Reply Brief — PacifiCorp, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 30, 2024
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No. 23-1068
In the Supreme Court of the United States
PACIFICORP, et al.,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF
MEGAN BERGE
SARAH DOUGLAS
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
700 K Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
J. MARK LITTLE
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
910 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
Attorneys for the
Oklahoma Industry
Petitioners
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
KEVIN M. LEROY
EMILY A. O’BRIEN
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe Street
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
misha.tseytlin@troutman.com
Attorneys for PacifiCorp
(Additional counsel listed on inside cover.)
STEVEN J. CHRISTIANSEN
DAVID C. REYMANN
PARR BROWN GEE
& LOVELESS
101 South 200 East
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Deseret
Generation &
Transmission CoOperative
MARIE BRADSHAW
DURRANT
Vice President and
General Counsel
CHRISTIAN C. STEPHENS
Senior Attorney
PACIFICORP
1407 North Temple
Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
CARROLL WADE
MCGUFFEY III
MELISSA HORNE
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
600 Peachtree St. N.E.
Suite 3000
Atlanta, GA 30308
Attorneys for PacifiCorp
(Additional counsel listed on following page.)
ALAN I. ROBBINS
DEBRA D. ROBY
THOMAS B. STEIGER III
WASHINGTON ENERGY
LAW LLP
900 17th St. NW
Suite 500-A
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Utah
Municipal Power Agency
H. MICHAEL KELLER
ARTEMIS D. VAMIANAKIS
FABIAN VANCOTT
95 South State Street
Suite 2300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
EMILY L. WEGENER
General Counsel
UTAH ASSOCIATED
MUNICIPAL POWER
SYSTEMS
155 North 400 West
Suite 480
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Attorneys for Utah
Associated Municipal
Power Systems
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REPLY BRIEF ............................................................1
I. This Court Should Grant This Petition Now
Rather Than Waiting For The Later-Filed
Calumet Shreveport Petition............................3
II. EPA’s Merits Arguments Do Not Support
Holding Or Denying The Petition And, In
Any Event, Are Incorrect ...............................12
CONCLUSION ..........................................................15
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709 (2005)............................................... 8
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
446 U.S. 578 (1980)............................................... 4
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense,
583 U.S. 109 (2018)........................................... 4, 7
Texas v. EPA,
829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016)............................... 14
West Virginia v. EPA,
90 F.4th 323 (4th Cir. 2024) ............................... 14
Statutes And Rules
42 U.S.C. § 7410 ............................................. 5, 12, 13
42 U.S.C. § 7606 ........................................1, 5, 6, 8, 13
Sup. Ct. R.10 ............................................................ 12
Sup. Ct. R.13.1 ......................................................... 11
Other Authorities
EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, Tables
SRE-1 and SRE-2 ................................................. 7
REPLY BRIEF
The Petition raises a circuit split over the proper
venue under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”) for challenges to EPA’s actions on state
implementation plans (“SIPs”). EPA does not dispute
that the Question Presented is deeply important, has
divided the circuits, and merits review. Instead, it
argues that this Court should hold the Petition and
grant review in its later-filed petition in EPA v.
Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC, No.23-1229.
This Court should reject EPA’s request to hold
this Petition. Instead, this Court should grant this
Petition (along with the States’ petition, No.23-1068)
before the end of this Term, for three reasons.
First, Calumet Shreveport is unlikely to resolve
the important Question Presented here. That case
does not involve EPA actions on SIPs and does not
raise many of the issues at play here, such as EPA’s
core theory that packaging many SIPs together in a
single Federal Register notice renders an action
“nationally applicable.” EPA does not dispute that
the parties urgently need clarity over the proper
venue for these exceedingly common SIP-action
challenges, and Calumet Shreveport is unlikely to
provide it.
2
Second, if this Court wanted to grant either this
Petition or the Calumet Shreveport petition (and, of
course, it can just grant both), this Petition is the
superior vehicle. Calumet Shreveport concerns a
nearly defunct exemption program under which EPA
used to grant waivers from certain renewable-fuel
standards. This case presents the ubiquitous scenario
of EPA’s periodic review of SIPs and implicates
unique venue considerations arising in that
important context. Further, this Petition is now fully
briefed, whereas EPA just filed its Calumet
Shreveport petition, many months after the decision
below issued.
Third, holding this Petition for Calumet
Shreveport—or even waiting until Calumet
Shreveport is briefed to decide whether to grant this
Petition—would lead to continued chaos in the ozonetransport-SIP litigation. If this Court does not grant
this Petition before the end of this Term, Utah,
Oklahoma, and Petitioners may well have to litigate
their challenges to EPA’s SIP denials in the D.C.
