Petitioners Brief — Environmental Protection Agency, Petitioner v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2024
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No. 23-1229
In the Supreme Court of the United States
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
v.
CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
DIMPLE CHAUDHARY
Acting General Counsel
SUSANNAH WEAVER
Deputy General Counsel
GAUTAM SRINIVASAN
Associate General Counsel
MATTHEW MARKS
Deputy Associate General
Counsel
SUSAN STAHLE
JEANHEE HONG
Attorneys
Environmental Protection
Agency
Washington, D.C. 20004
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
TODD KIM
Assistant Attorney General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
AIMEE W. BROWN
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
BRYAN J. HARRISON
JEFFREY HUGHES
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions
filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the
requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel
Standard program. Six of those refineries petitioned
for review of EPA’s decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which
denied the government’s motion to transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit. The question presented is as
follows:
Whether venue for the refineries’ challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the denial actions
are “nationally applicable” or, alternatively, are “based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” 42
U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinion below ................................................................................ 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 1
Statement:
A. Legal background ............................................................ 2
B. Facts and proceedings below ......................................... 6
Summary of argument ............................................................... 14
Argument:
The D.C. Circuit is the appropriate venue for review
of the denial actions at issue here ........................................ 18
A. The denial actions are nationally applicable ............... 19
1. The text, context, and history of Section
7607(b)(1) make clear that the denial actions
are nationally applicable ......................................... 20
2. The court of appeals’ and respondents’
contrary reasoning is inconsistent with the
statutory text ........................................................... 24
B. The denial actions at issue here are based on
determinations of nationwide scope or effect ............. 29
1. The denial actions at issue here were based
on determinations of nationwide scope ................. 30
2. The court of appeals’ and respondents’
contrary reasoning would render the
“nationwide scope or effect” prong of Section
7607(b)(1) practically insignificant ........................ 38
Conclusion ................................................................................... 46
Appendix — Statutory provisions........................................... 1a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
ATK Launch System, Inc. v. United States
EPA, 651 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2011) .......................... 21, 27
(III)
IV
Cases—Continued:
Page
Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA,
936 F.3d 628 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 2792 (2020) ..................................................... 9
American Road & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA,
705 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
571 U.S. 1125 (2014)............................................................ 20
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020) .......... 31, 39
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA,
45 F.4th 380 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ............................................. 29
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134 (1940).............................................................. 27
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
446 U.S. 578 (1980).......................................................... 3, 25
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Ref., LLC v.
Renewable Fuels Ass’n:
141 S. Ct. 974 (2021) .......................................................... 7
594 U.S. 382 (2021) ............................................................ 7
Hunt Ref. Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107
(11th Cir. 2024) ........................................................ 13, 20, 24
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) ......................................................... 32
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,
490 U.S. 360 (1989).............................................................. 33
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) ............. 25
National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense,
583 U.S. 109 (2018).............................................................. 29
National Environmental Development
Ass’n Clean Air Project v. EPA,
891 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ........................................... 18
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
465 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1972) ............................................... 37
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ....................................... 36, 37
V
Cases—Continued:
Page
Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019) ................................. 25
RMS of Ga., LLC v. EPA,
64 F.4th 1368 (11th Cir. 2023) ..................................... 27, 29
Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,
948 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2020) ................................... 6, 7
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)............................ 21
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) ....... 31, 35
Sierra Club v. EPA, 47 F.4th 738
(D.C. Cir. 2022) ....................................................... 29, 33, 43
Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA,
114 F.4th 693 (D.C. Cir. 2024)........................... 13, 14, 44
Southern Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA,
863 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2017) ................................... 20, 21, 29
Texas v. EPA:
829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016)............................................ 31
983 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2020)............................................ 33
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)............. 27
West Virginia Chamber of Commerce v. Browner,
166 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1998) ............................................... 27
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001).................................................. 20, 24, 25
Statutes and regulations:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ..................................... 2
Tit. 42 .................................................................................. 2
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(1)(k) .......................................... 5, 5a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) ................................ 4, 45, 6a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(B)(i) ...................................... 4, 8a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)(III) ......................... 45, 12a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(3) ............................................. 4, 14a
VI
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Page
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(5) ............................................. 4, 18a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(5)(B) ....................................... 5, 18a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(5)(D) ....................................... 5, 19a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(5)(E) ....................................... 5, 19a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9) ......................................... 5, 9, 27a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A) ....................................... 9, 27a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(i) .................................... 5, 27a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I) .......................... 5, 9, 27a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II)......................... 5, 6, 27a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B) ......................9, 26, 27, 33, 28a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) ................................ 5, 6, 28a
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) ............................... 5, 6, 28a
42 U.S.C. 7607(a) ....................................................... 22
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) ...... 2, 11, 14, 16-22, 24, 25, 29-33,
38-43, 30a
42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9) ................................................... 32
42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9)(A) ............................................. 35
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 776 ............................................ 2
Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1 U.S.C. 1) ................. 26
5 U.S.C. 706(2) ....................................................................... 35
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) .................................................................. 32
42 U.S.C. 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970) ...........................2, 3, 22, 23, 36
40 C.F.R.:
Section 80.2 ........................................................................ 4
Section 80.1406 .................................................................. 4
Sections 80.1425-80.1429................................................... 5
Section 80.1426(a) .............................................................. 5
Section 80.1426(e) .............................................................. 5
Section 80.1427(a)(1) ......................................................... 5
Section 80.1427(a)(6) ......................................................... 5
VII
Regulations—Continued:
Page
Section 80.1428(b).............................................................. 5
Section 80.1428(c) .............................................................. 5
Section 80.1429(b).............................................................. 5
Miscellaneous:
April 2022 Denial of Petitions for Small
Refinery Exemptions Under the Renewable
Fuel Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,300
(Apr. 25, 2022) ..................................................... 8, 10, 30, 33
Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) ......................... 21, 31
Committee on Adjudication, Administrative Conference of the United States, Aggregation of Similar
Claims in Agency Adjudication (June 13, 2016),
https://perma.cc/ 2UQS-TJ6F ........................................... 28
David P. Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal
Pollution Laws, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1221 (1977) .................. 36
41 Fed. Reg. 56,767 (Dec. 30, 1976) ................... 17, 37, 38, 40
86 Fed. Reg. 70,999 (Dec. 14, 2021) ............................ 7, 43
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ....... 4, 23, 38
Notice of June 2022 Denial of Petitions for
Small Refinery Exemptions Under the
Renewable Fuel Standard Program,
87 Fed. Reg. 34,873 (June 8, 2022) ............... 8, 10, 30, 33
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ................. 3, 23
The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989):
Vol. 4 ................................................................................. 30
Vol. 5 ................................................................................. 31
Vol. 14 ............................................................................... 31
Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language (1976) .. 21, 30, 31, 41
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-1229
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
v.
CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-43a)
is reported at 86 F.4th 1121.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
November 22, 2023. Petitions for rehearing were denied on January 22, 2024 (Pet. App. 331a-333a). On April
11, 2024, Justice Alito extended the time within which
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including
May 21, 2024. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on May 20, 2024, and was granted on October 21,
2024. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent statutory provisions are reprinted in the
appendix. App., infra, 1a-32a.
(1)
2
STATEMENT
A. Legal Background
1. When a petitioner seeks review of a “final action”
taken by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.,
Section 7607(b)(1) of Title 42 provides for direct court
of appeals review of the petitioner’s challenge. To determine which circuit has exclusive venue over the challenge, Section 7607(b)(1) separates EPA’s final actions
into three categories. First, challenges to certain specified actions or to “any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken,” must be
filed “only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Second,
challenges to actions that are “locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit.” Ibid. Third,
“[n]otwithstanding” the sentence directing review of locally or regionally applicable actions to “the appropriate circuit,” challenges to such locally or regionally applicable actions “may be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect and if in taking such action the Administrator
finds and publishes that such action is based on such a
determination.” Ibid.
Congress adopted this three-prong structure in
1977. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95, 91 Stat. 776. The predecessor to Section
7607(b)(1) had provided for direct court of appeals review only of certain specifically enumerated EPA actions. 42 U.S.C. 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970). EPA actions involving “national primary or secondary ambient air
quality standard[s],” “emission standard[s],” or other
3
specified standards or controls were reviewable only in
the D.C. Circuit, while EPA’s actions “in approving or
promulgating” a state or federal “implementation plan”
were reviewable only in “the appropriate circuit.” Ibid.
That division reflected Congress’s view that EPA actions that are “national in scope” should receive “even
and consistent national application,” which would be accomplished through centralized D.C. Circuit review.
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970) (1970
Senate Report). By contrast, Congress viewed EPA actions approving or promulgating “implementation plans
which run only to one air quality control region” as appropriately reviewed “in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Circuit in which the affected air quality control region, or portion thereof, is located.” Ibid. At that time,
the venue provision did not include a catchall for other
nationally or locally or regionally applicable actions, nor
did the provision specifically reference EPA actions
that are based on a determination of nationwide scope
or effect. Rather, final actions that the CAA venue provision did not specifically address were reviewable only
by a district court exercising federal-question jurisdiction. See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S.
578, 584 (1980).
In 1977, Congress amended the statute to authorize
direct court of appeals review of all EPA “final actions”
under the CAA. Congress achieved that result by adding the catchall categories for the first two subsets of
final actions, and by adding the third category of locally
or regionally applicable actions that are based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. The House
Report accompanying the amendment explained that
the revision would “provide[] for essentially locally,
statewide, or regionally applicable rules or orders to be
4
reviewed in the U.S. court of appeals for the circuit in
which such locality, State, or region is located.” H.R.
Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1977) (1977
House Report). “On the other hand,” the report explained, venue would lie only in the D.C. Circuit “if an
action of the Administrator is found by him to be based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect (including a determination which has scope or effect beyond a
single judicial circuit).” Id. at 324.
2. The EPA actions at issue in this case involve the
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, a CAA program that generally requires transportation fuel sold or
introduced into commerce in the United States to contain specified volumes of renewable fuel. See 42 U.S.C.
7545(o)(2)(A)(i) and (B)(i). To implement the program,
EPA expresses renewable-fuel targets as a percentage
of the gasoline and diesel fuel that is projected to be sold
in the upcoming year, and the agency adopts regulations
to ensure compliance. See 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(A)(i); see
also 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(3). Obligated parties “use that
annual-percentage standard to determine their volume
obligations” for the year. Pet. App. 3a. Each obligated
party’s renewable-fuel-volume obligation is proportional to its annual production or importation of gasoline and diesel fuel.
EPA’s implementing regulations identify refineries
and importers of gasoline and diesel as obligated parties
subject to RFS requirements. 40 C.F.R. 80.2, 80.1406.
To track whether an obligated party has satisfied RFS
program requirements, EPA uses a credit system that
offers parties flexibility in achieving compliance. See 42
U.S.C. 7545(o)(5). Producers and importers of renewable fuels generate credits—called Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs)—for each gallon of renewable
5
fuel they produce or import for use in the United States.
40 C.F.R. 80.1426(a). The producers and importers assign a RIN to each batch of renewable fuel. 40 C.F.R.
80.1426(e). A RIN may be used after it is “separated”
from its batch by an obligated party or by an entity that
blends the renewable fuel into gasoline or diesel. 40
C.F.R. 80.1429(b). Once separated, RINs may be kept
for compliance or sold. 40 C.F.R. 80.1425-80.1429. Each
year, a refinery may generate its own credits by blending renewable fuel into transportation fuel, or it may
purchase the requisite number of credits. See Pet. App.
206a-207a; see also 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(5)(B) and (E); 40
C.F.R. 80.1428(b), 80.1429(b).
Obligated parties meet their renewable-fuel-volume
obligations by “retir[ing]” RINs in an annual compliance demonstration. 40 C.F.R. 80.1427(a)(1). A refinery may use a particular RIN only during the calendar
year in which it was generated or in the following calendar year. 40 C.F.R. 80.1427(a)(6), 80.1428(c). An obligated party who fails to demonstrate full compliance in
one year may carry forward a compliance deficit to the
following year. 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(5)(D).
Congress created a three-tiered scheme through
which obligated parties that qualify as “[s]mall refineries” may obtain exemptions from RFS program requirements. 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9) (emphasis omitted); see 42
U.S.C. 7545(o)(1)(k) (defining “small refinery”).
First, Congress granted all small refineries a blanket exemption until 2011. 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(i).
Second, Congress directed the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) to study “whether compliance with the
requirements of [the RFS program] would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on small refineries.”
42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I). For any small refinery
6
that DOE determined “would be subject to a disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply,” Congress directed EPA to extend the exemption for at least
two years. 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).
