Opposition Brief — Patrick D. Thompson, Petitioner v. United States

No. 23-1095

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

NICOLE M. ARGENTIERI

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

SOFIA M. VICKERY

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether petitioner made “any false statement,” for

purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1014’s bar on making such a statement to influence an action of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or a bank that it insures, by stating

that he owed a lender $110,000 when he knew that he

owed $269,000, and by incorrectly stating the loan’s purpose.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statement ...................................................................................... 1

Argument....................................................................................... 5

Conclusion ................................................................................... 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) ....... 7

Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) ........................................... 12

Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) ................. 10

Diaz v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 1727 (2024) ....................... 7

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ..................... 9

Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938) ................................ 8

Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners,

L.P., 601 U.S. 257 (2024) .................................................... 10

Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc.,

547 U.S. 9 (2006) ................................................................... 9

Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305 (1882) ....................... 11

United States v. Attick, 649 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 861 (1981) ................................. 11, 12

United States v. Autorino,

381 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2004) .................................................. 11

United States v. Concemi,

957 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1992) ............................................... 12

United States v. Copus,

110 F.3d 1529 (10th Cir. 1997) ........................................... 11

United States v. Freed, 921 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2019) ..... 5, 11

United States v. Greene, 578 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1978),

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979) ..................................... 11

(III)

IV

Cases—Continued:

Page

United States v. Kurlemann,

736 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2013) ......................................... 12, 13

United States v. Miller, 676 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.)

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856 and 459 U.S. 866 (1982) .......... 11

United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) ......... 11

United States v. Thorn, 17 F.3d 325 (11th Cir. 1994) ........ 12

United States v. Waechter,

771 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1985) ............................................... 13

United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1995),

vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) ................ 11

United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) .............. 8, 10, 11

Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982) ........... 6, 8, 9

Statutes:

Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095-1096 ........... 9

§ 215, 35 Stat. 1130-1131 ................................................... 9

Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 519, 70 Stat. 507 ................................ 9

Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 .......... 8

§ 8(a), 48 Stat. 134 ............................................................. 8

Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004,

Pub. L. No. 108-458, Tit. VI, Subtit. H, § 6702,

118 Stat. 3764-3766 (18 U.S.C. 1038) .................................. 9

18 U.S.C. 1001 .......................................................................... 9

18 U.S.C. 1014 ................................................................. 1, 3-13

18 U.S.C. 1341 .......................................................................... 9

18 U.S.C. 1621 ........................................................................ 10

18 U.S.C. 2314 .......................................................................... 9

26 U.S.C. 7206(1) ..................................................................... 2

Miscellaneous:

W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the

Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) .................................................. 7

V

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

(1981) ...................................................................................... 6

Webster’s New International Dictionary of the

English Language (1917)..................................................... 6

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-1095

PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 2a-23a)

is reported at 89 F.4th 1010. The order of the district

court (Pet. App. 24a-89a) is not published in the Federal

Supplement but is available at 2022 WL 1908896.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

January 8, 2024. The petition for a writ of certiorari was

filed on April 5, 2024. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, petitioner

was convicted on two counts of making a false statement

to a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014,

and five counts of filing false income tax returns, in

(1)

2

violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1). Judgment 1. He was sentenced to four months of imprisonment, to be followed

by one year of supervised release. Judgment 2-3. The

court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 2a-23a.

1. Between 2011 and 2014, petitioner took out three

loans from Washington Federal Bank for Savings that

totaled $219,000. Pet. App. 3a. Initially, petitioner borrowed $110,000 to make an equity contribution to a law

firm he had joined. Ibid. For that loan, petitioner

signed a promissory note listing his home address and

stating that the loan was secured by that property.

Ibid.

Petitioner subsequently took out two additional

loans with a combined value of $109,000. Pet. App. 3a.

He first borrowed $20,000 to pay a tax bill. Ibid. He

then borrowed another $89,000 to repay a debt to another bank. Ibid. Petitioner did not sign any paperwork for those loans. Ibid.

In 2014, the president of Washington Federal emailed petitioner a list of the three loans, stating that

petitioner owed $219,000 plus interest, which at that

time resulted in a total debt of $232,273.82. Pet. App.

