Reply Brief — Environmental Protection Agency, Petitioner v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 11, 2024

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No. 23-1229

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

PETITIONER

v.

CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A.

B.

The court of appeals’ decision is incorrect .................... 2

This Court’s review is warranted ................................... 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

ATK Launch Sys., Inc., v. EPA, 651 F.3d 1194

(10th Cir. 2011) ................................................................ 4, 10

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v.

Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382 (2021) ............... 3, 10

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015) ......... 3

RMS of Ga., LLC v. EPA, 64 F.4th 1368

(11th Cir. 2023) ...................................................................... 4

Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co., v. EPA:

No. 22-1073, 2024 WL 3801747

(D.C. Cir. July 26, 2024) .......................................... 7, 8

101 F.4th 871 (D.C. Cir. 2024) .......................................... 8

Southern Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666

(7th Cir. 2017)........................................................................ 4

Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ..................................... 2

42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).............................................. 2, 8

42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii) ................................................ 3

42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)(III)......................................... 8

42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B)(iii) ............................................... 3

42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) ......................................... 1-3, 5, 6, 11

(I)

II

Miscellaneous:

Page

Committee on Adjudication, Administrative Conference of the United States, Aggregation of Similar

Claims in Agency Adjudication (June 13, 2016),

https://perma.cc/2UQS-TJ6F .............................................. 3

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions Table SRE-1

(July 24, 2024), https://www.epa.gov/fuelsregistration-reporting-and-compliance-help/

rfs-small-refinery-exemptions............................................. 9

Energy Information Administration, Refinery

Capacity Report for 2024 (Jan. 1, 2024),

https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/

table5.pdf ............................................................................... 9

80 Fed. Reg. 33,840 (June 12, 2015) ....................................... 4

86 Fed. Reg. 27,756 (May 21, 2021) ....................................... 4

86 Fed. Reg. 70,999 (Dec. 14, 2021) ..................................... 10

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-1229

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

PETITIONER

v.

CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

The Fifth Circuit held that venue in that court was

proper for challenges to two agency actions in which the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had applied a

uniform methodology in denying Renewable Fuel

Standard (RFS) exemption petitions filed by small refineries throughout the country. The Fifth Circuit’s

venue holding directly conflicts with a published decision of the Eleventh Circuit and with unpublished orders of four other circuits. The governing venue provision mandates exclusive venue in the D.C. Circuit for

challenges to “nationally applicable” EPA actions, and

for challenges to any EPA action that is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect * * * if in taking such action [EPA] finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” 42 U.S.C.

7607(b)(1). EPA’s denial actions belong in the D.C. Circuit under either test, and the Fifth Circuit’s contrary

(1)

2

holding subverts Congress’s intent to achieve uniformity in judicial review of nationally relevant EPA actions. Respondents’ attempts to minimize the significance of the circuit conflict, both in general and in its

implications for the ultimate disposition of the exemption petitions at issue here, are unpersuasive. This

Court’s review is warranted.

A. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Is Incorrect

The denial actions at issue here were “nationally applicable * * * final action[s]” within the meaning of 42

U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). In the alternative, if those actions

were “locally or regionally applicable,” they were

“based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”

and EPA made and published a finding to that effect.

Ibid. Respondents’ contrary arguments lack merit.

1. The denial actions are “nationally applicable” because they apply a uniform methodology to 105 petitions

for exemptions from the RFS program, spanning 18

States and eight federal judicial circuits. See Pet. 1215; Pet. App. 187a, 329a. In directing that challenges to

locally or regionally applicable EPA actions should generally be filed in “the appropriate circuit,” Section

7607(b)(1) indicates that there is only one appropriate

regional circuit in which to seek review of such actions.

42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). That in turn implies that, when an EPA action is not confined to a single judicial circuit, the action is “nationally applicable”

and subject to review in the D.C. Circuit. See Pet. 1314.

Respondents dispute none of this. Instead, they contend (Br. in Opp. 18-19) that a reviewing court should

treat the two denial actions at issue here as 105 individual denials of exemption petitions. Respondents assert

that, because the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401

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et seq., refers to “ ‘a petition,’ ” EPA must “separately

consider and decide each petition it receives.” Br. in

Opp. 19 (citing 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) and (ii)). But

the Fifth Circuit rejected respondents’ claim that EPA

had acted contrary to law by “evaluat[ing] multiple petitions simultaneously.” Pet. App. 29a; see ibid. (explaining that respondents had “fail[ed] to show that the

relevant statutory provisions require EPA to consider

exemption petitions individually”).

