Reply Brief — PacifiCorp, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 30, 2024

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No. 23-1068

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PACIFICORP, et al.,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF

MEGAN BERGE

SARAH DOUGLAS

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

700 K Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

J. MARK LITTLE

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

910 Louisiana Street

Houston, TX 77002

Attorneys for the

Oklahoma Industry

Petitioners

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KEVIN M. LEROY

EMILY A. O’BRIEN

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe Street

Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

Attorneys for PacifiCorp

(Additional counsel listed on inside cover.)

STEVEN J. CHRISTIANSEN

DAVID C. REYMANN

PARR BROWN GEE

& LOVELESS

101 South 200 East

Suite 700

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Attorneys for Deseret

Generation &

Transmission CoOperative

MARIE BRADSHAW

DURRANT

Vice President and

General Counsel

CHRISTIAN C. STEPHENS

Senior Attorney

PACIFICORP

1407 North Temple

Suite 320

Salt Lake City, UT 84116

CARROLL WADE

MCGUFFEY III

MELISSA HORNE

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

600 Peachtree St. N.E.

Suite 3000

Atlanta, GA 30308

Attorneys for PacifiCorp

(Additional counsel listed on following page.)

ALAN I. ROBBINS

DEBRA D. ROBY

THOMAS B. STEIGER III

WASHINGTON ENERGY

LAW LLP

900 17th St. NW

Suite 500-A

Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneys for Utah

Municipal Power Agency

H. MICHAEL KELLER

ARTEMIS D. VAMIANAKIS

FABIAN VANCOTT

95 South State Street

Suite 2300

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

EMILY L. WEGENER

General Counsel

UTAH ASSOCIATED

MUNICIPAL POWER

SYSTEMS

155 North 400 West

Suite 480

Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Attorneys for Utah

Associated Municipal

Power Systems

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPLY BRIEF ............................................................1

I. This Court Should Grant This Petition Now

Rather Than Waiting For The Later-Filed

Calumet Shreveport Petition............................3

II. EPA’s Merits Arguments Do Not Support

Holding Or Denying The Petition And, In

Any Event, Are Incorrect ...............................12

CONCLUSION ..........................................................15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Cutter v. Wilkinson,

544 U.S. 709 (2005)............................................... 8

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,

446 U.S. 578 (1980)............................................... 4

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense,

583 U.S. 109 (2018)........................................... 4, 7

Texas v. EPA,

829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016)............................... 14

West Virginia v. EPA,

90 F.4th 323 (4th Cir. 2024) ............................... 14

Statutes And Rules

42 U.S.C. § 7410 ............................................. 5, 12, 13

42 U.S.C. § 7606 ........................................1, 5, 6, 8, 13

Sup. Ct. R.10 ............................................................ 12

Sup. Ct. R.13.1 ......................................................... 11

Other Authorities

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, Tables

SRE-1 and SRE-2 ................................................. 7

REPLY BRIEF

The Petition raises a circuit split over the proper

venue under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act

(“CAA”) for challenges to EPA’s actions on state

implementation plans (“SIPs”). EPA does not dispute

that the Question Presented is deeply important, has

divided the circuits, and merits review. Instead, it

argues that this Court should hold the Petition and

grant review in its later-filed petition in EPA v.

Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC, No.23-1229.

This Court should reject EPA’s request to hold

this Petition. Instead, this Court should grant this

Petition (along with the States’ petition, No.23-1068)

before the end of this Term, for three reasons.

First, Calumet Shreveport is unlikely to resolve

the important Question Presented here. That case

does not involve EPA actions on SIPs and does not

raise many of the issues at play here, such as EPA’s

core theory that packaging many SIPs together in a

single Federal Register notice renders an action

“nationally applicable.” EPA does not dispute that

the parties urgently need clarity over the proper

venue for these exceedingly common SIP-action

challenges, and Calumet Shreveport is unlikely to

provide it.

2

Second, if this Court wanted to grant either this

Petition or the Calumet Shreveport petition (and, of

course, it can just grant both), this Petition is the

superior vehicle. Calumet Shreveport concerns a

nearly defunct exemption program under which EPA

used to grant waivers from certain renewable-fuel

standards. This case presents the ubiquitous scenario

of EPA’s periodic review of SIPs and implicates

unique venue considerations arising in that

important context. Further, this Petition is now fully

briefed, whereas EPA just filed its Calumet

Shreveport petition, many months after the decision

below issued.

Third, holding this Petition for Calumet

Shreveport—or even waiting until Calumet

Shreveport is briefed to decide whether to grant this

Petition—would lead to continued chaos in the ozonetransport-SIP litigation. If this Court does not grant

this Petition before the end of this Term, Utah,

Oklahoma, and Petitioners may well have to litigate

their challenges to EPA’s SIP denials in the D.C.

