Respondents Brief — Environmental Protection Agency, Petitioner v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2024

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No. 23-1229

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioner,

v.

CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, LLC, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

SUPPORTING PETITIONER

DAVID M. LEHN

JAY SCHUFFENHAUER

CESAR AZRAK

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

1401 New York Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 237-2727

dlehn@bsfllp.com

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 663-6800

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

EVAN M. EZRAY

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

401 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 1200

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

(954) 377-4237

Counsel for Petitioners

Counsel for Growth Energy

MATTHEW W. MORRISON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW

PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 663-8036

matthew.morrison

@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for the Renewable

Fuels Association

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Growth Energy has no parent company and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in Growth Energy.

The Renewable Fuels Association has no parent

company and no publicly held company has a 10% or

greater ownership interest in the Renewable Fuels Association.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .............. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................vi

INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................ 4

A. The Clean Air Act’s Venue Provision ................ 4

B. The Renewable Fuel Program ............................ 5

1.

Annual national volume requirements ............................................................... 5

2.

Small-refinery exemptions ........................... 7

C. EPA’s 2022 Exemption Actions.......................... 9

D. Litigation Challenging The 2022

Exemption Actions ............................................. 13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................... 16

ARGUMENT ..................................................................... 19

I.

SECTION 307(b)(1) MAKES ALL CLEAN AIR

ACT ACTIONS RAISING GENERAL ISSUES

REVIEWABLE IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT ........................ 19

A. Section 307(b)(1) Must Be Interpreted

To Provide Clear And Simple Venue

Rules ..................................................................... 19

B. Section 307(b)(1)’s Text Comprehensively Centralizes In The D.C. Circuit

Review Of All Actions Raising General

Issues .................................................................... 20

(iii)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page(s)

C. Section 307(b)(1)’s Legislative History

Confirms That Congress Specifically

Intended That All Actions Raising

General Issues Would Be Reviewable

In The D.C. Circuit ............................................. 26

D. Interpreting §307(b)(1) To Make All

Actions Applying A General Standard

Reviewable In The D.C. Circuit Does

Not Mean All Actions Will Be

Reviewed In The D.C. Circuit .......................... 32

II. THE 2022 EXEMPTION ACTIONS MUST BE

REVIEWED IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT ............................ 34

A. The Integrated 2022 Exemption

Actions Are The Relevant Actions, But

The Unit Of Action Is Irrelevant Here

Anyway ................................................................. 35

B. The 2022 Exemption Actions Are

“Nationally Applicable” ..................................... 36

C. Alternatively, EPA Published Its

(Sound) Finding That The 2022

Exemption Actions Are “Based On A

Determination Of Nationwide Scope Or

Effect” ................................................................... 40

1.

Courts must defer to EPA’s finding

that an action is based on a

determination of nationwide scope

or effect.......................................................... 40

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page(s)

2.

EPA’s finding that the 2022

exemption actions are based on

determinations of nationwide scope

or effect is correct ........................................ 43

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 48

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Alaska

Department

of

Environmental

Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) ....... 18, 42

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers

v. EPA, 937 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................. 8, 37

Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d

691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................................5-6, 46

Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)........... 26

Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488

U.S. 204 (1988) ............................................................ 39

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 45 F.4th 380 (D.C.

Cir. 2022) ...................................................................... 32

Dayton Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703

(6th Cir. 1975).............................................................. 29

Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1

(2015) ............................................................................ 19

Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1

(2012) ............................................................................ 20

Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141

(D.C. Cir. 2015) ........................................................... 37

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ..................................................... 20

Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024) ............... 25

Fry v. Napoleon Community School, 580 U.S.

154 (2017) ..................................................................... 23

Growth Energy v. EPA, 5 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir.

2021) ............................................................................... 6

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578

(1980) ........................................................................ 4, 40

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) ...................... 20

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v.

Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382 (2021) .....6-7, 9

Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107 (11th

Cir. 2024) ...........................................................15-16, 41

Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir.

2018) ............................................................................. 39

Kentucky v. EPA, __ F.4th __, No. 23-3216, 2024

WL 5001991 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) .......................... 33

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.

Ct. 2244 (2024) ..................................................18, 40-41

Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562

(2011) ............................................................................ 26

Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,

571 U.S. 161 (2014) ..................................................... 19

National Environmental Development Ass’n’s

Clean Air Project v. EPA, 891 F.3d 1041

(D.C. Cir. 2018) ......................................................42-43

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

EPA, 465 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1972) ............................ 28

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,

475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ...............................28-29

Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458

(1980) ............................................................................ 19

Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) ............... 47

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024) .............. 40

Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206

(10th Cir. 2020).............................................................. 9

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551

U.S. 47 (2007) .............................................................. 23

Sierra Club v. EPA, 926 F.3d 844 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .....32-33

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 101

F.4th 871 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ............................................ 8

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 114

F.4th 693 (D.C. Cir. 2024) .......................................... 45

Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016)................... 41

West Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th 323 (4th Cir.

2024) ............................................................................. 33

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) ................... 21

STATUTORY AND OTHER

LEGISLATIVE MATEIRALS

1 U.S.C. §1 .......................................................................... 47

5 U.S.C.

§551 ............................................................................... 40

§706 ............................................................................... 41

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

42 U.S.C.

§7401 ............................................................................. 25

§7410 ............................................................................. 25

§7411 ............................................................................. 26

§7420 ............................................................................. 26

§7521 ............................................................................. 25

§7545 ......................................................................5-7, 36

§7607 ............. 1, 4-5, 12, 16, 20, 24-25, 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 47

§7675 ............................................................................... 4

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,

Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) .................. 27

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,

Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)

...... 1-3, 12-13, 16-17, 20-21, 23-32, 34-35, 38-43, 47-48

Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) ....................... 5

H.R. 6161 (1977) ................................................................. 30

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-564 (1977) .................................. 30

H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 (1977) ..............................3, 17, 29-30

S. Rep. No. 91-1196 (1970) ...................................... 3, 17, 27

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

REGULATIONS AND OTHER

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

40 C.F.R.

§50.2 .............................................................................. 25

§50.4 .............................................................................. 25

§80.2 ................................................................................ 6

§80.1405 ...................................................................... 6, 8

§80.1407 .......................................................................... 6

§80.1415 .......................................................................... 6

§80.1428 .......................................................................... 7

§80.1429 .......................................................................... 7

Approval and Promulgation of Implementation

Plans, 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (May 31, 1972) ............. 28

Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974) ........... 29

Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg.

56,767 (Dec. 30, 1976) ..................................3, 17, 30-31

Approval and Promulgation of Implementation

Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 296 (Jan. 5, 2016) ...................... 34

Notice of Opportunity to Comment on Proposed

Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery

Exemptions, 86 Fed. Reg. 70,999 (Dec. 14,

2021) ............................................................................. 10

Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty

Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 30, 2021).............. 25

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

April 2022 Denial of Petitions for Small

Refinery Exemptions Under the Renewable

Fuel Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg.

24,300 (Apr. 25, 2022) ........................................... 10, 12

Notice of June 2022 Denial of Petitions for

Small Refinery Exemptions Under the

Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 87

Fed. Reg. 34,873 (June 8, 2022) ...........................11-12

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program:

RFS Annual Rules, 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600

(July 1, 2022).................................................................. 8

Dkt. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0566, https://

www.regulations.gov/docket/EPA-HQOAR-2021-0566 ........................................................... 10

EPA, Renewable Fuel Annual Standards

https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuelstandard-program/renewable-fuel-annualstandards (updated June 4, 2024) ............................. 46

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://

www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reportingand-compliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions (data updated Nov. 21, 2024) ................... 46

OTHER AUTHORITIES

“List of automotive assembly plants in the

United

States,”

Wikipedia,

https://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automotive_

assembly_plants_in_the_United_States................. 25

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/ ...................................................21-24, 32, 47

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-1229

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioner,

v.

CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, LLC, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

SUPPORTING PETITIONER

INTRODUCTION

Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act specifies the

proper circuit in which to review any “action” by EPA

under the Act. A petition for review “may be filed only

in” the D.C. Circuit “if” either (a) the action is “nationally applicable” or (b) the action “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such

action the Administrator finds and publishes that such

action is based on such a determination.” 42 U.S.C.

§7607(b)(1). Otherwise, the petition for review “may be

filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the

appropriate circuit.” Id.

2

The Renewable Fuel Program (“RFP”) is a Clean

Air Act program that mandates the amount of renewable fuel to be blended annually into the nation’s supply

of gasoline and diesel fuel. In 2022, EPA issued two actions that together denied 105 requests by 36 “small refineries” around the country to be exempted from their

RFP obligations for certain compliance years because of

their alleged economic hardship. In the actions, EPA

adopted, applied, and announced for future use a general

standard comprising (a) a legal requirement that any petitioning refinery must show that its alleged hardship

would be caused by its RFP compliance and (b) a general

presumption that RFP compliance does not cause refineries hardship because refineries can recoup their compliance costs. EPA concluded that no refinery had rebutted its presumption or otherwise showed the requisite causation.

Disappointed refineries sought review of EPA’s exemption actions in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth,

Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. In the decision below, a divided Fifth Circuit panel held that it was the appropriate venue under §307(b)(1) because the exemption

actions are “neither nationally applicable nor based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect.”