Circuit, whereas ten other States and their industries
are litigating in their regional circuits. As the
Solicitor General explained in a petition filed in this
Court just a few weeks ago, regarding a different
venue dispute, “[g]ranting review now would ensure
that th[e]se petitions are considered in the first
instance in the venues required by the [CAA]” and
“would also avoid the duplication of effort and waste
3
of resources that would occur if the [D.C.] Circuit were
to consider [these petitions] on the merits, only for
this Court to hold later that venue was improper all
along[.]” Pet.20–21, FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.,
No.23-1187 (May 2, 2024) (“R.J. Reynolds Pet.”).
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has set a schedule indicating
that it may lift the temporary abeyance on the
challenges below if this Court does not grant review
before the end of this Term, meaning that, if this
Court follows EPA’s suggestion, the D.C. Circuit could
resolve these challenges on the merits before this
Court rules on the merits in Calumet Shreveport.
I.
This Court Should Grant This Petition Now
Rather Than Waiting For The Later-Filed
Calumet Shreveport Petition
A. As Petitioners explained, there is an urgent
need for this Court to grant this Petition to resolve the
acknowledged circuit split over whether EPA’s
packaging of SIP disapprovals into a single document,
while using an allegedly consistent methodology to
evaluate those SIPs, renders such actions
challengeable only in the D.C. Circuit, or whether any
challenge can only be brought in the regional circuit.
Pet.4–27. Because EPA frequently acts on SIPs,
States and affected industry need guidance on the
proper venue for SIP-action challenges. Pet.28–29.
This Court’s resolution of this “importan[t]” question,
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 586
4
(1980), is also urgently needed given the ongoing
chaos in the ozone-transport-SIP cases, where ten
States and their industries are currently litigating in
their regional circuits, while Utah, Oklahoma, and
their industries have been transferred to the D.C.
Circuit. Pet.27–35. This Court brought such order in
analogous circumstances in National Association of
Manufacturers v. Department of Defense (“NAM”), 583
U.S. 109 (2018), even in a less chaotic context, and it
should do so here too. Pet.33–35.
B. EPA concedes that “a circuit conflict exists”
over the Question Presented, Br. For Fed. Resp’ts
(“Resp.”) 19, and “agrees” that “this Court should
provide guidance” on “the proper application of
Section 307(b)(1),” Resp.9. EPA argues that this
Court should hold this Petition for its later-filed
petition in Calumet Shreveport. This Court should
reject EPA’s approach for three reasons. Indeed, even
waiting to grant this Petition until completion of the
Calumet Shreveport petition briefing over the
summer would cause needless confusion and harm.
1. Calumet Shreveport is unlikely to resolve the
Question Presented here.
Calumet Shreveport
involves the issue of whether EPA’s denial of petitions
filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from
the requirements of the CAA’s Renewable Fuel
Standard program (“RFS”) are “nationally applicable”
actions or, alternatively, locally or regionally
5
applicable actions “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect,” such that review of those
denials lies in the D.C. Circuit. Pet.I, EPA v. Calumet
Shreveport Refining, LLC, No.23-1229 (May 20, 2024)
(“Calumet Pet.”); see also Pet.I, Growth Energy v.
Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC, No.23-1230 (May
20, 2024) (“Growth Energy Pet.”). The case here, in
contrast, involves the venue for EPA’s SIP
disapprovals—which are state-centric, per 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410—including whether those disapprovals are
“nationally applicable” or “locally or regionally
applicable” actions. Pet.i, 7–8.
This difference is critical because venue for SIP
actions implicates multiple considerations absent in
the RFS-exemption context.
Section 307(b)(1)
provides that SIP “approv[als]” are “locally or
regionally applicable,” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); Pet.36–
37; Growth Energy Pet.33, meaning that challenges to
such actions clearly belong in the regional circuits, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Section 307(b)(1) does not contain
any reference to the locally-or-regionally-applicable
character of RFS-exemption actions. Growth Energy
Pet.33. Further, the denials in Calumet Shreveport
apparently relied upon a general factual finding
applicable to them all, id.; see Calumet Pet.6, 13, 16,
while EPA separately considered and rejected each
SIP here based upon state-specific considerations,
Pet.35–36.
Additionally, EPA’s central venue
argument here—that packaging together many
6
“locally applicable” SIP disapprovals in a single
Federal Register notice transforms them into a single
“nationally applicable” SIP disapproval—is absent
from Calumet Shreveport.