Circuit, whereas ten other States and their industries

are litigating in their regional circuits. As the

Solicitor General explained in a petition filed in this

Court just a few weeks ago, regarding a different

venue dispute, “[g]ranting review now would ensure

that th[e]se petitions are considered in the first

instance in the venues required by the [CAA]” and

“would also avoid the duplication of effort and waste

3

of resources that would occur if the [D.C.] Circuit were

to consider [these petitions] on the merits, only for

this Court to hold later that venue was improper all

along[.]” Pet.20–21, FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.,

No.23-1187 (May 2, 2024) (“R.J. Reynolds Pet.”).

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has set a schedule indicating

that it may lift the temporary abeyance on the

challenges below if this Court does not grant review

before the end of this Term, meaning that, if this

Court follows EPA’s suggestion, the D.C. Circuit could

resolve these challenges on the merits before this

Court rules on the merits in Calumet Shreveport.

I.

This Court Should Grant This Petition Now

Rather Than Waiting For The Later-Filed

Calumet Shreveport Petition

A. As Petitioners explained, there is an urgent

need for this Court to grant this Petition to resolve the

acknowledged circuit split over whether EPA’s

packaging of SIP disapprovals into a single document,

while using an allegedly consistent methodology to

evaluate those SIPs, renders such actions

challengeable only in the D.C. Circuit, or whether any

challenge can only be brought in the regional circuit.

Pet.4–27. Because EPA frequently acts on SIPs,

States and affected industry need guidance on the

proper venue for SIP-action challenges. Pet.28–29.

This Court’s resolution of this “importan[t]” question,

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 586

4

(1980), is also urgently needed given the ongoing

chaos in the ozone-transport-SIP cases, where ten

States and their industries are currently litigating in

their regional circuits, while Utah, Oklahoma, and

their industries have been transferred to the D.C.

Circuit. Pet.27–35. This Court brought such order in

analogous circumstances in National Association of

Manufacturers v. Department of Defense (“NAM”), 583

U.S. 109 (2018), even in a less chaotic context, and it

should do so here too. Pet.33–35.

B. EPA concedes that “a circuit conflict exists”

over the Question Presented, Br. For Fed. Resp’ts

(“Resp.”) 19, and “agrees” that “this Court should

provide guidance” on “the proper application of

Section 307(b)(1),” Resp.9. EPA argues that this

Court should hold this Petition for its later-filed

petition in Calumet Shreveport. This Court should

reject EPA’s approach for three reasons. Indeed, even

waiting to grant this Petition until completion of the

Calumet Shreveport petition briefing over the

summer would cause needless confusion and harm.

1. Calumet Shreveport is unlikely to resolve the

Question Presented here.

Calumet Shreveport

involves the issue of whether EPA’s denial of petitions

filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from

the requirements of the CAA’s Renewable Fuel

Standard program (“RFS”) are “nationally applicable”

actions or, alternatively, locally or regionally

5

applicable actions “based on a determination of

nationwide scope or effect,” such that review of those

denials lies in the D.C. Circuit. Pet.I, EPA v. Calumet

Shreveport Refining, LLC, No.23-1229 (May 20, 2024)

(“Calumet Pet.”); see also Pet.I, Growth Energy v.

Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC, No.23-1230 (May

20, 2024) (“Growth Energy Pet.”). The case here, in

contrast, involves the venue for EPA’s SIP

disapprovals—which are state-centric, per 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410—including whether those disapprovals are

“nationally applicable” or “locally or regionally

applicable” actions. Pet.i, 7–8.

This difference is critical because venue for SIP

actions implicates multiple considerations absent in

the RFS-exemption context.

Section 307(b)(1)

provides that SIP “approv[als]” are “locally or

regionally applicable,” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); Pet.36–

37; Growth Energy Pet.33, meaning that challenges to

such actions clearly belong in the regional circuits, 42

U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Section 307(b)(1) does not contain

any reference to the locally-or-regionally-applicable

character of RFS-exemption actions. Growth Energy

Pet.33. Further, the denials in Calumet Shreveport

apparently relied upon a general factual finding

applicable to them all, id.; see Calumet Pet.6, 13, 16,

while EPA separately considered and rejected each

SIP here based upon state-specific considerations,

Pet.35–36.

Additionally, EPA’s central venue

argument here—that packaging together many

6

“locally applicable” SIP disapprovals in a single

Federal Register notice transforms them into a single

“nationally applicable” SIP disapproval—is absent

from Calumet Shreveport.