Pet.App.17a. All the other numbered circuits disagreed

and transferred their cases to the D.C. Circuit. Consequently, two circuits—the Fifth and the D.C. Circuits—

rendered judgments on the merits of the general standard EPA used to adjudicate the refineries’ exemption

petitions. Although both circuits vacated EPA’s actions,

they did not fully agree on the reasons, resulting in one

rule for refineries in the Fifth Circuit and another rule

for refineries everywhere else going forward. This split

injects uncertainty into a program that governs the entire nation’s supply of transportation fuel and affects

3

every level of the supply chain, from farmers growing

renewable-fuel feedstocks, to producers of renewable

and petroleum-based fuels, to distributors, retailers, and

consumers of transportation fuel.

This state of affairs is exactly what Congress sought

to avoid when it wrote §307(b)(1). Both the text and legislative history of §307(b)(1) show clearly that Congress

enacted it to ensure “even and consistent national” rules

for EPA and affected actors, S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 41

(1970), by centralizing in the D.C. Circuit review of all

actions involving “generic” or “national issues,” Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767, 56,768:356,769:1 (Dec. 30, 1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 324

(1977).

Thus, §307(b)(1) creates a comprehensive

scheme to ensure that every action raising a general issue for review—that is, an issue that is not limited to an

individual actor or to actors in a single judicial circuit—

is reviewable in the D.C. Circuit. Only such an understanding provides a clear rule by which to achieve Congress’s goal of avoiding duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules, while also avoiding wasteful threshold litigation over the proper venue.

The 2022 exemption actions at issue are reviewable

exclusively in the D.C. Circuit, for three independent

reasons. First, they are “nationally applicable” because

every adjudication of a small-refinery exemption petition

inherently affects, by operation of law, national RFP requirements. Alternatively, the actions are “nationally

applicable” because they prescribed general standards

for adjudicating all pending and future small-refinery

exemption petitions, irrespective of the refinery’s location. And finally, the actions are (and EPA published its

finding that they are) “based on … determination[s] of

nationwide scope or effect”: EPA’s general causation requirement and general presumption of cost recoupment,

4

which apply to all small refineries seeking exemption,

were essential premises on which the exemption denials

rested.

All these reasons hold regardless of whether the relevant “action” is defined as each of the 105 individual exemption denials or as the integrated actions through

which EPA issued those denials. Each disappointed refinery challenged EPA’s general standard for adjudicating small-refinery petitions, reaching partially different

results. That the fragmented litigation resulted in disparate rules between circuits proves that the exemption

actions should have been reviewed only in the D.C. Circuit, as should all future RFP exemption actions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Clean Air Act’s Venue Provision

Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act establishes

rules for determining “the proper venue as between the

District of Columbia Circuit and the other Federal Circuits” to review EPA actions under the Act. Harrison

v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 590 (1980); see 42

U.S.C. §7675(k)(1)(C) (extending Act’s venue provision

to actions under American Innovation and Manufacturing Act).

The venue provision establishes three cascading

tests. First, the Act directs that petitions for review of

“any … nationally applicable regulations promulgated,

or final action taken, by the Administrator under [the

Act] may be filed only in” the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C.

§7607(b)(1). Second, the Act prescribes a presumptive

venue for petitions for review of any action that is not

“nationally applicable”: petitions for review of “any

other final action of the Administrator under [the Act]

… which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed

5

only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.” Id. But, third, the Act allows EPA to

rebut the second test’s presumption in certain circumstances: “Notwithstanding the [second test,] a petition

for review of any action referred to in [the second test]

may be filed only in the [D.C. Circuit] if such action is

based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect

and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and

publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” Id.

B. The Renewable Fuel Program

1. Annual national volume requirements

Congress created the Act’s Renewable Fuel Program (“RFP”)—or, as EPA calls it, the “Renewable Fuel

Standard” (“RFS”)—“to ‘move the United States toward greater energy independence and security’ and ‘increase the production of clean renewable fuels.’” Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 697 (D.C.

Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.) (quoting Pub. L. No. 110-140,

§§201-202, 121 Stat. 1492, preamble (2007)). The program achieves these goals by “requir[ing] an increasing

amount of renewable fuel to be introduced into the Nation’s transportation fuel supply each year.” Id. at 696;

see 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (B). “Therefore, … [national] demand for renewable fuel [is] a function of the

renewable fuel standards.” Americans for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 710 (quotation cleaned).

Under the RFP, there are annual national volume

requirements for four categories of renewable fuel.

Americans for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 697-698, 701.

EPA must “translat[e] the[se] annual volume requirements into ‘percentage standards,’” which “represent

the percentage of transportation fuel introduced into

commerce that must consist of renewable fuel.” Id. at

6

699; see §7545(o)(3)(B)(i)-(ii); 40 C.F.R. §80.1405(c). That

is, the percentage standards roughly equal the national

mandated renewable-fuel volumes divided by the total

national volume of gasoline and diesel fuel that EPA projects will be used in the relevant year. The Act charges

EPA with establishing the percentage standards before

the relevant year begins. §7545(o)(2)(B)(ii), (3)(B)(i).

EPA has designated refineries and importers of petroleum-based gasoline and diesel fuel as the “obligated

parties” that must comply with the RFP’s percentage

standards. 40 C.F.R. §80.2; see §7545(o)(2)(A)(iii),

(3)(B)(ii). Obligated parties “must ensure” that the required volumes of renewable fuel are used. Americans

for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 697. Although there are

myriad obligated parties, there is only one percentage

standard for each category of renewable fuel.

§7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(III). “The percentage standards inform each obligated party of how much [of each category

of] renewable fuel it must introduce into U.S. commerce

based on the volumes of fossil-based gasoline or diesel it

imports or produces.” Americans for Clean Energy, 864

F.3d at 699; see 40 C.F.R. §80.1407(a). “In other words,

the EPA estimates what percentage of the overall fuel

supply each renewable-fuel [category] should constitute

and then requires each obligated party to replicate those

percentages on an individual basis.” Growth Energy v.

EPA, 5 F.4th 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

EPA “polices these mandates with a system of credits.” HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382, 386 (2021); see

§7545(o)(5). “Each credit”—called a RIN—“represents

the blending of [an ethanol-equivalent gallon] of renewable fuel” into gasoline or diesel fuel. HollyFrontier, 594

U.S. at 386; see 40 C.F.R. §80.1415. “A refinery that

blends renewables may either ‘retire’ the credits it has

7

earned (i.e., use them) to satisfy its own RFP volume obligation—or sell those credits to a different [obligated

party] that needs them.” HollyFrontier, 594 U.S. at 386;

see 40 C.F.R. §§80.1428-80.1429.

To illustrate with a simplified example: If the required national renewable-fuel volume for 2025 is 10 billion gallons and the total projected transportation-fuel

use for 2025 is 100 billion gallons, EPA would set the

2025 percentage standard at 10%. Then, if an obligated

party introduced 5 million gallons of transportation fuel

into commerce during 2025, its RFP obligation would be

500,000 gallons of renewable fuel, which it would satisfy

by blending that amount of renewable fuel into its gasoline and diesel, buying that number of RINs in the market, or doing a mix of both.

2. Small-refinery exemptions

Congress allowed “small refineries”—refineries

whose “throughput” is below a specified level,

§7545(o)(1)(K)—to be exempted from their RFP obligations under limited circumstances. Relevant here, individual small refineries may “petition” EPA for an exemption (technically, for an extension of their prior exemption) by showing that they “would be subject to a

disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply with” their RFP obligations. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii),

(B)(i).

Although small-refinery exemptions (“SREs”) are

granted to individual small refineries, they affect RFP

obligations nationally by operation of law. Under EPA’s

formula for computing the annual percentage standards

that apply to all non-exempt obligated parties, EPA accounts for small-refinery exemptions to a certain extent:

when setting the standards for a given year, EPA “increas[es] the [percentage] standards on [all] non-exempt

8

obligated parties” for that year by the amount needed to

offset all exemptions that either were already granted

for that year or are projected to be granted for that year.

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: RFS Annual Rules, 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600, 39,632:2 (July 1, 2022);

see Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 101 F.4th

871, 890-892 (D.C. Cir. 2024); 40 C.F.R. §80.1405(c).

EPA does not adjust the percentage standards to account for exemptions to the extent they exceed EPA’s

projection of exemptions for a given year. For example,

EPA (explicitly or implicitly) projected zero exemptions

for compliance years 2016-2022, see 87 Fed. Reg. at

39,633, 39,632:1, so if EPA eventually grants an exemption for one of those years, the exemption will not be accounted for in annual percentage standards. Whenever

EPA does not adjust the percentage standards to account for an exemption, the exemption “hinder[s] the

achievement of the applicable renewable-fuel volumes

because [the exemption] artificially inflate[s] the denominator—the nation’s total supply of petroleum-based

transportation fuel—and thereby reduce[s] the percentage standards applied to nonexempt refiners and importers.” Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 881. In other

words, exemptions that are not accounted for in the percentage standards lower the nationally required volume

of renewable fuel, creating a “renewable-fuel shortfall.”

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v.

EPA, 937 F.3d 559, 571, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

In short, every individual small-refinery exemption

adjudication automatically affects RFP obligations nationally: accounted-for exemptions increase the RFP obligations of all non-exempt obligated parties nationally,

whereas unaccounted-for exemptions reduce the nationally required volume of renewable-fuel use.

