Respondents Brief — Environmental Protection Agency, Petitioner v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2024
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No. 23-1229
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner,
v.
CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, LLC, ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
SUPPORTING PETITIONER
DAVID M. LEHN
JAY SCHUFFENHAUER
CESAR AZRAK
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
1401 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 237-2727
dlehn@bsfllp.com
SETH P. WAXMAN
Counsel of Record
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 663-6800
seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com
EVAN M. EZRAY
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
401 East Las Olas Boulevard
Suite 1200
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
(954) 377-4237
Counsel for Petitioners
Counsel for Growth Energy
MATTHEW W. MORRISON
SHELBY L. DYL
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-8036
matthew.morrison
@pillsburylaw.com
Counsel for the Renewable
Fuels Association
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Growth Energy has no parent company and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in Growth Energy.
The Renewable Fuels Association has no parent
company and no publicly held company has a 10% or
greater ownership interest in the Renewable Fuels Association.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .............. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................vi
INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................ 4
A. The Clean Air Act’s Venue Provision ................ 4
B. The Renewable Fuel Program ............................ 5
1.
Annual national volume requirements ............................................................... 5
2.
Small-refinery exemptions ........................... 7
C. EPA’s 2022 Exemption Actions.......................... 9
D. Litigation Challenging The 2022
Exemption Actions ............................................. 13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................... 16
ARGUMENT ..................................................................... 19
I.
SECTION 307(b)(1) MAKES ALL CLEAN AIR
ACT ACTIONS RAISING GENERAL ISSUES
REVIEWABLE IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT ........................ 19
A. Section 307(b)(1) Must Be Interpreted
To Provide Clear And Simple Venue
Rules ..................................................................... 19
B. Section 307(b)(1)’s Text Comprehensively Centralizes In The D.C. Circuit
Review Of All Actions Raising General
Issues .................................................................... 20
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page(s)
C. Section 307(b)(1)’s Legislative History
Confirms That Congress Specifically
Intended That All Actions Raising
General Issues Would Be Reviewable
In The D.C. Circuit ............................................. 26
D. Interpreting §307(b)(1) To Make All
Actions Applying A General Standard
Reviewable In The D.C. Circuit Does
Not Mean All Actions Will Be
Reviewed In The D.C. Circuit .......................... 32
II. THE 2022 EXEMPTION ACTIONS MUST BE
REVIEWED IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT ............................ 34
A. The Integrated 2022 Exemption
Actions Are The Relevant Actions, But
The Unit Of Action Is Irrelevant Here
Anyway ................................................................. 35
B. The 2022 Exemption Actions Are
“Nationally Applicable” ..................................... 36
C. Alternatively, EPA Published Its
(Sound) Finding That The 2022
Exemption Actions Are “Based On A
Determination Of Nationwide Scope Or
Effect” ................................................................... 40
1.
Courts must defer to EPA’s finding
that an action is based on a
determination of nationwide scope
or effect.......................................................... 40
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page(s)
2.
EPA’s finding that the 2022
exemption actions are based on
determinations of nationwide scope
or effect is correct ........................................ 43
CONCLUSION ................................................................. 48
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Alaska
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) ....... 18, 42
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
v. EPA, 937 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................. 8, 37
Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d
691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................................5-6, 46
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)........... 26
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488
U.S. 204 (1988) ............................................................ 39
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 45 F.4th 380 (D.C.
Cir. 2022) ...................................................................... 32
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703
(6th Cir. 1975).............................................................. 29
Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1
(2015) ............................................................................ 19
Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1
(2012) ............................................................................ 20
Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141
(D.C. Cir. 2015) ........................................................... 37
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ..................................................... 20
Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024) ............... 25
Fry v. Napoleon Community School, 580 U.S.
154 (2017) ..................................................................... 23
Growth Energy v. EPA, 5 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir.
2021) ............................................................................... 6
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578
(1980) ........................................................................ 4, 40
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) ...................... 20
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v.
Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382 (2021) .....6-7, 9
Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107 (11th
Cir. 2024) ...........................................................15-16, 41
Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir.
2018) ............................................................................. 39
Kentucky v. EPA, __ F.4th __, No. 23-3216, 2024
WL 5001991 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) .......................... 33
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.
Ct. 2244 (2024) ..................................................18, 40-41
Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562
(2011) ............................................................................ 26
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
571 U.S. 161 (2014) ..................................................... 19
National Environmental Development Ass’n’s
Clean Air Project v. EPA, 891 F.3d 1041
(D.C. Cir. 2018) ......................................................42-43
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 465 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1972) ............................ 28
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ...............................28-29
Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458
(1980) ............................................................................ 19
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) ............... 47
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024) .............. 40
Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206
(10th Cir. 2020).............................................................. 9
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551
U.S. 47 (2007) .............................................................. 23
Sierra Club v. EPA, 926 F.3d 844 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .....32-33
Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 101
F.4th 871 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ............................................ 8
Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 114
F.4th 693 (D.C. Cir. 2024) .......................................... 45
Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016)................... 41
West Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th 323 (4th Cir.
2024) ............................................................................. 33
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) ................... 21
STATUTORY AND OTHER
LEGISLATIVE MATEIRALS
1 U.S.C. §1 .......................................................................... 47
5 U.S.C.
§551 ............................................................................... 40
§706 ............................................................................... 41
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
42 U.S.C.
§7401 ............................................................................. 25
§7410 ............................................................................. 25
§7411 ............................................................................. 26
§7420 ............................................................................. 26
§7521 ............................................................................. 25
§7545 ......................................................................5-7, 36
§7607 ............. 1, 4-5, 12, 16, 20, 24-25, 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 47
§7675 ............................................................................... 4
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) .................. 27
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
...... 1-3, 12-13, 16-17, 20-21, 23-32, 34-35, 38-43, 47-48
Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) ....................... 5
H.R. 6161 (1977) ................................................................. 30
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-564 (1977) .................................. 30
H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 (1977) ..............................3, 17, 29-30
S. Rep. No. 91-1196 (1970) ...................................... 3, 17, 27
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
REGULATIONS AND OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS
40 C.F.R.
§50.2 .............................................................................. 25
§50.4 .............................................................................. 25
§80.2 ................................................................................ 6
§80.1405 ...................................................................... 6, 8
§80.1407 .......................................................................... 6
§80.1415 .......................................................................... 6
§80.1428 .......................................................................... 7
§80.1429 .......................................................................... 7
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans, 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (May 31, 1972) ............. 28
Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974) ........... 29
Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg.
56,767 (Dec. 30, 1976) ..................................3, 17, 30-31
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 296 (Jan. 5, 2016) ...................... 34
Notice of Opportunity to Comment on Proposed
Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery
Exemptions, 86 Fed. Reg. 70,999 (Dec. 14,
2021) ............................................................................. 10
Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 30, 2021).............. 25
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
April 2022 Denial of Petitions for Small
Refinery Exemptions Under the Renewable
Fuel Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg.
24,300 (Apr. 25, 2022) ........................................... 10, 12
Notice of June 2022 Denial of Petitions for
Small Refinery Exemptions Under the
Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 87
Fed. Reg. 34,873 (June 8, 2022) ...........................11-12
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program:
RFS Annual Rules, 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600
(July 1, 2022).................................................................. 8
Dkt. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0566, https://
www.regulations.gov/docket/EPA-HQOAR-2021-0566 ........................................................... 10
EPA, Renewable Fuel Annual Standards
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuelstandard-program/renewable-fuel-annualstandards (updated June 4, 2024) ............................. 46
EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://
www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reportingand-compliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions (data updated Nov. 21, 2024) ................... 46
OTHER AUTHORITIES
“List of automotive assembly plants in the
United
States,”
Wikipedia,
https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automotive_
assembly_plants_in_the_United_States................. 25
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/ ...................................................21-24, 32, 47
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-1229
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner,
v.
CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, LLC, ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
SUPPORTING PETITIONER
INTRODUCTION
Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act specifies the
proper circuit in which to review any “action” by EPA
under the Act. A petition for review “may be filed only
in” the D.C. Circuit “if” either (a) the action is “nationally applicable” or (b) the action “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such
action the Administrator finds and publishes that such
action is based on such a determination.” 42 U.S.C.
§7607(b)(1). Otherwise, the petition for review “may be
filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
appropriate circuit.” Id.
2
The Renewable Fuel Program (“RFP”) is a Clean
Air Act program that mandates the amount of renewable fuel to be blended annually into the nation’s supply
of gasoline and diesel fuel. In 2022, EPA issued two actions that together denied 105 requests by 36 “small refineries” around the country to be exempted from their
RFP obligations for certain compliance years because of
their alleged economic hardship. In the actions, EPA
adopted, applied, and announced for future use a general
standard comprising (a) a legal requirement that any petitioning refinery must show that its alleged hardship
would be caused by its RFP compliance and (b) a general
presumption that RFP compliance does not cause refineries hardship because refineries can recoup their compliance costs. EPA concluded that no refinery had rebutted its presumption or otherwise showed the requisite causation.
Disappointed refineries sought review of EPA’s exemption actions in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. In the decision below, a divided Fifth Circuit panel held that it was the appropriate venue under §307(b)(1) because the exemption
actions are “neither nationally applicable nor based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
Pet.App.17a. All the other numbered circuits disagreed
and transferred their cases to the D.C. Circuit. Consequently, two circuits—the Fifth and the D.C. Circuits—
rendered judgments on the merits of the general standard EPA used to adjudicate the refineries’ exemption
petitions. Although both circuits vacated EPA’s actions,
they did not fully agree on the reasons, resulting in one
rule for refineries in the Fifth Circuit and another rule
for refineries everywhere else going forward. This split
injects uncertainty into a program that governs the entire nation’s supply of transportation fuel and affects
3
every level of the supply chain, from farmers growing
renewable-fuel feedstocks, to producers of renewable
and petroleum-based fuels, to distributors, retailers, and
consumers of transportation fuel.
