Amicus Curiae Brief — Oklahoma, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 24, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Nos. 23-1067 and 23-1068
IN THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.,
v.
Petitioners,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
PACIFICORP, ET AL.,
v.
Petitioners,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
BRIEF OF FORMER EPA GENERAL
COUNSELS JONATHAN CANNON, E. DONALD
ELLIOTT, AND AVI GARBOW AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
MATTHEW J. SANDERS
Counsel of Record
DEBORAH A. SIVAS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC
MILLS LEGAL CLINIC AT
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
(650) 736-8775
matthewjsanders@stanford.edu
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT ......................................................... 2
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4
I.
Section 7607(b)(1)’s History Reflects
Congress’s Intent That the D.C. Circuit
Should Review Nationally Significant EPA
Actions. .................................................................. 4
A. The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
Provided Centralized Review of MultiCircuit Actions................................................ 5
B. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
Supported EPA’s Interpretation of the
Venue Provision. ............................................ 7
II. EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and “Based
on a Determination of Nationwide Scope or
Effect” Findings Are Consistent and
Judicious. ............................................................ 12
A. EPA’s Findings for the Disapproval
Action are Consistent With Its
Longstanding Approach to Making
Such Findings............................................... 13
B. EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and
“Based on a Determination of
Nationwide Scope or Effect” Findings
are Judicious. ............................................... 16
ii
C. EPA Correctly Applies Its “Nationally
Applicable”
and
“Based
on
a
Determination of Nationwide Scope or
Effect” Findings to Its Entire Action. ......... 18
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 19
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P.,
572 U.S. 489 (2014) .............................................. 15
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
603 U.S. 369 (2024) ................................................ 4
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
465 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1972)................... 6, 9, 10, 19
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19
Southern Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA,
863 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2017) ................................ 19
Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1 (1965) .................................................. 12
West Virginia v. EPA,
90 F.4th 323 (4th Cir. 2024) ................................ 17
Statutes
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1)......................................... 2, 13, 18
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, (1970) .......................... 5
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, (1977) .................... 7, 8, 11
iv
Other Authorities
37 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (May 31, 1972) ............................ 6
41 Fed. Reg. 56,767 (Dec. 30, 1976) ................ 9, 10, 11
64 Fed. Reg. 28,250 (May 25, 1999) .......................... 15
76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) ..................... 13, 15
79 Fed. Reg. 69,769 (Nov. 24, 2014).......................... 13
83 Fed. Reg. 65,878 (Dec. 21, 2018) .......................... 14
88 Fed. Reg. 9,336 (Feb. 13, 2023) .................... 2, 3, 14
89 Fed. Reg. 104,043 (Dec. 20, 2024) ........................ 16
H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)...................... 8
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) ............................................................ 8, 9, 11
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) ...................................................................... 5
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are former General Counsels of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) who
collectively
served
in
three
Presidential
Administrations.
Jonathan Cannon was EPA’s General Counsel
during the Clinton Administration. Cannon is also the
Blaine T. Phillips Distinguished Professor of
Environmental Law Emeritus at the University of
Virginia School of Law, and was the inaugural
director of the Law School’s Program in Law,
Communities and the Environment. As a professor
and director, Cannon has taught and wrote
extensively about environmental and administrative
law.
E. Donald Elliott was EPA’s General Counsel
during the George H. W. Bush Administration. Elliott
is the Florence Rogatz Professor of Law at Yale Law
School. Elliott has been teaching environmental and
administrative law on the Yale Law faculty for over
40 years.
Avi Garbow was EPA’s General Counsel during
the Obama Administration, and the longest-serving
General Counsel in EPA’s history. Garbow has also
worked for EPA as an attorney, Deputy General
Counsel, and Senior Counselor under three separate
administrations.
1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no person or entity other than amici curiae or their counsel
contributed monetarily to the preparation or submission of this
brief.
2
Amici write in support of Respondent EPA’s
position that its action to disapprove the 21 state
implementation plans at issue in this case may be
reviewed in only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit under the venue
provision of the Clean Air Act, Section 7607(b)(1) of
Title 42.
