Amicus Curiae Brief — Damon Landor, Petitioner v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, et al.

No. 23-1197

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DAMON LANDOR,

Petitioner,

v.

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

AND PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF HINDU AMERICAN

FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

NEEDHY SHAH

HINDU AMERICAN

FOUNDATION

100 S. Broad St.

Suite 1318

Philadelphia, PA 19110

(202) 223-8222

needhy@hafsite.org

CHRISTOPHER S. ROSS

Counsel of Record

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF

AMERICA, COLUMBUS

SCHOOL OF LAW

3600 John McCormack Rd. NE

Washington, DC 20064

(202) 319-6783

rosscs@cua.edu

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................. 5

I. Prisoners—particularly members of minority

religious faiths and traditions—routinely face

hurdles to exercising their religious beliefs

while incarcerated. ............................................... 5

A. RLUIPA protects prisoners who wish to

practice their faith. ......................................... 6

B. RLUIPA protects individuals of all

faiths and traditions, including the

Hindu community supported by

Amicus. ............................................................ 7

1. The varied and complex practices

associated with Hindu festivals and

ceremonies often require precise timing. 9

2. The Hindu principle of righteousness

demands truthfulness in all aspects of

life. ............................................................ 12

3. Prison officials who fail to respect and

accommodate different religious

traditions routinely violate RULIPA..... 15

C. Religious practice benefits prisoners

and aids in rehabilitative efforts. ................ 18

ii

D. Declaratory and injunctive relief alone

fail to fulfill RLUIPA’s promises. ................ 20

II. RLUIPA provides for monetary damages

against officials who violate prisoners’ rights to

exercise their religion. ....................................... 22

A. RLUIPA’s plain text demonstrates

Congress’s intent to authorize

monetary damages. ...................................... 22

1. Tanzin v. Tanvir confirms that

“appropriate relief” includes monetary

damages. .................................................. 22

2. Other aspects of RLUIPA confirm that

appropriate relief includes monetary

damages. .................................................. 26

B. Allowing monetary damages for

violations of RLUIPA is valid under the

Spending Clause. .......................................... 28

CONCLUSION ........................................................... 31

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Agrawal v. Briley,

No. 02-C-6807, 2006 WL 3523750 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6,

2006);........................................................................ 15

Bargo v. Kelley,

No. 5:14CV00078, 2015 WL 5118132 (E.D. Ark.

Aug. 5, 2015), report and recommendation

adopted, 2015 WL 5096479 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 28,

2015)................................................................... 15, 16

Blake v. Thomas,

No. 23-15151, 2024 WL 5205741 (9th Cir. Dec. 24,

2024)......................................................................... 15

Chernetsky v. Nevada,

No. 21-16540, 2024 WL 1253783 (9th Cir. Mar. 25,

2024)......................................................................... 16

City of Boerne v. Flores,

521 U.S. 507 (1997)................................................. 23

Curtis v. Loether,

415 U.S. 189 (1974)................................................. 25

Cutter v. Wilkinson,

544 U.S. 709 (2005)...............................2, 5, 6, 18, 23

Cutter v. Wilkinson,

423 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2005) .................................. 19

DeMarco v. Davis,

914 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2019) .................................. 20

Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990)................................................. 23

iv

Haight v. Thompson,

763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2014) ...................... 16, 28, 29

Heyward v. Cooper,

88 F.4th 648 (6th Cir. 2023)................................... 21

Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352 (2015)................................... 3, 6, 23, 26

Khatib v. Cnty. of Orange,

639 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ........... 17, 21

Pennhurt State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

451 U.S. 1 (1981) ..................................................... 29

Russello v. United States,

464 U.S. 16 (1983) ................................................... 27

Sabri v. United States,

541 U.S. 600 (2004)................................................. 28

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas,

560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009) .................................. 28

South Dakota v. Dole,

483 U.S. 203 (1987)........................................... 28, 29

Tanzin v. Tanvir,

592 U.S. 43 (2020) .......... 4, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27

Tapia v. United States,

564 U.S. 319 (2011)................................................. 19

Tripathy v. McCoy,

103 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2024) .................................. 14

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ......................................................... 25

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 ........................................ 3, 22, 23

v

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 ..................................................... 6

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 .................. 3, 4, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3 ................................................... 27

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 ................................................... 24

Other Authorities

146 Cong. Rec. 16698, 16699 (2000) .....5, 6, 17, 19, 23

146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) ….. 20

146 Cong. Rec. S6678, S6689 (daily ed. July 13,

2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ……….…... 21, 22

2025 Dharmic Days & Hindu Holidays Calendar,

Hindu Am. Found. .................................................... 9

2025 Diwali Puja Calendar, Drik Panchang ........... 10

2025 Lakshmi Puja, Drik Panchang......................... 10

All About Diwali, Hindu Am. Found. ......................... 9

Anthony J. Papageorgiou, For-Profit Incarceration:

An Evaluation of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act in the Era of Private

Prison Business Models, 18 Rutgers Bus. L. Rev.

66 (No. 2, Spring 2023) ..................................... 18, 19

Byron R. Johnson & Sung Joon Jang, Offender-led

religious movements: Why we should have faith in

prisoner-led reform, Open Access Gov’t (Jan. 29,

2024)......................................................................... 20

Christians, Pew Research Center,

2023-2024 U.S. Religious Landscape Study

Interactive Database ................................................ 7

vi

Grant Duwe & Byron R. Johnson, Estimating the

Benefits of a Faith-Based Correctional Program,

2 Int’l J. of Crim. & Socio. 227 (2013) ............. 19, 20

Hindu Am. Found., What is Dharma? 1 (2014) ....... 12

Hindus, Pew Research Center,

2023-24 U.S. Religious Landscape Study

Interactive Database ................................................ 7

Introduction to Hinduism, 1 Religious Organizations

and the Law, § 1:22 (2d ed. 2023) ............................ 8

Krsna Yajurveda, Taittiriya Upanisad § 1.11,

in The Taittiriya Upanisad With the Commentaries

of Sankaracharya, Suresvaracharya, and Sayana

(Vidyaranya) (A. Mahadeva Sastri trans., 1903) . 12

Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs,

and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of

Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 Seton Hall L.