Third, Congress established a mechanism through
which a small refinery “may at any time petition [EPA]
for an extension of the exemption under subparagraph
(A) for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). In evaluating a petition for such an exemption, EPA, “in consultation with”
DOE, “shall consider the findings of [DOE’s study] and
other economic factors.” 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii).
B. Facts And Proceedings Below
1. In August 2019, EPA issued a single decision acting on 36 exemption petitions filed by small refineries
for the 2018 compliance year, granting 31 petitions and
denying five. See C.A. App. 2928. Multiple parties petitioned for review of the action in the D.C. Circuit. See
Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 19-1196; Big
West Oil, LLC v. EPA, No. 19-1197; Renewable Fuels
Ass’n v. EPA, No. 19-1220; Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. EPA,
No. 19-1216; Wynnewood Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 20-1099.
While those challenges were pending, the Tenth Circuit issued a decision vacating and remanding three
EPA orders granting three exemption petitions for the
2016 and 2017 compliance years. Renewable Fuels Ass’n
v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1258 (2020). The court held that
a small refinery is eligible for an extension of an exemption only if it has maintained a continuous, uninterrupted exemption, id. at 1245-1249; that “renewable
fuels compliance must be the cause of any disproportionate hardship” in order for an exemption to be available, id. at 1253; and that EPA had “ ‘failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem’ ” when it did not ad-
7
dress whether refiners could “pass RIN costs on to customers,” id. at 1257 (citation omitted). This Court
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari limited to the
first of those Tenth Circuit holdings. HollyFrontier
Cheyenne Ref., LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 141
S. Ct. 974 (2021). Pending this Court’s resolution of
HollyFrontier, the D.C. Circuit granted EPA’s motion
to hold in abeyance the petitions for review that had
been filed in that court. See Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co.
v. EPA, No. 19-1196, Doc. 1883334 (Feb. 2, 2021); p. 6,
supra.
This Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision in
HollyFrontier, holding that a small refinery may be eligible for an exemption renewal even if the refinery had
allowed a prior exemption to lapse. HollyFrontier
Cheyenne Ref., LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S.
382, 390 (2021). In the pending D.C. Circuit proceedings, EPA then moved for a voluntary remand without
vacatur to allow the agency to reconsider its action on
the 2018 exemption petitions in light of this Court’s decision in HollyFrontier, and in light of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Renewable Fuels Association of additional issues this Court had not reached. See Sinclair
Wyoming Ref. Co., No. 19-1196, Doc. 1911606 (Aug. 25,
2021). The D.C. Circuit granted that motion and instructed EPA to act on the petitions within 120 days.
Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co., No. 19-1196, Doc. 1925942
(Dec. 8, 2021).
2. In December 2021, EPA proposed to deny all
pending small refinery exemption petitions. 86 Fed.
Reg. 70,999 (Dec. 14, 2021); see C.A. App. 520-585.
Seeking to create a nationally uniform program, EPA
proposed to adopt the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Renewable Fuels Association on the issues this Court had
8
not considered. Under that approach, EPA proposed to
interpret the pertinent statutory provisions as requiring small refineries seeking exemptions to show that
RFS compliance itself caused a disproportionate economic hardship. C.A. App. 545-548. In accordance with
the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, EPA also analyzed whether
refineries were able to pass on the costs of RFS compliance to consumers. The agency concluded that the evidence supported a rebuttable presumption that such
costs “are fully passed through to consumers,” so that
small refineries ordinarily would not suffer disproportionate economic hardship as a result of RFS compliance. Id. at 549; see id. at 548-584. In light of those
conclusions, EPA proposed to deny all the pending exemption petitions and sought comment on that proposed decision.
After the comment period ended, EPA took two actions. In April 2022—the deadline set by the D.C. Circuit to resolve the remanded petitions—EPA denied 36
exemption petitions filed by small refineries for the
2018 compliance year. Pet. App. 193a; see April 2022
Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery Exemptions
Under the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 87 Fed.
Reg. 24,300 (Apr. 25, 2022) (April Notice). In June
2022, EPA denied an additional 69 petitions for the
2016-2021 compliance years. Pet. App. 48a; see Notice
of June 2022 Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery Exemptions Under the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg. 34,873, 34,874 (June 8, 2022) (June
Notice). The two denial actions reflect the same reasoning and are based on two principal rationales, one statutory and one economic. 1 The denial actions contain exFor ease of reference, this brief cites only the April 2022 denial
when discussing reasoning common to both actions.
1
9
plicit agency findings that the actions are nationally applicable or, in the alternative, that they are based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect.
Statutory interpretation. In the April and June 2022
denial actions, EPA concluded that an extension of the
small refinery exemption under the relevant provisions
may be granted only if disproportionate economic hardship was “caused by RFS compliance.” Pet. App. 242a.
For relevant context, the agency turned to paragraph
(A) of 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9), which established the initial
blanket exemption for small refineries and the two-year
extension based on the DOE study. See 42 U.S.C.
7545(o)(9)(A) and (B). The agency observed that paragraph (A) focuses on “whether compliance with the requirements of [the RFS program] would impose a [disproportionate economic hardship] on small refineries.”
Pet. App. 243a (quoting 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I)).
Because paragraph (B) provides for an extension of the
exemption provided by paragraph (A), EPA construed
paragraph (B) to require a similar causal connection between RFS compliance and any resulting economic
hardship. Id. at 245a. The agency found it “hard to imagine that Congress intended” to permit exemptions for
hardships resulting from “a broad array of circumstances unrelated to the RFS program.” Id. at 247a.
Economic analysis. In implementing the RFS program, EPA has made “longstanding and consistent
findings” that obligated parties can pass the costs of
RFS compliance on to purchasers, a phenomenon called
RIN cost passthrough. Pet. App. 248a; see, e.g., Alon
Ref. Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA, 936 F.3d 628, 649-650
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (discussing earlier studies
reaching this conclusion), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2792
(2020). In the April and June 2022 denial actions, EPA
10
reassessed and reaffirmed those prior findings. Pet.
App. 248a-303a; see id. at 240a-241a (explaining related
concept of “RIN discount”). After reviewing extensive
market data, the agency determined that “all obligated
parties recover the cost of acquiring RINs by selling the
gasoline and diesel fuel they produce at the market
price, which reflects these RIN costs.” Id. at 249a. EPA
further concluded that “RINs are generally widely
available in an open and liquid market,” and that the
“cost of acquiring RINs is the same for all parties.”
Ibid.
Given that all refineries bear the same costs of RFS
compliance and can recover those costs by selling at
market price, EPA found that such costs presumptively
do not cause disproportionate economic hardship to any
small refinery. Pet. App. 248a-250a. EPA determined
that none of the petitioning small refineries had rebutted that presumption through evidence about their specific circumstances. Id. at 251a-252a; see id. at 305a310a.
Venue. EPA determined that the denial actions are
subject to review exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because
they are “ ‘nationally applicable’ ” or, in the alternative,
because they are “based on a determination of ‘nationwide scope or effect.’ ” Pet. App. 328a; id. at 187a (same
for June 2022 denial action); see April Notice, 87 Fed.
Reg. at 24,300-24,301; June Notice, 87 Fed. Reg. at
34,874. The agency explained that the April 2022 denial
action encompasses petitions from more than 30 small
refineries located within 18 States in seven of the ten
EPA regions and in eight different federal judicial circuits. Pet. App. 329a; see id. at 187a (similar for June
denial). The agency further observed that the denial
actions are “based on EPA’s revised interpretation of
11
the relevant CAA provisions and the * * * RIN cost
passthrough principles that are applicable to all small
refineries no matter the location or market in which
they operate.” Id. at 329a; see id. at 187a-188a.
3. Six small refineries filed petitions for review in
the Fifth Circuit, collectively challenging both denial
actions. Pet. App. 2a, 6a. Various renewable-fuel trade
associations were granted leave to intervene as respondents. See 22-60266 C.A. Doc. 303-1 (Mar. 16, 2023). The
court granted the petitions for review, vacated the denial actions as to the six petitioners, and remanded to
EPA for further proceedings. Pet. App. 1a-34a.
a. The court of appeals denied EPA’s motion to transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit. Pet. App. 9a-15a.
The court held that the denial actions are “locally or regionally applicable” rather than “nationally applicable,”
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), because the actions’ “legal effect”
is limited to the petitioning refineries, and the actions
do not “bind[ ] EPA in any future adjudication,” Pet.
App. 11a-12a (emphases omitted).
The court of appeals further held that neither denial
action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope
or effect.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The court acknowledged, but disagreed with, EPA’s express finding that
the denial actions were based on such determinations.
Pet. App. 12a-14a. The court noted that, under EPA’s
interpretation of the relevant provisions, the agency
will review refinery-specific information to determine
whether there is any basis to depart from EPA’s general conclusions about market conditions and RIN
passthrough. Id. at 15a. The court of appeals concluded
that, because “there is still a non-zero chance [EPA] will
grant small refinery petitions” based on “data and evidence” about particular refineries’ circumstances, “the
12
Denial Actions rely on refinery-specific determinations
and are not based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect.” Ibid.
On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held the denial actions unlawful on three grounds. Pet. App. 16a-33a.
First, the court found that small refineries have a protectable property interest in being exempt from RFS
program obligations, and that EPA had impermissibly
applied its new analysis retroactively to deprive the refineries here of that interest. Id. at 16a. Second, the
court rejected the agency’s interpretation of the governing statutory language. The court characterized the
agency’s position as requiring that “compliance costs
must be the sole cause of ” hardship, id. at 23a, and it
disagreed on the ground that hardship may have “myriad causes,” id. at 25a. Third, the court concluded that
the agency had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Id.
at 29a-33a. Without questioning the agency’s RIN cost
passthrough analysis as a general matter, id. at 31a
n.44, the court found that the analysis was undermined
as to the petitioning refineries by data concerning the
particular local markets in which they operate, id. at
31a-33a.
b. Judge Higginbotham dissented as to venue. Pet.
App. 35a-43a. He would have held that the denial actions are “nationally applicable” because they “apply
one consistent statutory interpretation and economic
analysis to thirty-six small refineries, located in eighteen different states, in the geographical boundaries of
eight different circuit courts.” Id. at 38a. In the alternative, he concluded that the denial actions are “ ‘based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect’ ” because
the “two determinations at the[ir] core”—the agency’s
statutory interpretation and economic analysis—“are ap-
13
plicable to all small refineries no matter the location or
market in which they operate.” Id. at 40a-42a.
4. Other small refineries petitioned for review of the
April and June 2022 denial actions in the Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Each
of the other regional circuits either dismissed the petitions without prejudice based on improper venue2 or
transferred them to the D.C. Circuit. 3
The D.C. Circuit consolidated the various petitions
that were before it, and on July 26, 2024, the court vacated and remanded the denial actions. Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 114 F.4th 693 (per curiam). The
court held that EPA had imposed an “overly strict causation requirement” in concluding that only disproportionate compliance costs could justify granting an exemption and in failing to consider certain RIN purchases as a source of disproportionate economic hardship. Id. at 707; see id. at 707-711. The court also held
See Hunt Ref. Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107 (11th Cir. 2024); Calumet Mont. Ref., LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70124, Doc. 16 (9th Cir. Oct. 25,
2022); Par Haw. Ref., LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70125, Doc. 16 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2022); San Joaquin Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 22-70126, Doc. 16
(9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 22-70128,
Doc. 13 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Calumet Mont. Ref., LLC v. EPA,
No. 22-70166, Doc. 14 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Par Haw. Ref., LLC
v. EPA, No. 22-70168, Doc. 13 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); San Joaquin
Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 22-70170, Doc. 12 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Kern
Oil & Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 22-70172, Doc. 14 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022).
3
See American Ref. Grp., Inc. v. EPA, No. 22-1991, Doc. 23 (3d
Cir. Aug. 9, 2022); American Ref. Grp. v. EPA, No. 22-2435, Doc. 20
(3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2022); Countrymark Ref. & Logistics, LLC v. EPA,
No. 22-1878, Doc. 13 (7th Cir. July 20, 2022); Countrymark Ref. &
Logistics, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-2368, Doc. 9 (7th Cir. Sept. 8, 2022);
Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 22-9538, Doc. 010110728295 (10th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2022); Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 22-9553, Doc.
010110737506 (10th Cir. Sept. 12, 2022).
2
14
that the denial actions were arbitrary and capricious because EPA had not sufficiently justified its conclusion
that small refineries can purchase RINs on a regular
basis and recoup that cost in the sales price of their fuel.
