Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jack Jordan, Petitioner v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Supreme Court briefApr 2, 2024

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23-

ORIGINAL

No. 23-

FILED

APR 0 2 2024

Ilti

Supreme Court of tfie finite!) States

JACK JORDAN,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jack Jordan

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City, Missouri 64116

courts@amicuslaw.us

(816) 853-1142

received

APR - 4 2024

°^SBPrW%CLERK

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether any federal law or the U.S. Constitu

tion authorize any federal judge to penalize or punish

any person because such person stated in written fed

eral court filings that one or more federal judges know

ingly violated rights and freedoms expressly secured to

persons by the U.S. Constitution and federal laws or

that such judge(s) committed federal offenses {e.g., in

18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343, 1349, 1512

or 1519).

2. When an attorney challenges reciprocal dis

barment, whether federal law or the U.S. Constitution

authorize any federal court (including the U.S. Su

preme Court) to disbar an attorney (i.e., deprive the at

torney of his liberty and property, e.g., license to

practice his profession in such court) for purported

misconduct without such federal court, itself, expressly

identifying the particular standard(s) of conduct such

court concluded were relevant, identifying the attorney

conduct that purportedly violated any such standard,

identifying the facts material to proving how any such

attorney conduct violated any such standard, and iden

tifying the evidence that was admissible and admitted

to prove all material facts.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued

3. When an attorney challenges reciprocal dis

barment and requests a hearing, whether federal law

governing federal courts or the U.S. Constitution au

thorize any federal court (including the U.S. Supreme

Court) to disbar such attorney before affording such at

torney advance notice of the standards such court (at

least initially) concluded were violated and the conduct

that such court (at least initially) concluded violated

any such standard and a hearing, in compliance with

the Federal Rules of Evidence, regarding any issue

identified (in federal law, our Constitution or U.S. Su

preme Court precedent) as relevant.

Ill

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

U.S. Court ofAppeals, District of Columbia Circuit (dis

barment):

In re Jordan, No. 23-8505 (Nov. 14, 2023),

reh’ng and reh’ng en banc denied (Jan. 3,

2024).

INDIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Kansas Supreme Court (disbarment)

In re Jordan, 316 Kan. 501, 518 P.3d 1203

(2022), cert, denied sub nom. Jordan v. Kan.

Disciplinary Adm’r, 143 S. Ct. 982 (2023) (No.

22-684).

U.S. Supreme Court (disbarment)

In re Disbarment of Jordan, 143 S. Ct. 2605

(June 5, 2023), recon. denied 144 S. Ct. 259

(Oct. 2, 2023).

U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit (disbarment):

Jordan u. U.S. Dept, ofLabor, No. 20-2494 (8th

Cir. Nov. 2, 2021), recon. denied (Nov. 17,

2021), cert, denied sub nom. Jordan v. DOL,

142 S. Ct. 2649 (2022) (No. 21-1180).

U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit (disbarment):

In re Jordan, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 16506

(Jan. 3, 2023), recon. denied (Jan. 20, 2023),

cert, denied sub nom. Jordan u. United States

Ct. ofAppeals, 143 S. Ct. 2661 (2023) (No. 221029).

INDIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS—

Continued

U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit:

Jack Jordan v. U.S. Dept, of Justice, No. 225289 (Apr. 11, 2023) (summary affirmance of

denial of motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 re:

Powers’ email), reh’ng and reh’ng en banc de

nied (July 20,2023), cert, denied (Jan. 8,2024)

(No. 23-533).

Jack Jordan u. U.S. Dept, of Labor, No. 195201 (summary affirmance of summary judg

ment re: Powers’ email) (Jan. 16, 2020) reh’ng

denied (Feb. 18, 2020), cert, denied sub nom.

Jordan v. DOL, 141 S. Ct. 640 (Oct 19, 2020)

(No. 20-241).

Jack Jordan v. U.S. Dept, of Labor, No. 185128 (summary affirmance of summary judg

ment re: Powers’ email) (Oct. 19,2018), reh’ng

and reh’ng en banc denied (Jan. 24, 2019).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED......................

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DECISIONS BELOW.................................

JURISDICTION...................................... .

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED.....................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

II.

III.

IV.

VI.

Judges’ Retaliation Against Petitioner

Was Blatantly Unconstitutional View

point Discrimination...................................

Judges Repressing Criticism Violated the

First Amendment (and Much More of Our

Constitution).................................................

The First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amend

ments and Criminal Statutes Protect At

torney Speech/Petitions..............................

Before Punishing Attorney Speech or Peti

tions, Courts Must Prove Material Facts ...

Judges Failing to Justify Their Conduct

Are Essentially Mere Con Men, Priests or

Tyrants.........................................................

Using Judges’ Hearsay Against Petitioner

Irrefutably Was Illegal and Unconstitu

tional..............................................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

VII. This Is a Clean Vehicle to Address Outra

geous Violations of Our Constitution........ 46

CONCLUSION........................................................ 47

APPENDIX

In re: Jack Jordan, No. 23-8505 (D.C. Cir. Nov.

14, 2023) (disbarment order)........................... App. 1

In re: Jack Jordan, No. 23-8505 (D.C. Cir. Aug.

22, 2023) (denying oral argument).... ............. App. 3

In re: Jack Jordan, No. 23-8505 (D.C. Cir. Apr.

24, 2023) (discharging show cause order;

denying hearing; treating review of state

court order as a federal appeal)....................... App. 4

In re: Jack Jordan, No. 23-8505 (D.C. Cir. Feb.

10, 2023) (order to show cause re: reciprocal

disbarment based on state court order)......... App. 7

In re: Jack Jordan, No. 23-8505 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 3,

2024) (denying rehearing en banc)................. App. 9

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis,

143 S. Ct. 2298 (2023)............

12-14

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer,

144 S. Ct. 18 (2023)................

Alleyne v. United States,

570 U.S. 99 (2013)...................

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

All U.S. 242 (1986)................

Bank Markazi v. Peterson,

136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016)............

BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB

536 U.S. 516 (2002)................

Berry v. Schmitt,

688 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2012)..

Bond v. United States,

572 U.S. 844 (2014)................

Briscoe v. Lahue,

460 U.S. 325 (1983).................

California v. Green,

399 U.S. 149 (1910)................

Cohen v. Hurley,

366 U.S. 117 (1961)................

Cohens v. Virginia,

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)

Connick v. Myers,

461 U.S. 138 (1983).............

17, 23, 28

Vlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Dennis v. Sparks,

449 U.S. 24 (1980).................

31,44

District of Columbia u. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008)...............

19, 20

Dred Scott u. Sandford,

60 U.S. 393 (1857).................

29, 30

Etting v. U.S. Bank,

24 U.S. 59 (1826)....................

Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. 339 (1880).....:.........

First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti,

435 U.S. 765 (1978)...............

Gamble u. United States,

139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019)...........

Garcetti v. Ceballos,

547 U.S. 410 (2006)...............

23, 28

Garrison v. Louisiana,

379 U.S. 64 (1964).................

10,17,18, 23, 38

Gentile u. State Bar of Nevada,

501 U.S. 1030 (1991)..............

Gravel v. United States,

408 U.S. 606 (1972)...............

Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69 (1984)..................

12,13

Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409 (1976).............

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

■i

Iancu v. Brunetti,

139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).......................

In re Jordan,

316 Kan. 501, 518 P.3d 1203 (2022)

In re Primus,

436 U.S. 412 (1978)............................

In re Palmisano,

70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995)................

In re Pyle,

156 P.3d 1231 (Kan. 2007)................

In re Ruffalo,

390 U.S. 544 (1968)............................

James v. City of Boise,

577 U.S. 306 (2016)............................

Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)........................

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.

353 U.S. 252 (1957)............................

32, 35

Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia,

435 U.S. 829 (1978)............................

...15

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,

531 U.S. 533 (2001)............................

Mackay v. Easton,

86 U.S. 619 (1873)..............................

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)............

39, 42

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

Matal v. Tam,

582 U.S. 218 (2017)..................

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,

497 U.S. 1 (1990)......................

10,18,19, 38

Miranda u. Ariz.,

384 U.S. 436 (1966)..................

Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225 (1972)..................

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963)..................

10,16, 23, 27, 28, 35

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)..................

Near v. Minn.,

283 U.S. 697 (1931)......................

19, 20, 37

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964)..................... 10,15-17, 24, 28, 35

Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard,

568 U.S. 17 (2012).........................

Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns,

.435 U.S. 589 (1978)......................