Rev. 353 (2018).......................................................... 7

Manava Dharmasastra § 8.104,

in The Laws of Manu, XXV The Sacred Books of

the East 272 (Georg Bühler trans., 1969)............. 13

Navratri | Navaratri, Drik Panchang...................... 10

Paryushana, Hindu Am. Found. ............................... 11

Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the

H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 10 (Jul.

14, 1997) .......................................................... 6, 7, 18

Suhag A. Shukla & Samir Kalra, Hindu American

Foundation Formal Comments on Proposed Inmate

Religious Property Regulations, Submitted to Cal.

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (May 7, 2013) .................... 8

vii

Sukla Yajurveda, Brhadaranyaka Upanisad § 1.4.14,

in The Brhadarankyaka Upanisad With the

Commentary of Sankaracarya (S. Madhavananda

trans., 3d ed. 1950) ........................................... 12, 13

The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali 89 (Swami

Prabhavananda trans., 1953) ................................ 13

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report on the Twentieth

Anniversary of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act, (Sept. 22, 2020) ...... 7

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The Hindu American Foundation (“the

Foundation”) is a nonprofit organization that

advances the understanding of Hinduism and Hindu

Dharma traditions to secure the rights and dignity of

Hindu Americans for present and future generations.

The Foundation provides accurate and engaging

educational resources, impactful advocacy to protect

and promote religious liberty, and programming that

empowers Hindu Americans to sustain their culture

and identity. The Foundation is committed to

religious liberty for Hindus and members of all faiths

throughout the United States.

As relevant here, the Foundation’s work

occasionally involves consulting with prison officials

to help them understand Hindu practices and

otherwise

working

to

secure

appropriate

accommodations for Hindus who are in prison. When

officials lack an appreciation for the complexities of

certain Hindu practices, they are more likely to

violate prisoners’ statutory and constitutional rights

to exercise their religion, including the rights afforded

by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (RLUIPA). The availability of damages

under RLUIPA will incentivize prison officials to

respect more carefully the rights of Hindus and

adherents to other minority religious practices.

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no counsel for any party in this case

wrote any part of this amici brief, and no person except amici

contributed to the costs of its preparation.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Congress passed the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc, et seq., by unanimous consent after

considering an array of evidence showing that

religious communities—especially those of minority

faiths and traditions—often face improper burdens in

the land-use and institutionalized-persons contexts.

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 (2005)

(describing Congressional “hearings spanning three

years” showing how state and local governments erect

“frivolous or arbitrary” barriers to the free exercise of

religion). Specifically, Congress aimed to “protect[]

institutionalized persons who are unable freely to

attend to their religious needs and are therefore

dependent on the government’s permission and

accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Id. at

721.

All too often, though, religious prisoners do not

receive RLUIPA’s full protections. As Amicus’ own

experiences demonstrate, prison officials often lack

familiarity with the practices and customs of minority

faiths. Amicus must draw on its expertise to counsel

prison officials on the rich and varied practices that

constitute Hinduism to ensure that Hindus receive

appropriate accommodations while incarcerated. See

infra § I.B.1-2.

Not every prison, however, is so conscientious as

to engage with Amicus on these issues. As the sheer

number of RLUIPA cases filed in federal courts

demonstrates, prisoners regularly face barriers to

exercising their religious beliefs.

3

RLUIPA exists to ensure that religious exercise

remains protected in prisons, and it provides a

remedy for violations of that freedom. This approach

provides corollary benefits, as well. For instance,

research shows that prisoners who participate in

religious practices are less likely to become

recidivists. And rich religious practice in prisons

supports the rehabilitative aims of our penal system.

See infra § I.C. Cultivating sincere religious practice

in prisons is good for prisoners, good for prisons, and

good for society.

When a prisoner’s right to exercise his religion is

violated, RLUIPA permits him to seek “appropriate

relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). To be sure, this relief

includes equitable remedies, which are necessary to

stop prison officials’ unlawful or harassing behavior.

But as shown in cases like this—where prison officials

forcibly pinned down a Rastafarian prisoner and

shaved 20 years’ worth of hair from his head—

equitable remedies are often not enough. See Pet. Br.

8-9. Many meritorious RLUIPA claims are ultimately

dismissed as moot when a prisoner is transferred to

another facility or completes his sentence. See infra

§ I.D. Thus, equitable relief alone is sometimes

insufficient when prison officials restrict religious

exercise.

That’s why Congress unambiguously provided for

compensatory relief in the form of monetary damages

in RLUIPA. RLUIPA and its “sister statute,” the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), operate

in parallel. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015).

Both statutes permit the plaintiff to seek “appropriate

relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c); id. § 2000cc-2(a). As

4

this Court held, RFRA’s use of the phrase

“appropriate relief” includes monetary damages. See

Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 51 (2020). Tanzin’s

logic applies with equal force here. The text,

structure, and purpose of RLUIPA all support

awarding monetary damages when prison officials

violate prisoners’ rights to exercise their religion.

Barring incarcerated individuals from being

awarded monetary damages for the violation of their

religious rights fails to respect RLUIPA’s purpose and

full breadth. First, the statute directs courts to

interpret it to provide the maximum benefit for

religious freedom, yet disallowing monetary damages

leaves many prisoners without any meaningful

remedy (and often, no remedy at all). Second, the

statute’s

text

indicates

unequivocally

that

“appropriate relief” must mean more than declaratory

and injunctive relief. Section 2000cc-2(f) provides that

in an enforcement action under RLUIPA, the

Attorney General may only obtain “injunctive or

declaratory relief,” whereas private plaintiffs may

obtain “appropriate relief” under § 2000cc-2(c).