Id. at 711-714. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, however, the
D.C. Circuit declined to address whether EPA’s approach was impermissibly retroactive. Id. at 714 n.12.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the plain terms of Section 7607(b)(1), the denial actions here are reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision imposes atextual
requirements and fails to give effect to the provision
Congress enacted.
A. Under Section 7607(b)(1), “nationally applicable”
EPA final actions are subject to judicial review only in
the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). To apply that
statutory requirement, courts consider the final action
on its face and determine whether it applies to entities
located throughout the country rather than in a single
region. The denial actions here qualify as “nationally
applicable” on that basis: They resolve exemption petitions from small refineries located in 18 States and eight
federal judicial circuits across the country.
Statutory context confirms that result. Section
7607(b)(1) distinguishes between “nationally applicable” EPA actions, which are subject to review in the
D.C. Circuit, and “locally or regionally applicable” actions, which are subject to review in “the appropriate
circuit.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). Congress’s use of the definite article indicates that there is
only one “appropriate circuit” for review of any particular “locally or regionally applicable” action. When an
EPA action applies to entities in multiple circuits, no
single regional circuit can be identified as “the” appro-
15
priate venue, so the action is properly viewed as “nationally applicable” rather than “locally or regionally
applicable.”
Section 7607(b)(1)’s legislative history reinforces
that conclusion. That history reflects Congress’s understanding that any “locally or regionally applicable”
action could be reviewed in the regional court of appeals
where the affected entity was located. Where affected
entities are spread across multiple circuits, however,
Congress viewed the D.C. Circuit as the proper venue.
In endorsing the contrary conclusion, both the court
of appeals and respondents go beyond the statutory text
to impose additional restrictions on the availability of
D.C. Circuit review. The court of appeals required that
the final action have a prospective effect on future
agency decisions. But the court did not ground that requirement in the statutory text, and respondents do not
defend it. Respondents instead argue that, for venue
purposes, the Court should treat the denial of each refinery’s exemption petition as a separate “final action.”
But that requirement likewise is untethered to the statutory text, and this Court has long recognized that
agencies have discretion to devise their own procedures,
including by aggregating common issues for joint resolution. EPA acted reasonably in taking that approach
here. And in determining the proper venue for challenges to the agency’s denial actions, the Court should
focus on the actions that EPA actually took, rather than
on a hypothetical array of 105 separate, refinery-specific
disapprovals.
B. Even if this Court finds the denial actions here to
be “locally or regionally applicable,” those actions are
still subject to review only in the D.C. Circuit because
they are “based on a determination of nationwide scope
16
or effect,” and EPA published its findings to that effect
in accordance with Section 7607(b)(1)’s requirements.
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
In requiring a “determination of nationwide scope or
effect,” the statutory text focuses on the underlying
reasons for EPA’s final action. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
The final action must be “based on” the relevant determinations, indicating that the determinations must be a
but-for cause of the agency’s final action—forming the
core of the agency’s analysis. And to be nationwide in
scope or effect, the core justifications for EPA’s final
action must be intended to govern the agency’s decisionmaking in actions throughout the country, or have
legal consequences for entities beyond a single judicial
circuit.
The denial actions here meet those requirements.
EPA found that the denial actions were based on two interrelated determinations of nationwide scope: (1) EPA’s
statutory interpretation that a small refinery’s disproportionate economic hardship will support an exemption only if it is caused by compliance with the RFS program; and (2) EPA’s economic analysis of the national
market for RINs, which found that the cost to acquire
RINs is the same for refineries everywhere and is
passed through to consumers in the price of fuels. Those
determinations apply to all small refinery exemption requests under the RFS program as a whole, and they
were the core rationales for EPA’s denials of the exemption requests.
Statutory history confirms Congress’s intent that
EPA actions like the denial actions here would be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit. The original 1970 version
of the venue provision did not specifically authorize
D.C. Circuit review of final actions that are based on a
17
determination of nationwide scope or effect. That statutory gap led to litigation over which circuit qualified as
“the appropriate circuit” when EPA issued an action
that established a legal framework for implementation
plans that spanned multiple States in multiple judicial
circuits. In amending the statute to its current form,
Congress adopted the view expressed by EPA’s thenGeneral Counsel, who urged that challenges to such actions should be channeled to the D.C. Circuit to “centralize review” and “tak[e] advantage of [the D.C. Circuit’s] administrative law expertise,” thereby “facilitating an orderly development of the basic law” that EPA
would apply nationwide. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767, 56,769
(Dec. 30, 1976).
The court of appeals and respondents have not disputed that the EPA actions at issue here rested in part
on interpretive and economic determinations having nationwide scope or effect. They have observed, however,
that EPA also considered refinery-specific facts in ruling on the exemption requests. But the statute does not
require that the final action be based solely on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Nor would such a
limitation make sense. The third prong of Section
7607(b)(1) comes into play only when the challenged
EPA action is “locally or regionally applicable,” and
such actions almost always will rest at least in part on
consideration of local or regional circumstances. 42
U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
Respondents are also incorrect in asserting that
EPA’s interpretation would allow for D.C. Circuit venue
for challenges to every locally or regionally applicable
action. The statute imposes meaningful limits on EPA’s
authority to find that a particular action is “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect.” Courts
18
should enforce those limits without adding more of their
own making.
ARGUMENT
THE D.C. CIRCUIT IS THE APPROPRIATE VENUE FOR
REVIEW OF THE DENIAL ACTIONS AT ISSUE HERE
The CAA’s venue provision reflects a clear congressional preference for “uniform judicial review of regulatory issues of national importance.” National Environmental Development Ass’n Clean Air Project v. EPA,
891 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Silberman, J., concurring). Section 7607(b)(1) specifies two distinct circumstances in which review of nationally significant
EPA actions will be channeled to the D.C. Circuit. First,
any “nationally applicable” final action is subject to review exclusively in the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
Second, even if a challenged final action is “locally or
regionally applicable,” venue lies exclusively in the D.C.
Circuit if that action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the
Administrator finds and publishes that such action is
based on such a determination.” Ibid.
Because the denial actions at issue here resolve the
exemption petitions of small refineries across the country, those actions are “nationally applicable” within the
meaning of Section 7607(b)(1). In the alternative, if the
Court views the denial actions as “locally or regionally
applicable,” those EPA actions are based on determinations of nationwide scope because they are grounded in
EPA’s statutory interpretation and analysis of marketplace conditions, both of which apply to all small refinery exemption requests under the RFS program as a
whole. Section 7607(b)(1) thus requires that challenges
to the denial actions be brought in the D.C. Circuit.
19
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case provides a paradigmatic example of the outcome that Section 7607(b)(1) was intended to prevent. The two EPA
denial actions at issue here collectively covered 105 exemption petitions from 39 small refineries located in
eight different judicial circuits. The actions were premised on a statutory interpretation and an economic analysis that the agency had not previously announced, and
that constituted “determination[s] of nationwide scope
or effect” under any reasonable understanding of that
phrase. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The ensuing briefing in
the court of appeals focused primarily on those nationwide determinations, not on refinery-specific circumstances. The denial actions thus are precisely the types
of EPA actions that Congress regarded as appropriate
for centralized D.C. Circuit review.
Under the Fifth Circuit’s venue analysis, however,
the 25 covered refineries that challenged EPA’s denial
actions in court could have obtained judicial review only
through individual challenges filed in seven different regional circuits. That extreme fragmentation was avoided
here only because some refineries initially petitioned
for review in the D.C. Circuit, and five other regional
circuits either dismissed petitions for lack of venue or
transferred petitions to that court. But if this Court endorses the Fifth Circuit’s venue analysis, future challenges to similar EPA actions can be expected to consume far greater judicial resources, with consequent
heightened risks of inconsistent outcomes. Congress
crafted Section 7607(b)(1) to avoid that result, and this
Court should vacate the court of appeals’ judgment.
A. The Denial Actions Are Nationally Applicable
Each of the two denial actions resolved the exemption petitions of more than 30 small refineries located in
20
multiple judicial circuits across the country. It therefore is apparent on the face of the final actions that they
are “nationally applicable” and subject to review in the
D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The contrary arguments advanced by the court of appeals and respondents do not contest the reach of the two denial actions
EPA issued, but instead advocate additional limitations
that the statutory text does not impose.
1.
The text, context, and history of Section 7607(b)(1)
make clear that the denial actions are nationally applicable
Section 7607(b)(1) instructs that a challenge to a “final action” that is “nationally applicable” must be heard
in the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). That language
encompasses the denial actions at issue here because
those actions apply to small refineries in multiple judicial circuits throughout the country. The statutory context and history confirm Congress’s intent that the D.C.
Circuit would review challenges to such actions.
a. Under the text of Section 7607(b)(1), the proper
venue for challenges to EPA’s implementation of the
CAA depends on the “final action” that is being challenged. The term “action” in Section 7607(b)(1) “is
meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which
an agency may exercise its power.” Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001). And as
numerous courts of appeals have recognized, the statutory text makes clear that venue turns on the nature of
the pertinent EPA action rather than on the basis for a
particular petitioner’s challenge. See, e.g., Hunt Ref.
Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2024); Southern Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir.
2017); American Road & Transp. Builders Ass’n v.
EPA, 705 F.3d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
21
571 U.S. 1125 (2014); ATK Launch Sys., Inc. v. EPA,
651 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2011). Courts thus must
look to the face of the action and determine whether it
applies to—or includes “within its scope,” Black’s Law
Dictionary 91 (5th ed. 1979) (Black’s) (defining “apply”)—entities “throughout [the] nation,” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language 1505 (1976) (Webster’s) (defining “nationally”).
Statutory context sheds further light on what geographic scope an action must have to be “nationally applicable.” Under Section 7607(b)(1), each EPA action is
either “nationally applicable” or “locally or regionally
applicable.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). In distinguishing between those two types of actions, “[t]he text of the statute leaves no room for an intermediate case.” Southern
Ill. Power Coop., 863 F.3d at 673. If the challenged action is “nationally applicable,” the D.C. Circuit is the exclusive forum for judicial review. And unless a “locally
or regionally applicable” action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” it may be challenged “only in the United States Court of Appeals for
the appropriate circuit.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The statute’s use of the definite article—“the appropriate circuit,” ibid. (emphasis added)—indicates that, for any
given locally or regionally applicable EPA action, there
is only one appropriate regional court of appeals in
which to seek review. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426, 434 (2004) (explaining that the “use of the definite
article” in the federal habeas statute “indicates that
22
there is generally only one proper respondent to a given
prisoner’s habeas petition”). 4
The existence of a single appropriate court of appeals for this category of EPA actions in turn conveys
that a particular action is “locally or regionally applicable” only if it applies to entities that are confined to a
single judicial circuit. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). After all,
for an action that applies equally to entities in more
than one judicial circuit, no particular court of appeals
can be identified as “the appropriate circuit” for review.
Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus, any action that spans
more than one judicial circuit is properly viewed as “nationally applicable” and subject to review only in the
D.C. Circuit. Ibid.
b. The history of Section 7607(b)(1) reflects the
same understanding. As originally enacted in 1970, the
CAA venue provision stated that any action “promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air
quality standard,” “emission standard,” “standard of
performance,” or other specified standards or controls,
would be reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C.
1857h-5(b)(1) (1970). The provision further specified
that any action “approving or promulgating any implementation plan” could be reviewed only in “the appropriate circuit.” Ibid. Because that venue provision did
not specify the proper court for review of the many EPA
actions that did not fall within any of the enumerated
categories, such actions were reviewable only by disSection 7607(b)(1)’s reference to “the appropriate circuit,” 42
U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added), contrasts with the preceding
subsection, where Congress contemplated the prospect of multiple
permissible forums by authorizing “the district court * * * for any
district in which such person is found or resides or transacts business” to issue certain orders, 42 U.S.C. 7607(a) (emphasis added).
4
23
trict courts exercising federal-question jurisdiction.
See p. 3, supra.