Amici have a strong interest, based on their prior
leadership within EPA, in ensuring the agency and
reviewing courts properly interpret the Clean Air Act,
including the venue provision, Section 7607(b)(1). In
addition, by virtue of their significant experience
within EPA, including interpreting and applying
Section 7607(b)(1), as well as their expertise in
environmental and administrative law, amici are
uniquely positioned to offer insight into how that
provision works, Congress’s intent behind the
provision, and EPA’s consistent approach to
interpreting and applying it.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Section 7607(b)(1), judicial review of an
EPA action must be had in the D.C. Circuit if the
action is (1) “nationally applicable,” or (2) “locally or
regionally applicable” but is nonetheless “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect.” 42
U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
As EPA has explained, consolidated review in the
D.C. Circuit of multi-circuit actions avoids piecemeal
litigation, promotes judicial economy, and mitigates
uncertainty and inconsistency for States and
regulated parties. 88 Fed. Reg. 9,336, 9,380 (Feb. 13,
3
2023). EPA notes, “a nationally consistent approach to
the [Clean Air Act’s] mandate concerning interstate
transport of ozone pollution constitutes the best use of
agency resources.” Id. at 9,338. Allowing review of
such actions in multiple regional circuit courts would
significantly impede EPA’s mission of implementing
coordinated national programs to control interstate
air pollution.
The text and legislative and statutory history of
Section 7607(b)(1)—the “venue provision”—support
EPA’s position that the provision allows for
centralized review of actions, like EPA’s disapproval
action at issue in this case, that apply to entities
across multiple circuits. The 1970 version of the venue
provision
evinced
Congress’s
fundamental
understanding that centralized review of actions
“national in scope” was necessary to protect EPA’s
national rulemaking ability under the Clean Air Act.
Then, EPA, buttressed by the courts, interpreted the
venue provision to offer centralized review of multicircuit actions. EPA’s General Counsel recommended
that Congress require challenges to such actions to be
heard in only the D.C. Circuit. In the 1977 Clean Air
Amendments, Congress amended the venue provision,
bringing its language into alignment with EPA’s
interpretation and practice.
In the 48 years since Congress made those
amendments to the venue provision, the provision’s
text has not changed. Neither has EPA’s position
regarding which actions require centralized review—
that is, which actions are “nationally applicable” or
“based on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect.” EPA’s interpretation of Section 7607(b)(1) in
4
this case remains consistent with its prior
interpretations and the letter and spirit of the statute,
and should receive significant “respect” from this
Court under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024). Moreover, EPA rarely finds that
its actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect,” thereby
honoring the role of regional circuit courts in
reviewing locally or regionally applicable actions.
In applying this interpretation to the disapproval
action at issue here, EPA correctly found that its
action is “nationally applicable” and “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect,” and
therefore can be reviewed in only the D.C. Circuit.
ARGUMENT
I.
Section
7607(b)(1)’s
History
Reflects
Congress’s Intent That the D.C. Circuit
Should Review Nationally Significant EPA
Actions.
Congress intended challenges to nationally
significant EPA actions like the disapproval action to
be reviewable in only the D.C. Circuit. Ever since
Congress first wrote a venue provision for the Clean
Air Act in 1970, it has maintained that an EPA action
that affects entities in multiple circuits may be
reviewed by only the D.C. Circuit. EPA interpreted
the provision accordingly, the courts of appeals agreed
with EPA’s interpretation, and in 1977 Congress
enshrined EPA’s and the courts’ interpretation in the
language of the Act itself.
5
A. The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
Provided Centralized Review of MultiCircuit Actions.
In 1970, when Congress first contemplated judicial
review of EPA’s actions under the Clean Air Act,
Congress aimed to write a venue provision that would
achieve “even and consistent” application of EPA’s
national standards. S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 41 (1970). To this end, Congress specified that
EPA actions that are “national in scope”—defined in
context as actions that impact more than one air
quality control region—should be reviewed by only the
D.C. Circuit.2 Id. Congress worried that, if actions
that impacted entities in more than one circuit could
be challenged in more than one circuit, the courts
could reach conflicting rulings and hamper EPA’s
ability to effectively regulate air quality. Id.
To address that concern, the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments included a venue provision that made
any action “promulgating any national primary or
secondary ambient air quality standard,” “emission
standard,” or other specified standards, reviewable in
only the D.C. Circuit. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676, 1708 (1970).