This state of affairs is exactly what Congress sought
to avoid when it wrote §307(b)(1). Both the text and legislative history of §307(b)(1) show clearly that Congress
enacted it to ensure “even and consistent national” rules
for EPA and affected actors, S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 41
(1970), by centralizing in the D.C. Circuit review of all
actions involving “generic” or “national issues,” Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767, 56,768:356,769:1 (Dec. 30, 1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 324
(1977).
Thus, §307(b)(1) creates a comprehensive
scheme to ensure that every action raising a general issue for review—that is, an issue that is not limited to an
individual actor or to actors in a single judicial circuit—
is reviewable in the D.C. Circuit. Only such an understanding provides a clear rule by which to achieve Congress’s goal of avoiding duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules, while also avoiding wasteful threshold litigation over the proper venue.
The 2022 exemption actions at issue are reviewable
exclusively in the D.C. Circuit, for three independent
reasons. First, they are “nationally applicable” because
every adjudication of a small-refinery exemption petition
inherently affects, by operation of law, national RFP requirements. Alternatively, the actions are “nationally
applicable” because they prescribed general standards
for adjudicating all pending and future small-refinery
exemption petitions, irrespective of the refinery’s location. And finally, the actions are (and EPA published its
finding that they are) “based on … determination[s] of
nationwide scope or effect”: EPA’s general causation requirement and general presumption of cost recoupment,
4
which apply to all small refineries seeking exemption,
were essential premises on which the exemption denials
rested.
All these reasons hold regardless of whether the relevant “action” is defined as each of the 105 individual exemption denials or as the integrated actions through
which EPA issued those denials. Each disappointed refinery challenged EPA’s general standard for adjudicating small-refinery petitions, reaching partially different
results. That the fragmented litigation resulted in disparate rules between circuits proves that the exemption
actions should have been reviewed only in the D.C. Circuit, as should all future RFP exemption actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Clean Air Act’s Venue Provision
Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act establishes
rules for determining “the proper venue as between the
District of Columbia Circuit and the other Federal Circuits” to review EPA actions under the Act. Harrison
v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 590 (1980); see 42
U.S.C. §7675(k)(1)(C) (extending Act’s venue provision
to actions under American Innovation and Manufacturing Act).
The venue provision establishes three cascading
tests. First, the Act directs that petitions for review of
“any … nationally applicable regulations promulgated,
or final action taken, by the Administrator under [the
Act] may be filed only in” the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C.
§7607(b)(1). Second, the Act prescribes a presumptive
venue for petitions for review of any action that is not
“nationally applicable”: petitions for review of “any
other final action of the Administrator under [the Act]
… which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed
5
only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.” Id. But, third, the Act allows EPA to
rebut the second test’s presumption in certain circumstances: “Notwithstanding the [second test,] a petition
for review of any action referred to in [the second test]
may be filed only in the [D.C. Circuit] if such action is
based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect
and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and
publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” Id.
B. The Renewable Fuel Program
1. Annual national volume requirements
Congress created the Act’s Renewable Fuel Program (“RFP”)—or, as EPA calls it, the “Renewable Fuel
Standard” (“RFS”)—“to ‘move the United States toward greater energy independence and security’ and ‘increase the production of clean renewable fuels.’” Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 697 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.) (quoting Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§§201-202, 121 Stat. 1492, preamble (2007)). The program achieves these goals by “requir[ing] an increasing
amount of renewable fuel to be introduced into the Nation’s transportation fuel supply each year.” Id. at 696;
see 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (B). “Therefore, … [national] demand for renewable fuel [is] a function of the
renewable fuel standards.” Americans for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 710 (quotation cleaned).
Under the RFP, there are annual national volume
requirements for four categories of renewable fuel.
Americans for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 697-698, 701.
EPA must “translat[e] the[se] annual volume requirements into ‘percentage standards,’” which “represent
the percentage of transportation fuel introduced into
commerce that must consist of renewable fuel.” Id. at
6
699; see §7545(o)(3)(B)(i)-(ii); 40 C.F.R. §80.1405(c). That
is, the percentage standards roughly equal the national
mandated renewable-fuel volumes divided by the total
national volume of gasoline and diesel fuel that EPA projects will be used in the relevant year. The Act charges
EPA with establishing the percentage standards before
the relevant year begins. §7545(o)(2)(B)(ii), (3)(B)(i).
EPA has designated refineries and importers of petroleum-based gasoline and diesel fuel as the “obligated
parties” that must comply with the RFP’s percentage
standards. 40 C.F.R. §80.2; see §7545(o)(2)(A)(iii),
(3)(B)(ii). Obligated parties “must ensure” that the required volumes of renewable fuel are used. Americans
for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 697. Although there are
myriad obligated parties, there is only one percentage
standard for each category of renewable fuel.
§7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(III). “The percentage standards inform each obligated party of how much [of each category
of] renewable fuel it must introduce into U.S. commerce
based on the volumes of fossil-based gasoline or diesel it
imports or produces.” Americans for Clean Energy, 864
F.3d at 699; see 40 C.F.R. §80.1407(a). “In other words,
the EPA estimates what percentage of the overall fuel
supply each renewable-fuel [category] should constitute
and then requires each obligated party to replicate those
percentages on an individual basis.” Growth Energy v.
EPA, 5 F.4th 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
EPA “polices these mandates with a system of credits.” HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382, 386 (2021); see
§7545(o)(5). “Each credit”—called a RIN—“represents
the blending of [an ethanol-equivalent gallon] of renewable fuel” into gasoline or diesel fuel. HollyFrontier, 594
U.S. at 386; see 40 C.F.R. §80.1415. “A refinery that
blends renewables may either ‘retire’ the credits it has
7
earned (i.e., use them) to satisfy its own RFP volume obligation—or sell those credits to a different [obligated
party] that needs them.” HollyFrontier, 594 U.S. at 386;
see 40 C.F.R. §§80.1428-80.1429.
To illustrate with a simplified example: If the required national renewable-fuel volume for 2025 is 10 billion gallons and the total projected transportation-fuel
use for 2025 is 100 billion gallons, EPA would set the
2025 percentage standard at 10%. Then, if an obligated
party introduced 5 million gallons of transportation fuel
into commerce during 2025, its RFP obligation would be
500,000 gallons of renewable fuel, which it would satisfy
by blending that amount of renewable fuel into its gasoline and diesel, buying that number of RINs in the market, or doing a mix of both.
2. Small-refinery exemptions
Congress allowed “small refineries”—refineries
whose “throughput” is below a specified level,
§7545(o)(1)(K)—to be exempted from their RFP obligations under limited circumstances. Relevant here, individual small refineries may “petition” EPA for an exemption (technically, for an extension of their prior exemption) by showing that they “would be subject to a
disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply with” their RFP obligations. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii),
(B)(i).
Although small-refinery exemptions (“SREs”) are
granted to individual small refineries, they affect RFP
obligations nationally by operation of law. Under EPA’s
formula for computing the annual percentage standards
that apply to all non-exempt obligated parties, EPA accounts for small-refinery exemptions to a certain extent:
when setting the standards for a given year, EPA “increas[es] the [percentage] standards on [all] non-exempt
8
obligated parties” for that year by the amount needed to
offset all exemptions that either were already granted
for that year or are projected to be granted for that year.
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: RFS Annual Rules, 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600, 39,632:2 (July 1, 2022);
see Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 101 F.4th
871, 890-892 (D.C. Cir. 2024); 40 C.F.R. §80.1405(c).
EPA does not adjust the percentage standards to account for exemptions to the extent they exceed EPA’s
projection of exemptions for a given year. For example,
EPA (explicitly or implicitly) projected zero exemptions
for compliance years 2016-2022, see 87 Fed. Reg. at
39,633, 39,632:1, so if EPA eventually grants an exemption for one of those years, the exemption will not be accounted for in annual percentage standards. Whenever
EPA does not adjust the percentage standards to account for an exemption, the exemption “hinder[s] the
achievement of the applicable renewable-fuel volumes
because [the exemption] artificially inflate[s] the denominator—the nation’s total supply of petroleum-based
transportation fuel—and thereby reduce[s] the percentage standards applied to nonexempt refiners and importers.” Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 881. In other
words, exemptions that are not accounted for in the percentage standards lower the nationally required volume
of renewable fuel, creating a “renewable-fuel shortfall.”
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v.
EPA, 937 F.3d 559, 571, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
In short, every individual small-refinery exemption
adjudication automatically affects RFP obligations nationally: accounted-for exemptions increase the RFP obligations of all non-exempt obligated parties nationally,
whereas unaccounted-for exemptions reduce the nationally required volume of renewable-fuel use.