Congress’s use of different terms indicates its clear

intent to include monetary damages in RLUIPA’s

private cause of action. This latter point—coupled

with Tanzin’s analysis of the same remedy provision

in RFRA—provides all the clarity this Court should

need to find that monetary damages for RLUIPA

violations are permissible under the Spending

Clause.

5

ARGUMENT

I.

Prisoners—particularly

members

of

minority religious faiths and traditions—

routinely face hurdles to exercising their

religious beliefs while incarcerated.

Although RLUIPA protects all religious and faith

traditions, it is of particular importance to minority

religious groups, including the Hindu American

community whose interests Amicus represents.

Spiritual formation is not only a protected right for all

people, but is also a powerful aid for individual

prisoners and prisons’ rehabilitative aims more

broadly. Yet, far too often, prison officials impede

religious exercise. Whether through “indifference,

ignorance, or bigotry,” the barriers officials erect

against religious practice are frequently unlawful.

Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716 (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. 16698,

16699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.

Kennedy on RLUIPA)).

Most importantly, the unlawful acts that impede

prisoners’

religious

exercise

frequently

go

unremedied. The length of the litigation process often

means that prisoners have moved to a new facility or

completed their sentences by the time a remedy can

be obtained. This effectively moots many prisoners’

cases, offering them no remedy at all. Declaratory

relief is simply insufficient to right egregious harms

suffered by prisoners. Only compensatory damages

can ensure the full vindication of prisoners’ rights

under RLUIPA, particularly when they are no longer

in the offending facility or under the charge of a

particular official. Moreover, the threat of monetary

6

damages would provide a concrete incentive for

prisons and their officials to respect RLUIPA’s

command to accommodate inmates’ religious

practices, subject to exception only in the most

stringent of circumstances.

A. RLUIPA protects prisoners who wish to

practice their faith.

Under RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose a

substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). If the government does impose

such a burden, it must “demonstrate[] that imposition

… is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest” and “is the least restrictive means of

furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

Id. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).

Congress enacted RLUIPA, in part, to prevent

“‘frivolous or arbitrary’ barriers [to] institutionalized

persons’ religious exercise.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716

(quoting 146 Cong. Rec. at 16699). RLUIPA

“provide[s] greater protection for religious exercise

than is available under the First Amendment” to

groups and situations in which religious individuals

are especially vulnerable. Holt, 574 U.S. at 357.

This promise is of particular importance to

incarcerated members of religious minority groups

and traditions. Among “Congress’ principal concerns”

when enacting RLUIPA “was that, as a practical

matter, unpopular and minority faiths would receive

a less sympathetic hearing” when challenging

burdens on their religious exercise. Protecting

7

Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing

Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the H. Comm.

on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 10 (Jul. 14, 1997)

(statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler).

As the Department of Justice has reported,

“RLUIPA claims in institutional settings are most

often raised by people who practice minority faiths.”

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report on the Twentieth

Anniversary of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act 25-26 (Sept. 22, 2020),

https://perma.cc/57DD-QSBT. And data show that

“[o]ver half of all prisoner decisions” under RLUIPA

and RFRA “involve[] non-Christian religious

minorities.” See Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N.

Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical

Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 Seton

Hall L. Rev. 353, 376 (2018). The data therefore bear

out Congress’s concerns in enacting these statutes:

although the majority (62%) of U.S. adults are

Christian, the majority of RLUIPA and RFRA claims

are raised by non-Christians. See Christians, Pew

Research Center, 2023-2024 U.S. Religious

Landscape

Study

Interactive

Database,

https://perma.cc/P4K5-9X3Z.

B. RLUIPA protects individuals of all faiths

and traditions, including the Hindu

community supported by Amicus.

Amicus represents the interests of Hindu

Americans, who comprise around 1% of the

population in the United States. See Hindus, Pew

Research Center, 2023-24 U.S. Religious Landscape

Study Interactive Database, https://perma.cc/TRN9-

8

56PY. Hinduism “is the world’s oldest living religion.”

Suhag A. Shukla & Samir Kalra, Hindu American

Foundation Formal Comments on Proposed Inmate

Religious Property Regulations, Submitted to Cal.

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (May 7, 2013),

https://perma.cc/69M8-77UH. Although it “has no

single founder or commonly held set of practices or

beliefs,” “most Hindus” generally believe in a

“Supreme [Being] represented by a multitude of

deities,” engage in ceremonial veneration (known as

puja), “believe in karmic reincarnation,” and “draw on

[] common [principles] of virtuous behavior known as

dharma.” Introduction to Hinduism, 1 Religious

Organizations and the Law, § 1:22 (2d ed. 2023).

Hindu practices vary across geographic regions

and communities and have been influenced by a rich

history of spiritual teachings and writings. See

Shukla & Kalra, supra, at 2-3. Accordingly, the term

“Hinduism” covers a vast array of unique religious

practices. The breadth and complexity of Hinduism,

coupled with the sizable number of Hindus in the

United States, can make it difficult to ensure this

minority religious community receives full and fair

accommodations in a timely manner.

In the following sections, Amicus explains two

aspects of Hinduism—(1) ceremonies associated with

festivals and other celebrations and (2) truthfulness

as integral to righteousness—and provides current

examples of how prisons’ varied approaches to

providing accommodations can either permit or

impede each of these practices. It then demonstrates

more broadly how the failure of prison officials to

9

accommodate these and other religious practices can

be detrimental to incarcerated Hindus.

1. The varied and complex practices

associated with Hindu festivals and

ceremonies often require precise

timing.

Observing festivals and ceremonies is an

important part of Hindu practice. Hindus celebrate

many more festivals and observances than prevalent

Western religions do. The holidays commemorate

particular deities, seasons or natural cycles, historical

events, and events in the lives of significant spiritual

teachers. See 2025 Dharmic Days & Hindu Holidays

Calendar, Hindu Am. Found., myhaf.org/25holidays4402. For many of these festivals, “practicing Hindus

may request specific accommodations or time off to

complete sacred rites of passage, or may be observing

a specific diet or fast.” Id.

