with the
storage of spent nuclear fuel.” Idaho v. DOE, 945
F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1991). Conventional wisdom
held that “spent fuel would be . . . stored in onsite
fuel storage pools” for “one year[ ]” before reprocessing.
40 Fed. Reg. at 42,801.
Consistent with this understanding, the AEA did
“not refer explicitly to spent nuclear fuel.” Illinois v.
General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir. 1982).
For several more decades, “[i]t was accepted that
spent fuel would be reprocessed.” Idaho, 945 F.2d at
298.
3
In 1980, Congress amended the AEA to address
spent fuel, but only in limited part, by criminalizing
damaging “spent nuclear fuel from” a “utilization
facility,” e.g., a nuclear power plant. Act of June 30,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 780, 787;
42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc). In 1988, Congress finally added
“spent nuclear fuel” to the AEA as a defined term that
incorporated the same “meaning[ ] given such term[ ]”
in the NWPA. Price-Anderson Amendments Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 4(b), 102 Stat. 1066, 1069.
In 2005, Congress instructed NRC to “establish a system” for the import and export of nuclear materials,
including “byproduct materials, source materials,
special nuclear materials,” and, separately, “spent
nuclear fuel.” Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-58, § 656(a), 119 Stat. 594, 813-14.
2. The government’s response to the reprocessing industry’s collapse
“In the mid-70s, . . . the private reprocessing industry collapsed.” Idaho, 945 F.2d at 298. In 1977, President Carter announced that the United States would
stop commercially reprocessing spent fuel entirely.
See 45 Fed. Reg. 74,693 (Nov. 12, 1980).
a. NRC promulgated new regulations
In September 1978, NRC’s Chairman declared
that the AEA does “not explicitly authorize regulation
of radioactive waste facilities.”1 NRC nonetheless
proposed rules regulating storage of spent fuel at
“independent spent fuel storage installation[s].” 43 Fed.
1 NRC, Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities:
Report to Congress on Extending the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Licensing or Regulatory Authority to Federal Radioactive
Waste Storage and Disposal Activities, NUREG-0527, at G-9
(Sept. 1979), https://www.google.com/books/edition/Regulation_
of_Federal_Radioactive_Waste/ERpSAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0.
4
Reg. 46,309, 46,309 (Oct. 6, 1978). NRC recognized
its existing regulations were “largely designed for
relatively short-term possession” of nuclear materials
“in conjunction with operations involving such materials.” Id. NRC had no rules “for extended spent fuel
storage under static storage conditions involving no
operations on such materials.” Id.
In 1980, NRC issued its final rule. See 45 Fed. Reg.
74,693. The rule permitted private parties to seek
licenses for “up to 20 years” of “temporary storage” of
spent fuel, “with renewal at [NRC’s] option.” Id. at
74,693. NRC stated its rule was issued “[p]ursuant to
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,” id. at 74,699, but did
not explain how any AEA provisions authorized the
new rules.
While NRC’s 1980 rules purport to “permit[ ] either”
“away-from-reactor” or “at-reactor” private storage,
id. at 74,696, away-from-reactor storage was rare. Before 1980, only “three facilities for spent fuel storage”
had received any kind of license. Id. at 74,698. All
originally were licensed as reprocessing facilities,
then repurposed for storage once reprocessing ended.
Id. Just one now stores spent fuel – General Electric’s
reprocessing facility in Morris, Illinois. See generally
Off. of Nuclear Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Spent
Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory (Dec.
2024) (“Spent Fuel Inventory”) (listing all spent fuel
storage sites and inventory). NRC licensed the Morris
facility as a reprocessing (production) facility in 1967,
but the reprocessing efforts failed soon after, and NRC
then licensed the facility to store the spent fuel that it
had received for reprocessing. See In re General Elec.
Co., 22 N.R.C. 851 (Nov. 4, 1985); Richard B. Stewart
& Jane B. Stewart, Solving the Spent Nuclear Fuel
Impasse, 21 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1, 22 n.69 (2014). A
5
nuclear power reactor is less than one mile from the
Morris facility. See In re General Elec. Co., 15 N.R.C.
530, 1982 WL 43396, at *3 (Mar. 2, 1982).
In 1982, NRC renewed GE’s license, using the 1980
rules. See id. at *1-3. Given the facility’s proximity to
a nuclear reactor, NRC assessed “the combined radiological impacts from the Morris Operation” and the
nearby reactor as a single location. Id. at *3. This
facility remains “the only non-DOE operated” storage
facility “not co-located at a reactor site.” Spent Fuel
Inventory 7.
b. Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act, a comprehensive short- and
long-term storage plan for spent nuclear
fuel
In the 1982 NWPA, Congress responded to the
“national problem” resulting from “the accumulation
of . . . spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors.”
42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2). The Act comprehensively
addressed spent fuel storage.
First, Congress directed that the Department of
Energy (“DOE”) ultimately would be responsible for
taking title to and permanently disposing of the waste.
Congress charged DOE with selecting a site and constructing a permanent, government-owned repository
for spent fuel. Id. §§ 10132, 10134. DOE eventually
selected – and Congress endorsed – Yucca Mountain
in Nevada for that repository. See id. §§ 10134(b), (d),
10172. In 2008, DOE sought authorization from NRC
to construct the facility, only to withdraw its application two years later. See New York v. NRC, 824 F.3d
1012, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Now, “there is not even a
prospective site for a repository.” Id.
Second, the NWPA places “primary responsibility”
for interim storage of spent fuel on “persons owning
6
and operating civilian nuclear power reactors.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 10151(a)(1). They must “maximiz[e] . . . storage” at
their reactors and “add[ ] new onsite storage capacity
in a timely manner where practical.” Id. Congress
also recognized the federal government’s “responsibility” to enable “the effective use of existing storage
facilities,” including authorizing “needed new storage
capacity at the site of each civilian nuclear power
reactor.” Id. § 10151(a)(2) (emphasis added).
As fallback, the NWPA permits storing “not more
than 1,900 metric tons” of spent fuel “at one or more
facilities owned by the Federal Government,” id.
§ 10151(b)(2), which can include sites away from
nuclear reactors, see § 10155(a)(1)(A)-(C). Congress
authorized this alternative only for commercial operators that “cannot reasonably provide adequate spent
nuclear fuel storage capacity at the site of such
reactor.” Id. § 10151(b)(2). Before using governmentowned storage, a commercial operator must exhaust
storage “at the site of any . . . civilian nuclear power
reactor operated by such person.” Id. § 10155(b)(1)(A).
Operators also must “diligently pursu[e] licensed
alternatives to the use of Federal storage capacity,”
including expanding onsite storage, constructing new
onsite storage, or acquiring onsite “modular or mobile
. . . storage equipment.” Id. § 10155(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
The NWPA does not permit private, offsite storage
of spent fuel. Congress explained that “nothing in [the
NWPA] shall be construed to encourage, authorize, or
require the private or Federal use . . . of any storage
facility located away from the site of any civilian
nuclear power reactor and not owned by the Federal
Government.” Id. § 10155(h).
Consistent with the NWPA, “essentially all” spent
fuel “has remained on the generating reactor sites.”
7
Spent Fuel Inventory 10. As of 2022, more than 70
privately owned spent fuel storage sites exist – just
one (the Morris facility) is away from a reactor site (by
0.7 miles). See id. at 2; see also id. at 7.
3. The Hobbs Act
In 1913, Congress enacted the Urgent Deficiencies
Act (“UDA”), which allowed judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) orders. See Act
of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, § 1, 38 Stat. 208, 219-20.
A three-judge district court would hear challenges to
ICC orders, see id. at 220, in “de novo” trials, Hearings
on H.R. 5487, 81st Cong. 25, 27 (1950). Congress subsequently used the UDA’s judicial-review procedures
for other agencies’ orders. See, e.g., Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1093
(FCC); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of
1930, ch. 436, §§ 10-11, 46 Stat. 531, 535 (Department
of Agriculture).
In 1950, Congress replaced the UDA with the
Administrative Orders Review Act (or Hobbs Act). See
ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950). That Act standardizes
judicial review of agency orders for several agencies,
including NRC. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1)-(7). Courts
of appeals have “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear challenges to covered orders. Id. § 2342. A court’s jurisdiction “is invoked by filing a petition” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2344. Id. Under § 2344, “[a]ny party aggrieved by
[a covered] final order may, within 60 days after its
entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of
appeals.”
For NRC orders, the Hobbs Act governs challenges
to “final orders . . . made reviewable by” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2239. Id. § 2342(4). Section 2239(a) provides that,
“[i]n any proceeding under this chapter, . . . [NRC]
shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person
8
whose interest may be affected by the proceeding,
and shall admit any such person as a party to such
proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). By regulation,
NRC enforces additional requirements before admitting prospective intervenors. One must demonstrate
a “property, financial or other interest in the proceeding,” 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(1)(iii), and “provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute
exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue
of law or fact,” id. § 2.309(f )(1)(vi). NRC also forbids
challenges to “NRC rule[s] or regulation[s],” In re
Interim Storage Partners LLC, 90 N.R.C. 31, 53 (Aug.
23, 2019), unless “application of the rule or regulation
. . . would not serve the purposes for which the rule or
regulation was adopted,” 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b). Section
2239(b)(1) states that “[a]ny final order entered in any
proceeding of the kind specified in subsection (a)”
“shall be subject to judicial review in the manner
prescribed in” the Hobbs Act.
B. Factual And Procedural Background
1. The Permian Basin
The Permian Basin “covers an area approximately
250 miles wide and 300 miles long” across western
Texas and eastern New Mexico, JA64-65, and includes
nearly 300,000 active oil and gas wells, JA106. The
Permian Basin is “the largest producing oilfield in the
world.” JA118. It also includes aquifers that provide
freshwater to dozens of counties in Texas and New
Mexico. JA143-44, 173-74. That water is “used for
domestic potable water, stock, irrigation, and commercial purposes.” JA144.
2. ISP’s application for a license to store spent
fuel in the Permian Basin
In April 2016, ISP’s predecessor applied for a license
to build an above-ground storage facility for 5,000
9
metric tons of spent fuel in Andrews County, Texas, in
the Permian Basin. JA12. The proposed site is more
than 300 miles from the nearest nuclear power plant
and more than 1,000 miles from most other nuclear
reactors in the country. JA242-43 (maps). “Transportation of [spent fuel] to the proposed [site] would
be primarily or entirely by rail.” JA80. Thus, spent
fuel would cross the country by railcar, travelling
alongside “oil-field commodities,” “crude oil,” and
“significant agricultural commodities.” JA121.
Although the initial request was to store 5,000
metric tons of spent fuel, the plan was eventually to
increase that capacity to 40,000 metric tons. JA41-42.
The stated purpose for the site was to receive spent
fuel from “existing permanently shutdown and/or
decommissioned commercial reactors across the U.S.,”
not to expand overall capacity for storage of spent fuel.
JA12-13. In June 2018, ISP submitted a revised application that changed nothing relevant here. JA75.
Even at 5,000 metric tons, ISP’s proposed storage
facility would be the largest independent storage site
for spent fuel in the country. The current largest storage site is the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
(an operating reactor), which stores less than 3,000
metric tons of spent fuel. See Spent Fuel Inventory
B.2.
3. Fasken opposed ISP’s license application
Fasken is one of the nation’s largest private
landowners, with hundreds of thousands of acres in
the Permian Basin near ISP’s proposed facility. JA64,
186. On its land, Fasken grazes tens of thousands of
cattle, operates nearly 2,000 active oil and gas wells,
and has residential and commercial real estate developments. Its employees travel daily throughout that
land to work cattle and service the wells. Fasken’s
10
business would share roads and railroad lines with
the ISP facility. That facility would expose Fasken’s
employees to radiation, threaten to devalue its land,
and disrupt its commercial operations. See Fasken
Petition and Request for Hearing 2-4 (N.R.C. Oct. 29,
2018).
Fasken objected to ISP’s proposed license and
sought a hearing under § 2239(a)(1)(A), as a “person
whose interest may be affected by [a licensing] proceeding” and who NRC “shall admit . . . as a party to
such proceeding.”
First, Fasken noted ISP’s inability to comprehensively monitor spent fuel canisters for leaks, JA196,
and inadequacies in its plans for addressing leaks,
which would expose the public to “millions of curies
. . . of radioactivity,” JA164 (cleaned up). Fasken also
explained that there is “no current understanding
as to how the now leaking spent fuel would behave,”
“how long it could be safely contained,” or “how a
transportation cask could be moved or transported
while holding a leaking” canister. Id.
Second, Fasken identified potash mining and the
Salada Formation, an extensive salt bed located upwind from the proposed facility, which would corrode
the above-ground storage canisters, causing leaks.
JA155. Risk of corrosion is material because the area
including the proposed site frequently “experienc[es]
the ‘haboob’ sandstorm phenomena,” which will coat
the canisters with corrosive salt and potash. JA194.
Third, the Permian Basin sits above “a highly dense
fault network . . . , with some faults showing greater
than 45% probability of slip.” JA138. An earthquake
could cause canisters to leak. JA140. Yet ISP had no
11
“strategic plan for seismic monitoring” or for addressing “damage from a seismic surface event.” JA136.2
Fourth, a release would be disastrous for the
surrounding area. Any release “would allow cesium
to rapidly spread downwind . . . . Once deposited onto
a ground surface . . . , the cesium will dissolve into”
rainwater “and begin infiltrating into the local water
table.” JA199. It could disrupt the Permian Basin for
centuries. JA198.
Fifth, the proposed site is several hundred miles
from even the closest nuclear reactor. JA241-43.
NRC, however, evaluated transportation risks only
“within a 50-mile buffer.” JA238. Fasken explained
NRC could not rely on its decades-old transportation
risk assessment for Yucca Mountain in Nevada to
ensure safety for spent fuel shipped hundreds or
thousands of miles to the proposed ISP site in Texas.
JA245-46.