9

C. EPA’s 2022 Exemption Actions

In 2017 and 2018, EPA granted 54 exemptions for

the 2016 and 2017 compliance years, covering about 2.6

billion gallons of renewable fuel. Renewable Fuels Ass’n

v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1225-1226 (10th Cir. 2020). Representatives of the renewable-fuels industry challenged

three of those exemptions in the Tenth Circuit. Id. at

1226. That court held that the exemptions were invalid

for three reasons. First, the refineries were ineligible

because they had not been continuously exempt through

all prior years of the RFP. Id. at 1245-1249. Second,

EPA erroneously interpreted the statute not to require

that the refinery’s RFP “compliance … be the cause of

any disproportionate hardship”; instead, EPA allowed

exemptions based on hardship suffered “as a result of

something other than RF[P] compliance” that would exist regardless of the RFP. Id. at 1253-1254. Third, EPA

“ignored or failed to provide reasons for deviating from

[its own] prior studies showing that RIN purchase costs

do not disproportionately harm refineries” because refineries can “recover the cost of the RINs they purchase

by passing that cost along in the form of higher prices for

the petroleum based fuels they produce.” Id. at 12541257 (quotation cleaned). This Court subsequently rejected the Tenth Circuit’s first ground—the “continuity

requirement”—but did not opine on the other two

grounds. HollyFrontier, 594 U.S. at 389-390.

Meanwhile, in 2019, EPA adjudicated 36 small-refinery exemption petitions for 2018, granting 31 and denying 5 under the same flawed approach it had applied in

granting the 2016-2017 exemptions. Pet.App.48a, 177a

n.248, 185a. Representatives of the renewable-fuels industry challenged those denials in the D.C. Circuit.

Pet.App.7a; Pet.App.48a, 78a.

10

In December 2021, EPA publicly noticed and solicited comment on a proposal “to deny all pending SRE

petitions,” including the three 2016-2017 exemptions remanded by the Tenth Circuit, under a new approach that

corrected the two remaining errors identified by the

Tenth Circuit. Notice of Opportunity to Comment on

Proposed Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery Exemptions, 86 Fed. Reg. 70,999, 71,000:2 (Dec. 14, 2021);

see Pet.App.48a-49a & n.4, 52a, 184a.

At the same time, the D.C. Circuit remanded the 36

exemptions before it to EPA for reconsideration in light

of the decisions by this Court and the Tenth Circuit, and

in light of EPA’s proposed denial of all pending exemptions under a revised approach. Pet.App.78a. Whereas

the Tenth Circuit had not imposed a deadline on EPA’s

reconsideration, the D.C. Circuit gave EPA until April

7, 2022, to issue new decisions on the exemptions it was

remanding. Pet.App.78a. In January 2022, EPA announced that it was “expanding” its proposed denial “to

include” those 36 exemption petitions. Pet.App.48a n.1.

All administrative materials and comments relating to

all the proposed denials were maintained on a single administrative docket. See Dkt. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR2021-05661; see Pet.App.53a.

After receiving comments from the petitioning refineries and other interested parties, EPA finalized its

proposal in two parts. On April 7, 2022—the D.C. Circuit’s deadline—EPA issued and published notice of a final action denying the 36 exemption petitions for 2018

that had been remanded by the D.C. Circuit and added

to the administrative proceeding in January 2022.

Pet.App.190a, 193a; April 2022 Denial of Petitions for

Small Refinery Exemptions Under the Renewable Fuel

1

https://www.regulations.gov/docket/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0566.

11

Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,300 (Apr. 25, 2022).

In June 2022, EPA issued and published notice of a final

action denying the remaining 69 pending exemption petitions before it, including the three remanded by the

Tenth Circuit. Pet.App.45a, 48a; Notice of June 2022 Denial of Petitions for Small Refinery Exemptions Under

the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 87 Fed. Reg.

34,873 (June 8, 2022).

The two actions together denied all pending exemption petitions based on a “change in approach” that corrected the two remaining errors identified by the Tenth

Circuit. Pet.App.80a-85a; Pet.App.224a-228a. First,

EPA interpreted the Act to require that a petitioning

“small refinery … demonstrate a direct causal relationship between its RF[P] compliance costs and the [disproportionate economic hardship] it alleges”; “financial difficulties” that are “unrelated” to compliance “will not

satisfy” the exemption standard anymore. Pet.App.80a;

see also Pet.App.102; Pet.App.224a, 244a. Second, EPA

determined, based on old and new studies of the national

RIN market and of various fuel markets, that small refineries, irrespective of their location, “have the ability

… to pass through their RIN costs.” Pet.App.154a; see

also Pet.App.66a-68a, 82a, 106a-109a, 167a-168a;

Pet.App.210a-212a, 226a, 248a-251a, 296a, 308a-310a; see

also C.A.J.A.00081; C.A.J.A.0227. Accordingly, EPA

found that, as a general matter, RFP compliance “cannot

cause” small refineries to incur any net compliance costs,

let alone the requisite disproportionate economic hardship. Pet.App.68a, 83a-84a; see also Pet.App.212a, 227a228a.

EPA invited the petitioning small refineries to rebut

its general presumption that they incur no net RFP compliance costs, by submitting refinery-specific evidence

showing that in fact they are unable to recoup their RIN

12

costs or that they otherwise do incur net compliance

costs (and in turn that those costs inflict disproportionate economic hardship). Pet.App.54a-55a; Pet.App.198a199a. After reviewing all the evidence submitted by

each refinery, EPA concluded that none had rebutted its

presumption that they can recoup their RFP compliance

costs. Pet.App.55a, 57a, 84a, 107a-110a, 162a-163a;

Pet.App.199a, 201a, 228a, 249a-252a, 304a-305a.

In EPA’s published notices of the final exemption

actions, EPA stated that the actions are “nationally applicable” and found that they are “based on a determination of ‘nationwide scope or effect.’” 87 Fed. Reg. at

24,300:3-24,301:1 (quoting §7607(b)(1)); 87 Fed. Reg. at

34,874:2. The notice for the April denial explained that

it “denies petitions for exemptions … for over 30 small

refineries across the country and applies to small refineries located within 18 states in 7 of the 10 EPA regions

and in 8 different Federal judicial circuits.” 87 Fed. Reg.

at 24,301:1. The notice for the June denial included the

same statement, except that it covered small refineries

located in 15 States. 87 Fed. Reg. at 34,874:2. The notices added that the exemption actions are “based on

EPA’s revised interpretation of the relevant [statutory]

provisions [requiring causation] and the RIN discount

and RIN cost passthrough principles that are applicable

to all small refineries no matter the location or market in

which they operate,” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,301:1; 87 Fed.

Reg. at 34,874:2-3, i.e., based on the presumption that

“all refineries” can “recover their RIN costs through the

market price of the fuel they produce” because those

prices “increase[] to reflect the cost of the RIN,” 87 Fed.

Reg. at 24,300:3; 87 Fed. Reg. at 34,874:1. Therefore, under §307(b)(1), the notices stated, “petitions for judicial

review of th[ese] action[s] must be filed in” the D.C. Circuit. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,301:1; 87 Fed. Reg. at 34,874:3.

13

D. Litigation Challenging The 2022 Exemption

Actions

1. Numerous small refineries filed petitions for review in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Many of the petitions filed in

numbered circuits were duplicative of ones filed in the

D.C. Circuit. In all the cases filed in numbered circuits,

EPA moved under §307(b)(1) to dismiss or transfer to

the D.C. Circuit.

Motions panels in the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits concluded that the D.C. Circuit was the

only proper venue for reviewing the 2022 exemption actions and therefore granted EPA’s motions.2 Motions

panels in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits deferred the

venue issue to merits panels.

2

See Order, American Refining Group v. EPA, No. 22-1991,

ECF #23 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2022); Order, American Refining Group v.

EPA, No. 22-2435, ECF #20 (3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2022); Order, Countrymark Refining and Logistics, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-1878, ECF

#13 (7th Cir. July 20, 2022); Order, Countrymark Refining and Logistics, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-2368, ECF #9 (7th Cir. Sept. 8, 2022);

Order, Calumet Montana Refining, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70124,

ECF #16 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Par Hawaii Refining, LLC

v. EPA, No. 22-70125, ECF #16 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, San

Joaquin Refining Co., Inc. v. EPA, No. 22-70126, ECF #16 (9th Cir.

Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Kern Oil & Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 2270128, ECF #13 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Calumet Montana

Refining, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70166, ECF #14 (9th Cir. Oct. 25,

2022); Order, Par Hawaii Refining, LLC v. EPA, No. 22-70168,

ECF #13 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order, San Joaquin Refining Co.,

Inc. v. EPA, No. 22-70170, ECF #12 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022); Order,

Kern Oil & Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-70172, ECF #14 (9th Cir.

Oct. 25, 2022); Order, Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-9538,

ECF #10935421 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 2022); Order, Wyoming Refining

Co. v. EPA, No. 22-9553, ECF #10939881 (10th Cir. Sept. 12, 2022).

14

2. In the decision below, a divided Fifth Circuit

disagreed with the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth

Circuits, holding that the D.C. Circuit is not the exclusive venue for reviewing the 2022 exemption actions because the actions are “neither nationally applicable nor

based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”

Pet.App.17a.

The Fifth Circuit majority first determined that the

2022 exemption actions are not nationally applicable. The

majority declared that “the legal effect—… not the practical effect—of an agency action … determines whether

that action is ‘nationally applicable.” Pet.App.11a. The

majority considered the 2022 actions’ legal effect not to be

national because the actions’ “new approach” does not

govern “all” small refineries since (the court said) that approach does not “bind[] EPA in any future adjudication”

of exemption petitions. Pet.App.12a.

The majority also concluded that the 2022 actions

are not based on a determination of nationwide scope or

effect. Giving EPA “no deference,” the majority determined that EPA’s finding to the contrary was not “accura[te].” Pet.App.13a (emphasis omitted), 15a. The

majority acknowledged that the actions are partially

“based on factors and facts common to each petition”—

i.e., EPA’s causation requirement and general cost-recoupment presumption—but emphasized that those

common factors were not alone “a sufficient basis to adjudicate [the] exemption petitions.” Pet.App.15a. To

deny each petition, EPA had to determine whether each

individual refinery had rebutted the general presumption that they can avoid net compliance cost based on

“refinery-specific” evidence. Id.