3a. In 2016, in two separate loan applications, petitioner

stated that he owed $249,050 to Washington Federal.

Ibid. And a year later, he received a statement from

Washington Federal showing that his outstanding balance was $249,049.96. Ibid. Petitioner gave that invoice

to his accountant and kept a copy in an envelope on

which he wrote, “Washington Fed $249,049.96?” Id. at

3a-4a.

Washington Federal failed in 2017. Pet. App. 4a.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)

became its receiver, assuming responsibility for collecting money owed to the bank. Ibid. The FDIC’s loan

3

servicer thereafter sent petitioner an invoice showing a

loan balance of $269,120.58. Ibid.

In February 2018, petitioner called the loan servicer.

Pet. App. 4a. During that recorded call, petitioner

stated that “the numbers that you’ve sent me show[]

that I have a loan for $269,000. I—I borrowed $100,000”

or “$110,000.” Ibid. He claimed that he had “no idea

where the 269 number comes from” and that he was

“shocked” and “very perplexed” by that amount, which

was “significantly higher” than “remotely . . . what we

were talking about.” Ibid. He added that he “want[ed]

to quickly resolve all this” and said, of the $269,000 figure, “I dispute that.” Id. at 4a-5a. During a second

phone call in March 2018, petitioner told two FDIC contractors that he disputed owing around $269,000. Id. at

5a. He further stated that he had borrowed $110,000

for “home improvement.” Ibid.

Petitioner and the FDIC later settled his debt for

$219,000, the amount of the loans without interest. Pet.

App. 5a. In those negotiations, petitioner maintained

that he did not owe interest on the loans. Ibid. The

FDIC believed it might struggle to collect interest because Washington Federal had not kept proper records.

Ibid.

2. A federal grand jury sitting in the Northern District of Illinois charged petitioner with two counts of

making a false statement to a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014, as well as five tax offenses.

Indictment 1-10. Section 1014 prohibits “knowingly

mak[ing] any false statement or report * * * for the

purpose of influencing in any way the action of ” the

FDIC (or another listed entity) upon any loan. 18

U.S.C. 1014. The first Section 1014 count charged petitioner with falsely stating during the February 2018

4

phone call that “he only owed $100,000 or $110,000 to

Washington Federal and that any higher amount was

incorrect.” Indictment 3. The second Section 1014

count charged petitioner with falsely stating on the

March 2018 call that “he only owed $110,000 to Washington Federal, that any higher amount was incorrect,

and that these funds were for home improvement.” Indictment 4.

At the close of trial, the district court read to the jurors “the specific language of the false statements alleged in the indictment,” Pet. App. 42a, and instructed

them that in order to return a guilty verdict, they had

to find, among other elements, that petitioner made the

“charged” statements, 2/14/22 Trial Tr. (Tr.) 1323, 1325;

see Pet. App. 43a. The jury found petitioner guilty on

both Section 1014 counts (Counts 1 and 2), as well as all

the tax counts. Tr. 1428-1429. On Count 2, the jury returned a special verdict finding that petitioner made

both false statements alleged in that count: i.e., that he

“only owed $110,000” to Washington Federal and that

“any higher amount was incorrect” and that “the funds

he received from Washington Federal were for home

improvement.” Pet. App. 6a; see Tr. 1323, 1325, 13321333, 1428. The district court denied petitioner’s motion

for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, Pet. App. 24a89a, and sentenced him to four months of imprisonment,

Judgment 2-3.

3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 2a-23a.

The court rejected petitioner’s contention that he did

not violate Section 1014, premised on the theory that

while “his statements may have misrepresented what

he owed,” they were “literally true.” Id. at 8a; see id. at

7a-12a. The court explained that, even assuming that

petitioner’s statements were true in a technical sense

5

and thus merely “misleading,” circuit precedent recognized that Section 1014 “criminalizes misleading representations.” Id. at 9a; see United States v. Freed, 921

F.3d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 2019) (statement’s falsity depends on how it would “naturally be understood”). And

the court accordingly determined that petitioner’s insistence “he had borrowed $110,000,” and his expression of “shock” at “being told that he owed upwards of

$260,000,” constituted “false statements” under Section

1014. Pet. App. 10a.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner renews his claim (Pet. 13-18) that he did

not make “any false statement” within the meaning of

18 U.S.C. 1014 by claiming to owe his lender only

$110,000 when he knew that he owed about $269,000,

and by incorrectly stating the loan’s purpose. But his

statements were false by any measure, and his contrary

argument would not entitle him to relief in any circuit.

