Respondents Brief — Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al., Petitioners v. Texas, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 15, 2025

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Nos. 23-1300 & 23-1312

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

AND

INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS, LLC,

Petitioners,

v.

STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

__________

On Writs of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

__________

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

FASKEN LAND AND MINERALS, LTD.

__________

ALLAN KANNER

ANNEMIEKE M. TENNIS

KANNER & WHITELEY, L.L.C.

701 Camp Street

New Orleans, LA 70130

(504) 524-5777

MONICA RENEE PERALES

FASKEN LAND AND

MINERALS, LTD.

6101 Holiday Hill Road

Midland, TX 79707

(432) 687-1777

January 15, 2025

DAVID C. FREDERICK

Counsel of Record

SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH

CHRISTOPHER C. GOODNOW

MATTHEW J. WILKINS

RYAN M. FOLIO

KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,

FIGEL & FREDERICK,

P.L.L.C.

1615 M Street, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 326-7900

(dfrederick@kellogghansen.com)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(“NRC”) exceeded its authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by licensing a private company to

store 5,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel in the

Permian Basin.

2. Whether NRC can insulate its license grant

from judicial review under the Hobbs Act by rejecting

on the merits objections to its asserted licensing authority and denying intervenor status to indisputably

interested persons opposing that license application

before the agency.

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. is a

non-governmental corporate party with no parent

corporations. Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. is a

limited partnership organization existing under the

laws of Texas. No publicly held corporation owns

10% or more of its stock.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .......................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATEMENT .............................................................. 2

A. Statutory And Regulatory Background .......... 2

1. The Atomic Energy Act............................... 2

2. The government’s response to the

reprocessing industry’s collapse ................. 3

a. NRC promulgated new regulations ........ 3

b. Congress enacted the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act, a comprehensive

short- and long-term storage plan

for spent nuclear fuel ............................ 5

3. The Hobbs Act ............................................. 7

B. Factual And Procedural Background .............. 8

1. The Permian Basin ..................................... 8

2. ISP’s application for a license to store

spent fuel in the Permian Basin ................ 8

3. Fasken opposed ISP’s license application............................................................... 9

4. The Fifth Circuit vacated NRC’s license

grant .......................................................... 12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 14

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 17

iv

I. NRC LACKS AUTHORITY TO LICENSE

PRIVATELY OWNED, AWAY-FROMREACTOR STORAGE FOR SPENT

NUCLEAR FUEL........................................... 17

A. NRC’s Assertion Of Authority Contradicts Congress’s Comprehensive

Program For Storing Spent Nuclear

Fuel............................................................ 17

1. The NWPA creates a detailed

program for storing spent nuclear

fuel that excludes private, offsite

storage.................................................. 17

2. NRC’s asserted authority flouts

the NWPA’s Interim Storage

Program ............................................... 20

B. Petitioners Misinterpret The NWPA ....... 21

C. The AEA Does Not Authorize NRC

To License Offsite Storage For Spent

Fuel............................................................ 24

1. The AEA’s explicit provisions

concerning spent nuclear fuel do

not authorize storage licenses............. 24

2. NRC’s authority to license source,

special nuclear, and byproduct

materials does not add up to

authority to license spent fuel

storage.................................................. 26

3. Interim spent fuel storage facilities

do not satisfy the AEA’s licensing

regimes for source, special nuclear,

or byproduct materials ........................ 29

v

4. NRC’s remaining arguments about

the “other” clauses are unpersuasive ....................................................... 31

D. Petitioners’ Remaining Arguments Are

Unpersuasive ............................................ 33

1. The AEA does not implicitly authorize licensing of spent-nuclearfuel storage .......................................... 33

2. NRC’s past practice and regulations do not support its claims to

authority .............................................. 35

II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAD JURISDICTION ............................................................... 37

A. Fasken Is A “Party Aggrieved” Under

The Hobbs Act ........................................... 37

1. Fasken satisfied statutory judicialreview requirements ........................... 37

2. The Fifth Circuit properly rejected

petitioners’ atextual arguments ......... 38

3. Text, precedent, and purpose confirm the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation ....................................................... 39

4. Petitioners’ remaining arguments

fail ........................................................ 42

B. Jurisdiction Exists To Review Ultra

Vires Agency Action .................................. 43

1. American courts long have exercised jurisdiction to review ultra

vires action ........................................... 43

2. The Hobbs Act does not abolish

traditional ultra vires review .............. 45

vi

3. Petitioners’ criticisms of the ultra

vires rule are unfounded ..................... 47

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 48

ADDENDUM ...................................................... Add. 1

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136

(1967) ........................................................ 44-45, 48

Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357

(11th Cir. 2002) .................................................... 39

American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. ICC, 673 F.2d

82 (5th Cir. 1982)................................................. 45

AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67

(2021) .............................................................. 36-37

Baros v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 400 F.3d 228

(5th Cir. 2005)...................................................... 47

Board of Governors v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S.

32 (1991) .............................................................. 46

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) .................... 48

Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ...... 39

Comuni-Centre Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 856 F.2d

1551 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ........................................... 40

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) ...... 38

Don’t Waste Michigan v. NRC, 2023 WL 395030

(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2023) .............................. 12-13, 41

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) ................... 27

Edward Hines Yellow Pine Tr. v. United States,

263 U.S. 143 (1923) ............................................. 44

FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463

(1984) ................................................................... 46

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ........................................22, 25

viii

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.

729 (1985) ............................................................ 41

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse

Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987) ........... 28

ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S.

270 (1987) ............................................................ 46

Idaho v. DOE, 945 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1991) ........... 2-3

Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206

(7th Cir. 1982)........................................................ 2

Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) .................. 45-46

Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &

Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) .................................. 39

Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) ....................... 41

Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516 (1st Cir.

1989)..................................................................... 41

Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d

911 (5th Cir. 1993) ............................................... 47

NARUC v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ...... 20

National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. FERC,

6 F.4th 1044 (9th Cir. 2021) ................................ 41

New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. NRC, 59 F.4th

1112 (10th Cir. 2023) ........................................... 13

New York v. NRC:

681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ..............................2, 26

824 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................. 5

Ohio Nuclear-Free Network v. NRC, 53 F.4th 236

(D.C. Cir. 2022) .................................................... 41

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 588 U.S. 1 (2019) .................38, 42, 44

ix

Posadas v. National City Bank of New York,

296 U.S. 497 (1936) ............................................. 22

Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024) ......... 26

Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.

1985)..................................................................... 48

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) .......... 29

Simmons v. ICC, 716 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ......... 43

Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S.

557 (1919) ............................................................ 44

Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011) .............. 41

Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 144 S.

Ct. 1414 (2024)................................................39, 42

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) ........... 43

United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) .......... 22

United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New

York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009).................................... 41

United States ex rel. Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.S.

397 (1917) ............................................................ 41

Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302

(2014) ................................................................... 33

Wales Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.

1984)................................................................45, 47

Water Transp. Ass’n v. ICC, 819 F.2d 1189

(D.C. Cir. 1987) .................................................... 41

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) .... 25, 32-34

Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)........ 30-31

x

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

General Elec. Co., In re:

15 N.R.C. 530, 1982 WL 43396 (Mar. 2, 1982) .........5

22 N.R.C. 851, 1985 WL 57012 (Nov. 4, 1985) .........4

Interim Storage Partners LLC, In re:

90 N.R.C. 31 (Aug. 23, 2019) ................ 8, 11-12, 37

90 N.R.C. 181 (Nov. 18, 2019) ........................ 11-12

92 N.R.C. 491 (Dec. 17, 2020) ............................. 12

2021 WL 8087739 (N.R.C. Jan. 29, 2021)........... 12

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208

(Urgent Deficiencies Act) ...................................... 7

§ 1:

38 Stat. 219-20 ................................................. 7

38 Stat. 220 ...................................................... 7

Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295,

§ 204(a), 94 Stat. 780, 787 ..................................... 3

Administrative Orders Review Act, ch. 1189,

64 Stat. 1129 (1950) (28 U.S.C. § 2341 et

seq.) (Hobbs Act) ............................... 7-8, 13-14, 16,

37-39, 41, 43-45, 48

28 U.S.C. § 2342 .............................................. 7, 45

28 U.S.C. § 2342(1)-(7) .......................................... 7

28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) ................................................ 7

28 U.S.C. § 2344 ...................................7, 16, 37, 45

28 U.S.C. § 2346 .................................................. 13

28 U.S.C. § 2348 .................................................. 39

xi

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701

et seq. ................................................................... 43

5 U.S.C. § 702 ...................................................... 43

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703,

68 Stat. 919 (42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.) ..... 2-4, 12-13,

15-16, 21-29, 32-35,

37-39, 42-43, 45, 47

Ch. 6, 68 Stat. 929-32 ...............................................28

Ch. 7, 68 Stat. 932-35 ...............................................28

Ch. 8, 68 Stat. 935 ....................................................28

42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) .......................................... 2, 31

42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) .............................................. 2

42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc) ............................................... 3

42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee) ............................................ 26

42 U.S.C. § 2021b(9)(A)(i) .................................... 24

42 U.S.C. § 2065(c)(3) .......................................... 24

42 U.S.C. § 2073 .............................................28, 35

42 U.S.C. § 2073(a) ................................................ 2

42 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1)-(3) .................................... 30

42 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(4) .......................................... 30

42 U.S.C. § 2093 .............................................28, 35

42 U.S.C. § 2093(a)(1)-(3) .................................... 30

42 U.S.C. § 2093(a)(4) .....................................30, 32

42 U.S.C. § 2111 .............................................28, 35

42 U.S.C. § 2111(a) .............................................. 30

42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2134................................... 23-24

42 U.S.C. § 2160(f ) .............................................. 24

xii

42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) .............................................. 29

42 U.S.C. § 2210h(a)(2)(B)................................... 24

42 U.S.C. § 2210i ............................................24, 27

42 U.S.C. § 2239 .................................................... 7

42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) ................................................ 7

42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) ......................8, 10, 16, 37

42 U.S.C. § 2239(b)(1) ............................................ 8

42 U.S.C. § 2284(a)(3) .......................................... 24

Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a),

48 Stat. 1064, 1093 ................................................ 7

Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,

§ 656(a), 119 Stat. 594, 813-14 .............................. 3

Federal Trade Commission Act, §13(b), 15 U.S.C.

§ 53(b) ................................................................... 36

Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, (21 U.S.C. § 301

et seq. ................................................................... 44

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C.

§ 10101 et seq. ........................................... 1, 3, 5-6,

12-15, 17-27, 29,

31-32, 34, 37, 45, 47

42 U.S.C. § 10101(23) .......................................... 26

42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2) .................................... 5, 25

42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(7) ........................................ 25

42 U.S.C. § 10132 .................................................. 5

42 U.S.C. § 10134 .................................................. 5

42 U.S.C. § 10134(b) .............................................. 5

42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) ........................................ 5, 23

42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10155.................................... 31

xiii

42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10157.................................... 17

42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(1) ...............................6, 17, 24

42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(2) .......................................... 6

42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(3) ........................................ 17

42 U.S.C. § 10151(b)(1) ........................ 17-18, 20-21

42 U.S.C. § 10151(b)(2) ...............................6, 18, 21

42 U.S.C. § 10152 ...........................................18, 20

42 U.S.C. § 10153 .....................................18, 21, 23

42 U.S.C. § 10154 ................................................ 18

42 U.S.C. § 10155 ................................................ 19

42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1) ...................................18, 21

42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(A) ................................... 19

42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(A)-(C) ............................... 6

42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(B) ................................... 19

42 U.S.C. § 10155(a)(1)(C) ................................... 19

42 U.S.C. § 10155(b)(1)(A) ............................... 6, 19

42 U.S.C. § 10155(b)(1)(B) ................................... 19

42 U.S.C. § 10155(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) .......................... 6

42 U.S.C. § 10155(h) ....................... 6, 20, 23, 32, 39

42 U.S.C. § 10172 .................................................. 5

Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930,

ch. 436, §§ 10-11, 46 Stat. 531, 535....................... 7

Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.

L. No. 100-408, § 4(b), 102 Stat. 1066, 1069 .... 3, 24

28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(1) ............................................... 13

xiv

10 C.F.R.:

§ 2.309(a) .............................................................. 38

§ 2.309(d)(1)(iii)...................................................... 8

§ 2.309(f )(1)(vi) ................................................ 8, 38

§ 2.335(b) ................................................................ 8

§ 72.3 .................................................................... 27

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

To Provide for the Review of Certain Orders:

Hearings on H.R. 5487 Before the Subcomm.

of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong.

(1950) ..................................................................... 7

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear

Future: Report to the Secretary of Energy

(Jan. 2012), https://www.energy.gov/ne/

articles/blue-ribbon-commission-americasnuclear-future-report-secretary-energy.......... 2, 20

Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n:

Environmental Impact Statement for Interim

Storage Partners LLC’s License Application

for a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility

for Spent Nuclear Fuel in Andrews County,

Texas: Final Report, NUREG-2239 (July

2021),

https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2120/

ML21209A955.pdf ............................................... 25

Final Rule, Licensing Requirements for the

Storage of Spent Fuel in an Independent

Fuel Spent Storage Installation, 45 Fed.

Reg. 74,693 (Nov. 12, 1980) .............. 3-4, 27, 33, 35

xv

Notice, Spent Fuel Storage, 40 Fed. Reg.

42,801 (Sept. 16, 1975) ...............................2, 28, 35

Proposed Rule, Storage of Spent Fuel in an

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), 43 Fed. Reg. 46,309 (Oct. 6,

1978)......................................................... 3-4, 32-33

Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities: Report to Congress on Extending the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Licensing

or Regulatory Authority to Federal Radioactive Waste Storage and Disposal Activities,

NUREG-0527 (Sept. 1979), available at

https://www.google.com/books/edition/

Regulation_of_Federal_Radioactive_Waste/

ERpSAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. ..........................3

Off. of Nuclear Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy,

Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste

Inventory (Dec. 2024)............................ 4-5, 7, 9, 36

Petition of Permian Basin Land and Royalty

Organization and Fasken Land and Minerals for Intervention and Request for

Hearing, In re Interim Storage Partners,

Docket No. 72-1050 (N.R.C. Oct. 29, 2018),

https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1830/ML18302

A412.pdf ............................................................... 10

OTHER MATERIALS

App. to Pet. for a Writ of Cert., NRC v. Fasken

Land & Minerals, Ltd., No. 23-1341 (U.S.

June 25, 2024)...................................................... 14

Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) ..................... 40

xvi

Br. for Resp. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,

Bullcreek v. NRC, Nos. 03-1018 & 03-1022,

2003 WL 25588879 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2003) ....... 35

Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae

Supporting Pet’r, Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser

Gypsum Co., No. 22-1079 (U.S. Dec. 14,

2023)..................................................................... 39

Pet. for a Writ of Cert.:

Holtec Int’l v. NRC, No. 23-1352 (U.S. June

25, 2024) ............................................................... 14

NRC v. Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd.,

No. 23-1341 (U.S. June 25, 2024) ....................... 14

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

(2012) ..................................................22, 27, 31, 34

Richard B. Stewart & Jane B. Stewart, Solving

the Spent Nuclear Fuel Impasse, 21 N.Y.U.

Envtl. L.J. 1 (2014) ................................................ 4

7 The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) .................. 40

The Random House Dictionary of the English

Language (1967) ............................................. 40-41

Webster’s New International Dictionary of the

English Language (2d ed. 1957) ......................... 32

INTRODUCTION

Until the 1970s, the government and the nuclear

industry planned to reprocess spent fuel from nuclear

reactors. Congress therefore did not specifically

address where to store spent fuel until the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act of 1982 (“NWPA”). The NWPA’s

detailed regime for interim storage does not permit

private, offsite storage.

Here, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”)

relied on pre-NWPA regulations to license a massive,

privately owned interim storage facility far from the

reactors that generated the spent fuel. Until this

license, essentially all spent fuel has been stored

onsite at nuclear reactors. Petitioner ISP’s proposed

storage facility instead would be in West Texas, far

from any reactor and atop the nation’s largest hydrocarbon reserves. NRC’s licensing process precluded

all interested parties except the licensee from fully

participating. NRC then contested appellate jurisdiction against those it shut out of the administrative

process.

NRC’s arbitrary actions are especially problematic

given the massive economic and social significance of

spent fuel storage plans. When Congress intended to

empower NRC to address storage, it did so in the

NWPA, which speaks directly to where spent fuel can

be stored on an interim basis. But NRC largely

ignores that Act. Instead, NRC justifies its power

flex from the penumbras and emanations of statutes

enacted during an era when no one thought interim

storage was needed because spent fuel would be reprocessed.