NRC recognized Fasken’s “proximity to the proposed
facility” made it a person whose interest may be
affected by the proposed ISP license. Interim Storage
Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 52 (finding Fasken had “standing”). But after summarily reviewing the merits
of Fasken’s objections, NRC concluded Fasken did
not “proffer[ ] an admissible contention” raising “a
genuine dispute on a material issue,” and accordingly
denied it intervenor status. Id. at 52-53, 109-18.
NRC also denied intervenor status to every other
objector, finding their contentions lacked merit.3 In 2020,
2 In March 2020, a 5.0 magnitude earthquake struck the area.
JA179.
3 NRC initially deemed one Sierra Club objection meritorious,
but later reconsidered and denied Sierra Club intervenor status.
See Interim Storage Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 80; In re Interim
12
NRC again denied Fasken intervenor status after
Fasken filed a contention based on newly revealed
information in NRC’s draft environmental impact
statement, which NRC also rejected on the merits.
See In re Interim Storage Partners LLC, 2021 WL
8087739, at *7-9 (N.R.C. Jan. 29, 2021).4
In September 2021, NRC issued a 40-year license
to ISP. JA275, 286. Without citing any specific
AEA provision, NRC concluded the facility “meets
the standards and requirements of the [AEA] . . . and
[NRC’s] regulations set forth in 10 CFR.” JA284.
NRC did not address the NWPA.
4. The Fifth Circuit vacated NRC’s license
grant
Challenges to NRC’s license grant were filed in the
Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. Texas filed first in the
Fifth Circuit with Fasken close behind. Three private
parties then petitioned in the D.C. Circuit,5 and New
Mexico petitioned in the Tenth Circuit.6 Each petition
challenged the same order granting the license, but
NRC filed the administrative record in each circuit
Storage Partners LLC, 90 N.R.C. 181, 182 (Nov. 18, 2019); In re
Interim Storage Partners LLC, 92 N.R.C. 491, 492 (Dec. 17, 2020).
NRC never permitted Sierra Club’s contention that “any awayfrom-reactor interim storage facility is necessarily unlawful
under the AEA and/or the NWPA,” deeming it “an impermissible
challenge to NRC regulations that is precluded by 10 C.F.R.
§ 2.335.” Interim Storage Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 60.
4 Fasken and others petitioned for review of the intervention
denials. The D.C. Circuit held that NRC “acted reasonably” in
concluding they had not proffered admissible contentions. Don’t
Waste Michigan v. NRC, 2023 WL 395030, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,
2023) (per curiam).
5 See Nos. 21-1227, 21-1230, 21-1231 (D.C. Cir.).
6 See No. 21-9593 (10th Cir.).
13
and did not seek to transfer the later-filed petitions
to the Fifth Circuit. But see 28 U.S.C. § 2346 (“the
agency shall file . . . the record on review as provided
by section 2112”); id. § 2112(a)(1) (governing filing
of administrative record when multiple petitions in
different circuits challenge the same order).
Although the Fifth Circuit cases were filed first, that
court was last to rule. The D.C. and Tenth Circuits
declined to reach the merits, concluding they lacked
jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. They interpreted
the Act to permit only NRC-approved intervenors to
petition for review. See Don’t Waste Michigan, 2023
WL 395030, at *3; New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. NRC,
59 F.4th 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 2023).
The Fifth Circuit, however, upheld jurisdiction and
vacated the license. App. 2a. On jurisdiction, the
court observed that, under “the fairest reading of
the Hobbs Act,” Fasken and Texas are “part[ies]
aggrieved” because they participated in the agency
proceedings. App. 17a-18a. Ultimately, the court
concluded it had jurisdiction because NRC acted ultra
vires and in violation of express limitations on its
authority. App. 18a-20a.
On the merits, the court held the AEA does not
authorize NRC “to issue licenses for private parties to
store spent nuclear fuel away-from-the-reactor.” App.
2a. Although the AEA grants “authority to issue
licenses for the possession of . . . constituent materials
of spent nuclear fuel,” “none” of the allowed purposes
for such licenses “encompass[es] storage or disposal of
. . . spent nuclear fuel.” App. 21a-22a. The court also
held the NWPA “creates a comprehensive statutory
scheme for addressing spent nuclear fuel” that “limits
temporary storage to private at-the-reactor storage or
at federal sites.” App. 29a. Accordingly, the NWPA
14
“doesn’t permit” NRC “to license a private, away-fromreactor storage facility for spent nuclear fuel.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. App.
31a. Judge Jones’s concurrence with five other judges
grounded the panel’s exercise of jurisdiction on “two
bases”: “these petitioners are parties aggrieved, and
the NRC has acted ultra vires.” App. 33a. “The bottom line for Hobbs Act ‘party aggrieved’ status,” Judge
Jones explained, “is to participate in agency proceedings, which both Fasken and Texas did.” App. 38a.
Judge Jones also clarified that Fifth Circuit decisions
recognizing the ultra vires rule postdate the Hobbs Act
and that this Court and other courts of appeals recognize a similar rule in various contexts. App. 41a-43a.7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The Fifth Circuit correctly held NRC lacks
authority to license private, offsite storage of spent fuel.
A. The NWPA creates a comprehensive regime
for interim storage of spent fuel that does not permit
private, offsite storage. Owners of nuclear power
reactors are responsible for providing interim storage
of spent fuel at their reactor sites. If onsite storage
space is insufficient, the NWPA directs the federal
government (not private actors) to provide limited
overflow capacity, but only if no more onsite storage
is forthcoming. Of all possible means of providing
overflow storage, the NWPA forbids just one – private,
offsite storage. NRC therefore lacked authority to
license the ISP facility.
7 NRC has licensed a second, even larger facility in the
Permian Basin, to be operated by Holtec International. See Pet.
App. 3a-8a, No. 23-1341. The Fifth Circuit vacated the Holtec
license because it was “materially identical” to ISP’s license. Id.
at 2a. Holtec and the government have filed certiorari petitions,
which are pending. See Nos. 23-1341, 23-1352.
15
B. Petitioners’ efforts to limit the NWPA’s scope
are unpersuasive. The NWPA did not presume the
validity of prior NRC rules permitting offsite storage.
Those rules and the NWPA are diametrically opposed
– the rules permit private, offsite storage whereas the
NWPA specifically forbids it. Indeed, NRC’s interpretation of its regulations renders the NWPA’s entire
interim storage regime nugatory. The NWPA specifically endorses certain NRC regulations, but the offsitestorage regulations are not among them.
C. The AEA also does not authorize NRC to license
private, offsite storage of spent fuel.
Although the AEA contains provisions explicitly
addressing spent fuel, none authorizes its storage.
Nor does NRC’s authority to license productive uses
of source, special nuclear, and byproduct materials
add up to authority to license storage of spent fuel.
The AEA’s plain text and structure reveal that spent
fuel is more than these three materials combined,
so authority to license uses of each material does not
constitute authority to license uses of spent fuel. In
addition, storage is not an authorized use of those
materials; indeed, storage is not a “use” at all because
stored spent fuel is not productively employed, as
NRC’s regulations recognize.
D. Petitioners’ remaining arguments for inferring
authority to license private, offsite storage of spent
fuel in the AEA fail. The need to temporarily hold
spent fuel in support of other, expressly authorized
activities (like reprocessing) is not the same thing
as storage, which involves holding spent fuel with no
further use in mind.
Petitioners also overstate NRC’s history of interpreting the AEA to authorize private, offsite storage.
NRC did not claim such authority until 1975, two
decades after Congress enacted the AEA, and did not
16
identify what statutory purposes they purported to
fulfill until this litigation. Even then, NRC almost
never exercised this authority. In the nearly 50 years
between NRC’s claiming this authority and its granting ISP’s license, NRC licensed only four private,
offsite storage facilities, just one of which ever was
built.
II. The Fifth Circuit correctly ruled NRC could
not shield its order from appellate review by denying
obviously aggrieved parties intervenor status.
A. Fasken is a “party aggrieved” entitled to petition for review of NRC’s license grant under the Hobbs
Act. Read together, the AEA and the Hobbs Act create
a permissive framework for judicial review: the AEA
requires NRC to “admit . . . as a party” “any person
whose interest may be affected by [a] proceeding” and
who “request[s]” a hearing, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A);
and the Hobbs Act, in turn, allows “[a]ny party
aggrieved” to petition for review, 28 U.S.C. § 2344.
Fasken amply meets these statutory requirements
because it requested a hearing, the proposed facility
threatens its business interests, and it was aggrieved
by NRC’s license grant. NRC’s and ISP’s counter –
that Fasken tried and failed to intervene in the
proceeding – misses the point. The AEA and the
Hobbs Act do not make intervention under NRC’s
rules a prerequisite to judicial review, and NRC lacks
authority to add impediments to judicial review
through regulation.
B. The Fifth Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction because NRC acted ultra vires. Judicial-review
statutes, like the Hobbs Act, presumptively do not bar
preexisting modes of review. American courts long
have exercised jurisdiction to review ultra vires agency
action – indeed, this Court blessed such review both
before and after the Hobbs Act became law.
17
ARGUMENT
I. NRC LACKS AUTHORITY TO LICENSE PRIVATELY OWNED, AWAY-FROM-REACTOR
STORAGE FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
A. NRC’s Assertion Of Authority Contradicts
Congress’s Comprehensive Program For
Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel
1. The NWPA creates a detailed program
for storing spent nuclear fuel that
excludes private, offsite storage
Congress has addressed where to store spent fuel on
an interim basis: onsite at privately owned nuclear
reactors. Congress also has addressed where to store
spent fuel on an interim basis if those reactor sites run
out of space: at federally owned storage facilities until
more onsite capacity is ready. NRC therefore lacks
statutory authority to license ISP’s private, offsite
storage.
The NWPA’s interim storage plan is codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10157, in a part of the U.S. Code
titled “Interim Storage Program.” Congress began by
making critical “find[ing]s” and articulating “purposes”
of the Interim Storage Program. Congress found that
reactor operators bear the “responsibility for providing interim storage of spent nuclear fuel . . . at the site
of each civilian nuclear power reactor” and that “the
Federal Government has the responsibility to provide”
overflow “capacity for interim storage of spent nuclear
fuel” when there is not “adequate storage capacity at
the sites of such reactors.” 42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(1),
(a)(3).
Congress articulated two corresponding purposes.
The first encourages use of existing storage capacity
and addition of new storage capacity for spent fuel
“at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor.” Id.
18
§ 10151(b)(1). The second creates “a federally owned
and operated system for the interim storage of spent
nuclear fuel . . . to prevent disruptions in the orderly
operation of any civilian nuclear power reactor that
cannot reasonably provide adequate spent nuclear
fuel storage capacity at the site of such reactor.” Id.
§ 10151(b)(2).
Congress then enacted substantive provisions to
implement those findings and purposes, confirming
that interim storage of spent fuel is to occur onsite at
civilian nuclear power reactors, or at federally owned
locations (which can be offsite) as a backup. Congress
repeatedly directed DOE and NRC to maximize the
use of onsite storage capacity and did not authorize
private, offsite storage.
§ 10152: DOE and NRC “shall . . . encourage and
expedite the effective use of available storage,
and necessary additional storage, at the site of
each civilian nuclear power reactor” (emphases
added).
§ 10153: NRC “shall . . . establish procedures
for the licensing of ” approved storage technology
“for use at the site of any civilian nuclear power
reactor” (same).
§ 10154: NRC “shall ” follow prescribed procedures when considering applications “to expand
the spent fuel storage capacity at the site of a
civilian nuclear power reactor” (same).
Congress also recognized that the supply of spent
fuel could at times exceed such storage capacity. In
that situation, the NWPA permits storing excess fuel
in federally owned facilities until additional onsite
storage becomes available: DOE “shall provide . . . not
more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for the storage
of spent nuclear fuel.” Id. § 10155(a)(1). Owners of
19
spent fuel may use this excess storage capacity “only
if ” several conditions are met. First, using the federally owned storage capacity must be necessary “to
ensure the continued orderly operation of ” the nuclear
reactor generating the spent fuel. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(A).
Second, storage “cannot reasonably be provided” at
the site of that reactor “or at the site of any other
civilian nuclear power reactor” owned by the same
person. Id. Third, additional onsite “capacity cannot
be made available in a timely manner.” Id. Fourth,
the reactor owner must be “diligently pursuing licensed
alternatives” to expand storage capacity “at the site of
any civilian nuclear power reactor” for future spent
fuel storage needs. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(B).
These conditions reaffirm Congress’s express requirement for onsite spent fuel storage. Congress authorized federal overflow capacity only when existing
onsite storage is insufficient and more onsite storage
is not forthcoming.
In addition, § 10155 is the only authorization
Congress provides for offsite interim storage of spent
fuel. And offsite storage in a federally owned facility
is only one of three options Congress gave DOE.
See id. § 10155(a)(1)(A). The other two options involve
additional onsite storage. First, DOE may provide
“modular or mobile spent nuclear fuel storage equipment . . . at the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor.” Id. § 10155(a)(1)(B). Second, DOE may construct
new “storage capacity at any site of a civilian nuclear
power reactor.” Id. § 10155(a)(1)(C).
While the NWPA specifically permits these methods
of providing surplus storage, it specifically forbids just
one – private, offsite storage facilities: “nothing in
[the NWPA] shall be construed to encourage, authorize, or require the private or Federal use . . . of any
storage facility located away from the site of any
20
civilian nuclear power reactor and not owned by
the Federal Government.” Id. § 10155(h). Congress
elsewhere has not expressly provided for private,
offsite storage.
2. NRC’s asserted authority flouts the
NWPA’s Interim Storage Program
Petitioners do not contend the NWPA authorizes
ISP’s license and for good reason. ISP’s license undermines the statutory purposes and requirements of the
NWPA’s Interim Storage Program.
The NWPA requires NRC to encourage using
currently available onsite storage capacity for spent
fuel. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10151(b)(1), 10152. But the
ISP facility would do the opposite – transfer spent
fuel from existing onsite storage to a private, offsite
location. JA13, 90.