Consider the Hindu festival of Diwali, also known

as the “Festival of Lights.” Diwali is one of the most

celebrated and significant holidays for many Hindus.

The festival can span five days and involves unique

pujas performed at different times and on different

days. Notably, the degree of importance given to any

celebration or puja varies widely by the specific Hindu

tradition followed. See All About Diwali, Hindu Am.

Found., https://perma.cc/JZ7F-H349. The timing of

each puja is specific to that custom, and is critical to

performing it properly.

Although the timing of each puja is critical, it is

not always common knowledge. In fact, most Hindus

10

must consult a calendar developed each year to

identify the auspicious time, or muhurta—which can

vary based on the individual’s location—to perform

the puja. See 2025 Diwali Puja Calendar, Drik

Panchang, https://perma.cc/L54B-9JEF.

To provide one example: the third day of Diwali,

the day of Lakshmi puja, celebrates Goddess Lakshmi

and is considered by some to be the most important

day of the festival. In 2025, Lakshmi puja will occur

on October 20, and the appropriate window of time

(often spanning only one or two hours) for most

Hindus to conduct this puja will vary based on their

individual location. 2025 Lakshmi Puja, Drik

Panchang, https://perma.cc/M753-E8CP.

For incarcerated Hindus, being able to pray at the

proper times in accordance with their sincere

religious beliefs is imperative not only during Diwali,

but also during other festivals and holy days relevant

to that person’s religious practice. These observances

also often require more than prayers recited at certain

times. For example, Navaratri “is a significant Hindu

festival” dedicated to Goddess Durga, “which is

observed for 9 nights and 10 days,” though some

regions and traditions might celebrate different

goddesses. Navratri | Navaratri, Drik Panchang,

https://perma.cc/LQ67-78ET. Many observe this

festival with a nine-day fast from certain foods, or all

foods, as part of their religious practice. See id.

Likewise, an important festival in Jainism—

another Dharmic tradition with roots in India,

making up less than 1% of the U.S. population—is

Paryushana. While there are some variations in the

11

ways that Jains practice Paryushana, many will

observe a complete food fast—and sometimes even

limited water intake—for eight days. Others might

observe a vegetarian fast that excludes leafy greens

and root vegetables. See Paryushana, Hindu Am.

Found., https://perma.cc/LP74-WR28.

Prison officials are frequently unfamiliar with

Hindu practices. While a fasting period like Navaratri

might seem somewhat similar to Islam’s month-long

fast during Ramadan, the Hindu festival is much

shorter and has a highly variable schedule for

breaking the fast. As a result, it can be more difficult

to

implement

an

appropriate

religious

accommodation in a timely and accurate way for the

Hindu observance. Similarly, Jains are an even

smaller portion of the U.S. population, so prison

officials are even less likely to be familiar with or

willing to accommodate practices like those observed

during Paryushana.

For this reason, Amicus must educate prison

officials about Hindu practices, often in conjunction

with religious accommodation requests made by

prisoners. In one recent exchange, a prison official

consulted Amicus seeking to validate the religious

basis for an accommodation requested by a Hindu

inmate. As part of this inmate’s religious tradition, he

practiced Sandhya Vandanam, which required him to

pray three times each day during specific timeframes

that vary based on sunrise, solar noon, and sunset.

These times of prayer, however, conflicted with the

inmate’s mandatory drug-counseling class. Amicus

was able to verify and explain the nature of this

Hindu observance, and consequently, the prison

12

official ensured she would accommodate these

observances. Without Amicus’ involvement, it is

unlikely that a prison official would have understood

and accommodated this inmate’s religious practice.

2. The Hindu principle of righteousness

demands truthfulness in all aspects of

life.

As noted above, a core principle in Hinduism is

dharma (righteousness), which is “a mode of conduct

and being that helps spiritual advancement” and is

“both the guide and foundation for all aspects of life.”

Hindu Am. Found., What is Dharma? 1 (2014),

https://perma.cc/TU2L-7LYB.

One of dharma’s guiding principles is truthfulness

(satya). See id. at 2. Hinduism teaches that satya is

essential for a righteous life. For example, as set forth

in the Taittiriya Upanisad, a central source of

knowledge in Hinduism: “Speak the true. Follow

Dharma.” Krsna Yajurveda, Taittiriya Upanisad

§ 1.11, in The Taittiriya Upanisad With the

Commentaries of Sankaracharya, Suresvaracharya,

and Sayana (Vidyaranya) 155 (A. Mahadeva Sastri

trans., 1903). As further explained by a prominent

Hindu philosopher and founder of the Smarta

Dharma tradition, this teaching requires “giving

utterance to a thing as it is perceived, without

hypocrisy or a motive to do injury.” See id. This

commentary explains that truthfulness in Hinduism

requires expression without deception.

The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, another important

text for Hindus, reinforces this teaching by declaring

13

that “righteousness is verily truth,” explaining that

“both these are but righteousness.” Sukla Yajurveda,

Brhadaranyaka

Upanisad

§ 1.4.14,

in

The

Brhadarankyaka Upanisad With the Commentary of

Sankaracarya 178 (S. Madhavananda trans., 3d ed.

1950). Truthfulness is thus encapsulated within

righteousness. Modern Hindu teachers continue to

emphasize this point: Swami Prabhavananda taught

that “true spirituality consists in ‘making the heart

and the lips the same,’” requiring perfect alignment

between inner conviction and outward expression.

The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali 89 (Swami

Prabhavananda trans., 1953) (quoting teacher Sri

Ramakrishna).

The obligation of truthfulness is broad. The YogaSutras [or Aphorisms] of Patanjali—a foundational

source for this Hindu practice—lists abstention from

falsehood among five universal restraints that

become “basic rules of conduct” that “must be

practiced without any reservations as to time, place,”

or purpose. See id. § 2.30-31, pp. 89-90. The obligation

of truthfulness thus cannot be overridden by temporal

circumstances. See id. Although Hindu teaching

recognizes some exceptions, they are quite narrow.