The Fifth Circuit correctly saw NRC’s gambit as a

lawless exercise of power in direct contravention of

Congress’s will. Because the judiciary must check

agency actions divorced from statutory authority, that

judgment should be affirmed.

2

STATEMENT

A. Statutory And Regulatory Background

1. The Atomic Energy Act

Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

(“AEA”) “to encourage widespread participation in

the development and utilization of atomic energy.” 42

U.S.C. § 2013(d). Under the AEA, NRC may license

private parties to acquire and use nuclear material,

including the enriched uranium that fuels nuclear

reactors. See id. § 2073(a); id. § 2014(aa).

Nuclear fuel is “spent” once “it can no longer

efficiently produce energy.” Blue Ribbon Commission

on America’s Nuclear Future: Report to the Secretary

of Energy 10 (Jan. 2012) (“Blue Ribbon Commission”).

“[S]pent fuel[ ] remain[s] radioactive for thousands of

years,” id. at 14, and “poses a dangerous, long-term

health and environmental risk,” New York v. NRC,

681 F.3d 471, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

From “the early days of the nuclear power industry,”

utilities and legislators believed spent fuel would be

“reprocessed” into “fresh reactor fuel.” 40 Fed. Reg.

42,801, 42,801 (Sept. 16, 1975). Those “operating

nuclear reactors were largely unconcerned with the

storage of spent nuclear fuel.” Idaho v. DOE, 945

F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1991). Conventional wisdom

held that “spent fuel would be . . . stored in onsite

fuel storage pools” for “one year[ ]” before reprocessing.

40 Fed. Reg. at 42,801.

Consistent with this understanding, the AEA did

“not refer explicitly to spent nuclear fuel.” Illinois v.

General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir. 1982).

For several more decades, “[i]t was accepted that

spent fuel would be reprocessed.” Idaho, 945 F.2d at

298.

3

In 1980, Congress amended the AEA to address

spent fuel, but only in limited part, by criminalizing

damaging “spent nuclear fuel from” a “utilization

facility,” e.g., a nuclear power plant. Act of June 30,

1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 780, 787;

42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc). In 1988, Congress finally added

“spent nuclear fuel” to the AEA as a defined term that

incorporated the same “meaning[ ] given such term[ ]”

in the NWPA. Price-Anderson Amendments Act of

1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 4(b), 102 Stat. 1066, 1069.

In 2005, Congress instructed NRC to “establish a system” for the import and export of nuclear materials,

including “byproduct materials, source materials,

special nuclear materials,” and, separately, “spent

nuclear fuel.” Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.

109-58, § 656(a), 119 Stat. 594, 813-14.

2. The government’s response to the reprocessing industry’s collapse

“In the mid-70s, . . . the private reprocessing industry collapsed.” Idaho, 945 F.2d at 298. In 1977, President Carter announced that the United States would

stop commercially reprocessing spent fuel entirely.

See 45 Fed. Reg. 74,693 (Nov. 12, 1980).

a. NRC promulgated new regulations

In September 1978, NRC’s Chairman declared

that the AEA does “not explicitly authorize regulation

of radioactive waste facilities.”1 NRC nonetheless

proposed rules regulating storage of spent fuel at

“independent spent fuel storage installation[s].” 43 Fed.

1 NRC, Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities:

Report to Congress on Extending the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Licensing or Regulatory Authority to Federal Radioactive

Waste Storage and Disposal Activities, NUREG-0527, at G-9

(Sept. 1979), https://www.google.com/books/edition/Regulation_

of_Federal_Radioactive_Waste/ERpSAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0.

4

Reg. 46,309, 46,309 (Oct. 6, 1978). NRC recognized

its existing regulations were “largely designed for

relatively short-term possession” of nuclear materials

“in conjunction with operations involving such materials.” Id. NRC had no rules “for extended spent fuel

storage under static storage conditions involving no

operations on such materials.” Id.

In 1980, NRC issued its final rule. See 45 Fed. Reg.

74,693. The rule permitted private parties to seek

licenses for “up to 20 years” of “temporary storage” of

spent fuel, “with renewal at [NRC’s] option.” Id. at

74,693. NRC stated its rule was issued “[p]ursuant to

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,” id. at 74,699, but did

not explain how any AEA provisions authorized the

new rules.

While NRC’s 1980 rules purport to “permit[ ] either”

“away-from-reactor” or “at-reactor” private storage,

id. at 74,696, away-from-reactor storage was rare. Before 1980, only “three facilities for spent fuel storage”

had received any kind of license. Id. at 74,698. All

originally were licensed as reprocessing facilities,

then repurposed for storage once reprocessing ended.

Id. Just one now stores spent fuel – General Electric’s

reprocessing facility in Morris, Illinois. See generally

Off. of Nuclear Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Spent

Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory (Dec.

2024) (“Spent Fuel Inventory”) (listing all spent fuel

storage sites and inventory). NRC licensed the Morris

facility as a reprocessing (production) facility in 1967,

but the reprocessing efforts failed soon after, and NRC

then licensed the facility to store the spent fuel that it

had received for reprocessing. See In re General Elec.

Co., 22 N.R.C. 851 (Nov. 4, 1985); Richard B. Stewart

& Jane B. Stewart, Solving the Spent Nuclear Fuel

Impasse, 21 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1, 22 n.69 (2014). A

5

nuclear power reactor is less than one mile from the

Morris facility. See In re General Elec. Co., 15 N.R.C.

530, 1982 WL 43396, at *3 (Mar. 2, 1982).

In 1982, NRC renewed GE’s license, using the 1980

rules. See id. at *1-3. Given the facility’s proximity to

a nuclear reactor, NRC assessed “the combined radiological impacts from the Morris Operation” and the

nearby reactor as a single location. Id. at *3. This

facility remains “the only non-DOE operated” storage

facility “not co-located at a reactor site.” Spent Fuel

Inventory 7.

b. Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act, a comprehensive short- and

long-term storage plan for spent nuclear

fuel

In the 1982 NWPA, Congress responded to the

“national problem” resulting from “the accumulation

of . . . spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors.”

42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2). The Act comprehensively

addressed spent fuel storage.

First, Congress directed that the Department of

Energy (“DOE”) ultimately would be responsible for

taking title to and permanently disposing of the waste.

Congress charged DOE with selecting a site and constructing a permanent, government-owned repository

for spent fuel. Id. §§ 10132, 10134. DOE eventually

selected – and Congress endorsed – Yucca Mountain

in Nevada for that repository. See id. §§ 10134(b), (d),

10172. In 2008, DOE sought authorization from NRC

to construct the facility, only to withdraw its application two years later. See New York v. NRC, 824 F.3d

1012, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Now, “there is not even a

prospective site for a repository.” Id.

Second, the NWPA places “primary responsibility”

for interim storage of spent fuel on “persons owning

6

and operating civilian nuclear power reactors.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 10151(a)(1). They must “maximiz[e] . . . storage” at

their reactors and “add[ ] new onsite storage capacity

in a timely manner where practical.” Id. Congress

also recognized the federal government’s “responsibility” to enable “the effective use of existing storage

facilities,” including authorizing “needed new storage

capacity at the site of each civilian nuclear power

reactor.” Id. § 10151(a)(2) (emphasis added).

As fallback, the NWPA permits storing “not more

than 1,900 metric tons” of spent fuel “at one or more

facilities owned by the Federal Government,” id.

§ 10151(b)(2), which can include sites away from

nuclear reactors, see § 10155(a)(1)(A)-(C). Congress

authorized this alternative only for commercial operators that “cannot reasonably provide adequate spent

nuclear fuel storage capacity at the site of such

reactor.” Id. § 10151(b)(2). Before using governmentowned storage, a commercial operator must exhaust

storage “at the site of any . . . civilian nuclear power

reactor operated by such person.” Id. § 10155(b)(1)(A).

Operators also must “diligently pursu[e] licensed

alternatives to the use of Federal storage capacity,”

including expanding onsite storage, constructing new

onsite storage, or acquiring onsite “modular or mobile

. . . storage equipment.” Id. § 10155(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).

The NWPA does not permit private, offsite storage

of spent fuel. Congress explained that “nothing in [the

NWPA] shall be construed to encourage, authorize, or

require the private or Federal use . . . of any storage

facility located away from the site of any civilian

nuclear power reactor and not owned by the Federal

Government.” Id. § 10155(h).

Consistent with the NWPA, “essentially all” spent

fuel “has remained on the generating reactor sites.”

7

Spent Fuel Inventory 10. As of 2022, more than 70

privately owned spent fuel storage sites exist – just

one (the Morris facility) is away from a reactor site (by

0.7 miles). See id. at 2; see also id. at 7.

3. The Hobbs Act

In 1913, Congress enacted the Urgent Deficiencies

Act (“UDA”), which allowed judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) orders. See Act

of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, § 1, 38 Stat. 208, 219-20.

A three-judge district court would hear challenges to

ICC orders, see id. at 220, in “de novo” trials, Hearings

on H.R. 5487, 81st Cong. 25, 27 (1950). Congress subsequently used the UDA’s judicial-review procedures

for other agencies’ orders. See, e.g., Communications

Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1093

(FCC); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of

1930, ch. 436, §§ 10-11, 46 Stat. 531, 535 (Department

of Agriculture).

In 1950, Congress replaced the UDA with the

Administrative Orders Review Act (or Hobbs Act). See

ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950). That Act standardizes

judicial review of agency orders for several agencies,

including NRC. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1)-(7). Courts

of appeals have “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear challenges to covered orders. Id. § 2342. A court’s jurisdiction “is invoked by filing a petition” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2344. Id. Under § 2344, “[a]ny party aggrieved by

[a covered] final order may, within 60 days after its

entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of

appeals.”

For NRC orders, the Hobbs Act governs challenges

to “final orders . . . made reviewable by” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2239. Id. § 2342(4). Section 2239(a) provides that,

“[i]n any proceeding under this chapter, . . . [NRC]

shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person

8

whose interest may be affected by the proceeding,

and shall admit any such person as a party to such

proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). By regulation,

NRC enforces additional requirements before admitting prospective intervenors. One must demonstrate

a “property, financial or other interest in the proceeding,” 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(1)(iii), and “provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute

exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue

of law or fact,” id. § 2.309(f )(1)(vi). NRC also forbids

challenges to “NRC rule[s] or regulation[s],” In re

Interim Storage Partners LLC, 90 N.R.C. 31, 53 (Aug.

23, 2019), unless “application of the rule or regulation

. . . would not serve the purposes for which the rule or

regulation was adopted,” 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b). Section

2239(b)(1) states that “[a]ny final order entered in any

proceeding of the kind specified in subsection (a)”

“shall be subject to judicial review in the manner

prescribed in” the Hobbs Act.

B. Factual And Procedural Background

1. The Permian Basin

The Permian Basin “covers an area approximately

250 miles wide and 300 miles long” across western

Texas and eastern New Mexico, JA64-65, and includes

nearly 300,000 active oil and gas wells, JA106. The

Permian Basin is “the largest producing oilfield in the

world.” JA118. It also includes aquifers that provide

freshwater to dozens of counties in Texas and New

Mexico. JA143-44, 173-74. That water is “used for

domestic potable water, stock, irrigation, and commercial purposes.” JA144.

2. ISP’s application for a license to store spent

fuel in the Permian Basin

In April 2016, ISP’s predecessor applied for a license

to build an above-ground storage facility for 5,000

9

metric tons of spent fuel in Andrews County, Texas, in

the Permian Basin. JA12. The proposed site is more

than 300 miles from the nearest nuclear power plant

and more than 1,000 miles from most other nuclear

reactors in the country. JA242-43 (maps). “Transportation of [spent fuel] to the proposed [site] would

be primarily or entirely by rail.” JA80. Thus, spent

fuel would cross the country by railcar, travelling

alongside “oil-field commodities,” “crude oil,” and

“significant agricultural commodities.” JA121.

Although the initial request was to store 5,000

metric tons of spent fuel, the plan was eventually to

increase that capacity to 40,000 metric tons. JA41-42.

The stated purpose for the site was to receive spent

fuel from “existing permanently shutdown and/or

decommissioned commercial reactors across the U.S.,”

not to expand overall capacity for storage of spent fuel.

JA12-13. In June 2018, ISP submitted a revised application that changed nothing relevant here. JA75.

Even at 5,000 metric tons, ISP’s proposed storage

facility would be the largest independent storage site

for spent fuel in the country. The current largest storage site is the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station

(an operating reactor), which stores less than 3,000

metric tons of spent fuel. See Spent Fuel Inventory

B.2.

3. Fasken opposed ISP’s license application

Fasken is one of the nation’s largest private

landowners, with hundreds of thousands of acres in

the Permian Basin near ISP’s proposed facility. JA64,

186. On its land, Fasken grazes tens of thousands of

cattle, operates nearly 2,000 active oil and gas wells,

and has residential and commercial real estate developments. Its employees travel daily throughout that

land to work cattle and service the wells. Fasken’s

10

business would share roads and railroad lines with

the ISP facility. That facility would expose Fasken’s

employees to radiation, threaten to devalue its land,

and disrupt its commercial operations. See Fasken

Petition and Request for Hearing 2-4 (N.R.C. Oct. 29,

2018).

Fasken objected to ISP’s proposed license and

sought a hearing under § 2239(a)(1)(A), as a “person

whose interest may be affected by [a licensing] proceeding” and who NRC “shall admit . . . as a party to

such proceeding.”

First, Fasken noted ISP’s inability to comprehensively monitor spent fuel canisters for leaks, JA196,

and inadequacies in its plans for addressing leaks,

which would expose the public to “millions of curies

. . . of radioactivity,” JA164 (cleaned up). Fasken also

explained that there is “no current understanding

as to how the now leaking spent fuel would behave,”

“how long it could be safely contained,” or “how a

transportation cask could be moved or transported

while holding a leaking” canister. Id.

Second, Fasken identified potash mining and the

Salada Formation, an extensive salt bed located upwind from the proposed facility, which would corrode

the above-ground storage canisters, causing leaks.

JA155. Risk of corrosion is material because the area

including the proposed site frequently “experienc[es]

the ‘haboob’ sandstorm phenomena,” which will coat

the canisters with corrosive salt and potash. JA194.

Third, the Permian Basin sits above “a highly dense

fault network . . . , with some faults showing greater

than 45% probability of slip.” JA138. An earthquake

could cause canisters to leak. JA140. Yet ISP had no

11

“strategic plan for seismic monitoring” or for addressing “damage from a seismic surface event.” JA136.2

Fourth, a release would be disastrous for the

surrounding area. Any release “would allow cesium

to rapidly spread downwind . . . . Once deposited onto

a ground surface . . . , the cesium will dissolve into”

rainwater “and begin infiltrating into the local water

table.” JA199. It could disrupt the Permian Basin for

centuries. JA198.

Fifth, the proposed site is several hundred miles

from even the closest nuclear reactor. JA241-43.

NRC, however, evaluated transportation risks only

“within a 50-mile buffer.” JA238. Fasken explained

NRC could not rely on its decades-old transportation

risk assessment for Yucca Mountain in Nevada to

ensure safety for spent fuel shipped hundreds or

thousands of miles to the proposed ISP site in Texas.

JA245-46.

NRC recognized Fasken’s “proximity to the proposed

facility” made it a person whose interest may be

affected by the proposed ISP license. Interim Storage

Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 52 (finding Fasken had “standing”). But after summarily reviewing the merits

of Fasken’s objections, NRC concluded Fasken did

not “proffer[ ] an admissible contention” raising “a

genuine dispute on a material issue,” and accordingly

denied it intervenor status. Id. at 52-53, 109-18.

NRC also denied intervenor status to every other

objector, finding their contentions lacked merit.3 In 2020,

2 In March 2020, a 5.0 magnitude earthquake struck the area.

JA179.

3 NRC initially deemed one Sierra Club objection meritorious,

but later reconsidered and denied Sierra Club intervenor status.

See Interim Storage Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 80; In re Interim

12

NRC again denied Fasken intervenor status after

Fasken filed a contention based on newly revealed

information in NRC’s draft environmental impact

statement, which NRC also rejected on the merits.