The NWPA also directs NRC to promote adding new
onsite storage capacity for spent fuel. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10151(b)(1), 10152. ISP’s facility, however, would
do the opposite. Providing a private, offsite facility for
(purportedly) interim storage of a large portion of the
nation’s spent fuel will discourage creating new onsite
storage capacity. It also will discourage construction
of a permanent repository, contrary to Congress’s
design. See NARUC v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 519 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (NWPA “is obviously designed to prevent
[DOE] from delaying the construction of . . . the
permanent facility while using temporary facilities”);
Blue Ribbon Commission xii (recognizing “efforts to
develop consolidated storage” could “hamper efforts to
move forward with the development of [permanent]
disposal capacity”).
The NWPA requires DOE to create a federally
owned and operated system of interim storage with
up to 1,900 metric tons of capacity. See 42 U.S.C.
21
§§ 10151(b)(1)-(2), 10155(a)(1). But the ISP facility
would be privately owned and operated and have a
capacity of 5,000 (and possibly up to 40,000) metric
tons.
B. Petitioners Misinterpret The NWPA
Unable to fit the license within the NWPA, NRC and
ISP claim that law is irrelevant. Their arguments
contradict the NWPA’s plain text and structure.
1. Petitioners argue (NRC Br. 42; ISP Br. 40-41)
the NWPA assumes the validity of NRC’s 1980
rules allowing private, offsite storage of spent fuel.
But when Congress wanted to endorse NRC’s existing
rules in the NWPA, it did so expressly. For example,
in instructing NRC to devise new licensing procedures
for new storage technologies, Congress said it did
“not preclude the licensing, under any applicable
procedures or rules of [NRC] in effect prior to such
establishment, of any technology for the storage of
civilian spent nuclear fuel at the site of any civilian
nuclear power reactor.” 42 U.S.C. § 10153 (emphasis
added). The NWPA’s enactment of a regime different
from NRC’s recently asserted authority to license offsite storage therefore reflects Congress’s disapproval,
not confirmation.
2. Petitioners’ argument (NRC Br. 43; ISP Br.
41-42) that the NWPA does not repeal the AEA
(and NRC’s 1980 rules) because repeal by implication
is disfavored also fails.
First, the AEA did not empower NRC to license
private, offsite storage facilities. No AEA provision
expressly authorizes such storage facilities. See infra
pp. 24-26. Thus, the AEA conferred no relevant
authority that the NWPA could repeal, implicitly or
otherwise.
22
Second, even if the AEA could be interpreted to
imply that NRC may license such storage facilities (it
does not, see infra pp. 26-34), that implication would
not trigger the presumption against implied repeal.
While “[r]epeal by implication of an express statutory
text is one thing[,] . . . repeal by implication of a legal
disposition implied by a statutory text is something
else.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453
(1988). We “presume[ ] that Congress will specifically
address language on the statute books that it wishes
to change.” Id. Not so when mere implications, rather
than express statutory provisions, are involved. The
“task of reconciling many laws enacted over time,
and getting them to make sense in combination,
necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute
may be altered by the implications of a later statute,”
especially “where the scope of the earlier statute is
broad but the subsequent statutes more specifically
address the topic at hand.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (cleaned
up). In such cases, the “specific policy embodied in a
later federal statute” – the NWPA’s specific regime for
interim storage of spent fuel – “should control our construction of the earlier statute” – the AEA’s (alleged)
general authorization to license uses of combinations
of nuclear materials – “even though it has not been
expressly amended.” Id. (same).
Third, in any event, the NWPA satisfies the criteria
for implied repeal. “Where provisions in the two
acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to
the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier one.” Posadas v. National City Bank of
New York, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (quoted in Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 328 (2012) (“Reading Law”)).
23
Reading the AEA to grant NRC unfettered authority
to license private, offsite storage facilities irreconcilably conflicts with the NWPA’s provisions for maximizing onsite storage, with limited federal storage (which
need not be offsite) as a fallback. “[N]othing in”
the NWPA should “be construed to . . . authorize . . .
any storage facility located away from the site of any
civilian nuclear power reactor and not owned by the
Federal Government.” 42 U.S.C. § 10155(h). NRC
and ISP thus read the AEA to permit what the NWPA
prohibits. As the later-enacted statute, the NWPA
wins that fight.
3. Contrary to petitioners’ claims (NRC Br. 15,
42-43; ISP Br. 42), the NWPA does confer relevant
new licensing authority. The NWPA grants NRC
new authority to license construction of a permanent
repository for the nation’s spent fuel. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 10134(d) (NRC “shall consider an application for a
construction authorization for all or part of a [permanent] repository” and “shall issue a final decision
approving or disapproving the issuance of a construction authorization”). The NWPA also grants NRC
new authority to license “any [storage] technology
approved . . . for use at the site of any civilian nuclear
power reactor.” Id. § 10153. These new grants of
licensing authority were necessary because, while the
AEA granted NRC power to license production facilities (like reprocessing plants) and utilization facilities
(like nuclear power reactors), it granted no authority
to license any other types of facilities (like storage
or disposal). See id. §§ 2131-2134. The NWPA thus
affirmatively grants power to license new types of
facilities and storage technologies not addressed in
the AEA. It is not a set of precatory recommendations
on how NRC could use its preexisting AEA powers.
24
4. ISP argues (at 42) the NWPA concerns “permanent disposal . . . by DOE, not temporary possession
. . . by private parties.” But the NWPA gives “civilian”
(i.e., private) reactor owners “the primary responsibility for providing interim storage” (i.e., temporary
possession). 42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(1).
C. The AEA Does Not Authorize NRC To
License Offsite Storage For Spent Fuel
NRC and ISP defend the license by relying on
implied authority they assert emanates from the AEA.
Given the NWPA’s provisions expressly addressing
the question presented, that assertion of implicit power
fails. The AEA nowhere comes close to the explicit
authorization needed to warrant congressional sanction of NRC’s action.
1. The AEA’s explicit provisions concerning spent nuclear fuel do not authorize
storage licenses
No AEA provision grants NRC express authority to
issue a license for storing spent fuel. Indeed, Congress
did not amend the AEA to add “spent nuclear fuel” as
a defined term until 1988 – six years after the NWPA’s
enactment.8 Although the AEA now addresses specific
aspects of, and activities involving, spent fuel,9 it
8
Price-Anderson Amendments Act § 4(b), 102 Stat. 1069
(codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee)).
9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b(9)(A)(i) (provisions governing lowlevel nuclear waste do not apply to spent nuclear fuel), 2065(c)(3)
(DOE is responsible for spent nuclear fuel used to generate a
certain medical isotope), 2160(f ) (largely prohibiting DOE from
accepting spent nuclear fuel from other countries), 2210h(a)(2)(B)
(exempting spent nuclear fuel from certain export, import, transfer, and tracking requirements), 2210i (requiring manifests for
transfers of spent nuclear fuel pursuant to export and import
licenses), 2284(a)(3) (creating criminal penalties for actions that
damage spent nuclear fuel).
25
nowhere authorizes NRC to license private, offsite
storage facilities for spent fuel. The only support NRC
and ISP can muster are AEA provisions that do not
expressly reference spent fuel. See infra pp. 26-34.
The lack of affirmative authorization to license
private, offsite storage of spent fuel should end this
case. See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723
(2022) (“[a]gencies have only those powers given to
them by Congress”).
Express congressional authorization is necessary
here because where to store the nation’s spent fuel
is a major question with tremendous “economic and
political significance.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
at 159-60. Economically, the ISP facility concededly
implicates more than $600 million of value to the
nuclear industry, which itself contributes more than
$60 billion in economic value annually. ISP Br. 3;
NEI Br. 6, 15. The license also raises the potentially
disastrous economic consequences of a radiation leak
in the Permian Basin, which produces 50% of domestic
hydrocarbons (JA145) worth hundreds of millions of
dollars daily.
Politically, the NWPA recognized that “spent nuclear
fuel from nuclear reactors” is “a national problem”
that “ha[s] become [a] major subject[ ] of public concern.”
42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2), (7). The agency proceedings
drew public comments from States, counties, and
cities; Native American tribes; environmental groups;
industry groups; transportation groups; chambers
of commerce; and thousands of individuals. NRC
received more than 2,500 unique comments from the
public on the draft Environmental Impact Statement.10 And spent fuel still “poses a dangerous, long10 See https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2120/ML21209A955.pdf.
26
term health and environmental risk,” so the question
of where to store it will remain politically salient for
decades to come. New York, 681 F.3d at 474.
Given the economic and political importance of
spent-nuclear-fuel storage (which neither NRC nor
ISP seriously disputes), this Court should expect
Congress to speak clearly on the subject. Congress
did so in the NWPA by creating an explicit, detailed
program for interim storage of spent fuel.
2. NRC’s authority to license source,
special nuclear, and byproduct materials
does not add up to authority to license
spent fuel storage
Petitioners erroneously claim (NRC Br. 32-35;
ISP Br. 29-32) NRC has authority to license storage
facilities for spent fuel because the AEA authorizes
licenses for possession and transfer of some of spent
fuel’s constituent parts – source, special nuclear, and
byproduct material.
a. Congress did not define “spent nuclear fuel” in
the AEA as “a combination of source, special nuclear,
and byproduct materials.” Instead, Congress defined
“spent nuclear fuel” to include characteristics not
found in definitions of source, special nuclear, and
byproduct material. For example, spent fuel must
“ha[ve] been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor.” 42
U.S.C. § 10101(23) (NWPA) (incorporated by reference
in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee) (AEA)). It also must not have
undergone “reprocessing.” Id. So spent fuel is not
simply the sum of source, special nuclear, and byproduct material, and the sum of NRC’s licensing power for
those materials is not the power to license spent fuel.
See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024)
(“In a given statute, the same term usually has the
same meaning and different terms usually have
different meanings.”).
27
NRC’s own definition of spent fuel reinforces this
point. In 1980, NRC defined spent fuel as “irradiated
nuclear fuel that has undergone at least one year’s
decay since being used as a source of energy in a
power reactor. Spent fuel includes the special nuclear
material, byproduct material, source material, and
other radioactive materials associated with fuel assemblies.” 45 Fed. Reg. at 74,700-01 (emphases added).
NRC’s current definition still has this language (plus
additional requirements added in subsequent years).
See 10 C.F.R. § 72.3. NRC thus has understood since
before the NWPA that spent fuel includes other materials besides source, special nuclear, and byproduct
material, and that spent fuel has properties none of
those constituent materials possesses individually or
together.
Treating spent fuel as the combination of source,
special nuclear, and byproduct materials also violates
the canon against surplusage by rendering “spent
nuclear fuel” superfluous in some later-enacted AEA
sections. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001) (Court is “reluctant to treat statutory terms
as surplusage in any setting”) (cleaned up); see also
Reading Law 174-79. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 2210i
empowers NRC to ensure that “byproduct materials,
source materials, special nuclear materials, high-level
radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic
waste, and low-level nuclear waste” transferred in the
United States “pursuant to an import or export license
. . . are accompanied by a manifest” (emphasis added).
If spent fuel were merely the combination of source,
special nuclear, and byproduct materials, then “spent
nuclear fuel” would be superfluous here.
b. Petitioners’ assertion (NRC Br. 32; ISP Br. 2930) that authority to license source, special nuclear,
28
and byproduct material adds up to authority to license
spent fuel also ignores the AEA’s history and context.
Long-term storage of spent fuel was a non-starter
when Congress passed the AEA in 1954. The commonly held belief “accepted reprocessing as the only”
way to deal with spent fuel; “storage was neither
recommended nor considered” by Congress. Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826
F.2d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 1987); see also supra pp. 2-3.
The original AEA therefore said nothing about
“spent nuclear fuel” or how to store it. Indeed, in
asserting that NRC always has understood the AEA
to empower it to license spent fuel storage, petitioners
point to nothing pre-dating the 1970s – when the
nuclear fuel reprocessing industry already had begun
to collapse. Before that collapse, the government had
no plans for how to store spent fuel beyond the limited
storage incidental to reprocessing. See 40 Fed. Reg. at
42,802. That historical context refutes the notion that
Congress implicitly granted NRC power to store spent
fuel in 1954.
Petitioners’ argument also renders meaningless
Congress’s 1988 decision not to create a separate
licensing regime for spent fuel in the AEA. From
its inception, the AEA has given each type of nuclear
material its own Chapter. See Pub. L. No. 83-703,
ch. 6, 68 Stat. 919, 929-32 (special nuclear material);
id., ch. 7, 68 Stat. 932-35 (source material); id., ch. 8,
68 Stat. 935 (byproduct material). Each Chapter
includes a licensing regime specific to that type of
nuclear material. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073 (special nuclear
material), 2093 (source material), 2111 (byproduct
material).
By contrast, when Congress added the term “spent
nuclear fuel” and related provisions to the AEA in
29
1988, Congress did not add the term “spent nuclear
fuel” to any of the existing licensing regimes for
those other nuclear materials. Those omissions are
intentional and meaningful – because Congress had
addressed storage in the NWPA. The Russello principle of express inclusion and omission thus fits to a tee.
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). Had
Congress intended to authorize NRC to issue licenses
for spent fuel, it would have done so expressly as in
the other licensing regimes. See id.
ISP’s reliance (at 29-30) on 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b)
fares no better. That section gives NRC authority to
“establish” rules governing “the possession and use of
special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material . . . to promote” defense, security, health,
and safety. But again, those materials do not add up
to spent fuel. And the purpose of ISP’s license is “to
return [decommissioned reactor sites] to greenfield
status,” not to promote defense, security, health, or
safety. JA90.
3. Interim spent fuel storage facilities do
not satisfy the AEA’s licensing regimes
for source, special nuclear, or byproduct materials
Even if the AEA’s grant of authority to license
possession of source, special nuclear, and byproduct
material somehow added up to authority to license
spent fuel, NRC still would need to show that storage
(in any location) satisfies all three licensing regimes
to prevail. Yet NRC cannot satisfy one of the regimes,
much less all three.