9
C. EPA’s 2022 Exemption Actions
In 2017 and 2018, EPA granted 54 exemptions for
the 2016 and 2017 compliance years, covering about 2.6
billion gallons of renewable fuel. Renewable Fuels Ass’n
v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1225-1226 (10th Cir. 2020). Representatives of the renewable-fuels industry challenged
three of those exemptions in the Tenth Circuit. Id. at
1226. That court held that the exemptions were invalid
for three reasons. First, the refineries were ineligible
because they had not been continuously exempt through
all prior years of the RFP. Id. at 1245-1249. Second,
EPA erroneously interpreted the statute not to require
that the refinery’s RFP “compliance … be the cause of
any disproportionate hardship”; instead, EPA allowed
exemptions based on hardship suffered “as a result of
something other than RF[P] compliance” that would exist regardless of the RFP. Id. at 1253-1254. Third, EPA
“ignored or failed to provide reasons for deviating from
[its own] prior studies showing that RIN purchase costs
do not disproportionately harm refineries” because refineries can “recover the cost of the RINs they purchase
by passing that cost along in the form of higher prices for
the petroleum based fuels they produce.” Id. at 12541257 (quotation cleaned). This Court subsequently rejected the Tenth Circuit’s first ground—the “continuity
requirement”—but did not opine on the other two
grounds. HollyFrontier, 594 U.S. at 389-390.
Meanwhile, in 2019, EPA adjudicated 36 small-refinery exemption petitions for 2018, granting 31 and denying 5 under the same flawed approach it had applied in
granting the 2016-2017 exemptions. Pet.App.48a, 177a
n.248, 185a. Representatives of the renewable-fuels industry challenged those denials in the D.C. Circuit.
Pet.App.7a; Pet.App.48a, 78a.
10
In December 2021, EPA publicly noticed and solicited comment on a proposal “to deny all pending SRE
petitions,” including the three 2016-2017 exemptions remanded by the Tenth Circuit, under a new approach that
corrected the two remaining errors identified by the
Tenth Circuit. Notice of Opportunity to Comment on
Proposed Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery Exemptions, 86 Fed. Reg. 70,999, 71,000:2 (Dec. 14, 2021);
see Pet.App.48a-49a & n.4, 52a, 184a.
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit remanded the 36
exemptions before it to EPA for reconsideration in light
of the decisions by this Court and the Tenth Circuit, and
in light of EPA’s proposed denial of all pending exemptions under a revised approach. Pet.App.78a. Whereas
the Tenth Circuit had not imposed a deadline on EPA’s
reconsideration, the D.C. Circuit gave EPA until April
7, 2022, to issue new decisions on the exemptions it was
remanding. Pet.App.78a. In January 2022, EPA announced that it was “expanding” its proposed denial “to
include” those 36 exemption petitions. Pet.App.48a n.1.
All administrative materials and comments relating to
all the proposed denials were maintained on a single administrative docket. See Dkt. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR2021-05661; see Pet.App.53a.
After receiving comments from the petitioning refineries and other interested parties, EPA finalized its
proposal in two parts. On April 7, 2022—the D.C. Circuit’s deadline—EPA issued and published notice of a final action denying the 36 exemption petitions for 2018
that had been remanded by the D.C. Circuit and added
to the administrative proceeding in January 2022.
Pet.App.190a, 193a; April 2022 Denial of Petitions for
Small Refinery Exemptions Under the Renewable Fuel
1
https://www.regulations.gov/docket/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0566.
11
Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,300 (Apr. 25, 2022).
In June 2022, EPA issued and published notice of a final
action denying the remaining 69 pending exemption petitions before it, including the three remanded by the
Tenth Circuit. Pet.App.45a, 48a; Notice of June 2022 Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery Exemptions Under
the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg.
34,873 (June 8, 2022).
The two actions together denied all pending exemption petitions based on a “change in approach” that corrected the two remaining errors identified by the Tenth
Circuit. Pet.App.80a-85a; Pet.App.224a-228a. First,
EPA interpreted the Act to require that a petitioning
“small refinery … demonstrate a direct causal relationship between its RF[P] compliance costs and the [disproportionate economic hardship] it alleges”; “financial difficulties” that are “unrelated” to compliance “will not
satisfy” the exemption standard anymore. Pet.App.80a;
see also Pet.App.102; Pet.App.224a, 244a. Second, EPA
determined, based on old and new studies of the national
RIN market and of various fuel markets, that small refineries, irrespective of their location, “have the ability
… to pass through their RIN costs.” Pet.App.154a; see
also Pet.App.66a-68a, 82a, 106a-109a, 167a-168a;
Pet.App.210a-212a, 226a, 248a-251a, 296a, 308a-310a; see
also C.A.J.A.00081; C.A.J.A.0227. Accordingly, EPA
found that, as a general matter, RFP compliance “cannot
cause” small refineries to incur any net compliance costs,
let alone the requisite disproportionate economic hardship. Pet.App.68a, 83a-84a; see also Pet.App.212a, 227a228a.
EPA invited the petitioning small refineries to rebut
its general presumption that they incur no net RFP compliance costs, by submitting refinery-specific evidence
showing that in fact they are unable to recoup their RIN
12
costs or that they otherwise do incur net compliance
costs (and in turn that those costs inflict disproportionate economic hardship). Pet.App.54a-55a; Pet.App.198a199a. After reviewing all the evidence submitted by
each refinery, EPA concluded that none had rebutted its
presumption that they can recoup their RFP compliance
costs. Pet.App.55a, 57a, 84a, 107a-110a, 162a-163a;
Pet.App.199a, 201a, 228a, 249a-252a, 304a-305a.
In EPA’s published notices of the final exemption
actions, EPA stated that the actions are “nationally applicable” and found that they are “based on a determination of ‘nationwide scope or effect.’” 87 Fed. Reg. at
24,300:3-24,301:1 (quoting §7607(b)(1)); 87 Fed. Reg. at
34,874:2. The notice for the April denial explained that
it “denies petitions for exemptions … for over 30 small
refineries across the country and applies to small refineries located within 18 states in 7 of the 10 EPA regions
and in 8 different Federal judicial circuits.” 87 Fed. Reg.
at 24,301:1. The notice for the June denial included the
same statement, except that it covered small refineries
located in 15 States. 87 Fed. Reg. at 34,874:2. The notices added that the exemption actions are “based on
EPA’s revised interpretation of the relevant [statutory]
provisions [requiring causation] and the RIN discount
and RIN cost passthrough principles that are applicable
to all small refineries no matter the location or market in
which they operate,” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,301:1; 87 Fed.
Reg. at 34,874:2-3, i.e., based on the presumption that
“all refineries” can “recover their RIN costs through the
market price of the fuel they produce” because those
prices “increase[] to reflect the cost of the RIN,” 87 Fed.
Reg. at 24,300:3; 87 Fed. Reg. at 34,874:1. Therefore, under §307(b)(1), the notices stated, “petitions for judicial
review of th[ese] action[s] must be filed in” the D.C. Circuit. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,301:1; 87 Fed. Reg. at 34,874:3.
13
D. Litigation Challenging The 2022 Exemption
Actions
1. Numerous small refineries filed petitions for review in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Many of the petitions filed in
numbered circuits were duplicative of ones filed in the
D.C. Circuit. In all the cases filed in numbered circuits,
EPA moved under §307(b)(1) to dismiss or transfer to
the D.C. Circuit.
Motions panels in the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits concluded that the D.C. Circuit was the
only proper venue for reviewing the 2022 exemption actions and therefore granted EPA’s motions.2 Motions
panels in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits deferred the
venue issue to merits panels.
2
See Order, American Refining Group v. EPA, No. 22-1991,
ECF #23 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2022); Order, American Refining Group v.
EPA, No. 22-2435, ECF #20 (3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2022); Order, Countrymark Refining and Logistics, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-1878, ECF
#13 (7th Cir. July 20, 2022); Order, Countrymark Refining and Logistics, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-2368, ECF #9 (7th Cir. Sept. 8, 2022);
Order, Calumet Montana Refining, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70124,
ECF #16 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Par Hawaii Refining, LLC
v. EPA, No. 22-70125, ECF #16 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, San
Joaquin Refining Co., Inc. v. EPA, No. 22-70126, ECF #16 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Kern Oil & Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 2270128, ECF #13 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Calumet Montana
Refining, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70166, ECF #14 (9th Cir. Oct. 25,
2022); Order, Par Hawaii Refining, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70168,
ECF #13 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, San Joaquin Refining Co.,
Inc. v. EPA, No. 22-70170, ECF #12 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order,
Kern Oil & Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-70172, ECF #14 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-9538,
ECF #10935421 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 2022); Order, Wyoming Refining
Co. v. EPA, No. 22-9553, ECF #10939881 (10th Cir. Sept. 12, 2022).
14
2. In the decision below, a divided Fifth Circuit
disagreed with the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits, holding that the D.C. Circuit is not the exclusive venue for reviewing the 2022 exemption actions because the actions are “neither nationally applicable nor
based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
Pet.App.17a.
The Fifth Circuit majority first determined that the
2022 exemption actions are not nationally applicable. The
majority declared that “the legal effect—… not the practical effect—of an agency action … determines whether
that action is ‘nationally applicable.” Pet.App.11a. The
majority considered the 2022 actions’ legal effect not to be
national because the actions’ “new approach” does not
govern “all” small refineries since (the court said) that approach does not “bind[] EPA in any future adjudication”
of exemption petitions. Pet.App.12a.
The majority also concluded that the 2022 actions
are not based on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect. Giving EPA “no deference,” the majority determined that EPA’s finding to the contrary was not “accura[te].” Pet.App.13a (emphasis omitted), 15a. The
majority acknowledged that the actions are partially
“based on factors and facts common to each petition”—
i.e., EPA’s causation requirement and general cost-recoupment presumption—but emphasized that those
common factors were not alone “a sufficient basis to adjudicate [the] exemption petitions.” Pet.App.15a. To
deny each petition, EPA had to determine whether each
individual refinery had rebutted the general presumption that they can avoid net compliance cost based on
“refinery-specific” evidence. Id.