The actions that Congress specified for D.C. Circuit
review in the 1970 statute were all “national in scope,”
and Congress sought to ensure that they received “even
and consistent national application” through centralized
review. 1970 Senate Report 41. By contrast, Congress
viewed EPA actions approving or promulgating “implementation plans which run only to one air quality control region” as amenable to review “in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Circuit in which the affected air quality
control region, or portion thereof, is located,” ibid.,
which the statute referred to as “the appropriate circuit,” 42 U.S.C. 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
When Congress amended the statute in 1977 to expand the scope of direct court of appeals review, it
adopted the same understanding of the limited geographic scope of actions that would be subject to review
in “the appropriate circuit.” The 1977 House Report explained that the revision would “provide[] for essentially locally, statewide, or regionally applicable rules or
orders to be reviewed in the U.S. court of appeals for
the circuit in which such locality, State, or region is located.” 1977 House Report 323. And the House Report
contrasted such local actions with nationally relevant
actions that extend “beyond a single judicial circuit”
and therefore should be subject to centralized D.C. Circuit review. Id. at 324. That history reinforces the conclusion that, under the venue provision in its current
form, final EPA actions that apply to entities in multiple
judicial circuits are reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit.
c. Applying that understanding here, the denial actions are nationally applicable. EPA “exercise[d] its
power” through two final denial actions, each of which
24
applies to multiple entities located throughout the country in multiple federal judicial circuits. Whitman, 531
U.S. at 478. The April 2022 denial action covers “36
* * * petitions for exemptions from the RFS program
for over 30 small refineries across the country and applies to small refineries located within 18 states in 7 of
the 10 EPA regions and in 8 different federal judicial
circuits.” Pet. App. 329a. The June 2022 denial action
covers “69 petitions for exemptions from the RFS program for over 30 small refineries across the country and
applies to small refineries located within 15 states in 7
of the 10 EPA regions and in 8 different Federal judicial
circuits.” Id. at 187a. On a plain-text understanding,
each of the two denial actions is therefore “nationally
applicable,” and respondents’ challenges to those actions can proceed only in the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1); see Hunt Ref. Co., 90 F.4th at 1110.
2.
The court of appeals’ and respondents’ contrary reasoning is inconsistent with the statutory text
Neither the court of appeals nor respondents have
disputed that the denial actions at issue here apply to
small refineries in multiple judicial circuits across the
country. Nor have they disputed the general proposition that, when an EPA final action applies to entities in
multiple judicial circuits, that action is “nationally applicable” within the meaning of Section 7607(b)(1). The
court of appeals nevertheless held that the denial actions are not “nationally applicable” because those actions apply only to the specific refineries whose exemption petitions EPA adjudicated, and those adjudications
will not bind the agency in any future proceeding. Respondents have not endorsed that rationale, but have
argued instead that the denial actions should be viewed
for venue purposes as 105 separate denials of 105 ex-
25
emption petitions, each of which is confined to a single
judicial circuit. Those arguments lack merit.
a. The court of appeals found it significant that the
denial actions apply only to the petitioning refineries
and do not “bind[] EPA in any future adjudication.”
Pet. App. 12a. But the court did not attempt to tether
that observation to the statutory text. And nothing in
Section 7607(b)(1) suggests that a final action must bind
EPA prospectively in order to be considered “nationally
applicable.” The court of appeals erred by effectively
“add[ing] words * * * to the statute Congress enacted”
and “impos[ing] a new requirement” that atextually limits the category of actions encompassed within Section
7607(b)(1)’s first category. Muldrow v. City of St.
Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024).
Indeed, under the court of appeals’ approach, virtually no adjudicatory actions would be deemed “nationally applicable” because agency adjudications typically
“lack ‘legal effect’ beyond the parties involved.” Pet.
App. 39a (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). But the venue
provision at issue here refers broadly to “any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Such “expansive language” is not amenable to the kind
of “limiting construction” the court of appeals’ analysis
would impose. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446
U.S. 578, 589 (1980); see Whitman, 531 U.S. at 478.
Elsewhere in Section 7607(b)(1), Congress distinguished
among particular agency actions by referring specifically to a “regulation[]” or “order.” 42 U.S.C 7607(b)(1).
In contrast, Congress’s reference to “any other nationally applicable * * * final action” should be given its
natural meaning rather than subjected to artificial constraints. Ibid.; cf. Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 414
26
(2019) (presuming that “every word and every provision” in a statute “is to be given effect”) (citation omitted).
b. Respondents do not defend the court of appeals’
reliance on the adjudicative character of the denial actions. Instead, respondents contend (Br. in Opp. 17-21)
that, for purposes of the venue provision, the relevant
“final action[s]” are not the two denial actions issued in
April and June of 2022, but rather 105 separate denials
of the various petitioning refineries’ exemption requests. That is incorrect.
Respondents argue that here, “[t]he final EPA action
‘under’ the CAA is EPA’s adjudication of individual
hardship petitions.” Br. in Opp. 18. Respondents highlight the fact that Section 7545(o)(9)(B) allows “a small
refinery” to petition for an exemption and requires EPA
to “evaluat[e] a petition.” 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B) (emphases added). But neither that CAA provision nor any
other restricts EPA’s ability to consider petitions together and resolve common issues in a single action.
The court of appeals recognized that “[w]ithout more,”
the use of “an indefinite article immediately followed
with a singular noun” does not “show that the relevant
statutory provisions require EPA to consider exemption petitions individually.” Pet. App. 29a.
The Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431, instructs
that, “unless the context indicates otherwise[,] words
importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” 1 U.S.C. 1. Here, the context
provides no reason to doubt that EPA may evaluate
multiple petitions in a single action. Indeed, this Court
has long recognized that administrative agencies
“should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure
and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting
27
them to discharge their multitudinous duties.” FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940);
see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)
(“[T]his Court has for more than four decades emphasized that the formulation of procedures was basically
to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which
Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judgments.”). That discretion includes the ability
to determine “whether applications should be heard
contemporaneously or successively.” Pottsville, 309
U.S. at 138. Section 7545(o)(9)(B)’s use of an indefinite
article is an insufficient basis for inferring any constraint on EPA’s discretion to aggregate similar petitions for joint resolution.
There is nothing unusual or problematic about EPA’s
decision to group the various exemption petitions to decide the common issues that affect refineries across the
country. That approach aligns with Section 7607(b)(1)’s
aim to promote national uniformity and with EPA’s
longstanding practice of resolving similar issues in a
single action to ensure consistent treatment. See ATK
Launch Sys., 651 F.3d at 1197 (single EPA action promulgating air quality designations for 31 areas across 18
States); RMS of Ga., LLC v. EPA, 64 F.4th 1368, 1371
(11th Cir. 2023) (single EPA action adjudicating allowance requests and issuing allowances to 32 entities to
consume hydrofluorocarbons); West Virginia Chamber
of Commerce v. Browner, 166 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1998)
(Tbl.) (per curiam) (single EPA action declaring that 22
States’ implementation plans were inadequate and required revisions). Indeed, such aggregation generally
is encouraged as a means of efficiently adjudicating
common issues. See Committee on Adjudication, Ad-
28
ministrative Conference of the United States, Aggregation of Similar Claims in Agency Adjudication (June
13, 2016), https://perma.cc/2UQS-TJ6F.
EPA’s approach was particularly sensible here.
EPA was considering the exemption petitions in light of
this Court’s decision in HollyFrontier, and in light of
the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Renewable Fuels Association on issues this Court had not addressed. See pp.
6-7, supra. EPA grouped the petitions together for resolution in order to “apply one consistent statutory interpretation and economic analysis to thirty-six small
refineries, located in eighteen different states, in the geographical boundaries of eight different circuit courts.”
Pet. App. 38a (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see also
pp. 7-8, supra.
In making prior exemption decisions, EPA has sometimes declined to group multiple petitions for resolution
in a single action because the agency concluded that the
circumstances did not call for such treatment. When
EPA has issued decisions on petitions from individual
small refineries, EPA has recognized that the actions
are locally or regionally applicable. See, e.g., Producers
of Renewables United for Integrity Truth & Transparency v. EPA, No. 18-1202, Doc. 1775897 (D.C. Cir. Mar.
4, 2019). But whichever course EPA chooses in a particular instance, it is the face of the final action that determines the proper venue.
Respondents’ position would require the court where
a petition for review is filed to look behind EPA’s characterization of its own agency action and potentially
substitute a judicial determination of the relevant unit
of analysis. But respondents provide little guidance on
how courts would make that determination. Lower
courts confronted with such arguments have generally
29
rejected requests to second-guess EPA’s own framing
and have focused solely on the face of the final agency
action. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 45 F.4th
380, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that EPA’s construction and application to a specific context of “nationally applicable provisions of the
Clean Air Act” rendered the agency action itself nationally applicable); Sierra Club v. EPA, 47 F.4th 738, 744
(D.C. Cir. 2022) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that
EPA’s approvals of Texas’s state implementation plans
were nationally applicable because EPA had announced
a new understanding that would apply in other locations, thereby “effectively amend[ing] the agency’s national implementation regulations”); Southern Ill. Power
Coop., 863 F.3d at 671 (rejecting petitioner’s argument
that EPA’s designations of nonattainment areas were
an “amalgamation of many different locally or regionally applicable actions”); RMS of Ga., 64 F.4th at 1374
(rejecting petitioner’s argument that an allocation of allowances among entities should be considered a “document detailing many smaller individual actions”).
Focusing on the face of the EPA action has allowed
courts and litigants to quickly and efficiently determine
where venue lies, preventing wasteful expenditure of
resources resolving threshold issues, and furthering
Section 7607(b)(1)’s purpose of “prioritiz[ing] efficiency.”
National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583
U.S. 109, 130 (2018). Respondents’ approach, by contrast, would “introduce[] needless uncertainty into the
determination of venue, where the need for clear rules
is especially acute.” Southern Ill. Power Coop., 863 F.3d
at 673.
30
B. The Denial Actions At Issue Here Are Based On Determinations Of Nationwide Scope Or Effect
Even if the Court concludes that EPA’s denial actions here are “locally or regionally applicable,” those
actions still are reviewable exclusively in the D.C. Circuit. Those actions are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” and EPA published findings
to that effect. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
1.
The denial actions at issue here were based on determinations of nationwide scope
Under Section 7607(b)(1), a final action that is “locally or regionally applicable” is nonetheless reviewable
in the D.C. Circuit if it is “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect, and if in taking such action
the Administrator finds and publishes that such action
is based on such a determination.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
There is no dispute that EPA published the requisite
findings. See Pet. App. 12a-13a; see also April Notice,
87 Fed. Reg. at 24,301; June Notice, 87 Fed. Reg. at
34,874. Those findings were correct.
a. A “determination” is a “decision arrived at or
promulgated; a determinate sentence, conclusion, or
opinion.” 4 The Oxford English Dictionary 548 (2d ed.
1989) (OED); see Webster’s 616 (“the settling and ending of a controversy esp. by judicial decision”; “the resolving of a question by argument or reasoning”). The
text of Section 7607(b)(1) distinguishes between the
agency’s “final action” and the relevant underlying “determination.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). A particular EPA
action may reflect multiple agency determinations, but
by referring to “a determination of nationwide scope or
effect,” Section 7607(b)(1) authorizes D.C. Circuit venue
(if EPA publishes the requisite finding) so long as any
31
single determination of that kind forms the basis of the
action. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Requiring that the action be “ ‘based on’ ” the relevant determination ordinarily “indicates a but-for causal
relationship and thus a necessary logical condition.”
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63 (2007).
EPA’s actions may be—and frequently are—based on
multiple determinations, and courts have long accepted
such independent causes as adequate. See Bostock v.
Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020) (noting that
“[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes” that can
be sufficient to trigger liability). Under “the traditional
but-for causation standard,” causation cannot be defeated “just by citing some other factor that contributed
to [the] challenged * * * decision.” Ibid. “So long as”
the relevant determination “was one but-for cause of
th[e] decision, that is enough to trigger the law.” Ibid.
Thus, under Section 7607(b)(1), the relevant determinations must “lie at the core of the agency action” and cannot be “[m]erely peripheral or extraneous.” Texas v.
EPA, 829 F.3d 405, 419 (5th Cir. 2016).
Section 7607(b)(1) further provides that venue may
be appropriate in the D.C. Circuit when the relevant determination has “nationwide scope or effect.” 42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). “Scope” means “the general range or extent of cognizance, consideration, activity, or influence.” Webster’s 2035; see 14 OED 672
(“[R]ange of application or of subjects embraced.”).
“Effect” generally means “something that is produced
by an agent or cause.” Webster’s 724; see 5 OED 79 (“To
bring about”; “to accomplish”). When used with respect
to a statute, “effect” refers to “[t]he result * * * which
a statute will produce upon the existing law.” Black’s
462. Applying that definition in the context of agency
32
action, the “effect” of an agency determination refers to
the legal consequences that determination produces.
Thus, Section 7607(b)(1) allows for D.C. Circuit review
when EPA’s final action sets out as a core justification
a principle or conclusion that is intended to govern the
agency’s decisionmaking in actions throughout the country, or when a central rationale for EPA’s final action
has legal consequences for entities beyond a single judicial circuit.