Calumet Pet.12–18.
Lastly, unlike EPA’s RFS-exemption actions, SIP
decisions implicate core federalism concerns. Pet.5–
6; Growth Energy Pet.33.
Notably, industry petitioners aligned with EPA in
Calumet Shreveport did not suggest that holding this
Petition for Calumet Shreveport is sensible. Growth
Energy Pet.33–34. Instead, they emphasized the
“distinct issues” there, while suggesting that the
Court “hear the cases in tandem,” if it granted review
in both. Id. at 34. And EPA described the circuit split
here in its Calumet petition as “a separate circuit
conflict.” Calumet Pet.20–21 (emphasis added).
2. EPA claims that Calumet Shreveport is a better
vehicle to interpret 42 U.S.C. § 7607, but if this Court
had to choose between granting this Petition or the
Calumet Shreveport petition—and, of course, this
Court can just grant both sets of petitions—this
Petition is a far better vehicle.
This Petition arises in a more practically
important context. States submit SIPs every time
EPA promulgates a new National Ambient Air
Quality Standard; States submit SIPs to comply with
EPA’s “Regional Haze Program”; and States must
7
seek approval for SIP revisions. Pet.28–29. In
contrast, the RFS-exemption program in Calumet
Shreveport is near-defunct, with EPA not granting
any exemption since 2017, while giving no indication
of any forthcoming deviation. EPA, RFS Small
Refinery Exemptions, Tables SRE-1 & SRE-2.*
Further, this Petition is fully briefed, while
completion of briefing for the Calumet Shreveport
petition is some time away. Indeed, unless this Court
departs from its standard practice of not granting
petitions over the summer recess, this Court is
unlikely to grant review in Calumet Shreveport until
the end of September.
EPA claims that Calumet Shreveport is a better
vehicle because the split there is between final
judgments of multiple circuits, while the split here is
between the Tenth Circuit’s final judgment and other
circuits’ nonfinal decisions (including the Fourth
Circuit’s published decision). Resp.18–20. But in
NAM, 583 U.S. 109, this Court resolved a split
between nonfinal orders of the Sixth Circuit and a
district court precisely to bring order to a chaotic
situation, and it should do so here. Pet.33–35.
* Available at https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-report
ing-and-compliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions
visited May 29, 2024).
(last
8
Indeed, that this Petition involves ongoing cases is an
additional reason to grant it now, given the need for
clarity and basic fairness in these ongoing cases, see
infra Part I.B.3, just as the Solicitor General argued
in her pending R.J. Reynolds petition, seeking review
(even absent a split) of an interlocutory venuetransfer-denial order, R.J. Reynolds Pet.I, 6.
EPA notes that Calumet Shreveport “assessed
both whether the challenged EPA denial actions were
nationally applicable and whether they were based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect” under
Section 307(b)(1), while the Tenth Circuit declined to
address the latter grounds. Resp.20–21 (citations
omitted). But the parties fully briefed whether the
SIP disapprovals here were “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect” below, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); Pet.13–16, 31, and EPA agrees
that this aspect would be “properly before” this Court,
Resp.21. Further, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits decided this issue, with the parties raising
extremely similar arguments. Pet.38. Thus, this
Court would not be acting as a court “of first view.”
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005).
3. This Court holding this Petition for Calumet
Shreveport would continue a chaotic and unfair
situation in the ongoing ozone-transport-SIP
litigation. Indeed, even waiting until the Calumet
Shreveport petition briefing is completed to grant this
9
Petition could well prejudice Petitioners, lead to more
chaos, and even potentially trigger emergency
proceedings before this Court over the summer.
The timing here is important. Because of EPA’s
months-long wait to file its petition, the Calumet
Shreveport respondents’ response deadline is June 21.
Dkt. Entry 05-20-24, Calumet Shreveport, No.231229. That means that unless this Court departs
from its usual practice of not granting petitions over
the summer recess, this Court is unlikely to grant in
Calumet Shreveport before September 30, 2024, and
unlikely to enter a merits decision until 2025.
Proceedings on the ten other SIP disapprovals are
continuing in the regional circuits—with multiple
circuits potentially entering final judgments before
this Court would resolve Calumet Shreveport. The
Fifth and Sixth Circuits already held oral arguments
on the SIP disapproval challenges there. Pet.17–18;
Kentucky v. EPA, No.23-3216, Dkt.92 (6th Cir. May 8,
2024). The Eleventh Circuit tentatively calendared
oral argument in September 2024. Alabama v. EPA,
No.23-11173, Dkt.57 (11th Cir. May 9, 2024). Merits
briefing in the Eighth Circuit has concluded, and oral
argument should be scheduled in due course.