15

Proceeding to the merits, the majority granted the

petitions for review, vacated the 2022 exemption actions,

and remanded to EPA. Pet.App.3a.

Dissenting, Judge Higginbotham concluded that the

D.C. Circuit is the only proper venue. First, he explained that the question of “national applicability”

should be “measure[d] … by looking to the location of the

persons or enterprises that the action regulates.”

Pet.App.37a (quotation cleaned). The 2022 exemption

actions “inescapably” satisfy this standard because

“they apply one consistent statutory interpretation and

economic analysis to thirty-six small refineries, located

in eighteen different states, in the geographical boundaries of eight different circuit courts.” Pet.App.37a-38a.

Alternatively, Judge Higginbotham would have held,

the actions are based on a determination of nationwide

scope or effect. He acknowledged that the actions are

partially based on refinery-specific determinations, but

he explained that, while “there can be multiple determinations that influence an agency’s actions,” “what matters” is whether some “core determinations” have nationwide scope or effect. Pet.App.42a. “[T]he two determinations at the core of the Denial Actions”—again, EPA’s

causation requirement and its general cost-recoupment

finding—have nationwide scope and effect because they

“appl[y] to all small refineries no matter the location or

market in which they operate.” Pet.App.41a-42a.

3. Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit aligned

with the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and

held that the D.C. Circuit is the only proper venue for

reviewing the 2022 exemption actions. See Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107, 1113 (11th Cir. 2024). The

Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s

16

analysis, instead finding “Judge Higginbotham’s dissent

… more persuasive.” Id. at 1112.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Congress enacted §307(b)(1) to avoid duplicative

litigation and inconsistent rules for EPA and regulated

actors. Accordingly, §307(b)(1) provides a comprehensive

system to ensure that all Clean Air Act actions defining

general standards or otherwise raising general issues are

reviewable in the D.C. Circuit.

A. Section 307(b)(1) provides that a petition for review “may be filed only in” the D.C. Circuit “if” either (a)

the action is “nationally applicable” or (b) the action “is

based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect

and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and

publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1). That text makes evident the

core objective of avoiding duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules, and it achieves that by comprehensively

centralizing in the D.C. Circuit review of all actions defining general standards or otherwise raising general issues.

This broad, simple venue rule also minimizes wasteful

threshold litigation.

The ordinary meaning of “applicable” broadly covers

the legal and practical reach of an action. The ordinary

meaning of “scope or effect” is similarly broad. The principal difference between the two tests is this: whereas

the “nationally applicable” test turns on the reach of the

standard or decision that the action establishes, the

“based on a determination” test turns on the reach of the

action’s essential premises. Thus, as venue rules that

centralize review of certain cases, the two tests must be

understood as complementary ways to identify actions

subject to challenge, or whose elements are subject to

17

challenge, in multiple circuits because, without centralized review, such actions could generate duplicative litigation and inconsistent outcomes. Accordingly, “nationally” and “nationwide” mean “general,” “irrespective of

location,” or “across circuits.”

This interpretation is confirmed by other aspects of

§307(b)(1). For example, the Act contemplates decentralized review of an action only in “the appropriate circuit,” indicating that there would be a single appropriate

local circuit—which cannot be the case for actions raising general issues.

B. This interpretation is also compelled by the legislative history. Congress’s aim was to send to the D.C.

Circuit those actions that were “national in scope” and

therefore “require[d] even and consistent national application,” while allowing local review of actions that “r[a]n

only to one air quality control region.” S. Rep. No. 911196, at 41 (1970). Congress explained that actions “involv[ing] generic issues that apply to EPA’s actions nationwide” are “virtually identical to [the] promulgation

of ‘national standards,’” and all such actions can be “reviewed in the D.C. Circuit” under the “based on a determination” test. Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed.

Reg. 56,767, 56,768:3-56,789:1 (Dec. 30, 1976) (quotation

cleaned). Congress added that a determination is “nationwide” if it “has scope or effect beyond a single judicial circuit.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 324 (1977).

C. Still, this interpretation of §307(b)(1) recognize

that there are various circumstances in which an action

applying a general standard will not be reviewed in the

D.C. Circuit.

II. For several independent reasons, the 2022 exemption actions must be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.

18

A. The relevant unit of administrative action is the

integrated exemption action as EPA issued it, not EPA’s

denial of each individual exemption petition. However,

D.C. Circuit review was required here regardless of how

the action is defined.

B. The exemption actions are “nationally applicable” for two separate reasons. First, every decision on a

small-refinery exemption petition is inherently nationally applicable because every such decision inherently

affects, by operation of law, the level of the national RFP

requirements and further affects renewable-fuel purchases and RIN purchases around the country.

Second, the exemption actions are nationally applicable because they—whether defined collectively or individually—expressly “adopt[ed]” a new general standard for adjudicating all pending and future exemption

petitions. Pet.App.55a.

C. Alternatively, the exemption actions are also

“based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”

1. The APA “mandate[s] that judicial review of”

EPA’s finding to that effect “be deferential,” Loper

Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2261

(2024), and nothing in the Clean Air Act displaces that

“default standard,” Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496 (2004).

2. Even if the finding is reviewed de novo, however,

it is correct. The exemption actions—whether defined

collectively or individually—expressly rested on determinations of nationwide scope or effect: EPA’s general

standard for adjudicating small-refinery exemptions, including both the causation requirement and the presumption of cost recoupment. This conclusion is also proved by

19

the fact that the actions precipitated lawsuits in numerous circuits all challenging that general standard.

ARGUMENT

I.

SECTION 307(b)(1) MAKES ALL CLEAN AIR ACT ACTIONS RAISING GENERAL ISSUES REVIEWABLE IN THE

D.C. CIRCUIT

Congress enacted §307(b)(1) to ensure consistent national rules for EPA and affected actors and to take advantage of the D.C. Circuit’s administrative-law expertise, by centralizing in the D.C. Circuit review of all actions that define general standards or otherwise raise

general issues that could be challenged by actors across

judicial circuits. Section 307(b)(1) creates a comprehensive system to ensure that such actions do not slip

through the cracks. This broad, simple venue rule both

avoids duplicative litigation and inconsistent results, and

also minimizes wasteful threshold litigation over the

proper forum.

A. Section 307(b)(1) Must Be Interpreted To

Provide Clear And Simple Venue Rules

“It is of first importance to have a [rule] … that will

not invite extensive threshold litigation” over the proper

court to hear a case. Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446

U.S. 458, 464 n.13 (1980) (quotation cleaned); see, e.g., Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 11 (2015) (noting “our rule favoring clear boundaries in the interpretation of jurisdictional statutes”); Mississippi ex rel.

Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 172-173

(2014). “[L]itigation over whether the case is in the right

court is essentially a waste of time and resources.” Navarro Savings, 446 U.S. at 464 n.13 (quotation cleaned).

Unclear venue rules also “encourage gamesmanship,”

while undermining the “predictability” that “benefits

20

plaintiffs deciding [where] to file suit.” Hertz Corp. v.

Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95 (2010). In short, unclear venue

rules hurt both the parties in any given case and the judicial system itself. See Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 15 (2012) (rejecting proposed test because it would “deprive the aggrieved employee, the

[agency], and the district court of clear guidance about

the proper forum for the employee’s claims at the outset

of the case”).

Therefore, the Court should interpret §307(b)(1) to

provide simple rules yielding clear answers in as many

situations as possible. An interpretation that relies on

vague tests or creates technical gaps will unnecessarily

invite confusion and controversy, leading to the kind of

wasteful litigation the Court has warned against.

B. Section 307(b)(1)’s Text Comprehensively

Centralizes In The D.C. Circuit Review Of All

Actions Raising General Issues

1. Section 307(b)(1) declares that the D.C. Circuit

is the exclusive forum for reviewing “any” action taken

by EPA under the Clean Air Act if (i) the action is “nationally applicable” or (ii) the action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and EPA makes

and publishes a finding that the action is based on such a

determination. §7607(b)(1). Section 307(b)(1) declares

that “the appropriate circuit” is the forum only for EPA

actions that does not satisfy either of those tests. Id.

“Viewing [§307(b)(1)] as a whole, it is evident” that

§307(b)(1)’s “core objective[],” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000), is to

avoid duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules for

EPA and regulated actors. To achieve this objective, an

action must be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit whenever

21

it invites challenge by parties regardless of their location

or in multiple circuits.

Thus, §307(b)(1) sets out two broad, complementary

tests for D.C. Circuit review. The “nationally applicable” test sends to the D.C. Circuit every action that establishes, revises, or reaffirms a general standard, because that action could be challenged by affected actors

regardless of their location. The “based on a nationwide

determination or effect” test sends to the D.C. Circuit

every action that rests on a general premise where the

validity or terms of that premise could be raised by actors around the country (provided that EPA makes and

publishes a finding that the action has such a basis). In

either of these circumstances, local review would invite

duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules for EPA and

regulated actors. Only actions that raise no general issues for which EPA desires uniformity must be reviewed in the relevant local circuit.

2. This simple, broad interpretation is supported

by careful examination of the text of §307(b)(1), whose

“words … must be read in their context and with a view

to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (quotation

cleaned)

First, consider the “nationally applicable” test. “Applicable” means “capable of or suitable for being applied,”3 and “apply” in turn means “to put into operation

or effect” (transitive) and “to have relevance or a valid

connection” (intransitive).4 Thus, an action is “nationally

3

“Applicable,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/applicable/.