Under the third prong of Section 7607(b)(1), a locally
or regionally applicable action is reviewable in the D.C.
Circuit only if (a) the action “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and (b) EPA “finds
and publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). When EPA publishes
the specified finding, a person who seeks review of the
pertinent EPA action may argue that the finding is incorrect and that venue therefore lies in a regional circuit. In such cases, any disputes about the meaning of
the phrase “determination of nationwide scope or effect” will present questions of statutory interpretation
that courts must decide de novo. See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024). But
EPA’s finding that the statutory standard is satisfied
with respect to a particular final action ordinarily will be
governed by the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. See
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (requiring application of arbitraryand-capricious standard to “agency action, findings, and
conclusions”); cf. 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9) (requiring application of arbitrary-and-capricious standard to particular EPA actions). That deferential standard of review
accounts for the fact that EPA has obvious knowledge
and expertise with respect to the centrality of the relevant “determination” to the agency’s own decisionmaking
33
process. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-377 (1989) (applying arbitrary-andcapricious review to a “factual dispute” as to whether
“new information undermines conclusions” the agency
reached because such a question “implicates substantial
agency expertise”).
By contrast, nothing in the statute requires EPA to
“find[] and publish[] that [an] action is based on * * * a
determination” of nationwide scope or effect, 42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1), even when the facts and law would support
such a finding. Rather, when EPA declines to publish
such a finding, that decision “is committed to the agency’s
discretion and thus is unreviewable,” Sierra Club, 47
F.4th at 745, and it effectively precludes D.C. Circuit
venue under Section 7607(b)(1)’s third prong. Thus, for
any locally or regionally applicable action that is based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect, Congress “entrusted EPA with discretion to determine the
proper venue as the agency sees fit.” Id. at 746; accord
Texas v. EPA, 983 F.3d 826, 834-835 (5th Cir. 2020). If
EPA concludes that a regional circuit is “best equipped
to evaluate” a particular agency action based on “local
market conditions,” Br. in Opp. 21, EPA may decline to
publish the relevant finding, thereby ensuring that the
regional circuit will have venue over any challenge to
the action.
b. As EPA correctly found, the denial actions at issue here were “based on” two interrelated “determination[s] of nationwide scope.” See April Notice, 87 Fed.
Reg. at 24,301; June Notice, 87 Fed. Reg. at 34,874.
First, the agency adopted a new interpretation of 42
U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B), construing that provision to require that any qualifying hardship “must be caused by
compliance with the RFS program” rather than by
34
some unrelated circumstance. Pet. App. 242a (capitalization and emphasis altered). Second, EPA determined, as a matter of economic reality, that every refinery recovers the cost of the RIN at the time it sells a
gallon of fuel. See id. at 249a. And because the “refining and fuel blending markets are highly competitive,”
EPA found that “RINs are generally widely available in
an open and liquid market,” and that “[t]he cost of acquiring RINs is the same for all parties”—features that
“facilitate the RIN cost passthrough.” Ibid. In light of
those two determinations, EPA concluded that, absent
unusual circumstances, compliance with the RFS program cannot cause disproportionate economic hardship
to small refineries.
As an interpretation of the statute and an analysis of
the national fuels and RIN markets that govern all
small refineries throughout the country seeking exemptions from the RFS program, EPA’s determinations are
“nationwide” in scope. Pet. App. 327a-328a. That EPA
adopted and applied those determinations uniformly to
small refineries across the country is evidence of that
fact. Those core determinations played a decisive role
in EPA’s denial actions, leading EPA to presume that
the petitioning small refineries across the country had
not experienced disproportionate economic hardship—
a presumption that EPA concluded no individual refineries had succeeded in rebutting. See id. at 15a. And
those determinations were essential to the validity of
the challenged denial actions, such that judicial rejection of either determination would provide a sufficient
basis for reversing the actions.5
Under the RFS program, EPA establishes percentage standards each year that all obligated parties must use to satisfy their
5
35
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate merits disposition of the petitions for review here confirms that the
challenged denial actions were “based on” the statutory
interpretation and economic analysis described above.
In this case the Fifth Circuit, having concluded that
EPA’s statutory interpretation was inconsistent with
the CAA’s text (Pet. App. 23a-27a) and that “EPA’s
RIN-passthrough theory [was] contrary to the evidence” (id. at 30a; see id. at 29a-33a), granted the petitions for review and vacated the denial actions. See id.
at 34a. If judicial invalidation of the relevant determination would provide a sufficient basis for finding the
final action itself to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”
42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9)(A); 5 U.S.C. 706(2), then the determination is properly viewed as “a necessary logical condition” of the action, Safeco, 551 U.S. at 63, and the requisite causal relationship exists.
c. The statutory history confirms that Congress intended for final actions like those at issue here to be
subject to review in the D.C. Circuit.
portion of the nationwide target volumes, see p. 4, supra. When
EPA anticipates granting an exemption petition at the time it establishes the percentage standard, it accounts for that exemption by
shifting the pro rata burden to other obligated parties. See Pet.
App. 248a & n.139. If EPA later grants an exemption it did not anticipate, the result is that the national target volumes will not be
reached for that year. See id. at 246a & n.135. EPA’s exemption
decisions thus implicate the legal obligations of all non-exempt refineries across the country. That reality further underscores the
need for nationwide uniformity, and thus the appropriateness of
D.C. Circuit review, which ensures that uniform standards will apply and that no refinery will receive a competitive advantage based
on the happenstance of the circuit in which it is located.
36
Before Congress amended the venue provision to authorize D.C. Circuit review of locally or regionally applicable actions with nationwide scope or effect, the
1970 statute made the approval or promulgation of state
or federal plans reviewable in “the appropriate circuit.”
42 U.S.C. 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970). Disputes concerning
that language spawned protracted litigation. See David
P. Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution
Laws, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1221, 1262-1269 (1977) (Currie).
Parties faced a lack of clarity as to which circuit was
“the appropriate circuit” when a petitioner challenged a
final action pertaining to state implementation plans
submitted by multiple states spanning multiple judicial
circuits. Id. at 1264.
In light of that uncertainty, one petitioner filed identical petitions in ten regional circuits, with an eleventh
in the D.C. Circuit, and then asked each of the regional
circuits to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit for resolution. Currie 1263. Five courts of appeals agreed to
do so, while the other five stayed proceedings pending
the disposition of the D.C. Circuit case. Ibid. Each of
the petitions challenged an EPA action that had approved numerous state implementation plans based on
the agency’s determination that the attainment deadlines for certain pollutants should be extended because
necessary control measures would not be available in
the time otherwise prescribed. See Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 969-970 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
In an opinion approving a transfer and finding the
D.C. Circuit to be “the appropriate circuit,” the First
Circuit explained that “[t]he legal issues raised by petitioners in the” various pending cases “seem[ed] to be
identical,” and that “litigation in several circuits, with
37
possible delayed results on the merits, can only serve to
frustrate the strong Congressional interest in improving the environment.” Natural Resources Defense
Council v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 494 (1st Cir. 1972) (per
curiam). The D.C. Circuit agreed, explaining that
“[n]one of the[] issues” raised by the petitions “involve
facts or laws peculiar to any one jurisdiction; rather, all
concern uniform determinations of nationwide effect
made by the Administrator.” Natural Resources Defense Council, 475 F.2d at 970.
In 1976, the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) drafted recommendations for amending
and clarifying the CAA venue provision. 41 Fed. Reg.
at 56,767. ACUS urged Congress to “clarify[] that the
appropriate circuit is the one containing the state whose
plan is challenged.” Ibid. EPA General Counsel G. William Frick provided additional views, however, and
counseled that “where ‘national issues’ are involved
they should be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.” Id. at
56,768. Frick noted that, although EPA actions involving state implementation plans “usually involve issues
peculiar to the affected States, such actions sometimes
involve generic determinations of nationwide scope or
effect.” Id. at 56,768-56,769. In Frick’s view, “Congress
intended review in the D.C. Circuit of ‘matters on which
national uniformity is desirable’ ” because of “the D.C.
Circuit’s obvious expertise in administrative law matters” and its familiarity with the CAA’s “complex” text
and history. Id. at 56,769. Citing the Natural Resources Defense Council cases as illustrative, Frick explained that it “makes sense to centralize review of ‘national’ [state implementation plan] issues in the D.C.
Circuit, taking advantage of its administrative law expertise and facilitating an orderly development of the
38
basic law under the Act, rather than to have such issues
decided separately by a number of courts.” Ibid.
By authorizing D.C. Circuit review of final EPA actions that are based on “determination[s] of nationwide
scope or effect,” the 1977 amendments incorporated
Frick’s own language. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); see 41 Fed.
Reg. at 56,768-56,769. The House Report that accompanied the 1977 amendments “concur[red]” with Frick’s
“comments, concerns, and recommendation.” 1977 House
Report 324. That history reflects Congress’s awareness
that, even when a particular EPA action specifically addresses a single State, region, or entity, judicial review
of the action may implicate national concerns. After
considering the competing viewpoints expressed by
ACUS and Frick as to the proper means of resolving
those national issues, Congress opted to authorize uniform resolution by providing a mechanism for exclusive
D.C. Circuit review.
2.
The court of appeals’ and respondents’ contrary reasoning would render the “nationwide scope or effect”
prong of Section 7607(b)(1) practically insignificant
The court of appeals and respondents have largely
ignored the determinations of nationwide scope or effect that EPA identified. The court and respondents
have focused instead on the refinery-specific circumstances that EPA also considered in the course of determining whether individual refineries could rebut the
presumption the agency had established. That myopic
approach is inconsistent with the statutory text and
would severely undercut the intended reach of the third
prong of Section 7607(b)(1). Under the correct interpretation of the statute, that prong has both meaningful
reach and meaningful limits, each designed to further
Congress’s purpose of channeling to the D.C. Circuit
39
those challenges that are likely to raise issues of national importance.
a. The Fifth Circuit erred in rejecting EPA’s finding
that the denial actions are based on determinations of
nationwide scope or effect. The court stated that EPA’s
statutory interpretation and economic analysis—“without
more”—“fail to provide the agency with a sufficient basis to adjudicate exemption petitions.” Pet. App. 15a.
The court observed that, in ruling on a specific exemption request, EPA must examine “refinery-specific”
facts to ensure that local circumstances do not warrant
a departure from the agency’s general economic analysis. Ibid. Respondents likewise emphasize (Br. in Opp.
23) that EPA considered “local facts and data” in determining that the refineries’ exemption requests should
be denied.
In treating that aspect of EPA’s methodology as decisive, the court and respondents would effectively limit
D.C. Circuit venue under Section 7607(b)(1)’s third
prong to review of EPA actions that are based solely on
determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Nothing
in the statutory text supports that approach. Where
Congress intended to require such a limitation, it said
so explicitly. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (providing
an exception to the statute’s 60-day filing window where
the “petition is based solely on grounds arising after”
that time period expires) (emphasis added); cf. Bostock,
590 U.S. at 656 (“As it has in other statutes, [Congress]
could have added ‘solely’ to indicate that actions taken
‘because of ’ the confluence of multiple factors do not violate the law.”). And this approach would effectively
preclude application of Section 7607(b)(1)’s third prong
to adjudications, which by their nature involve discrete
40
parties and virtually always implicate at least some
party-specific facts and judgments. Cf. p. 25, supra.
More fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit’s approach
would largely drain the “nationwide scope or effect”
prong of any practical significance. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
By its terms, Section 7607(b)(1)’s third prong applies
only to actions that are “locally or regionally applicable.” Ibid. Nearly all such actions can be expected to
rest at least in part on consideration of local or regional
circumstances. Yet on the Fifth Circuit’s view, EPA’s
consideration of such circumstances as one aspect of its
analysis suffices to preclude application of Section
7607(b)(1)’s third prong.