Neither petitioner argues that storage of spent fuel
satisfies any enumerated purpose for licensing source,
special nuclear, or byproduct materials. Nor could
they. For both special nuclear and source material,
30
those purposes are (1) conducting “research and development” into their useful applications, (2) for use in
“medical therapy,” and (3) for use in enrichment facilities and nuclear reactors. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073(a)(1)-(3),
2093(a)(1)-(3). For byproduct material, those purposes
are (1) “research or development purposes,” (2) “medical
therapy,” (3) “industrial uses,” and (4) “agricultural
uses.” Id. § 2111(a). Spent fuel in storage is not used
in “research and development,” “medical therapy,”
enrichment facilities, or nuclear reactors, or for
“industrial uses” or “agricultural uses.” The point of
storage is to keep spent fuel from any use at all.
Petitioners instead argue that spent fuel storage
is a permissible “other” purpose under each of the
three licensing regimes. Id. §§ 2073(a)(4), 2093(a)(4),
2111(a). But these “other” clauses must be interpreted
to authorize licenses only for purposes “similar in
nature to those [purposes] enumerated by the preceding
specific words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528,
545 (2015) (plurality); see also id. (“ejusdem generis[ ]
counsels: Where general words follow specific words
in a statutory enumeration, the general words are
usually construed to embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding
words.”) (cleaned up). Here, “other uses” and “other
useful applications” mean uses similar to research
and development, medical therapy, and agricultural
applications, and use in enrichment facilities and
nuclear reactors. The common thread linking those
enumerated uses is putting the nuclear material to an
active, productive use. Storage, however, is not a productive use or application of spent fuel; it is prolonged
non-use.
ISP is incorrect (at 35) that the list of purposes in
these sections is too short to apply ejusdem generis. A
31
statutory list need include just “two or more things,”
which these do, to apply the canon. Reading Law 199;
see also Yates, 574 U.S. at 544-45 (plurality) (applying
canon to list consisting of “a record, document, or other
object”).
4. NRC’s remaining arguments about the “other”
clauses are unpersuasive
a. NRC argues that storage of spent fuel is a
permitted “other use” for special nuclear material because temporary, private, offsite storage allegedly will
enable reactors to “continue operating or . . . be safely
decommissioned” and thereby “ ‘encourage widespread
participation in the development and utilization of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes.’ ” Br. 33 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2013(d)); accord ISP Br. 30-31. But the
NWPA explicitly created an interim storage program
to enable the continued operation of civilian nuclear
power reactors. That program expands onsite storage
and, if such storage is unavailable, potential offsite
storage in government-owned-and-operated storage
facilities until reactor operators can build more onsite
storage. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10155. NRC may
disagree with (but not disregard) Congress’s policy
choice. Decommissioning nuclear power plants is the
opposite of “the development and utilization of atomic
energy.” Id. § 2013(d).
NRC’s assertion (at 33) that the ISP facility will
enable reactors to continue operating by making more
storage space available also is inaccurate. The facility’s stated purpose is to “provide temporary storage
of [spent fuel] for decommissioned shutdown sites in
order to return the land to greenfield status.” JA90.
The ISP facility simply shifts storage capacity (and
spent fuel) from one site to another.
32
b. NRC argues spent fuel storage is a permissible
“other use” as “ ‘an aid to . . . industry.’ ” Br. 34-35
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2093(a)(4)). But storage is not
a “use.” “Use” means “[a]ct of employing anything,
or state of being employed; application; employment.”
Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English
Language 2806 (2d ed. 1957). Spent fuel in storage is
neither applied nor employed to any end, which NRC
acknowledged as early as 1980. See 43 Fed. Reg. at
46,309 (noting that “spent fuel storage under static
storage conditions involv[es] no operations on such
materials”) (emphasis added).
c. NRC also argues (at 33-34) that storage is
“similar in type” to research and development, medical uses, and use in a nuclear power reactor because
“the spent fuel stored . . . results from” those activities.
But by that logic, a garbage dump is “similar in type”
to almost all human activities, as garbage results from
them. Petitioners make a hash of Congress’s chosen
language.
d. “[A]mbiguous statutory text” that provides “a
merely plausible textual basis for [an] agency action”
is not enough to sustain agency claims to authority
over major questions. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723.
NRC’s claimed AEA authority fails every indicator of
textual clarity (contra NRC Br. 48-49; ISP Br. 38-39).
First, NRC’s reading of the “other” clauses enables
it “to adopt a regulatory program that Congress
ha[s] conspicuously . . . declined to enact itself.” West
Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724. Congress considered
and rejected the possibility of using private, offsite
facilities for interim storage in the NWPA. See 42
U.S.C. § 10155(h); supra pp. 19-20. NRC’s own assessment of policy cannot override Congress’s. See West
Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723.
33
Second, NRC derived its licensing power from “the
vague language of [three] ancillary provision[s] of ” the
AEA. Id. at 724. Such stitch work provides, at best,
an ambiguous and “merely plausible” textual basis for
NRC’s action. Id. at 723.
Third, NRC’s “ ‘discover[y] in a long-extant statute
[of ] an unheralded power’ ” to license private, offsite
storage facilities, id. at 724 (quoting Utility Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)), is
regulatory authority in search of statutory justification. Not until 1980 – more than 25 years after the
AEA’s enactment and prompted by President Carter’s
“deferral of reprocessing of spent fuel in April 1977” –
did NRC first promulgate rules for licensing private,
offsite storage facilities. 45 Fed. Reg. at 74,693.
And in taking that action, NRC identified no specific
statutory language authorizing it. See id.
D. Petitioners’ Remaining Arguments Are
Unpersuasive
1. The AEA does not implicitly authorize
licensing of spent-nuclear-fuel storage
a. NRC argues (at 32) the Court must imply a
power to store spent fuel because “storage is a practical necessity in order for licensed persons to” “transfer, deliver, acquire, possess, own, receive possession
or title to, import, or export” nuclear materials. Even
if temporarily holding spent fuel is necessary, that
is not storage; it is holding the spent fuel until ready
for another productive use. That’s not what NRC
licensed. Here, storage in the ISP facility is not part
of any other activity. It’s the end goal, not an incident
to some other, authorized use. See 43 Fed. Reg. at
46,309 (“extended spent fuel storage . . . involv[es] no
operations on such materials”).
34
b. NRC further argues (at 41) the AEA must
authorize onsite storage because Congress would not
give NRC authority to license activities that create
spent fuel without also giving authority to license the
possession of spent fuel. This argument is flawed.
First, this case concerns offsite storage, not onsite
storage. So even if AEA has implied authority to
license limited onsite interim storage, that would not
justify NRC’s ISP offsite license.
Second, because Congress did give NRC authority
to license the storage of spent fuel in the NWPA,
its previous inaction is irrelevant. Again, before
the spent-fuel-reprocessing industry collapsed in the
1970s, the plan was to reprocess spent fuel, not store
it. Confronted with a new and unexpected challenge,
Congress enacted a new law. That law blessed previous onsite storage efforts, instructed NRC to authorize
additional onsite storage, and disclaimed the use of
offsite storage.
c. NRC also argues (at 36-37) that its “licensing
authority for facilities reinforces” its argument because the AEA “does not require a facilities license for
any other type of facility” – like storage – “that houses
nuclear fuel.” The AEA authorizes NRC to issue
licenses for just two types of facilities: production
facilities (like reprocessing plants) and utilization
facilities (like nuclear power reactors). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2131-2134. This does not mean other types of facilities require no license; it means NRC lacks authority
(under the AEA) to license any other type of facility,
including stand-alone storage facilities. NRC’s contrary assertion violates both the rule that “[a]gencies
have only those powers given to them by Congress,”
West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723, and the omitted-case
canon, see Reading Law 93-94.
35
2. NRC’s past practice and regulations do
not support its claims to authority
NRC argues (at 38-39) its “consistent interpretation” and application “of the [AEA] confirms that the
Act authorizes [NRC] to license the offsite storage of
spent fuel.” This argument fails.
First, NRC’s current AEA interpretation is not longstanding because NRC never previously attempted
to explain the statutory bases or purposes of interim
storage. In 1975, NRC first claimed “the discretion to
deal with issues of ” where and how to store spent fuel.
40 Fed. Reg. at 42,802. NRC cited no source for that
discretion at all, much less any AEA section. Then,
when NRC in 1980 promulgated regulations for licensing offsite interim storage, it made no attempt to
justify those regulations as conforming to the AEA’s
text. Instead, NRC said only that its new rules were
“issued under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,” with no
explanation of which AEA sections authorized which
regulations or why. 45 Fed. Reg. at 74,699. In 2003,
NRC claimed authority to license interim storage under
the combined authority of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2093,
and 2111 specifically. See NRC Br. 5, Bullcreek v.
NRC, Nos. 03-1018 & 03-1022, 2003 WL 25588879
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2003). But NRC still did not explain
what statutory purposes that storage supposedly fulfilled. So NRC’s efforts to justify its authority using
the AEA’s actual text are of recent provenance.
Second, NRC barely has used its wrongfully claimed
authority. NRC acknowledges (at 6) it has licensed
just four private, offsite storage facilities since
claiming such authority 45 years ago. Of those
four, two (ISP and Holtec) are the subjects of active
litigation in this Court, another (Private Fuel Storage
in Utah) never was built, and just one (the Morris
facility, originally licensed and built before 1980 as a
36
reprocessing facility, not a storage facility) ever was
built.
The remaining “offsite” storage petitioners now claim
exists, see NRC Br. 5-6, 39; ISP Br. 32 (claiming
“at least a dozen” offsite facilities), is actually onsite
storage – as DOE’s spent fuel inventory report
acknowledges. Spent Fuel Inventory 7-8 (listing 25
“shutdown reactors . . . with [spent fuel] remaining
onsite” and describing the Morris facility as “the only
non-DOE operated, NRC licensed pool storage facility
that is not co-located at a reactor site”) (emphases
added).
The ISP facility’s scale also is unprecedented.
The facility would hold at least 5,000 – and potentially
up to 40,000 – metric tons of spent fuel. No spent
fuel storage sites of that scale exist in this country.
Just the initial 5,000 metric tons would make the ISP
facility the largest single deposit of spent fuel in the
country. By comparison, the Morris facility – the only
private, offsite storage facility in the country – held
just 674 metric tons of spent fuel as of 2021. See id. at
F.3.
Third, even if NRC consistently had claimed and
exercised authority to license private, offsite storage
facilities (it did not), an old and oft-repeated error is
still error. For example, the Federal Trade Commission claimed for decades it had power to receive
“equitable monetary relief ” under § 13(b) of its organic
statute, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v.
FTC, 593 U.S. 67, 70, 72-74, 81-82 (2021). It had
issued regulatory guidance explicitly claiming that
power and “use[d] § 13(b) to win equitable monetary
relief directly in court with great frequency” since “the
late 1970s.” Id. at 73-74. Nevertheless, this Court
unanimously held that § 13(b) does not authorize the
37
FTC to receive equitable monetary relief. Id. at 70.
That holding applies here.11
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAD JURISDICTION
A. Fasken Is A “Party Aggrieved” Under The
Hobbs Act
1. Fasken satisfied statutory judicialreview requirements
The Hobbs Act permits “[a]ny party aggrieved by [a]
final order” of NRC to petition for review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2344. The AEA states NRC “shall admit . . . as a
party” to a licensing proceeding “any person whose
interest may be affected by the proceeding” and who
“request[s]” a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A).
Under that language, Fasken is a “party aggrieved”
entitled to seek judicial review. Fasken’s interest will
be affected by ISP’s license. See supra pp. 10-11.
NRC so found, and no party disputes that finding. See
Interim Storage Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 52. Petitioners
acknowledge Fasken requested a hearing. See NRC
Br. 9; ISP Br. 11.
The AEA and the Hobbs Act require nothing
more. See 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (“shall admit . . .
as a party”); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (the word
“shall” “creates an obligation impervious to [agency]
discretion”). And NRC’s license grant “aggrieved”
Fasken. App. 33a (“[T]here’s no question that Fasken
. . . is ‘aggrieved.’ ”) (Jones, J.).
11 The D.C. Circuit’s contrary holding in Bullcreek v. NRC, 359
F.3d 536 (2004), is unpersuasive. That decision assumed without
analysis that the AEA authorized NRC to license private, offsite
storage (it does not) and focused on whether § 10155(h) alone
(rather than the NWPA’s Interim Storage Program as a whole)
overcame that assumed authority.
38
2. The Fifth Circuit properly rejected
petitioners’ atextual arguments
Petitioners argue NRC’s decision not to grant
Fasken status as an intervenor – because it disagreed
with Fasken’s objections on the merits – sufficed to
deny it “party” status. NRC Br. 27. That confuses
intervention under NRC regulations with party status
under the AEA and the Hobbs Act. NRC’s intervention rules (adopted 35 years after the AEA) require
that an intervenor “propose[ ] at least one admissible
contention that meets the requirements of paragraph
(f ) of this section” – including, for example, that NRC
agree the contention raises “a material issue of law or
fact.” 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a), (f )(1)(vi).
NRC’s attempt to interpose a substantive hurdle to
party status lacks statutory support: the AEA requires
only that a person demonstrate its interest would be
affected and request a hearing to become a party; the
Hobbs Act imposes no additional requirements. See
PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic,
Inc., 588 U.S. 1, 26 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“[T]here is certainly no basis to
interpret a silent statute as achieving that extraordinary close-the-courthouse-door outcome.”). These
statutes’ clarity means “the judicial inquiry is
complete.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
98 (2003) (cleaned up).
The Fifth Circuit properly concluded the only
requirements for party status are statutory: affected
interests and participation. It reasoned that Fasken’s
geographical proximity to the proposed site meant
the license would affect Fasken’s interests. App. 12a.
It then ruled that “the plain text of the Hobbs Act
requires only that a petitioner have participated – in
some way – in the agency proceedings, which . . .
Fasken did.” App. 17a. The Fifth Circuit thus rejected
39
the “extra-textual” argument that intervention is an
“additional requirement[ ]” for party status. App. 18a.
As Judge Jones separately wrote, “the breadth of
NRC’s statutory charge to allow ‘affected persons’ to
be made ‘parties’ ” makes it “paradoxical to resort to
the Hobbs Act to disable Fasken . . . from judicial
review.” App. 35a.