4

“Apply,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apply/.

22

applicable” if the standard or decision it announces regulates actors nationally. The court below understood

this to refer to the action’s “legal effect,” i.e., the action’s

effect on “legal rights, duties, or obligations.”

Pet.App.11a-12a. That interpretation is incomplete in

two respects. First, the court limited the assessment of

legal effect to the parties that had challenged the action,

failing to fully account for the action’s legal effect on

other actors. Second, as just noted, the ordinary meaning of “applicable” also encompasses “relevance” and

“connection,” and therefore an action is also “nationally

applicable” if its rule or decision is significant for, or affects the interests of, parties that could challenge the action nationally.

Next, consider the “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” test. “Scope” means “extent of

treatment, activity, or influence” and “range of operation,”5 and “effect” means “something that inevitably follows an antecedent,” “the quality or state of being operative,” “power to bring about a result,” and “a goal or

purpose.”6 One might say that “scope” focuses on the

actor or conduct that is the target of the determination,

whereas “effect” focuses on the determination’s consequences for that actor or conduct. But that understanding would shortchange the breadth of the ordinary

meaning of both “scope” and “effect.” In context, “scope

or effect” is properly understood as comprehensively

covering all aspects of a determination, legal or practical.

5

“Scope,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scope/.

6

“Effect,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effect/.

23

It is clear, therefore, that both “applicable” and

“scope or effect” are capacious and similar. The principal

difference between the two tests stems from the second

test’s use of the phrase “based on a determination of”:

under the first test, the action itself must be national,

whereas under the second test, what must be national is

the determination on which the action is based. In context, the phrase “based on a determination of” identifies

something that is a “sine qua non” of the action, Fry v.

Napoleon Community School, 580 U.S. 154, 167 (2017),

i.e., “something absolutely indispensable or essential” to

the action.7 See also Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.

Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63 (2007) (“in common talk, the phrase

‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal relationship” (quotation cleaned)). Consequently, the “based on a determination” test turns on the geographic scope or effect of

the action’s essential premises.

All these interpretations must be understood more

concretely in the broader context of §307(b)(1)’s role as

a rule prescribing the appropriate venue for litigating

the validity of agency actions. The tests are ways to

identify the potential for challenge or potential issues a

challenger could raise in the lawsuit, such as the validity

of a national standard or the validity of a statutory interpretation or national policy on which a specific action is

premised. And because the tests prescribe a central

venue for litigating certain cases, they must further be

understood as identifying situations where fragmented

review in local circuits could lead to duplicative litigation

and inconsistent rules for affected actors and for EPA.

7

“Sine qua non,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sine%20

qua%20non/.

24

This understanding of §307(b)(1) informs the meaning of “nationally” and “nationwide.” The definition of

“national” is “of or relating to a nation,”8 and similarly

the definition of “nationwide” is “extending throughout

a nation.”9 In context, they mean “general,” i.e., “irrespective of location” or “across circuits,” reflecting the

circumstances in which local review of an action could

generate duplicative litigation and inconsistent results

regarding an issue.

In short, the two tests for D.C. Circuit review together comprehensively identify actions that define general standards or otherwise raise general issues for review, rather than actions that raise issues limited to a

single actor or location.

This interpretation is confirmed by §307(b)(1)’s directive that a “locally or regionally applicable” action is

presumptively reviewable “only in the United States

Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.”

§7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). Congress’s use of the definite article (“the”) indicates that actions must be reviewed in a local circuit only if there is only one appropriate local circuit. And there can be a single appropriate local circuit only if the action raises issues limited to

a single actor or a single circuit. If the action raises a

general issue that could be raised by aggrieved parties

in multiple circuits, then local review in multiple “appropriate” circuits could result in duplicative litigation and

inconsistent rules. Had Congress wanted to tolerate

8

“National,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/national.

9

“Nationwide,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation

wide.

25

fragmented review of common, general issues in multiple circuits, it could easily have said that. Indeed, Congress did so in the preceding subsection of §307, where

it stated that “the district court … for any district in

which such person is found or resides … shall have jurisdiction” to issue certain orders. §7607(a).

Section 307(b)(1)’s express categorization of specific

actions as “nationally” or “locally or regionally” applicable also reinforces this interpretation. See Fischer v.

United States, 603 U.S. 480, 487 (2024) (“under the …

canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective term at

the end of a list of specific items is typically controlled

and defined by reference to the specific classes … that

precede it” (quotation cleaned)). The Act identifies as

“nationally applicable” those actions that “promulgat[e]”

a “standard,” “rule,” “control or prohibition”—all actions

that establish a standard or decision affecting parties

generally, irrespective of their specific location.

§7607(b)(1). For example, the Act deems “nationally applicable” the “national … ambient air quality standard[s]” (“NAAQS”), §7607(b)(1), which establish minimum air quality requirements that must be met in every

State. See 40 C.F.R. §§50.2(d), 50.4; 42 U.S.C. §§7401,

7410(a). The Act also deems “nationally applicable” limits on greenhouse-gas emissions for all manufacturers of

light-duty vehicles, see 42 U.S.C. §7521; Revised 2023

and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse

Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434, 74,434,

74,438, 74,439 (Dec. 30, 2021), even though the regulated

vehicle manufacturers are based in and produce vehicles

in a small minority of States.10

10

See “List of automotive assembly plants in the United

States,” Wikipedia (identifying about 17 automakers with

26

In contrast, the Act identifies as “locally or regionally applicable” actions that “approv[e] or promulgat[e]”

a state implementation plan (“SIP”) for a NAAQS, actions that grant or deny particular types of waivers, and

actions that impose certain penalties. §307(b)(1). Each

of these actions prescribes a standard or rule for a single

actor or location, namely, the State that proposed the

plan or the “person” who requested the waiver for an

emissions “source” or whose “source” violated applicable

emissions limits, see 42 U.S.C. §§7411(j), 7420(a)(2)(A).

Thus, comparison of this list of “locally or regionally applicable” actions to the list of “nationally applicable” actions illustrates that centralized review in the D.C. Circuit is warranted where the action is general, whereas

review in the local circuit is warranted where the action

is tied uniquely to a particular actor or location.

C. Section 307(b)(1)’s Legislative History Confirms That Congress Specifically Intended

That All Actions Raising General Issues Would

Be Reviewable In The D.C. Circuit

If §307(b)(1)’s text were ambiguous in any relevant

way, its legislative history would “clear [that] up.”

Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011);

accord Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 674

(2020); id. at 721 (Alito, J., dissenting). Consistent with

the textual interpretation just described, the history

shows that Congress designed §307(b)(1) to ensure that

any action defining a standard or otherwise raising an

issue affecting actors regardless of their location would

be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit to avoid duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules under the Act and to take

headquarters in 7 States and assembly plants in 17 States), https://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automotive_assembly_plants_in_the

_United_States.

27

advantage of the D.C. Circuit’s administrative-law expertise.

1. As initially enacted in 1970, §307(b)(1) lacked

the terms “nationally applicable,” “locally or regionally

applicable,” and “based on a determination of nationwide

scope or effect.” Instead, the provision specified the

venue for each type of action. Section 307(b)(1) required

that the D.C. Circuit review any “action … promulgating

any national primary or secondary ambient air quality

standard, any emission standard under section 112, any

standard of performance under section 111, any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to

be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under section 202(b)(5), any control or prohibition

under section 211, or any standard under section 2931.”

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (hereinafter “1970

Amendments”), Pub. L. No. 91-604, §12(a), 84 Stat. 1676,

1708 (1970). And §307(b)(1) provided that “the appropriate circuit” would review any “action in approving or

promulgating any implementation plan under section

110 or section 111(d).” Id.

The statute’s structure reflected Congress’ expectations about which actions would raise general issues and

thus require uniform disposition. The types of actions

designated for exclusive D.C. Circuit review were “national in scope” and therefore “require[d] even and consistent national application.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 41

(1970). Actions to be reviewed in “the appropriate circuit,” in contrast, “r[a]n only to one air quality control

region.” Id. (emphasis added).

Questions soon emerged regarding how to accomplish Congress’ goal of centralized review given the statute’s limited language. In 1972, various environmental

groups challenged an EPA action approving and

28

promulgating numerous States’ proposed SIPs together.

See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

465 F.2d 492, 493 (1st Cir. 1972) (addressing Approval

and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 37 Fed.

Reg. 10,842 (May 31, 1972)). The approvals undisputedly

had to be challenged in “the appropriate circuit” under

§307(b)(1) as it stood then. Id. at 493-494. Accordingly,

the petitioners sued in every regional circuit. Id. at 493.

But because they challenged “administrative policy positions which were applied nationally and uniformly” to

render the approvals, they argued that the D.C. Circuit

was “the appropriate” circuit. Id.

The First Circuit agreed, holding that the D.C. Circuit was the appropriate circuit because the lawsuit involved “the automatic application of standard, nationwide guidelines to all plans simultaneously [that] preordains wholesale approvals or extensions,” rather than

“particularistic attention … given to each plan devised

for one air quality control region.” Id. at 494. The court

emphasized: “The legal issues raised by petitioners in

the First Circuit seem to be identical with those raised

in every other circuit. The parties are the same. There

do not appear to be factual questions unique to each circuit.” Id. at 495. Therefore, localized adjudication would

create “possible inconsistent and delayed results on the

merits.” Id.

The D.C. Circuit then reached the same conclusion

because the contrary conclusion “would produce some

anomalous results” for two reasons. Natural Resources

Defense Council v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 969 (D.C. Cir.