No further review is warranted.

1. The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioner’s claim that he did not make a “false” statement

within the meaning of Section 1014. Pet. App. 7a-12a.

a. As a threshold matter, petitioner errs at the outset by claiming (Pet. 5) that he “was convicted under 18

U.S.C. § 1014 for stating that he borrowed $110,000 and

that he disputed owing $269,000”—statements he characterizes as “misleading” but technically “not false.”

That premise is mistaken.

Petitioner was indicted and a jury found him guilty

not just for saying he borrowed $110,000 and disputed

borrowing $269,000, but also for stating “that any

higher amount was incorrect” (Counts 1 and 2) and that

the funds were for “home improvement” (Count 2). Indictment 3-4; Tr. 1323, 1325, 1332-1333, 1428. Petitioner

6

does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings that he made the statements

as charged. And those statements were false under any

standard of falsity.

As petitioner knew, he had received much more than

$110,000 in loans, and the loans were steadily accumulating unpaid interest. It was also plainly false that the

loan was for home improvement; petitioner knew that

he had borrowed the initial funds for his law-firm capital contribution. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 41-42. Petitioner’s

claim that Section 1014 does not prohibit merely misleading representations is beside the point.

b. Even if petitioner had made only the “misleading”

statements that he had borrowed $110,000 and disputed

the $269,000 figure, he still would have violated Section

1014. As the court of appeals correctly recognized, Pet.

App. 9a, Section 1014 criminalizes misleading representations and is not limited to “literally false” statements.

A “false statement” under Section 1014 is “a factual

assertion” that can “be characterized as ‘true’ or

‘false.’ ” Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 284

(1982). In ordinary usage, the word “false” has never

been limited by notions of “technical” or “literal” veracity. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 819 (1981) (defining “false” as “not true,”

“deceitful,” “tending to mislead”) (capitalization and

emphasis omitted); Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 787 (1917) (defining

“false” as “Uttering falsehood; unveracious; given to deceit; dishonest”; “Not according with truth or reality;

not true; erroneous; as, a false statement”; “Not genuine or real; assumed or designed to deceive”).

Indeed, even petitioner’s own gloss on the statutory

language—“literally false” (Pet. 5, 16)—presupposes

7

that a statement can be “false” even without being an

express and literal falsehood. And legal usage accords

with that plain-language meaning. In law as in life, “half

of the truth may obviously amount to a lie, if it is understood to be the whole.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser

and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 106, at 738 (5th ed.

1984).

This understanding of falsity accords with common

sense. On petitioner’s view, a child’s statement that she

“ate one cookie,” after having cleaned out the whole

cookie jar, would not be a “false” statement because it

could be viewed as technically true: she ate one, and

then all the rest. Similarly, petitioner would not have

made a false statement here even if he had claimed to

owe $500 (or any nonzero amount) and disputed the

real, higher figure. That hypertechnical view of what it

means for a statement to be “false” is untenable and inconsistent with normal usage.

Other features of Section 1014’s text reinforce its

coverage of statements that falsely imply that they are

the whole truth. See Diaz v. United States, 144 S. Ct.

1727, 1735 (2024) (emphasizing “a word’s meaning is informed by its surrounding context,” and a “crucial part

of that context is the other words in the sentence”). The

statute prohibits not “a” but “any false statement,” 18

U.S.C. 1014 (emphasis added), which “suggests a broad

meaning.” Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.

214, 219 (2008). Furthermore, it criminalizes false

statements made “for the purpose of influencing in any

way the action of ” the lenders and other financial institutions listed in the statute. 18 U.S.C. 1014. It would

be anomalous to read a law designed to protect lenders

from being “influenc[ed] in any way” as excluding misleading statements. Ibid.

8

Precedent points in the same direction. In Kay v.

United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938), this Court encountered

a similarly phrased statutory predecessor, Section 8(a)

of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat.