15
Proceeding to the merits, the majority granted the
petitions for review, vacated the 2022 exemption actions,
and remanded to EPA. Pet.App.3a.
Dissenting, Judge Higginbotham concluded that the
D.C. Circuit is the only proper venue. First, he explained that the question of “national applicability”
should be “measure[d] … by looking to the location of the
persons or enterprises that the action regulates.”
Pet.App.37a (quotation cleaned). The 2022 exemption
actions “inescapably” satisfy this standard because
“they apply one consistent statutory interpretation and
economic analysis to thirty-six small refineries, located
in eighteen different states, in the geographical boundaries of eight different circuit courts.” Pet.App.37a-38a.
Alternatively, Judge Higginbotham would have held,
the actions are based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect. He acknowledged that the actions are
partially based on refinery-specific determinations, but
he explained that, while “there can be multiple determinations that influence an agency’s actions,” “what matters” is whether some “core determinations” have nationwide scope or effect. Pet.App.42a. “[T]he two determinations at the core of the Denial Actions”—again, EPA’s
causation requirement and its general cost-recoupment
finding—have nationwide scope and effect because they
“appl[y] to all small refineries no matter the location or
market in which they operate.” Pet.App.41a-42a.
3. Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit aligned
with the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and
held that the D.C. Circuit is the only proper venue for
reviewing the 2022 exemption actions. See Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107, 1113 (11th Cir. 2024). The
Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
16
analysis, instead finding “Judge Higginbotham’s dissent
… more persuasive.” Id. at 1112.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Congress enacted §307(b)(1) to avoid duplicative
litigation and inconsistent rules for EPA and regulated
actors. Accordingly, §307(b)(1) provides a comprehensive
system to ensure that all Clean Air Act actions defining
general standards or otherwise raising general issues are
reviewable in the D.C. Circuit.
A. Section 307(b)(1) provides that a petition for review “may be filed only in” the D.C. Circuit “if” either (a)
the action is “nationally applicable” or (b) the action “is
based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect
and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and
publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1). That text makes evident the
core objective of avoiding duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules, and it achieves that by comprehensively
centralizing in the D.C. Circuit review of all actions defining general standards or otherwise raising general issues.
This broad, simple venue rule also minimizes wasteful
threshold litigation.
The ordinary meaning of “applicable” broadly covers
the legal and practical reach of an action. The ordinary
meaning of “scope or effect” is similarly broad. The principal difference between the two tests is this: whereas
the “nationally applicable” test turns on the reach of the
standard or decision that the action establishes, the
“based on a determination” test turns on the reach of the
action’s essential premises. Thus, as venue rules that
centralize review of certain cases, the two tests must be
understood as complementary ways to identify actions
subject to challenge, or whose elements are subject to
17
challenge, in multiple circuits because, without centralized review, such actions could generate duplicative litigation and inconsistent outcomes. Accordingly, “nationally” and “nationwide” mean “general,” “irrespective of
location,” or “across circuits.”
This interpretation is confirmed by other aspects of
§307(b)(1). For example, the Act contemplates decentralized review of an action only in “the appropriate circuit,” indicating that there would be a single appropriate
local circuit—which cannot be the case for actions raising general issues.
B. This interpretation is also compelled by the legislative history. Congress’s aim was to send to the D.C.
Circuit those actions that were “national in scope” and
therefore “require[d] even and consistent national application,” while allowing local review of actions that “r[a]n
only to one air quality control region.” S. Rep. No. 911196, at 41 (1970). Congress explained that actions “involv[ing] generic issues that apply to EPA’s actions nationwide” are “virtually identical to [the] promulgation
of ‘national standards,’” and all such actions can be “reviewed in the D.C. Circuit” under the “based on a determination” test. Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed.
Reg. 56,767, 56,768:3-56,789:1 (Dec. 30, 1976) (quotation
cleaned). Congress added that a determination is “nationwide” if it “has scope or effect beyond a single judicial circuit.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 324 (1977).
C. Still, this interpretation of §307(b)(1) recognize
that there are various circumstances in which an action
applying a general standard will not be reviewed in the
D.C. Circuit.
II. For several independent reasons, the 2022 exemption actions must be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.
18
A. The relevant unit of administrative action is the
integrated exemption action as EPA issued it, not EPA’s
denial of each individual exemption petition. However,
D.C. Circuit review was required here regardless of how
the action is defined.
B. The exemption actions are “nationally applicable” for two separate reasons. First, every decision on a
small-refinery exemption petition is inherently nationally applicable because every such decision inherently
affects, by operation of law, the level of the national RFP
requirements and further affects renewable-fuel purchases and RIN purchases around the country.
Second, the exemption actions are nationally applicable because they—whether defined collectively or individually—expressly “adopt[ed]” a new general standard for adjudicating all pending and future exemption
petitions. Pet.App.55a.
C. Alternatively, the exemption actions are also
“based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
1. The APA “mandate[s] that judicial review of”
EPA’s finding to that effect “be deferential,” Loper
Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2261
(2024), and nothing in the Clean Air Act displaces that
“default standard,” Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496 (2004).
2. Even if the finding is reviewed de novo, however,
it is correct. The exemption actions—whether defined
collectively or individually—expressly rested on determinations of nationwide scope or effect: EPA’s general
standard for adjudicating small-refinery exemptions, including both the causation requirement and the presumption of cost recoupment. This conclusion is also proved by
19
the fact that the actions precipitated lawsuits in numerous circuits all challenging that general standard.
ARGUMENT
I.
SECTION 307(b)(1) MAKES ALL CLEAN AIR ACT ACTIONS RAISING GENERAL ISSUES REVIEWABLE IN THE
D.C. CIRCUIT
Congress enacted §307(b)(1) to ensure consistent national rules for EPA and affected actors and to take advantage of the D.C. Circuit’s administrative-law expertise, by centralizing in the D.C. Circuit review of all actions that define general standards or otherwise raise
general issues that could be challenged by actors across
judicial circuits. Section 307(b)(1) creates a comprehensive system to ensure that such actions do not slip
through the cracks. This broad, simple venue rule both
avoids duplicative litigation and inconsistent results, and
also minimizes wasteful threshold litigation over the
proper forum.
A. Section 307(b)(1) Must Be Interpreted To
Provide Clear And Simple Venue Rules
“It is of first importance to have a [rule] … that will
not invite extensive threshold litigation” over the proper
court to hear a case. Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446
U.S. 458, 464 n.13 (1980) (quotation cleaned); see, e.g., Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 11 (2015) (noting “our rule favoring clear boundaries in the interpretation of jurisdictional statutes”); Mississippi ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 172-173
(2014). “[L]itigation over whether the case is in the right
court is essentially a waste of time and resources.” Navarro Savings, 446 U.S. at 464 n.13 (quotation cleaned).
Unclear venue rules also “encourage gamesmanship,”
while undermining the “predictability” that “benefits
20
plaintiffs deciding [where] to file suit.” Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95 (2010). In short, unclear venue
rules hurt both the parties in any given case and the judicial system itself. See Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 15 (2012) (rejecting proposed test because it would “deprive the aggrieved employee, the
[agency], and the district court of clear guidance about
the proper forum for the employee’s claims at the outset
of the case”).
Therefore, the Court should interpret §307(b)(1) to
provide simple rules yielding clear answers in as many
situations as possible. An interpretation that relies on
vague tests or creates technical gaps will unnecessarily
invite confusion and controversy, leading to the kind of
wasteful litigation the Court has warned against.
B. Section 307(b)(1)’s Text Comprehensively
Centralizes In The D.C. Circuit Review Of All
Actions Raising General Issues
1. Section 307(b)(1) declares that the D.C. Circuit
is the exclusive forum for reviewing “any” action taken
by EPA under the Clean Air Act if (i) the action is “nationally applicable” or (ii) the action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and EPA makes
and publishes a finding that the action is based on such a
determination. §7607(b)(1). Section 307(b)(1) declares
that “the appropriate circuit” is the forum only for EPA
actions that does not satisfy either of those tests. Id.
“Viewing [§307(b)(1)] as a whole, it is evident” that
§307(b)(1)’s “core objective[],” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000), is to
avoid duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules for
EPA and regulated actors. To achieve this objective, an
action must be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit whenever
21
it invites challenge by parties regardless of their location
or in multiple circuits.
Thus, §307(b)(1) sets out two broad, complementary
tests for D.C. Circuit review. The “nationally applicable” test sends to the D.C. Circuit every action that establishes, revises, or reaffirms a general standard, because that action could be challenged by affected actors
regardless of their location. The “based on a nationwide
determination or effect” test sends to the D.C. Circuit
every action that rests on a general premise where the
validity or terms of that premise could be raised by actors around the country (provided that EPA makes and
publishes a finding that the action has such a basis). In
either of these circumstances, local review would invite
duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules for EPA and
regulated actors. Only actions that raise no general issues for which EPA desires uniformity must be reviewed in the relevant local circuit.
2. This simple, broad interpretation is supported
by careful examination of the text of §307(b)(1), whose
“words … must be read in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (quotation
cleaned)
First, consider the “nationally applicable” test. “Applicable” means “capable of or suitable for being applied,”3 and “apply” in turn means “to put into operation
or effect” (transitive) and “to have relevance or a valid
connection” (intransitive).4 Thus, an action is “nationally
3
“Applicable,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/applicable/.