Calumet Pet.12–18.

Lastly, unlike EPA’s RFS-exemption actions, SIP

decisions implicate core federalism concerns. Pet.5–

6; Growth Energy Pet.33.

Notably, industry petitioners aligned with EPA in

Calumet Shreveport did not suggest that holding this

Petition for Calumet Shreveport is sensible. Growth

Energy Pet.33–34. Instead, they emphasized the

“distinct issues” there, while suggesting that the

Court “hear the cases in tandem,” if it granted review

in both. Id. at 34. And EPA described the circuit split

here in its Calumet petition as “a separate circuit

conflict.” Calumet Pet.20–21 (emphasis added).

2. EPA claims that Calumet Shreveport is a better

vehicle to interpret 42 U.S.C. § 7607, but if this Court

had to choose between granting this Petition or the

Calumet Shreveport petition—and, of course, this

Court can just grant both sets of petitions—this

Petition is a far better vehicle.

This Petition arises in a more practically

important context. States submit SIPs every time

EPA promulgates a new National Ambient Air

Quality Standard; States submit SIPs to comply with

EPA’s “Regional Haze Program”; and States must

7

seek approval for SIP revisions. Pet.28–29. In

contrast, the RFS-exemption program in Calumet

Shreveport is near-defunct, with EPA not granting

any exemption since 2017, while giving no indication

of any forthcoming deviation. EPA, RFS Small

Refinery Exemptions, Tables SRE-1 & SRE-2.*

Further, this Petition is fully briefed, while

completion of briefing for the Calumet Shreveport

petition is some time away. Indeed, unless this Court

departs from its standard practice of not granting

petitions over the summer recess, this Court is

unlikely to grant review in Calumet Shreveport until

the end of September.

EPA claims that Calumet Shreveport is a better

vehicle because the split there is between final

judgments of multiple circuits, while the split here is

between the Tenth Circuit’s final judgment and other

circuits’ nonfinal decisions (including the Fourth

Circuit’s published decision). Resp.18–20. But in

NAM, 583 U.S. 109, this Court resolved a split

between nonfinal orders of the Sixth Circuit and a

district court precisely to bring order to a chaotic

situation, and it should do so here. Pet.33–35.

* Available at https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-report

ing-and-compliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions

visited May 29, 2024).

(last

8

Indeed, that this Petition involves ongoing cases is an

additional reason to grant it now, given the need for

clarity and basic fairness in these ongoing cases, see

infra Part I.B.3, just as the Solicitor General argued

in her pending R.J. Reynolds petition, seeking review

(even absent a split) of an interlocutory venuetransfer-denial order, R.J. Reynolds Pet.I, 6.

EPA notes that Calumet Shreveport “assessed

both whether the challenged EPA denial actions were

nationally applicable and whether they were based on

a determination of nationwide scope or effect” under

Section 307(b)(1), while the Tenth Circuit declined to

address the latter grounds. Resp.20–21 (citations

omitted). But the parties fully briefed whether the

SIP disapprovals here were “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect” below, 42

U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); Pet.13–16, 31, and EPA agrees

that this aspect would be “properly before” this Court,

Resp.21. Further, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth

Circuits decided this issue, with the parties raising

extremely similar arguments. Pet.38. Thus, this

Court would not be acting as a court “of first view.”

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005).

3. This Court holding this Petition for Calumet

Shreveport would continue a chaotic and unfair

situation in the ongoing ozone-transport-SIP

litigation. Indeed, even waiting until the Calumet

Shreveport petition briefing is completed to grant this

9

Petition could well prejudice Petitioners, lead to more

chaos, and even potentially trigger emergency

proceedings before this Court over the summer.

The timing here is important. Because of EPA’s

months-long wait to file its petition, the Calumet

Shreveport respondents’ response deadline is June 21.

Dkt. Entry 05-20-24, Calumet Shreveport, No.231229. That means that unless this Court departs

from its usual practice of not granting petitions over

the summer recess, this Court is unlikely to grant in

Calumet Shreveport before September 30, 2024, and

unlikely to enter a merits decision until 2025.

Proceedings on the ten other SIP disapprovals are

continuing in the regional circuits—with multiple

circuits potentially entering final judgments before

this Court would resolve Calumet Shreveport. The

Fifth and Sixth Circuits already held oral arguments

on the SIP disapproval challenges there. Pet.17–18;

Kentucky v. EPA, No.23-3216, Dkt.92 (6th Cir. May 8,

2024). The Eleventh Circuit tentatively calendared

oral argument in September 2024. Alabama v. EPA,

No.23-11173, Dkt.57 (11th Cir. May 9, 2024). Merits

briefing in the Eighth Circuit has concluded, and oral

argument should be scheduled in due course.

