Amicus Curiae Brief — Damon Landor, Petitioner v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, et al.

No. 23-1197

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

DAMON LANDOR,

Petitioner,

v.

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

AND PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

__________

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

__________

BRIEF OF FORMER CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

__________

September 3, 2025

SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH

Counsel of Record

DAREN G. ZHANG

ABIGAIL E. DEHART

KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,

FIGEL & FREDERICK,

P.L.L.C.

1615 M Street, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 326-7900

(sangstreich@kellogghansen.com)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT .......................................................... 5

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 7

I. The Assault On Landor Was Unjustified

And Unrelated To Security Concerns ............. 7

II. Religious Practices Are Worth Protecting

Under RLUIPA Because Of The Positive

Influence On Safety In Prisons And Jails ...... 10

III. Allowing Money Damages Under

RLUIPA Provides An Important Remedy

For, And Deterrent Against, Religious

Liberty Violations In State Correctional

Facilities ......................................................... 11

IV. Correctional Officers Expect To Be

Liable For Monetary Damages For

Violating An Incarcerated Person’s

Religious Liberty ............................................ 13

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 16

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Al Saud v. Lamb, 2020 WL 1904619 (D. Ariz.

Apr. 17, 2020) ...................................................... 13

Barnett v. Short, 2022 WL 17338086 (E.D. Mo.

Nov. 30, 2022), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part,

and remanded, 129 F.4th 534 (8th Cir. 2025) ...... 13

Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346 (9th Cir. 2024) ......... 9

Fuqua v. Ryan, 2024 WL 4648078 (9th Cir.

Nov. 1, 2024) .......................................................... 9

Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) ........................ 1, 9

Loving v. Morton, 2022 WL 2971989 (S.D.N.Y.

July 27, 2022) ........................................................ 9

Mitchell v. Denton Cnty. Sheriff ’s Off., 2021 WL

4025800 (Aug. 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3931116 (E.D.

Tex. Sept. 1, 2021) .......................................... 12-13

Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182 (4th Cir.

2009)..................................................................... 12

Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir.

2012)..................................................................... 12

Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020) ......................... 9

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) ........................ 12

Walker v. Baldwin, 74 F.4th 878 (7th Cir. 2023) ...... 12

Ware v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corr., 866 F.3d 263

(5th Cir. 2017)........................................................ 7

iii

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND RULES

U.S. Const. amend. I ............................................. 1, 12

Free Exercise Clause.................................. 1, 12

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ..................... 7, 9, 11-14

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. ...... 1-2,

6-14, 16

§ 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.......................................... 1

§ 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) ......................... 9, 11

§ 5(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) ............................... 2

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...........................................7, 9, 12, 16

La. Stat. Ann. § 13:5108.1(A) ................................... 16

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.92.060-4.92.075 ..................... 16

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 ........................................................... 1

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

California Bd. of State & Cmty. Corr., Adult

Corrections Officer Core Course Manual

(rev. Jan. 2022), https://www.bscc.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/Adult-Corrections-OfficerCore-Training-Course-Manual-January2022.pdf .....................................................................14

U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious

Freedoms in Prison (Apr. 2025), https://www.

usccr.gov/files/2025-04/enforcing-religiousfreedoms-in-prison.pdf ....................................10, 13

Washington Dep’t of Corr., Training & Development, https://doc.wa.gov/jobs/benefits/trainingdevelopment ................................................................ 14

iv

OTHER MATERIALS

Agreement Between the State of New York and

the New York State Correctional Officers

and Police Benevolent Association, Inc.

(2023-2026) (Mar. 28, 2024), https://oer.ny.

gov/system/files/documents/2024/09/20232026-security-services-unit-contractagreement.pdf ..................................................... 16

Joshua J. Fougère, Paying for Prisoner Suits:

How the Source of Damages Impacts State

Correctional Agencies’ Behavior, 43 Colum.

J.L. & Soc. Probs. 283 (2010) .............................. 15

Daniel E. Hall et al., Suing cops and corrections

officers: Officer attitudes and experiences

about civil liability, 26 Policing: An Int’l J.