Olmstead v. United States,

277 U.S. 438 (1928)......................

Pickering v. Board of Ed.,

391 U.S. 563 (1968)...................

10,18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Quercia v. United States,

289 U.S. 466 (1933)...................... ....

Reedv. Town of Gilbert,

576 U.S. 155 (2015)...........................

Republican Party v. White,

536 U.S. 765 (2002)..................... .

Roberts v. United States Jaycees,

468 U.S. 609 (1984)...........................

Rosenberger v.

Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa.

515 U.S. 819 (1995)...........................

Rosenblatt v. Baer,

383 U.S. 75 (1966).............................

17,18

Roth v. United States,

354 U.S. 476 (1957)...........................

Rucho u. Common Cause,

139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019)......................

Selling v. Radford,

243 U.S. 46 (1917).............................

Shurtleff v. City of Bos.,

142 S. Ct. 1583 (2022)......................

11,12

Snyder v. Phelps,

562 U.S. 443 (2011)...........................

17, 37

Speiser v. Randall,

357 U.S. 513 (1958)...........................

Spevack v. Klein,

385 U.S. 511 (1967)...........................

23,31

Xll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Standing Comm, on Discipline of

the United States Dist. Court v. Yagman,

55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)........................

38, 39

Sweeney v. Patterson,

76 U.S.App.D.C. 23,128 F.2d 457 (1942)...

Thornhill v. Alabama,

310 U.S. 88 (1940).........................................

14, 37

Thryu, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP,

140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020)..................................

Trump v. Anderson,

144 S. Ct. 662, 218 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2024)......

Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States,

143 S. Ct. 940 (2023)....................................

United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass’n,

389 U.S. 217 (1967).......................................

23, 27

United States v. Benjamin Brandon Grey,

891 F.3d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2018)....................

United States v. Classic,

313 U.S. 299 (1941).......................................

United States v.

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,

529 U.S. 803 (2000).......................................

United States u. Price,

383 U.S. 787 (1966).......................................

United States v. Trump,

91 F.4th 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2024).....................

Xlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States v. Vaello-Madero,

142 S.Ct. 1539 (2022)....................

United States v. Will,

449 U.S. 200 (1980)......... ...............

United States v. Wiltberger,

18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).........

United States v. Windsor,

570 U.S. 744 (2013)........................

Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

491 U.S. 781 (1989)........................

West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624 (1943)........................

Whitney v. California,

274 U.S. 357 (1927)........................

Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar,

575 U.S. 433 (2015)........................

Wood v. Georgia,

370 U.S. 375 (1962)....................

Constitution and Statutes

U.S. Const.

Amend. I

1,11-14, 16, 17,19, 20, 22,

.... 28, 29, 34, 36-39, 41,43

Amend. V....

........... 2,14, 22, 26, 29, 31

Amend. X....

2, 22

Amend. XIV

2,14,16, 22, 27, 29, 31,41

XIV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Art. Ill..................

Art. IV...................

Art. VI...................

5U.S.C. 3331.............

18U.S.C. 241.............

18U.S.C. 242............

18U.S.C. 371.............

18U.S.C. 1001...........

18U.S.C. 1519...........

28U.S.C. 2071...........

28U.S.C. 2072...........

28U.S.C. 2074...........

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-460

Rules

FED.R.APP.P. 46.

FED.R.EVID. 101

FED.R.EVID. 301

FED.R.EVID. 602

FED.R.EVID. 603

FED.R.EVID. 605

FED.R.EVID. 614

FED.R.EVID. 802

Page

..2, 3,22

3, 22,44

3,22

....4, 6, 22, 30, 31, 39

4, 6, 22, 30, 31, 34, 39

......... 4, 6, 22,30, 39

................... 5,6, 39

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

FED.R.EVID. 803..

FED.R.EVID. 806..

FED.R.EVID. 1101

Kan.R.Prof.C. 8.2..

Other Authorities

Address of the General Assembly of Virginia

(1799) (James Madison).......................................

Amendments to the Constitution (1789) (James

Madison)....................... ..........................................

Declaration of Independence (1776).....................

The Federalist Papers

No. 51 (James Madison).......................................

No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)..............................

No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton)..............................

No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)..............................

Report of 1800 on the Virginia Resolutions of

1798 (James Madison).........................................

Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)...................

Virginia Resolutions of 1798 (James Madison)...

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Jack Jordan respectfully petitions for a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

DECISIONS BELOW

The orders disbarring Petitioner (App. 1-2) and

denying rehearing en banc (App. 9) are unreported but

available at 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 30393 and 2024 WL

55399, respectively.

JURISDICTION

Judgment was entered on November 14, 2023. A

timely-filed petition for rehearing en banc was denied

on January 3, 2024. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const. Amend. I:

Congress shall make no Jaw . . . abridging the

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right

of the people peaceably to assemble, and to pe

tition the Government for a redress of griev

ances.

U.S. Const. Amend. V:

No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law. . . .

U.S. Const. Amend. X:

The powers not delegated to the United States

by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the

States, are reserved to the States respectively,

or to the people.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the

State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

U.S. Const. Art. Ill, §1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall

be vested in one supreme Court, and in such

inferior Courts as the Congress may from

time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,

both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall

hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and

shall, at stated Times, receive for their Ser

vices, a Compensation, which shall not be di

minished during their Continuance in Office.

U.S. Const. Art. Ill, §2:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,

in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti

tution, the Laws of the United States, and

Treaties made, or which shall be made, under

their Authority . . . [and] to Controversies to

which the United States shall be a Party. . ..

U.S. Const. Art. IV, §2, cl. 1:

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to

all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in

the several States.

U.S. Const. Art. IV, §4:

The United States shall guarantee to every

State in this Union a Republican Form of Gov

ernment. . . .

U.S. Const. Art. VI:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shall be made in Pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall

be made, under the Authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith

standing.

The Senators and Representatives before

mentioned, and the Members of the several

State Legislatures, and all executive and judi

cial Officers, both of the United States and of

the several States, shall be bound by Oath or

Affirmation, to support this Constitution. . . .

18 U.S.C. 241:

If two or more persons conspire to injure, op

press, threaten, or intimidate any person in

any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Posses

sion, or District in the free exercise or enjoy

ment of any right or privilege secured to him

by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, or because of his having so exercised

the same . .. They shall be fined under this ti

tle or imprisoned not more than ten years, or

both. ...

18 U.S.C. 242:

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordi

nance, regulation, or custom, willfully sub

jects any person in any State, Territory,

Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im

munities secured or protected by the Consti

tution or laws of the United States . . . shall

be fined under this title or imprisoned not

more than one year, or both. . . .

18 U.S.C. 371:

If two or more persons conspire either to com

mit any offense against the United States, or

to defraud the United States, or any agency

thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and

one or more of such persons do any act to ef

fect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. 1001:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this sec

tion, whoever, in any matter within the juris

diction of the executive, legislative, or judicial

branch of the Government of the United

States, knowingly and willfully—

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by

any trick, scheme, or device a material

fact;

(2) makes any materially false, ficti

tious, or fraudulent statement or repre

sentation; or

(3) makes or uses any false writing or

document knowing the same to contain

any materially false, fictitious, or fraudu

lent statement or entry;

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not

more than 5 years. .. .

(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party

to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s coun

sel, for statements, representations, writings

or documents submitted by such party or

counsel to a judge or magistrate in that pro

ceeding.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Every federal offense quoted above applies to the

judicial misconduct Petitioner addressed herein or in

the court filings for which Petitioner was disbarred.

U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) and federal ap

peals court judges knowingly violated Petitioner’s

rights secured by federal law and the Constitution.

They helped conceal evidence of criminal judicial mis

conduct, and they disbarred Petitioner to do so. Then,

SCOTUS Justices lied to America.

They trumpeted their so-called Code “[t]o dispel” a

purported “misunderstanding that” they “regard

themselves as unrestricted” by “ethics rules.” Code of

Conduct, Statement of the Court (11/13/2023). For such

purpose, all “undersigned” Justices represented that

they “subscribe to this Code” and “Commentary.” Id. at

9. They knowingly misrepresented that they already

did (and would) “comply with” the “Constitution,” in

cluding “Arndt. 5 (due process clause).” Id. at 13 (Com

mentary).

Repeatedly, Petitioner previously stated and

proved that administrative and federal judges (and at

torneys employed by federal agencies or Littler Mendelson, PC.) knowingly misrepresented facts, evidence

or legal authorities and committed federal offenses in

18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 371,1001,1519. They knowingly vi

olated the Constitution and federal laws (federal rules

of procedure and evidence, the Freedom of Information

Act (“FOIA”) or the Administrative Procedure Act).