EPA acted reasonably in grouping the petitions together.1 Indeed, such aggregation is encouraged as a

means of efficiently adjudicating common issues. See

Committee on Adjudication, Administrative Conference

of the United States, Aggregation of Similar Claims in

Agency Adjudication (June 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/

2UQS-TJ6F. This Court has likewise recognized the

“very basic tenet of administrative law that agencies

should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.”

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 102

(2015) (citation omitted). The decision whether to group

petitions presenting common questions falls within that

category. Consistent with that view, and with Section

7607(b)(1)’s focus on the “final action taken,” 42 U.S.C.

7607(b)(1), other circuits have looked to the face of

EPA’s action when applying Section 7607(b)(1) and

Respondents argue (Br. in Opp. 19, 23) that EPA was able to

aggregate the petitions here only by violating the CAA’s 90-day

deadline for the agency to rule on an exemption petition. See 42

U.S.C. 7545(o)(9)(B)(iii). But respondent Wynnewood agreed to delay proceedings to allow EPA to account for the implications of this

Court’s decision in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382 (2021); the other respondents

similarly understood that EPA’s delay was tied to that case, and

they did not press EPA to act on their petitions within the 90-day

window. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 11-17.

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have rejected attempts to disjoin actions, even when

parties describe them as “an amalgamation of many different locally or regionally applicable agency actions.”

Southern Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 671 (7th

Cir. 2017); see ATK Launch Sys., Inc., v. EPA, 651 F.3d

1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 2011); RMS of Ga., LLC v. EPA, 64

F.4th 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 2023).

Respondents are also wrong to assert (Br. in Opp.

24-25) that, under EPA’s approach, every EPA action is

nationally applicable because it will inevitably be based

on a “uniform statutory standard.” EPA has not argued

that application of a uniform standard is sufficient to

make an action nationally applicable. Rather, an EPA

action qualifies as nationally applicable when it applies

a uniform standard to entities in multiple judicial circuits. Consistent with that approach, when EPA has

acted on a single RFS exemption petition, the agency

has typically asserted that any petition for review

should be filed in the appropriate regional circuit. See,

e.g., Gov’t C.A. Br. at 22-28, Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v.

EPA, No. 18-1115 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2019); Order at 1-2,

American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 09-1085 (D.C.

Cir. Mar. 15, 2010). By contrast, when EPA has taken

a final action that applies a nationally uniform standard

to entities in multiple judicial circuits, it has stated that

petitions for review belong in the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g.,

86 Fed. Reg. 27,756 (May 21, 2021) (final rule promulgating federal plan for municipal solid waste landfills located in multiple States and Indian country); 80 Fed.

Reg. 33,840 (June 12, 2015) (final rule finding state implementation plans for 36 States substantially inadequate to meet CAA requirements).

2. Even if the denial actions at issue here were “locally or regionally applicable,” they would still be re-

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viewable exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because they

were “based on a determination of nationwide scope or

effect” and EPA made and published a finding to that

effect. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). EPA based the denials on

its statutory interpretation that any qualifying hardship

“must be caused by compliance with the RFS program,”

and on its economic determination that, as a matter of

market reality, the cost of compliance is the same for all

refineries and is reflected in market prices. Pet. App.

248a; see Pet. 15-16; Pet. App. 242a, 249a. EPA seeks

to apply those determinations uniformly nationwide to

ensure consistent treatment of small refineries.

Like the court of appeals (Pet. App. 15a), respondents contend (Br. in Opp. 22-23) that the challenged

EPA actions cannot be reviewable in the D.C. Circuit

under Section 7607(b)(1)’s second prong because EPA

considered individual refineries’ “local facts and data”

in determining that the refineries’ exemption requests

should be denied. Id. at 23. That approach would effectively limit the applicability of Section 7607(b)(1)’s second prong to review of EPA actions that are based

solely on determinations of nationwide scope or effect.

But since the “nationwide scope or effect” prong potentially comes into play only when the challenged EPA action is “locally or regionally applicable,” 42 U.S.C.

7607(b)(1), and since such EPA actions characteristically rest at least in part on consideration of local or regional circumstances, that approach would largely negate this basis for D.C. Circuit venue. See Pet. 17.