1973). First, some of the challenged “implementation

plans … cover[ed] jurisdictions falling within several circuits.” Id. Second, “all of these cases raise[d] identical

legal issues. None of these issues involve[d] facts or laws

peculiar to any one jurisdiction; rather, all concern[ed]

29

uniform determinations of nationwide effect made by the

Administrator.” Id. at 970. Therefore, centralized review

in the D.C. Circuit served the “strong congressional concern for coordinated decision-making.” Id. at 969-970.

Two years later, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the

First and D.C. Circuits and accordingly applied “a similar analysis” to an action that “amended state implementation plans” and therefore “plainly” had to be reviewed

in “the appropriate circuit” under §307(b)(1). Dayton

Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703, 706, 708 (6th

Cir. 1975) (addressing Prevention of Significant Air

Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5,

1974)). Because the challenged action was “the product

of a unitary rule-making proceeding” and had “the effect

of amending every state’s air quality implementation

plan in precisely the same way”—and thus was “national

in scope and appl[ied] uniformly throughout the country”—the court recognized that review in each “local circuit” would create “a substantial risk of seriously inconsistent results and an inevitable delay.” Id. at 707-708.

Therefore, the court held that the D.C. Circuit was the

appropriate circuit. Id. at 708.

2. In 1977, Congress “clarif[ied]” §307(b)(1)’s language to provide a more direct path to the result reached

by the First, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits in the Natural Resources and Dayton Power cases, namely, centralized review in the D.C. Circuit of actions raising general issues.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 323 (1977).

Congress’s 1977 amendments gave §307(b)(1) its

current form. First, Congress expanded the range of actions for which review in the D.C. Circuit is mandatory

by adding “any other nationally applicable regulations

promulgated, or final action taken, by” EPA. Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §304(c)(1),

30

91 Stat. 685, 776 (1977). Second, Congress correspondingly expanded the range of actions for which review in

“the appropriate circuit” is presumptively mandatory by

adding “any other final action … which is locally or regionally applicable.” Id. §304(c)(2). Finally, Congress

added the third venue test, under which the second

test’s presumption would be rebutted in favor of the

D.C. Circuit “if [the] action is based on a determination

of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action

the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is

based on such a determination.” Id. §304(c)(4).

The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce, which prepared the amendments, see Pub. L.

No. 95-95, §305(c)(1), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (enacting H.R.

6161); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-564, at 140 (1977) (conference committee adopted House version), explained that

a determination is “nationwide” if it “has scope or effect

beyond a single judicial circuit.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294,

at 324 (emphasis added). That understanding reflects

§307(b)(1)’s fundamental purpose of avoiding duplicative

litigation and inconsistent rules. Because an underlying

determination whose scope or effect spans multiple circuits could aggrieve parties in those multiple circuits,

the revised statute ensures that review of such determinations can be centralized.

The Committee also stated that “[i]n adopting”

these amendments, it “concur[red] … with the comments, concerns, and recommendation contained in item

No. 1 of the separate statement of G. William Frick”—

then EPA’s general counsel—that “accompanied the Administrative Conference’s views.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294,

at 324. Mr. Frick recommended that §307(b)(1) be

amended to make clear that “where national issues are

involved they should be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.”

Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767,

31

56,768:3 (Dec. 30, 1976) (quotation cleaned). He observed that although “[c]ases involving” actions like

“permits” and SIP “approval[s] … usually involve issues

peculiar to the affected States,” they “sometimes involve

generic issues that apply to EPA’s actions nationwide,”

i.e., “generic determinations of nationwide scope or effect.” Id. at 56,768:3-56,769:1. “[S]uch actions [are] virtually identical to promulgation of ‘national standards,’”

which should be “reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.” Id. at

56,769:1; see id. 56,768:1 (discussing “national standards”).

As examples of actions involving generic issues or

actions otherwise virtually identical to national standards, which should be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit, Mr.

Frick cited the action approving numerous States’ SIPs

at issue in the Natural Resources cases, through which

EPA had applied a policy nationally and uniformly to

concurrently resolve multiple States’ status. 41 Fed.

Reg. at 56,769:1 & n.1. He noted that “it is possible to

argue that the D.C. Circuit is the ‘appropriate circuit’ for

review of ‘national’ SIP issues,” as the D.C., First, and

Sixth Circuits had already held under §307(b)(1)’s original language. Id. at 56,769:1 & n.3. But the new “based

on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” test, he

explained, would reinforce Congress’ original “inten[t]”

that “review … of matters on which national uniformity

is desirable” would take place in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at

56,769:1 (quotation cleaned). And, he said, “it ma[de]

sense to centralize review of ‘national’ … issues in the

D.C. Circuit[ to] tak[e] advantage of [that court’s] administrative law expertise and facilitat[e] an orderly development of the basic law under the Act.” Id. at

56,769:1.

32

D. Interpreting §307(b)(1) To Make All Actions

Applying A General Standard Reviewable In

The D.C. Circuit Does Not Mean All Actions

Will Be Reviewed In The D.C. Circuit

In their brief in opposition, respondents argued (at

25-26) that “apply[ing] a uniform standard to similarly

situated regulated parties” cannot suffice to require

D.C. Circuit review under §307(b)(1) because the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) “compel[s] EPA”

to do that “in every action,” and therefore every EPA

action would have to be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit.

That argument is substantially overstated.

First, as explained above, the “nationally applicable”

test does not depend on what standard the action rests

on, but rather depends on what standard the action establishes (or revises or reaffirms). Merely “constru[ing]

and appl[ying] nationally applicable provisions … does

not transform a locally applicable action into a nationally

applicable one.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 45 F.4th

380, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2022); see also Sierra Club v. EPA,

926 F.3d 844, 849-850 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Second, applying a uniform standard can but will

not always satisfy the “based on a determination” test.

A “determination” is “the resolving of a question by argument or reasoning” or “the act, process, or result of an

accurate measurement.”11 EPA sometimes applies a

mandatory or settled general standard, e.g., a standard

directly imposed by the Act, a standard conclusively

adopted by the courts as the best reading of the statute,

or a standard for which the Act’s 60-day time bar has

11

“Determination,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determination.

33

expired, see §7607(b)(1). In such cases, the action would

be based not on a determination of the general standard—the selection of the standard would not be up for

debate or judicial review—but rather only on the standard’s rote application.

Third, some EPA actions do not turn on a general

determination at all. For example, EPA has denied proposed SIPs for purely factual reasons specific to the proposing State. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th

323, 328-329 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he circumstances addressed by the EPA were those particular and unique to

West Virginia …. These discussions all focused on the

data particular to West Virginia and the analyses that

West Virginia conducted with respect to those statespecific data.”); Kentucky v. EPA, __ F.4th __, No. 233216, 2024 WL 5001991, at *12 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024)

(“[T]he agency decided that Kentucky’s plan did not satisfy the Good Neighbor Provision due to circumstances

… unique to that plan,” and EPA “would have denied

Kentucky’s plan even if it had allowed Kentucky to use

the 2011 modeling and 1 ppb threshold” (quotation

cleaned)). Such grounds would be sufficient to deny a

proposed SIP, and therefore a SIP denial premised only

on such grounds would not be based on a determination

of nationwide scope or effect.

And fourth, even where an action is based on a general determination, the D.C. Circuit is the exclusive

venue to review it only if EPA expressly makes and publishes a finding to that effect. §7607(b)(1). EPA has discretion not to make such a finding and sometimes exercises that prerogative. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 926 F.3d at

849-850. For example, EPA might elect not to make the

requisite finding if it recognizes that the general standard applied is unlikely to be challenged—and thus the

risk of duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules is

34

low—or if it believes that duplicative litigation or inconsistent rules are tolerable or even desirable in the particular context. Compare, e.g., Pet.App.187a n.259 (“In

deciding whether to invoke the exception by making and

publishing a finding that this final action is based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect, the Administrator has also taken into account a number of policy

considerations, including his judgment balancing the

benefit of obtaining the D.C. Circuit’s authoritative centralized review versus allowing development of the issue

in other contexts and the best use of Agency resources.”), with, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 296, 326 (Jan. 5, 2016)

(“some variation” allowed for SIP actions “across EPA

regions” (quotation cleaned)).

II. THE 2022 EXEMPTION ACTIONS MUST BE REVIEWED

IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT

For several independent reasons, §307(b)(1) mandates that the 2022 exemption actions be reviewed exclusively in the D.C. Circuit. First, the actions are nationally applicable because every small-refinery exemption adjudication affects national RFP obligations as a

matter of law, and in turn has consequences for non-exempt obligated parties and renewable-fuel producers

around the country. Second, the actions are nationally

applicable because they announced general standards

for adjudicating all RFP exemption petitions, wherever

the petitioning refinery might be. And third, the actions

are based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect (and EPA properly published a finding saying so)

because EPA’s new general standard—both its causation requirement and its presumption of cost recoupment—was an essential premise of all the exemption denials. All these reasons hold true regardless of whether

the relevant administrative actions are the 105

35

individual exemption denials or the integrated actions

through which those denials were issued.

For all these reasons, the D.C. Circuit is the appropriate circuit for review of these actions just as much as

it was for review of the SIP-related actions in the Natural Resources and Dayton Power cases, whose results

Congress endorsed when it revised §307(b)(1) in 1977.