128, that was later consolidated with several others into

Section 1014. 48 Stat. 134 (prohibiting “mak[ing] any

statement, knowing it to be false, * * * for the purpose

of influencing in any way the action of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation” et al.); see United States v.

Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 494-495 (1997); Williams, 458 U.S.

at 288 (interpreting Section 1014 by reference to these

predecessor statutes). In rejecting a constitutional

challenge to the law, the Court explained that “Congress was entitled to secure protection” of the homeloan program “against false and misleading representations.” Kay, 303 U.S. at 7; see id. at 6 (statute prohibits

statements made “falsely with intent to mislead” and

“to deceive by false information”).

Because “Congress expects its statutes to be read in

conformity with this Court’s precedents,” Wells, 519

U.S. at 495, that understanding of “false” should inform

the interpretation of the modern Section 1014. The

Court more recently relied on Kay in Wells, where it

declined to read a materiality element into Section 1014.

Id. at 494-495. And the relevant false statements in

Wells constituted “concealing from several banks” information contained in “secret side agreements” that

the defendant did not disclose. Id. at 484-485.

c. Petitioner provides no sound basis why a statement that is contextually “false” would not satisfy the

language of the statute.

Petitioner cites (Pet. 14-15) other laws that use

terms like “misleading” or “fraudulent” in conjunction

with “false,” but none of them supports his “literal

9

falsity” gloss on Section 1014. The other provisions

were enacted at various times, some of them decades

apart. E.g., Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of

2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, Tit. VI, Subtit. H, § 6702, 118

Stat. 3764-3766 (18 U.S.C. 1038). Even for those few (18

U.S.C. 1001, 1341, and 2314) that were part of the same

1948 recodification as Section 1014, see Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 20 (2006), the

relevant language either appeared before 1948, see Act

of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095-1096 (original

version of Section 1001); § 215, 35 Stat. 1130-1131 (original version of Section 1341), or was inserted after 1948,

see Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 519, 70 Stat. 507 (amending

Section 2314). Accordingly, the kind of inference that

can be drawn when Congress includes “particular language in one section of a statute but omit[s] it in another

section of the same Act,” Johnson v. United States, 559

U.S. 133, 143 (2010) (citation omitted), does not apply

here.

Petitioner’s reliance (Pet. 16) on Williams v. United

States is likewise misplaced. Williams held that depositing a check supported by insufficient funds did not violate Section 1014 because “a check is not a factual assertion at all,” and thus not a “statement” that can be

true or false. 458 U.S. at 284. The Court therefore had

no occasion to address the literal-falsity issue. In fact,

Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion, joined by three

other Justices, “assume[d] that the majority” would

agree “that the failure to disclose material information

needed to avoid deception in connection with loan transactions covered by § 1014 constitutes a ‘false statement

or report,’ and thus violates the statute,” id. at 296, and

the opinion of the Court said nothing to the contrary.

10

Petitioner similarly errs in relying (Pet. 17) on

Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).

Bronston held that the federal perjury statute, 18

U.S.C. 1621, does not prohibit a trial witness’s “answer,

under oath, that is literally true but not responsive to

the question asked and arguably misleading by negative

implication.” 409 U.S. at 353. The case turned on that

statute’s distinct language—referring not to a “false

statement” but to a statement the speaker “does not believe to be true”—and the distinct context of providing

testimony. See id. at 357-360. And as this Court has

made clear, “Congress did not codify the crime of perjury or comparable common-law crimes in § 1014.”

Wells, 519 U.S. at 491.

Petitioner’s fears (Pet. 17) of expansive liability are

unsound. As this Court emphasized in rejecting much

the same argument in Wells, Section 1014 applies “only

if the speaker knows the falsity of what he says and intends it to influence” one of the enumerated financial

institutions. 519 U.S. at 499. The statute also does not

reach forms of “deception” and “fraudulent behavior”

(Pet. 13), such as a “pure omission,” that do not involve

a statement, Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab

Partners, L.P., 601 U.S. 257, 263 (2024). Nothing about

the statute is either unclear or uncommonly broad.