3. Text, precedent, and purpose confirm
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation
a. Hobbs Act § 2348 supports Fasken. It governs
intervention in Hobbs Act proceedings and distinguishes a “party in interest in the proceeding before
the agency whose interests will be affected” from
others “whose interests are affected by the order of the
agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2348. The former may intervene
by “motion and as of right,” while the latter “may
intervene,” but not as of right. Id. Congress’s use
of the expansive phrase “party in interest” confirms
Fasken’s rights. A “party in interest” encompasses
all “entities that are potentially concerned with or
affected by a proceeding.” Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser
Gypsum Co., 144 S. Ct. 1414, 1424 (2024). That
holding confirms the breadth of those the Hobbs Act
considers a party.12 It does not support NRC’s effort
to erect the agency’s intervention rules as a barrier to
party status; the AEA compels the agency to accept
interested parties that request a hearing.13
12 See also U.S. Amicus Br. 13, Truck Ins., No. 22-1079 (U.S.
Dec. 14, 2023) (arguing “party in interest” “is broad and refers to
a participant in an action or affair that is concerned with or
affected by its potential effects”) (emphases added).
13 NRC cites (at 19) Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, which is
inapposite. There, the court dismissed a petition for lack of
jurisdiction because the petitioner did not participate at the
agency and its only interest was the case’s “potential effect as
a precedent.” 311 F.3d 1357, 1367 n.17 (11th Cir. 2002).
40
Public meaning does not support petitioners’
position. The three dictionaries NRC cites (at 17)
confirm participation as the touchstone for party
status. The only dictionary definition of “[p]arty
aggrieved” encompasses Fasken. See Party, Black’s
Law Dictionary 1278 (4th ed. 1951) (defining “[p]arty
aggrieved” as “one whose right has been directly and
injuriously affected by action of court”). Black’s says
that definition applies “[u]nder statutes permitting
any party aggrieved to appeal.” Id. And while the
dictionary defines “party” to mean “he or they by
or against whom a suit is brought,” the dictionary
cautions that “ ‘[p]arty’ is not restricted to strict meaning of plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit” and instead
can be “defined as one concerned in or privy to a
matter.” Id. The second dictionary NRC cites
defines “party” as “[o]ne who takes part, participates,
or is concerned in some action or affair; a participator;
an accessory.” 7 The Oxford English Dictionary 515
(1933) (emphases added). By contrast, the definition
NRC cites applies only if there are “two sides in some
proceeding, as the litigants in an action at law.”
Id. That definition does not apply: unlike lawsuits
in court, or complaint and enforcement proceedings
before administrative agencies – which principally
affect only plaintiffs and defendants – a licensing
proceeding affects a wide range of interested parties.
Cf. Comuni-Centre Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 856 F.2d 1551,
1555 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (unlike “a bipolar civil action
in a district court,” a “licensing case has the interest
of the public as its focus”). The third dictionary is
similar: it defines “party” as a “participant,” and NRC’s
definition applies only to lawsuits. The Random
41
House Dictionary of the English Language 1052-53
(1967).14
b. NRC’s extra-textual intervention requirement
lacks supporting precedent. One case it cites (at 30) –
National Parks Conservation Association v. FERC,
6 F.4th 1044 (9th Cir. 2021) – did not involve a Hobbs
Act agency. Another – Don’t Waste Michigan, 2023
WL 395030, at *3 – held without explanation that
denial of intervention undermined party status. In
Water Transportation Association v. ICC, the D.C.
Circuit held an interested person was a “party.”
See 819 F.2d 1189, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1987). And in Ohio
Nuclear-Free Network v. NRC, the interested person
did not even try to intervene. See 53 F.4th 236, 239
(D.C. Cir. 2022).
c. Finally, NRC’s use of intervention rules to
preclude appellate review is arbitrary. NRC cursorily
addressed Fasken’s merits arguments in denying it
intervenor status. That arbitrary approach allows
NRC to shortchange the merits, analyzing them
summarily without a complete record and controlling
“the courthouse door.” App. 33a-34a (Jones, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); cf.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,
739 (1985) (“Congress decided on the scope of judicial
review . . . solely by reference to the subject matter of
[NRC] action and not by reference to the procedural
particulars of [NRC] action.”); Massachusetts v. NRC,
878 F.2d 1516, 1520 (1st Cir. 1989) (“NRC cannot now
claim that by refusing to grant the Commonwealth’s
14 NRC’s other cases are irrelevant because they define “party”
in a lawsuit, not a licensing proceeding. See Smith v. Bayer
Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 (2011); United States ex rel. Eisenstein
v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 932-33 (2009); Marino v. Ortiz,
484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam); United States ex rel.
Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.S. 397, 402 (1917).
42
requests to become a party, the NRC’s decisions
are beyond review.”). This Court instead rejects
“conflat[ing] the merits of an objection with the
threshold party in interest inquiry.” Truck Ins., 144
S. Ct. at 1427.
By contrast, limiting judicial review to parties that
both have an interest and participated in the proceeding (whether by requesting a hearing or otherwise)
supports sound agency and judicial decision making.
“The point of the Hobbs Act is to force parties
who want to challenge agency orders via facial,
pre-enforcement challenges to do so promptly and to
do so in a court of appeals.” PDR Network, 588 U.S.
at 13 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment).
That purpose is met whenever people with affected
interests participate in the agency proceeding and –
when the agency rejects their views – sue timely in a
federal appeals court. Fasken did that by requesting
a hearing to protect its interests and timely petitioning the Fifth Circuit for review.
4. Petitioners’ remaining arguments fail
Petitioners seem to concede participation unlocks
party status. NRC (at 18) defines “party” as “a
participator” (emphasis added) and conceded (at Pet.
12) that “[t]he courts of appeals (including the Fifth
Circuit) have accordingly concluded that . . . actual[ ]
participat[ion] in the agency proceeding” suffices for
party status. ISP states that, “to pursue judicial
review under the statute, a person must either be
a ‘party’ to the agency proceeding, or at least have
attempted to become a ‘party’ to those proceedings.”
Br. 10 (emphases added). Fasken participated in NRC
proceedings in the AEA-prescribed manner, so the
Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction to entertain Fasken’s
petition even on ISP’s view.
That Fasken could (and did) appeal the denial of its
intervention motion is irrelevant. Success on that
43
appeal might have entitled Fasken to intervene and
participate more before NRC, but the AEA and the
Hobbs Act require neither. Nor does it matter that
Fasken did not distinguish party status and intervention in that appeal or in Fifth Circuit proceedings.
Party status goes to the Court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction; such arguments “can never be forfeited
or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630
(2002).
Finally, it hardly helps NRC (at 18) that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) refers to adversely
affected or aggrieved “person[s] ” rather than parties.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added). Fasken’s request for
a hearing and demonstration of its interest in the
license make it a “party aggrieved” and distinguish it
from someone who ignored the agency proceedings
entirely before seeking judicial review. Simmons v.
ICC does not help NRC, either. See NRC Br. 18 (citing
716 F.2d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.)). Its statement that the Hobbs Act refers “to a party before the
agency, not a party to the judicial proceeding,” 716
F.2d at 43, leaves unanswered the question who was
a party before the agency, which is the question here.
The Court need go no further.
Judge Jones
explained that the panel’s exercise of jurisdiction rested
on “two bases of authority”: “these petitioners are
parties aggrieved, and the NRC has acted ultra vires.”
App. 33a. The ultra vires ground was not required.
B. Jurisdiction Exists To Review Ultra Vires
Agency Action
1. American courts long have exercised
jurisdiction to review ultra vires action
The Fifth Circuit did not err in upholding jurisdiction because NRC acted ultra vires.
44
Judicial-review statutes like the Hobbs Act
presumptively do not bar preexisting modes of
review.15 In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, this
Court “survey[ed]” its “[e]arly cases” and concluded
“that judicial review of a final agency action by an
aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is
persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose
of Congress.” 387 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1967). Applying
that principle, the Court held the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act’s “specific review provisions . . . were
designed to give an additional remedy and not to cut
down more traditional channels of review.” Id. at 142
(emphasis added); see also PDR Network, 588 U.S.
at 16 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)
(Abbott Laboratories is a “landmark decision”).
American courts long have recognized that persons
can challenge agency actions taken without and
contrary to their statutory authority, even if they did
not participate in proceedings before the agency. For
example, in Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States,
this Court upheld jurisdiction “to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not
attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before”
the ICC, if the “contention is that the commission has
exceeded its statutory powers.” 249 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1919). Similarly, in Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustee v. United States, the Court stated that persons
could challenge the ICC’s orders if they are “alleged to
be in excess of the [ICC’s] power” and “subject[ ] [the
plaintiffs] to legal injury, actual or threatened.” 263
U.S. 143, 147-48 (1923).
15 NRC’s argument (at 16) that “[t]here is no textual basis
for the Fifth Circuit’s . . . ultra vires exception to th[e] partyaggrieved requirement” is misplaced. The question is whether
the Hobbs Act abrogated all preexisting modes of review.
45
2. The Hobbs Act does not abolish traditional ultra vires review
Enacted in 1950, the Hobbs Act “does not manifest
a congressional purpose to eliminate judicial review”
of ultra vires agency action. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at
144. The Act gives the federal appeals courts (other
than the Federal Circuit) “exclusive jurisdiction to
enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to
determine the validity of,” certain agency orders. 28
U.S.C. § 2342. But that exclusivity provision establishes only that challenges to those orders must occur
in an appellate venue. Likewise, § 2344’s requirement
that parties aggrieved must petition for review
“within 60 days after” an order is entered limits the
time within which persons may sue but leaves claims
substantively unaffected.
Finally, decisions immediately after the Hobbs Act
suggest the ultra vires rule survives. For example, in
Leedom v. Kyne, this Court said it will not “lightly
infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection
of rights it confers against agency action taken in
excess of delegated powers.” 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958).
It held federal district courts have jurisdiction if an
agency acts “in excess of its delegated powers and
contrary to a specific [statutory] prohibition.” Id. at
188 (emphasis added). That principle applies here.
NRC’s license grant exceeded its delegated powers
under the AEA and the NWPA. The Fifth Circuit’s
exercise of jurisdiction thus fits under Leedom. See
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. ICC, 673 F.2d 82, 85
n.4 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“a person may appeal
an agency action even if not a party to the original
agency proceeding . . . if the agency action is attacked
as exceeding [its] power”); accord Wales Transp., Inc.
v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774, 776 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984).
46
Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.,
502 U.S. 32 (1991), is not to the contrary. There, the
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Leedom
because (1) the relevant statute gave the party challenging agency action “a meaningful and adequate
means” to do so, and (2) “Congress ha[d] spoken
clearly and directly” that other ways to challenge
agency action were precluded. Id. at 43-44. Here,
both factors favor exercising jurisdiction. “[NRC’s]
interpretation of the [AEA and the Hobbs Act] would
wholly deprive [Fasken] of a meaningful and adequate
means of vindicating its statutory rights” because
NRC denied intervention to all interested persons.
Id. Those Acts do not support empowering NRC to
insulate its decisions from judicial review.
3. Petitioners’ criticisms of the ultra vires
rule are unfounded
Petitioners’ efforts to limit judicial review fail.
a. In FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466
U.S. 463 (1984), and ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987) – which NRC cites (at
20) to undermine the ultra vires rule – the agencies
did not argue that no court had the power to review
its orders. Rather, in ITT World, this Court held a
district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the agency’s
action as ultra vires in part because appellate review
was “[t]he appropriate procedure for obtaining judicial
review.” 466 U.S. at 468. Similarly, in Brotherhood,
the Court premised its analysis on the availability of
“appeal[ ] to the courts directly after” agency action.
482 U.S. at 279. NRC misreads Brotherhood (at 20) to
mean the Court “refused to adopt a[n] . . . exception to
the [Hobbs] Act’s 60-day filing window.” The Court
did not address that issue because those appeals were
timely. See 482 U.S. at 277.
47
b. Several of petitioners’ other criticisms of the
ultra vires rule also are speculative. NRC (at 21) and
ISP (at 27) argue the rule allows non-parties to obtain
appellate review. But Fasken was a party to NRC’s
proceeding. It did not “intentionally eschew[ ] available agency procedures for becoming a party.” ISP
Br. 27. Nor was NRC “deprive[d] . . . of the ability
to respond to [Fasken’s] arguments.” NRC Br. 21.
“Fasken’s multiple attempts formally to intervene” or
to reopen the record “were repeatedly rebuffed by the
agency,” App. 33a (Jones, J.), and the agency did so
only after summarily rejecting the merits of Fasken’s
contentions. This case, therefore, does not involve
the ultra vires rule empowering a person “to skip
the administrative proceeding and then ambush the
agency” in court. NRC Br. 21.
NRC’s next argument (at 22) – that the ultra vires
exception threatens to swallow the party-aggrieved
rule because ultra vires “may be a synonym for
‘wrong’ ” – is “hyperbol[ic]” and speculative as well.
App. 43a (Jones, J.). As Judge Jones explained, the
exception requires that the agency acted not only
without authority, but also in violation of express
limitations on its authority. Id. That rule is neither
“obscure” nor “indeterminate.” NRC Br. 22. It applies
here because NRC acted without AEA authority in
granting the license and did so in violation of express
limitations on NRC’s authority under the NWPA. By
contrast, in other cases, the Fifth Circuit repeatedly
has found the ultra vires principle inapplicable. See
Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911,
922 (5th Cir. 1993); Baros v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co.,
400 F.3d 228, 238 n.24 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Wales
Transp., 728 F.2d at 776 n.1 (ultra vires rule did not
change outcome because one petitioner “as to all
48
claims . . . participated in the original agency proceeding”).
c. Petitioners’ remaining criticisms of the ultra
vires rule lack merit. NRC’s argument (at 20-21)
the ultra vires rule is “untethered to the norms that
govern litigation in court” rests on a false equivalence
between “agency adjudication” and “district court
case[s].” While a non-party to a district-court case
cannot appeal it, the same is not necessarily true
for agency adjudication. As NRC acknowledges (at
18), the APA expressly allows interested persons to
challenge adverse agency action. That includes agency
adjudication. See Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d
936, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Standing to challenge
agency adjudications is of course more expansive than
standing to appeal lower court judgments, in that not
only the losing party before the agency but even . . .
other persons with interests adverse to the winning
party[ ] may often sue.”).