A. The Integrated 2022 Exemption Actions Are

The Relevant Actions, But The Unit Of Action

Is Irrelevant Here Anyway

In opposing certiorari, respondents argued that “the

relevant administrative action is EPA’s denial of each

small refinery’s individual petition for hardship relief”—

105 supposed actions in all—not the integrated exemption actions issued in April and June 2022. Opp.17, 20-21

(quotation cleaned). As the analysis below shows, the

question of how to define the unit of action is irrelevant

here; either way, the D.C. Circuit was the only venue in

which the petitions for review could be filed under

§307(b)(1). See infra pt. II.B-C.

In any event, respondents’ definition of the relevant

unit of action is incorrect. EPA defined the “actions” as

the integrated decisions issued in April and June 2022

collectively denying multiple exemption petitions: “In

this action, [EPA] is denying 69 petitions …. This final

action … is a single action, but it is comprised of the adjudication of 69 [exemption] petitions.” Pet.App.48a;

Pet.App.193a. Respondents’ contrary statutory arguments beg the question. They noted (at 18) that

§307(b)(1)’s venue provisions refer to “action … under

this chapter” and that “chapter” refers to the Clean Air

Act. However, EPA’s integrated exemption actions

were issued under the Clean Air Act just as much as an

action denying a single exemption petition alone.

36

Respondents also noted (at 19) that the Act’s provisions

authorizing small-refinery exemptions consistently use

the singular to refer to the exemption petition and

EPA’s adjudication thereof: “A small refinery” may petition “for an extension of the exemption,”

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis added); “In evaluating a petition,” §7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) (emphasis added); “The Administrator shall act on any petition … not later than 90 days

after the date of receipt of the petition,”

§7545(o)(9)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). That language does

not, however, preclude EPA from resolving multiple individual petitions jointly under a single, common standard, as EPA did here.

B. The 2022 Exemption Actions Are “Nationally

Applicable”

1. The 2022 Exemption Actions are “nationally applicable,” for two independent reasons.

First, unlike other types of individual adjudications,

such as a typical SIP approval, see §7607(b)(1), small-refinery exemption decisions have a distinctive feature

that makes each such adjudication inherently nationally

applicable.

The RFP establishes general standards specifying

the amount of renewable fuel that obligated parties must

inject into the nation’s transportation-fuel supply, irrespective of their location. Because of the RFP’s legal

structure, a decision on a petition for a small-refinery exemption is necessarily a decision that defines the level of

those national RFP requirements. Granting an exemption automatically either (a) raises the percentage standards for all non-exempt obligated parties (if EPA adjusts

the percentage standards to account for the exemption,

as required by EPA’s regulations under certain circumstances), or (b) reduces the nationally required volume

37

of renewable-fuel use (if EPA does not make that adjustment). Therefore, any litigation over an exemption decision (regardless of whether the decision granted or denied the exemption) is about the level of the general

RFP standards. Moreover, these legal effects have corresponding practical effects on renewable-fuel purchases and RIN purchases around the country. See supra pp.7-8, 21-23.12

Second, even if the foregoing were not true, the 2022

exemption actions would be nationally applicable because they announced a new general standard for adjudicating all exemption petitions. In the actions, EPA

“adopt[ed]” its interpretation that the Act requires that

a petitioning refinery “demonstrate a direct causal relationship between its RF[P] compliance costs and the

[disproportionate economic hardship] it alleges,”

Pet.App.55a, 57a, 80a, 104a, 106a; Pet.App.199a, 224a,

228a, 246a, 248a, and EPA established a presumption

that RFP compliance does not cause small refineries

such hardship because they can recoup their compliance

costs by passing the costs through the supply chain,

Pet.App.68a, 83a-84a, 107a-108a, 168a; Pet.App.212a,

227a-228a, 249a-250a, 310a. In both actions, EPA stated

that this standard “appl[ies] to all small refineries no

matter the location or market in which they operate.”

12

Although renewable-fuel producers are not “obligated parties,” they are a direct object of exemption decisions because RFS

“annual standards” “directly regulate biofuel producers” by mandating the amount of renewable fuel that must be supplied and used,

American Fuel, 937 F.3d at 595, and, as just explained, exemption

decisions affect the level of those standards. See Energy Future

Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh,

J.) (although “regulation [prohibiting use of certain biofuel in vehicles] is technically directed at vehicle manufacturers,” biofuel producers were also “an object of the action”).

38

Pet.App.187a-188a, 329a (emphasis added). And in both

actions, EPA stated that it “will” apply this standard

both to all exemption petitions then pending and “going

forward.” Pet.App.101a; see also Pet.App.104a (EPA “is

therefore adopting this interpretation going forward.”);

Pet.App.242a-243a, 246a. Thus, the actions “promulgate[d]” a general “standard” or “rule,” just like the regulations and rules that §307(b)(1) expressly identifies as

nationally applicable and subject to mandatory exclusive

D.C. Circuit review. §7607(b)(1).

That the actions promulgated a general standard is

so even if each individual exemption denial is deemed the

relevant administrative action, because each such action

made the same announcement concurrently through the

April and June 2022 exemption actions. As the citations

in the preceding paragraph show, EPA expressly announced its general standard in both actions. Indeed, in

the June action EPA explained and defended the general

standard anew, e.g., Pet.App.84a-85a (“For the reasons

described herein, EPA believes that this approach is the

best interpretation of—and the most reasonable way to

implement—the statutory SRE provisions.”), and in as

much detail as it had in the April 2022 exemption action,

compare

Pet.App.223a-228a,

242a-326a

with

Pet.App.79a-85a, 100a-184a.

In any event, the temporal separation between the

April and June 2022 exemption actions is artificial and

should be disregarded for venue purposes. Both actions

were the product of the unitary administrative proceeding commenced in December 2021. See supra p.10. EPA

merely adjudicated the petitions in two tranches for administrative convenience based on their procedural posture: the April adjudications covered the exemption petitions for 2018, which the D.C. Circuit had remanded

and which the D.C. Circuit had directed EPA to

39

adjudicate by April 7, 2022, whereas the June adjudications covered all the other pending exemption petitions,

which were not subject to a court-ordered deadline. Supra pp.9-12. Thus, the two actions genuinely reflect a

single resolution of a single, comprehensive administrative proceeding.

2. The court below considered the 2022 exemption

actions not “nationally applicable” because their general

“approach” does not “bind[] EPA in any future adjudication” of exemption petitions. Pet.App.12a. That is incorrect for several independent reasons.

First, the court below did not account for the inherently national nature of every small-refinery exemption

decision.

Second, the 2022 exemption actions’ general standard controlled at least with respect to all pending exemption petitions, and that is enough. Section 307(b)(1)

does not specify whether the action’s “applicability”

must be in the present or future.

And third, the exemption action’s general standard

indeed bound EPA in the future as much as a regulation

would. Not only did the actions state that EPA “will”

apply the new standard “going forward,” supra p.38, but

also “[a]djudication … has future … legal consequences,

since the principles announced in an adjudication”—just

like a regulation—“cannot be departed from in future

adjudications without reason.” Bowen v. Georgetown

University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 216-217 (1988) (Scalia,

J., concurring); see, e.g., Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d

475, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“An agency interpretation in

40

an informal adjudication may … have general applicability and the force of law.”).13

The lower court’s reasoning “effectively removes all

‘adjudications’ from the ambit of §7607(b)(1),” contrary

to the statutory text. Pet.App.39a. Section 307(b)(1)’s

“nationally applicable” test expressly applies not only to

“any … regulations,” but also to “any … action.”

§7607(b)(1). Congress has expressly defined administrative “action” to include informal adjudication. 5 U.S.C.

§551(7), (13). Thus, “action” in this context must include

the adjudication of small-refinery exemption petitions,

particularly given the Act’s juxtaposition of “action” and

“regulations”; otherwise, “action” would be superfluous.

See also Harrison, 446 U.S. at 583, 592-593 (phrase “any

other final action” in §307(b)(1) encompasses not only

“formal adjudication [and] informal rulemaking,” but

also informal adjudication). “[T]hat kind of superfluity,

in and of itself, refutes [the court of appeals’] reading.”

Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 143 (2024).

C. Alternatively, EPA Published Its (Sound)

Finding That The 2022 Exemption Actions Are

“Based On A Determination Of Nationwide

Scope Or Effect”

1. Courts must defer to EPA’s finding that an

action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect

EPA’s finding that an action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” should be reviewed

deferentially. The APA “mandate[s] that judicial review

13

This remains true for an agency’s statutory interpretation

until the courts conclusively determine the “best reading” of the

statute. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244,

2266 (2024).

41

of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential”

under the arbitrary-and-capricious and substantial-evidence standards. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2261 (2024) (citing 5 U.S.C.

§706(2)(A), (E)).

The court below, however, concluded that it had to

“independently assess” whether the exemption actions

are based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Pet.App.13a (quotation cleaned). According to

Fifth Circuit precedent, §307(b)(1)’s “based on a determination” test has “two conditions”: “First the action

must be based on such a determination and second the

agency must so find and publish.” Texas v. EPA, 829

F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2016). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, courts “must make an independent assessment of the scope of the determinations” “[b]ecause

the answer to the first condition controls the role of the

court.” Id. The intuition behind the Fifth Circuit’s position seems to be that deferring to EPA’s finding “effectively collapse[s] both conditions into the second condition, thereby rendering the first condition superfluous.”

Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107, 1114 (11th Cir.

2024) (Lagoa, J., concurring). That is not the case.

To be sure, there cannot be both deferential review

of EPA’s finding and de novo review on the same question; it must be one or the other. But the lower court’s

analysis is incorrect. Deferential review does not render

the first “condition” superfluous because §307(b)(1) does

not actually require both the court and EPA to make the

same finding. Rather, the best reading of §307(b)(1) is

that it establishes a substantive condition and a procedural condition, both for EPA: it spells out the finding

that EPA must make and then spells out the process by

which EPA must make it in order to trigger D.C. Circuit

42

venue, namely, EPA must make the finding expressly,

in a published notice.