The 1970 venue provision also stated that
“Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating
any implementation plan ... may be filed only ... in the
appropriate circuit.” Id. Thus, the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments reflected Congress’s recognition that
2 Congress required centralized review for actions “national
in scope,” while requiring local review for actions that “ran only
to one air quality control region.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196 at 41.
6
EPA actions that are “national in scope” should
receive “even and consistent national application,”
requiring centralized review in the D.C. Circuit.
Unfortunately, the 1970 venue provision proved
difficult to implement. By addressing only particular
EPA actions, the provision left unspecified the venue
for EPA actions that were not listed, and it did not
specify the “appropriate court” for judicial review of
EPA actions regarding an implementation plan. Legal
challenges soon made these shortcomings apparent,
and prompted Congress to clarify its intent.
In 1972, EPA finalized an action approving
numerous States’ proposed SIPs. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842
(May 31, 1972). Several environmental groups
challenged EPA’s action. See Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA (“NRDC I”), 465 F.2d
492, 493 (1st Cir. 1972). The groups argued they were
permitted to sue in every regional circuit because “the
appropriate circuit” referenced in the statutory text
was meant to be synonymous with “local.” Id. at 493.
EPA, meanwhile, argued that the challenges had to be
brought in the D.C. Circuit. The First and D.C.
Circuits agreed with EPA. NRDC I, 465 F.2d at 493;
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (“NRDC
II”), 475 F.2d 968, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Central to EPA’s position was that the action at
issue “nationally and uniformly” approved or
disapproved the SIPs, making challenges in regional
circuits inappropriate and potentially problematic.
NRDC I, 465 F.2d at 493. The First Circuit agreed;
since the issues were the same across circuits,
“litigation in several circuits” could unnecessarily lead
to “possible inconsistent and delayed results.” Id. at
7
495. The D.C. Circuit similarly cautioned that reading
the venue provision to allow non-centralized review of
multi-circuit issues could yield undesirable
consequences, such as multiple reviews of a decision
by EPA concerning an implementation plan for a
single metropolitan area that sits in more than one
circuit. “We doubt that Congress intended such a
result, especially in light of the indication elsewhere
in the Act of a strong congressional concern for
coordinated
decision-making ... over
several
jurisdictions.” NRDC II, 475 F.2d at 969. In other
words, the courts understood that Congress, in the
1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, had aimed to
provide a consistent review process for actions that
applied to entities in more than one circuit, and that
EPA was interpreting the venue provision consistent
with Congress’s intent.
If Congress had other intentions, later
amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1977 and 1990
provided ample opportunity to correct course. Yet the
legislative history shows Congress choosing to double
down on EPA’s interpretation of the venue provision:
that challenges to EPA actions like the one at issue in
this case are “national in scope” and must be reviewed
in the D.C. Circuit.
B. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
Supported EPA’s Interpretation of the
Venue Provision.
Four years after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
NRDC II, Congress returned to the venue provision in
the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. Pub. L. No. 9595, 91 Stat. 685, 776 (1977). The Amendments were
prepared by the House Committee on Interstate and
8
Foreign Commerce, which explained its intention
behind the Amendments in an accompanying report.
H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. Rep. No.
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Unlike the 1970
venue provision, which directed review of only certain
enumerated actions to the D.C. Circuit, see p. 5,
supra, the 1977 Amendments added a catch-all clause
to direct review of “any other nationally applicable
regulations promulgated, or final action taken” to the
D.C. Circuit, as well. Pub. L. No. 95-95 at 776.
In addition, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
added a catch-all clause to direct review of “any other
final action ... which is locally or regionally
applicable” to the appropriate circuit. Id. But the
Amendments made an important exception: A
challenge to a locally or regionally applicable action
could be filed in only the D.C. Circuit “if such action is
based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect
and if in taking such action the Administrator finds
and publishes that such action is based on such a
determination.” Id.
These changes to the venue provision enshrined
the First and D.C. Circuits’ 1972 and 1973 decisions
in support of EPA’s interpretation. In NRDC II, the
D.C. Circuit recognized that the provision allowed for
centralized review of “determinations of nationwide
effect”—a phrase that was not yet a term of art. NRDC
II, 475 F.2d at 970. In the Amendments, Congress
modified the venue provision to include almost
precisely the same phrase. Pub. L. No. 95-95 at 776.