As for ISP, its reliance (at 19) on Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205 (2007), is misplaced. Bowles held courts
may not create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional
requirements. See id. at 214. The ultra vires rule
is not an “exception” to the Hobbs Act because it
preexisted the Act. See App. 42a (Jones, J.). Under
Abbott Laboratories, the rule governs unless superseded by statute.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeal’s judgment should be affirmed.
49
Respectfully submitted,
ALLAN KANNER
ANNEMIEKE M. TENNIS
KANNER & WHITELEY, L.L.C.
701 Camp Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 524-5777
MONICA RENEE PERALES
FASKEN LAND AND
MINERALS, LTD.
6101 Holiday Hill Road
Midland, TX 79707
(432) 687-1777
January 15, 2025
DAVID C. FREDERICK
Counsel of Record
SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH
CHRISTOPHER C. GOODNOW
MATTHEW J. WILKINS
RYAN M. FOLIO
KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,
FIGEL & FREDERICK,
P.L.L.C.
1615 M Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 326-7900
(dfrederick@kellogghansen.com
ADDENDUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703,
68 Stat. 919 (42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.):
Table of Contents for Pub. L. No. 83-703
(excerpt) ............................................................. Add. 1
42 U.S.C. § 2014 (excerpts) ........................... Add. 3
42 U.S.C. § 2073(a) ........................................ Add. 4
42 U.S.C. § 2093(a) ........................................ Add. 5
42 U.S.C. § 2111(a) ........................................ Add. 5
42 U.S.C. § 2131 ............................................ Add. 7
42 U.S.C. § 2132 ............................................ Add. 7
42 U.S.C. § 2133(a) ........................................ Add. 8
42 U.S.C. § 2134 ............................................ Add. 8
42 U.S.C. § 2210i ......................................... Add. 11
42 U.S.C. § 2239 .......................................... Add. 11
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (42 U.S.C. § 10101
et seq.):
Table of Contents for Pub. L. No. 97-425
(excerpt) ........................................................ Add. 16
42 U.S.C. § 10101(23) .................................. Add. 18
42 U.S.C. § 10131 ........................................ Add. 18
42 U.S.C. § 10151 ........................................ Add. 20
42 U.S.C. § 10152 ........................................ Add. 21
42 U.S.C. § 10153 ........................................ Add. 21
42 U.S.C. § 10154 ........................................ Add. 22
42 U.S.C. § 10155 (excerpts) ....................... Add. 25
42 U.S.C. § 10172 ........................................ Add. 31
ii
Administrative Orders Review Act, ch. 1189,
64 Stat. 1129 (1950) (28 U.S.C. § 2341 et
seq.) (Hobbs Act):
28 U.S.C. § 2342 .......................................... Add. 32
28 U.S.C. § 2344 .......................................... Add. 33
28 U.S.C. § 2348 .......................................... Add. 34
10 C.F.R.:
§ 2.309 (excerpts) ......................................... Add. 35
§ 2.335(b) ...................................................... App. 39
§ 72.3 (excerpt)............................................. App. 40
Add. 1
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (42 U.S.C. § 2011
et seq.):
1. Excerpt from Table of Contents for Pub. L. No.
83-703:
“ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
“CHAPTER 1. DECLARATION, FINDINGS,
AND PURPOSE
“Sec. 1. Declaration.
“Sec. 2. Findings.
“Sec. 3. Purpose.
“CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS
“Sec. 11. Definitions.
“CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION
“Sec. 21. Atomic Energy Commission.
“Sec. 22. Members.
“Sec. 23. Office.
“Sec. 24. General Manager.
“Sec. 25. Divisions and Offices.
“Sec. 26. General Advisory Committee.
“Sec. 27. Military Liaison Committee.
“Sec. 28. Appointment of Army, Navy, or Air Force
Officers.
“CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH
“Sec. 31. Research Assistance.
“Sec. 32. Research by the Commission.
“Sec. 33. Research for Others.
Add. 2
“CHAPTER 5. PRODUCTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
“Sec. 41. Ownership and Operation of Production
Facilities.
“Sec. 42. Irradiation of Materials.
“Sec. 43. Acquisition of Production Facilities.
“Sec. 44. Disposition of Energy.
“CHAPTER 6. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
“Sec. 51. Special Nuclear Material.
“Sec. 52. Government Ownership of All Special Nuclear
Material.
“Sec. 53. Domestic Distribution of Special Nuclear
Material.
“Sec. 54. Foreign Distribution of Special Nuclear Material.
“Sec. 55. Acquisition.
“Sec. 56. Fair Price.
“Sec. 57. Prohibition.
“CHAPTER 7. SOURCE MATERIAL
“Sec. 61. Source Material.
“Sec. 62. License for Transfers Required.
“Sec. 63. Domestic Distribution of Source Material.
“Sec. 64. Foreign Distribution of Source Material.
“Sec. 65. Reporting.
“Sec. 66. Acquisition.
“Sec. 67. Operations on Lands Belonging to the United
States.
“Sec. 68. Public Lands.
“Sec. 69. Prohibition.
“CHAPTER 8. BYPRODUCT MATERIAL
“Sec. 81. Domestic Distribution.
“Sec. 82. Foreign Distribution of Byproduct Material.
***”
Add. 3
2.
42 U.S.C. § 2014 provides in relevant part:
§ 2014. Definitions
The intent of Congress in the definitions as given
in this section should be construed from the words
or phrases used in the definitions. As used in this
chapter:
***
(aa) The term “special nuclear material” means
(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or
in the isotope 235, and any other material which the
Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section
2071 of this title, determines to be special nuclear
material, but does not include source material; or
(2) any material artificially enriched by any of the
foregoing, but does not include source material.
***
(cc) The term “utilization facility” means (1) any
equipment or device, except an atomic weapon,
determined by rule of the Commission to be capable
of making use of special nuclear material in such
quantity as to be of significance to the common
defense and security, or in such manner as to affect
the health and safety of the public, or peculiarly
adapted for making use of atomic energy in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and
security, or in such manner as to affect the health and
safety of the public; or (2) any important component
part especially designed for such equipment or device
as determined by the Commission.
***
(ee) HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE; SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL.—The terms “high-level radioactive
Add. 4
waste” and “spent nuclear fuel” have the meanings
given such terms in section 10101 of this title.
***
3.
42 U.S.C. § 2073 provides in relevant part:
§ 2073. Domestic distribution of special nuclear
material
(a) Licenses
The Commission is authorized (i) to issue licenses to
transfer or receive in interstate commerce, transfer,
deliver, acquire, possess, own, receive possession of or
title to, import, or export under the terms of an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section
2153 of this title, special nuclear material, (ii) to make
special nuclear material available for the period of the
license, and, (iii) to distribute special nuclear material
within the United States to qualified applicants requesting such material—
(1) for the conduct of research and development
activities of the types specified in section 2051 of
this title;
(2) for use in the conduct of research and development activities or in medical therapy under a license
issued pursuant to section 2134 of this title;
(3) for use under a license issued pursuant to
section 2133 of this title;
(4) for such other uses as the Commission determines to be appropriate to carry out the purposes of
this chapter.
***
Add. 5
4.
42 U.S.C. § 2093 provides in relevant part:
§ 2093. Domestic distribution of source material
(a) License
The Commission is authorized to issue licenses
for and to distribute source material within the
United States to qualified applicants requesting such
material—
(1) for the conduct of research and development
activities of the types specified in section 2051 of
this title;
(2) for use in the conduct of research and development activities or in medical therapy under a license
issued pursuant to section 2134 of this title;
(3) for use under a license issued pursuant to
section 2133 of this title; or
(4) for any other use approved by the Commission
as an aid to science or industry.
***
5.
42 U.S.C. § 2111 provides in relevant part:
§ 2111. Domestic distribution
(a) In general
No person may transfer or receive in interstate
commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire,
own, possess, import, or export any byproduct material, except to the extent authorized by this section,
section 2112 or section 2114 of this title. The Commission is authorized to issue general or specific licenses
to applicants seeking to use byproduct material for research or development purposes, for medical therapy,
Add. 6
industrial uses, agricultural uses, or such other useful
applications as may be developed. The Commission
may distribute, sell, loan, or lease such byproduct
material as it owns to qualified applicants with or
without charge: Provided, however, That, for byproduct material to be distributed by the Commission for a
charge, the Commission shall establish prices on such
equitable basis as, in the opinion of the Commission,
(a) will provide reasonable compensation to the Government for such material, (b) will not discourage the
use of such material or the development of sources of
supply of such material independent of the Commission, and (c) will encourage research and development.
In distributing such material, the Commission shall
give preference to applicants proposing to use such
material either in the conduct of research and development or in medical therapy. The Commission shall
not permit the distribution of any byproduct material
to any licensee, and shall recall or order the recall of
any distributed material from any licensee, who is not
equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety
standards to protect health as may be established by
the Commission or who uses such material in violation
of law or regulation of the Commission or in a manner
other than as disclosed in the application therefor
or approved by the Commission. The Commission is
authorized to establish classes of byproduct material
and to exempt certain classes or quantities of material
or kinds of uses or users from the requirements for a
license set forth in this section when it makes a
finding that the exemption of such classes or quantities of such material or such kinds of uses or users will
not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common
defense and security and to the health and safety of
the public.
***
Add. 7
6.
42 U.S.C. § 2131 provides:
§ 2131. License required
It shall be unlawful, except as provided in section
2121 of this title, for any person within the United
States to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,
manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, use,
import, or export any utilization or production facility
except under and in accordance with a license issued
by the Commission pursuant to section 2133 or 2134
of this title.
7.
42 U.S.C. § 2132 provides:
§ 2132. Utilization and production facilities for
industrial or commercial purposes
(a) Issuance of licenses
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), or
otherwise specifically authorized by law, any license
hereafter issued for a utilization or production facility
for industrial or commercial purposes shall be issued
pursuant to section 2133 of this title.
(b) Facilities constructed or operated under
section 2134(b)
Any license hereafter issued for a utilization or production facility for industrial or commercial purposes,
the construction or operation of which was licensed
pursuant to section 2134(b) of this title prior to
enactment into law of this subsection, shall be issued
under section 2134(b) of this title.
(c) Cooperative Power Reactor Demonstration
facilities
Any license for a utilization or production facility
for industrial or commercial purposes constructed or
Add. 8
operated under an arrangement with the Commission
entered into under the Cooperative Power Reactor
Demonstration Program shall, except as otherwise
specifically required by applicable law, be issued
under section 2134(b) of this title.
8.
42 U.S.C. § 2133 provides in relevant part:
§ 2133. Commercial licenses
(a) Conditions
The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to
persons applying therefor to transfer or receive in
interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer,
acquire, possess, use, import, or export under the
terms of an agreement for cooperation arranged
pursuant to section 2153 of this title, utilization or
production facilities for industrial or commercial
purposes. Such licenses shall be issued in accordance
with the provisions of subchapter XV and subject to
such conditions as the Commission may by rule or
regulation establish to effectuate the purposes and
provisions of this chapter.
***
9.
42 U.S.C. § 2134 provides:
§ 2134. Medical, industrial, and commercial
licenses
(a) Medical therapy
The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to
persons applying therefor for utilization facilities for
use in medical therapy. In issuing such licenses the
Commission is directed to permit the widest amount
Add. 9
of effective medical therapy possible with the amount
of special nuclear material available for such purposes
and to impose the minimum amount of regulation
consistent with its obligations under this chapter to
promote the common defense and security and to
protect the health and safety of the public.
(b) Industrial and commercial purposes
As provided for in subsection (b) or (c) of section
2132 of this title, or where specifically authorized by
law, the Commission is authorized to issue licenses
under this subsection to persons applying therefor for
utilization and production facilities for industrial and
commercial purposes. In issuing licenses under this
subsection, the Commission shall impose the minimum amount of such regulations and terms of license
as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations
under this chapter.
(c) Research and development activities
(1) In general
Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Commission
is authorized to issue licenses to persons applying
therefor for utilization and production facilities useful
in the conduct of research and development activities
of the types specified in section 2051 of this title.
(2) Regulation
The Commission is directed to impose only such
minimum amount of regulation of the licensee as
the Commission finds will permit the Commission to
fulfill its obligations under this chapter to promote the
common defense and security and to protect the health
and safety of the public and will permit the conduct of
widespread and diverse research and development.
Add. 10
(3) Limitation on utilization facilities
The Commission may issue a license under this
section for a utilization facility useful in the conduct
of research and development activities of the types
specified in section 2051 of this title if—
(A) not more than 75 percent of the annual costs
to the licensee of owning and operating the facility
are devoted to the sale, other than for research and
development or education and training, of—
(i) nonenergy services;
(ii) energy; or
(iii) a combination of nonenergy services and
energy; and
(B) not more than 50 percent of the annual costs
to the licensee of owning and operating the facility
are devoted to the sale of energy.
(d) Limitations
No license under this section may be given to any
person for activities which are not under or within the
jurisdiction of the United States, except for the export
of production or utilization facilities under terms of
an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to
section 2153 of this title or except under the provisions
of section 2139 of this title. No license may be issued
to any corporation or other entity if the Commission
knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled,
or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a
foreign government. In any event, no license may be
issued to any person within the United States if, in the
opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to
such person would be inimical to the common defense
and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Add. 11
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2210i provides:
§ 2210i. Secure transfer of nuclear materials
(a) The Commission shall establish a system to
ensure that materials described in subsection (b),
when transferred or received in the United States
by any party pursuant to an import or export license
issued pursuant to this chapter, are accompanied by a
manifest describing the type and amount of materials
being transferred or received. Each individual receiving or accompanying the transfer of such materials
shall be subject to a security background check conducted by appropriate Federal entities.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by the Commission
by regulation, the materials referred to in subsection
(a) are byproduct materials, source materials, special
nuclear materials, high-level radioactive waste, spent
nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, and low-level radioactive waste (as defined in section 10101(16) of this
title).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 provides:
§ 2239. Hearings and judicial review
(a)(1)(A) In any proceeding under this chapter, for
the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of
any license or construction permit, or application to
transfer control, and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing
with the activities of licensees, and in any proceeding
for the payment of compensation, an award or royalties under sections 2183, 2187, 2236(c) or 2238 of this
title, the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the
request of any person whose interest may be affected
by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as
Add. 12
a party to such proceeding. The Commission shall
hold a hearing after thirty days’ notice and publication
once in the Federal Register, on each application
under section 2133 or 2134(b) of this title for a construction permit for a facility, and on any application
under section 2134(c) of this title for a construction
permit for a testing facility. In cases where such a
construction permit has been issued following the
holding of such a hearing, the Commission may, in the
absence of a request therefor by any person whose
interest may be affected, issue an operating license or
an amendment to a construction permit or an amendment to an operating license without a hearing, but
upon thirty days’ notice and publication once in the
Federal Register of its intent to do so. The Commission may dispense with such thirty days’ notice and
publication with respect to any application for an
amendment to a construction permit or an amendment to an operating license upon a determination
by the Commission that the amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration.