See In re Interim Storage Partners LLC, 2021 WL

8087739, at *7-9 (N.R.C. Jan. 29, 2021).4

In September 2021, NRC issued a 40-year license

to ISP. JA275, 286. Without citing any specific

AEA provision, NRC concluded the facility “meets

the standards and requirements of the [AEA] . . . and

[NRC’s] regulations set forth in 10 CFR.” JA284.

NRC did not address the NWPA.

4. The Fifth Circuit vacated NRC’s license

grant

Challenges to NRC’s license grant were filed in the

Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. Texas filed first in the

Fifth Circuit with Fasken close behind. Three private

parties then petitioned in the D.C. Circuit,5 and New

Mexico petitioned in the Tenth Circuit.6 Each petition

challenged the same order granting the license, but

NRC filed the administrative record in each circuit

Storage Partners LLC, 90 N.R.C. 181, 182 (Nov. 18, 2019); In re

Interim Storage Partners LLC, 92 N.R.C. 491, 492 (Dec. 17, 2020).

NRC never permitted Sierra Club’s contention that “any awayfrom-reactor interim storage facility is necessarily unlawful

under the AEA and/or the NWPA,” deeming it “an impermissible

challenge to NRC regulations that is precluded by 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.335.” Interim Storage Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 60.

4 Fasken and others petitioned for review of the intervention

denials. The D.C. Circuit held that NRC “acted reasonably” in

concluding they had not proffered admissible contentions. Don’t

Waste Michigan v. NRC, 2023 WL 395030, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,

2023) (per curiam).

5 See Nos. 21-1227, 21-1230, 21-1231 (D.C. Cir.).

6 See No. 21-9593 (10th Cir.).

13

and did not seek to transfer the later-filed petitions

to the Fifth Circuit. But see 28 U.S.C. § 2346 (“the

agency shall file . . . the record on review as provided

by section 2112”); id. § 2112(a)(1) (governing filing

of administrative record when multiple petitions in

different circuits challenge the same order).

Although the Fifth Circuit cases were filed first, that

court was last to rule. The D.C. and Tenth Circuits

declined to reach the merits, concluding they lacked

jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. They interpreted

the Act to permit only NRC-approved intervenors to

petition for review. See Don’t Waste Michigan, 2023

WL 395030, at *3; New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. NRC,

59 F.4th 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 2023).

The Fifth Circuit, however, upheld jurisdiction and

vacated the license. App. 2a. On jurisdiction, the

court observed that, under “the fairest reading of

the Hobbs Act,” Fasken and Texas are “part[ies]

aggrieved” because they participated in the agency

proceedings. App. 17a-18a. Ultimately, the court

concluded it had jurisdiction because NRC acted ultra

vires and in violation of express limitations on its

authority. App. 18a-20a.

On the merits, the court held the AEA does not

authorize NRC “to issue licenses for private parties to

store spent nuclear fuel away-from-the-reactor.” App.

2a. Although the AEA grants “authority to issue

licenses for the possession of . . . constituent materials

of spent nuclear fuel,” “none” of the allowed purposes

for such licenses “encompass[es] storage or disposal of

. . . spent nuclear fuel.” App. 21a-22a. The court also

held the NWPA “creates a comprehensive statutory

scheme for addressing spent nuclear fuel” that “limits

temporary storage to private at-the-reactor storage or

at federal sites.” App. 29a. Accordingly, the NWPA

14

“doesn’t permit” NRC “to license a private, away-fromreactor storage facility for spent nuclear fuel.” Id.

The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. App.

31a. Judge Jones’s concurrence with five other judges

grounded the panel’s exercise of jurisdiction on “two

bases”: “these petitioners are parties aggrieved, and

the NRC has acted ultra vires.” App. 33a. “The bottom line for Hobbs Act ‘party aggrieved’ status,” Judge

Jones explained, “is to participate in agency proceedings, which both Fasken and Texas did.” App. 38a.

Judge Jones also clarified that Fifth Circuit decisions

recognizing the ultra vires rule postdate the Hobbs Act

and that this Court and other courts of appeals recognize a similar rule in various contexts. App. 41a-43a.7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The Fifth Circuit correctly held NRC lacks

authority to license private, offsite storage of spent fuel.

A. The NWPA creates a comprehensive regime

for interim storage of spent fuel that does not permit

private, offsite storage. Owners of nuclear power

reactors are responsible for providing interim storage

of spent fuel at their reactor sites. If onsite storage

space is insufficient, the NWPA directs the federal

government (not private actors) to provide limited

overflow capacity, but only if no more onsite storage

is forthcoming. Of all possible means of providing

overflow storage, the NWPA forbids just one – private,

offsite storage. NRC therefore lacked authority to

license the ISP facility.

7 NRC has licensed a second, even larger facility in the

Permian Basin, to be operated by Holtec International. See Pet.

App. 3a-8a, No. 23-1341. The Fifth Circuit vacated the Holtec

license because it was “materially identical” to ISP’s license. Id.

at 2a. Holtec and the government have filed certiorari petitions,

which are pending. See Nos. 23-1341, 23-1352.

15

B. Petitioners’ efforts to limit the NWPA’s scope

are unpersuasive. The NWPA did not presume the

validity of prior NRC rules permitting offsite storage.

Those rules and the NWPA are diametrically opposed

– the rules permit private, offsite storage whereas the

NWPA specifically forbids it. Indeed, NRC’s interpretation of its regulations renders the NWPA’s entire

interim storage regime nugatory. The NWPA specifically endorses certain NRC regulations, but the offsitestorage regulations are not among them.

C. The AEA also does not authorize NRC to license

private, offsite storage of spent fuel.

Although the AEA contains provisions explicitly

addressing spent fuel, none authorizes its storage.

Nor does NRC’s authority to license productive uses

of source, special nuclear, and byproduct materials

add up to authority to license storage of spent fuel.

The AEA’s plain text and structure reveal that spent

fuel is more than these three materials combined,

so authority to license uses of each material does not

constitute authority to license uses of spent fuel. In

addition, storage is not an authorized use of those

materials; indeed, storage is not a “use” at all because

stored spent fuel is not productively employed, as

NRC’s regulations recognize.

D. Petitioners’ remaining arguments for inferring

authority to license private, offsite storage of spent

fuel in the AEA fail. The need to temporarily hold

spent fuel in support of other, expressly authorized

activities (like reprocessing) is not the same thing

as storage, which involves holding spent fuel with no

further use in mind.

Petitioners also overstate NRC’s history of interpreting the AEA to authorize private, offsite storage.

NRC did not claim such authority until 1975, two

decades after Congress enacted the AEA, and did not

16

identify what statutory purposes they purported to

fulfill until this litigation. Even then, NRC almost

never exercised this authority. In the nearly 50 years

between NRC’s claiming this authority and its granting ISP’s license, NRC licensed only four private,

offsite storage facilities, just one of which ever was

built.

II. The Fifth Circuit correctly ruled NRC could

not shield its order from appellate review by denying

obviously aggrieved parties intervenor status.

A. Fasken is a “party aggrieved” entitled to petition for review of NRC’s license grant under the Hobbs

Act. Read together, the AEA and the Hobbs Act create

a permissive framework for judicial review: the AEA

requires NRC to “admit . . . as a party” “any person

whose interest may be affected by [a] proceeding” and

who “request[s]” a hearing, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A);

and the Hobbs Act, in turn, allows “[a]ny party

aggrieved” to petition for review, 28 U.S.C. § 2344.

Fasken amply meets these statutory requirements

because it requested a hearing, the proposed facility

threatens its business interests, and it was aggrieved

by NRC’s license grant. NRC’s and ISP’s counter –

that Fasken tried and failed to intervene in the

proceeding – misses the point. The AEA and the

Hobbs Act do not make intervention under NRC’s

rules a prerequisite to judicial review, and NRC lacks

authority to add impediments to judicial review

through regulation.

B. The Fifth Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction because NRC acted ultra vires. Judicial-review

statutes, like the Hobbs Act, presumptively do not bar

preexisting modes of review. American courts long

have exercised jurisdiction to review ultra vires agency

action – indeed, this Court blessed such review both

before and after the Hobbs Act became law.

17

ARGUMENT

I. NRC LACKS AUTHORITY TO LICENSE PRIVATELY OWNED, AWAY-FROM-REACTOR

STORAGE FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

A. NRC’s Assertion Of Authority Contradicts

Congress’s Comprehensive Program For

Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel

1. The NWPA creates a detailed program

for storing spent nuclear fuel that

excludes private, offsite storage

Congress has addressed where to store spent fuel on

an interim basis: onsite at privately owned nuclear

reactors. Congress also has addressed where to store

spent fuel on an interim basis if those reactor sites run

out of space: at federally owned storage facilities until

more onsite capacity is ready. NRC therefore lacks

statutory authority to license ISP’s private, offsite

storage.

The NWPA’s interim storage plan is codified at

42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10157, in a part of the U.S. Code

titled “Interim Storage Program.” Congress began by

making critical “find[ing]s” and articulating “purposes”

of the Interim Storage Program. Congress found that

reactor operators bear the “responsibility for providing interim storage of spent nuclear fuel . . . at the site

of each civilian nuclear power reactor” and that “the

Federal Government has the responsibility to provide”

overflow “capacity for interim storage of spent nuclear

fuel” when there is not “adequate storage capacity at

the sites of such reactors.” 42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(1),

(a)(3).

Congress articulated two corresponding purposes.

The first encourages use of existing storage capacity

and addition of new storage capacity for spent fuel

“at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor.” Id.

18

§ 10151(b)(1). The second creates “a federally owned

and operated system for the interim storage of spent

nuclear fuel . . . to prevent disruptions in the orderly

operation of any civilian nuclear power reactor that

cannot reasonably provide adequate spent nuclear

fuel storage capacity at the site of such reactor.” Id.

§ 10151(b)(2).

Congress then enacted substantive provisions to

implement those findings and purposes, confirming

that interim storage of spent fuel is to occur onsite at

civilian nuclear power reactors, or at federally owned

locations (which can be offsite) as a backup. Congress

repeatedly directed DOE and NRC to maximize the

use of onsite storage capacity and did not authorize

private, offsite storage.

 § 10152: DOE and NRC “shall . . . encourage and

expedite the effective use of available storage,

and necessary additional storage, at the site of

each civilian nuclear power reactor” (emphases

added).

 § 10153: NRC “shall . . . establish procedures

for the licensing of ” approved storage technology

“for use at the site of any civilian nuclear power

reactor” (same).

 § 10154: NRC “shall ” follow prescribed procedures when considering applications “to expand

the spent fuel storage capacity at the site of a

civilian nuclear power reactor” (same).

Congress also recognized that the supply of spent

fuel could at times exceed such storage capacity. In

that situation, the NWPA permits storing excess fuel

in federally owned facilities until additional onsite

storage becomes available: DOE “shall provide . . . not

more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for the storage

of spent nuclear fuel.” Id. § 10155(a)(1). Owners of

19

spent fuel may use this excess storage capacity “only

if ” several conditions are met. First, using the federally owned storage capacity must be necessary “to

ensure the continued orderly operation of ” the nuclear

reactor generating the spent fuel. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(A).

Second, storage “cannot reasonably be provided” at

the site of that reactor “or at the site of any other

civilian nuclear power reactor” owned by the same

person. Id. Third, additional onsite “capacity cannot

be made available in a timely manner.” Id. Fourth,

the reactor owner must be “diligently pursuing licensed

alternatives” to expand storage capacity “at the site of

any civilian nuclear power reactor” for future spent

fuel storage needs. Id. § 10155(b)(1)(B).

These conditions reaffirm Congress’s express requirement for onsite spent fuel storage. Congress authorized federal overflow capacity only when existing

onsite storage is insufficient and more onsite storage

is not forthcoming.

In addition, § 10155 is the only authorization

Congress provides for offsite interim storage of spent

fuel. And offsite storage in a federally owned facility

is only one of three options Congress gave DOE.

See id. § 10155(a)(1)(A). The other two options involve

additional onsite storage. First, DOE may provide

“modular or mobile spent nuclear fuel storage equipment . . . at the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor.” Id. § 10155(a)(1)(B). Second, DOE may construct

new “storage capacity at any site of a civilian nuclear

power reactor.” Id. § 10155(a)(1)(C).

While the NWPA specifically permits these methods

of providing surplus storage, it specifically forbids just

one – private, offsite storage facilities: “nothing in

[the NWPA] shall be construed to encourage, authorize, or require the private or Federal use . . . of any

storage facility located away from the site of any

20

civilian nuclear power reactor and not owned by

the Federal Government.” Id. § 10155(h). Congress

elsewhere has not expressly provided for private,

offsite storage.

2. NRC’s asserted authority flouts the

NWPA’s Interim Storage Program

Petitioners do not contend the NWPA authorizes

ISP’s license and for good reason. ISP’s license undermines the statutory purposes and requirements of the

NWPA’s Interim Storage Program.

The NWPA requires NRC to encourage using

currently available onsite storage capacity for spent

fuel. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10151(b)(1), 10152. But the

ISP facility would do the opposite – transfer spent

fuel from existing onsite storage to a private, offsite

location. JA13, 90.

The NWPA also directs NRC to promote adding new

onsite storage capacity for spent fuel. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 10151(b)(1), 10152. ISP’s facility, however, would

do the opposite. Providing a private, offsite facility for

(purportedly) interim storage of a large portion of the

nation’s spent fuel will discourage creating new onsite

storage capacity. It also will discourage construction

of a permanent repository, contrary to Congress’s

design. See NARUC v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 519 (D.C.

Cir. 2013) (NWPA “is obviously designed to prevent

[DOE] from delaying the construction of . . . the

permanent facility while using temporary facilities”);

Blue Ribbon Commission xii (recognizing “efforts to

develop consolidated storage” could “hamper efforts to

move forward with the development of [permanent]

disposal capacity”).

The NWPA requires DOE to create a federally

owned and operated system of interim storage with

up to 1,900 metric tons of capacity. See 42 U.S.C.

21

§§ 10151(b)(1)-(2), 10155(a)(1). But the ISP facility

would be privately owned and operated and have a

capacity of 5,000 (and possibly up to 40,000) metric

tons.

B. Petitioners Misinterpret The NWPA

Unable to fit the license within the NWPA, NRC and

ISP claim that law is irrelevant. Their arguments

contradict the NWPA’s plain text and structure.

1. Petitioners argue (NRC Br. 42; ISP Br. 40-41)

the NWPA assumes the validity of NRC’s 1980

rules allowing private, offsite storage of spent fuel.

But when Congress wanted to endorse NRC’s existing

rules in the NWPA, it did so expressly. For example,

in instructing NRC to devise new licensing procedures

for new storage technologies, Congress said it did

“not preclude the licensing, under any applicable

procedures or rules of [NRC] in effect prior to such

establishment, of any technology for the storage of

civilian spent nuclear fuel at the site of any civilian

nuclear power reactor.” 42 U.S.C. § 10153 (emphasis

added). The NWPA’s enactment of a regime different

from NRC’s recently asserted authority to license offsite storage therefore reflects Congress’s disapproval,

not confirmation.

2. Petitioners’ argument (NRC Br. 43; ISP Br.

41-42) that the NWPA does not repeal the AEA

(and NRC’s 1980 rules) because repeal by implication

is disfavored also fails.

First, the AEA did not empower NRC to license

private, offsite storage facilities. No AEA provision

expressly authorizes such storage facilities. See infra

pp. 24-26. Thus, the AEA conferred no relevant

authority that the NWPA could repeal, implicitly or

otherwise.

22

Second, even if the AEA could be interpreted to

imply that NRC may license such storage facilities (it

does not, see infra pp. 26-34), that implication would

not trigger the presumption against implied repeal.

While “[r]epeal by implication of an express statutory

text is one thing[,] . . . repeal by implication of a legal

disposition implied by a statutory text is something

else.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453

(1988). We “presume[ ] that Congress will specifically

address language on the statute books that it wishes

to change.” Id. Not so when mere implications, rather

than express statutory provisions, are involved. The

“task of reconciling many laws enacted over time,

and getting them to make sense in combination,

necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute

may be altered by the implications of a later statute,”

especially “where the scope of the earlier statute is

broad but the subsequent statutes more specifically

address the topic at hand.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (cleaned

up). In such cases, the “specific policy embodied in a

later federal statute” – the NWPA’s specific regime for

interim storage of spent fuel – “should control our construction of the earlier statute” – the AEA’s (alleged)

general authorization to license uses of combinations

of nuclear materials – “even though it has not been

expressly amended.” Id. (same).