They committed crimes to conceal, by concealing

or helping conceal evidence, e.g., of whether text re

dacted from one or two emails was protected by the at

torney-client privilege (and FOIA Exemption 4),

specifically, because it contained one (or two) privilege

notations (purportedly quoted) or expressly requested

an attorney’s “legal advice” or “input and review.” Such

request (if real) must include non-commercial words

which no agency lawfully can conceal, e.g., “please ad

vise regarding” or “please review and provide input.”

See SCOTUS No. 23-533 (petition).

No one ever even attempted to prove that federal

law permitted concealing evidence that judges and at

torneys lied about the foregoing notation(s) or re

quests). See, e.g., SCOTUS Nos. 23-533, 21-1320, 211350,21-1180,20-420, 20-241 (petitions, waivers of op

position).

No one ever even attempted to show that any rel

evant Petitioner statement of fact or law was false or

misleading. Government attorneys refrained from do

ing so even though Petitioner repeatedly apprised

them of their duty and the consequences of violating it.

Compare waivers filed regarding all SCOTUS petitions

cited on pages iii-iv, above, with U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 15.2

(“Counsel” have “an obligation to the Court to point

out” promptly “any perceived misstatement” of “fact or

law” in “the petition” bearing “on what issues properly

would be before the Court.” “Any objection” based on

“what occurred in the proceedings below” may other

wise “be deemed waived.”).

Instead, federal judges retaliated by having state

judges disbar Petitioner and then federal judges “re

ciprocally” disbarred Petitioner. SCOTUS and federal

appeals court judges failed to (ever) identify any rule

they concluded Petitioner violated, any Petitioner

speech/petition they concluded violated any rule, or

any fact or evidence they considered material or rele

vant. Cf. App. 1-2, 9; page iii, above (additional disbar

ment decisions). No one ever even disputed anything

Petitioner wrote showing that federal disbarments

were unconstitutional and criminal.

A D.C. Circuit clerk ordered Petitioner to “show

cause” why he could not be disbarred because of mere

“issu[ance]” of a “Kansas Supreme Court” (“KSC”) “or

der.” App. 7. After Petitioner showed cause, judges (il

legally) denied Petitioner’s request for hearing and

(illegally) treated disbarment as an appeal (of a state

order). App. 4-6. More judges denied oral argument.

App. 3. Without any substantive justification, judges

summarily disbarred Petitioner and denied rehearing.

App. 1-2, 9.

No decision disbarring Petitioner was—or can

be—justified with any controlling legal authority or

material fact thereunder. Every such proceeding was a

frivolous, fraudulent sham.

The retaliating judges usurped (and helped other

judges usurp) power to commit federal offenses and

knowingly violate our Constitution. They proved our

judicial system is an obvious (and often criminal) con

fidence game and many judges are con men. They

showed how judges rig their game. They conspired sys

tematically to attack and undermine our Constitution.

As KSC judges acknowledged, “Some judges are

dishonest” and “their identification and removal is” a

“high priority” to “help cleanse the judicial system of

miscreants” because “confidence in the judicial system”

must be “justified” (not blind). In re Pyle, 156 P.3d 1231,

1247 (Kan. 2007) (quoting In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d

483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995)). “Precisely because lawyers”

have “special competence in assessing judges” (id. at

1248), our systems of law and government depend

upon lawyers to expose and oppose judges violating pur

Constitution.

Attorneys, therefore, are court officers, sworn to

support our Constitution, and KSC (and federal) prec

edent and rules protect true “lawyer” statements “con

cerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge.” Id. at

1243 (quoting Kan.R.Prof.C. 8.2(a)). True “statements”

cannot “unfairly undermine public confidence in the

administration of justice.” Id. (quoting Comment to

Kan.R.Prof.C. 8.2(a)). “Expressing honest” attorney

“opinions on such matters contributes to improving the

administration of justice.” Id.

“Rule 8.2(a)” permits punishing “only false state

ments,” i.e., only “factual allegations”proue<i “false.” Id.

Government must prove with “clear and convincing ev

idence that” Petitioner asserted “false statements of

fact.” Id. at 1244.

Instead, KSC judges repeatedly lied, flouted KSC

rules and precedent and knowingly violated our Con

stitution (and Kansas statutes and Constitution). Cf.

SCOTUS No. 22-684 (petition). They knowingly mis

represented that mere attorneys (somehow) “deter

mined” they were “not required to prove Jordan’s

statements were false.” In re Jordan, 518 P.3d 1203,

1239 (Kan. 2022). They explicitly (and SCOTUS and

appeals court judges implicitly) fraudulently flouted

copious SCOTUS precedent. See id. at 1224,1234,1235

(citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); New

York Times Co. u. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garri

son v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)\ Pickering v. Board

of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412

(1978); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1

(1990)).

They fraudulently pretended they could rely on

Petitioner’s purported “failure to disprove” a federal

judge’s fraudulent conclusory contention that Peti

tioner’s statements were “baseless.” Id. at 1239. They

knowingly misrepresented (and merely contended)

that Petitioner’s “assertions” that federal “judges lied

about Powers’ email, concealed evidence, and commit

ted crimes” clearly “had to have been made with reck

less disregard to their truth or falsity.” Id.

They disbarred Petitioner because in federal court

“filings,” Petitioner’s “allegations about” federal

judges” were “serious” and “derogatory,” i.e., about

“criminal activity, lies, misrepresentations, [criminal]

conspiracy’ and “treason to the Constitution” because

they criminally concealed or helped conceal parts of

“Powers’ email,” to knowingly misrepresent they were

“protected” by “attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 1226.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decisions disbarring Petitioner (for speech/pe

titions) were entirely undefended and utterly indefen

sible. Judges’ silence should be contrasted with copious

contrary conclusions written or joined by all current

SCOTUS Justices.

All judges who disbarred Petitioner (for opposing

criminal judicial misconduct) knew their own conduct

was illegal, unconstitutional and criminal.

Judges’ Retaliation Against Petitioner Was

Blatantly Unconstitutional Viewpoint Dis

crimination.

Judges “target [ing]” Petitioner’s “particular views”

committed “blatant” and “egregious” “violation [s] of

the First Amendment.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi

tors of the Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Courts

constitute a “limited public forum” in which judges

“may not” ever “discriminate against speech on the ba

sis of its viewpoint.” Id. Accord Shurtleffv. City of Bos.,

142 S. Ct. 1583, 1602 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concur

ring) (“limited public forum”). Judges’ “viewpoint dis

crimination” is “presumed impermissible when

directed against speech” never proved to be not “within

the forum’s limitations.” Rosenberger at 830.

“When the government encourages diverse ex

pression,” including “by creating a forum for debate”

{e.g., in court proceedings) “the First Amendment pre

vents [government] from discriminating against

speakers based on their viewpoint.” Shurtleff at 1587.

. Judges “may not exclude” or punish lawyer or litigant

“speech” to repress the “viewpoint” that judges cannot

influence litigation with illegal, unconstitutional or

criminal misconduct. Id. at 1593. Such repression

clearly is “impermissible viewpoint discrimination.”

Id.

Judges retaliated against Petitioner because his

speech about judges was “derogatory.” Matal u. Tam,

582 U.S. 218, 221 (2017). Such retaliation is “the es

sence of viewpoint discrimination;” it “reflects” mere

“disapproval of a subset of messages” that judges

merely consider “offensive.” Id. Judges’ “viewpoint

discrimination” unconstitutionally “singled out a sub

set of messages for disfavor based on the views ex

pressed.” Id. Accord Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294,

2298-2299 (2019) (emphasizing unanimity in Tam).

“Viewpoint discrimination is poison to a free society;”

“it is especially important” thatjudges emphasize “that

the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint dis

crimination.” Id. at 2302 (Alito, J., concurring).

Judges may not “aim at the suppression of speech”

on “the basis of viewpoint.” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis,

143 S. Ct. 2298, 2332 (2023) (Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. United States

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,623-624 (1984)). Judges may not

“appl[y] the law” for “the purpose of hampering” attor

neys’ “ability to express” their or their client’s “views”

regarding issues relevant to court proceedings. Id.

(quoting Roberts at 624). Petitioner’s “services (legal

advocacy) were expressive; indeed, they consisted of

speech.” Id. at 2333 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)). Judges have no power to “in

hibit” attorneys’ “ability to advocate” in court filings

their or their clients’ “ideas and beliefs.” Id. (citing

Hishon at 78).

Any “regulation of speech because of disagreement

with the message it conveys” violates our Constitution.

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

Court “restrictions on the time, place, or manner” of

“speech” must be proved “reasonable.” Id. (collecting

cases). If sanctions can be “justified without reference

to the content” of “speech,” they must be “justified” with

proof they were “narrowly tailored to serve” a “signifi

cant governmental interest” and proof they “leave open

ample alternative channels for communication” of rel

evant “information.” Id.