Arkansas v. EPA, No.23-1320, Dkts.5355745,

5359307 (8th Cir.).

10

During this same time, Petitioners (as well

Oklahoma and Utah) will confront chaotic and unfair

proceedings in the D.C. Circuit. Pet.21–22. The D.C.

Circuit placed the cases below in abeyance until

July 5, Order 2, Utah v. EPA, No.23-1102,

Dkt.2051205 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 2024)—the expected

date by which this Court would consider Petitioners’

and Utah’s/Oklahoma’s petitions, as these parties had

informed the D.C. Circuit that they had petitioned

well before their 90-day deadlines to seek venue

clarity, see Utah & Oklahoma Pet’rs Mot. To Govern

2–3, Utah, No.23-1102, Dkt.2047570 (D.C. Cir. Mar.

29, 2024). By July 5, the parties must file motions to

govern below, including by “address[ing] any request

for expedition.”

Order 2, Utah, No.23-1102,

Dkt.2051205 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 2024). EPA’s movantintervenors have already made clear their intent to

move to dissolve the Tenth Circuit’s stays that are

protecting Petitioners, Movant-Intervenors’ Mot. To

Govern 1–2, Utah, No.23-1102, Dkt.2047607 (D.C.

Cir. Mar. 29, 2024), thus they likely will request such

relief after July 5. EPA has expressed its desire for

“expedited consideration” below and “oral argument

in September.” Resp’ts Mot. To Govern 2, 6, Utah,

No.23-1102, Dkt.2047551 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2024).

Thus, if this Court has not granted review here

by July 5, Petitioners will face the possibility that the

D.C. Circuit will expedite merits consideration over

the summer and perhaps even dissolve the Tenth

11

Circuit’s stays—despite the pendency of this Petition

before this Court. The D.C. Circuit may require

merits briefing and issue its decision before this Court

would fully resolve Calumet Shreveport. Further, if

the D.C. Circuit dissolves the stays, Petitioners would

be forced to rush to this Court over the summer

seeking emergency stays to restore the status quo.

Subjecting Petitioners to this chaos and

unfairness is especially unjustified given their

diligence.

Petitioners, along with Utah and

Oklahoma, expeditiously filed their Petition on March

28—just 30 days after the Tenth Circuit’s order below,

Pet.App.1a, and 60 days before their deadline, Sup.

Ct. R.13.1. Petitioners took this accelerated approach

so that this Court would consider the Petition before

the summer recess and avoid the chaotic and

inequitable proceedings looming in the D.C. Circuit.

By contrast, EPA filed its Calumet Shreveport

petition on May 20, about four months after the

Calumet Shreveport court of appeals’ January 22,

2024 rehearing denial. Calumet Pet.1.

Finally, if this Court wishes to consider resolving

this case and Calumet Shreveport in tandem, this

Court should still grant this Petition now rather than

waiting for the Calumet Shreveport petition briefing

to complete, to avoid the possibility of the D.C.

Circuit’s proceedings resuming after July 5.

Thereafter, this Court can decide if it wishes to grant

12

review of Calument Shreveport when briefing on that

case completes, setting that case for the same fall

argument date to provide prompt resolution.

II. EPA’s Merits Arguments Do Not Support

Holding Or Denying The Petition And, In

Any Event, Are Incorrect

While EPA argues that the Tenth Circuit

correctly decided the Question Presented, that is not

a traditional basis for denying review of an important

issue that involves a split. See Sup. Ct. R.10(a).

Regardless, EPA’s merits arguments are wrong.

A. The Tenth Circuit’s decision is incorrect. EPA’s

SIP disapprovals for Utah and Oklahoma,

respectively, are “locally or regionally applicable”

actions under Section 307(b)(1). Pet.35. The relevant

action under Section 307(b)(1) is EPA’s disapproval of

these SIPs, respectively, as Section 7410(k)(3) directs

EPA to separately consider each SIP, and such action

is locally or regionally applicable, as Section 307(b)(1)

recognizes. Pet.35–37. EPA cannot transform a SIP

disapproval into a nationally applicable action by

administratively packaging it with other SIPs in a

Federal Register notice. Pet.37–38. EPA’s alternative

determination of “nationwide scope or effect” under

Section 307(b)(1)’s third sentence is invalid because,

again, EPA’s disapprovals rested on intensely factual,

state-specific determinations. Pet.38–39.