Third, in any event, the NWPA satisfies the criteria

for implied repeal. “Where provisions in the two

acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to

the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal

of the earlier one.” Posadas v. National City Bank of

New York, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (quoted in Antonin

Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 328 (2012) (“Reading Law”)).

23

Reading the AEA to grant NRC unfettered authority

to license private, offsite storage facilities irreconcilably conflicts with the NWPA’s provisions for maximizing onsite storage, with limited federal storage (which

need not be offsite) as a fallback. “[N]othing in”

the NWPA should “be construed to . . . authorize . . .

any storage facility located away from the site of any

civilian nuclear power reactor and not owned by the

Federal Government.” 42 U.S.C. § 10155(h). NRC

and ISP thus read the AEA to permit what the NWPA

prohibits. As the later-enacted statute, the NWPA

wins that fight.

3. Contrary to petitioners’ claims (NRC Br. 15,

42-43; ISP Br. 42), the NWPA does confer relevant

new licensing authority. The NWPA grants NRC

new authority to license construction of a permanent

repository for the nation’s spent fuel. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 10134(d) (NRC “shall consider an application for a

construction authorization for all or part of a [permanent] repository” and “shall issue a final decision

approving or disapproving the issuance of a construction authorization”). The NWPA also grants NRC

new authority to license “any [storage] technology

approved . . . for use at the site of any civilian nuclear

power reactor.” Id. § 10153. These new grants of

licensing authority were necessary because, while the

AEA granted NRC power to license production facilities (like reprocessing plants) and utilization facilities

(like nuclear power reactors), it granted no authority

to license any other types of facilities (like storage

or disposal). See id. §§ 2131-2134. The NWPA thus

affirmatively grants power to license new types of

facilities and storage technologies not addressed in

the AEA. It is not a set of precatory recommendations

on how NRC could use its preexisting AEA powers.

24

4. ISP argues (at 42) the NWPA concerns “permanent disposal . . . by DOE, not temporary possession

. . . by private parties.” But the NWPA gives “civilian”

(i.e., private) reactor owners “the primary responsibility for providing interim storage” (i.e., temporary

possession). 42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(1).

C. The AEA Does Not Authorize NRC To

License Offsite Storage For Spent Fuel

NRC and ISP defend the license by relying on

implied authority they assert emanates from the AEA.

Given the NWPA’s provisions expressly addressing

the question presented, that assertion of implicit power

fails. The AEA nowhere comes close to the explicit

authorization needed to warrant congressional sanction of NRC’s action.

1. The AEA’s explicit provisions concerning spent nuclear fuel do not authorize

storage licenses

No AEA provision grants NRC express authority to

issue a license for storing spent fuel. Indeed, Congress

did not amend the AEA to add “spent nuclear fuel” as

a defined term until 1988 – six years after the NWPA’s

enactment.8 Although the AEA now addresses specific

aspects of, and activities involving, spent fuel,9 it

8

Price-Anderson Amendments Act § 4(b), 102 Stat. 1069

(codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee)).

9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b(9)(A)(i) (provisions governing lowlevel nuclear waste do not apply to spent nuclear fuel), 2065(c)(3)

(DOE is responsible for spent nuclear fuel used to generate a

certain medical isotope), 2160(f ) (largely prohibiting DOE from

accepting spent nuclear fuel from other countries), 2210h(a)(2)(B)

(exempting spent nuclear fuel from certain export, import, transfer, and tracking requirements), 2210i (requiring manifests for

transfers of spent nuclear fuel pursuant to export and import

licenses), 2284(a)(3) (creating criminal penalties for actions that

damage spent nuclear fuel).

25

nowhere authorizes NRC to license private, offsite

storage facilities for spent fuel. The only support NRC

and ISP can muster are AEA provisions that do not

expressly reference spent fuel. See infra pp. 26-34.

The lack of affirmative authorization to license

private, offsite storage of spent fuel should end this

case. See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723

(2022) (“[a]gencies have only those powers given to

them by Congress”).

Express congressional authorization is necessary

here because where to store the nation’s spent fuel

is a major question with tremendous “economic and

political significance.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.

at 159-60. Economically, the ISP facility concededly

implicates more than $600 million of value to the

nuclear industry, which itself contributes more than

$60 billion in economic value annually. ISP Br. 3;

NEI Br. 6, 15. The license also raises the potentially

disastrous economic consequences of a radiation leak

in the Permian Basin, which produces 50% of domestic

hydrocarbons (JA145) worth hundreds of millions of

dollars daily.

Politically, the NWPA recognized that “spent nuclear

fuel from nuclear reactors” is “a national problem”

that “ha[s] become [a] major subject[ ] of public concern.”

42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2), (7). The agency proceedings

drew public comments from States, counties, and

cities; Native American tribes; environmental groups;

industry groups; transportation groups; chambers

of commerce; and thousands of individuals. NRC

received more than 2,500 unique comments from the

public on the draft Environmental Impact Statement.10 And spent fuel still “poses a dangerous, long10 See https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2120/ML21209A955.pdf.

26

term health and environmental risk,” so the question

of where to store it will remain politically salient for

decades to come. New York, 681 F.3d at 474.

Given the economic and political importance of

spent-nuclear-fuel storage (which neither NRC nor

ISP seriously disputes), this Court should expect

Congress to speak clearly on the subject. Congress

did so in the NWPA by creating an explicit, detailed

program for interim storage of spent fuel.

2. NRC’s authority to license source,

special nuclear, and byproduct materials

does not add up to authority to license

spent fuel storage

Petitioners erroneously claim (NRC Br. 32-35;

ISP Br. 29-32) NRC has authority to license storage

facilities for spent fuel because the AEA authorizes

licenses for possession and transfer of some of spent

fuel’s constituent parts – source, special nuclear, and

byproduct material.

a. Congress did not define “spent nuclear fuel” in

the AEA as “a combination of source, special nuclear,

and byproduct materials.” Instead, Congress defined

“spent nuclear fuel” to include characteristics not

found in definitions of source, special nuclear, and

byproduct material. For example, spent fuel must

“ha[ve] been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor.” 42

U.S.C. § 10101(23) (NWPA) (incorporated by reference

in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee) (AEA)). It also must not have

undergone “reprocessing.” Id. So spent fuel is not

simply the sum of source, special nuclear, and byproduct material, and the sum of NRC’s licensing power for

those materials is not the power to license spent fuel.

See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024)

(“In a given statute, the same term usually has the

same meaning and different terms usually have

different meanings.”).

27

NRC’s own definition of spent fuel reinforces this

point. In 1980, NRC defined spent fuel as “irradiated

nuclear fuel that has undergone at least one year’s

decay since being used as a source of energy in a

power reactor. Spent fuel includes the special nuclear

material, byproduct material, source material, and

other radioactive materials associated with fuel assemblies.” 45 Fed. Reg. at 74,700-01 (emphases added).

NRC’s current definition still has this language (plus

additional requirements added in subsequent years).

See 10 C.F.R. § 72.3. NRC thus has understood since

before the NWPA that spent fuel includes other materials besides source, special nuclear, and byproduct

material, and that spent fuel has properties none of

those constituent materials possesses individually or

together.

Treating spent fuel as the combination of source,

special nuclear, and byproduct materials also violates

the canon against surplusage by rendering “spent

nuclear fuel” superfluous in some later-enacted AEA

sections. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174

(2001) (Court is “reluctant to treat statutory terms

as surplusage in any setting”) (cleaned up); see also

Reading Law 174-79. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 2210i

empowers NRC to ensure that “byproduct materials,

source materials, special nuclear materials, high-level

radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic

waste, and low-level nuclear waste” transferred in the

United States “pursuant to an import or export license

. . . are accompanied by a manifest” (emphasis added).

If spent fuel were merely the combination of source,

special nuclear, and byproduct materials, then “spent

nuclear fuel” would be superfluous here.

b. Petitioners’ assertion (NRC Br. 32; ISP Br. 2930) that authority to license source, special nuclear,

28

and byproduct material adds up to authority to license

spent fuel also ignores the AEA’s history and context.

Long-term storage of spent fuel was a non-starter

when Congress passed the AEA in 1954. The commonly held belief “accepted reprocessing as the only”

way to deal with spent fuel; “storage was neither

recommended nor considered” by Congress. Florida

Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826

F.2d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 1987); see also supra pp. 2-3.

The original AEA therefore said nothing about

“spent nuclear fuel” or how to store it. Indeed, in

asserting that NRC always has understood the AEA

to empower it to license spent fuel storage, petitioners

point to nothing pre-dating the 1970s – when the

nuclear fuel reprocessing industry already had begun

to collapse. Before that collapse, the government had

no plans for how to store spent fuel beyond the limited

storage incidental to reprocessing. See 40 Fed. Reg. at

42,802. That historical context refutes the notion that

Congress implicitly granted NRC power to store spent

fuel in 1954.

Petitioners’ argument also renders meaningless

Congress’s 1988 decision not to create a separate

licensing regime for spent fuel in the AEA. From

its inception, the AEA has given each type of nuclear

material its own Chapter. See Pub. L. No. 83-703,

ch. 6, 68 Stat. 919, 929-32 (special nuclear material);

id., ch. 7, 68 Stat. 932-35 (source material); id., ch. 8,

68 Stat. 935 (byproduct material). Each Chapter

includes a licensing regime specific to that type of

nuclear material. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073 (special nuclear

material), 2093 (source material), 2111 (byproduct

material).

By contrast, when Congress added the term “spent

nuclear fuel” and related provisions to the AEA in

29

1988, Congress did not add the term “spent nuclear

fuel” to any of the existing licensing regimes for

those other nuclear materials. Those omissions are

intentional and meaningful – because Congress had

addressed storage in the NWPA. The Russello principle of express inclusion and omission thus fits to a tee.

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). Had

Congress intended to authorize NRC to issue licenses

for spent fuel, it would have done so expressly as in

the other licensing regimes. See id.

ISP’s reliance (at 29-30) on 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b)

fares no better. That section gives NRC authority to

“establish” rules governing “the possession and use of

special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material . . . to promote” defense, security, health,

and safety. But again, those materials do not add up

to spent fuel. And the purpose of ISP’s license is “to

return [decommissioned reactor sites] to greenfield

status,” not to promote defense, security, health, or

safety. JA90.

3. Interim spent fuel storage facilities do

not satisfy the AEA’s licensing regimes

for source, special nuclear, or byproduct materials

Even if the AEA’s grant of authority to license

possession of source, special nuclear, and byproduct

material somehow added up to authority to license

spent fuel, NRC still would need to show that storage

(in any location) satisfies all three licensing regimes

to prevail. Yet NRC cannot satisfy one of the regimes,

much less all three.

Neither petitioner argues that storage of spent fuel

satisfies any enumerated purpose for licensing source,

special nuclear, or byproduct materials. Nor could

they. For both special nuclear and source material,

30

those purposes are (1) conducting “research and development” into their useful applications, (2) for use in

“medical therapy,” and (3) for use in enrichment facilities and nuclear reactors. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073(a)(1)-(3),

2093(a)(1)-(3). For byproduct material, those purposes

are (1) “research or development purposes,” (2) “medical

therapy,” (3) “industrial uses,” and (4) “agricultural

uses.” Id. § 2111(a). Spent fuel in storage is not used

in “research and development,” “medical therapy,”

enrichment facilities, or nuclear reactors, or for

“industrial uses” or “agricultural uses.” The point of

storage is to keep spent fuel from any use at all.

Petitioners instead argue that spent fuel storage

is a permissible “other” purpose under each of the

three licensing regimes. Id. §§ 2073(a)(4), 2093(a)(4),

2111(a). But these “other” clauses must be interpreted

to authorize licenses only for purposes “similar in

nature to those [purposes] enumerated by the preceding

specific words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528,

545 (2015) (plurality); see also id. (“ejusdem generis[ ]

counsels: Where general words follow specific words

in a statutory enumeration, the general words are

usually construed to embrace only objects similar in

nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding

words.”) (cleaned up). Here, “other uses” and “other

useful applications” mean uses similar to research

and development, medical therapy, and agricultural

applications, and use in enrichment facilities and

nuclear reactors. The common thread linking those

enumerated uses is putting the nuclear material to an

active, productive use. Storage, however, is not a productive use or application of spent fuel; it is prolonged

non-use.

ISP is incorrect (at 35) that the list of purposes in

these sections is too short to apply ejusdem generis. A

31

statutory list need include just “two or more things,”

which these do, to apply the canon. Reading Law 199;

see also Yates, 574 U.S. at 544-45 (plurality) (applying

canon to list consisting of “a record, document, or other

object”).

4. NRC’s remaining arguments about the “other”

clauses are unpersuasive

a. NRC argues that storage of spent fuel is a

permitted “other use” for special nuclear material because temporary, private, offsite storage allegedly will

enable reactors to “continue operating or . . . be safely

decommissioned” and thereby “ ‘encourage widespread

participation in the development and utilization of

atomic energy for peaceful purposes.’ ” Br. 33 (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 2013(d)); accord ISP Br. 30-31. But the

NWPA explicitly created an interim storage program

to enable the continued operation of civilian nuclear

power reactors. That program expands onsite storage

and, if such storage is unavailable, potential offsite

storage in government-owned-and-operated storage

facilities until reactor operators can build more onsite

storage. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10155. NRC may

disagree with (but not disregard) Congress’s policy

choice. Decommissioning nuclear power plants is the

opposite of “the development and utilization of atomic

energy.” Id. § 2013(d).

NRC’s assertion (at 33) that the ISP facility will

enable reactors to continue operating by making more

storage space available also is inaccurate. The facility’s stated purpose is to “provide temporary storage

of [spent fuel] for decommissioned shutdown sites in

order to return the land to greenfield status.” JA90.

The ISP facility simply shifts storage capacity (and

spent fuel) from one site to another.

32

b. NRC argues spent fuel storage is a permissible

“other use” as “ ‘an aid to . . . industry.’ ” Br. 34-35

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2093(a)(4)). But storage is not

a “use.” “Use” means “[a]ct of employing anything,

or state of being employed; application; employment.”

Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English

Language 2806 (2d ed. 1957). Spent fuel in storage is

neither applied nor employed to any end, which NRC

acknowledged as early as 1980. See 43 Fed. Reg. at

46,309 (noting that “spent fuel storage under static

storage conditions involv[es] no operations on such

materials”) (emphasis added).

c. NRC also argues (at 33-34) that storage is

“similar in type” to research and development, medical uses, and use in a nuclear power reactor because

“the spent fuel stored . . . results from” those activities.

But by that logic, a garbage dump is “similar in type”

to almost all human activities, as garbage results from

them. Petitioners make a hash of Congress’s chosen

language.

d. “[A]mbiguous statutory text” that provides “a

merely plausible textual basis for [an] agency action”

is not enough to sustain agency claims to authority

over major questions. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723.

NRC’s claimed AEA authority fails every indicator of

textual clarity (contra NRC Br. 48-49; ISP Br. 38-39).

First, NRC’s reading of the “other” clauses enables

it “to adopt a regulatory program that Congress

ha[s] conspicuously . . . declined to enact itself.” West

Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724. Congress considered

and rejected the possibility of using private, offsite

facilities for interim storage in the NWPA. See 42

U.S.C. § 10155(h); supra pp. 19-20. NRC’s own assessment of policy cannot override Congress’s. See West

Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723.

33

Second, NRC derived its licensing power from “the

vague language of [three] ancillary provision[s] of ” the

AEA. Id. at 724. Such stitch work provides, at best,

an ambiguous and “merely plausible” textual basis for

NRC’s action. Id. at 723.

Third, NRC’s “ ‘discover[y] in a long-extant statute

[of ] an unheralded power’ ” to license private, offsite

storage facilities, id. at 724 (quoting Utility Air

Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)), is

regulatory authority in search of statutory justification. Not until 1980 – more than 25 years after the

AEA’s enactment and prompted by President Carter’s

“deferral of reprocessing of spent fuel in April 1977” –

did NRC first promulgate rules for licensing private,

offsite storage facilities. 45 Fed. Reg. at 74,693.

And in taking that action, NRC identified no specific

statutory language authorizing it. See id.