For example, the Manava Dharmasastra permits

falsehood only “[w]henever the death of [a person]

would be caused by a declaration of the truth.”

Manava Dharmasastra § 8.104, in The Laws of Manu,

XXV The Sacred Books of the East 272 (Georg Bühler

trans., 1969).

Like the observation of pujas or prayers at

appropriate times, the requirement that Hindus be

truthful has clashed with prison policies. Amicus has

14

monitored the case of Sanjay Tripathy, a Hindu man

who proclaimed his innocence despite being convicted

of a sexual offense. See Tripathy v. McCoy, 103 F.4th

106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed (No.

24-229) (Aug. 27, 2024) (raising the same question

presented as the one in this case). Tripathy alleges

that as part of his sentence, he was ordered to

participate in a rehabilitation program that required

him to accept responsibility for the offense of which

he was convicted. See id. He claimed that to do so

would have required him to “make a false statement”

in violation of his Hindu beliefs. Id. at 112. Although

Tripathy has a viable RLUIPA claim, he cannot seek

injunctive relief because he has been released from

prison. But, as here, the Second Circuit rejected his

RLUIPA claim on the ground that he could not seek

damages against prison officials. See id.

When prison officials fail to accommodate

practices like a Hindu’s obligation of truthfulness,

Tripathy and other Hindus in his position can be

compelled to violate a core tenet of Hindu dharma and

their religious beliefs. While prison officials might

readily understand why a Muslim prisoner needs

access to halal food or why a Jewish prisoner requires

Sabbath observance, those administering correctional

programs are frequently unfamiliar with Hindu

religious obligations that are set forth in Sanskrit

texts and ancient commentaries and practiced by only

1%

of

the

U.S.

population.

Meaningful

accommodation requires recognizing that for devout

Hindu prisoners, being forced to falsely admit guilt

violates a fundamental religious practice that their

tradition teaches as essential to spiritual

development.

15

3. Prison officials who fail to respect and

accommodate

different

religious

traditions routinely violate RULIPA.

Hindus, like many other religious prisoners, often

request accommodations that are never provided—

effectively barring these prisoners from exercising

their religion. As a result, they must resort to

RLUIPA to remedy past wrongs and ensure they can

practice their religious traditions without hindrance

in the future. For example, Shree Agrawal was a

Hindu prisoner in Illinois who asserted that prison

officials would not provide “a diet free of meat and

eggs, even though a vegetarian diet conforming to

[his] religious restrictions was available” to other

inmates of different faiths. See Agrawal v. Briley, No.

02-C-6807, 2006 WL 3523750, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6,

2006); see also Blake v. Thomas, No. 23-15151, 2024

WL 5205741, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 2024)

(addressing claim by Hindu prisoner whose faith

required that he observe ahisma (non-harm) through

“a ‘vegan way of life,’” that was not accommodated by

Nevada officials).

Beyond religious dietary restrictions, prison

officials have also failed to accommodate Hindu

prisoners’ specific prayer practices. For example, in

Bargo v. Kelley, a prisoner asserted that he was “a

practitioner and adherent of Kriya/Raja Yoga of the

Hindu religion,” and that prison officials denied his

use of a barracks room to practice yoga and an

appropriate prayer rug, despite allegedly allowing

Islamic inmates to use the room for prayer and

allowing prayer rugs. No. 5:14CV00078, 2015 WL

5118132, at *1-2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 5, 2015), report and

16

recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 5096479 (E.D.

Ark. Aug. 28, 2015) (denying, in part, officials’ motion

for summary judgment on RLUIPA claim).

As these examples illustrate, RLUIPA’s promise to

protect all prisoners’ religious exercise often falls

short, with many Hindu prisoners’ requests for

religious accommodation being ignored or, worse, met

with hostility. The problem arises from the lack of

familiarity with Hindu religious beliefs and the

corresponding skepticism shown toward them. This is

true beyond Hinduism as well. To provide but a couple

of examples from across the federal judiciary:

x

In Chernetsky v. Nevada, a Wiccan prisoner

requested natural scented oils for prayer. No.

21-16540, 2024 WL 1253783, at *2 (9th Cir.

Mar. 25, 2024). Without evidence, the prison

deemed the oils a security risk and informed

Chernetsky that synthetic oils would suffice,

despite acknowledging his disagreement that

the synthetic oils were a suitable alternative.

Id.

x

In Haight v. Thompson, a group of Native

American inmates sought to build a sweat

lodge to practice their traditions, but were

refused. 763 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2014). The

Sixth Circuit held, however, that the prison

had offered insufficient evidence that the sweat

lodge would pose a risk to prisoners’ safety. See

id. at 561-63.

The list could go on. These examples demonstrate

that prisons often refuse to accommodate practices of

17

minority religious faiths under the guise of public

safety rather than seeking to understand and

accommodate the beliefs of religious minorities.

In some egregious instances, prisons do not simply

fail to accommodate religious practice—they show

outright hostility toward or harass those seeking to

practice their faith. Petitioner’s allegations here

demonstrate the point: as a Rastafarian, Petitioner

had long kept a Nazarite Vow never to cut his hair.

Pet. App. 2a. For most of his sentence, two prisons

respected this practice. See id. But “with only three

weeks left in his sentence,” officials moved him to a

new facility that refused to honor this

accommodation, even though Landor “provided proof

of past religious accommodations” and “handed the

guard a copy of” a Fifth Circuit decision holding that

cutting a Rastafarian’s hair violated RLUIPA. Id.

“Unmoved,” prison officials threw the decision in the

trash, restrained Landor, and shaved twenty years’

growth of hair from his head. Id.