II.

Judges Repressing Criticism Violated the

First Amendment (and Much More of Our

Constitution).

“[T]he Free Speech Clause” protects every Ameri

can’s “freedom to think as” he “will and to speak as” he

“think[s].” Elenis, 143 S. Ct. at 2310. Such “rights” are

“inalienable.” Id. at 2311 (quoting James Madison).

“[T]he freedom of thought and speech” are “indis

pensable to the discovery and spread” of “truth” about

public affairs. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274

U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, Holmes, JJ., concur

ring)). “By allowing all views to flourish,” we “may test

and improve our own thinking” as “individuals and as

a Nation,” so it is a “fixed star in our constitutional con

stellation” that “government may not interfere” (as

judges have) with the “marketplace of ideas” about

whether judicial conduct is constitutional or criminal.

Id. (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319

U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).

“All manner of speech” (including in court proceed

ings) enjoys “First Amendment’s protections.” Id. at

2312. “[T]he First Amendment’s protections belong” to

“all, including” attorneys “whose motives” judges “may

find misinformed or offensive.”Id. at 2317. “[T]he First

Amendment protects” Petitioner’s “right to speak his

mind regardless of whether the government considers

his speech sensible” or “misguided” or whether it

causes judges “anguish” or “incalculable grief.” Id. at

2312.

In 1774, Congress (comprising many attorneys)

emphasized that “freedom of the press” already was

one of our “great rights” because it served the “ad

vancement of truth” and “diffusion of liberal senti

ments on the administration of Government,”

including so that “oppressive officers” can be “shamed

or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes

of conducting [public] affairs.” Near v. Minn., 283 U.S.

697,717 (1931); Roth u. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484

(1957); Thornhill u. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)

(substituting “ashamed” for “shamed”).

“[T]he law” (including the First, Fifth and Four

teenth Amendments) “gives judges as persons, or

courts as institutions” absolutely “no greater

immunity from” our “criticism” (or our Constitution)

“than other persons or institutions.” Landmark

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978)

(cleaned up). Attorney “speech cannot be punished”

merely “to protect the court as a mystical entity” or

“judges as individuals or as anointed priests set apart

from the community and spared the criticism to which”

all “other public servants are exposed.” Id. at 842.

Mere “injury to [any judge’s] official reputation is

an insufficient reason” for “repressing speech that

would otherwise be free,” and “protect [ing]” the “insti

tutional reputation of the courts, is entitled to no

greater weight in the constitutional scales.” Id. at 841842. Judges also cannot rely on contentions that “alle

gations of [judicial] misconduct” are “unfounded” (or

baseless). Id. at 840.

Judges have no power to punish attorney criticism

that judges deem merely unfounded or offensive (or

both). See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273 (col

lecting cases). “Criticism of [judges’] official conduct

does not lose its constitutional protection merely be

cause it is effective criticism” and “diminishes their of

ficial reputations.” Id. Any “repression” of “criticism of

the judge or his decision” must “be justified” by proving

“obstruction of justice.” Id. Judges’ retaliation against

Petitioner is far worse than even the Sedition Act of

1798, which required proof criticism was “false” and

“malicious.” Id.

All courts must protect all Americans’ “privilege

for criticism of official conduct.” Id. at 282. All courts

must “support” the “privilege for the citizen-critic of

government.” Id. Such “privilege is required by the

First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 283. Courts

cannot “give public servants an unjustified preference

over the public they serve” by affording “critics of offi

cial conduct” less than “a fair equivalent of the immun

ity granted to the officials themselves.” Id. at 282-283.

See also id. at 269 (cleaned up):

freedom of expression upon public questions

is secured [as a] constitutional safeguard to

assure unfettered interchange of ideas [to

bring about] political and social changes de

sired by the people. [ F]ree political discussion

[so] that government may be responsive to the

will of the people and that changes may be ob

tained by lawful means! is] essential to the se

curity of the Republic [and] is a fundamental

principle of our constitutional system.

“(I)t is a prized American privilege to speak one’s

mind” on “all public institutions.” Id. “[T]his oppor

tunity” must “be afforded” for “vigorous advocacy” in

court proceedings. Id. (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 429)

(“the First Amendment” necessarily “protects vigorous

advocacy” in court proceedings “against governmental

intrusion”) (collecting cases).

All “public men” are essentially “public property,”

and “discussion cannot be denied and the right” and

“duty” of citizen “criticism must not be stifled.” Id. at

268. The pernicious pretense that judges have the

power to punish attorneys for speech/petitions expos

ing criminal judicial misconduct “reflect [s] the

obsolete” (seditious libel) “doctrine that the governed

must not criticize their governors.” Id. at 272 (quoting

Sweeney v. Patterson, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 24, 128 F.2d

457, 458 (1942)). “The interest of the public” in the

truth about purported public servants “outweighs the

interest” of “any [offended] individual. [Clearly,] pro

tection of the public requires” both “discussion” and

“information” about judicial misconduct. Id. (both deci

sions).

Attorney “statements of fact” or “comment or opin

ion regarding [any] political conduct” or “public offi

cials” are “not actionable” without “showing” a public

interest “suffered” actual “injury” by “reason” of such

“statements.” Sweeney at 458.

Petitioner’s “speech on public issues occupies the

highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment val

ues, and is entitled to special protection.” Snyder v.

Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick v.

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (cleaned up). See also

Snyder at 453 (discussing when “[s]peech deals with

matters of public concern”).

Petitioner’s “speech concerning public affairs” is

“the essence of self-government” and “debate on [such]

issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”

and it may “include vehement, caustic,” and “unpleas

antly sharp attacks on government and public offi

cials.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75. Accord Snyder at

452\ Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).

[The public has] a strong interest in debate on

public issues [including] about those persons

who are in a position significantly to influence

the resolution of those issues. Criticism of gov

ernment is at the very center of the constitu

tionally protected area of free discussion.

Criticism of those responsible for government

operations must be free, lest criticism of gov

ernment itself be penalized.

Rosenblatt at 85.

Garrison publicly implied eight judges were crim

inally corrupt and (like Petitioner) was essentially

prosecuted for seditious libel. But the “public interest

in a free flow of information to the people concerning

public officials, their servants” is “paramount,” so “an

ything which” even “might touch on an official’s fitness

for office is relevant,” including judges’ “dishonesty,

malfeasance, or improper motivation.” Garrison at 77.

“Truth may not be the subject of” any type of con

tent-based “sanctions” “where discussion of public af

fairs is concerned,” so “only” proven “false statements”

may be punished (for content) with “either civil or

criminal sanctions.” Id. at 74. Our Constitution “abso

lutely prohibits” any type of content-based “punish

ment of truthful criticism” of any public servant’s

public service. Id. at 78. Accord Pickering, 391 U.S. at

574 (precluding government employee’s discharge).

No Petitioner speech/petition “relating to matters

of public concern” was proved to “contain” even a “false

factual connotation,” so it must “receive full constitu

tional protection.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. Punished

speech must at least “imply” an “assertion of fact” that

was proved “false.” Id. at 19.

Despite knowing all the foregoing (and much of

the following), judges viciously and surreptitiously

“punished” Petitioner for, essentially, common-law se

ditious libel. Copious, evidence proves such retaliation

is outrageously unconstitutional and attorney freedom

to expose and oppose judicial misconduct is protected

by much of our Constitution.

Clearly, the First “Amendment” merely “codified”

parts of “pre-existing right[s].” N. Y. State Rifle & Pistol

Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2127 (2022) (quoting

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,592 (2008)).

Such “Amendment” was written and ratified not “to lay

down” any “novel principle but rather” purely because

it “codified” only parts of “right [s]” that Americans “in

herited” from many generations of “ancestors” who sac

rificed much in many ways for such rights. Id. (quoting

Heller at 599).

Such rights clearly were not “granted by the Con

stitution.” Heller at 592. They are not “in any manner

dependent upon” the Constitution for their “existence.”

Id. “The” plain “text” of multiple “Amendment [s] im

plicitly recognizes the pre-existence of” multiple

“right[s]” by “declaring] only that” they “shall not be

infringed” or abridged. Id.

“Constitutional rights” have “the scope they were

understood” (by the people) “to have when the people

adopted them, whether or not future legislatures” or

“judges think that scope too broad.” Heller at 634-635

(emphasis added). “Constitutional rights” have “the

scope they were understood to have when the people

adopted them” Bruen at 2136.

“The First Amendment contains the freedom-ofspeech guarantee that” many generations of “the peo

ple ratified” as much with their blood and lives as with

their voices and votes. Heller at 635. Such “Amend

ment” is merely the “product” of a very long history “of

an interest balancing by the people” for the people. Id.