D. Petitioners’ Remaining Arguments Are

Unpersuasive

1. The AEA does not implicitly authorize

licensing of spent-nuclear-fuel storage

a. NRC argues (at 32) the Court must imply a

power to store spent fuel because “storage is a practical necessity in order for licensed persons to” “transfer, deliver, acquire, possess, own, receive possession

or title to, import, or export” nuclear materials. Even

if temporarily holding spent fuel is necessary, that

is not storage; it is holding the spent fuel until ready

for another productive use. That’s not what NRC

licensed. Here, storage in the ISP facility is not part

of any other activity. It’s the end goal, not an incident

to some other, authorized use. See 43 Fed. Reg. at

46,309 (“extended spent fuel storage . . . involv[es] no

operations on such materials”).

34

b. NRC further argues (at 41) the AEA must

authorize onsite storage because Congress would not

give NRC authority to license activities that create

spent fuel without also giving authority to license the

possession of spent fuel. This argument is flawed.

First, this case concerns offsite storage, not onsite

storage. So even if AEA has implied authority to

license limited onsite interim storage, that would not

justify NRC’s ISP offsite license.

Second, because Congress did give NRC authority

to license the storage of spent fuel in the NWPA,

its previous inaction is irrelevant. Again, before

the spent-fuel-reprocessing industry collapsed in the

1970s, the plan was to reprocess spent fuel, not store

it. Confronted with a new and unexpected challenge,

Congress enacted a new law. That law blessed previous onsite storage efforts, instructed NRC to authorize

additional onsite storage, and disclaimed the use of

offsite storage.

c. NRC also argues (at 36-37) that its “licensing

authority for facilities reinforces” its argument because the AEA “does not require a facilities license for

any other type of facility” – like storage – “that houses

nuclear fuel.” The AEA authorizes NRC to issue

licenses for just two types of facilities: production

facilities (like reprocessing plants) and utilization

facilities (like nuclear power reactors). See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2131-2134. This does not mean other types of facilities require no license; it means NRC lacks authority

(under the AEA) to license any other type of facility,

including stand-alone storage facilities. NRC’s contrary assertion violates both the rule that “[a]gencies

have only those powers given to them by Congress,”

West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723, and the omitted-case

canon, see Reading Law 93-94.

35

2. NRC’s past practice and regulations do

not support its claims to authority

NRC argues (at 38-39) its “consistent interpretation” and application “of the [AEA] confirms that the

Act authorizes [NRC] to license the offsite storage of

spent fuel.” This argument fails.

First, NRC’s current AEA interpretation is not longstanding because NRC never previously attempted

to explain the statutory bases or purposes of interim

storage. In 1975, NRC first claimed “the discretion to

deal with issues of ” where and how to store spent fuel.

40 Fed. Reg. at 42,802. NRC cited no source for that

discretion at all, much less any AEA section. Then,

when NRC in 1980 promulgated regulations for licensing offsite interim storage, it made no attempt to

justify those regulations as conforming to the AEA’s

text. Instead, NRC said only that its new rules were

“issued under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,” with no

explanation of which AEA sections authorized which

regulations or why. 45 Fed. Reg. at 74,699. In 2003,

NRC claimed authority to license interim storage under

the combined authority of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2093,

and 2111 specifically. See NRC Br. 5, Bullcreek v.

NRC, Nos. 03-1018 & 03-1022, 2003 WL 25588879

(D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2003). But NRC still did not explain

what statutory purposes that storage supposedly fulfilled. So NRC’s efforts to justify its authority using

the AEA’s actual text are of recent provenance.

Second, NRC barely has used its wrongfully claimed

authority. NRC acknowledges (at 6) it has licensed

just four private, offsite storage facilities since

claiming such authority 45 years ago. Of those

four, two (ISP and Holtec) are the subjects of active

litigation in this Court, another (Private Fuel Storage

in Utah) never was built, and just one (the Morris

facility, originally licensed and built before 1980 as a

36

reprocessing facility, not a storage facility) ever was

built.

The remaining “offsite” storage petitioners now claim

exists, see NRC Br. 5-6, 39; ISP Br. 32 (claiming

“at least a dozen” offsite facilities), is actually onsite

storage – as DOE’s spent fuel inventory report

acknowledges. Spent Fuel Inventory 7-8 (listing 25

“shutdown reactors . . . with [spent fuel] remaining

onsite” and describing the Morris facility as “the only

non-DOE operated, NRC licensed pool storage facility

that is not co-located at a reactor site”) (emphases

added).

The ISP facility’s scale also is unprecedented.

The facility would hold at least 5,000 – and potentially

up to 40,000 – metric tons of spent fuel. No spent

fuel storage sites of that scale exist in this country.

Just the initial 5,000 metric tons would make the ISP

facility the largest single deposit of spent fuel in the

country. By comparison, the Morris facility – the only

private, offsite storage facility in the country – held

just 674 metric tons of spent fuel as of 2021. See id. at

F.3.

Third, even if NRC consistently had claimed and

exercised authority to license private, offsite storage

facilities (it did not), an old and oft-repeated error is

still error. For example, the Federal Trade Commission claimed for decades it had power to receive

“equitable monetary relief ” under § 13(b) of its organic

statute, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v.

FTC, 593 U.S. 67, 70, 72-74, 81-82 (2021). It had

issued regulatory guidance explicitly claiming that

power and “use[d] § 13(b) to win equitable monetary

relief directly in court with great frequency” since “the

late 1970s.” Id. at 73-74. Nevertheless, this Court

unanimously held that § 13(b) does not authorize the

37

FTC to receive equitable monetary relief. Id. at 70.

That holding applies here.11

II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAD JURISDICTION

A. Fasken Is A “Party Aggrieved” Under The

Hobbs Act

1. Fasken satisfied statutory judicialreview requirements

The Hobbs Act permits “[a]ny party aggrieved by [a]

final order” of NRC to petition for review. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2344. The AEA states NRC “shall admit . . . as a

party” to a licensing proceeding “any person whose

interest may be affected by the proceeding” and who

“request[s]” a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A).

Under that language, Fasken is a “party aggrieved”

entitled to seek judicial review. Fasken’s interest will

be affected by ISP’s license. See supra pp. 10-11.

NRC so found, and no party disputes that finding. See

Interim Storage Partners, 90 N.R.C. at 52. Petitioners

acknowledge Fasken requested a hearing. See NRC

Br. 9; ISP Br. 11.

The AEA and the Hobbs Act require nothing

more. See 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (“shall admit . . .

as a party”); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad

Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (the word

“shall” “creates an obligation impervious to [agency]

discretion”). And NRC’s license grant “aggrieved”

Fasken. App. 33a (“[T]here’s no question that Fasken

. . . is ‘aggrieved.’ ”) (Jones, J.).

11 The D.C. Circuit’s contrary holding in Bullcreek v. NRC, 359

F.3d 536 (2004), is unpersuasive. That decision assumed without

analysis that the AEA authorized NRC to license private, offsite

storage (it does not) and focused on whether § 10155(h) alone

(rather than the NWPA’s Interim Storage Program as a whole)

overcame that assumed authority.

38

2. The Fifth Circuit properly rejected

petitioners’ atextual arguments

Petitioners argue NRC’s decision not to grant

Fasken status as an intervenor – because it disagreed

with Fasken’s objections on the merits – sufficed to

deny it “party” status. NRC Br. 27. That confuses

intervention under NRC regulations with party status

under the AEA and the Hobbs Act. NRC’s intervention rules (adopted 35 years after the AEA) require

that an intervenor “propose[ ] at least one admissible

contention that meets the requirements of paragraph

(f ) of this section” – including, for example, that NRC

agree the contention raises “a material issue of law or

fact.” 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a), (f )(1)(vi).

NRC’s attempt to interpose a substantive hurdle to

party status lacks statutory support: the AEA requires

only that a person demonstrate its interest would be

affected and request a hearing to become a party; the

Hobbs Act imposes no additional requirements. See

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic,

Inc., 588 U.S. 1, 26 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring

in the judgment) (“[T]here is certainly no basis to

interpret a silent statute as achieving that extraordinary close-the-courthouse-door outcome.”). These

statutes’ clarity means “the judicial inquiry is

complete.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,

98 (2003) (cleaned up).

The Fifth Circuit properly concluded the only

requirements for party status are statutory: affected

interests and participation. It reasoned that Fasken’s

geographical proximity to the proposed site meant

the license would affect Fasken’s interests. App. 12a.

It then ruled that “the plain text of the Hobbs Act

requires only that a petitioner have participated – in

some way – in the agency proceedings, which . . .

Fasken did.” App. 17a. The Fifth Circuit thus rejected

39

the “extra-textual” argument that intervention is an

“additional requirement[ ]” for party status. App. 18a.

As Judge Jones separately wrote, “the breadth of

NRC’s statutory charge to allow ‘affected persons’ to

be made ‘parties’ ” makes it “paradoxical to resort to

the Hobbs Act to disable Fasken . . . from judicial

review.” App. 35a.

3. Text, precedent, and purpose confirm

the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation

a. Hobbs Act § 2348 supports Fasken. It governs

intervention in Hobbs Act proceedings and distinguishes a “party in interest in the proceeding before

the agency whose interests will be affected” from

others “whose interests are affected by the order of the

agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2348. The former may intervene

by “motion and as of right,” while the latter “may

intervene,” but not as of right. Id. Congress’s use

of the expansive phrase “party in interest” confirms

Fasken’s rights. A “party in interest” encompasses

all “entities that are potentially concerned with or

affected by a proceeding.” Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser

Gypsum Co., 144 S. Ct. 1414, 1424 (2024). That

holding confirms the breadth of those the Hobbs Act

considers a party.12 It does not support NRC’s effort

to erect the agency’s intervention rules as a barrier to

party status; the AEA compels the agency to accept

interested parties that request a hearing.13

12 See also U.S. Amicus Br. 13, Truck Ins., No. 22-1079 (U.S.

Dec. 14, 2023) (arguing “party in interest” “is broad and refers to

a participant in an action or affair that is concerned with or

affected by its potential effects”) (emphases added).

13 NRC cites (at 19) Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, which is

inapposite. There, the court dismissed a petition for lack of

jurisdiction because the petitioner did not participate at the

agency and its only interest was the case’s “potential effect as

a precedent.” 311 F.3d 1357, 1367 n.17 (11th Cir. 2002).

40

Public meaning does not support petitioners’

position. The three dictionaries NRC cites (at 17)

confirm participation as the touchstone for party

status. The only dictionary definition of “[p]arty

aggrieved” encompasses Fasken. See Party, Black’s

Law Dictionary 1278 (4th ed. 1951) (defining “[p]arty

aggrieved” as “one whose right has been directly and

injuriously affected by action of court”). Black’s says

that definition applies “[u]nder statutes permitting

any party aggrieved to appeal.” Id. And while the

dictionary defines “party” to mean “he or they by

or against whom a suit is brought,” the dictionary

cautions that “ ‘[p]arty’ is not restricted to strict meaning of plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit” and instead

can be “defined as one concerned in or privy to a

matter.” Id. The second dictionary NRC cites

defines “party” as “[o]ne who takes part, participates,

or is concerned in some action or affair; a participator;

an accessory.” 7 The Oxford English Dictionary 515

(1933) (emphases added). By contrast, the definition

NRC cites applies only if there are “two sides in some

proceeding, as the litigants in an action at law.”

Id. That definition does not apply: unlike lawsuits

in court, or complaint and enforcement proceedings

before administrative agencies – which principally

affect only plaintiffs and defendants – a licensing

proceeding affects a wide range of interested parties.

Cf. Comuni-Centre Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 856 F.2d 1551,

1555 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (unlike “a bipolar civil action

in a district court,” a “licensing case has the interest

of the public as its focus”). The third dictionary is

similar: it defines “party” as a “participant,” and NRC’s

definition applies only to lawsuits. The Random

41

House Dictionary of the English Language 1052-53

(1967).14

b. NRC’s extra-textual intervention requirement

lacks supporting precedent. One case it cites (at 30) –

National Parks Conservation Association v. FERC,

6 F.4th 1044 (9th Cir. 2021) – did not involve a Hobbs

Act agency. Another – Don’t Waste Michigan, 2023

WL 395030, at *3 – held without explanation that

denial of intervention undermined party status. In

Water Transportation Association v. ICC, the D.C.

Circuit held an interested person was a “party.”

See 819 F.2d 1189, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1987). And in Ohio

Nuclear-Free Network v. NRC, the interested person

did not even try to intervene. See 53 F.4th 236, 239

(D.C. Cir. 2022).

c. Finally, NRC’s use of intervention rules to

preclude appellate review is arbitrary. NRC cursorily

addressed Fasken’s merits arguments in denying it

intervenor status. That arbitrary approach allows

NRC to shortchange the merits, analyzing them

summarily without a complete record and controlling

“the courthouse door.” App. 33a-34a (Jones, J.,

concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); cf.

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,

739 (1985) (“Congress decided on the scope of judicial

review . . . solely by reference to the subject matter of

[NRC] action and not by reference to the procedural

particulars of [NRC] action.”); Massachusetts v. NRC,

878 F.2d 1516, 1520 (1st Cir. 1989) (“NRC cannot now

claim that by refusing to grant the Commonwealth’s

14 NRC’s other cases are irrelevant because they define “party”

in a lawsuit, not a licensing proceeding. See Smith v. Bayer

Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 (2011); United States ex rel. Eisenstein

v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 932-33 (2009); Marino v. Ortiz,

484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam); United States ex rel.

Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.S. 397, 402 (1917).

42

requests to become a party, the NRC’s decisions

are beyond review.”). This Court instead rejects

“conflat[ing] the merits of an objection with the

threshold party in interest inquiry.” Truck Ins., 144

S. Ct. at 1427.

By contrast, limiting judicial review to parties that

both have an interest and participated in the proceeding (whether by requesting a hearing or otherwise)

supports sound agency and judicial decision making.

“The point of the Hobbs Act is to force parties

who want to challenge agency orders via facial,

pre-enforcement challenges to do so promptly and to

do so in a court of appeals.” PDR Network, 588 U.S.

at 13 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment).

That purpose is met whenever people with affected

interests participate in the agency proceeding and –

when the agency rejects their views – sue timely in a

federal appeals court. Fasken did that by requesting

a hearing to protect its interests and timely petitioning the Fifth Circuit for review.

4. Petitioners’ remaining arguments fail

Petitioners seem to concede participation unlocks

party status. NRC (at 18) defines “party” as “a

participator” (emphasis added) and conceded (at Pet.

12) that “[t]he courts of appeals (including the Fifth

Circuit) have accordingly concluded that . . . actual[ ]

participat[ion] in the agency proceeding” suffices for

party status. ISP states that, “to pursue judicial

review under the statute, a person must either be

a ‘party’ to the agency proceeding, or at least have

attempted to become a ‘party’ to those proceedings.”

Br. 10 (emphases added). Fasken participated in NRC

proceedings in the AEA-prescribed manner, so the

Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction to entertain Fasken’s

petition even on ISP’s view.

That Fasken could (and did) appeal the denial of its

intervention motion is irrelevant. Success on that

43

appeal might have entitled Fasken to intervene and

participate more before NRC, but the AEA and the

Hobbs Act require neither. Nor does it matter that

Fasken did not distinguish party status and intervention in that appeal or in Fifth Circuit proceedings.

Party status goes to the Court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction; such arguments “can never be forfeited

or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630

(2002).

Finally, it hardly helps NRC (at 18) that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) refers to adversely

affected or aggrieved “person[s] ” rather than parties.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added). Fasken’s request for

a hearing and demonstration of its interest in the

license make it a “party aggrieved” and distinguish it

from someone who ignored the agency proceedings

entirely before seeking judicial review. Simmons v.

ICC does not help NRC, either. See NRC Br. 18 (citing

716 F.2d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.)). Its statement that the Hobbs Act refers “to a party before the

agency, not a party to the judicial proceeding,” 716

F.2d at 43, leaves unanswered the question who was

a party before the agency, which is the question here.

The Court need go no further.

Judge Jones

explained that the panel’s exercise of jurisdiction rested

on “two bases of authority”: “these petitioners are

parties aggrieved, and the NRC has acted ultra vires.”

App. 33a. The ultra vires ground was not required.

B. Jurisdiction Exists To Review Ultra Vires

Agency Action

1. American courts long have exercised

jurisdiction to review ultra vires action

The Fifth Circuit did not err in upholding jurisdiction because NRC acted ultra vires.