The nearly identical language indicates the attention
Congress paid to EPA’s legal arguments in litigation,
9
and Congress’s corresponding intention to keep
review of multi-circuit SIP actions in the D.C. Circuit.
The changes to the venue provision were also
responsive to recommendations from then-EPA
General Counsel G. William Frick. The 1970 version
of the venue provision and the NRDC I and II
decisions prompted recommendations to the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
regarding amendments to the provision. Two sets of
these recommendations influenced the final
amendments enacted in 1977. H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at
324.
The first of the two sets of recommendations was
written by Professor David Currie, while the second
was written by General Counsel Frick. 41 Fed. Reg.
56,767, 56,767-69 (Dec. 30, 1976). Both sets of
recommendations were published in 1976 by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, an
independent federal agency established in part to
“study the efficiency, adequacy and fairness of the
administrative procedure used by administrative
agencies ... and to make recommendations for
improvement” to Congress. Id. at 56,767.
According to Professor Currie, “Congress should
amend [the venue provision] of the Clean Air Act to
make explicit that the Administrator’s action in
approving or promulgating state implementation
plans is reviewable in the circuit containing the state
whose plan is challenged,” not just “the appropriate
court.” Id. at 56,768. General Counsel Frick opposed
that recommendation because, if adopted, it would
foreclose a conclusion that the D.C. Circuit was the
appropriate venue for “matters on which national
10
uniformity is desirable.” Id. Frick agreed that
interpreting “appropriate” to mean “local” was
sensible for challenges involving “issues peculiar to
the affected states.” However, he urged that Congress
maintain the flexible usage of “appropriate” to ensure
the D.C. Circuit would review actions “where ‘national
issues’ are involved” or which “involve generic
determinations of nationwide scope or effect.” Id. at
56,768-69.
In defending centralized review of multi-circuit
issues, Frick cited the NRDC I and NRDC II decisions
of the First and D.C. Circuits. Id. at 56,769. Frick
believed that centralizing judicial review of multicircuit issues in the D.C. Circuit would “tak[e]
advantage of [that court’s] administrative law
expertise and facilitat[e] an orderly development of
the Act, rather than to have such issues decided
separately by a number of courts.” Id. He further
reasoned that the validity of EPA’s actions in such
cases would turn not “on the particulars of its impacts
within a given circuit,” but on general issues, and
therefore that a single court, and the D.C. Circuit
specifically, was best situated to hear challenges to
such actions. Id. And although Professor Currie and
General Counsel Frick disagreed over the
interpretation of “appropriate” in the wake of earlier
litigation, both emphasized the need to avoid “undue
duplication of proceedings” that could be caused by
allowing several circuit courts to independently rule
on a single EPA action. Id. at 56,768-69.
When Congress finally enacted the 1977 Clean Air
Act Amendments, it both (1) kept the 1970
Amendments’ original language directing any
11
individual SIP approval to the “appropriate court,”
and (2) specified that any locally or regionally
applicable action based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect could be challenged in only
the D.C. Circuit. Pub. L. No. 95-95 at 776. Thus, it
reinforced EPA’s interpretation. In fact, in the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce’s
report explaining changes to the Act, the House
Committee stated that it agreed with the “comments,
concerns, and recommendation ... of the separate
statement of G. William Frick.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294
at 324.
The House Committee’s report also clarified that
“determination of nationwide scope or effect” includes
“a determination which has scope or effect beyond a
single judicial circuit.” Id. at 324. Congress’s
expansive definition of “nationwide” underscored its
primary purpose in updating the venue provision: to
avoid duplicative or inconsistent rulings in order to
maximize the efficacy of EPA’s administrative
programs. Congress’s 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments represented an effort to centralize
review of issues, including EPA decisions regarding
SIPs, that impact entities in more than one circuit. 41
Fed. Reg. at 56,769; H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 324.
In sum, with every chance to clarify to the
contrary, Congress’s 1977 Amendments supported
EPA’s conclusions regarding how the venue provision
should be construed, and Congress has not amended
the provision further. Overall, the text and history of
Section 7607(b)(1) shows that Congress intended to
allow for centralized review of multi-circuit issues. It
also shows that Congress wrote the provision to be
12
consistent with EPA’s position regarding the types of
actions that require centralized review (that is, which
actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect”).