In a similarly disturbing case from California,

Souhair Khatib, a Muslim woman, covered her hair

with a hijab according to her religion. Khatib v. Cnty.

of Orange, 639 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

When she arrived at a holding facility for a probation

violation, male officers told her that she must remove

her headscarf in front of the men in the facility. If she

did not remove it herself, the officers said they would

forcibly do so. See id. In her lawsuit, she explained

that this was “a serious breach of [her] faith” that was

both “deeply humiliating and defiling.” Id.

18

Prisoners necessarily have their freedom limited

in dramatic fashion, yet they remain subject to the

greatest extent of the government’s coercive power.

Their “right to practice their faith is at the mercy of

those running the institution.” 146 Cong. Rec. S7775

(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

“RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who

are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and

are therefore dependent on the government’s

permission and accommodation for exercise of their

religion.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 721. RLUIPA must

protect the religious exercise of all prisoners—even

those whose practices may lie outside traditions with

which mainstream American society is most familiar.

C. Religious practice benefits prisoners and

aids in rehabilitative efforts.

The exercise of religion or spiritual traditions is

more than simply a balm for the individual prisoner’s

conscience. Exercising religion is often “the one thing

that will turn the lives of … prisoners around.”

Protecting Religious Liberty After Boerne, supra,

105th Cong. 5 (Statement of Charles W. Colson).

Indeed, “[a]ccording to over 40 years of empirical

research summarizing the relationship between

religion and crime, findings indicate that religion

decreases propensities for criminal behavior.”

Anthony J. Papageorgiou, For-Profit Incarceration:

An Evaluation of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act in the Era of Private

Prison Business Models, 18 Rutgers Bus. L. Rev. 66,

66 (No. 2, Spring 2023).

19

Creating space for prisoners to exercise religion

thus aligns with the rehabilitative needs that are one

component of modern sentencing practice. Cf. Tapia

v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011). Indeed, as

the Sixth Circuit explained when upholding RLUIPA

against a Spending Clause challenge on remand from

this Court’s decision in Cutter, RLUIPA is

“reasonably calculated to address the federal

government’s interest in the rehabilitation of state

prisoners.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 586 (6th

Cir. 2005). “[O]ne of the statute’s main purposes,” in

fact, “is to allow inmates greater freedom of religion

in order to promote their rehabilitation.” Id. at 587

(citing 146 Cong. Rec. S6678, S6689 (daily ed. July 13,

2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). As Senator

Kennedy stated: “Sincere faith and worship can be an

indispensable part of rehabilitation, and these

protections should be an important part of that

process.” 146 Cong. Rec. at S6689.

Religious-based rehabilitation programs in

prisons have long shown a positive effect in reducing

recidivism. Grant Duwe & Byron R. Johnson,

Estimating the Benefits of a Faith-Based Correctional

Program, 2 Int’l J. of Crim. & Socio. 227, 227-28

(2013). Studies show that religious people are less

likely to commit additional crimes after being

released from prison. See id. at 230; see also

Papageorgiou, supra at 79 (“Data suggests that

religious exposure (both during and after

incarceration) is an evidence-based method in

combatting future crime.”). Studies also show those in

religious-based programs are at a significant

advantage to be employed upon release and are less

likely to re-offend. See Duwe & Johnson, supra, at

20

235; see also Byron R. Johnson & Sung Joon Jang,

Offender-led religious movements: Why we should

have faith in prisoner-led reform, Open Access Gov’t

(Jan. 29, 2024), https://perma.cc/2Z47-HD8Z.

RLUIPA necessarily protects individual prisoners’

rights to exercise their religions. And it also has a

salutary effect on prisoners and society writ large.

Violations of prisoners’ free exercise hurt the

individual prisoner and undermine a prison’s

penological goals. Both individuals and society suffer

as a result of that infringement on religious liberty.

D. Declaratory and injunctive relief alone

fail to fulfill RLUIPA’s promises.

When a prison or its officers violate RLUIPA, the

statute allows the prisoner to seek relief in court. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). In many cases, the prisoner

will seek equitable relief, such as an injunction

requiring prison officials to accommodate the

religious practice. But an equitable remedy is often

insufficient to stop ongoing, targeted, or deeply

harassing behavior. See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. at

51. Indeed, as Tanzin recognized in the context of

RFRA, “damages … [are] not just ‘appropriate’ relief

… [but are sometimes] the only form of relief that can

remedy some RFRA violations.” Id.

This conclusion is so for at least two reasons.

First, consider the cases detailed above. When an

observance or object of religious significance is taken,

disrespected, or destroyed, equitable remedies can

only go so far. Cf. DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383,

389-90 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that damages would be

21

the “only recourse” for a prisoner whose religious

“books were allegedly destroyed”). Injunctive relief

cannot remedy Mr. Landor’s being shorn of hair he

had been growing for twenty years as part of his

Rastafarian beliefs. See Pet. App. 25a (Oldham, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

Injunctive relief cannot remedy Ms. Khatib’s being

forced to remove her hijab in front of male officers in

contravention of her Muslim faith. See Khatib, 639

F.3d at 901.

Second, consider the jailhouse context. “[P]risons

can moot claims for injunctive or declaratory relief

through release or transfer.” See Pet. App. 32a

(Oldham, J., dissenting). For instance, in Heyward v.

Cooper, the Sixth Circuit held that a Muslim

prisoner’s RLUIPA claim based on failure to

accommodate his Ramadan fast was moot because the

denial had occurred five years prior, and he had been

transferred to a new facility. See 88 F.4th 648, 656-57

(6th Cir. 2023) (noting that monetary damages were

not otherwise available).

At bottom, equitable remedies can only do so much

to protect religious prisoners when state or local

prison officials fail to accommodate their religious

beliefs. And, as noted above, this rings particularly

true for traditions like Hinduism, where prison

officials are unlikely to be educated about those

beliefs: pujas may be missed when the window to

perform a certain ceremony is quite short and

potentially difficult to calculate, and dharma may be

impossible to follow when a prisoner’s dietary

requirements are ignored or he is compelled to falsely

admit guilt by a prison program.