4
“Apply,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apply/.
22
applicable” if the standard or decision it announces regulates actors nationally. The court below understood
this to refer to the action’s “legal effect,” i.e., the action’s
effect on “legal rights, duties, or obligations.”
Pet.App.11a-12a. That interpretation is incomplete in
two respects. First, the court limited the assessment of
legal effect to the parties that had challenged the action,
failing to fully account for the action’s legal effect on
other actors. Second, as just noted, the ordinary meaning of “applicable” also encompasses “relevance” and
“connection,” and therefore an action is also “nationally
applicable” if its rule or decision is significant for, or affects the interests of, parties that could challenge the action nationally.
Next, consider the “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” test. “Scope” means “extent of
treatment, activity, or influence” and “range of operation,”5 and “effect” means “something that inevitably follows an antecedent,” “the quality or state of being operative,” “power to bring about a result,” and “a goal or
purpose.”6 One might say that “scope” focuses on the
actor or conduct that is the target of the determination,
whereas “effect” focuses on the determination’s consequences for that actor or conduct. But that understanding would shortchange the breadth of the ordinary
meaning of both “scope” and “effect.” In context, “scope
or effect” is properly understood as comprehensively
covering all aspects of a determination, legal or practical.
5
“Scope,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scope/.
6
“Effect,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effect/.
23
It is clear, therefore, that both “applicable” and
“scope or effect” are capacious and similar. The principal
difference between the two tests stems from the second
test’s use of the phrase “based on a determination of”:
under the first test, the action itself must be national,
whereas under the second test, what must be national is
the determination on which the action is based. In context, the phrase “based on a determination of” identifies
something that is a “sine qua non” of the action, Fry v.
Napoleon Community School, 580 U.S. 154, 167 (2017),
i.e., “something absolutely indispensable or essential” to
the action.7 See also Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63 (2007) (“in common talk, the phrase
‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal relationship” (quotation cleaned)). Consequently, the “based on a determination” test turns on the geographic scope or effect of
the action’s essential premises.
All these interpretations must be understood more
concretely in the broader context of §307(b)(1)’s role as
a rule prescribing the appropriate venue for litigating
the validity of agency actions. The tests are ways to
identify the potential for challenge or potential issues a
challenger could raise in the lawsuit, such as the validity
of a national standard or the validity of a statutory interpretation or national policy on which a specific action is
premised. And because the tests prescribe a central
venue for litigating certain cases, they must further be
understood as identifying situations where fragmented
review in local circuits could lead to duplicative litigation
and inconsistent rules for affected actors and for EPA.
7
“Sine qua non,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sine%20
qua%20non/.
24
This understanding of §307(b)(1) informs the meaning of “nationally” and “nationwide.” The definition of
“national” is “of or relating to a nation,”8 and similarly
the definition of “nationwide” is “extending throughout
a nation.”9 In context, they mean “general,” i.e., “irrespective of location” or “across circuits,” reflecting the
circumstances in which local review of an action could
generate duplicative litigation and inconsistent results
regarding an issue.
In short, the two tests for D.C. Circuit review together comprehensively identify actions that define general standards or otherwise raise general issues for review, rather than actions that raise issues limited to a
single actor or location.
This interpretation is confirmed by §307(b)(1)’s directive that a “locally or regionally applicable” action is
presumptively reviewable “only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.”
§7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). Congress’s use of the definite article (“the”) indicates that actions must be reviewed in a local circuit only if there is only one appropriate local circuit. And there can be a single appropriate local circuit only if the action raises issues limited to
a single actor or a single circuit. If the action raises a
general issue that could be raised by aggrieved parties
in multiple circuits, then local review in multiple “appropriate” circuits could result in duplicative litigation and
inconsistent rules. Had Congress wanted to tolerate
8
“National,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/national.
9
“Nationwide,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation
wide.
25
fragmented review of common, general issues in multiple circuits, it could easily have said that. Indeed, Congress did so in the preceding subsection of §307, where
it stated that “the district court … for any district in
which such person is found or resides … shall have jurisdiction” to issue certain orders. §7607(a).
Section 307(b)(1)’s express categorization of specific
actions as “nationally” or “locally or regionally” applicable also reinforces this interpretation. See Fischer v.
United States, 603 U.S. 480, 487 (2024) (“under the …
canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective term at
the end of a list of specific items is typically controlled
and defined by reference to the specific classes … that
precede it” (quotation cleaned)). The Act identifies as
“nationally applicable” those actions that “promulgat[e]”
a “standard,” “rule,” “control or prohibition”—all actions
that establish a standard or decision affecting parties
generally, irrespective of their specific location.
§7607(b)(1). For example, the Act deems “nationally applicable” the “national … ambient air quality standard[s]” (“NAAQS”), §7607(b)(1), which establish minimum air quality requirements that must be met in every
State. See 40 C.F.R. §§50.2(d), 50.4; 42 U.S.C. §§7401,
7410(a). The Act also deems “nationally applicable” limits on greenhouse-gas emissions for all manufacturers of
light-duty vehicles, see 42 U.S.C. §7521; Revised 2023
and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434, 74,434,
74,438, 74,439 (Dec. 30, 2021), even though the regulated
vehicle manufacturers are based in and produce vehicles
in a small minority of States.10
10
See “List of automotive assembly plants in the United
States,” Wikipedia (identifying about 17 automakers with
26
In contrast, the Act identifies as “locally or regionally applicable” actions that “approv[e] or promulgat[e]”
a state implementation plan (“SIP”) for a NAAQS, actions that grant or deny particular types of waivers, and
actions that impose certain penalties. §307(b)(1). Each
of these actions prescribes a standard or rule for a single
actor or location, namely, the State that proposed the
plan or the “person” who requested the waiver for an
emissions “source” or whose “source” violated applicable
emissions limits, see 42 U.S.C. §§7411(j), 7420(a)(2)(A).
Thus, comparison of this list of “locally or regionally applicable” actions to the list of “nationally applicable” actions illustrates that centralized review in the D.C. Circuit is warranted where the action is general, whereas
review in the local circuit is warranted where the action
is tied uniquely to a particular actor or location.
C. Section 307(b)(1)’s Legislative History Confirms That Congress Specifically Intended
That All Actions Raising General Issues Would
Be Reviewable In The D.C. Circuit
If §307(b)(1)’s text were ambiguous in any relevant
way, its legislative history would “clear [that] up.”
Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011);
accord Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 674
(2020); id. at 721 (Alito, J., dissenting). Consistent with
the textual interpretation just described, the history
shows that Congress designed §307(b)(1) to ensure that
any action defining a standard or otherwise raising an
issue affecting actors regardless of their location would
be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit to avoid duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules under the Act and to take
headquarters in 7 States and assembly plants in 17 States), https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automotive_assembly_plants_in_the
_United_States.
27
advantage of the D.C. Circuit’s administrative-law expertise.
1. As initially enacted in 1970, §307(b)(1) lacked
the terms “nationally applicable,” “locally or regionally
applicable,” and “based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect.” Instead, the provision specified the
venue for each type of action. Section 307(b)(1) required
that the D.C. Circuit review any “action … promulgating
any national primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard, any emission standard under section 112, any
standard of performance under section 111, any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to
be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under section 202(b)(5), any control or prohibition
under section 211, or any standard under section 2931.”
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (hereinafter “1970
Amendments”), Pub. L. No. 91-604, §12(a), 84 Stat. 1676,
1708 (1970). And §307(b)(1) provided that “the appropriate circuit” would review any “action in approving or
promulgating any implementation plan under section
110 or section 111(d).” Id.
The statute’s structure reflected Congress’ expectations about which actions would raise general issues and
thus require uniform disposition. The types of actions
designated for exclusive D.C. Circuit review were “national in scope” and therefore “require[d] even and consistent national application.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 41
(1970). Actions to be reviewed in “the appropriate circuit,” in contrast, “r[a]n only to one air quality control
region.” Id. (emphasis added).
Questions soon emerged regarding how to accomplish Congress’ goal of centralized review given the statute’s limited language. In 1972, various environmental
groups challenged an EPA action approving and
28
promulgating numerous States’ proposed SIPs together.
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
465 F.2d 492, 493 (1st Cir. 1972) (addressing Approval
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 37 Fed.
Reg. 10,842 (May 31, 1972)). The approvals undisputedly
had to be challenged in “the appropriate circuit” under
§307(b)(1) as it stood then. Id. at 493-494. Accordingly,
the petitioners sued in every regional circuit. Id. at 493.
But because they challenged “administrative policy positions which were applied nationally and uniformly” to
render the approvals, they argued that the D.C. Circuit
was “the appropriate” circuit. Id.
The First Circuit agreed, holding that the D.C. Circuit was the appropriate circuit because the lawsuit involved “the automatic application of standard, nationwide guidelines to all plans simultaneously [that] preordains wholesale approvals or extensions,” rather than
“particularistic attention … given to each plan devised
for one air quality control region.” Id. at 494. The court
emphasized: “The legal issues raised by petitioners in
the First Circuit seem to be identical with those raised
in every other circuit. The parties are the same. There
do not appear to be factual questions unique to each circuit.” Id. at 495. Therefore, localized adjudication would
create “possible inconsistent and delayed results on the
merits.” Id.
The D.C. Circuit then reached the same conclusion
because the contrary conclusion “would produce some
anomalous results” for two reasons. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 969 (D.C. Cir.