Such “interest balancing by the people” certainly

“elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens” to use speech, press and

petitions “for self-defense” against abusive officials. Id.

Accord Bruen at 2131. The First Amendment is “the

‘product of an interest balancing by the people,’ not the

evolving product of federal judges.” Bruen at 2133, n.7.

“It is this balance—struck by the traditions of the

American people—that demands” the “unqualified def

erence” of all public servants. Id. at 2131.

The “enshrinement” in our Constitution “of consti

tutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices

off the table” for all public servants. Heller at 636. Our

Constitution’s express “enumeration of” First Amend

ment “right [s] takes out of the hands of [all] govern

ment—even [judges]—the power to decide on a caseby-case basis whether the right is really worth insist

ing upon.” Id. at 634. Many generations of judges re

taliating against critics proves that any “constitutional

guarantee” that is “subject” to “judges’ assessments of

its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Id.

To prevent and expose abuses of power by any pub

lic servant, Virginia’s legislature (including George

Mason and James Madison) emphasized (as those who

wrote or read the Declaration of Independence knew)

that “the freedom of the Press is one of the greatest

bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by

despotick Governments.” Virginia Declaration of

Rights §12 (June 12,1776).

The Founders and Framers (many of whom were

attorneys) feared sitting judges as much as standing

armies. They emphasized that abuses by the king’s

judges were crucial causes of the Revolution. See, e.g.,

Declaration of Independence (1776) ^[^6,10-12,15,17,

20-23. Americans fought for “Laws” ensuring “the

Right of Representation” which would be “formidable

to Tyrants” (id. *][5) and “for opposing” with “Firmness”

any “Invasions on the Rights of the People” (id. ^7).

Much in the original Constitution emphatically

protected political expression as integral and essential

to sovereign citizens’ seZ/'-government (requiring and

protecting speech by legislators, executive and judicial

officers (including attorneys), electors, voters, jurors

and witnesses exercising (only) parts of the people’s

power to think, speak and write for ourselves). Public

servants have the power to say people lied and commit

ted crimes because sovereign citizens have the right to

say so (including about public servants).

“[T]he People” created the “Constitution” (and

Congress and SCOTUS) to “establish Justice” and “se

cure the Blessings of Liberty.” U.S. Const. Preamble.

Our Constitution secures “all Privileges and Immuni

ties of Citizens” against all public servants, including

by requiring a “Republican Form of Government.” Art.

IV. Accord Amend. XIV, §1 (“privileges or immunities,”

“due process of law,” “equal protection of the laws”).

Federal judges have only such “powers” as the Peo

ple “delegated” to courts “by the Constitution.” Amend.

X. “No person” may be “deprived” of “life” or any “lib

erty” or “property” by any judge “without due process

of law.” Amend. V. Accord Amend. XIV, §1; 18 U.S.C.

241, 242, 371.

Federal “Judges” may hold and use “their Offices”

only “during” and for “good Behaviour.” U.S. Const. Art.

Ill, §1. All “Judges” (state and federal) always are

“bound” by the “Constitution” and federal “Laws” (“the

supreme Law of the Land”) despite “any Thing” else “to

the Contrary.” Art. VI. Absolutely “all” state and fed

eral “judicial Officers” always are “bound” to “support”

the “Constitution.” Id.

No judge has any power to “abridg[e] the freedom

of speech, or of the press” or “the right” to “petition”

courts to “redress” any “grievances” regarding uncon

stitutional or criminal judicial misconduct. Amend. I.

Accord Amend. XIV, §1. Regarding First Amendment

rights and freedoms, all persons are equal and all pub

lic servants (state and federal) are equal.

The “freedom of speech” and “press” are one free

dom in two forms. So “a reporter’s constitutional rights

are no greater than those of any other member of the

public.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 609

(1978) (collecting cases). Individuals and corpora

tions/media have the same speech/press freedom. See

First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

Judges are “constitutionally disqualified from dic

tating” (in the manner they did) “the subjects about

which” attorneys “may speak” or which “speakers” may

“address a public issue.” Id. at 784-785. Bellotti pro

tected state-created corporations; a fortiori, it protects

state-licensed attorneys. Button; Garrison; Connick;

Garcetti; United Mine Workers', Speuack, herein, also

protect, specifically, attorney speech.

Alexander Hamilton and James Madison knew

much of the foregoing (including that principles as

serted in the Bill of Rights were implied in our original

Constitution). So they emphasized that state and fed

eral “bills of rights” were “unnecessary” to “declare

that things shall not be done which there is no power

to do.” Federalist No. 84 (Hamilton) (for The Federalist

Papers, see https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/fulltext). In state and federal constitutions, “no power” was

“given” “by which restrictions may be imposed” on “lib

erty of the press” to expose and oppose unconstitu

tional or criminal judicial misconduct. Id.

Hamilton (an attorney) repeatedly emphasized

that our Constitution protected Americans from “the

great engines of judicial despotism,” including “arbi

trary methods,” “prosecuting pretended offenses,” and

“arbitrary punishments.” Federalist No. 83. Accord

Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton); Alleyne v. United States,

570 U.S. 99, 126-127 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)

(“judicial despotism”).

Limiting judicial despotism was among the pri

mary points of state and federal constitutions. Only

“the legislature, not the Court” has the power “to define

a crime” {e.g., sedition) “and ordain its punishment.”

United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95

(1820) (Marshall, C.J.).

Madison emphasized the “great importance in

[our] republic” of “guard [ing our] society against the

oppression of [our so-called] rulersFederalist No. 51.

“[T]he Constitution created a [republican] form of

government under which ‘The people, not [public serv

ants], possess the absolute sovereignty.’ [Our republi

can] government dispersed power” in many ways

precisely because “of the people’s” extreme “distrust” of

“power” at “all levels.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 274

(emphasis added) (quoting Madison). In “Republican

Government,” naturally, “the censorial power” gener

ally must be “in the people over [public servants], and

not in [public servants] over the people.” Id. at 275

(quoting Madison).

Madison subsequently re-emphasized that all

Americans’ speech is protected from all government

(federal and state): “The people shall not be deprived

or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to pub

lish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as

one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”

Amendments to the Constitution (1789) (proposed)

(https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0112-02-0126).

Nearly everything negative said about the Sedi

tion Act of 1798 or the vicious officials who abused it

(especially the impeached SCOTUS Justice Chase) ap

plies to judges retaliating against Petitioner for oppos

ing criminal judicial misconduct.

Judges’ “artful and vicious” retaliation was crafted

to “conceal usurpation” that “is forbidden” by “the

Constitution.” Address of the General Assembly of

Virginia (1799) (Madison) (https ://press-pubs.uchicago.

edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs21.html).

Judges retaliating against critics defraud Americans of

“sacred rights” and “the bulwark of” our “liberty;” such

“hideous” abuse of power “turns loose” the “utmost in

vention of insatiable” judicial “malice and ambition.”

Id.

Judges usurped “power [s] not delegated” to them

and even “expressly and positively forbidden by”

multiple constitutional provisions and amendments.

Virginia Resolutions of 1798 (Madison) (https://founders.

archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0128). Judges’

usurpations were “deliberate” and “dangerous,”

demonstrated “reproachful inconsistency” and “crimi

nal degeneracy,” and “subvert [ed] ” the “principles of

free government” and many “provisions of” our “Con

stitution.” Id. Such usurpations should “produce uni

versal alarm, because” judges seek to defraud

Americans of our “right of freely examining public

characters and measures, and of free communication

among the people thereon, which has ever been justly

deemed the only effectual guardian of” every American

“right.” Id.

The “evil of usurpation” by “the judicial depart

ment” committing “infractions dangerous to the essen

tial rights of” the people also is “dangerous to the great

purposes for which the Constitution was established,”

i.e., confirming two great “truths,” the “sovereignty of

the people over constitutions” and the “authority of

constitutions over governments.” Report of 1800 on

the Virginia Resolutions (Madison) (https://founders.

archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0202).

Generations of judges have designed decisions to

deceive Americans and defraud us of our rights. See,

e.g., Jordan, 518 P.3d at 1225 (quoting Gentile v. State

Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991)) (“in the

courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, what

ever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely

circumscribed”). That far-less-than-half-truth straw

man in irrelevant dictum is the darling of judicial

despots and con men. Many judges abuse it to attack

only attorneys and attack even writing.

The truth is far greater and simpler. “No person”

may be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. Nobody (in

cluding judges) has any contrary right or power. And

copious law expressly permits and protects copious

speech (by lawyers, litigants, witnesses, jurors) in

courtrooms and court papers, including Petitioner’s.