22

II.

RLUIPA provides for monetary damages

against officials who violate prisoners’

rights to exercise their religion.

The insufficiency of equitable remedies in the

prison context underscores why monetary damages

are so critical. RLUIPA enables a prisoner to seek any

“appropriate relief” from prison officials who

unlawfully place a substantial burden on a prisoner’s

exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). The

Court should clarify that “appropriate relief” includes

monetary damages, as the plain text of RLUIPA and

this Court’s decision in Tanzin make clear.

A. RLUIPA’s

plain

text

demonstrates

Congress’s intent to authorize monetary

damages.

1. Tanzin v. Tanvir confirms that

“appropriate relief” includes monetary

damages.

RLUIPA permits a prisoner whose religiousexercise rights have been violated to obtain

“appropriate relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). This

includes monetary damages against prison officials.

“[S]tart with the statutory text.” Tanzin, 592 U.S.

at 46. RLUIPA authorizes “[a] person” to “assert a

violation” of the statute “as a claim or defense in a

judicial proceeding” and to “obtain appropriate relief

against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).

Congress used an identical phrase when it provided

for “appropriate relief” for violations of RFRA. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).

23

Congress enacted RFRA in the wake of this

Court’s holding that challenges to neutral laws of

general applicability would no longer warrant strict

scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. Emp. Div.,

Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,

879 (1990). Like RLUIPA, RFRA prohibits

“government[s] [from] substantially burden[ing]”

religious exercise without a compelling justification.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). After this Court held RFRA

unconstitutional as applied to the states, City of

Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Congress

responded by enacting RLUIPA to restore the same

strict scrutiny test to two areas where religious

discrimination was particularly acute: in prisons and

in state and local land-use determinations. See

Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716; see also 146 Cong. Rec. at

16699 (“[W]hether from indifference, ignorance,

bigotry, or lack of resources, some institutions restrict

religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary

ways.”).

RFRA and RLUIPA are “sister statute[s]” that use

parallel text and “mirror[]” one another. Holt, 574

U.S. at 356-57. As relevant here, both statutes

provide a private cause of action allowing those whose

religious-exercise rights have been violated to “obtain

appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000bb-1(c); id. § 2000cc-2(a). Accordingly, the

Court’s decision in Tanzin is highly relevant to this

case. In Tanzin, the Court noted that Congress sought

to revive the standards controlling Free Exercise

cases before Smith through RFRA and held that

RFRA permits monetary damages. 592 U.S. at 50-51.

24

Tanzin decided several key issues that apply

directly to the question presented here.

First, Tanzin explained that “RFRA’s text provides

a clear answer” to the question of whether “injured

parties can sue Government officials in their personal

capacities.” 592 U.S. at 47. “They can,” because RFRA

provides for “relief ‘against a government,’ which is

defined to include ‘a branch, department, agency,

instrumentality, and official (or other person acting

under color of law) of the United States.’” Id. (citation

omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(c), 2000bb2(1)). Congress’s inclusion of officials and persons

acting under color of law in the definition of “a

government” indicates that individual-capacity suits

for monetary damages are necessarily within RFRA’s

scope.

So too here. RLUIPA defines “government” to

mean “(i) a State, county, municipality, or other

governmental entity created under the authority of a

State; (ii) any branch, department, agency,

instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause

(i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of

State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i)-(iii)

(emphasis added). As in RFRA, Congress defined

“government” to include officials and persons acting

under color of law, so a lawsuit against an individual

defendant in his personal capacity remains a case

against a government. Cf. Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 48.

Second, this Court examined “[t]he legal ‘backdrop

against which Congress enacted’ RFRA,” and

concluded that this background supports individualcapacity suits. See id. (quoting Stewart v. Dutra

25

Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 487 (2005)). The Court

noted that RFRA’s “phrase ‘persons acting under color

of law’ draws on one of the most well-known civil

rights statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. That statute

has long permitted “suits against officials in their

individual capacities.” Id. Because Congress used “the

same terminology … in the very same field of civil

rights law,” the phrase carried a consistent meaning

in both contexts. Id. So too here: when Congress

elected to use the same phrase in RLUIPA, it chose to

extend the availability of individual-capacity suits to

that context as well.

Third, turning to the question of what constitutes

“appropriate relief” under RFRA, the Court reasoned

that monetary damages are “commonly available

against state and local government officials” in other

civil-rights contexts. Id. at 50. “[D]amages have long

been awarded as appropriate relief” in cases against

individual officers and, “[t]hough more limited” in

some ways now, they “remain an appropriate form of

relief today.” Id. at 48-49; see also Curtis v. Loether,

415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (describing monetary

damages as “the traditional form of relief offered in

the courts of law”). Drawing another parallel with

§ 1983, this Court explained that “damages claims

have always been available” under that statute “for

clearly established violations of the First

Amendment.” Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 50. The Court

further observed that “RFRA made clear that it was

reinstating both the pre-Smith substantive

protections of the First Amendment and the right to

vindicate those protections by a claim.” Id. Therefore,

because “RFRA reinstated pre-Smith protections and

rights, … RFRA must have at least the same avenues

26

for relief against officials …. [as] before Smith.” Id. at

51.

Again, what was true for RFRA in Tanzin is true

for RLUIPA here. RLUPIA, like RFRA, is meant to

“reinstate[] pre-Smith protections and rights” in the

prison and land-use contexts. Id. Before Smith, those

seeking to vindicate a violation of their religious

freedoms would have been able to seek monetary

damages from government officials and those acting

under color of law. Thus, RLUIPA must permit

damages against those same individuals.

2. Other aspects of RLUIPA confirm that

appropriate relief includes monetary

damages.

Although the Court could begin and end with

Tanzin, RLUIPA contains additional features that

authorize monetary damages.