Police Strategies & Mgmt. 529 (Dec. 2003) ........ 15

Point Security Inc., B.O.S.S. II, https://point

securityinc.com/b-o-s-s-ii/ ..................................... 8

Rapiscan Systems, MobileTrace® Narcotics,

https://www.rapiscansystems.com/en/

products/mobiletrace-narcotics ............................. 8

Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv.

L. Rev. 1555 (2003) .............................................. 15

Tek84, Inc., Tek84 Product Suite, https://www.

tek84.com/ .............................................................. 8

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici curiae are 11 high-ranking former corrections

officials with more than four hundred years of

combined experience working in some of the largest

correctional systems in the country. Their experience

spans at least nine jurisdictions, within which

they worked at or oversaw numerous facilities that

collectively housed thousands of prisoners. They have

worked at all levels of the prison system, from entrylevel staff to senior positions.

Amici have first-hand experience administering

prisons while accommodating religious exercise under

the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.

They have implemented RLUIPA’s “least-restrictivemeans standard” by fully considering religious accommodations, which they recognize is not only required

by law but also sound penal policy. See Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352, 364-65 (2015). As corrections professionals, amici have an interest in ensuring jails and

prisons are managed consistently with evidence-based

and effective penological standards.

In amici’s experience, granting reasonable requests

for religious accommodations — in Landor’s case, by

permitting him to maintain long hair or to keep it under

a “rastacap” — serves to enhance the prison environment and individual rehabilitation. Rejecting reasonable religious accommodation requests can have the

opposite effect, which can negatively impact prison

security. Amici are concerned about blatant religious

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amici

represent that they authored this brief in its entirety and that

none of the parties or their counsel, nor any other person or entity

other than amici or their counsel, made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

violations occurring across state correctional facilities

and believe that allowing recovery of money damages

against state officials and employees would further

Congress’s intent that RLUIPA “shall be construed

in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). In situations like Landor’s,

money damages are the only way to provide relief.

Amici respectfully submit this brief to set forth the

basis for their views.

Steve J. Martin is a former General Counsel/Chief

of Staff of the Texas prison system (1981-1985) and

has served in gubernatorial appointments in Texas

on both a sentencing commission and a council for

prisoners with mental impairments. He coauthored

Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling Down (1987)

and has written numerous articles on criminal justice

issues. He also served as a federal court monitor for

the New York City Department of Corrections, where

he provided oversight of New York jails’ compliance

with the settlement agreement with federal prosecutors. He has more than 50 years of experience in the

field of corrections, including decades of experience as

a corrections expert for both the U.S. Departments of

Justice and Homeland Security Civil Rights Divisions

investigating conditions of confinement in facilities

across the country and U.S. Territories.

Dr. Kathleen Dennehy is a former Commissioner

and Chief Executive Officer for the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts Department of Correction. Dr. Dennehy

has worked in the criminal justice system for 48 years

and has been a consultant for justice and correctional

systems for more than 25 years. She earned a Ph.D.

from Brandeis University and has taught courses on

criminal justice at the undergraduate and graduate

levels. Dr. Dennehy served for 6-1/2 years as an

independent federal court monitor, and she now serves

3

as an expert witness in prison-based sexual-abuse

cases nationwide.

Dan Pacholke served the Washington State Department of Corrections for 33 years, starting as a Correctional Officer and retiring as Secretary. He has

served in a wide range of roles, including Correctional

Officer, Emergency Operations Manager, Director of

Prisons, and Superintendent of three separate facilities. Since leaving the Washington State Department

of Corrections, he has served as an expert witness and

consultant in a number of jurisdictions.

Martin Horn is a former Commissioner of the

New York City Department of Corrections and former

Secretary of Corrections for the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania. He has worked in the criminal justice

system for more than 45 years and retired in 2020 as

the Distinguished Lecturer in Corrections at the City

University of New York.