As explained above (see pp. 37-38, supra), Congress
enacted Section 7607(b)(1) in its current form after
EPA’s then-General Counsel highlighted the fact that
EPA’s approval and promulgation of implementation
plans for individual States, which will necessarily rest
at least in part on State-specific circumstances, can also
raise issues of national significance for which D.C. Circuit review is appropriate. See 41 Fed. Reg. at 56,769.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision thus contravenes Congress’s purpose of centralizing review of national issues
in the D.C. Circuit and prioritizing the efficient resolution of those issues, even when the actions also address
local or regional concerns. See Pet. App. 43a (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
b. Respondents also contend that, because “EPA in
every action [must] apply a uniform approach to similarly affected parties,” adopting the government’s interpretation would allow D.C. Circuit venue for challenges to every locally or regionally applicable EPA action. Br. in Opp. 25-26. That is incorrect. The statutory
41
text includes significant limitations that would prevent
that result.
i. As an initial matter, the relevant language in Section 7607(b)(1) imposes a causation requirement, authorizing D.C. Circuit venue only when the challenged
agency action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (emphasis
added). See pp. 30-31, supra. EPA’s finding that such
a standard is satisfied is subject to arbitrary-andcapricious review. See p. 32, supra. That causation requirement ensures that D.C. Circuit review will be
available only if the relevant determinations are at the
core of EPA’s action. For the reasons already explained, ibid., that causation requirement is satisfied
here—but it will not be satisfied for every EPA action.
ii. The word “determination” suggests a resolution
of an unsettled issue. See Webster’s 616 (“the settling
and ending of a controversy esp. by judicial decision”).
On that understanding, EPA does not make a “determination of nationwide scope” when it merely applies a
previously established agency rule, policy, or interpretation to new “locally or regionally applicable” circumstances, even if EPA has previously expressed its intent
that the relevant agency rule or policy will apply nationwide. In deciding whether an EPA rule or policy constitutes a “determination” when the agency applies it in
taking a new action, the court may consider whether
EPA announced the rule or policy at roughly the same
time as the challenged agency action itself. The court
may also consider whether the participants in any
notice-and-comment period or comparable agency proceeding leading up to the challenged action contested
the validity of the rule or policy.
42
That approach reflects a textually reasonable understanding of the statutory term “determination,” and it
would further the congressional policy judgments reflected in the second and third prongs of Section
7607(b)(1). The vast majority of “locally or regionally
applicable” EPA actions reflect the application of some
nationwide agency rule, policy, or interpretation to a
factual setting that is confined to a single judicial circuit. When the circumstances suggest that the rule, policy, or interpretation itself is likely to be called into
question in any judicial challenge to the EPA action,
routing such challenges to the D.C. Circuit serves important interests in judicial efficiency and nationwide
uniformity. That is particularly so if the relevant EPA
determination is intended to govern future agency actions. But where the validity of the general rule or policy appears to be settled, such that any judicial challenges to the action are likely to focus on the application
of the general pronouncement to discrete local facts,
those interests are inapposite.
Here, EPA’s new statutory interpretation and economic analysis were announced at roughly the same
time as, and were intended to guide, the denial actions
themselves. Comments on the proposed denial actions
disputed the validity of the interpretation and analysis.
See C.A. App. 96-144, 242-290 (summarizing and responding to comments). The interpretation and analysis therefore are properly viewed as EPA “determination[s]” within the meaning of Section 7607(b)(1), rather
than as the application of settled nationwide principles
to new factual settings. 6
Respondents have contended (Br. in Opp. 29) that EPA’s April
and June 2022 denial actions raise distinct venue issues because the
6
43
iii. As explained above, a locally or regionally applicable EPA action is reviewable in the D.C. Circuit only
if (a) the action “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and (b) EPA “finds and publishes
that such action is based on such a determination.” 42
U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Even when the facts and law would
support the specified finding, EPA has plenary discretion to decide whether to publish that finding, and the
agency “may weigh any number of considerations” in
making that decision. Sierra Club, 47 F.4th at 746; see
p. 33, supra. For example, EPA may consider whether
any petitions for review of a particular action would
likely contest EPA determinations of national concern,
or instead would likely dispute EPA’s understanding of
local or regional circumstances. For EPA actions in the
latter category, the agency may decline to publish the
relevant finding, thereby ensuring that the regional circuit will have venue over any challenge to the action.
c. The limitations described above meaningfully
constrain the number of locally or regionally applicable
actions that will be subject to D.C. Circuit review, while
furthering the congressional purpose embodied in Section 7607(b)(1) to promote efficient and uniform resoluApril denial action announced a new approach to small-refinery exemptions, while the June denial action simply applied that approach
to additional refineries. That contention is overstated. Both denial
actions here stemmed from a single proposed denial that first announced EPA’s new approach to exemptions. Pet. App. 48a, 193a;
see 86 Fed. Reg. at 70,999 (proposing to “deny all pending [exemption] petitions” based on the agency’s determinations regarding the
meaning of disproportionate economic hardship and the market realities of refinery operations). The fact that a short time passed between the finalization of the two actions—without any court considering the validity of EPA’s new determinations—is an insufficient
basis to distinguish between the actions for purposes of venue.
44
tion of disputed issues of national significance. By contrast, respondents’ interpretation would limit D.C. Circuit review of locally or regionally applicable EPA actions to a vanishingly small category. Embracing that
interpretation would lead to the very problems Congress sought to avoid in amending the CAA’s venue provision to include the nationwide-scope-or-effect language.
This case is illustrative. As a result of the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to transfer this case, EPA now faces two
merits decisions from two different circuit courts that
addressed substantially similar challenges to the same
denial actions. The petitioners in both circuits focused
their attacks on the statutory interpretation and economic analysis that EPA had adopted and applied nationwide, not on any refinery-specific EPA findings.
And EPA avoided further fragmentation of judicial review only because five other regional courts of appeals
dismissed similar challenges for improper venue or
transferred challenges to the D.C. Circuit.
Although both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits ultimately
vacated EPA’s denial actions, the differences in reasoning between the two circuits may lead to different results on remand. 7 That would create a bifurcated RFS
Most notably, the Fifth Circuit found that refineries had reasonably relied on EPA’s prior approach to adjudicating exemption petitions, such that the agency’s consideration of updated economic information regarding RFS compliance costs—relating to the “RIN
cost passthrough principle”—created an impermissible retroactive
effect. Pet. App. 14a; see id. at 16a-23a. The D.C. Circuit declined
to reach that issue. See Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 114
F.4th 693, 714 n.12 (2024) (per curiam). Under the Fifth Circuit’s
retroactivity analysis, EPA would be required to evaluate the remanded petitions under its prior approach, without considering up7
45
program consisting of one program for remanded petitions for most of the nation, and a separate, more favorable program for exemption claimants in the Fifth Circuit. That result is contrary to Congress’s direction to
ensure a uniform, nationwide framework for increasing
renewable fuel use, see e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(A)(i)
and (o)(2)(B)(ii)(III), and with Section 7607(b)(1)’s evident purpose of ensuring efficient, uniform resolution of
issues with national significance. And if this Court endorses the Fifth Circuit’s venue analysis, future EPA
actions similar to the denial actions here can be expected to spawn litigation in several courts of appeals,
with a consequent increased waste of judicial resources
and a heightened risk of inconsistent outcomes. Nothing in the statutory text requires that result, and the
Court should reject it.
dated economic analysis of a small refinery’s compliance costs beyond those contemplated by the DOE study and corresponding
scoring matrix. That aspect of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion focuses
not on any refinery-specific circumstance, but on the economic analysis EPA used in assessing exemption petitions from refineries nationwide. Under the D.C. Circuit’s analysis, by contrast, EPA may
consider any updated economic information about a small refinery’s
compliance costs that is relevant to assessing whether the refinery
actually suffers disproportionate economic hardship.
46
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the order of the court of
appeals and remand with instructions to transfer the
case to the D.C. Circuit.
Respectfully submitted.
DIMPLE CHAUDHARY
Acting General Counsel
SUSANNAH WEAVER
Deputy General Counsel
GAUTAM SRINIVASAN
Associate General Counsel
MATTHEW MARKS
Deputy Associate General
Counsel
SUSAN STAHLE
JEANHEE HONG
Attorneys
Environmental Protection
Agency
DECEMBER 2024
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
TODD KIM
Assistant Attorney General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
AIMEE W. BROWN
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
BRYAN J. HARRISON
JEFFREY HUGHES
Attorneys
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix — Statutory provisions:
42 U.S.C. 7545(o) ......................................... 1a
42 U.S.C. 7607(b) ........................................ 30a
(I)
APPENDIX
1.
42 U.S.C. 7545(o) provides:
Regulation of fuels
(o)
Renewable fuel program
(1) Definitions
In this section:
(A)
Additional renewable fuel
The term “additional renewable fuel” means
fuel that is produced from renewable biomass and
that is used to replace or reduce the quantity of
fossil fuel present in home heating oil or jet fuel.
(B)
(i)
Advanced biofuel
In general
The term “advanced biofuel” means renewable fuel, other than ethanol derived from corn
starch, that has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, as determined by the Administrator, after notice and opportunity for comment, that
are at least 50 percent less than baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions.
(ii) Inclusions
The types of fuels eligible for consideration
as “advanced biofuel” may include any of the
following:
(I)
Ethanol derived from cellulose,
hemicellulose, or lignin.
(1a)
2a
(II) Ethanol derived from sugar or
starch (other than corn starch).
(III) Ethanol derived from waste material, including crop residue, other vegetative
waste material, animal waste, and food
waste and yard waste.
(IV) Biomass-based diesel.
(V) Biogas (including landfill gas and
sewage waste treatment gas) produced
through the conversion of organic matter
from renewable biomass.
(VI) Butanol or other alcohols produced
through the conversion of organic matter
from renewable biomass.
(VII) Other fuel derived from cellulosic
biomass.
(C)
Baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions
The term “baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions” means the average lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, as determined by the Administrator, after notice and opportunity for comment, for gasoline or diesel (whichever is being replaced by the renewable fuel) sold or distributed
as transportation fuel in 2005.
(D)
Biomass-based diesel
The term “biomass-based diesel” means renewable fuel that is biodiesel as defined in section
13220(f ) of this title and that has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, as determined by the Administrator, after notice and opportunity for com-
3a
ment, that are at least 50 percent less than the
baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, renewable fuel derived from co-processing biomass with
a petroleum feedstock shall be advanced biofuel if
it meets the requirements of subparagraph (B),
but is not biomass-based diesel.
(E)
Cellulosic biofuel
The term “cellulosic biofuel” means renewable
fuel derived from any cellulose, hemicellulose, or
lignin that is derived from renewable biomass and
that has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, as determined by the Administrator, that are at least
60 percent less than the baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions.
(F)
Conventional biofuel
The term “conventional biofuel” means renewable fuel that is ethanol derived from corn starch.
(G)
Greenhouse gas
The term “greenhouse gas” means carbon dioxide, hydrofluorocarbons, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons,91sulfur hexafluoride. The Administrator may include any other anthropogenicallyemitted gas that is determined by the Administrator, after notice and comment, to contribute to
global warming.
(H)
Lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions
The term “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions”
means the aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas
9
So in original.
The word “and” probably should appear.
4a
emissions (including direct emissions and significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use changes), as determined by
the Administrator, related to the full fuel lifecycle,
including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from feedstock generation
or extraction through the distribution and delivery and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all greenhouse
gases are adjusted to account for their relative
global warming potential.
(I)
Renewable biomass
The term “renewable biomass” means each of
the following:
(i) Planted crops and crop residue harvested from agricultural land cleared or cultivated at any time prior to December 19, 2007,
that is either actively managed or fallow, and
nonforested.
(ii) Planted trees and tree residue from actively managed tree plantations on nonfederal102land cleared at any time prior to December 19, 2007, including land belonging to an
Indian tribe or an Indian individual, that is held
in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the
United States.
(iii) Animal waste material and animal byproducts.
10
So in original.
Probably should be “non-Federal”.
5a
(iv) Slash and pre-commercial thinnings
that are from non-federal10 forestlands, including forestlands belonging to an Indian tribe or
an Indian individual, that are held in trust by
the United States or subject to a restriction
against alienation imposed by the United
States, but not forests or forestlands that are
ecological communities with a global or State
ranking of critically imperiled, imperiled, or
rare pursuant to a State Natural Heritage Program, old growth forest, or late successional
forest.
(v) Biomass obtained from the immediate
vicinity of buildings and other areas regularly
occupied by people, or of public infrastructure,
at risk from wildfire.
(vi) Algae.
(vii) Separated yard waste or food waste, including recycled cooking and trap grease.
(J)
Renewable fuel
The term “renewable fuel” means fuel that is
produced from renewable biomass and that is used
to replace or reduce the quantity of fossil fuel present in a transportation fuel.
(K)
Small refinery
The term “small refinery” means a refinery for
which the average aggregate daily crude oil
throughput for a calendar year (as determined by
dividing the aggregate throughput for the calendar year by the number of days in the calendar
year) does not exceed 75,000 barrels.
6a
(L)
Transportation fuel
The term “transportation fuel” means fuel for
use in motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, nonroad vehicles, or nonroad engines (except for
ocean-going vessels).