Petitioner cannot be punished for the content of

petitions opposing illegal, unconstitutional and crimi

nal judicial misconduct.

The “right to petition” is “one of the most precious

of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.”

BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, *524 (2002)

(quoting United Mine Workers v. Illinois BarAss’n, 389

U.S. 217, 222 (1967)) (cleaned up). Such “right is im

plied” by “the very idea of a government, republican in

form,” and it “extends to all departments of the Gov

ernment” including “courts.” Id. at 524-525.

“[T]he rights of free speech” and “free press” are

“not confined to” (or from) “any field.” United Mine

Workers at 223. “[T]he principles announced in But

ton,” infra, govern “litigation” (petitions or speech) “for

political purposes” or “solely designed to compensate”

alleged “victims.” Id.

Courts “may not prohibit” any “modes of expres

sion and association protected by the First and Four

teenth Amendments” by merely invoking the mere

general “power to regulate the legal profession.” But

ton, 371 U.S. at 428-429. “[I]t is no answer to” any of

Petitioner’s “constitutional claims” that the mere “pur

pose of” any “regulations” (court rules or rulings) “was

merely to insure high professional standards.” Id. at

438-439. Judges “may not, under the [mere] guise of

prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore” (know

ingly violate) “constitutional rights” (as judges did). Id.

at 439.

Courts “cannot foreclose the exercise of constitu

tional rights by mere labels,” e.g., attorney, discipline,

reciprocal (or judge). Id. at 429. No “regulatory

measures” (court rule or ruling), “no matter how so

phisticated,” can “be employed in purpose or in effect

to stifle, penalize, or curb” Petitioner’s “exercise of First

Amendment rights.” Id. at 439. Accord New York

Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (dispensing with all “mere la

bels” abused as “formulae for the repression of expres

sion”). “The test is not the [mere] form in” (or the label

under) which government “power” was “applied but” whether “such power” was “exercised” constitutionally.

Id. at 265.

Government “cannot condition” even actual “employ

ment” (much less licensing) “on a basis that infringes

[any] employee’s” (any attorney’s) “constitutionally

protected interest in freedom of expression.” Garcetti v.

Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006) (quoting Connick,

461 U.S. at 142).

Every “citizen who works for the government [for

the public] is nonetheless a citizen. The First Amend

ment limits the ability of [government even as an] em

ployer to leverage [even an] employment relationship

to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties”

that even government “employees enjoy” as “citizens.”

Garcetti at 419. Even when government restricts

speech of attorneys as actual “employees” when

“speaking as citizens about matters of public concern,”

government must prove it imposed “only” such “speech

restrictions” as were “necessary for” government “to

operate efficiently and effectively.” Id.

III. The First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amend

ments and Criminal Statutes Protect At

torney Speech/Petitions.

Judges’ retaliation against Petitioner obscenely of

fends our Constitution. Many controlling authorities

confirm our Constitution secures equal protection of

law to all citizens. See, e.g., United States v. VaelloMadero, 142 S. Ct. 1539,1547-1552 (2022) (Thomas, J.,

concurring). Even so, an absurd attitude of supremacy

infects the minds of many judges, including those re

taliating against Petitioner.

SCOTUS Justices repeatedly have addressed such

infection. For example, the “Chief Justice” (and six oth

ers) previously knowingly misrepresented that “free

blacks” had “none of the rights and privileges” of “citi

zens” because they purportedly always had been

treated as “a subordinate and inferior class of beings”

merely because they “had been subjugated” by “domi

nant” people in power, so they “had no rights or privi

leges” except “such as those who held power and

[controlled] Government might choose to grant them.”

Id. at 1547 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.

393, 404-405 (1857)).

SCOTUS Justices defrauded many Americans of

“the privileges and immunities of citizens,” including

“full liberty of speech” upon “all subjects upon which”

all “citizens” have the right to “speak.” Dred Scott at

416-417. Judges continue to do the same to lawyers.

A primary point of the Fourteenth Amendment

and powerful legislation of the late 1800’s was to

emphatically reverse and remedy SCOTUS Justices’

(and their co-conspirators’) Dred Scott fraud. See, e.g.,'

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230-231, 238-243

(1972); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 769-807

(1966) (discussing 18 U.S.C. 241, 242 and tracing their

history to 1866-1870).

Any judges “conspiring] to injure, oppress,

threaten, or intimidate” attorneys “in the free exercise

or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to” them

“by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or

because of” their “having so exercised” any such “right

or privilege” commit a crime. 18 U.S.C. 241. Accord 18

U.S.C. 371.

Any judge acting “under color of any law” or “cus

tom” to “willfully” deprive attorneys “of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured or protected by” any

provision of the “Constitution” or federal “laws” com

mits a crime. 18 U.S.C. 242. No judge or judicial action

or custom is exempt, including so-called deference,

comity, reciprocity, res judicata, presumptions or pre

tenses {e.g., that judicial hearsay against Petitioner is

true or is evidence it is true). In Section 242, the “qual

ification” regarding “alienage, color and race” is inap

plicable “to deprivations of any rights or privileges.”

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).

“Judges” clearly can be punished under “criminal

laws” for “official acts,” including the “notable example”

of knowingly “violating a federal statute.” United

States v. Trump, 91 F.4th 1173, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2024)

(citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)). “Even

judges” clearly “can be punished criminally” under Sec

tions 241 or 242 “for willful deprivations of constitu

tional rights.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429

(1976). Accord Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28, n.5

(1980); Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325,345, n.32 (1983).

The “Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the

Fourteenth,” and each “extends its protection to law

yers,” and neither may “be watered down” to facilitate

“disbarment.” Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514

(1967) (Douglas, Black, Brennan, JJ., Warren, C.J.).

Judges cannot resort to “procedure” that “would deny”

attorneys “all opportunity” to compel each court “to

make a record” showing proof of material facts (by

clear and convincing evidence). Id. at 518-519.

There is “no room in the” Fifth or Fourteenth

Amendments to discriminate based on mere “classifi

cations of people so as to deny [lawyers due process].

Lawyers are not excepted” from “person” in the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments, and judges “can imply

no exception.” Id. at 516.

“The special responsibilities [attorneys] assume”

as “officer [s] of the court do not carry with them” any

“diminution” of attorneys’ “Fifth Amendment rights.”

Id. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring).

“The threat of disbarment and the loss of profes

sional standing, professional reputation, and of liveli

hood are powerful forms of compulsion” that some

judges abuse to illegally intimidate and injure attor

neys. Id. at 516 (plurality). So the following “views” in

Cohen were implicit (“need not be elaborated again”).

Id. at 514.

The “important role” of “lawyers” in “our society”

makes it “imperative that [lawyers] not be discrimi

nated against” regarding “freedoms that are designed

to protect” Americans “against the tyrannical exertion

of governmental power. [Indeed,] the great purposes

underlying [such] freedoms [include affording] inde

pendence to those who must discharge important pub

lic responsibilities. [Lawyers], with responsibilities as

great as those placed upon any group in our society,

must have that independence.” Cohen v. Hurley, 366

U.S. 117, 137 (1961) (Black, Douglas, JJ., Warren, C.J.,

dissenting)

It is “important” to “society and the bar itself that

lawyers be unintimidated—free to think, speak, and

act as members of an Independent Bar.” Konigsberg v.

State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957). “An in

formed, independent judiciary” must have “an in

formed, independent bar.” Legal Services Corp. v.

Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001). judges cannot

“prohibit[] speech and expression upon which courts

must depend for the proper exercise” of “judicial

power.” Id.

Judges and “courts depend” on an “independent

bar” for “the proper performance of [judges’ and courts’

constitutional] duties and responsibilities. Restricting”

conscientious, capable “attorneys” from “presenting ar

guments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal

system by altering the traditional” (constitutional)

“role” of “attorneys.” Id. at 544.

Judges cannot “exclude from litigation those argu

ments and theories” they deem “unacceptable but

which by their nature are within the province of the

courts to consider.” Id. at 546. Judges cannot refuse to

adjudicate credibility and crimes merely because

judges lied and committed crimes.

Our “Constitution guarantees” the “entire inde

pendence of” federal “officers” (including judges and

attorneys) “from any control” by “States.” Trump v. An

derson, 144 S. Ct. 662, 218 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7-8 (2024).

Petitioner’s “right” to be an officer of each federal

court was “secured” by our Constitution and federal

law and “may not be taken away” in violation thereof.

Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 48 (1917). Judges’

“duty” is “not to disbar except upon the conviction” that

they are “constrained” to disbar. Id. at 51.