Phil Stanley is a long-time corrections administrator serving both the New Hampshire Department of

Corrections and the Washington State Department of

Corrections. He was the Commissioner of Corrections

in New Hampshire, and, in Washington, his roles

have included director of a regional justice center,

probation officer, regional administrator, and superintendent. He has more than 50 years’ experience in

the field of corrections. He is currently a consultant

for jail operations.

Gary Mohr has more than 51 years of correctional

experience, including as the director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”),

the deputy director and superintendent of the Ohio

Department of Youth Services, the deputy director of

administration for ODRC, and the deputy director for

the ODRC Office of Prisons. He also served as the

4

warden for 12-1/2 years across four different prisons

and has served as a federal court-appointed prison

monitor for the Georgia Department of Corrections.

He served as the President of the American Correctional Association, the largest corrections accrediting

body in the United States.

Patrick Hurley is a former prison warden in Ohio.

He has more than 35 years of experience in adult and

juvenile corrections, during which he held line and

supervisory positions in the Ohio corrections system.

Since leaving the ODRC, Mr. Hurley has served as an

expert corrections consultant and as a subject-matter

expert for the court-appointed monitor in the New

York City Department of Corrections and the Juvenile

Detention System in Puerto Rico. He testifies regularly in state and federal court.

Brian Fischer was the Commissioner of the New

York State Department of Correctional Services,

appointed in 2007 and retired in 2013. Before that, he

served as the superintendent of a prison.

Stephen Huffman is a former assistant director,

regional director, and warden in the ODRC. He was

appointed to serve as assistant director after more

than 30 years of serving in correctional facilities in

Ohio. Mr. Huffman currently serves as a corrections

expert and testifies regularly as an expert witness in

state and federal court.

Eldon Vail is a former Secretary of the Washington

State Department of Corrections. He has 35 years of

experience serving at all levels in the Washington

State corrections system, including as superintendent

of three adult institutions, including two facilities

with maximum-security inmates. For the last 10

years, Mr. Vail has served as an expert witness and

correctional consultant and has been retained more

than 60 times in 24 States.

5

Roger Werholtz served the Kansas Department of

Corrections for 33 years — eight of those years as the

Secretary of Corrections. During that time, he supervised all three divisions of the Kansas Department of

Corrections: Community and Field Services; Programs

and Staff Development; and Facilities Management.

He has served as interim executive director of the

Colorado Department of Corrections as well, and is

an expert witness for the U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division. He also has experience in community mental health, child protective services, and

substance abuse treatment and prevention, and has

served as a graduate-level instructor in the University

of Kansas School of Social Welfare.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In amici’s experience — backed up by research —

accommodating individual religious practices can

have a demonstrably positive effect on individual

adjustment and rehabilitation and, as a result, on the

prison environment as a whole. In well-run prisons,

existing procedures protect prisoners, ensuring that

their religious rights are not invaded. When such

procedures are violated or flagrantly ignored, prison

officials should be held liable for their actions.

What happened to Landor was improper and

unnecessary. As a practicing Rastafarian, with only

three weeks left in his sentence, Landor requested

a simple and commonly allowed accommodation: to

maintain long hair in accordance with his religious

beliefs. The Louisiana correctional officers forcibly

shaved Landor’s hair, disregarding his proof of past

religious accommodations and case law support.

These violations of Landor’s religious rights were

unjustified and unrelated to any security concerns.

And the fact that injunctive relief was unavailable to

6

Landor once his head was shaved shows why money

damages should be available under RLUIPA within

the state correctional system. In Landor’s case

and too many others, money damages are the only

meaningful relief that exists when injunctive relief

can simply be mooted when prisoners are transferred

to a different facility or released.

As recognized by correctional officials across the

nation and by Congress when it enacted RLUIPA,

religious liberty in prisons is worth protecting. When

drafting RLUIPA, Congress was well aware of unique

security issues in prisons. Yet Congress also recognized that prison officials sometimes impose rules

that unnecessarily restrict religious liberty. This case

is precisely the type of case Congress was concerned

about when it enacted RLUIPA — where vaguely

articulated reasons, including security, are used to

justify unwarranted acts depriving inmates of their

religious rights. Congress intended RLUIPA to provide not only greater protection for religious exercise

than the First Amendment, but also the right to

vindicate those protections through a broad set of

remedies. RLUIPA requires more than empty condemnations when violations occur — money damages

are necessary to provide incentives to put in place

processes to prevent clear violations of prisoners’

religious rights.