13

B. EPA argues that the relevant action under

Section 307(b)(1) is EPA’s packaged “disapproval

action, which applies to 21 States[.]” Resp.11–12

(citations omitted). But EPA cannot dictate whether

a SIP disapproval is “nationally applicable” or “locally

or regionally applicable” by packing multiple actions

into a single Federal Register notice. Pet.2, 24, 37,

39–40. EPA’s statutory source of authority for its

actions determines the relevant action for Section

307(b)(1)’s analysis. Pet.35–36, 39–40. Here, Section

7410(k)(3) is the relevant statute, and it directs that

SIP actions are “logically divisible” by State, Resp.14,

as they are state-specific, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3). It is

undisputed that EPA could have published its 21

disapprovals here as separate Federal Register

notices if it desired. While EPA criticizes Petitioners

for requiring courts to discern whether EPA’s actions

are “logically divisible,” Resp.14, courts need only

consider the statutes authorizing EPA’s action.

EPA disputes Petitioners’ argument that Section

307(b)(1) directs that review of SIP actions belongs in

the regional circuits, Resp.14–15, but the text is clear.

Section 307(b)(1) provides that challenges to “action

in approving or promulgating any implementation

plan under section 7410 . . . or any other final action

. . . (including any denial or disapproval by [EPA]

under subchapter I) which is locally or regionally

applicable may be filed only in the . . . appropriate

circuit.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphases added).

14

This “statutory text places review of SIP approvals or

disapprovals in the regional circuits[.]” Texas v. EPA,

829 F.3d 405, 419 n.16 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Amici

Br. of Arkansas, et al., 4–9, Oklahoma v. EPA, No.231067 (May 1, 2024).

EPA has nothing to say, see Resp.16–17, in

defense of the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on the agency’s

alleged “uniform statutory interpretation and

common analytical methods,” Resp.11. EPA, of

course, must apply a consistent approach for SIP

actions, as unexplained inconsistency renders agency

action unlawfully arbitrary. Pet.40–41. So, if these

are attributes of a “nationally applicable” action,

“there never could be a local or regional action[.]”

West Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th 323, 329 (4th Cir.

2024).

Tellingly, EPA offers no alternative

explanation for the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on the

agency’s supposed application of a uniform standard.

See Resp.16–17. That leaves EPA’s packaging of the

disapprovals as the sole basis for their alleged

national applicability, which is plainly insufficient.

Supra p.13.

Finally, EPA argues that the SIP disapprovals

were “based on a determination of nationwide scope

or effect,” Resp.12–14, but this is wrong. EPA’s use of

“a nationally consistent four-step framework” does

not give its disapprovals a nationwide “scope,”

Resp.12–13, as EPA’s determinations were “intensely

15

factual” and “unique to each State,” Pet. 38–39

(citations omitted). That EPA considered each State’s

impact on downwind States also does not help EPA,

Resp.13–14, as SIP disapprovals are “usually highly

fact-bound and particular to the individual State,”

Pet. 38 (citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

MEGAN BERGE

SARAH DOUGLAS

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

700 K Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

J. MARK LITTLE

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

910 Louisiana Street

Houston, TX 77002

Attorneys for the

Oklahoma Industry

Petitioners

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KEVIN M. LEROY

EMILY A. O’BRIEN

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe Street

Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

Attorneys for PacifiCorp

16

STEVEN J. CHRISTIANSEN

DAVID C. REYMANN

PARR BROWN GEE

& LOVELESS

101 South 200 East

Suite 700

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Attorneys for Deseret

Generation &

Transmission CoOperative

MARIE BRADSHAW

DURRANT

Vice President and

General Counsel

CHRISTIAN C. STEPHENS

Senior Attorney

PACIFICORP

1407 North Temple

Suite 320

Salt Lake City, UT 84116

CARROLL WADE

H. MICHAEL KELLER

MCGUFFEY III

ARTEMIS D. VAMIANAKIS

MELISSA HORNE

FABIAN VANCOTT

TROUTMAN PEPPER

95 South State Street

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

Suite 2300

600 Peachtree St. N.E.

Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Suite 3000

Atlanta, GA 30308

Attorneys for Utah

Attorneys for PacifiCorp

Associated Municipal

Power Systems

17

EMILY L. WEGENER

General Counsel

UTAH ASSOCIATED

MUNICIPAL POWER

SYSTEMS

155 North 400 West

Suite 480

Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Attorneys for Utah

Associated Municipal

Power Systems

ALAN I. ROBBINS

DEBRA D. ROBY

THOMAS B. STEIGER III

WASHINGTON ENERGY

LAW LLP

900 17th St. NW

Suite 500-A

Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneys for Utah

Municipal Power Agency

May 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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