(B)(i) Not less than 180 days before the date scheduled for initial loading of fuel into a plant by a licensee
that has been issued a combined construction permit
and operating license under section 2235(b) of this
title, the Commission shall publish in the Federal
Register notice of intended operation. That notice
shall provide that any person whose interest may be
affected by operation of the plant, may within 60 days
request the Commission to hold a hearing on whether
the facility as constructed complies, or on completion
will comply, with the acceptance criteria of the license.
(ii) A request for hearing under clause (i) shall
show, prima facie, that one or more of the acceptance
criteria in the combined license have not been, or will
Add. 13
not be met, and the specific operational consequences
of nonconformance that would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the
public health and safety.
(iii) After receiving a request for a hearing under
clause (i), the Commission expeditiously shall either
deny or grant the request. If the request is granted,
the Commission shall determine, after considering
petitioners’ prima facie showing and any answers
thereto, whether during a period of interim operation,
there will be reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. If the Commission
determines that there is such reasonable assurance, it
shall allow operation during an interim period under
the combined license.
(iv) The Commission, in its discretion, shall
determine appropriate hearing procedures, whether
informal or formal adjudicatory, for any hearing under
clause (i), and shall state its reasons therefor.
(v) The Commission shall, to the maximum possible
extent, render a decision on issues raised by the hearing request within 180 days of the publication of the
notice provided by clause (i) or the anticipated date for
initial loading of fuel into the reactor, whichever is
later. Commencement of operation under a combined
license is not subject to subparagraph (A).
(2)(A) The Commission may issue and make
immediately effective any amendment to an operating
license or any amendment to a combined construction
and operating license, upon a determination by the
Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the
pendency before the Commission of a request for a
hearing from any person. Such amendment may be
Add. 14
issued and made immediately effective in advance of
the holding and completion of any required hearing.
In determining under this section whether such
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission shall consult with the State
in which the facility involved is located. In all other
respects such amendment shall meet the requirements of this chapter.
(B) The Commission shall periodically (but not less
frequently than once every thirty days) publish notice
of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued,
as provided in subparagraph (A). Each such notice
shall include all amendments issued, or proposed to be
issued, since the date of publication of the last such
periodic notice. Such notice shall, with respect to each
amendment or proposed amendment (i) identify the
facility involved; and (ii) provide a brief description of
such amendment. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to delay the effective date of any amendment.
(C) The Commission shall, during the ninety-day
period following the effective date of this paragraph,
promulgate regulations establishing (i) standards for
determining whether any amendment to an operating
license or any amendment to a combined construction
and operating license involves no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) criteria for providing or, in emergency
situations, dispensing with prior notice and reasonable opportunity for public comment on any such
determination, which criteria shall take into account
the exigency of the need for the amendment involved;
and (iii) procedures for consultation on any such
determination with the State in which the facility
involved is located.
Add. 15
(b) The following Commission actions shall be
subject to judicial review in the manner prescribed in
chapter 158 of title 28 and chapter 7 of title 5:
(1) Any final order entered in any proceeding of
the kind specified in subsection (a).
(2) Any final order allowing or prohibiting a
facility to begin operating under a combined
construction and operating license.
(3) Any final order establishing by regulation
standards to govern the Department of Energy’s
gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plants,
including any such facilities leased to a corporation
established under the USEC Privatization Act [42
U.S.C. 2297h et seq.].
(4) Any final determination under section 2297f(c)
of this title relating to whether the gaseous diffusion
plants, including any such facilities leased to a corporation established under the USEC Privatization
Act [42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.], are in compliance with
the Commission’s standards governing the gaseous
diffusion plants and all applicable laws.
Add. 16
Relevant provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (42 U.S.C.
§ 10101 et seq.):
1. Excerpt from Table of Contents for Pub. L. No.
97-425:
SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the “Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982”.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Separability.
Sec. 4. Territories and possessions.
Sec. 5. Ocean disposal.
Sec. 6. Limitation on spending authority.
Sec. 7. Protection of classified national security information.
Sec. 8. Applicability.
Sec. 9. Applicability.
TITLE I—DISPOSAL AND STORAGE OF HIGH-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL,
AND LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Sec. 101. State and affected Indian tribe participation in
development of proposed repositories for defense
waste.
SUBTITLE A—REPOSITORIES FOR DISPOSAL OF HIGHLEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Sec. 111. Findings and purposes.
Sec. 112. Recommendation of candidate sites for site
characterization.
Sec. 113. Site characterization.
Add. 17
Sec. 114. Site approval and construction authorization.
Sec. 115. Review of repository site selection.
Sec. 116. Participation of States.
Sec. 117. Consultation with States and Indian tribes.
Sec. 118. Participation of Indian tribes.
Sec. 119. Judicial review of agency actions.
Sec. 120. Expedited authorizations.
Sec. 121. Certain standards and criteria.
Sec. 122. Disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
Sec. 123. Title to material.
Sec. 124. Consideration of effect of acquisition of water
rights.
Sec. 125. Termination of certain provisions.
SUBTITLE B—INTERIM STORAGE PROGRAM
Sec. 131. Findings and purposes.
Sec. 132. Available capacity for interim storage of spent
nuclear fuel.
Sec. 133. Interim at-reactor storage.
Sec. 134. Licensing of facility expansions and transshipments.
Sec. 135. Storage of spent nuclear fuel.
Sec. 136. Interim Storage Fund.
Sec. 137. Transportation.
SUBTITLE C—MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE
Sec. 141. Monitored retrievable storage.
SUBTITLE D—LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Sec. 151. Financial arrangements for site closure.
***
Add. 18
2.
42 U.S.C. § 10101 provides in relevant part:
§ 10101. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter:
***
(23) The term “spent nuclear fuel” means fuel that
has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following
irradiation, the constituent elements of which have
not been separated by reprocessing.
***
3.
42 U.S.C. § 10131 provides:
§ 10131. Findings and purposes
(a) The Congress finds that—
(1) radioactive waste creates potential risks and
requires safe and environmentally acceptable methods
of disposal;
(2) a national problem has been created by the
accumulation of (A) spent nuclear fuel from nuclear
reactors; and (B) radioactive waste from (i) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; (ii) activities related
to medical research, diagnosis, and treatment; and
(iii) other sources;
(3) Federal efforts during the past 30 years to devise
a permanent solution to the problems of civilian
radioactive waste disposal have not been adequate;
(4) while the Federal Government has the responsibility to provide for the permanent disposal of highlevel radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel as
may be disposed of in order to protect the public health
and safety and the environment, the costs of such
disposal should be the responsibility of the generators
and owners of such waste and spent fuel;
Add. 19
(5) the generators and owners of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have the primary
responsibility to provide for, and the responsibility to
pay the costs of, the interim storage of such waste and
spent fuel until such waste and spent fuel is accepted
by the Secretary of Energy in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter;
(6) State and public participation in the planning
and development of repositories is essential in order
to promote public confidence in the safety of disposal
of such waste and spent fuel; and
(7) high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel have become major subjects of public concern, and
appropriate precautions must be taken to ensure that
such waste and spent fuel do not adversely affect the
public health and safety and the environment for this
or future generations.
(b) The purposes of this part are—
(1) to establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of repositories that will provide a
reasonable assurance that the public and the environment will be adequately protected from the hazards
posed by high-level radioactive waste and such spent
nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in a repository;
(2) to establish the Federal responsibility, and a
definite Federal policy, for the disposal of such waste
and spent fuel;
(3) to define the relationship between the Federal
Government and the State governments with respect
to the disposal of such waste and spent fuel; and
(4) to establish a Nuclear Waste Fund, composed of
payments made by the generators and owners of such
waste and spent fuel, that will ensure that the costs of
Add. 20
carrying out activities relating to the disposal of such
waste and spent fuel will be borne by the persons
responsible for generating such waste and spent fuel.
4.
42 U.S.C. § 10151 provides:
§ 10151. Findings and purposes
(a) The Congress finds that—
(1) the persons owning and operating civilian
nuclear power reactors have the primary responsibility for providing interim storage of spent nuclear fuel
from such reactors, by maximizing, to the extent practical, the effective use of existing storage facilities at
the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor, and by
adding new onsite storage capacity in a timely manner
where practical;
(2) the Federal Government has the responsibility
to encourage and expedite the effective use of existing
storage facilities and the addition of needed new storage capacity at the site of each civilian nuclear power
reactor; and
(3) the Federal Government has the responsibility
to provide, in accordance with the provisions of this
part, not more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for
interim storage of spent nuclear fuel for civilian
nuclear power reactors that cannot reasonably provide
adequate storage capacity at the sites of such reactors
when needed to assure the continued, orderly operation of such reactors.
(b) The purposes of this part are—
(1) to provide for the utilization of available spent
nuclear fuel pools at the site of each civilian nuclear
power reactor to the extent practical and the addition
of new spent nuclear fuel storage capacity where
practical at the site of such reactor; and
Add. 21
(2) to provide, in accordance with the provisions of
this part, for the establishment of a federally owned
and operated system for the interim storage of spent
nuclear fuel at one or more facilities owned by the
Federal Government with not more than 1,900 metric
tons of capacity to prevent disruptions in the orderly
operation of any civilian nuclear power reactor that
cannot reasonably provide adequate spent nuclear
fuel storage capacity at the site of such reactor when
needed.
5.
42 U.S.C. § 10152 provides:
§ 10152. Available capacity for interim storage
of spent nuclear fuel
The Secretary, the Commission, and other authorized Federal officials shall each take such actions as
such official considers necessary to encourage and
expedite the effective use of available storage, and
necessary additional storage, at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor consistent with—
(1) the protection of the public health and safety,
and the environment;
(2) economic considerations;
(3) continued operation of such reactor;
(4) any applicable provisions of law; and
(5) the views of the population surrounding such
reactor.
6.
42 U.S.C. § 10153 provides:
§ 10153. Interim at-reactor storage
The Commission shall, by rule, establish procedures
for the licensing of any technology approved by the
Commission under section 10198(a) of this title for
Add. 22
use at the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor.
The establishment of such procedures shall not preclude the licensing, under any applicable procedures
or rules of the Commission in effect prior to such
establishment, of any technology for the storage of
civilian spent nuclear fuel at the site of any civilian
nuclear power reactor.
7.
42 U.S.C. § 10154 provides:
§ 10154.
Licensing of facility expansions and
transshipments
(a) Oral argument
In any Commission hearing under section 189 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2239) on an
application for a license, or for an amendment to an
existing license, filed after January 7, 1983, to expand
the spent nuclear fuel storage capacity at the site of
a civilian nuclear power reactor, through the use of
high-density fuel storage racks, fuel rod compaction,
the transshipment of spent nuclear fuel to another
civilian nuclear power reactor within the same utility
system, the construction of additional spent nuclear
fuel pool capacity or dry storage capacity, or by other
means, the Commission shall, at the request of any
party, provide an opportunity for oral argument with
respect to any matter which the Commission determines to be in controversy among the parties. The
oral argument shall be preceded by such discovery
procedures as the rules of the Commission shall
provide. The Commission shall require each party,
including the Commission staff, to submit in written
form, at the time of the oral argument, a summary of
the facts, data, and arguments upon which such party
proposes to rely that are known at such time to
Add. 23
such party. Only facts and data in the form of sworn
testimony or written submission may be relied upon
by the parties during oral argument. Of the materials
that may be submitted by the parties during oral
argument, the Commission shall only consider those
facts and data that are submitted in the form of sworn
testimony or written submission.
(b) Adjudicatory hearing
(1) At the conclusion of any oral argument under
subsection (a), the Commission shall designate any
disputed question of fact, together with any remaining
questions of law, for resolution in an adjudicatory
hearing only if it determines that—
(A) there is a genuine and substantial dispute
of fact which can only be resolved with sufficient
accuracy by the introduction of evidence in an
adjudicatory hearing; and
(B) the decision of the Commission is likely to
depend in whole or in part on the resolution of such
dispute.
(2) In making a determination under this subsection, the Commission—
(A) shall designate in writing the specific facts
that are in genuine and substantial dispute, the
reason why the decision of the agency is likely to
depend on the resolution of such facts, and the
reason why an adjudicatory hearing is likely to
resolve the dispute; and
(B) shall not consider—
(i) any issue relating to the design, construction,
or operation of any civilian nuclear power reactor
already licensed to operate at such site, or any
civilian nuclear power reactor for which a
Add. 24
construction permit has been granted at such site,
unless the Commission determines that any such
issue substantially affects the design, construction,
or operation of the facility or activity for which
such license application, authorization, or amendment is being considered; or
(ii) any siting or design issue fully considered
and decided by the Commission in connection with
the issuance of a construction permit or operating
license for a civilian nuclear power reactor at such
site, unless (I) such issue results from any revision
of siting or design criteria by the Commission
following such decision; and (II) the Commission
determines that such issue substantially affects
the design, construction, or operation of the facility or activity for which such license application,
authorization, or amendment is being considered.
(3) The provisions of paragraph (2)(B) shall apply
only with respect to licenses, authorizations, or amendments to licenses or authorizations, applied for under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)
before December 31, 2005.