Respondents cannot dispute that the “core determinations” driving EPA’s disposition of the individual refineries’ exemption requests were the agency’s determinations regarding the statute’s meaning and the characteristics of the relevant market, which taken together

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resulted in denial of the petitions nationwide. Pet. App.

42a (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Two other features

of the denial actions at issue here make it particularly

appropriate to regard those actions as “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” First, EPA’s

overarching statutory-interpretation and economic determinations presumptively resolve each of the petitions, subject only to possible rebuttal of the presumption based on refinery-specific circumstances. See Pet.

18. And second, EPA’s disposition of the petitions will

affect other entities in addition to the petitioning refineries because the agency must account for exemptions

by shifting burdens to other parties. See Pet. 16; see

also Pet. App. 248a & n.139.

Respondents repeat their contention (Br. in Opp. 2526) that EPA’s rationale would result in D.C. Circuit

venue for every locally or regionally applicable action.

But this ground for D.C. Circuit venue applies only

when the challenged agency action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” 42 U.S.C.

7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). The italicized language

requires a causal connection between the determination

and the ultimate decision that will not exist in every

case.

B. This Court’s Review Is Warranted

Although respondents do not dispute that the question presented is the subject of a circuit split on a recurring issue, they assert (Br. in Opp. 26-31) that this case

is an unsuitable vehicle for deciding the question. But

respondents identify no concerns that should prevent

the Court from granting review here, and this case remains the best available vehicle to clarify Section

7607(b)(1)’s proper application.

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1. Respondents contend (Br. in Opp. 26-27) that,

even if this Court grants review and ratifies the government’s position on venue, the Court’s decision will make

no difference to the ultimate disposition of the underlying exemption petitions at issue here. As respondents

explain (ibid.), the D.C. Circuit recently vacated EPA

denial actions involving dozens of small-refinery exemption petitions spanning compliance years 2016-2021.

See Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co., v. EPA, No. 221073, 2024 WL 3801747 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2024) (per

curiam). Respondents argue (Br. in Opp. 27) that, even

if the Court grants certiorari in the present case and

ultimately holds that respondents’ petitions for review

should have been filed in the D.C. Circuit, “the only result of transfer would be another loss for the government on the merits, with the D.C. Circuit adopting the

same reasoning as the Fifth Circuit here.”

Respondents are correct that, if the Court grants

certiorari in this case and EPA prevails on the venue

issue, the agency will ultimately reconsider respondents’ exemption petitions under the legal standards announced by the D.C. Circuit in Sinclair. In that scenario, however, EPA would have meaningful options for

adjudicating those petitions that it lacks under the Fifth

Circuit’s decision. See Pet. 23 (foreseeing that, “[i]f the

D.C. Circuit disagrees with the Fifth Circuit even in

part, its order may subject EPA to conflicting guidance

on remand”).

Most notably, the Fifth Circuit found that refineries

had reasonably relied on EPA’s prior approach to adjudicating exemption petitions, such that the agency’s

consideration of updated economic information regarding RFS compliance costs—relating to the “RIN cost

passthrough principle”—created impermissible retro-

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activity. Pet. App. 16a-23a. The Sinclair court did not

reach this issue.2 Under the Fifth Circuit’s retroactivity

analysis, EPA would be required to evaluate the remanded petitions under its prior approach, which primarily relied on the Department of Energy’s 2011

study, without considering updated economic analysis

of a small refinery’s compliance costs beyond those contemplated by the study and corresponding scoring matrix. Under Sinclair, by contrast, EPA may consider

any updated economic information about the refinery’s

compliance costs that is relevant to assessing whether a

small refinery actually suffers hardship. That difference between the Fifth and D.C. Circuits’ merits analyses is reasonably likely to be outcome-determinative

with respect to at least some exemption petitions.

The difference between the two opinions thus creates

a realistic prospect that the RFS program—through

which Congress directed EPA to ensure a uniform, nationwide framework for increasing renewable fuel use,

see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) and (o)(2)(B)(ii)(III)—

will consist of one program for remanded petitions for

most of the nation, and a separate, more favorable program for exemption claimants in the Fifth Circuit. EPA

estimates that as many as 18 small refineries, with annual aggregate RFS compliance obligations of approximately a billion gallons of renewable fuel, could potentially be entitled to review in the Fifth Circuit under

that court’s venue holding. If EPA is required to grant

exemptions to those refineries based on the Fifth CirThe D.C. Circuit did, however, deny a separate retroactivity

challenge to EPA’s action. See Sinclair, 2024 WL 3801747, at *17*19; see also Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 101 F.4th 871,

880, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (upholding another EPA retroactive RFS

action and collecting past D.C. Circuit cases that did the same).