1973). First, some of the challenged “implementation
plans … cover[ed] jurisdictions falling within several circuits.” Id. Second, “all of these cases raise[d] identical
legal issues. None of these issues involve[d] facts or laws
peculiar to any one jurisdiction; rather, all concern[ed]
29
uniform determinations of nationwide effect made by the
Administrator.” Id. at 970. Therefore, centralized review
in the D.C. Circuit served the “strong congressional concern for coordinated decision-making.” Id. at 969-970.
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
First and D.C. Circuits and accordingly applied “a similar analysis” to an action that “amended state implementation plans” and therefore “plainly” had to be reviewed
in “the appropriate circuit” under §307(b)(1). Dayton
Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703, 706, 708 (6th
Cir. 1975) (addressing Prevention of Significant Air
Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5,
1974)). Because the challenged action was “the product
of a unitary rule-making proceeding” and had “the effect
of amending every state’s air quality implementation
plan in precisely the same way”—and thus was “national
in scope and appl[ied] uniformly throughout the country”—the court recognized that review in each “local circuit” would create “a substantial risk of seriously inconsistent results and an inevitable delay.” Id. at 707-708.
Therefore, the court held that the D.C. Circuit was the
appropriate circuit. Id. at 708.
2. In 1977, Congress “clarif[ied]” §307(b)(1)’s language to provide a more direct path to the result reached
by the First, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits in the Natural Resources and Dayton Power cases, namely, centralized review in the D.C. Circuit of actions raising general issues.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 323 (1977).
Congress’s 1977 amendments gave §307(b)(1) its
current form. First, Congress expanded the range of actions for which review in the D.C. Circuit is mandatory
by adding “any other nationally applicable regulations
promulgated, or final action taken, by” EPA. Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §304(c)(1),
30
91 Stat. 685, 776 (1977). Second, Congress correspondingly expanded the range of actions for which review in
“the appropriate circuit” is presumptively mandatory by
adding “any other final action … which is locally or regionally applicable.” Id. §304(c)(2). Finally, Congress
added the third venue test, under which the second
test’s presumption would be rebutted in favor of the
D.C. Circuit “if [the] action is based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action
the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is
based on such a determination.” Id. §304(c)(4).
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, which prepared the amendments, see Pub. L.
No. 95-95, §305(c)(1), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (enacting H.R.
6161); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-564, at 140 (1977) (conference committee adopted House version), explained that
a determination is “nationwide” if it “has scope or effect
beyond a single judicial circuit.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294,
at 324 (emphasis added). That understanding reflects
§307(b)(1)’s fundamental purpose of avoiding duplicative
litigation and inconsistent rules. Because an underlying
determination whose scope or effect spans multiple circuits could aggrieve parties in those multiple circuits,
the revised statute ensures that review of such determinations can be centralized.
The Committee also stated that “[i]n adopting”
these amendments, it “concur[red] … with the comments, concerns, and recommendation contained in item
No. 1 of the separate statement of G. William Frick”—
then EPA’s general counsel—that “accompanied the Administrative Conference’s views.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294,
at 324. Mr. Frick recommended that §307(b)(1) be
amended to make clear that “where national issues are
involved they should be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.”
Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767,
31
56,768:3 (Dec. 30, 1976) (quotation cleaned). He observed that although “[c]ases involving” actions like
“permits” and SIP “approval[s] … usually involve issues
peculiar to the affected States,” they “sometimes involve
generic issues that apply to EPA’s actions nationwide,”
i.e., “generic determinations of nationwide scope or effect.” Id. at 56,768:3-56,769:1. “[S]uch actions [are] virtually identical to promulgation of ‘national standards,’”
which should be “reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.” Id. at
56,769:1; see id. 56,768:1 (discussing “national standards”).
As examples of actions involving generic issues or
actions otherwise virtually identical to national standards, which should be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit, Mr.
Frick cited the action approving numerous States’ SIPs
at issue in the Natural Resources cases, through which
EPA had applied a policy nationally and uniformly to
concurrently resolve multiple States’ status. 41 Fed.
Reg. at 56,769:1 & n.1. He noted that “it is possible to
argue that the D.C. Circuit is the ‘appropriate circuit’ for
review of ‘national’ SIP issues,” as the D.C., First, and
Sixth Circuits had already held under §307(b)(1)’s original language. Id. at 56,769:1 & n.3. But the new “based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” test, he
explained, would reinforce Congress’ original “inten[t]”
that “review … of matters on which national uniformity
is desirable” would take place in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at
56,769:1 (quotation cleaned). And, he said, “it ma[de]
sense to centralize review of ‘national’ … issues in the
D.C. Circuit[ to] tak[e] advantage of [that court’s] administrative law expertise and facilitat[e] an orderly development of the basic law under the Act.” Id. at
56,769:1.
32
D. Interpreting §307(b)(1) To Make All Actions
Applying A General Standard Reviewable In
The D.C. Circuit Does Not Mean All Actions
Will Be Reviewed In The D.C. Circuit
In their brief in opposition, respondents argued (at
25-26) that “apply[ing] a uniform standard to similarly
situated regulated parties” cannot suffice to require
D.C. Circuit review under §307(b)(1) because the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) “compel[s] EPA”
to do that “in every action,” and therefore every EPA
action would have to be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.
That argument is substantially overstated.
First, as explained above, the “nationally applicable”
test does not depend on what standard the action rests
on, but rather depends on what standard the action establishes (or revises or reaffirms). Merely “constru[ing]
and appl[ying] nationally applicable provisions … does
not transform a locally applicable action into a nationally
applicable one.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 45 F.4th
380, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2022); see also Sierra Club v. EPA,
926 F.3d 844, 849-850 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Second, applying a uniform standard can but will
not always satisfy the “based on a determination” test.
A “determination” is “the resolving of a question by argument or reasoning” or “the act, process, or result of an
accurate measurement.”11 EPA sometimes applies a
mandatory or settled general standard, e.g., a standard
directly imposed by the Act, a standard conclusively
adopted by the courts as the best reading of the statute,
or a standard for which the Act’s 60-day time bar has
11
“Determination,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determination.
33
expired, see §7607(b)(1). In such cases, the action would
be based not on a determination of the general standard—the selection of the standard would not be up for
debate or judicial review—but rather only on the standard’s rote application.
Third, some EPA actions do not turn on a general
determination at all. For example, EPA has denied proposed SIPs for purely factual reasons specific to the proposing State. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th
323, 328-329 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he circumstances addressed by the EPA were those particular and unique to
West Virginia …. These discussions all focused on the
data particular to West Virginia and the analyses that
West Virginia conducted with respect to those statespecific data.”); Kentucky v. EPA, __ F.4th __, No. 233216, 2024 WL 5001991, at *12 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024)
(“[T]he agency decided that Kentucky’s plan did not satisfy the Good Neighbor Provision due to circumstances
… unique to that plan,” and EPA “would have denied
Kentucky’s plan even if it had allowed Kentucky to use
the 2011 modeling and 1 ppb threshold” (quotation
cleaned)). Such grounds would be sufficient to deny a
proposed SIP, and therefore a SIP denial premised only
on such grounds would not be based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect.
And fourth, even where an action is based on a general determination, the D.C. Circuit is the exclusive
venue to review it only if EPA expressly makes and publishes a finding to that effect. §7607(b)(1). EPA has discretion not to make such a finding and sometimes exercises that prerogative. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 926 F.3d at
849-850. For example, EPA might elect not to make the
requisite finding if it recognizes that the general standard applied is unlikely to be challenged—and thus the
risk of duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules is
34
low—or if it believes that duplicative litigation or inconsistent rules are tolerable or even desirable in the particular context. Compare, e.g., Pet.App.187a n.259 (“In
deciding whether to invoke the exception by making and
publishing a finding that this final action is based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect, the Administrator has also taken into account a number of policy
considerations, including his judgment balancing the
benefit of obtaining the D.C. Circuit’s authoritative centralized review versus allowing development of the issue
in other contexts and the best use of Agency resources.”), with, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 296, 326 (Jan. 5, 2016)
(“some variation” allowed for SIP actions “across EPA
regions” (quotation cleaned)).
II. THE 2022 EXEMPTION ACTIONS MUST BE REVIEWED
IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT
For several independent reasons, §307(b)(1) mandates that the 2022 exemption actions be reviewed exclusively in the D.C. Circuit. First, the actions are nationally applicable because every small-refinery exemption adjudication affects national RFP obligations as a
matter of law, and in turn has consequences for non-exempt obligated parties and renewable-fuel producers
around the country. Second, the actions are nationally
applicable because they announced general standards
for adjudicating all RFP exemption petitions, wherever
the petitioning refinery might be. And third, the actions
are based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect (and EPA properly published a finding saying so)
because EPA’s new general standard—both its causation requirement and its presumption of cost recoupment—was an essential premise of all the exemption denials. All these reasons hold true regardless of whether
the relevant administrative actions are the 105
35
individual exemption denials or the integrated actions
through which those denials were issued.
For all these reasons, the D.C. Circuit is the appropriate circuit for review of these actions just as much as
it was for review of the SIP-related actions in the Natural Resources and Dayton Power cases, whose results
Congress endorsed when it revised §307(b)(1) in 1977.
A. The Integrated 2022 Exemption Actions Are
The Relevant Actions, But The Unit Of Action
Is Irrelevant Here Anyway
In opposing certiorari, respondents argued that “the
relevant administrative action is EPA’s denial of each
small refinery’s individual petition for hardship relief”—
105 supposed actions in all—not the integrated exemption actions issued in April and June 2022. Opp.17, 20-21
(quotation cleaned). As the analysis below shows, the
question of how to define the unit of action is irrelevant
here; either way, the D.C. Circuit was the only venue in
which the petitions for review could be filed under
§307(b)(1). See infra pt. II.B-C.