(2) Renewable fuel program
(A)
(i)
Regulations
In general
Not later than 1 year after August 8, 2005,
the Administrator shall promulgate regulations to ensure that gasoline sold or introduced
into commerce in the United States (except in
noncontiguous States or territories), on an annual average basis, contains the applicable volume of renewable fuel determined in accordance with subparagraph (B). Not later than 1
year after December 19, 2007, the Administrator shall revise the regulations under this paragraph to ensure that transportation fuel sold
or introduced into commerce in the United
States (except in noncontiguous States or territories), on an annual average basis, contains
at least the applicable volume of renewable
fuel, advanced biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and
biomass-based diesel, determined in accordance with subparagraph (B) and, in the case of
any such renewable fuel produced from new facilities that commence construction after December 19, 2007, achieves at least a 20 percent
reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions
compared to baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions.
7a
(ii)
(I)
Noncontiguous State opt-in
In general
On the petition of a noncontiguous State
or territory, the Administrator may allow
the renewable fuel program established under this subsection to apply in the noncontiguous State or territory at the same time
or any time after the Administrator promulgates regulations under this subparagraph.
(II) Other actions
In carrying out this clause, the Administrator may—
(aa) issue or revise regulations under this paragraph;
(bb) establish applicable percentages
under paragraph (3);
(cc) provide for the generation of
credits under paragraph (5); and
(dd) take such other actions as are
necessary to allow for the application of
the renewable fuels program in a noncontiguous State or territory.
(iii)
Provisions of regulations
Regardless of the date of promulgation, the
regulations promulgated under clause (i)—
(I) shall contain compliance provisions
applicable to refineries, blenders, distributors, and importers, as appropriate, to en-
8a
sure that the requirements of this paragraph are met; but
(II) shall not—
(aa) restrict geographic areas in
which renewable fuel may be used; or
(bb) impose any per-gallon obligation for the use of renewable fuel.
(iv) Requirement in case of failure to promulgate regulations
If the Administrator does not promulgate
regulations under clause (i), the percentage of
renewable fuel in gasoline sold or dispensed to
consumers in the United States, on a volume
basis, shall be 2.78 percent for calendar year
2006.
(B)
(i)
Applicable volumes
Calendar years after 2005
(I)
Renewable fuel
For the purpose of subparagraph (A), the
applicable volume of renewable fuel for the
calendar years 2006 through 2022 shall be
determined in accordance with the following
table:
Calendar year:
Applicable volume of
renewable fuel
(in billions of gallons):
2006 .........................
4.0
2007 .........................
4.7
9a
2008 .........................
9.0
2009 .........................
11.1
2010 .........................
12.95
2011 .........................
13.95
2012 .........................
15.2
2013 .........................
16.55
2014 .........................
18.15
2015 .........................
20.5
2016 .........................
22.25
2017 .........................
24.0
2018 .........................
26.0
2019 .........................
28.0
2020 .........................
30.0
2021 .........................
33.0
2022 .........................
36.0
(II) Advanced biofuel
For the purpose of subparagraph (A), of
the volume of renewable fuel required under
subclause (I), the applicable volume of advanced biofuel for the calendar years 2009
through 2022 shall be determined in accordance with the following table:
Calendar year:
Applicable volume of
advanced biofuel
(in billions of gallons):
2009 .........................
0.6
2010 .........................
0.95
10a
2011 .........................
1.35
2012 .........................
2.0
2013 .........................
2.75
2014 .........................
3.75
2015 .........................
5.5
2016 .........................
7.25
2017 .........................
9.0
2018 .........................
11.0
2019 .........................
13.0
2020 .........................
15.0
2021 .........................
18.0
2022 .........................
21.0
(III) Cellulosic biofuel
For the purpose of subparagraph (A), of
the volume of advanced biofuel required under subclause (II), the applicable volume of
cellulosic biofuel for the calendar years 2010
through 2022 shall be determined in accordance with the following table:
Calendar year:
Applicable volume of
cellulosic biofuel
(in billions of gallons):
2010 .........................
0.1
2011 .........................
0.25
2012 .........................
0.5
2013 .........................
1.0
2014 .........................
1.75
11a
2015 .........................
3.0
2016 .........................
4.25
2017 .........................
5.5
2018 .........................
7.0
2019 .........................
8.5
2020 .........................
10.5
2021 .........................
13.5
2022 .........................
16.0
(IV) Biomass-based diesel
For the purpose of subparagraph (A), of
the volume of advanced biofuel required under subclause (II), the applicable volume of
biomass-based diesel for the calendar years
2009 through 2012 shall be determined in accordance with the following table:
Calendar year:
Applicable volume of
biomass-based diesel
(in billions of gallons):
2009 .........................
0.5
2010 .........................
0.65
2011 .........................
0.80
2012 .........................
1.0
(ii)
Other calendar years
For the purposes of subparagraph (A), the
applicable volumes of each fuel specified in the
tables in clause (i) for calendar years after the
calendar years specified in the tables shall be
determined by the Administrator, in coordina-
12a
tion with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Agriculture, based on a review of the
implementation of the program during calendar years specified in the tables, and an analysis of—
(I) the impact of the production and
use of renewable fuels on the environment,
including on air quality, climate change, conversion of wetlands, ecosystems, wildlife
habitat, water quality, and water supply;
(II) the impact of renewable fuels on the
energy security of the United States;
(III) the expected annual rate of future
commercial production of renewable fuels,
including advanced biofuels in each category
(cellulosic biofuel and biomass-based diesel);
(IV) the impact of renewable fuels on the
infrastructure of the United States, including deliverability of materials, goods, and
products other than renewable fuel, and the
sufficiency of infrastructure to deliver and
use renewable fuel;
(V) the impact of the use of renewable
fuels on the cost to consumers of transportation fuel and on the cost to transport
goods; and
(VI) the impact of the use of renewable
fuels on other factors, including job creation, the price and supply of agricultural
commodities, rural economic development,
and food prices.
13a
The Administrator shall promulgate rules establishing the applicable volumes under this
clause no later than 14 months before the first
year for which such applicable volume will apply.
(iii) Applicable volume of advanced biofuel
For the purpose of making the determinations in clause (ii), for each calendar year, the
applicable volume of advanced biofuel shall be
at least the same percentage of the applicable
volume of renewable fuel as in calendar year
2022.
(iv) Applicable volume of cellulosic biofuel
For the purpose of making the determinations in clause (ii), for each calendar year, the
applicable volume of cellulosic biofuel established by the Administrator shall be based on
the assumption that the Administrator will not
need to issue a waiver for such years under paragraph (7)(D).
(v)
Minimum applicable volume of biomassbased diesel
For the purpose of making the determinations in clause (ii), the applicable volume of
biomass-based diesel shall not be less than the
applicable volume listed in clause (i)(IV) for
calendar year 2012.
14a
(3) Applicable percentages
(A)
Provision of estimate of volumes of gasoline
sales
Not later than October 31 of each of calendar
years 2005 through 2021, the Administrator of the
Energy Information Administration shall provide
to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency an estimate, with respect to the
following calendar year, of the volumes of transportation fuel, biomass-based diesel, and cellulosic
biofuel projected to be sold or introduced into
commerce in the United States.
(B)
Determination of applicable percentages
(i)
In general
Not later than November 30 of each of calendar years 2005 through 2021, based on the
estimate provided under subparagraph (A), the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall determine and publish in the
Federal Register, with respect to the following
calendar year, the renewable fuel obligation
that ensures that the requirements of paragraph (2) are met.
(ii)
Required elements
The renewable fuel obligation determined
for a calendar year under clause (i) shall—
(I) be applicable to refineries, blenders, and importers, as appropriate;
(II) be expressed in terms of a volume
percentage of transportation fuel sold or in-
15a
troduced into commerce in the United
States; and
(III) subject to subparagraph (C)(i), consist of a single applicable percentage that
applies to all categories of persons specified
in subclause (I).
(C)
Adjustments
In determining the applicable percentage for
a calendar year, the Administrator shall make
adjustments—
(i) to prevent the imposition of redundant
obligations on any person specified in subparagraph (B)(ii)(I); and
(ii) to account for the use of renewable fuel
during the previous calendar year by small refineries that are exempt under paragraph (9).
(4) Modification of greenhouse gas reduction percentages
(A)
In general
The Administrator may, in the regulations under the last sentence of paragraph (2)(A)(i), adjust
the 20 percent, 50 percent, and 60 percent reductions in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions specified in paragraphs (2)(A)(i) (relating to renewable
fuel), (1)(D) (relating to biomass-based diesel),
(1)(B)(i) (relating to advanced biofuel), and (1)(E)
(relating to cellulosic biofuel) to a lower percentage. For the 50 and 60 percent reductions, the
Administrator may make such an adjustment only
if he determines that generally such reduction is
not commercially feasible for fuels made using a
16a
variety of feedstocks, technologies, and processes
to meet the applicable reduction.
(B)
Amount of adjustment
In promulgating regulations under this paragraph, the specified 50 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from advanced biofuel and in
biomass-based diesel may not be reduced below 40
percent. The specified 20 percent reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions from renewable fuel
may not be reduced below 10 percent, and the
specified 60 percent reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions from cellulosic biofuel may not be reduced below 50 percent.
(C)
Adjusted reduction levels
An adjustment under this paragraph to a percent less than the specified 20 percent greenhouse
gas reduction for renewable fuel shall be the minimum possible adjustment, and the adjusted
greenhouse gas reduction shall be established by
the Administrator at the maximum achievable
level, taking cost in consideration, for natural gas
fired corn-based ethanol plants, allowing for the
use of a variety of technologies and processes.
An adjustment in the 50 or 60 percent greenhouse
gas levels shall be the minimum possible adjustment for the fuel or fuels concerned, and the adjusted greenhouse gas reduction shall be established at the maximum achievable level, taking
cost in consideration, allowing for the use of a variety of feedstocks, technologies, and processes.
17a
(D)
5-year review
Whenever the Administrator makes any adjustment under this paragraph, not later than 5
years thereafter he shall review and revise (based
upon the same criteria and standards as required
for the initial adjustment) the regulations establishing the adjusted level.
(E)
Subsequent adjustments
After the Administrator has promulgated a final rule under the last sentence of paragraph
(2)(A)(i) with respect to the method of determining lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, except as
provided in subparagraph (D), the Administrator
may not adjust the percent greenhouse gas reduction levels unless he determines that there has
been a significant change in the analytical methodology used for determining the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. If he makes such determination, he may adjust the 20, 50, or 60 percent reduction levels through rulemaking using the criteria and standards set forth in this paragraph.
(F)
Limit on upward adjustments
If, under subparagraph (D) or (E), the Administrator revises a percent level adjusted as provided in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) to a
higher percent, such higher percent may not exceed the applicable percent specified in paragraph
(2)(A)(i), (1)(D), (1)(B)(i), or (1)(E).
(G)
Applicability of adjustments
If the Administrator adjusts, or revises, a percent level referred to in this paragraph or makes
18a
a change in the analytical methodology used for
determining the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, such adjustment, revision, or change (or any
combination thereof ) shall only apply to renewable fuel from new facilities that commence construction after the effective date of such adjustment, revision, or change.
(5) Credit program
(A)
In general
The regulations promulgated under paragraph
(2)(A) shall provide—
(i) for the generation of an appropriate
amount of credits by any person that refines,
blends, or imports gasoline that contains a
quantity of renewable fuel that is greater than
the quantity required under paragraph (2);
(ii) for the generation of an appropriate
amount of credits for biodiesel; and
(iii) for the generation of credits by small
refineries in accordance with paragraph (9)(C).
(B)
Use of credits
A person that generates credits under subparagraph (A) may use the credits, or transfer all or
a portion of the credits to another person, for the
purpose of complying with paragraph (2).
(C)
Duration of credits
A credit generated under this paragraph shall
be valid to show compliance for the 12 months as
of the date of generation.
19a
(D)
Inability to generate or purchase sufficient
credits
The regulations promulgated under paragraph
(2)(A) shall include provisions allowing any person
that is unable to generate or purchase sufficient
credits to meet the requirements of paragraph (2)
to carry forward a renewable fuel deficit on condition that the person, in the calendar year following
the year in which the renewable fuel deficit is
created—
(i) achieves compliance with the renewable fuel requirement under paragraph (2); and
(ii) generates or purchases additional renewable fuel credits to offset the renewable
fuel deficit of the previous year.