44

Judicial-review statutes like the Hobbs Act

presumptively do not bar preexisting modes of

review.15 In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, this

Court “survey[ed]” its “[e]arly cases” and concluded

“that judicial review of a final agency action by an

aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is

persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose

of Congress.” 387 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1967). Applying

that principle, the Court held the Food, Drug, and

Cosmetic Act’s “specific review provisions . . . were

designed to give an additional remedy and not to cut

down more traditional channels of review.” Id. at 142

(emphasis added); see also PDR Network, 588 U.S.

at 16 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)

(Abbott Laboratories is a “landmark decision”).

American courts long have recognized that persons

can challenge agency actions taken without and

contrary to their statutory authority, even if they did

not participate in proceedings before the agency. For

example, in Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States,

this Court upheld jurisdiction “to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not

attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before”

the ICC, if the “contention is that the commission has

exceeded its statutory powers.” 249 U.S. 557, 562-63

(1919). Similarly, in Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustee v. United States, the Court stated that persons

could challenge the ICC’s orders if they are “alleged to

be in excess of the [ICC’s] power” and “subject[ ] [the

plaintiffs] to legal injury, actual or threatened.” 263

U.S. 143, 147-48 (1923).

15 NRC’s argument (at 16) that “[t]here is no textual basis

for the Fifth Circuit’s . . . ultra vires exception to th[e] partyaggrieved requirement” is misplaced. The question is whether

the Hobbs Act abrogated all preexisting modes of review.

45

2. The Hobbs Act does not abolish traditional ultra vires review

Enacted in 1950, the Hobbs Act “does not manifest

a congressional purpose to eliminate judicial review”

of ultra vires agency action. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at

144. The Act gives the federal appeals courts (other

than the Federal Circuit) “exclusive jurisdiction to

enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to

determine the validity of,” certain agency orders. 28

U.S.C. § 2342. But that exclusivity provision establishes only that challenges to those orders must occur

in an appellate venue. Likewise, § 2344’s requirement

that parties aggrieved must petition for review

“within 60 days after” an order is entered limits the

time within which persons may sue but leaves claims

substantively unaffected.

Finally, decisions immediately after the Hobbs Act

suggest the ultra vires rule survives. For example, in

Leedom v. Kyne, this Court said it will not “lightly

infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection

of rights it confers against agency action taken in

excess of delegated powers.” 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958).

It held federal district courts have jurisdiction if an

agency acts “in excess of its delegated powers and

contrary to a specific [statutory] prohibition.” Id. at

188 (emphasis added). That principle applies here.

NRC’s license grant exceeded its delegated powers

under the AEA and the NWPA. The Fifth Circuit’s

exercise of jurisdiction thus fits under Leedom. See

American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. ICC, 673 F.2d 82, 85

n.4 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“a person may appeal

an agency action even if not a party to the original

agency proceeding . . . if the agency action is attacked

as exceeding [its] power”); accord Wales Transp., Inc.

v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774, 776 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984).

46

Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.,

502 U.S. 32 (1991), is not to the contrary. There, the

Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Leedom

because (1) the relevant statute gave the party challenging agency action “a meaningful and adequate

means” to do so, and (2) “Congress ha[d] spoken

clearly and directly” that other ways to challenge

agency action were precluded. Id. at 43-44. Here,

both factors favor exercising jurisdiction. “[NRC’s]

interpretation of the [AEA and the Hobbs Act] would

wholly deprive [Fasken] of a meaningful and adequate

means of vindicating its statutory rights” because

NRC denied intervention to all interested persons.

Id. Those Acts do not support empowering NRC to

insulate its decisions from judicial review.

3. Petitioners’ criticisms of the ultra vires

rule are unfounded

Petitioners’ efforts to limit judicial review fail.

a. In FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466

U.S. 463 (1984), and ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987) – which NRC cites (at

20) to undermine the ultra vires rule – the agencies

did not argue that no court had the power to review

its orders. Rather, in ITT World, this Court held a

district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the agency’s

action as ultra vires in part because appellate review

was “[t]he appropriate procedure for obtaining judicial

review.” 466 U.S. at 468. Similarly, in Brotherhood,

the Court premised its analysis on the availability of

“appeal[ ] to the courts directly after” agency action.

482 U.S. at 279. NRC misreads Brotherhood (at 20) to

mean the Court “refused to adopt a[n] . . . exception to

the [Hobbs] Act’s 60-day filing window.” The Court

did not address that issue because those appeals were

timely. See 482 U.S. at 277.

47

b. Several of petitioners’ other criticisms of the

ultra vires rule also are speculative. NRC (at 21) and

ISP (at 27) argue the rule allows non-parties to obtain

appellate review. But Fasken was a party to NRC’s

proceeding. It did not “intentionally eschew[ ] available agency procedures for becoming a party.” ISP

Br. 27. Nor was NRC “deprive[d] . . . of the ability

to respond to [Fasken’s] arguments.” NRC Br. 21.

“Fasken’s multiple attempts formally to intervene” or

to reopen the record “were repeatedly rebuffed by the

agency,” App. 33a (Jones, J.), and the agency did so

only after summarily rejecting the merits of Fasken’s

contentions. This case, therefore, does not involve

the ultra vires rule empowering a person “to skip

the administrative proceeding and then ambush the

agency” in court. NRC Br. 21.

NRC’s next argument (at 22) – that the ultra vires

exception threatens to swallow the party-aggrieved

rule because ultra vires “may be a synonym for

‘wrong’ ” – is “hyperbol[ic]” and speculative as well.

App. 43a (Jones, J.). As Judge Jones explained, the

exception requires that the agency acted not only

without authority, but also in violation of express

limitations on its authority. Id. That rule is neither

“obscure” nor “indeterminate.” NRC Br. 22. It applies

here because NRC acted without AEA authority in

granting the license and did so in violation of express

limitations on NRC’s authority under the NWPA. By

contrast, in other cases, the Fifth Circuit repeatedly

has found the ultra vires principle inapplicable. See

Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911,

922 (5th Cir. 1993); Baros v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co.,

400 F.3d 228, 238 n.24 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Wales

Transp., 728 F.2d at 776 n.1 (ultra vires rule did not

change outcome because one petitioner “as to all

48

claims . . . participated in the original agency proceeding”).

c. Petitioners’ remaining criticisms of the ultra

vires rule lack merit. NRC’s argument (at 20-21)

the ultra vires rule is “untethered to the norms that

govern litigation in court” rests on a false equivalence

between “agency adjudication” and “district court

case[s].” While a non-party to a district-court case

cannot appeal it, the same is not necessarily true

for agency adjudication. As NRC acknowledges (at

18), the APA expressly allows interested persons to

challenge adverse agency action. That includes agency

adjudication. See Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d

936, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Standing to challenge

agency adjudications is of course more expansive than

standing to appeal lower court judgments, in that not

only the losing party before the agency but even . . .

other persons with interests adverse to the winning

party[ ] may often sue.”).

As for ISP, its reliance (at 19) on Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205 (2007), is misplaced. Bowles held courts

may not create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional

requirements. See id. at 214. The ultra vires rule

is not an “exception” to the Hobbs Act because it

preexisted the Act. See App. 42a (Jones, J.). Under

Abbott Laboratories, the rule governs unless superseded by statute.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeal’s judgment should be affirmed.

49

Respectfully submitted,

ALLAN KANNER

ANNEMIEKE M. TENNIS

KANNER & WHITELEY, L.L.C.

701 Camp Street

New Orleans, LA 70130

(504) 524-5777

MONICA RENEE PERALES

FASKEN LAND AND

MINERALS, LTD.

6101 Holiday Hill Road

Midland, TX 79707

(432) 687-1777

January 15, 2025

DAVID C. FREDERICK

Counsel of Record

SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH

CHRISTOPHER C. GOODNOW

MATTHEW J. WILKINS

RYAN M. FOLIO

KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,

FIGEL & FREDERICK,

P.L.L.C.

1615 M Street, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 326-7900

(dfrederick@kellogghansen.com

ADDENDUM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703,

68 Stat. 919 (42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.):

Table of Contents for Pub. L. No. 83-703

(excerpt) ............................................................. Add. 1

42 U.S.C. § 2014 (excerpts) ........................... Add. 3

42 U.S.C. § 2073(a) ........................................ Add. 4

42 U.S.C. § 2093(a) ........................................ Add. 5

42 U.S.C. § 2111(a) ........................................ Add. 5

42 U.S.C. § 2131 ............................................ Add. 7

42 U.S.C. § 2132 ............................................ Add. 7

42 U.S.C. § 2133(a) ........................................ Add. 8

42 U.S.C. § 2134 ............................................ Add. 8

42 U.S.C. § 2210i ......................................... Add. 11

42 U.S.C. § 2239 .......................................... Add. 11

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.

97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (42 U.S.C. § 10101

et seq.):

Table of Contents for Pub. L. No. 97-425

(excerpt) ........................................................ Add. 16

42 U.S.C. § 10101(23) .................................. Add. 18

42 U.S.C. § 10131 ........................................ Add. 18

42 U.S.C. § 10151 ........................................ Add. 20

42 U.S.C. § 10152 ........................................ Add. 21

42 U.S.C. § 10153 ........................................ Add. 21

42 U.S.C. § 10154 ........................................ Add. 22

42 U.S.C. § 10155 (excerpts) ....................... Add. 25

42 U.S.C. § 10172 ........................................ Add. 31

ii

Administrative Orders Review Act, ch. 1189,

64 Stat. 1129 (1950) (28 U.S.C. § 2341 et

seq.) (Hobbs Act):

28 U.S.C. § 2342 .......................................... Add. 32

28 U.S.C. § 2344 .......................................... Add. 33

28 U.S.C. § 2348 .......................................... Add. 34

10 C.F.R.:

§ 2.309 (excerpts) ......................................... Add. 35

§ 2.335(b) ...................................................... App. 39

§ 72.3 (excerpt)............................................. App. 40

Add. 1

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (42 U.S.C. § 2011

et seq.):

1. Excerpt from Table of Contents for Pub. L. No.

83-703:

“ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

“CHAPTER 1. DECLARATION, FINDINGS,

AND PURPOSE

“Sec. 1. Declaration.

“Sec. 2. Findings.

“Sec. 3. Purpose.

“CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS

“Sec. 11. Definitions.

“CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION

“Sec. 21. Atomic Energy Commission.

“Sec. 22. Members.

“Sec. 23. Office.

“Sec. 24. General Manager.

“Sec. 25. Divisions and Offices.

“Sec. 26. General Advisory Committee.

“Sec. 27. Military Liaison Committee.

“Sec. 28. Appointment of Army, Navy, or Air Force

Officers.

“CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH

“Sec. 31. Research Assistance.

“Sec. 32. Research by the Commission.

“Sec. 33. Research for Others.

Add. 2

“CHAPTER 5. PRODUCTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

“Sec. 41. Ownership and Operation of Production

Facilities.

“Sec. 42. Irradiation of Materials.

“Sec. 43. Acquisition of Production Facilities.

“Sec. 44. Disposition of Energy.

“CHAPTER 6. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

“Sec. 51. Special Nuclear Material.

“Sec. 52. Government Ownership of All Special Nuclear

Material.

“Sec. 53. Domestic Distribution of Special Nuclear

Material.

“Sec. 54. Foreign Distribution of Special Nuclear Material.

“Sec. 55. Acquisition.

“Sec. 56. Fair Price.

“Sec. 57. Prohibition.

“CHAPTER 7. SOURCE MATERIAL

“Sec. 61. Source Material.

“Sec. 62. License for Transfers Required.

“Sec. 63. Domestic Distribution of Source Material.

“Sec. 64. Foreign Distribution of Source Material.

“Sec. 65. Reporting.

“Sec. 66. Acquisition.

“Sec. 67. Operations on Lands Belonging to the United

States.

“Sec. 68. Public Lands.

“Sec. 69. Prohibition.

“CHAPTER 8. BYPRODUCT MATERIAL

“Sec. 81. Domestic Distribution.

“Sec. 82. Foreign Distribution of Byproduct Material.

***”

Add. 3

2.

42 U.S.C. § 2014 provides in relevant part:

§ 2014. Definitions

The intent of Congress in the definitions as given

in this section should be construed from the words

or phrases used in the definitions. As used in this

chapter:

***

(aa) The term “special nuclear material” means

(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or

in the isotope 235, and any other material which the

Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section

2071 of this title, determines to be special nuclear

material, but does not include source material; or

(2) any material artificially enriched by any of the

foregoing, but does not include source material.

***

(cc) The term “utilization facility” means (1) any

equipment or device, except an atomic weapon,

determined by rule of the Commission to be capable

of making use of special nuclear material in such

quantity as to be of significance to the common

defense and security, or in such manner as to affect

the health and safety of the public, or peculiarly

adapted for making use of atomic energy in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and

security, or in such manner as to affect the health and

safety of the public; or (2) any important component

part especially designed for such equipment or device

as determined by the Commission.

***

(ee) HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE; SPENT

NUCLEAR FUEL.—The terms “high-level radioactive

Add. 4

waste” and “spent nuclear fuel” have the meanings

given such terms in section 10101 of this title.

***

3.

42 U.S.C. § 2073 provides in relevant part:

§ 2073. Domestic distribution of special nuclear

material

(a) Licenses

The Commission is authorized (i) to issue licenses to

transfer or receive in interstate commerce, transfer,

deliver, acquire, possess, own, receive possession of or

title to, import, or export under the terms of an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section

2153 of this title, special nuclear material, (ii) to make

special nuclear material available for the period of the

license, and, (iii) to distribute special nuclear material

within the United States to qualified applicants requesting such material—

(1) for the conduct of research and development

activities of the types specified in section 2051 of

this title;

(2) for use in the conduct of research and development activities or in medical therapy under a license

issued pursuant to section 2134 of this title;

(3) for use under a license issued pursuant to

section 2133 of this title;

(4) for such other uses as the Commission determines to be appropriate to carry out the purposes of

this chapter.

***

Add. 5

4.

42 U.S.C. § 2093 provides in relevant part:

§ 2093. Domestic distribution of source material

(a) License

The Commission is authorized to issue licenses

for and to distribute source material within the

United States to qualified applicants requesting such

material—

(1) for the conduct of research and development

activities of the types specified in section 2051 of

this title;

(2) for use in the conduct of research and development activities or in medical therapy under a license

issued pursuant to section 2134 of this title;

(3) for use under a license issued pursuant to

section 2133 of this title; or

(4) for any other use approved by the Commission

as an aid to science or industry.

***

5.

42 U.S.C. § 2111 provides in relevant part:

§ 2111. Domestic distribution

(a) In general

No person may transfer or receive in interstate

commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire,

own, possess, import, or export any byproduct material, except to the extent authorized by this section,

section 2112 or section 2114 of this title. The Commission is authorized to issue general or specific licenses

to applicants seeking to use byproduct material for research or development purposes, for medical therapy,

Add. 6

industrial uses, agricultural uses, or such other useful

applications as may be developed. The Commission

may distribute, sell, loan, or lease such byproduct

material as it owns to qualified applicants with or

without charge: Provided, however, That, for byproduct material to be distributed by the Commission for a

charge, the Commission shall establish prices on such

equitable basis as, in the opinion of the Commission,

(a) will provide reasonable compensation to the Government for such material, (b) will not discourage the

use of such material or the development of sources of

supply of such material independent of the Commission, and (c) will encourage research and development.

In distributing such material, the Commission shall

give preference to applicants proposing to use such

material either in the conduct of research and development or in medical therapy. The Commission shall

not permit the distribution of any byproduct material

to any licensee, and shall recall or order the recall of

any distributed material from any licensee, who is not

equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety

standards to protect health as may be established by

the Commission or who uses such material in violation

of law or regulation of the Commission or in a manner

other than as disclosed in the application therefor

or approved by the Commission. The Commission is

authorized to establish classes of byproduct material

and to exempt certain classes or quantities of material

or kinds of uses or users from the requirements for a

license set forth in this section when it makes a

finding that the exemption of such classes or quantities of such material or such kinds of uses or users will

not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common

defense and security and to the health and safety of

the public.

***

Add. 7

6.

42 U.S.C. § 2131 provides:

§ 2131. License required

It shall be unlawful, except as provided in section

2121 of this title, for any person within the United

States to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,

manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, use,

import, or export any utilization or production facility

except under and in accordance with a license issued

by the Commission pursuant to section 2133 or 2134

of this title.

7.

42 U.S.C. § 2132 provides:

§ 2132. Utilization and production facilities for

industrial or commercial purposes

(a) Issuance of licenses

Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), or

otherwise specifically authorized by law, any license

hereafter issued for a utilization or production facility

for industrial or commercial purposes shall be issued

pursuant to section 2133 of this title.