In any event, respondents’ definition of the relevant
unit of action is incorrect. EPA defined the “actions” as
the integrated decisions issued in April and June 2022
collectively denying multiple exemption petitions: “In
this action, [EPA] is denying 69 petitions …. This final
action … is a single action, but it is comprised of the adjudication of 69 [exemption] petitions.” Pet.App.48a;
Pet.App.193a. Respondents’ contrary statutory arguments beg the question. They noted (at 18) that
§307(b)(1)’s venue provisions refer to “action … under
this chapter” and that “chapter” refers to the Clean Air
Act. However, EPA’s integrated exemption actions
were issued under the Clean Air Act just as much as an
action denying a single exemption petition alone.
36
Respondents also noted (at 19) that the Act’s provisions
authorizing small-refinery exemptions consistently use
the singular to refer to the exemption petition and
EPA’s adjudication thereof: “A small refinery” may petition “for an extension of the exemption,”
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis added); “In evaluating a petition,” §7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) (emphasis added); “The Administrator shall act on any petition … not later than 90 days
after the date of receipt of the petition,”
§7545(o)(9)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). That language does
not, however, preclude EPA from resolving multiple individual petitions jointly under a single, common standard, as EPA did here.
B. The 2022 Exemption Actions Are “Nationally
Applicable”
1. The 2022 Exemption Actions are “nationally applicable,” for two independent reasons.
First, unlike other types of individual adjudications,
such as a typical SIP approval, see §7607(b)(1), small-refinery exemption decisions have a distinctive feature
that makes each such adjudication inherently nationally
applicable.
The RFP establishes general standards specifying
the amount of renewable fuel that obligated parties must
inject into the nation’s transportation-fuel supply, irrespective of their location. Because of the RFP’s legal
structure, a decision on a petition for a small-refinery exemption is necessarily a decision that defines the level of
those national RFP requirements. Granting an exemption automatically either (a) raises the percentage standards for all non-exempt obligated parties (if EPA adjusts
the percentage standards to account for the exemption,
as required by EPA’s regulations under certain circumstances), or (b) reduces the nationally required volume
37
of renewable-fuel use (if EPA does not make that adjustment). Therefore, any litigation over an exemption decision (regardless of whether the decision granted or denied the exemption) is about the level of the general
RFP standards. Moreover, these legal effects have corresponding practical effects on renewable-fuel purchases and RIN purchases around the country. See supra pp.7-8, 21-23.12
Second, even if the foregoing were not true, the 2022
exemption actions would be nationally applicable because they announced a new general standard for adjudicating all exemption petitions. In the actions, EPA
“adopt[ed]” its interpretation that the Act requires that
a petitioning refinery “demonstrate a direct causal relationship between its RF[P] compliance costs and the
[disproportionate economic hardship] it alleges,”
Pet.App.55a, 57a, 80a, 104a, 106a; Pet.App.199a, 224a,
228a, 246a, 248a, and EPA established a presumption
that RFP compliance does not cause small refineries
such hardship because they can recoup their compliance
costs by passing the costs through the supply chain,
Pet.App.68a, 83a-84a, 107a-108a, 168a; Pet.App.212a,
227a-228a, 249a-250a, 310a. In both actions, EPA stated
that this standard “appl[ies] to all small refineries no
matter the location or market in which they operate.”
12
Although renewable-fuel producers are not “obligated parties,” they are a direct object of exemption decisions because RFS
“annual standards” “directly regulate biofuel producers” by mandating the amount of renewable fuel that must be supplied and used,
American Fuel, 937 F.3d at 595, and, as just explained, exemption
decisions affect the level of those standards. See Energy Future
Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh,
J.) (although “regulation [prohibiting use of certain biofuel in vehicles] is technically directed at vehicle manufacturers,” biofuel producers were also “an object of the action”).
38
Pet.App.187a-188a, 329a (emphasis added). And in both
actions, EPA stated that it “will” apply this standard
both to all exemption petitions then pending and “going
forward.” Pet.App.101a; see also Pet.App.104a (EPA “is
therefore adopting this interpretation going forward.”);
Pet.App.242a-243a, 246a. Thus, the actions “promulgate[d]” a general “standard” or “rule,” just like the regulations and rules that §307(b)(1) expressly identifies as
nationally applicable and subject to mandatory exclusive
D.C. Circuit review. §7607(b)(1).
That the actions promulgated a general standard is
so even if each individual exemption denial is deemed the
relevant administrative action, because each such action
made the same announcement concurrently through the
April and June 2022 exemption actions. As the citations
in the preceding paragraph show, EPA expressly announced its general standard in both actions. Indeed, in
the June action EPA explained and defended the general
standard anew, e.g., Pet.App.84a-85a (“For the reasons
described herein, EPA believes that this approach is the
best interpretation of—and the most reasonable way to
implement—the statutory SRE provisions.”), and in as
much detail as it had in the April 2022 exemption action,
compare
Pet.App.223a-228a,
242a-326a
with
Pet.App.79a-85a, 100a-184a.
In any event, the temporal separation between the
April and June 2022 exemption actions is artificial and
should be disregarded for venue purposes. Both actions
were the product of the unitary administrative proceeding commenced in December 2021. See supra p.10. EPA
merely adjudicated the petitions in two tranches for administrative convenience based on their procedural posture: the April adjudications covered the exemption petitions for 2018, which the D.C. Circuit had remanded
and which the D.C. Circuit had directed EPA to
39
adjudicate by April 7, 2022, whereas the June adjudications covered all the other pending exemption petitions,
which were not subject to a court-ordered deadline. Supra pp.9-12. Thus, the two actions genuinely reflect a
single resolution of a single, comprehensive administrative proceeding.
2. The court below considered the 2022 exemption
actions not “nationally applicable” because their general
“approach” does not “bind[] EPA in any future adjudication” of exemption petitions. Pet.App.12a. That is incorrect for several independent reasons.
First, the court below did not account for the inherently national nature of every small-refinery exemption
decision.
Second, the 2022 exemption actions’ general standard controlled at least with respect to all pending exemption petitions, and that is enough. Section 307(b)(1)
does not specify whether the action’s “applicability”
must be in the present or future.
And third, the exemption action’s general standard
indeed bound EPA in the future as much as a regulation
would. Not only did the actions state that EPA “will”
apply the new standard “going forward,” supra p.38, but
also “[a]djudication … has future … legal consequences,
since the principles announced in an adjudication”—just
like a regulation—“cannot be departed from in future
adjudications without reason.” Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 216-217 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring); see, e.g., Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d
475, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“An agency interpretation in
40
an informal adjudication may … have general applicability and the force of law.”).13
The lower court’s reasoning “effectively removes all
‘adjudications’ from the ambit of §7607(b)(1),” contrary
to the statutory text. Pet.App.39a. Section 307(b)(1)’s
“nationally applicable” test expressly applies not only to
“any … regulations,” but also to “any … action.”
§7607(b)(1). Congress has expressly defined administrative “action” to include informal adjudication. 5 U.S.C.
§551(7), (13). Thus, “action” in this context must include
the adjudication of small-refinery exemption petitions,
particularly given the Act’s juxtaposition of “action” and
“regulations”; otherwise, “action” would be superfluous.
See also Harrison, 446 U.S. at 583, 592-593 (phrase “any
other final action” in §307(b)(1) encompasses not only
“formal adjudication [and] informal rulemaking,” but
also informal adjudication). “[T]hat kind of superfluity,
in and of itself, refutes [the court of appeals’] reading.”
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 143 (2024).
C. Alternatively, EPA Published Its (Sound)
Finding That The 2022 Exemption Actions Are
“Based On A Determination Of Nationwide
Scope Or Effect”
1. Courts must defer to EPA’s finding that an
action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect
EPA’s finding that an action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” should be reviewed
deferentially. The APA “mandate[s] that judicial review
13
This remains true for an agency’s statutory interpretation
until the courts conclusively determine the “best reading” of the
statute. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244,
2266 (2024).
41
of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential”
under the arbitrary-and-capricious and substantial-evidence standards. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2261 (2024) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§706(2)(A), (E)).
The court below, however, concluded that it had to
“independently assess” whether the exemption actions
are based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Pet.App.13a (quotation cleaned). According to
Fifth Circuit precedent, §307(b)(1)’s “based on a determination” test has “two conditions”: “First the action
must be based on such a determination and second the
agency must so find and publish.” Texas v. EPA, 829
F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2016). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, courts “must make an independent assessment of the scope of the determinations” “[b]ecause
the answer to the first condition controls the role of the
court.” Id. The intuition behind the Fifth Circuit’s position seems to be that deferring to EPA’s finding “effectively collapse[s] both conditions into the second condition, thereby rendering the first condition superfluous.”
Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107, 1114 (11th Cir.
2024) (Lagoa, J., concurring). That is not the case.
To be sure, there cannot be both deferential review
of EPA’s finding and de novo review on the same question; it must be one or the other. But the lower court’s
analysis is incorrect. Deferential review does not render
the first “condition” superfluous because §307(b)(1) does
not actually require both the court and EPA to make the
same finding. Rather, the best reading of §307(b)(1) is
that it establishes a substantive condition and a procedural condition, both for EPA: it spells out the finding
that EPA must make and then spells out the process by
which EPA must make it in order to trigger D.C. Circuit
42
venue, namely, EPA must make the finding expressly,
in a published notice.