2. Petitioner suggests (Pet. 6-13) a conflict in the

courts of appeals about Section 1014’s applicability to

representations that are “literally true.” As an initial

matter, this case could not implicate any such disagreement, because as noted above, see pp. 5-6, petitioner’s

statements were not “literally true.” He thus could not

prevail under any circuit’s approach, and this Court

does not grant a writ of certiorari to “decide abstract

questions of law * * * which, if decided either way,

11

affect no right” of the parties. Supervisors v. Stanley,

105 U.S. 305, 311 (1882). And in any event, his claim of

circuit disagreement is overstated.

Petitioner acknowledges that four courts of appeals

(the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits) have

squarely rejected the rule he urges. Pet. 11-13; see

United States v. Freed, 921 F.3d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 2019);

United States v. Copus, 110 F.3d 1529, 1535 (10th Cir.

1997); United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 752 (8th Cir.

1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 482 (1997);

United States v. Greene, 578 F.2d 648, 657 (5th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979). The Second

and Ninth Circuits have also found that certain statements, even if literally true, violated Section 1014. See

United States v. Autorino, 381 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2004)

(defendant’s “concealment, while pledging the stock

certificate, of the fact that he had fraudulently caused

the certificate to be cancelled and replaced” satisfied

Section 1014); United States v. Miller, 676 F.2d 359, 363

(9th Cir.) (rejecting the defense that statements “literally construed” were true when they typically would not

be interpreted in that manner), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

856 and 459 U.S. 866 (1982). And although the Third

Circuit has not found it necessary to resolve the question, see Pet. 6 n.2, it has described petitioner’s position

as “at least questionable.” United States v. Ryan, 828

F.2d 1010, 1014 (1987), abrogated on other grounds by

Wells, 519 U.S. 482.

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 6-11) that three courts of

appeals—the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits—require a statement to be “literally false” to violate Section 1014. But the statement that he quotes from the

First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Attick, 649

F.2d 61, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 861 (1981)—“one cannot

12

be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 if the statement

claimed to be false is, in fact, literally true,” id. at 63—

did not address a contextually false statement. Instead,

the First Circuit was considering a simple yes-or-no dispute about whether an “Event of Default” had occurred

under a contract, id. at 63-65. The First Circuit found

sufficient evidence that one had occurred and that the

defendant knew it, and accordingly affirmed his conviction under Section 1014. See ibid. And the First Circuit

has subsequently affirmed convictions under Section

1014 based on a defendant’s misleading omissions of relevant secondary mortgages in a settlement statement.

See United States v. Concemi, 957 F.2d 942, 950-951

(1992).

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.

Thorn, 17 F.3d 325 (1994), likewise did not adopt petitioner’s rule. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit found

that the relevant “statement,” a title insurance policy

that the defendant submitted to a financial institution,

did not contain even “implied false statements,” because

it “did not make any representation as to the state of ”

the relevant preexisting mortgage. Id. at 328-329 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Fifth

Circuit decision that petitioner recognizes as in accord

with the decision below in this case, see Pet. 11, predates the separation of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits

and thus would bind the Eleventh Circuit as well as the

Fifth. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,

1207-1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

The Sixth Circuit’s view in United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F.3d 439 (2013), that “a false-statement

prosecution under § 1014 cannot generally be premised

on implied representations,” id. at 447, is in at least

some tension with the reasoning of the decision below.

13

But Kurlemann did not question “the rule that an omission may amount to a false assertion if the omitted information is specifically requested or if the defendant

was under a legal duty to disclose the admitted information.” Id. at 449. And it relied on circuit precedent

that recognized that a document may contain “implied

factual assertions” based on “the system of statutes,

regulations, and announced policies” that created it.

United States v. Waechter, 771 F.2d 974, 978-979 (1985);

see Kurlemann, 736 F.3d at 448.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kurlemann does not

support petitioner’s request for further review in this

case. It is unclear how practically meaningful any disagreement between the two circuits might be. And it is

far from clear that the Sixth Circuit would find petitioner’s conduct here—in which petitioner responded to

a request for repayment of a $269,120.58 balance by

falsely asserting that he had “no idea” where the number came from and recalled only a single $100,000 or

$110,000 loan, Pet. App. 4a-5a—to be outside the scope

of Section 1014.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Solicitor General

NICOLE M. ARGENTIERI

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

SOFIA M. VICKERY

Attorney

JULY 2024