Section 307(b)(1) should be read this way for several

reasons.

First, it is the Fifth Circuit’s view that renders part

of §307(b)(1) superfluous. If Congress intended courts

to determine the basis of an action independently, there

would have been no need for Congress to also direct

EPA to formally make the same finding; EPA’s substantive assessment would be irrelevant. One might say that

EPA’s publication of the finding would still serve the

role of expressing its desire for D.C. Circuit review

should the court make the requisite finding. But Congress could have easily achieved that more directly by

directing EPA to merely state that preference, without

the trouble of making a substantive finding.

Second, the APA’s “default standard” of deferential

review applies unless another statute “specif[ies] a

standard for judicial review,” Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496

(2004), and §307(b)(1) does not specify a standard for review for EPA findings that an action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Congress certainly knew how to do that because, elsewhere in the

Clean Air Act, Congress prescribed the standard for reviewing certain regulations promulgated via rulemaking. See §7607(d)(1), (9).

Third, deferential review is especially appropriate

here because “[i]t is clear that Congress, by empowering

the EPA Administrator to publish a finding that an action is ‘based on a determination of nationwide scope or

effect,’ delegated unusual authority to control the venue

of judicial review.” National Environmental Development Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 891 F.3d 1041,

43

1053 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Silberman, J., concurring). And

“the Administrator, as the national regulator, is in a

much better position than a regional circuit court to evaluate the nationwide impact of [the Administrator’s own]

action.” Id.

And fourth, deferential review serves the two overarching imperatives: avoiding wasteful litigation over

venue and avoiding duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules under the Act. The more deferential the

review of EPA’s finding, the less likely the finding is to

spur litigation over venue and the more likely EPA is to

successfully ensure centralized review when it deems

centralization warranted.

2. EPA’s finding that the 2022 exemption actions are based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect is correct

a. However EPA’s finding that the 2022 exemption actions are based on determinations of nationwide

scope or effect is reviewed, it is correct. This is plain

from the fact that the exemption actions—individually

or collectively—could have precipitated, and did in fact

precipitate, duplicative litigation of the same general issues, with inconsistent results and thus inconsistent

rules going forward.

In the 2022 exemption actions, EPA “determined

that any small refinery seeking an exemption … must”

satisfy the new two-part standard: the interpretation of

the Act to require direct causation and the empirical presumption that small refineries can recoup their RFP

compliance costs.

Pet.App.55a; Pet.App.199a-200a.

These are “determinations” under §307(b)(1) because

they reflect EPA’s reasoned resolution of a question and

a measurement (of small refineries’ ability to recoup

their RIN cost). These determinations have nationwide

44

scope or effect because they operate on and have consequences for all small refineries, irrespective of their location, across multiple judicial circuits. In other words,

they are general determinations, not limited to any individual refinery. See supra p.32, pp.22-23.

Further, the 2022 exemption actions—and each individual exemption adjudication rendered through the

2022 exemption actions—were based on these determinations. These determinations were essential premises

of each exemption adjudication: EPA denied each exemption petition because it concluded that each small refinery had failed to rebut EPA’s empirical presumption

of cost recoupment and therefore had not shown that

RFP compliance caused the refinery to suffer the alleged disproportionate economic hardship. See supra

pp.11-12. But for its general standard, EPA may well

have granted the exemption petitions instead. Indeed,

that is the result EPA routinely reached under its prior

approach, which did not require causation or account for

refineries’ ability to recoup their RFP compliance costs.

See supra pp.9-10.

Thus, the exemption denials involve general issues,

and those issues are appropriately subject to centralized

review. Local review would create a risk of duplicative

litigation and inconsistent rules for small-refinery exemptions—which is especially problematic for a program that establishes national standards to ensure that

certain volumes of renewable fuel are used nationally,

see supra pp.5-7.

Of course, this is exactly what happened. Refineries

whose exemption petitions were denied in April or June

2022 sought review in circuits around the country. See

supra p.13. They principally challenged the general elements of EPA’s general standard on grounds that were

45

independent of the individual refineries’ specific circumstances, including asserting that EPA’s causation requirement contradicted the Act’s plain text and that

EPA’s presumption of cost recoupment contradicted the

empirical record. See, e.g., C.A.ECF #270-3, at 42-65, 7273; Petitioners’ Final Joint Opening Br. 34-85, 98-103,

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-1073,

ECF #2035080 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2024); Petitioner’s

Opening Br. 35-52, Hunt Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 2211617, ECF #51 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2023).

Predictably, the two circuits to decide the merits of

the refineries’ arguments—the Fifth Circuit in this case

and the D.C. Circuit—reached different conclusions on

some of those issues. For example, the court below held

that EPA impermissibly acted retroactively in departing from certain aspects of its prior approach—its reliance on the Department of Energy’s “scoring matrix”—

because DOE had not accounted for refineries’ ability to

recoup their RIN costs. Pet.App.19a-23a. In contrast,

the D.C. Circuit declined to reach the retroactivity issue.

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 114 F.4th 693,

714 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Therefore, EPA may have to

revert to DOE’s framework when re-adjudicating the

exemption petitions remanded by the Fifth Circuit but

not when re-adjudicating the ones remanded by the D.C.

Circuit. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit and the court below identified different flaws in EPA’s RINpassthrough analysis. Compare id. at 711-714 with

Pet.App.30a-33a.14

14

Both circuits interpreted the Act to mean that small refineries must show that their RFP compliance is a “but-for” cause of

their disproportionate economic hardship, but need not show that

compliance is the “sole cause” of that hardship. Sinclair Wyoming,

46

Certainly, fragmented review of the 2022 exemption

actions created the potential for even wider divergence

between the circuits. And fragmented review of generic

determinations on which future small-refinery exemption actions are based could again create a serious risk of

duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules.

Inconsistent exemption rules pose a serious problem

for the RFP, which governs the entire nation’s supply of

transportation fuel and affects every level of the supply

chain, from farmers growing renewable-fuel feedstocks,

to producers of renewable and petroleum-based fuels, to

distributors, retailers, and consumers of transportation

fuel. Small refineries have been responsible for more

than 10%—several billion gallons—of the RFP’s annual

renewable-fuel mandate. Compare EPA, RFS Small

Refinery Exemptions, with EPA,15 Renewable Fuel Annual Standards.16 Allowing an ever-fragmenting patchwork of small-refinery exemption standards around the

country undermines the “market certainty so critical to

the [RFP’s] long term success.” Americans for Clean

Energy, 864 F.3d at 715 (quotation cleaned).

114 F.4th at 708-709; Pet.App.23-27a. But the lower courts’ rejection of the “sole cause” test was based on a misconception of EPA’s

position: EPA never required that RFP compliance be the sole

cause, only that it be the proximate cause, i.e., that there be “a direct causal relationship between its RF[P] compliance costs and”

the hardship. Pet.App.80a; Pet.App.224a. The lower courts never

addressed whether the Act requires proximate cause, and this case

presents no occasion for this Court to do so, either.

15

https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-com

pliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions (data updated Nov. 21,

2024).

16

https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/re

newable-fuel-annual-standards (updated June 4, 2024).

47

b. The lower court’s contrary conclusion is wrong.

Although the court acknowledged that EPA’s general standard had nationwide scope or effect and that the

exemption denials were based on that standard, the

court instead focused on the fact that the denials also

necessarily “rel[ied] on refinery-specific determinations” that “each of the petitions … did not … present

facts contrary to” EPA’s general cost-recoupment finding. Pet.App.15a.

That analysis contravenes the statute. Section

307(b)(1) does not send to the D.C. Circuit only those

cases that are based exclusively on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Section 307(b)(1) uses the indefinite article, providing for D.C. Circuit review if the

action is based on “a” determination of nationwide scope

or effect. §7607(b)(1). The Dictionary Act declares that,

“unless the context indicates otherwise[,] words importing the singular include and apply to several persons,

parties, or things.” 1 U.S.C. §1. And as an indefinite article, the word “a” often indicates “one or more.” The

dictionary defines “a” to mean “any,” which in turn

means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind,”

“one, some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity,” and “unmeasured or unlimited in amount, number,

or extent.”17

In this context, “a” must mean “one or more.” Actions by EPA under the Act can be and routinely are

based on multiple determinations, i.e., they have multiple essential premises. See Paroline v. United States,

17

“A,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a/; “any,” MerriamWebster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/any/.

48

572 U.S. 434, 444-445 (2014) (“Every event has many

[but-for] causes ….”). There would be no basis to single

out one among them as the determination that matters

for whether the “based on a determination” test is met.

Rather, as long as the action rests on at least one general

determination and thereby raises at least one general issue for judicial review, the action must be reviewable in

the D.C. Circuit because fragmented adjudication of that

general issue could spur the duplicative litigation and inconsistent rules that Congress enacted §307(b)(1) to

avoid.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the decision below.

49

Respectfully submitted.

DAVID M. LEHN

JAY SCHUFFENHAUER

CESAR AZRAK

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

1401 New York Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 237-2727

dlehn@bsfllp.com

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 663-6800

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

EVAN M. EZRAY

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

401 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 1200

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

(954) 377-4237

Counsel for Respondents

Counsel for Growth Energy

MATTHEW W. MORRISON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW

PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 663-8036

matthew.morrison

@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for the Renewable

Fuels Association

DECEMBER 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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