Section 307(b)(1) should be read this way for several
reasons.
First, it is the Fifth Circuit’s view that renders part
of §307(b)(1) superfluous. If Congress intended courts
to determine the basis of an action independently, there
would have been no need for Congress to also direct
EPA to formally make the same finding; EPA’s substantive assessment would be irrelevant. One might say that
EPA’s publication of the finding would still serve the
role of expressing its desire for D.C. Circuit review
should the court make the requisite finding. But Congress could have easily achieved that more directly by
directing EPA to merely state that preference, without
the trouble of making a substantive finding.
Second, the APA’s “default standard” of deferential
review applies unless another statute “specif[ies] a
standard for judicial review,” Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496
(2004), and §307(b)(1) does not specify a standard for review for EPA findings that an action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Congress certainly knew how to do that because, elsewhere in the
Clean Air Act, Congress prescribed the standard for reviewing certain regulations promulgated via rulemaking. See §7607(d)(1), (9).
Third, deferential review is especially appropriate
here because “[i]t is clear that Congress, by empowering
the EPA Administrator to publish a finding that an action is ‘based on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect,’ delegated unusual authority to control the venue
of judicial review.” National Environmental Development Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 891 F.3d 1041,
43
1053 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Silberman, J., concurring). And
“the Administrator, as the national regulator, is in a
much better position than a regional circuit court to evaluate the nationwide impact of [the Administrator’s own]
action.” Id.
And fourth, deferential review serves the two overarching imperatives: avoiding wasteful litigation over
venue and avoiding duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules under the Act. The more deferential the
review of EPA’s finding, the less likely the finding is to
spur litigation over venue and the more likely EPA is to
successfully ensure centralized review when it deems
centralization warranted.
2. EPA’s finding that the 2022 exemption actions are based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect is correct
a. However EPA’s finding that the 2022 exemption actions are based on determinations of nationwide
scope or effect is reviewed, it is correct. This is plain
from the fact that the exemption actions—individually
or collectively—could have precipitated, and did in fact
precipitate, duplicative litigation of the same general issues, with inconsistent results and thus inconsistent
rules going forward.
In the 2022 exemption actions, EPA “determined
that any small refinery seeking an exemption … must”
satisfy the new two-part standard: the interpretation of
the Act to require direct causation and the empirical presumption that small refineries can recoup their RFP
compliance costs.
Pet.App.55a; Pet.App.199a-200a.
These are “determinations” under §307(b)(1) because
they reflect EPA’s reasoned resolution of a question and
a measurement (of small refineries’ ability to recoup
their RIN cost). These determinations have nationwide
44
scope or effect because they operate on and have consequences for all small refineries, irrespective of their location, across multiple judicial circuits. In other words,
they are general determinations, not limited to any individual refinery. See supra p.32, pp.22-23.
Further, the 2022 exemption actions—and each individual exemption adjudication rendered through the
2022 exemption actions—were based on these determinations. These determinations were essential premises
of each exemption adjudication: EPA denied each exemption petition because it concluded that each small refinery had failed to rebut EPA’s empirical presumption
of cost recoupment and therefore had not shown that
RFP compliance caused the refinery to suffer the alleged disproportionate economic hardship. See supra
pp.11-12. But for its general standard, EPA may well
have granted the exemption petitions instead. Indeed,
that is the result EPA routinely reached under its prior
approach, which did not require causation or account for
refineries’ ability to recoup their RFP compliance costs.
See supra pp.9-10.
Thus, the exemption denials involve general issues,
and those issues are appropriately subject to centralized
review. Local review would create a risk of duplicative
litigation and inconsistent rules for small-refinery exemptions—which is especially problematic for a program that establishes national standards to ensure that
certain volumes of renewable fuel are used nationally,
see supra pp.5-7.
Of course, this is exactly what happened. Refineries
whose exemption petitions were denied in April or June
2022 sought review in circuits around the country. See
supra p.13. They principally challenged the general elements of EPA’s general standard on grounds that were
45
independent of the individual refineries’ specific circumstances, including asserting that EPA’s causation requirement contradicted the Act’s plain text and that
EPA’s presumption of cost recoupment contradicted the
empirical record. See, e.g., C.A.ECF #270-3, at 42-65, 7273; Petitioners’ Final Joint Opening Br. 34-85, 98-103,
Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-1073,
ECF #2035080 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2024); Petitioner’s
Opening Br. 35-52, Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 2211617, ECF #51 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2023).
Predictably, the two circuits to decide the merits of
the refineries’ arguments—the Fifth Circuit in this case
and the D.C. Circuit—reached different conclusions on
some of those issues. For example, the court below held
that EPA impermissibly acted retroactively in departing from certain aspects of its prior approach—its reliance on the Department of Energy’s “scoring matrix”—
because DOE had not accounted for refineries’ ability to
recoup their RIN costs. Pet.App.19a-23a. In contrast,
the D.C. Circuit declined to reach the retroactivity issue.
Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 114 F.4th 693,
714 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Therefore, EPA may have to
revert to DOE’s framework when re-adjudicating the
exemption petitions remanded by the Fifth Circuit but
not when re-adjudicating the ones remanded by the D.C.
Circuit. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit and the court below identified different flaws in EPA’s RINpassthrough analysis. Compare id. at 711-714 with
Pet.App.30a-33a.14
14
Both circuits interpreted the Act to mean that small refineries must show that their RFP compliance is a “but-for” cause of
their disproportionate economic hardship, but need not show that
compliance is the “sole cause” of that hardship. Sinclair Wyoming,
46
Certainly, fragmented review of the 2022 exemption
actions created the potential for even wider divergence
between the circuits. And fragmented review of generic
determinations on which future small-refinery exemption actions are based could again create a serious risk of
duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules.
Inconsistent exemption rules pose a serious problem
for the RFP, which governs the entire nation’s supply of
transportation fuel and affects every level of the supply
chain, from farmers growing renewable-fuel feedstocks,
to producers of renewable and petroleum-based fuels, to
distributors, retailers, and consumers of transportation
fuel. Small refineries have been responsible for more
than 10%—several billion gallons—of the RFP’s annual
renewable-fuel mandate. Compare EPA, RFS Small
Refinery Exemptions, with EPA,15 Renewable Fuel Annual Standards.16 Allowing an ever-fragmenting patchwork of small-refinery exemption standards around the
country undermines the “market certainty so critical to
the [RFP’s] long term success.” Americans for Clean
Energy, 864 F.3d at 715 (quotation cleaned).
114 F.4th at 708-709; Pet.App.23-27a. But the lower courts’ rejection of the “sole cause” test was based on a misconception of EPA’s
position: EPA never required that RFP compliance be the sole
cause, only that it be the proximate cause, i.e., that there be “a direct causal relationship between its RF[P] compliance costs and”
the hardship. Pet.App.80a; Pet.App.224a. The lower courts never
addressed whether the Act requires proximate cause, and this case
presents no occasion for this Court to do so, either.
15
https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-com
pliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions (data updated Nov. 21,
2024).
16
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/re
newable-fuel-annual-standards (updated June 4, 2024).
47
b. The lower court’s contrary conclusion is wrong.
Although the court acknowledged that EPA’s general standard had nationwide scope or effect and that the
exemption denials were based on that standard, the
court instead focused on the fact that the denials also
necessarily “rel[ied] on refinery-specific determinations” that “each of the petitions … did not … present
facts contrary to” EPA’s general cost-recoupment finding. Pet.App.15a.
That analysis contravenes the statute. Section
307(b)(1) does not send to the D.C. Circuit only those
cases that are based exclusively on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Section 307(b)(1) uses the indefinite article, providing for D.C. Circuit review if the
action is based on “a” determination of nationwide scope
or effect. §7607(b)(1). The Dictionary Act declares that,
“unless the context indicates otherwise[,] words importing the singular include and apply to several persons,
parties, or things.” 1 U.S.C. §1. And as an indefinite article, the word “a” often indicates “one or more.” The
dictionary defines “a” to mean “any,” which in turn
means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind,”
“one, some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity,” and “unmeasured or unlimited in amount, number,
or extent.”17
In this context, “a” must mean “one or more.” Actions by EPA under the Act can be and routinely are
based on multiple determinations, i.e., they have multiple essential premises. See Paroline v. United States,
17
“A,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a/; “any,” MerriamWebster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/any/.
48
572 U.S. 434, 444-445 (2014) (“Every event has many
[but-for] causes ….”). There would be no basis to single
out one among them as the determination that matters
for whether the “based on a determination” test is met.
Rather, as long as the action rests on at least one general
determination and thereby raises at least one general issue for judicial review, the action must be reviewable in
the D.C. Circuit because fragmented adjudication of that
general issue could spur the duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules that Congress enacted §307(b)(1) to
avoid.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the decision below.
49
Respectfully submitted.
DAVID M. LEHN
JAY SCHUFFENHAUER
CESAR AZRAK
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
1401 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 237-2727
dlehn@bsfllp.com
SETH P. WAXMAN
Counsel of Record
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 663-6800
seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com
EVAN M. EZRAY
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
401 East Las Olas Boulevard
Suite 1200
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
(954) 377-4237
Counsel for Respondents
Counsel for Growth Energy
MATTHEW W. MORRISON
SHELBY L. DYL
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-8036
matthew.morrison
@pillsburylaw.com
Counsel for the Renewable
Fuels Association
DECEMBER 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.