First, RLUIPA’s text instructs that the law “shall

be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious

exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the

terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-3(g). As this Court has noted, this provision

demonstrates that RLUIPA is designed to “provide

very broad protection for religious liberty.” Holt, 574

U.S. at 356, 358 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby

Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014)).

This broad protection is especially critical to

adherents of minority religious traditions. See supra

§ I. Because equitable remedies can go only so far in

protecting religious exercise in prisons, see supra

27

§ I.D, monetary damages can help to “maxim[ize]”

RLUIPA’s broad protections. Tanzin demonstrates

that the phrase “appropriate relief” is capacious

enough to encompass monetary damages—and does

so clearly. Granting monetary damages is thus

necessary to “construe[]” the term “to the maximum

extent permitted,” § 2000cc-3(g).

Second, RLUIPA’s statutory structure confirms

that “appropriate relief” includes monetary damages.

RLUIPA authorizes the Attorney General to “bring an

action for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce

compliance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f). The limited

scope of this enforcement remedy illuminates the

remedies available to those who sue under RLUIPA’s

private right of action, which provides for all

“appropriate relief.” Id. § 2000cc-2(a). Because the

Attorney General may seek only injunctive and

declaratory relief, Congress must necessarily have

intended some broader set of relief when it used the

correspondingly broader term “appropriate relief” in

§ 2000cc-2(a). See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.

16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes particular

language in one section of a statute but omits it in

another section of the same Act, it is generally

presumed that Congress acts intentionally and

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”

(citation omitted)).

Congress surely recognized the traditional view

that damages are “the only form of relief that can

remedy some … violations.” Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 51. If

Congress had intended something narrower, it would

have used the limited language it used in the

Attorney General’s enforcement provision.

28

B. Allowing

monetary

damages

for

violations of RLUIPA is valid under the

Spending Clause.

The Fifth Circuit declined to allow damages

against prison officials in their individual capacities,

holding that RLUIPA’s roots in the Spending Clause

precluded compelling individual actors to pay

damages. Pet. App. 11a; see also Sossamon v. Lone

Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009). As

Judge Oldham demonstrated in his dissent from the

denial of rehearing en banc, however, it cannot be the

case that the Spending Clause permits only grant

recipients—i.e., the state—to be liable for damages.

Pet. App. 30a (Oldham, J., dissenting) (noting that

the Fifth Circuit panel “recognized that Congress can

regulate ‘individuals who aren’t party to the contract’”

in at least some circumstances. Id. (quoting Pet. App.

12a)).

Indeed, this Court has upheld laws passed under

the Spending Clause that regulate non-grantrecipient activities. See Sabri v. United States, 541

U.S. 600, 608 (2004); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.

203 (1987).

The Sixth Circuit correctly declined to follow this

approach to the Spending Clause in an opinion by

Judge Sutton, who wrote that it “proves too much.”

Haight, 763 F.3d at 570. “If accepted,” he reasoned, “it

would mean that even an eminently clear statute—

say, that ‘plaintiffs could obtain money damages in

actions against state and local prison officials,

whether sued in their official or individual capacity’—

would not permit money damages.” Id. This view, he

29

concluded, “is not consistent” with this Court’s

precedent. Id.2

Again, Judge Oldham explained why this is so.

“Congress’s spending power is subject to four general

restrictions.” Pet. App. 31a (Oldham, J., dissenting)

(citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08). “Spending Clause

legislation must (1) be in pursuit of the general

welfare, (2) impose unambiguous conditions on the

grant of federal money, which (3) are related to the

federal interest in particular national projects or

programs, and (4) do not violate other provisions of

the Constitution.” Id.

None of these restrictions are present in RLUIPA.

RLUIPA serves general public purposes by protecting

prisoners’ right to exercise their religion, “[a]nd it

cannot be seriously disputed that making individual

officers liable for violating religious exercise rights

serves the same general public purpose.” Id. States

and municipalities have had “clear notice” that they

could be held liable under RLUIPA, and the statute’s

2 The Sixth Circuit correctly recognized that the Spending

Clause analysis employed by the Fifth Circuit and other circuits

was unpersuasive. But its Spending Clause analysis reached an

equally unpersuasive conclusion. In its view, the Spending

Clause requires a statute to have an unambiguous, clear

statement that an individual may be subject to monetary

damages. See Haight, 763 F.3d at 570. For all the reasons

described above, see supra § II.A, and in Petitioner’s Brief, Pet.

Br. 30-50, this conclusion is unwarranted. RLUIPA’s plain text

permits damages against prison officials and does so with all the

clarity needed to allow prison officials to know “what is expected

of” them to “exercise their choice knowingly” when operating

federally funded prisons. Pennhurt State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

30

remedy of “appropriate relief” has been in the law

from the outset. Id. (“As applied to suits against

individual officials and as understood by an ordinary

person at the time of RFRA’s enactment, the remedy

of ‘appropriate relief’ plainly encompassed money

damages, as the Supreme Court unanimously held.”).

Moreover, holding individual officers liable for

monetary damages is “reasonably related to the

purpose of the expenditure,” for the risk of damages

“should deter government misconduct and protect

religious exercise.” Id. at 31a-32a. Nor would

awarding damages violate any other aspect of the

Constitution. See id. For these reasons, the award of

monetary damages in RLUIPA passes constitutional

muster.

In short, RLUIPA’s broad goals of protecting

prisoners’ religious exercise to the maximum extent

and aiding in prisoner rehabilitation underscore

why—as in RFRA—Congress clearly intended to

authorize monetary damages against individual

prison officials.

31

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should

reverse the decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

NEEDHY SHAH

HINDU AMERICAN

FOUNDATION

100 S. Broad St.

Suite 1318

Philadelphia, PA 19110

(202) 223-8222

needhy@hafsite.org

CHRISTOPHER S. ROSS

Counsel of Record

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF

AMERICA, COLUMBUS

SCHOOL OF LAW

3600 John McCormack Rd. NE

Washington, DC 20064

(202) 319-6783

rosscs@cua.edu

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

September 2025