Respondents’ concerns that allowing monetary

damages for individual liability under RLUIPA will

create practical problems in prisons, such as staffing

shortages, are speculative, doubtful, and inconsistent

with amici’s experience. Correctional officers, as part

of the state government, know and expect to be liable

when they violate a prisoner’s clearly established civil

rights. Providing monetary relief under RLUIPA will

7

not make prisons worse; nor will it lead to staffing

shortages. Indeed, state officials have long been

subject to monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Instead, the Court should bridge the remedy gap

between RLUIPA and its sister statute, the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) (which

applies to federal prisons), so that when religious

rights are trampled in state prisons — as in Landor’s

case and too many others — meaningful relief exists.

ARGUMENT

I. The Assault On Landor Was Unjustified And

Unrelated To Security Concerns

Amici strongly condemn the treatment Landor endured. Based on their centuries of combined experience, amici know that most religious accommodations

— like hair length, reading religious texts, or kosher

meals — do not raise safety concerns in prisons.

In particular, hair length does not pose a security

concern in prisons. Over time, the vast majority of

prison systems have acknowledged that exceptionless

bans on unshorn hair are not the least restrictive

means of promoting safety or security. See Ware v.

Louisiana Dep’t of Corr., 866 F.3d 263, 273 (5th Cir.

2017) (noting “the grooming policies of the prisons

of 39 other jurisdictions” would allow dreadlocks

or afford an “opportunity to apply for a religious

accommodation that would allow dreadlocks”). In

amici’s experience, allowing religious accommodations for hair length has never once caused security

issues. Long hair is a common accommodation made

for many religions, and well-managed prisons routinely

grant such accommodations.2

2 Any security issues due to long hair are also mitigated by the

wide range of technology available today that can help prisons

8

What happened to Landor was particularly egregious. Landor had a devout and documented religious

practice, and he requested a safe accommodation:

retain the locks of the hair on his head and let them

continue to grow. There was no reason for prison officials to think that Landor’s long hair posed a security

concern — especially given his peaceful four months

in two other Louisiana facilities, both of which

accommodated Landor’s religious beliefs. In addition,

clearly established Fifth Circuit law fully supported

Landor and his religiously grounded desire to maintain his dreadlocks. See id. at 266 (finding DOC did

not meet its burden to show its hair-length policy

was justified under RLUIPA). Despite all of this, the

corrections officials at Raymond Laborde Correctional

Center in Louisiana knowingly violated Landor’s rights

by using force to pin him down and shave his head,

after throwing a copy of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

the trash.

The events of Landor’s case display an unnecessary

exercise of dominance and an arbitrary enforcement of

prison policy. Unpredictable and arbitrary behavior

from prison officials is detrimental to prison security.

Arbitrary policies will exacerbate prisoner perceptions

of arbitrary rulemaking and compromise institutional

order. Prison policy about whether someone deserves

a reasonable and safe religious accommodation also

should not vary from facility to facility and guard to

detect metal or contraband concealed in someone’s hair. See, e.g.,

Point Security Inc., B.O.S.S. II (technology that can detect metal

even hidden in a body cavity), https://pointsecurityinc.com/b-o-s-sii/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2025); Tek84, Inc., Tek84 Product Suite

(body scanner technology), https://www.tek84.com/ (last visited

Sept. 1, 2025); Rapiscan Systems, MobileTrace® Narcotics (portable drug detection devices), https://www.rapiscansystems.com/

en/products/mobiletrace-narcotics (last visited Sept. 1, 2025).