(E)
Credits for additional renewable fuel
The Administrator may issue regulations
providing: (i) for the generation of an appropriate amount of credits by any person that refines,
blends, or imports additional renewable fuels
specified by the Administrator; and (ii) for the use
of such credits by the generator, or the transfer of
all or a portion of the credits to another person,
for the purpose of complying with paragraph (2).
(6) Seasonal variations in renewable fuel use
(A)
Study
For each of calendar years 2006 through 2012,
the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration shall conduct a study of renewable
fuel blending to determine whether there are ex-
20a
cessive seasonal variations in the use of renewable
fuel.
(B)
Regulation of excessive seasonal variations
If, for any calendar year, the Administrator of
the Energy Information Administration, based on
the study under subparagraph (A), makes the determinations specified in subparagraph (C), the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency shall promulgate regulations to ensure
that 25 percent or more of the quantity of renewable fuel necessary to meet the requirements of
paragraph (2) is used during each of the 2 periods
specified in subparagraph (D) of each subsequent
calendar year.
(C)
Determinations
The determinations referred to in subparagraph (B) are that—
(i) less than 25 percent of the quantity of
renewable fuel necessary to meet the requirements of paragraph (2) has been used during 1
of the 2 periods specified in subparagraph (D)
of the calendar year;
(ii) a pattern of excessive seasonal variation described in clause (i) will continue in subsequent calendar years; and
(iii) promulgating regulations or other requirements to impose a 25 percent or more seasonal use of renewable fuels will not prevent or
interfere with the attainment of national ambient air quality standards or significantly increase the price of motor fuels to the consumer.
21a
(D)
Periods
The 2 periods referred to in this paragraph
are—
(i)
April through September; and
(ii) January through March and October
through December.
(E)
Exclusion
Renewable fuel blended or consumed in calendar year 2006 in a State that has received a waiver
under section 7543(b) of this title shall not be included in the study under subparagraph (A).
(F)
State exemption from seasonality requirements
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the seasonality requirement relating to renewable
fuel use established by this paragraph shall not
apply to any State that has received a waiver under section 7543(b) of this title or any State dependent on refineries in such State for gasoline
supplies.
(7) Waivers
(A)
In general
The Administrator, in consultation with the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Energy, may waive the requirements of paragraph
(2) in whole or in part on petition by one or more
States, by any person subject to the requirements
of this subsection, or by the Administrator on his
own motion by reducing the national quantity of
renewable fuel required under paragraph (2)—
22a
(i) based on a determination by the Administrator, after public notice and opportunity
for comment, that implementation of the requirement would severely harm the economy
or environment of a State, a region, or the
United States; or
(ii) based on a determination by the Administrator, after public notice and opportunity
for comment, that there is an inadequate domestic supply.
(B)
Petitions for waivers
The Administrator, in consultation with the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Energy, shall approve or disapprove a petition for a
waiver of the requirements of paragraph (2)
within 90 days after the date on which the petition
is received by the Administrator.
(C)
Termination of waivers
A waiver granted under subparagraph (A) shall
terminate after 1 year, but may be renewed by the
Administrator after consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Energy.
(D)
Cellulosic biofuel
(i) For any calendar year for which the projected volume of cellulosic biofuel production is
less than the minimum applicable volume established under paragraph (2)(B), as determined by
the Administrator based on the estimate provided
under paragraph (3)(A), not later than November
30 of the preceding calendar year, the Administrator shall reduce the applicable volume of cellulosic
23a
biofuel required under paragraph (2)(B) to the
projected volume available during that calendar
year. For any calendar year in which the Administrator makes such a reduction, the Administrator may also reduce the applicable volume of renewable fuel and advanced biofuels requirement
established under paragraph (2)(B) by the same or
a lesser volume.
(ii) Whenever the Administrator reduces the
minimum cellulosic biofuel volume under this subparagraph, the Administrator shall make available for sale cellulosic biofuel credits at the higher
of $0.25 per gallon or the amount by which $3.00
per gallon exceeds the average wholesale price of
a gallon of gasoline in the United States. Such
amounts shall be adjusted for inflation by the Administrator for years after 2008.
(iii) Eighteen months after December 19, 2007,
the Administrator shall promulgate regulations to
govern the issuance of credits under this subparagraph.
The regulations shall set forth the
method for determining the exact price of credits
in the event of a waiver. The price of such credits
shall not be changed more frequently than once
each quarter. These regulations shall include
such provisions, including limiting the credits’
uses and useful life, as the Administrator deems
appropriate to assist market liquidity and transparency, to provide appropriate certainty for regulated entities and renewable fuel producers, and
to limit any potential misuse of cellulosic biofuel
credits to reduce the use of other renewable fuels,
and for such other purposes as the Administrator
24a
determines will help achieve the goals of this subsection. The regulations shall limit the number
of cellulosic biofuel credits for any calendar year
to the minimum applicable volume (as reduced under this subparagraph) of cellulosic biofuel for
that year.
(E)
Biomass-based diesel
(i)
Market evaluation
The Administrator, in consultation with the
Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall periodically evaluate the impact
of the biomass-based diesel requirements established under this paragraph on the price of
diesel fuel.
(ii)
Waiver
If the Administrator determines that there
is a significant renewable feedstock disruption
or other market circumstances that would
make the price of biomass-based diesel fuel increase significantly, the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall issue an order
to reduce, for up to a 60-day period, the quantity of biomass-based diesel required under
subparagraph (A) by an appropriate quantity
that does not exceed 15 percent of the applicable annual requirement for biomass-based diesel. For any calendar year in which the Administrator makes a reduction under this subparagraph, the Administrator may also reduce
the applicable volume of renewable fuel and advanced biofuels requirement established under
25a
paragraph (2)(B) by the same or a lesser volume.
(iii)
Extensions
If the Administrator determines that the
feedstock disruption or circumstances described in clause (ii) is continuing beyond the
60-day period described in clause (ii) or this
clause, the Administrator, in consultation with
the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of
Agriculture, may issue an order to reduce, for
up to an additional 60-day period, the quantity
of biomass-based diesel required under subparagraph (A) by an appropriate quantity that
does not exceed an additional 15 percent of the
applicable annual requirement for biomassbased diesel.
(F)
Modification of applicable volumes
For any of the tables in paragraph (2)(B), if the
Administrator waives—
(i) at least 20 percent of the applicable volume requirement set forth in any such table for
2 consecutive years; or
(ii) at least 50 percent of such volume requirement for a single year,
the Administrator shall promulgate a rule (within
1 year after issuing such waiver) that modifies the
applicable volumes set forth in the table concerned for all years following the final year to
which the waiver applies, except that no such modification in applicable volumes shall be made for
any year before 2016. In promulgating such a
26a
rule, the Administrator shall comply with the processes, criteria, and standards set forth in paragraph (2)(B)(ii).
(8) Study and waiver for initial year of program
(A)
In general
Not later than 180 days after August 8, 2005,
the Secretary of Energy shall conduct for the Administrator a study assessing whether the renewable fuel requirement under paragraph (2) will
likely result in significant adverse impacts on consumers in 2006, on a national, regional, or State
basis.
(B)
Required evaluations
The study shall evaluate renewable fuel—
(i)
supplies and prices;
(ii) blendstock supplies; and
(iii) supply and distribution system capabilities.
(C)
Recommendations by the Secretary
Based on the results of the study, the Secretary
of Energy shall make specific recommendations to
the Administrator concerning waiver of the requirements of paragraph (2), in whole or in part,
to prevent any adverse impacts described in subparagraph (A).
(D)
(i)
Waiver
In general
Not later than 270 days after August 8, 2005,
the Administrator shall, if and to the extent
27a
recommended by the Secretary of Energy under subparagraph (C), waive, in whole or in
part, the renewable fuel requirement under
paragraph (2) by reducing the national quantity of renewable fuel required under paragraph (2) in calendar year 2006.
(ii)
No effect on waiver authority
Clause (i) does not limit the authority of the
Administrator to waive the requirements of
paragraph (2) in whole, or in part, under paragraph (7).
(9) Small refineries
(A)
Temporary exemption
(i)
In general
The requirements of paragraph (2) shall not
apply to small refineries until calendar year
2011.
(ii)
Extension of exemption
(I)
Study by Secretary of Energy
Not later than December 31, 2008, the
Secretary of Energy shall conduct for the
Administrator a study to determine whether
compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2) would impose a disproportionate
economic hardship on small refineries.
(II)
Extension of exemption
In the case of a small refinery that the
Secretary of Energy determines under subclause (I) would be subject to a dispropor-
28a
tionate economic hardship if required to
comply with paragraph (2), the Administrator shall extend the exemption under clause
(i) for the small refinery for a period of not
less than 2 additional years.
(B)
Petitions based on disproportionate economic hardship
(i)
Extension of exemption
A small refinery may at any time petition
the Administrator for an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason
of disproportionate economic hardship.
(ii)
Evaluation of petitions
In evaluating a petition under clause (i), the
Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall consider the findings of
the study under subparagraph (A)(ii) and other
economic factors.
(iii)
Deadline for action on petitions
The Administrator shall act on any petition
submitted by a small refinery for a hardship exemption not later than 90 days after the date of
receipt of the petition.
(C)
Credit program
If a small refinery notifies the Administrator
that the small refinery waives the exemption under subparagraph (A), the regulations promulgated under paragraph (2)(A) shall provide for the
generation of credits by the small refinery under
29a
paragraph (5) beginning in the calendar year following the date of notification.
(D)
Opt-in for small refineries
A small refinery shall be subject to the requirements of paragraph (2) if the small refinery notifies the Administrator that the small refinery
waives the exemption under subparagraph (A).
(10) Ethanol market concentration analysis
(A)
Analysis
(i)
In general
Not later than 180 days after August 8, 2005,
and annually thereafter, the Federal Trade
Commission shall perform a market concentration analysis of the ethanol production industry
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to determine whether there is sufficient competition
among industry participants to avoid pricesetting and other anticompetitive behavior.
(ii)
Scoring
For the purpose of scoring under clause (i)
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, all
marketing arrangements among industry participants shall be considered.
(B)
Report
Not later than December 1, 2005, and annually
thereafter, the Federal Trade Commission shall
submit to Congress and the Administrator a report on the results of the market concentration
analysis performed under subparagraph (A)(i).
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(11) Periodic reviews
To allow for the appropriate adjustment of the requirements described in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Administrator shall conduct periodic
reviews of—
(A)
existing technologies;
(B) the feasibility of achieving compliance
with the requirements; and
(C) the impacts of the requirements described in subsection (a)(2) 11 3 on each individual
and entity described in paragraph (2).
(12) Effect on other provisions
Nothing in this subsection, or regulations issued
pursuant to this subsection, shall affect or be construed to affect the regulatory status of carbon dioxide or any other greenhouse gas, or to expand or limit
regulatory authority regarding carbon dioxide or any
other greenhouse gas, for purposes of other provisions (including section 7475) of this chapter. The
previous sentence shall not affect implementation
and enforcement of this subsection.
2.
42 U.S.C. 7607(b) provides:
Administrative proceedings and judicial review
(b)
Judicial review
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary
ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or
11
So in original.
Subsection (a) does not contain a par. (2).
31a
requirement under section 7412 of this title, any standard of performance or requirement under section 7411
of this title,,34any standard under section 7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 7521(b)(1) of this title), any determination
under section 7521(b)(5) 15of this title, any control or prohibition under section 7545 of this title, any standard
under section 7571 of this title, any rule issued under
section 7413, 7419, or under section 7420 of this title, or
any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under
this chapter may be filed only in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for
review of the Administrator’s action in approving or
promulgating any implementation plan under section
7410 of this title or section 7411(d) of this title, any order under section 7411( j) of this title, under section
7412 of this title, under section 7419 of this title, or under section 7420 of this title, or his action under section
1857c-10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in effect before August 7, 1977) or under regulations thereunder, or
revising regulations for enhanced monitoring and compliance certification programs under section 7414(a)(3)
of this title, or any other final action of the Administrator under this chapter (including any denial or disapproval by the Administrator under subchapter I) which
is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence
may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals
1
3
See References in Text note below.
So in original.
32a
for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes
that such action is based on such a determination. Any
petition for review under this subsection shall be filed
within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely on
grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within
sixty days after such grounds arise. The filing of a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of any
otherwise final rule or action shall not affect the finality
of such rule or action for purposes of judicial review nor
extend the time within which a petition for judicial review of such rule or action under this section may be
filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such
rule or action.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to
which review could have been obtained under paragraph
(1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement. Where a final decision by the Administrator defers performance of any
nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time, any
person may challenge the deferral pursuant to paragraph (1).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.