Arkansas v. EPA, No.23-1320, Dkts.5355745,
5359307 (8th Cir.).
10
During this same time, Petitioners (as well
Oklahoma and Utah) will confront chaotic and unfair
proceedings in the D.C. Circuit. Pet.21–22. The D.C.
Circuit placed the cases below in abeyance until
July 5, Order 2, Utah v. EPA, No.23-1102,
Dkt.2051205 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 2024)—the expected
date by which this Court would consider Petitioners’
and Utah’s/Oklahoma’s petitions, as these parties had
informed the D.C. Circuit that they had petitioned
well before their 90-day deadlines to seek venue
clarity, see Utah & Oklahoma Pet’rs Mot. To Govern
2–3, Utah, No.23-1102, Dkt.2047570 (D.C. Cir. Mar.
29, 2024). By July 5, the parties must file motions to
govern below, including by “address[ing] any request
for expedition.”
Order 2, Utah, No.23-1102,
Dkt.2051205 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 2024). EPA’s movantintervenors have already made clear their intent to
move to dissolve the Tenth Circuit’s stays that are
protecting Petitioners, Movant-Intervenors’ Mot. To
Govern 1–2, Utah, No.23-1102, Dkt.2047607 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 29, 2024), thus they likely will request such
relief after July 5. EPA has expressed its desire for
“expedited consideration” below and “oral argument
in September.” Resp’ts Mot. To Govern 2, 6, Utah,
No.23-1102, Dkt.2047551 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2024).
Thus, if this Court has not granted review here
by July 5, Petitioners will face the possibility that the
D.C. Circuit will expedite merits consideration over
the summer and perhaps even dissolve the Tenth
11
Circuit’s stays—despite the pendency of this Petition
before this Court. The D.C. Circuit may require
merits briefing and issue its decision before this Court
would fully resolve Calumet Shreveport. Further, if
the D.C. Circuit dissolves the stays, Petitioners would
be forced to rush to this Court over the summer
seeking emergency stays to restore the status quo.
Subjecting Petitioners to this chaos and
unfairness is especially unjustified given their
diligence.
Petitioners, along with Utah and
Oklahoma, expeditiously filed their Petition on March
28—just 30 days after the Tenth Circuit’s order below,
Pet.App.1a, and 60 days before their deadline, Sup.
Ct. R.13.1. Petitioners took this accelerated approach
so that this Court would consider the Petition before
the summer recess and avoid the chaotic and
inequitable proceedings looming in the D.C. Circuit.
By contrast, EPA filed its Calumet Shreveport
petition on May 20, about four months after the
Calumet Shreveport court of appeals’ January 22,
2024 rehearing denial. Calumet Pet.1.
Finally, if this Court wishes to consider resolving
this case and Calumet Shreveport in tandem, this
Court should still grant this Petition now rather than
waiting for the Calumet Shreveport petition briefing
to complete, to avoid the possibility of the D.C.
Circuit’s proceedings resuming after July 5.
Thereafter, this Court can decide if it wishes to grant
12
review of Calument Shreveport when briefing on that
case completes, setting that case for the same fall
argument date to provide prompt resolution.
II. EPA’s Merits Arguments Do Not Support
Holding Or Denying The Petition And, In
Any Event, Are Incorrect
While EPA argues that the Tenth Circuit
correctly decided the Question Presented, that is not
a traditional basis for denying review of an important
issue that involves a split. See Sup. Ct. R.10(a).
Regardless, EPA’s merits arguments are wrong.
A. The Tenth Circuit’s decision is incorrect. EPA’s
SIP disapprovals for Utah and Oklahoma,
respectively, are “locally or regionally applicable”
actions under Section 307(b)(1). Pet.35. The relevant
action under Section 307(b)(1) is EPA’s disapproval of
these SIPs, respectively, as Section 7410(k)(3) directs
EPA to separately consider each SIP, and such action
is locally or regionally applicable, as Section 307(b)(1)
recognizes. Pet.35–37. EPA cannot transform a SIP
disapproval into a nationally applicable action by
administratively packaging it with other SIPs in a
Federal Register notice. Pet.37–38. EPA’s alternative
determination of “nationwide scope or effect” under
Section 307(b)(1)’s third sentence is invalid because,
again, EPA’s disapprovals rested on intensely factual,
state-specific determinations. Pet.38–39.