(b) Facilities constructed or operated under

section 2134(b)

Any license hereafter issued for a utilization or production facility for industrial or commercial purposes,

the construction or operation of which was licensed

pursuant to section 2134(b) of this title prior to

enactment into law of this subsection, shall be issued

under section 2134(b) of this title.

(c) Cooperative Power Reactor Demonstration

facilities

Any license for a utilization or production facility

for industrial or commercial purposes constructed or

Add. 8

operated under an arrangement with the Commission

entered into under the Cooperative Power Reactor

Demonstration Program shall, except as otherwise

specifically required by applicable law, be issued

under section 2134(b) of this title.

8.

42 U.S.C. § 2133 provides in relevant part:

§ 2133. Commercial licenses

(a) Conditions

The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to

persons applying therefor to transfer or receive in

interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer,

acquire, possess, use, import, or export under the

terms of an agreement for cooperation arranged

pursuant to section 2153 of this title, utilization or

production facilities for industrial or commercial

purposes. Such licenses shall be issued in accordance

with the provisions of subchapter XV and subject to

such conditions as the Commission may by rule or

regulation establish to effectuate the purposes and

provisions of this chapter.

***

9.

42 U.S.C. § 2134 provides:

§ 2134. Medical, industrial, and commercial

licenses

(a) Medical therapy

The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to

persons applying therefor for utilization facilities for

use in medical therapy. In issuing such licenses the

Commission is directed to permit the widest amount

Add. 9

of effective medical therapy possible with the amount

of special nuclear material available for such purposes

and to impose the minimum amount of regulation

consistent with its obligations under this chapter to

promote the common defense and security and to

protect the health and safety of the public.

(b) Industrial and commercial purposes

As provided for in subsection (b) or (c) of section

2132 of this title, or where specifically authorized by

law, the Commission is authorized to issue licenses

under this subsection to persons applying therefor for

utilization and production facilities for industrial and

commercial purposes. In issuing licenses under this

subsection, the Commission shall impose the minimum amount of such regulations and terms of license

as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations

under this chapter.

(c) Research and development activities

(1) In general

Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Commission

is authorized to issue licenses to persons applying

therefor for utilization and production facilities useful

in the conduct of research and development activities

of the types specified in section 2051 of this title.

(2) Regulation

The Commission is directed to impose only such

minimum amount of regulation of the licensee as

the Commission finds will permit the Commission to

fulfill its obligations under this chapter to promote the

common defense and security and to protect the health

and safety of the public and will permit the conduct of

widespread and diverse research and development.

Add. 10

(3) Limitation on utilization facilities

The Commission may issue a license under this

section for a utilization facility useful in the conduct

of research and development activities of the types

specified in section 2051 of this title if—

(A) not more than 75 percent of the annual costs

to the licensee of owning and operating the facility

are devoted to the sale, other than for research and

development or education and training, of—

(i) nonenergy services;

(ii) energy; or

(iii) a combination of nonenergy services and

energy; and

(B) not more than 50 percent of the annual costs

to the licensee of owning and operating the facility

are devoted to the sale of energy.

(d) Limitations

No license under this section may be given to any

person for activities which are not under or within the

jurisdiction of the United States, except for the export

of production or utilization facilities under terms of

an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to

section 2153 of this title or except under the provisions

of section 2139 of this title. No license may be issued

to any corporation or other entity if the Commission

knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled,

or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a

foreign government. In any event, no license may be

issued to any person within the United States if, in the

opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to

such person would be inimical to the common defense

and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Add. 11

10. 42 U.S.C. § 2210i provides:

§ 2210i. Secure transfer of nuclear materials

(a) The Commission shall establish a system to

ensure that materials described in subsection (b),

when transferred or received in the United States

by any party pursuant to an import or export license

issued pursuant to this chapter, are accompanied by a

manifest describing the type and amount of materials

being transferred or received. Each individual receiving or accompanying the transfer of such materials

shall be subject to a security background check conducted by appropriate Federal entities.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by the Commission

by regulation, the materials referred to in subsection

(a) are byproduct materials, source materials, special

nuclear materials, high-level radioactive waste, spent

nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, and low-level radioactive waste (as defined in section 10101(16) of this

title).

11. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 provides:

§ 2239. Hearings and judicial review

(a)(1)(A) In any proceeding under this chapter, for

the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of

any license or construction permit, or application to

transfer control, and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing

with the activities of licensees, and in any proceeding

for the payment of compensation, an award or royalties under sections 2183, 2187, 2236(c) or 2238 of this

title, the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the

request of any person whose interest may be affected

by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as

Add. 12

a party to such proceeding. The Commission shall

hold a hearing after thirty days’ notice and publication

once in the Federal Register, on each application

under section 2133 or 2134(b) of this title for a construction permit for a facility, and on any application

under section 2134(c) of this title for a construction

permit for a testing facility. In cases where such a

construction permit has been issued following the

holding of such a hearing, the Commission may, in the

absence of a request therefor by any person whose

interest may be affected, issue an operating license or

an amendment to a construction permit or an amendment to an operating license without a hearing, but

upon thirty days’ notice and publication once in the

Federal Register of its intent to do so. The Commission may dispense with such thirty days’ notice and

publication with respect to any application for an

amendment to a construction permit or an amendment to an operating license upon a determination

by the Commission that the amendment involves no

significant hazards consideration.

(B)(i) Not less than 180 days before the date scheduled for initial loading of fuel into a plant by a licensee

that has been issued a combined construction permit

and operating license under section 2235(b) of this

title, the Commission shall publish in the Federal

Register notice of intended operation. That notice

shall provide that any person whose interest may be

affected by operation of the plant, may within 60 days

request the Commission to hold a hearing on whether

the facility as constructed complies, or on completion

will comply, with the acceptance criteria of the license.

(ii) A request for hearing under clause (i) shall

show, prima facie, that one or more of the acceptance

criteria in the combined license have not been, or will

Add. 13

not be met, and the specific operational consequences

of nonconformance that would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the

public health and safety.

(iii) After receiving a request for a hearing under

clause (i), the Commission expeditiously shall either

deny or grant the request. If the request is granted,

the Commission shall determine, after considering

petitioners’ prima facie showing and any answers

thereto, whether during a period of interim operation,

there will be reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. If the Commission

determines that there is such reasonable assurance, it

shall allow operation during an interim period under

the combined license.

(iv) The Commission, in its discretion, shall

determine appropriate hearing procedures, whether

informal or formal adjudicatory, for any hearing under

clause (i), and shall state its reasons therefor.

(v) The Commission shall, to the maximum possible

extent, render a decision on issues raised by the hearing request within 180 days of the publication of the

notice provided by clause (i) or the anticipated date for

initial loading of fuel into the reactor, whichever is

later. Commencement of operation under a combined

license is not subject to subparagraph (A).

(2)(A) The Commission may issue and make

immediately effective any amendment to an operating

license or any amendment to a combined construction

and operating license, upon a determination by the

Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the

pendency before the Commission of a request for a

hearing from any person. Such amendment may be

Add. 14

issued and made immediately effective in advance of

the holding and completion of any required hearing.

In determining under this section whether such

amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission shall consult with the State

in which the facility involved is located. In all other

respects such amendment shall meet the requirements of this chapter.

(B) The Commission shall periodically (but not less

frequently than once every thirty days) publish notice

of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued,

as provided in subparagraph (A). Each such notice

shall include all amendments issued, or proposed to be

issued, since the date of publication of the last such

periodic notice. Such notice shall, with respect to each

amendment or proposed amendment (i) identify the

facility involved; and (ii) provide a brief description of

such amendment. Nothing in this subsection shall be

construed to delay the effective date of any amendment.

(C) The Commission shall, during the ninety-day

period following the effective date of this paragraph,

promulgate regulations establishing (i) standards for

determining whether any amendment to an operating

license or any amendment to a combined construction

and operating license involves no significant hazards

consideration; (ii) criteria for providing or, in emergency

situations, dispensing with prior notice and reasonable opportunity for public comment on any such

determination, which criteria shall take into account

the exigency of the need for the amendment involved;

and (iii) procedures for consultation on any such

determination with the State in which the facility

involved is located.

Add. 15

(b) The following Commission actions shall be

subject to judicial review in the manner prescribed in

chapter 158 of title 28 and chapter 7 of title 5:

(1) Any final order entered in any proceeding of

the kind specified in subsection (a).

(2) Any final order allowing or prohibiting a

facility to begin operating under a combined

construction and operating license.

(3) Any final order establishing by regulation

standards to govern the Department of Energy’s

gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plants,

including any such facilities leased to a corporation

established under the USEC Privatization Act [42

U.S.C. 2297h et seq.].

(4) Any final determination under section 2297f(c)

of this title relating to whether the gaseous diffusion

plants, including any such facilities leased to a corporation established under the USEC Privatization

Act [42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.], are in compliance with

the Commission’s standards governing the gaseous

diffusion plants and all applicable laws.

Add. 16

Relevant provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act

of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (42 U.S.C.

§ 10101 et seq.):

1. Excerpt from Table of Contents for Pub. L. No.

97-425:

SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the “Nuclear Waste

Policy Act of 1982”.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Separability.

Sec. 4. Territories and possessions.

Sec. 5. Ocean disposal.

Sec. 6. Limitation on spending authority.

Sec. 7. Protection of classified national security information.

Sec. 8. Applicability.

Sec. 9. Applicability.

TITLE I—DISPOSAL AND STORAGE OF HIGH-LEVEL

RADIOACTIVE WASTE, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL,

AND LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Sec. 101. State and affected Indian tribe participation in

development of proposed repositories for defense

waste.

SUBTITLE A—REPOSITORIES FOR DISPOSAL OF HIGHLEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Sec. 111. Findings and purposes.

Sec. 112. Recommendation of candidate sites for site

characterization.

Sec. 113. Site characterization.

Add. 17

Sec. 114. Site approval and construction authorization.

Sec. 115. Review of repository site selection.

Sec. 116. Participation of States.

Sec. 117. Consultation with States and Indian tribes.

Sec. 118. Participation of Indian tribes.

Sec. 119. Judicial review of agency actions.

Sec. 120. Expedited authorizations.

Sec. 121. Certain standards and criteria.

Sec. 122. Disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

Sec. 123. Title to material.

Sec. 124. Consideration of effect of acquisition of water

rights.

Sec. 125. Termination of certain provisions.

SUBTITLE B—INTERIM STORAGE PROGRAM

Sec. 131. Findings and purposes.

Sec. 132. Available capacity for interim storage of spent

nuclear fuel.

Sec. 133. Interim at-reactor storage.

Sec. 134. Licensing of facility expansions and transshipments.

Sec. 135. Storage of spent nuclear fuel.

Sec. 136. Interim Storage Fund.

Sec. 137. Transportation.

SUBTITLE C—MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE

Sec. 141. Monitored retrievable storage.

SUBTITLE D—LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Sec. 151. Financial arrangements for site closure.

***

Add. 18

2.

42 U.S.C. § 10101 provides in relevant part:

§ 10101. Definitions

For purposes of this chapter:

***

(23) The term “spent nuclear fuel” means fuel that

has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following

irradiation, the constituent elements of which have

not been separated by reprocessing.

***

3.

42 U.S.C. § 10131 provides:

§ 10131. Findings and purposes

(a) The Congress finds that—

(1) radioactive waste creates potential risks and

requires safe and environmentally acceptable methods

of disposal;

(2) a national problem has been created by the

accumulation of (A) spent nuclear fuel from nuclear

reactors; and (B) radioactive waste from (i) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; (ii) activities related

to medical research, diagnosis, and treatment; and

(iii) other sources;

(3) Federal efforts during the past 30 years to devise

a permanent solution to the problems of civilian

radioactive waste disposal have not been adequate;

(4) while the Federal Government has the responsibility to provide for the permanent disposal of highlevel radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel as

may be disposed of in order to protect the public health

and safety and the environment, the costs of such

disposal should be the responsibility of the generators

and owners of such waste and spent fuel;

Add. 19

(5) the generators and owners of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have the primary

responsibility to provide for, and the responsibility to

pay the costs of, the interim storage of such waste and

spent fuel until such waste and spent fuel is accepted

by the Secretary of Energy in accordance with the

provisions of this chapter;

(6) State and public participation in the planning

and development of repositories is essential in order

to promote public confidence in the safety of disposal

of such waste and spent fuel; and

(7) high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear

fuel have become major subjects of public concern, and

appropriate precautions must be taken to ensure that

such waste and spent fuel do not adversely affect the

public health and safety and the environment for this

or future generations.

(b) The purposes of this part are—

(1) to establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of repositories that will provide a

reasonable assurance that the public and the environment will be adequately protected from the hazards

posed by high-level radioactive waste and such spent

nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in a repository;

(2) to establish the Federal responsibility, and a

definite Federal policy, for the disposal of such waste

and spent fuel;

(3) to define the relationship between the Federal

Government and the State governments with respect

to the disposal of such waste and spent fuel; and

(4) to establish a Nuclear Waste Fund, composed of

payments made by the generators and owners of such

waste and spent fuel, that will ensure that the costs of

Add. 20

carrying out activities relating to the disposal of such

waste and spent fuel will be borne by the persons

responsible for generating such waste and spent fuel.

4.

42 U.S.C. § 10151 provides:

§ 10151. Findings and purposes

(a) The Congress finds that—

(1) the persons owning and operating civilian

nuclear power reactors have the primary responsibility for providing interim storage of spent nuclear fuel

from such reactors, by maximizing, to the extent practical, the effective use of existing storage facilities at

the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor, and by

adding new onsite storage capacity in a timely manner

where practical;

(2) the Federal Government has the responsibility

to encourage and expedite the effective use of existing

storage facilities and the addition of needed new storage capacity at the site of each civilian nuclear power

reactor; and

(3) the Federal Government has the responsibility

to provide, in accordance with the provisions of this

part, not more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for

interim storage of spent nuclear fuel for civilian

nuclear power reactors that cannot reasonably provide

adequate storage capacity at the sites of such reactors

when needed to assure the continued, orderly operation of such reactors.

(b) The purposes of this part are—

(1) to provide for the utilization of available spent

nuclear fuel pools at the site of each civilian nuclear

power reactor to the extent practical and the addition

of new spent nuclear fuel storage capacity where

practical at the site of such reactor; and

Add. 21

(2) to provide, in accordance with the provisions of

this part, for the establishment of a federally owned

and operated system for the interim storage of spent

nuclear fuel at one or more facilities owned by the

Federal Government with not more than 1,900 metric

tons of capacity to prevent disruptions in the orderly

operation of any civilian nuclear power reactor that

cannot reasonably provide adequate spent nuclear

fuel storage capacity at the site of such reactor when

needed.

5.

42 U.S.C. § 10152 provides:

§ 10152. Available capacity for interim storage

of spent nuclear fuel

The Secretary, the Commission, and other authorized Federal officials shall each take such actions as

such official considers necessary to encourage and

expedite the effective use of available storage, and

necessary additional storage, at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor consistent with—

(1) the protection of the public health and safety,

and the environment;

(2) economic considerations;

(3) continued operation of such reactor;

(4) any applicable provisions of law; and

(5) the views of the population surrounding such

reactor.

6.

42 U.S.C. § 10153 provides:

§ 10153. Interim at-reactor storage

The Commission shall, by rule, establish procedures

for the licensing of any technology approved by the

Commission under section 10198(a) of this title for

Add. 22

use at the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor.

The establishment of such procedures shall not preclude the licensing, under any applicable procedures

or rules of the Commission in effect prior to such

establishment, of any technology for the storage of

civilian spent nuclear fuel at the site of any civilian

nuclear power reactor.

7.

42 U.S.C. § 10154 provides:

§ 10154.

Licensing of facility expansions and

transshipments

(a) Oral argument

In any Commission hearing under section 189 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2239) on an

application for a license, or for an amendment to an

existing license, filed after January 7, 1983, to expand

the spent nuclear fuel storage capacity at the site of

a civilian nuclear power reactor, through the use of

high-density fuel storage racks, fuel rod compaction,

the transshipment of spent nuclear fuel to another

civilian nuclear power reactor within the same utility

system, the construction of additional spent nuclear

fuel pool capacity or dry storage capacity, or by other

means, the Commission shall, at the request of any

party, provide an opportunity for oral argument with

respect to any matter which the Commission determines to be in controversy among the parties. The

oral argument shall be preceded by such discovery

procedures as the rules of the Commission shall

provide. The Commission shall require each party,

including the Commission staff, to submit in written

form, at the time of the oral argument, a summary of

the facts, data, and arguments upon which such party

proposes to rely that are known at such time to

Add. 23

such party. Only facts and data in the form of sworn

testimony or written submission may be relied upon

by the parties during oral argument. Of the materials

that may be submitted by the parties during oral

argument, the Commission shall only consider those

facts and data that are submitted in the form of sworn

testimony or written submission.