9

guard. Congress intended RLUIPA to set a “rigorous

standard” that applies uniformly across the nation,

Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364 (2015), and it shores

up the consistency prisoners are entitled to while

practicing their religions. When officers or prison

officials blatantly disregard a prisoner’s religious

liberty, monetary damages can act as both relief for

the prisoner and a deterrent from violating that right

in the first place.

In well-run prisons, policies and procedures exist

to protect prisoners like Landor, to ensure that their

religious rights are not trampled on with a changing of

the guard. When — as in Landor’s case and in others

— those rights are impinged, it is imperative that

meaningful relief exists. And in Landor’s case and

others, money damages are the only meaningful relief

that can exist for RLUIPA violations.3 See Tanzin v.

Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 51 (2020) (damages are often “the

only form of relief that can remedy” RFRA violations,

because “[f ]or certain injuries . . . effective relief

consists of damages, not an injunction”). Prison

officials must ensure lawful policies and due process

protections, and, when individual officers transgress

those protections and policies, Congress established

“appropriate relief ” available to prisoners under

statutes like Section 1983 and RLUIPA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-2(a).

“Appropriate relief ” cannot mean

“nothing.”

3 See, e.g., Loving v. Morton, 2022 WL 2971989, at *11

(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022) (injunctive relief was moot because

prisoner transferred to different facility); Fuqua v. Ryan, 2024

WL 4648078, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2024) (same); Fuqua v. Raak,

120 F.4th 1346, 1357 (9th Cir. 2024) (injunctive relief was

moot because prisoner subsequently granted accommodation for

kosher-for-Passover diet).

10

II. Religious Practices Are Worth Protecting

Under RLUIPA Because Of The Positive

Influence On Safety In Prisons And Jails

There is no question that jails and prisons present

significant security concerns. However, prison officials

must address these concerns while also considering

other important interests, including the religious

rights of inmates. Allowing prisoners to practice their

faith in accordance with their beliefs can play a crucial

role in facilitating their adjustment to the new

environment in which they find themselves. Religious

teachings often recognize human dignity and

potential regardless of a person’s past behaviors,

and can provide meaning in prison. Ample research

shows that allowing such accommodations promotes

rehabilitation, increases prison safety, moderates the

likelihood of recidivism, and provides community both

within and outside of prisons. See, e.g., Prof. Byron

R. Johnson Cert-Stage Amicus Br. 8-15 (compiling

research); U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious Freedoms in Prison 28-42 (Apr. 2025) (same),

https://www.usccr.gov/files/2025-04/enforcing-religiousfreedoms-in-prison.pdf.

Amici’s experience confirms the conclusions in the

research: allowing prisoners to exercise their religious

beliefs can help moderate the harsh impact of prison

life and promote a safer prison environment. For

instance, amici have witnessed on numerous occasions how “involvement in faith-based activities has

inspired people to want to change who they are.”

“Inmates who have deeply held beliefs and are able to

practice their religious beliefs” “are able to find some

level of peace or ability to accept others.” Religious

practice provided a means for inmates “to connect

to their culture and family.” And it can get them

11

involved “in other prison programs and helps them

serve as a role model for positive behavior.” Amici

have also seen violence in two particular facilities

drop dramatically after the warden allowed various

religious programming. In short, all amici view the

fostering of legitimate religious practices as a wholly

positive influence on the day-to-day living conditions

in prisons or jails.

III. Allowing Money Damages Under RLUIPA

Provides An Important Remedy For, And

Deterrent Against, Religious Liberty Violations In State Correctional Facilities

To foster the benefits of religious practice in prisons,

the Court should interpret RLUIPA as Congress intended, allowing prisoners to seek “appropriate relief,”

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), when prison officials violate

their religious rights, which includes money damages.

Providing damages under RLUIPA is a crucial step toward protecting religious freedom in prisons because,

as happened to Landor and too many others, without

it, prison officials and officers will be able to violate

free exercise rights without consequence.