13
B. EPA argues that the relevant action under
Section 307(b)(1) is EPA’s packaged “disapproval
action, which applies to 21 States[.]” Resp.11–12
(citations omitted). But EPA cannot dictate whether
a SIP disapproval is “nationally applicable” or “locally
or regionally applicable” by packing multiple actions
into a single Federal Register notice. Pet.2, 24, 37,
39–40. EPA’s statutory source of authority for its
actions determines the relevant action for Section
307(b)(1)’s analysis. Pet.35–36, 39–40. Here, Section
7410(k)(3) is the relevant statute, and it directs that
SIP actions are “logically divisible” by State, Resp.14,
as they are state-specific, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3). It is
undisputed that EPA could have published its 21
disapprovals here as separate Federal Register
notices if it desired. While EPA criticizes Petitioners
for requiring courts to discern whether EPA’s actions
are “logically divisible,” Resp.14, courts need only
consider the statutes authorizing EPA’s action.
EPA disputes Petitioners’ argument that Section
307(b)(1) directs that review of SIP actions belongs in
the regional circuits, Resp.14–15, but the text is clear.
Section 307(b)(1) provides that challenges to “action
in approving or promulgating any implementation
plan under section 7410 . . . or any other final action
. . . (including any denial or disapproval by [EPA]
under subchapter I) which is locally or regionally
applicable may be filed only in the . . . appropriate
circuit.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphases added).
14
This “statutory text places review of SIP approvals or
disapprovals in the regional circuits[.]” Texas v. EPA,
829 F.3d 405, 419 n.16 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Amici
Br. of Arkansas, et al., 4–9, Oklahoma v. EPA, No.231067 (May 1, 2024).
EPA has nothing to say, see Resp.16–17, in
defense of the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on the agency’s
alleged “uniform statutory interpretation and
common analytical methods,” Resp.11. EPA, of
course, must apply a consistent approach for SIP
actions, as unexplained inconsistency renders agency
action unlawfully arbitrary. Pet.40–41. So, if these
are attributes of a “nationally applicable” action,
“there never could be a local or regional action[.]”
West Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th 323, 329 (4th Cir.
2024).
Tellingly, EPA offers no alternative
explanation for the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on the
agency’s supposed application of a uniform standard.
See Resp.16–17. That leaves EPA’s packaging of the
disapprovals as the sole basis for their alleged
national applicability, which is plainly insufficient.
Supra p.13.
Finally, EPA argues that the SIP disapprovals
were “based on a determination of nationwide scope
or effect,” Resp.12–14, but this is wrong. EPA’s use of
“a nationally consistent four-step framework” does
not give its disapprovals a nationwide “scope,”
Resp.12–13, as EPA’s determinations were “intensely
15
factual” and “unique to each State,” Pet. 38–39
(citations omitted). That EPA considered each State’s
impact on downwind States also does not help EPA,
Resp.13–14, as SIP disapprovals are “usually highly
fact-bound and particular to the individual State,”
Pet. 38 (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the Petition.
Respectfully submitted,
MEGAN BERGE
SARAH DOUGLAS
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
700 K Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
J. MARK LITTLE
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
910 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
Attorneys for the
Oklahoma Industry
Petitioners
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
KEVIN M. LEROY
EMILY A. O’BRIEN
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe Street
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
misha.tseytlin@troutman.com
Attorneys for PacifiCorp
16
STEVEN J. CHRISTIANSEN
DAVID C. REYMANN
PARR BROWN GEE
& LOVELESS
101 South 200 East
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Deseret
Generation &
Transmission CoOperative
MARIE BRADSHAW
DURRANT
Vice President and
General Counsel
CHRISTIAN C. STEPHENS
Senior Attorney
PACIFICORP
1407 North Temple
Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
CARROLL WADE
H. MICHAEL KELLER
MCGUFFEY III
ARTEMIS D. VAMIANAKIS
MELISSA HORNE
FABIAN VANCOTT
TROUTMAN PEPPER
95 South State Street
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
Suite 2300
600 Peachtree St. N.E.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Suite 3000
Atlanta, GA 30308
Attorneys for Utah
Attorneys for PacifiCorp
Associated Municipal
Power Systems
17
EMILY L. WEGENER
General Counsel
UTAH ASSOCIATED
MUNICIPAL POWER
SYSTEMS
155 North 400 West
Suite 480
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Attorneys for Utah
Associated Municipal
Power Systems
ALAN I. ROBBINS
DEBRA D. ROBY
THOMAS B. STEIGER III
WASHINGTON ENERGY
LAW LLP
900 17th St. NW
Suite 500-A
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Utah
Municipal Power Agency
May 2024
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