(b) Adjudicatory hearing

(1) At the conclusion of any oral argument under

subsection (a), the Commission shall designate any

disputed question of fact, together with any remaining

questions of law, for resolution in an adjudicatory

hearing only if it determines that—

(A) there is a genuine and substantial dispute

of fact which can only be resolved with sufficient

accuracy by the introduction of evidence in an

adjudicatory hearing; and

(B) the decision of the Commission is likely to

depend in whole or in part on the resolution of such

dispute.

(2) In making a determination under this subsection, the Commission—

(A) shall designate in writing the specific facts

that are in genuine and substantial dispute, the

reason why the decision of the agency is likely to

depend on the resolution of such facts, and the

reason why an adjudicatory hearing is likely to

resolve the dispute; and

(B) shall not consider—

(i) any issue relating to the design, construction,

or operation of any civilian nuclear power reactor

already licensed to operate at such site, or any

civilian nuclear power reactor for which a

Add. 24

construction permit has been granted at such site,

unless the Commission determines that any such

issue substantially affects the design, construction,

or operation of the facility or activity for which

such license application, authorization, or amendment is being considered; or

(ii) any siting or design issue fully considered

and decided by the Commission in connection with

the issuance of a construction permit or operating

license for a civilian nuclear power reactor at such

site, unless (I) such issue results from any revision

of siting or design criteria by the Commission

following such decision; and (II) the Commission

determines that such issue substantially affects

the design, construction, or operation of the facility or activity for which such license application,

authorization, or amendment is being considered.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2)(B) shall apply

only with respect to licenses, authorizations, or amendments to licenses or authorizations, applied for under

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)

before December 31, 2005.

(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to

the first application for a license or license amendment received by the Commission to expand onsite

spent fuel storage capacity by the use of a new technology not previously approved for use at any nuclear

powerplant by the Commission.

(c) Judicial review

No court shall hold unlawful or set aside a decision

of the Commission in any proceeding described in

subsection (a) because of a failure by the Commission

to use a particular procedure pursuant to this section

unless—

Add. 25

(1) an objection to the procedure used was

presented to the Commission in a timely fashion or

there are extraordinary circumstances that excuse

the failure to present a timely objection; and

(2) the court finds that such failure has precluded

a fair consideration and informed resolution of a

significant issue of the proceeding taken as a whole.

8.

42 U.S.C. § 10155 provides in relevant part:

§ 10155. Storage of spent nuclear fuel

(a) Storage capacity

(1) Subject to section 10107 of this title, the Secretary shall provide, in accordance with paragraph (5),

not more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for the

storage of spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear

power reactors. Such storage capacity shall be

provided through any one or more of the following

methods, used in any combination determined by the

Secretary to be appropriate:

(A) use of available capacity at one or more facilities owned by the Federal Government on January

7, 1983, including the modification and expansion of

any such facilities, if the Commission determines

that such use will adequately protect the public

health and safety, except that such use shall not—

(i) render such facilities subject to licensing

under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2011 et seq.) or the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.); or

(ii) except as provided in subsection (c) require

the preparation of an environmental impact

statement under section 102(2)(C) of the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.

Add. 26

4332(2)(C)), such facility is already being used, or

has previously been used, for such storage or for

any similar purpose.

(B) acquisition of any modular or mobile spent

nuclear fuel storage equipment, including spent

nuclear fuel storage casks, and provision of such

equipment, to any person generating or holding title

to spent nuclear fuel, at the site of any civilian

nuclear power reactor operated by such person or

at any site owned by the Federal Government on

January 7, 1983;

(C) construction of storage capacity at any site of

a civilian nuclear power reactor.

(2) Storage capacity authorized by paragraph (1)

shall not be provided at any Federal or non-Federal

site within which there is a candidate site for a repository. The restriction in the preceding sentence shall

only apply until such time as the Secretary decides

that such candidate site is no longer a candidate site

under consideration for development as a repository.

(3) In selecting methods of providing storage capacity under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider

the timeliness of the availability of each such method

and shall seek to minimize the transportation of spent

nuclear fuel, the public health and safety impacts, and

the costs of providing such storage capacity.

(4) In providing storage capacity through any

method described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall

comply with any applicable requirements for licensing

or authorization of such method, except as provided in

paragraph (1)(A)(i).

(5) The Secretary shall ensure that storage capacity

is made available under paragraph (1) when needed,

as determined on the basis of the storage needs specified in contracts entered into under section 10156(a)

Add. 27

of this title, and shall accept upon request any spent

nuclear fuel as covered under such contracts.

(6) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), the term

“facility” means any building or structure.

(b) Contracts

(1) Subject to the capacity limitation established in

subsections (a)(1) and (d), the Secretary shall offer to

enter into, and may enter into, contracts under section

10156(a) of this title with any person generating or

owning spent nuclear fuel for purposes of providing

storage capacity for such spent fuel under this section

only if the Commission determines that—

(A) adequate storage capacity to ensure the

continued orderly operation of the civilian nuclear

power reactor at which such spent nuclear fuel

is generated cannot reasonably be provided by the

person owning and operating such reactor at such

site, or at the site of any other civilian nuclear power

reactor operated by such person, and such capacity

cannot be made available in a timely manner

through any method described in subparagraph (B);

and

(B) such person is diligently pursuing licensed

alternatives to the use of Federal storage capacity

for the storage of spent nuclear fuel expected to be

generated by such person in the future, including—

(i) expansion of storage facilities at the site of

any civilian nuclear power reactor operated by

such person;

(ii) construction of new or additional storage

facilities at the site of any civilian nuclear power

reactor operated by such person;

(iii) acquisition of modular or mobile spent

nuclear fuel storage equipment, including spent

Add. 28

nuclear fuel storage casks, for use at the site of

any civilian nuclear power reactor operated by

such person; and

(iv) transshipment to another civilian nuclear

power reactor owned by such person.

(2) In making the determination described in

paragraph (1)(A), the Commission shall ensure maintenance of a full core reserve storage capability at the

site of the civilian nuclear power reactor involved

unless the Commission determines that maintenance

of such capability is not necessary for the continued

orderly operation of such reactor.

(3) The Commission shall complete the determinations required in paragraph (1) with respect to any

request for storage capacity not later than 6 months

after receipt of such request by the Commission.

***

(d) Review of sites and State participation

***

(6)(A) Upon deciding to provide an aggregate of 300

or more metric tons of storage capacity under subsection (a)(1) at any one site, the Secretary shall notify

the Governor and legislature of the State where such

site is located, or the governing body of the Indian

tribe in whose reservation such site is located, as the

case may be, of such decision. During the 60-day

period following receipt of notification by the Secretary of his decision to provide an aggregate of 300 or

more metric tons of storage capacity at any one site,

the Governor or legislature of the State in which such

site is located, or the governing body of the affected

Indian tribe where such site is located, as the case

may be, may disapprove the provision of 300 or more

metric tons of storage capacity at the site involved and

Add. 29

submit to the Congress a notice of such disapproval.

A notice of disapproval shall be considered to be submitted to the Congress on the date of the transmittal

of such notice of disapproval to the Speaker of the

House and the President pro tempore of the Senate.

Such notice of disapproval shall be accompanied by a

statement of reasons explaining why the provision of

such storage capacity at such site was disapproved by

such Governor or legislature or the governing body of

such Indian tribe.

(B) Unless otherwise provided by State law, the

Governor or legislature of each State shall have

authority to submit a notice of disapproval to the

Congress under subparagraph (A). In any case in

which State law provides for submission of any such

notice of disapproval by any other person or entity,

any reference in this part to the Governor or legislature of such State shall be considered to refer instead

to such other person or entity.

(C) The authority of the Governor and legislature of

each State under this paragraph shall not be applicable with respect to any site located on a reservation.

(D) If any notice of disapproval is submitted to the

Congress under subparagraph (A), the proposed provision of 300 or more metric tons of storage capacity

at the site involved shall be disapproved unless,

during the first period of 90 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress following the date of the

receipt by the Congress of such notice of disapproval,

the Congress passes a resolution approving such

proposed provision of storage capacity in accordance

with the procedures established in this paragraph and

subsections (d) through (f ) of section 10135 of this title

and such resolution thereafter becomes law. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “resolution” means

Add. 30

a joint resolution of either House of the Congress, the

matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:

“That there hereby is approved the provision of 300 or

more metric tons of spent nuclear fuel storage capacity

at the site located at ______________, with respect to

which a notice of disapproval was submitted by

______________ on ______________.” . The first blank

space in such resolution shall be filled with the

geographic location of the site involved; the second

blank space in such resolution shall be filled with the

designation of the State Governor and legislature or

affected Indian tribe governing body submitting the

notice of disapproval involved; and the last blank

space in such resolution shall be filled with the date of

submission of such notice of disapproval.

(E) For purposes of the consideration of any resolution described in subparagraph (D), each reference in

subsections (d) and (e) of section 10135 of this title

to a resolution of repository siting approval shall be

considered to refer to the resolution described in such

subparagraph.

(7) As used in this section, the term “affected Tribal

Council” means the governing body of any Indian tribe

within whose reservation boundaries there is located

a potentially acceptable site for interim storage

capacity of spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear

power reactors, or within whose boundaries a site for

such capacity is selected by the Secretary, or whose

federally defined possessory or usage rights to other

lands outside of the reservation’s boundaries arising

out of congressionally ratified treaties, as determined

by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to a petition

filed with him by the appropriate governmental officials of such tribe, may be substantially and adversely

Add. 31

affected by the establishment of any such storage

capacity.

***

(h) Application

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing

in this chapter shall be construed to encourage,

authorize, or require the private or Federal use, purchase, lease, or other acquisition of any storage facility

located away from the site of any civilian nuclear

power reactor and not owned by the Federal Government on January 7, 1983.

***

9.

42 U.S.C. § 10172 provides:

§ 10172. Selection of Yucca Mountain site

(a) In general

(1) The Secretary shall provide for an orderly phaseout of site specific activities at all candidate sites other

than the Yucca Mountain site.

(2) The Secretary shall terminate all site specific

activities (other than reclamation activities) at all

candidate sites, other than the Yucca Mountain site,

within 90 days after December 22, 1987.

(b) Eligibility to enter into benefits agreement

Effective on December 22, 1987, the State of Nevada

shall be eligible to enter into a benefits agreement

with the Secretary under section 10173 of this title.

Add. 32

Relevant provisions of the Administrative Orders

Review Act, ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950) (28 U.S.C.

§ 2341 et seq.) (Hobbs Act):

1.

28 U.S.C. § 2342 provides:

§ 2342. Jurisdiction of court of appeals

The court of appeals (other than the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive

jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or

in part), or to determine the validity of—

(1) all final orders of the Federal Communication

Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of

title 47;

(2) all final orders of the Secretary of Agriculture

made under chapters 9 and 20A of title 7, except

orders issued under sections 210(e), 217a, and

499g(a) of title 7;

(3) all rules, regulations, or final orders of—

(A) the Secretary of Transportation issued

pursuant to section 50501, 50502, 56101-56104,

or 57109 of title 46 or pursuant to part B or C of

subtitle IV, subchapter III of chapter 311, chapter

313, or chapter 315 of title 49; and

(B) the Federal Maritime Commission issued

pursuant to section 305, 41304, 41308, or 41309 or

chapter 421 or 441 of title 46;

(4) all final orders of the Atomic Energy Commission made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42;

(5) all rules, regulations, or final orders of the

Surface Transportation Board made reviewable by

section 2321 of this title;

(6) all final orders under section 812 of the Fair

Housing Act; and

Add. 33

(7) all final agency actions described in section

20114(c) of title 49.

Jurisdiction is invoked by filing a petition as provided

by section 2344 of this title.

2.

28 U.S.C. § 2344 provides:

§ 2344. Review of orders; time; notice; contents

of petition; service

On the entry of a final order reviewable under this

chapter, the agency shall promptly give notice thereof

by service or publication in accordance with its rules.

Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60

days after its entry, file a petition to review the order

in the court of appeals wherein venue lies. The action

shall be against the United States. The petition shall

contain a concise statement of—

(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which

review is sought;

(2) the facts on which venue is based;

(3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and

(4) the relief prayed.

The petitioner shall attach to the petition, as exhibits,

copies of the order, report, or decision of the agency.

The clerk shall serve a true copy of the petition on

the agency and on the Attorney General by registered

mail, with request for a return receipt.

Add. 34

3.

28 U.S.C. § 2348 provides:

§ 2348. Representation in proceeding; intervention

The Attorney General is responsible for and has

control of the interests of the Government in all court

proceedings under this chapter. The agency, and any

party in interest in the proceeding before the agency

whose interests will be affected if an order of the

agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended,

may appear as parties thereto of their own motion

and as of right, and be represented by counsel in any

proceeding to review the order. Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals, whose

interests are affected by the order of the agency, may

intervene in any proceeding to review the order. The

Attorney General may not dispose of or discontinue

the proceeding to review over the objection of any

party or intervenor, but any intervenor may prosecute, defend, or continue the proceeding unaffected by

the action or inaction of the Attorney General.

Add. 35

Relevant provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations:

1.

10 C.F.R. § 2.309 provides in relevant part:

§ 2.309 Hearing requests, petitions to intervene,

requirements for standing, and contentions.

(a) General requirements. Any person whose interest may be affected by a proceeding and who desires

to participate as a party must file a written request

for hearing and a specification of the contentions

which the person seeks to have litigated in the hearing. In a proceeding under 10 CFR 52.103, the Commission, acting as the presiding officer, will grant the

request if it determines that the requestor has standing under the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section and has proposed at least one admissible contention that meets the requirements of paragraph (f ) of

this section. For all other proceedings, except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, the Commission,

presiding officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board designated to rule on the request for hearing

and/or petition for leave to intervene, will grant the

request/petition if it determines that the requestor/

petitioner has standing under the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section and has proposed at least one

admissible contention that meets the requirements of

paragraph (f ) of this section. In ruling on the request

for hearing/petition to intervene submitted by petitioners seeking to intervene in the proceeding on the

HLW repository, the Commission, the presiding officer,

or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board shall also

consider any failure of the petitioner to participate as

a potential party in the pre-license application phase

under subpart J of this part in addition to the factors

in paragraph (d) of this section. If a request for

Add. 36

hearing or petition to intervene is filed in response to

any notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing, the

applicant/licensee shall be deemed to be a party.

***

(d) Standing.

(1) General requirements. A request for hearing

or petition for leave to intervene must state:

(i) The name, address and telephone number of

the requestor or petitioner;

(ii) The nature of the requestor’s/petitioner’s

right under the Act to be made a party to the

proceeding;

(iii) The nature and extent of the requestor’s/

petitioner’s property, financial or other interest in

the proceeding; and

(iv) The possible effect of any decision or order

that may be issued in the proceeding on the

requestor’s/petitioner’s interest.

(2) Rulings. In ruling on a request for hearing or

petition for leave to intervene, the Commission, the

presiding officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board designated to rule on such requests must determine, among other things, whether the petitioner

has an interest affected by the proceeding considering the factors enumerated in paragraph (d)(1) of

this section.

(3) Standing in enforcement proceedings. In

enforcement proceedings, the licensee or other

person against whom the action is taken shall have

standing.

***

Add. 37

(f ) Contentions.

(1) A request for hearing or petition for leave to

intervene must set forth with particularity the contentions sought to be raised. For each contention,

the request or petition must:

(i) Provide a specific statement of the issue of

law or fact to be raised or controverted, provided

further, that the issue of law or fact to be raised in

a request for hearing under 10 CFR 52.103(b)

must be directed at demonstrating that one or

more of the acceptance criteria in the combined

license have not been, or will not be met, and

that the specific operational consequences of

nonconformance would be contrary to providing

reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the

public health and safety;

(ii) Provide a brief explanation of the basis for

the contention;

(iii) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the

contention is within the scope of the proceeding;

(iv) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the

contention is material to the finding

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