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cuit’s ruling, the RFS program will fall short of ensuring the nationwide target volumes for the years at issue

in respondents’ challenge. And in the future, if Fifth

Circuit small refineries remain subject to more favorable standards for newly filed petitions, the exempted

volumes will be allocated to other obligated parties, see

Pet. 16, resulting in “serious practical harm to the RFS

program,” Pet. 23. This is precisely the type of disuniformity that the CAA’s venue provision is intended to

prevent.

Respondents are also incorrect in claiming (Br. in

Opp. 27) that the RFS program is “relatively obscure”

and does not warrant the Court’s attention because it

affects only small refineries. About 36 small refineries

currently are responsible for approximately ten percent

of U.S. refining capacity and an equivalent percentage

of the annual RFS obligations, and most such refineries

submit exemption petitions each year.3 Those exemptions

have a significant effect on the RFS program. In 2017, for

example, approximately 1.6 billion gallons of renewable

fuel obligations were not met due to exemptions, which

translated into billions of dollars in lost revenue for the

biofuels industry. See EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions Table SRE-1 (July 24, 2024), https://www.epa.gov/

fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rfsThe number of small refineries is based on the number of eligible

refineries that have previously petitioned EPA for a small-refinery

exemption and are still in operation. Refinery capacity information

is based on data from Table 5 of the Energy Information Administration’s Refinery Capacity Report for 2024 (Jan. 1, 2024), https://

www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/table5.pdf. Total U.S. refining capacity is calculated by summing the capacities of all refineries currently subject to the RFS program. Total refining capacity

of the small refineries is calculated by summing the capacities of all

small refineries currently subject to the RFS program.

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small-refinery-exemptions. EPA has litigated numerous petitions challenging exemption decisions since the

RFS program began, and this Court has previously

viewed the program’s operation as sufficiently important to warrant the Court’s review. See HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594

U.S. 382 (2021).

Contrary to respondents’ suggestion (Br. in Opp. 28),

EPA’s aggregation of petitions in the relevant actions

here is not “novel” or “aberrational.” EPA has frequently aggregated related determinations into a single

action. See, e.g., ATK Launch Sys., 651 F.3d at 1197

(transferring challenges to a single EPA action promulgating air quality designations for 31 areas across 18

States); Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No.

19-1196 (D.C. Cir.) (challenge to 2019 EPA action on 36

RFS petitions). And when such actions have been challenged, EPA has not acquiesced to venue in the regional

circuits. See C.A. Doc. 75, at 9-11 (July 12, 2022).

Finally, respondents contend (Br. in Opp. 29) that

EPA’s April and June 2022 denial actions raise distinct

venue issues because the April denial announced a new

approach to small-refinery exemptions, while the June

denial simply applied that approach to additional refineries. That concern is overstated. Both denial actions

here stemmed from a single proposed denial that first

announced EPA’s new approach to exemptions. Pet.

App. 48a, 193a; see 86 Fed. Reg. 70,999, 71,000 (Dec. 14,

2021) (proposing to “deny all pending [exemption] petitions” based on the agency’s determinations regarding

the meaning of disproportionate economic hardship and

the market realities of refinery operations). The fact

that a short time passed between the finalization of the

two actions—without any court considering the validity

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of EPA’s new determinations—is an insufficient basis

to distinguish between the actions for purposes of

venue.

2. This case remains a better vehicle for clarifying

the proper application of Section 7607(b)(1) than the

pending petitions for writs of certiorari in Oklahoma v.

EPA, No. 23-1067 (filed Mar. 28, 2024), and PacifiCorp

v. EPA, No. 23-1068 (filed Mar. 28, 2024). Unlike the

Tenth Circuit in the decision at issue there, the Fifth

and Eleventh Circuits in the RFS exemption-denial

cases addressed both prongs of Section 7607(b)(1). See

Gov’t Br. at 20-21, Nos. 23-1067 and 23-1068 (filed May

21, 2024). And contrary to respondents’ contention (Br.

in Opp. 30-31), the full merits adjudication by the court

below should not weigh against granting certiorari in

this case. Rather, the divergent views of the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit on the merits highlight the importance of the venue decision for ensuring national uniformity in the administration of nationwide programs.

Respectfully submitted.

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Solicitor General

SEPTEMBER 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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