Landor’s case is particularly egregious, but not

unique. As explained below, religious violations can

and do happen in state facilities without remedy or

consequence. Based on amici’s experience working

in, overseeing, and supervising correctional facilities,

officials should expect to be liable when someone blatantly violates the civil rights of an inmate. At times,

monetary fines serve as the only deterrent and ensure

that correctional officials and officers take prisoners’

religious liberties seriously. Amici agree there must

be some relief for prisoners like Landor. And even

though some States have a version of RFRA and

RLUIPA, one’s freedom of religion should not depend

12

on the State in which one is incarcerated. Having a

uniform standard through RLUIPA will benefit the

state corrections community as a whole.

RLUIPA provides more protections for religious

liberty than Section 1983, which is why Congress

enacted RLUIPA. As opposed to traditional First

Amendment jurisprudence under Section 1983 claims,

where prisoners’ free exercise claims are analyzed under the deferential rational-basis standard, see Turner

v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), RLUIPA requires the

government to meet a much higher burden of proof.

Through RFRA and RLUIPA, Congress reinstated the

strict-scrutiny standard for the Free Exercise Clause

of the First Amendment. If RLUIPA is treated differently (despite materially identical language as RFRA),

however, then only federal prisoners receive the full

protections intended by Congress. A right without a

remedy is meaningless, and, unlike in federal prisons

governed by RFRA, prisoners in state facilities will

continue to suffer infringements on their religious

rights due to the lack of equivalent protections.

Courts across the country have repeatedly found

that state prisons and jails imposed substantial

burdens on religious exercise, but concluded that

there was no remedy available to prisoners because

RLUIPA does not allow for damages: Like Landor,

Rastafarian inmates in Illinois and Kansas were needlessly forced to shave their dreadlocks. See Walker v.

Baldwin, 74 F.4th 878, 879 (7th Cir. 2023); Stewart

v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 2012). In

Maryland and Texas, prison officials refused Jewish

inmates’ requests for a kosher diet. See Rendelman v.

Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 2009); Mitchell

v. Denton Cnty. Sheriff ’s Off., 2021 WL 4025800, at *8

(Aug. 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted,

13

2021 WL 3931116 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2021). In Arizona, prison officials refused to give a Muslim prisoner

halal meals. See Al Saud v. Lamb, 2020 WL 1904619,

at *5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2020). And in a Missouri jail,

an inmate was prevented from reading the Bible.

See Barnett v. Short, 2022 WL 17338086, at *1-2 (E.D.

Mo. Nov. 30, 2022), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, and

remanded, 129 F.4th 534 (8th Cir. 2025). There are

many more examples. See, e.g., 33 Religious Organizations Cert-Stage Amicus Br. 10-16. And the number

of violations of religious liberty in state prisons

appears to be growing: A recent analysis of RLUIPA

cases found almost 1,500 more RLUIPA claims than

two decades ago. See Enforcing Religious Freedom in

Prisons at 143.

Too often in these cases, any hope for injunctive

relief is mooted by prisoners transferring facilities,

being released from custody, or, as in Landor’s case,

where an injunction cannot remedy the past harm.

In amici’s opinion, the conduct of corrections officers

and officials described in the RLUIPA cases would

be less likely to occur in the federal prison system,

where RFRA authorizes monetary damages. This

Court should resolve the inequity of religious freedom

that arbitrarily depends on whether an individual is

confined in a state or federal correctional facility.

IV. Correctional Officers Expect To Be Liable

For Monetary Damages For Violating An

Incarcerated Person’s Religious Liberty

Officers are trained on the law and to follow policy,

and they expect to be personally liable in certain

situations. When officers receive training, they are

informed about prisoners’ civil rights and relevant

law, and are told that, under certain circumstances,

they may be liable for monetary damages. See, e.g.,

14

Washington Dep’t of Corr., Training & Development

(describing mandatory core training topics including

“Rights of Incarcerated Individuals”), https://doc.wa.gov/

jobs/benefits/training-development (last visited Aug. 27,

2025); California Bd. of State & Cmty. Corr., Adult

Corrections Officer Core Course Manual 21 (rev. Jan.