Each court’s judges’ “duty” is to “determine” (adju

dicate) “for [them] selves” Petitioner’s “right” to be an

officer thereof. Id. at 50. They are bound by their “duty”

not “to abdicate” their “own functions” (duties) “by

treating” prior judges’ purported “judgment” as “ex

cluding all inquiry.” Id. at 50.

“[B]efore sanction is given” to any prior “disbar

ment,” each federal court must conduct its own “inves

tigation.” Id. at 48-49. “[T]he character and scope” of

“investigation” clearly “must depend upon” identified

“acts of misconduct and wrong” and “proof relied upon”

to “establish” such “misconduct.” Id. at 49. Each court

must identify such acts and proof.

Each federal court’s “intrinsic consideration of the

state record” must explicitly address what “facts” were

“found” and “proof” was presented that Petitioner

lacked the requisite “professional character” or

whether “other grave reason” precludes disbarment.

Id. at 51.

“[T]he substantive law” identifies “proof or eviden

tiary requirements,” including “which facts are mate

rial,” i.e., “might affect the outcome” under “governing

law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248

(1986). SCOTUS precedent emphasized material facts,

and “the First Amendment mandates a ‘clear and con

vincing’ standard.” Id. at 252. No court did (or can)

bear any relevant burden of proof.

“Disbarment” is “a punishment” that judges must

prove they used only “to protect the public.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968). Disbarment is “quasi

criminal.” Id. at 551. So Petitioner was “entitled to pro

cedural due process,” including “fair notice of” each

court’s “charge” and “opportunity” to provide “explana

tion and defence.” Id. at 550. Each court’s “charge must

be [made] known before the proceedings commence.”

Id. SCOTUS and appeals court judges never informed

Petitioner of any rule that they believed Petitioner vio

lated or how. Petitioner “had no notice” that any such

judge “considered” any Petitioner speech “a disbar

ment offense.” Id. at 550. “This absence of fair notice”

of “the precise nature of” federal courts’ federal

“charges deprived petitioner of procedural due pro

cess.” Id. at 552.

Judges cannot repress attorney speech with “pro

cedural violation of due process” that “would never

pass muster in any normal civil or criminal litigation”

for libel, defamation or contempt. Id. at 551. The “con

sequences” for attorneys compel at least due process

for “the ordinary run of civil cases” for defamation or

libel. Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 257.

After reasonable notice, a “hearing” must be “held”

because Petitioner (repeatedly) “requested” a “hear

ing.” FED.R.APP.P. 46(b)(3). Accord FED.R.APP.P.

46(c). Petitioner “must be given” a reasonable “oppor

tunity to show” he cannot constitutionally be “dis

barred.” FED.R.APP.P. 46(b)(2).

IV. Before Punishing Attorney Speech or Peti

tions, Courts Must Prove Material Facts.

“The constitutional protection” (due process of

law) “does not” necessarily “turn upon” the “truth, pop

ularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which

are offered.” Veit; York Times, 376 U.S. at 271 (quoting

Button, 371 U.S. at 445). So-called public servants pun

ishing or penalizing petitions and speech for content

about public issues determines due process.

Government must present “proof,” and it must

have “the convincing clarity which the constitutional

standard demands.” Id. at 285-286. “The power to cre

ate presumptions is not a means of escape from consti

tutional restrictions.” Id. at 284. Whenever “the

constitutional right to speak” is “deterred by” invoking

any “general” rule, “due process demands that the

speech be unencumbered until” government presents

“sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.” Speiser v.

Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-529 (1958).

“When First Amendment compliance is the point

to be proved, the risk of non-persuasion” always “must

rest with the Government, not with the citizen.”

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,

529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). “When” any “Government re

stricts” any “speech, the Government” always “bears

the burden of proving the constitutionality of its ac

tions.” Id. at 816.

“When” any “Government” restricts any “speech

based on its content,” any potential “presumption of

constitutionality” must be “reversed. Content-based

regulations” (including orders imposing punishment or

penalty) “are presumptively invalid, and the Govern

ment bears the burden to rebut that presumption.” Id.

at 817 (cleaned up).

Each court must prove it “determine [d] the consti

tutionality of” each content-based “restriction” (disbar

ment) with “strict scrutiny.” Republican Party v. White,

536 U.S. 765, 774-775 (2002). Accord Reed v. Town of

Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155,163-164 (2015).

“Content-based laws” (and punishments or penal

ties) are “presumptively unconstitutional.” Reed at

163. All sanctions targeted the content of Petitioner’s

speech/petitions. Cf. id. at 163-164 (identifying “con

tent-based” restrictions). Content-based sanctions

must “be justified only” by each court “proving] that”

each sanction was “narrowly tailored to serve” public

“interests” that are “compelling.” Id. at 163.

An “Amendment’s plain text covers” Petitioner’s

conduct, so “the Constitution presumptively protects

that conduct.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. Each court

must “justify” any “regulation” thereof, i.e., “must

demonstrate” that disbarment was “consistent with

this Nation’s historical tradition” of protecting

speech/petitions. Id. Each court “must affirmatively

prove that” disbarment was within this Nation’s “his

torical tradition” of protecting speech/petitions within

“the outer bounds” of each “right.” Id. at 2127.

In “First Amendment cases,” each “court is obli

gated” to conduct an “independent examination of the

whole record” to “make sure that” any purported “judg

ment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the

field of free expression.” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 454. “It is

imperative that, when the effective exercise of” First

Amendment “rights is claimed to be abridged,” all

“courts” must “weigh the circumstances” and “appraise

the substantiality of the reasons advanced” (by anyone

else) “in support of the challenged” punishment.

Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 96. “[W]hen it is claimed that”

First Amendment “liberties have been abridged,” each

court “cannot allow a” mere “presumption of validity of

the exercise of” any prior judge’s “power to interfere

with” the subsequent court’s “close examination of the

substantive [constitutional] claim presented.” Wood u.

Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386 (1962).

Due process of law means much more than judges’

mere empty “enunciation of a constitutionally accepta

ble standard” merely purportedly “describing the effect

of” judges’ or attorneys’ “conduct.” Id. Moreover, any

prior judge’s mere conclusion “may not preclude” (or

diminish) each court’s “responsibility to examine” all

relevant “evidence to see whether” admissible, admit

ted evidence “furnishes a rational basis for the charac

terization” that prior judges “put on it.” Id.

“Attorneys” asserting “statements impugning the

integrity of a judge” are “entitled” to “First Amend

ment protections applicable in the defamation con

text.” Standing Comm, on Discipline of the United

States Dist. Court v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th

Cir. 1995). “[A]ttorneys may be sanctioned for impugn

ing the integrity of a judge or the court only if their

statements are” proved “false;” moreover, “truth is an

absolute defense.” Id. (citing Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74).

Such “statements” clearly “may not be punished”

unless “proved” to be “false.” Id. Each “disciplinary

body” always “bears the burden of proving” (identifying

proof of) “falsity.” Id. Attorney “opinion” may “be pun

ished only” if “disclosed facts” or implied “facts are

[proved] false.” Id. at 1439.

Unless statements “imply facts capable of objec

tive verification,” they are “constitutionally immune

from sanctions.” Id. at 1441. Attorney “opinion” may be

“sanction [ed] only” if “declaring or implying actual

facts” “proved” “false.” Id. at 1438-1439 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21).

No one ever even “claim [ed] that” that any Peti

tioner “factual assertion was false, and” every court

failed to make any “finding to that effect,” so courts

must “proceed” on “the assumption that” each Peti

tioner factual “statement is true.” Id. at 1438.

Attorney “statement [s]” are “only actionable”

(sanctionable) if disclosed or implied “facts” were

proved “false;” specific “facts” must be “proven untrue.” Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 303 (6th Cir.

2012).

99 U

Judges Failing to Justify Their Conduct

Are Essentially Mere Con Men, Priests or

Tyrants.

The facts and issues here are so clear and so fun

damental and crucial to our Constitution that Ameri

cans cannot and should not trust any judges (including

SCOTUS Justices) who willfully fail to safeguard Peti

tioner’s exercises of First Amendment rights and free

doms. They should not be trusted about anything. They

criminally conspired systematically to attack and un

dermine “the Constitution” they swore to “support and

defend” against “all enemies.” 5 U.S.C. 3331. They are

such enemies (vicious anti-constitutionalists).

Judges criminally violated their oaths to “dis

charge” all “duties” “faithfully” to “the Constitution.”

Id. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 371, 1001, above. Their vi

cious violations were “worse than solemn mockery.”

Marhury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,180 (1803)

(Marshall, C.J.). They “usurp[ed]” powers “not given”

(and repeatedly expressly withheld) by our Constitu

tion to commit “treason to the Constitution.” United

States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, n.19 (1980) (Burger,

C.J.) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)

264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)).