(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to
the first application for a license or license amendment received by the Commission to expand onsite
spent fuel storage capacity by the use of a new technology not previously approved for use at any nuclear
powerplant by the Commission.
(c) Judicial review
No court shall hold unlawful or set aside a decision
of the Commission in any proceeding described in
subsection (a) because of a failure by the Commission
to use a particular procedure pursuant to this section
unless—
Add. 25
(1) an objection to the procedure used was
presented to the Commission in a timely fashion or
there are extraordinary circumstances that excuse
the failure to present a timely objection; and
(2) the court finds that such failure has precluded
a fair consideration and informed resolution of a
significant issue of the proceeding taken as a whole.
8.
42 U.S.C. § 10155 provides in relevant part:
§ 10155. Storage of spent nuclear fuel
(a) Storage capacity
(1) Subject to section 10107 of this title, the Secretary shall provide, in accordance with paragraph (5),
not more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for the
storage of spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear
power reactors. Such storage capacity shall be
provided through any one or more of the following
methods, used in any combination determined by the
Secretary to be appropriate:
(A) use of available capacity at one or more facilities owned by the Federal Government on January
7, 1983, including the modification and expansion of
any such facilities, if the Commission determines
that such use will adequately protect the public
health and safety, except that such use shall not—
(i) render such facilities subject to licensing
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2011 et seq.) or the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.); or
(ii) except as provided in subsection (c) require
the preparation of an environmental impact
statement under section 102(2)(C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.
Add. 26
4332(2)(C)), such facility is already being used, or
has previously been used, for such storage or for
any similar purpose.
(B) acquisition of any modular or mobile spent
nuclear fuel storage equipment, including spent
nuclear fuel storage casks, and provision of such
equipment, to any person generating or holding title
to spent nuclear fuel, at the site of any civilian
nuclear power reactor operated by such person or
at any site owned by the Federal Government on
January 7, 1983;
(C) construction of storage capacity at any site of
a civilian nuclear power reactor.
(2) Storage capacity authorized by paragraph (1)
shall not be provided at any Federal or non-Federal
site within which there is a candidate site for a repository. The restriction in the preceding sentence shall
only apply until such time as the Secretary decides
that such candidate site is no longer a candidate site
under consideration for development as a repository.
(3) In selecting methods of providing storage capacity under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider
the timeliness of the availability of each such method
and shall seek to minimize the transportation of spent
nuclear fuel, the public health and safety impacts, and
the costs of providing such storage capacity.
(4) In providing storage capacity through any
method described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall
comply with any applicable requirements for licensing
or authorization of such method, except as provided in
paragraph (1)(A)(i).
(5) The Secretary shall ensure that storage capacity
is made available under paragraph (1) when needed,
as determined on the basis of the storage needs specified in contracts entered into under section 10156(a)
Add. 27
of this title, and shall accept upon request any spent
nuclear fuel as covered under such contracts.
(6) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), the term
“facility” means any building or structure.
(b) Contracts
(1) Subject to the capacity limitation established in
subsections (a)(1) and (d), the Secretary shall offer to
enter into, and may enter into, contracts under section
10156(a) of this title with any person generating or
owning spent nuclear fuel for purposes of providing
storage capacity for such spent fuel under this section
only if the Commission determines that—
(A) adequate storage capacity to ensure the
continued orderly operation of the civilian nuclear
power reactor at which such spent nuclear fuel
is generated cannot reasonably be provided by the
person owning and operating such reactor at such
site, or at the site of any other civilian nuclear power
reactor operated by such person, and such capacity
cannot be made available in a timely manner
through any method described in subparagraph (B);
and
(B) such person is diligently pursuing licensed
alternatives to the use of Federal storage capacity
for the storage of spent nuclear fuel expected to be
generated by such person in the future, including—
(i) expansion of storage facilities at the site of
any civilian nuclear power reactor operated by
such person;
(ii) construction of new or additional storage
facilities at the site of any civilian nuclear power
reactor operated by such person;
(iii) acquisition of modular or mobile spent
nuclear fuel storage equipment, including spent
Add. 28
nuclear fuel storage casks, for use at the site of
any civilian nuclear power reactor operated by
such person; and
(iv) transshipment to another civilian nuclear
power reactor owned by such person.
(2) In making the determination described in
paragraph (1)(A), the Commission shall ensure maintenance of a full core reserve storage capability at the
site of the civilian nuclear power reactor involved
unless the Commission determines that maintenance
of such capability is not necessary for the continued
orderly operation of such reactor.
(3) The Commission shall complete the determinations required in paragraph (1) with respect to any
request for storage capacity not later than 6 months
after receipt of such request by the Commission.
***
(d) Review of sites and State participation
***
(6)(A) Upon deciding to provide an aggregate of 300
or more metric tons of storage capacity under subsection (a)(1) at any one site, the Secretary shall notify
the Governor and legislature of the State where such
site is located, or the governing body of the Indian
tribe in whose reservation such site is located, as the
case may be, of such decision. During the 60-day
period following receipt of notification by the Secretary of his decision to provide an aggregate of 300 or
more metric tons of storage capacity at any one site,
the Governor or legislature of the State in which such
site is located, or the governing body of the affected
Indian tribe where such site is located, as the case
may be, may disapprove the provision of 300 or more
metric tons of storage capacity at the site involved and
Add. 29
submit to the Congress a notice of such disapproval.
A notice of disapproval shall be considered to be submitted to the Congress on the date of the transmittal
of such notice of disapproval to the Speaker of the
House and the President pro tempore of the Senate.
Such notice of disapproval shall be accompanied by a
statement of reasons explaining why the provision of
such storage capacity at such site was disapproved by
such Governor or legislature or the governing body of
such Indian tribe.
(B) Unless otherwise provided by State law, the
Governor or legislature of each State shall have
authority to submit a notice of disapproval to the
Congress under subparagraph (A). In any case in
which State law provides for submission of any such
notice of disapproval by any other person or entity,
any reference in this part to the Governor or legislature of such State shall be considered to refer instead
to such other person or entity.
(C) The authority of the Governor and legislature of
each State under this paragraph shall not be applicable with respect to any site located on a reservation.
(D) If any notice of disapproval is submitted to the
Congress under subparagraph (A), the proposed provision of 300 or more metric tons of storage capacity
at the site involved shall be disapproved unless,
during the first period of 90 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress following the date of the
receipt by the Congress of such notice of disapproval,
the Congress passes a resolution approving such
proposed provision of storage capacity in accordance
with the procedures established in this paragraph and
subsections (d) through (f ) of section 10135 of this title
and such resolution thereafter becomes law. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “resolution” means
Add. 30
a joint resolution of either House of the Congress, the
matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:
“That there hereby is approved the provision of 300 or
more metric tons of spent nuclear fuel storage capacity
at the site located at ______________, with respect to
which a notice of disapproval was submitted by
______________ on ______________.” . The first blank
space in such resolution shall be filled with the
geographic location of the site involved; the second
blank space in such resolution shall be filled with the
designation of the State Governor and legislature or
affected Indian tribe governing body submitting the
notice of disapproval involved; and the last blank
space in such resolution shall be filled with the date of
submission of such notice of disapproval.
(E) For purposes of the consideration of any resolution described in subparagraph (D), each reference in
subsections (d) and (e) of section 10135 of this title
to a resolution of repository siting approval shall be
considered to refer to the resolution described in such
subparagraph.
(7) As used in this section, the term “affected Tribal
Council” means the governing body of any Indian tribe
within whose reservation boundaries there is located
a potentially acceptable site for interim storage
capacity of spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear
power reactors, or within whose boundaries a site for
such capacity is selected by the Secretary, or whose
federally defined possessory or usage rights to other
lands outside of the reservation’s boundaries arising
out of congressionally ratified treaties, as determined
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to a petition
filed with him by the appropriate governmental officials of such tribe, may be substantially and adversely
Add. 31
affected by the establishment of any such storage
capacity.
***
(h) Application
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to encourage,
authorize, or require the private or Federal use, purchase, lease, or other acquisition of any storage facility
located away from the site of any civilian nuclear
power reactor and not owned by the Federal Government on January 7, 1983.
***
9.
42 U.S.C. § 10172 provides:
§ 10172. Selection of Yucca Mountain site
(a) In general
(1) The Secretary shall provide for an orderly phaseout of site specific activities at all candidate sites other
than the Yucca Mountain site.
(2) The Secretary shall terminate all site specific
activities (other than reclamation activities) at all
candidate sites, other than the Yucca Mountain site,
within 90 days after December 22, 1987.
(b) Eligibility to enter into benefits agreement
Effective on December 22, 1987, the State of Nevada
shall be eligible to enter into a benefits agreement
with the Secretary under section 10173 of this title.
Add. 32
Relevant provisions of the Administrative Orders
Review Act, ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950) (28 U.S.C.
§ 2341 et seq.) (Hobbs Act):
1.
28 U.S.C. § 2342 provides:
§ 2342. Jurisdiction of court of appeals
The court of appeals (other than the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or
in part), or to determine the validity of—
(1) all final orders of the Federal Communication
Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of
title 47;
(2) all final orders of the Secretary of Agriculture
made under chapters 9 and 20A of title 7, except
orders issued under sections 210(e), 217a, and
499g(a) of title 7;
(3) all rules, regulations, or final orders of—
(A) the Secretary of Transportation issued
pursuant to section 50501, 50502, 56101-56104,
or 57109 of title 46 or pursuant to part B or C of
subtitle IV, subchapter III of chapter 311, chapter
313, or chapter 315 of title 49; and
(B) the Federal Maritime Commission issued
pursuant to section 305, 41304, 41308, or 41309 or
chapter 421 or 441 of title 46;
(4) all final orders of the Atomic Energy Commission made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42;
(5) all rules, regulations, or final orders of the
Surface Transportation Board made reviewable by
section 2321 of this title;
(6) all final orders under section 812 of the Fair
Housing Act; and
Add. 33
(7) all final agency actions described in section
20114(c) of title 49.
Jurisdiction is invoked by filing a petition as provided
by section 2344 of this title.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 2344 provides:
§ 2344. Review of orders; time; notice; contents
of petition; service
On the entry of a final order reviewable under this
chapter, the agency shall promptly give notice thereof
by service or publication in accordance with its rules.
Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60
days after its entry, file a petition to review the order
in the court of appeals wherein venue lies. The action
shall be against the United States. The petition shall
contain a concise statement of—
(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which
review is sought;
(2) the facts on which venue is based;
(3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and
(4) the relief prayed.
The petitioner shall attach to the petition, as exhibits,
copies of the order, report, or decision of the agency.
The clerk shall serve a true copy of the petition on
the agency and on the Attorney General by registered
mail, with request for a return receipt.
Add. 34
3.
28 U.S.C. § 2348 provides:
§ 2348. Representation in proceeding; intervention
The Attorney General is responsible for and has
control of the interests of the Government in all court
proceedings under this chapter. The agency, and any
party in interest in the proceeding before the agency
whose interests will be affected if an order of the
agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended,
may appear as parties thereto of their own motion
and as of right, and be represented by counsel in any
proceeding to review the order. Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals, whose
interests are affected by the order of the agency, may
intervene in any proceeding to review the order. The
Attorney General may not dispose of or discontinue
the proceeding to review over the objection of any
party or intervenor, but any intervenor may prosecute, defend, or continue the proceeding unaffected by
the action or inaction of the Attorney General.
Add. 35
Relevant provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations:
1.
10 C.F.R. § 2.309 provides in relevant part:
§ 2.309 Hearing requests, petitions to intervene,
requirements for standing, and contentions.
(a) General requirements. Any person whose interest may be affected by a proceeding and who desires
to participate as a party must file a written request
for hearing and a specification of the contentions
which the person seeks to have litigated in the hearing. In a proceeding under 10 CFR 52.103, the Commission, acting as the presiding officer, will grant the
request if it determines that the requestor has standing under the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section and has proposed at least one admissible contention that meets the requirements of paragraph (f ) of
this section. For all other proceedings, except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, the Commission,
presiding officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board designated to rule on the request for hearing
and/or petition for leave to intervene, will grant the
request/petition if it determines that the requestor/
petitioner has standing under the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section and has proposed at least one
admissible contention that meets the requirements of
paragraph (f ) of this section. In ruling on the request
for hearing/petition to intervene submitted by petitioners seeking to intervene in the proceeding on the
HLW repository, the Commission, the presiding officer,
or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board shall also
consider any failure of the petitioner to participate as
a potential party in the pre-license application phase
under subpart J of this part in addition to the factors
in paragraph (d) of this section. If a request for
Add. 36
hearing or petition to intervene is filed in response to
any notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing, the
applicant/licensee shall be deemed to be a party.
***
(d) Standing.
(1) General requirements. A request for hearing
or petition for leave to intervene must state:
(i) The name, address and telephone number of
the requestor or petitioner;
(ii) The nature of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding;
(iii) The nature and extent of the requestor’s/
petitioner’s property, financial or other interest in
the proceeding; and
(iv) The possible effect of any decision or order
that may be issued in the proceeding on the
requestor’s/petitioner’s interest.
(2) Rulings. In ruling on a request for hearing or
petition for leave to intervene, the Commission, the
presiding officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board designated to rule on such requests must determine, among other things, whether the petitioner
has an interest affected by the proceeding considering the factors enumerated in paragraph (d)(1) of
this section.
(3) Standing in enforcement proceedings. In
enforcement proceedings, the licensee or other
person against whom the action is taken shall have
standing.
***
Add. 37
(f ) Contentions.
(1) A request for hearing or petition for leave to
intervene must set forth with particularity the contentions sought to be raised. For each contention,
the request or petition must:
(i) Provide a specific statement of the issue of
law or fact to be raised or controverted, provided
further, that the issue of law or fact to be raised in
a request for hearing under 10 CFR 52.103(b)
must be directed at demonstrating that one or
more of the acceptance criteria in the combined
license have not been, or will not be met, and
that the specific operational consequences of
nonconformance would be contrary to providing
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the
public health and safety;
(ii) Provide a brief explanation of the basis for
the contention;
(iii) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the
contention is within the scope of the proceeding;
(iv) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the
contention is material to the finding
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