2022) (outlining a four-hour course on legal foundations and liability including “the major areas of officer

liability and the possible consequences associated with

each”), https://www.bscc.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/

Adult-Corrections-Officer-Core-Training-Course-ManualJanuary-2022.pdf.

Officers expect liability, including monetary penalties, when they blatantly disregard a clearly established right. For example, prison training manuals

routinely explain that officers may be individually

liable for clearly established civil rights violations.

And procedures are put in place to ensure adequate

process before any risk of violating such rights. It

makes little sense to continue the disparity between

federal officers under RFRA and state officers under

RLUIPA. Congress intended the same high standard

and same remedies to apply to federal government

officials and to the States.

The Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections contends that allowing monetary damages

for individual liability under RLUIPA will worsen the

correctional facility staffing issues “by driving down

staffing levels and dissuading job applicants.” Br. in

Opp. 23. Recruiting and adequate staffing are high

priorities for the correctional community, and there

are many factors contributing to correctional staffing

shortages — such as compensation, hours, location of

prisons, and entrance requirements. But in amici’s

experience, heightening the standard for respecting

15

prisoners’ religious freedom would not have an impact

on recruiting or staffing. See Daniel E. Hall et al.,

Suing cops and corrections officers: Officer attitudes

and experiences about civil liability, 26 Policing: An

Int’l J. Police Strategies & Mgmt. 529, 545 (Dec. 2003)

(surveying sheriff ’s deputies, corrections officers, and

municipal police officers in a southern State and

concluding that “most public safety officers are not

impacted on a day-to-day basis by the threat of civil

liability”).

Moreover, allowing individual damages under

RLUPA is unlikely to cause staffing shortages because,

even when qualified immunity does not apply, officers

rarely cover the costs of damages in a civil lawsuit.

See Joshua J. Fougère, Paying for Prisoner Suits:

How the Source of Damages Impacts State Correctional

Agencies’ Behavior, 43 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 283,

294-95 (2010); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation,

116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1671 (2003) (“in nearly all

inmate litigation, it is the correctional agency [not

officers] that pays both litigation costs and any judgments or settlements”). Amici’s experience includes

officials who made recommendations to the attorney

general about which officers are entitled to indemnification by the State, and, in most cases, officers receive

indemnity. Yet even if individual officers are rarely

on the hook for money damages, the penalty can still

have a deterrent effect on those officers who may be

subject to additional training, disciplinary action, or

other such corrective measures by their department.

And because the correctional agency often pays, the

prospect of monetary damages will incentivize prisons

to enhance job training and supervision to prevent

violations of religious liberty in the first place.

16

States can and do contract with individual officers

to indemnify them. Many States, by law, will defend

their employees, even in suits for money damages, at

the expense of the State. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code

§§ 4.92.060-4.92.075 (specifying that the State will

defend an employee in suits for money damages

and will satisfy the judgment when the employee was

“acting within the scope of his or her official duties”);

La. Stat. Ann. § 13:5108.1(A) (indemnifying employees in damages suits when an employee was “engaged

in the performance of the duties of the individual’s office”). Prison union contracts with States also broadly

indemnify their officers on the job. See Agreement

Between the State of New York and the New York

State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent

Association, Inc. (2023-2026), art. 21, at 56-58 (Mar.

28, 2024) (indemnifying officers from any judgment

that an inmate could bring while the officer is “acting

within the scope of their public employment or duties”

unless “the injury or damage resulted from intentional

wrongdoing on the part of the employee”), https://

oer.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2024/09/2023-2026security-services-unit-contract-agreement.pdf. Officers

have long been subject to monetary liability under

Section 1983, and, although RLUIPA will not have

an impact on recruitment, it will have an impact on

ensuring the religious freedoms guaranteed by our

Constitution are shared by all.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals’ judgment should be reversed.

17

Respectfully submitted,

September 3, 2025

SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH

Counsel of Record

DAREN G. ZHANG

ABIGAIL E. DEHART

KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,

FIGEL & FREDERICK,

P.L.L.C.

1615 M Street, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 326-7900

(sangstreich@kellogghansen.com)