Such black-collar crime is dangerous and poten

tially devastating:

Our Government is the potent, the omnipres

ent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the

whole people by its example. Crime is conta

gious. If the Government becomes a law

breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites

every man to become a law unto himself; it in

vites anarchy.

Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966) (quoting

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)

(Brandeis, Holmes, JJ., dissenting)).

The decisions of judges retaliating against Peti

tioner compellingly proved they knew their conduct

was unconstitutional and criminal. No judge even at

tempted to show how (or even contended that) any

thing gave any judge the power to disbar attorneys for

Petitioner’s entirely unrebutted statements in court

filings about judges’ unconstitutional or criminal mis

conduct. No judge attempted to show (or even con

tended) he did not commit any crime Petitioner

addressed.

America’s “interest” in ensuring that “public confi

dence in the fairness and integrity” of “judges” is justi

fied is “vital,” i.e., “of the highest order.” Williams-Yulee

v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 445-446 (2015). Judges (in

cluding SCOTUS Justices) must prove their decisions

disbarring Petitioner were not intentionally illegal, in

tentionally unconstitutional and intentionally crimi

nal.

Judicial decisions depriving people of life, liberty

or property without justification (by mere fiat) are

egregiously unconstitutional. They reveal judges act

ing like common con men, pseudo-priests or outright

tyrants.

Judges failing to justify their conduct have turned

adjudications into confidence games and judges into

con men. Such judges abuse silence to undermine and

attack our Constitution (systems of law and govern

ment). They imply Americans must have blind (not jus

tified) confidence that judges did not violate law, lie or

commit crimes.

Such confidence was not intended by the Framers

of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights or the

Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutions and laws are

worthless when judges systematically conspire to

usurp such power, making judges priests of an uncon

stitutional faith-based black magic cult. Cf. U.S. Const.

Amend. I (“establishment of religion”).

“Article III of the Constitution establishe[d]” a

“Judiciary” that must be “independent” of all except

the law and which has the “duty to say what the law

is” in “particular cases and controversies;” judges “who

apply [a] rule to particular cases, must of necessity ex

pound and interpret that rule.” Bank Markazi v.

Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1322-1323 (2016). Accord

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2525 (2019)

(Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).

“When faced” with the “constitutional wrongs” that

judges inflicted here, “courts must intervene.” Id.

“Jurists presiding over cases at every level have a

[constitutional] duty” to “say what the law is ” Acheson

Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 144 S. Ct. 18,28 (2023) (Thomas,

J., concurring). It “emphatically” is the constitutional

“duty of” judges to “say what the law is,” not merely

dictate (unconstitutional) consequences. Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall,

C.J.). Accord Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 867

(2014) (Scalia, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring). “Today,

the Court shirks its job.” Id. “[C]ourts” must not “shirk

their duty to say what the law is.” Thryv, Inc. v. ClickTo-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1389 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Expecting unquestioning “deference” to unjusti

fied “decisions” regarding constitutional rights is “in

consistent with [judges’] duty to say what the law is in

the cases that come before them” and “relegat[es

higher] courts” (and Americans, generally) “to the sta

tus of potted plants.” Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v.

United States, 143 S. Ct. 940, 954-955 (2023) (Gorsuch,

Alito, JJ., dissenting).

Each “Judge” is “required to declare the law” be

cause if he “states it erroneously, his opinion” must “be

revised; and if it can have had any influence on the”

judgment, it must “be set aside.” Etting v. U.S. Bank,

24 U.S. 59, 75 (1826) (Marshall, C.J.). Clearly, “judicial

discretion is not the power to ‘alter’ the law” but “the

duty to correctly ‘expound’ it .” Gamble v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 1960, 1982 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)

(quoting Madison).

SCOTUS’ “responsibility” is “to say what the law

is and afford the people the neutral forum for their dis

putes that they expect and deserve.” Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400,2448 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

“Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of

necessity expound and interpret that rule.” United

States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 787 (2013) (Roberts,

C.J., dissenting). SCOTUS’ “duty” is “to pronounce the

law” “when” adjudicating any “controversy that [is

SCOTUS’] business to resolve under Article III.” Id.

Every judge on every court “must abide by” the

“supreme Law of the Land” and “by the opinions of

[SCOTUS] interpreting that law.” Nitro-Lift Techs.,

L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012). “It is [SCO

TUS’] responsibility to say what” our Constitution

“means, and once [SCOTUS] has spoken, it is the duty

of” all “courts to respect that understanding.” Id.

Judges on “state courts” (and SCOTUS and lower

federal courts) are being “permitted to disregard” SCO

TUS “rulings” regarding Americans’ First Amendment

rights and freedoms, so federal “laws” and “constitu

tion” are utterly ineffective or radically “different in

different states” (and federal circuits) and have no

where near “the same construction, obligation, or effi

cacy, in” all “states” (or federal circuits). James v. City

of Boise, 577 U.S. 306, 307 (2016). “The public mis

chiefs” flowing therefrom are “truly deplorable.” Id.

(quoting Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)

304, 348 (1816)).

VI. Using Judges’ Hearsay Against Petitioner

Irrefutably Was Illegal and Unconstitu

tional.

Disbarments must be based on facts and evidence

(proof), not presumptions or pretenses ie.g., that

judges’ hearsay is true or evidence of its truth).

SCOTUS and appeals court judges abused mere

judges’ mere conclusory hearsay, which was worse than

worthless as support for judgment. “Congress” and fed

eral “Laws” govern the “Effect” of state “Records” or

“judicial Proceedings.” U.S. Const. Art. IV, §1. The Fed

eral Rules of Evidence govern. See FED.R.EVID. 101,

1101. Each federal court must “produc[e] ” (identify)

“evidence to rebut [each] presumption” stated above.

FED.R.EVID. 301.

No “constitutionally based privilege” exists “im

munizing judges from being required to testify about

their judicial conduct in third-party litigation.” Dennis

v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 30 (1980). Judges cannot fabri

cate “any nonconstitutional testimonial privilege pro

tecting” judges “from any questioning.” Gravel v.

United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972). No “judicially

fashioned privilege” can “immunize criminal conduct”

or “frustrate” legitimate “inquiry into whether” judicial

misconduct was “criminal.” Id. Accord 28 U.S.C. 2071,

2072(b), 2074(b).

“Hearsay” by any judge against Petitioner was

“not admissible” as evidence of its truth because such

use was not permitted by any “federal statute” or

“rules.” FED.R.EVID. 802. Judges’ hearsay is admissi

ble for some purposes, but not for the foregoing. Cf

FED.R.EVID. 803(8), 803(22), 803(23).

Judicial findings of fact “may be referred to as ex

positions of law upon” any actual “facts” actually “dis

closed, but they are not evidence of those facts.”

Mackay v. Easton, 86 U.S. 619, 620 (1873). Accord

United States v. Benjamin Brandon Grey, 891 F.3d

1054,1058-1059 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

Especially judges’ conclusory hearsay cannot re

place proof or facts. Presiding judges cannot (and did

not) testify under oath. Cf. FED.R.EVID. 602,603,605.

A presiding judge “may not” in any way usurp or “as

sume the role of a witness,” so “he may not either dis

tort” any “evidence” or “add to it.” Quercia v. United

States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933).

Judges’ conclusory hearsay could not be admitted

(in federal or Kansas courts) as evidence of its truth

(i.e., that Petitioner committed misconduct) because

Petitioner was not afforded any opportunity for crossexamination. Cf FED.R.EVID. 614, 806; Kan. Stat.

Ann. 60-460(a). Testimony in open court “forces the

witness to submit to cross-examination,” which is the

“greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery

of truth;” it “permits” everyone “to observe the

demeanor of the witness in making” and explaining

“his statement, thus aiding” in “assessing his credibil

ity.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,158 (1970).

VII. This Is a Clean Vehicle to Address Outra

geous Violations of Our Constitution.

No legal authority permits federal repression of

the content or viewpoint of Petitioner’s speech/peti

tions. Judges of three appeals courts and SCOTUS ma

liciously abused a combination of their silence and

public confidence to usurp power they knew our Con

stitution expressly denied—in many ways.

They disbarred a court officer without saying why.

They criminally retaliated against him because of the

content—and even viewpoint—of extremely protected

political speech and petitions. Leading federal judges

are actively abusing their positions and powers to at

tack and undermine our Constitution by defrauding us

of rights they know are essential to our Constitution.

CONCLUSION

Denying certiorari will further confirm the inten

tional illegality, unconstitutionality and criminality of

the judicial despotism at issue. It will promote cer

tainty of impropriety.

Respectfully submitted,

Jack Jordan

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City,

Missouri 64116

courts@amicuslaw.us

(816) 853-1142

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.