II.
EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and “Based
on a Determination of Nationwide Scope
or Effect” Findings Are Consistent and
Judicious.
Over time, EPA’s explanations for why it finds
particular actions “nationally applicable” or “based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect” have
remained consistent with the letter and spirit of
Section 7607(b)(1). Such consistent interpretations by
the agency charged with applying the statute are
entitled to substantial weight under long-established
Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). The findings in the
disapproval action are consistent with EPA’s prior
“nationally applicable” and “based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect” findings.
Moreover, EPA interprets Section 7607(b)(1)
narrowly and judiciously to make such findings. The
agency’s reading has neither deprived regional circuit
courts of their appropriate judicial-review roles nor
resulted in an overload of Clean Air Act cases in the
D.C. Circuit. Rather, EPA makes a finding that an
action is either “nationally applicable” or “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect” in fewer
than two percent of its Clean Air Act final rules
regarding implementation plans.
13
A. EPA’s Findings for the Disapproval
Action
are
Consistent
With
Its
Longstanding Approach to Making
Such Findings.
A locally or regionally applicable action that is
“based on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect” is reviewable in the D.C. Circuit only if EPA
makes and publishes a finding to that effect. 42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1). EPA can also make and publish a finding
that its action is “nationally applicable,” but such a
finding is not required for review of a nationally
applicable action to be directed to the D.C. Circuit.
Review of EPA’s “nationally applicable” and “based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”
findings over time shows that EPA’s arguments
regarding the disapproval action at issue here are
consistent with its longstanding practice and
interpretation of Section 7607(b)(1). A few examples
are illustrative.
In 2011, EPA looked to “a common core of factual
findings and analyses” to explain why it designated a
final action concerning the [interstate] transport of
pollutants as “based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect.” 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,352 (Aug. 8,
2011). In 2014, EPA similarly found that a
consolidated SIP decision was “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect” because
the States whose SIPs were affected were situated in
different circuits. 79 Fed. Reg. 69,769, 69,772 (Nov.
24, 2014). And in 2018, EPA found that 20 SIPs had
met their good neighbor provision obligations, and
explained that its approach to regulating ozone
emissions standards had nationwide scope or effect
14
because it was intended to be “consistently
implemented nationwide.” 83 Fed. Reg. 65,878, 65,923
(Dec. 21, 2018). EPA also designated each of these
actions “nationally applicable.”3
In the disapproval action at issue in this case, in
which EPA disapproved multiple SIPs, EPA relied on
similar reasoning to explain its “nationally
applicable” and “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect” findings. EPA: (1) based its
actions on a common core of findings and analyses; (2)
reached a decision concerning the SIPs of multiple
States in multiple circuits; and (3) adopted an
approach that effectuates consistent nationwide
implementation of the Clean Air Act. 88 Fed. Reg. at
9,380.
Other patterns in EPA’s venue findings over time
demonstrate that EPA’s findings in the disapproval
action are consistent with its longstanding approach
to making such findings. First, our review of all EPA
final rules regarding implementation plans since 1998
shows that the majority of EPA’s “nationally
applicable” and “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect” findings have been made
for rules that involved multiple States but not the
whole country.
3 These justifications may sound broad, but EPA is careful
and precise in making them. As we discuss in more detail in the
next section, in the last 10 years, EPA published “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect” findings in only 41
(1.5%) of its 2,708 Clean Air Act implementation plan final rules.
Similarly, EPA published “nationally applicable” findings in only
50 (1.8%) of those rules.
15
Second, EPA has a long history of making
“nationally applicable” and “based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect” findings for actions
related to the interstate transport of emissions. For
instance, in 2011, when EPA published its Transport
Rule limiting emissions of certain regulated
pollutants to downwind States, EPA found that “any
final action related to the Transport Rule is
‘nationally applicable’ within the meaning of Section
[7607(b)(1)].” 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,352 (emphasis
added). Further back, in 1999, EPA reasoned that its
consolidated SIP action was “nationally applicable”
and “based on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect” where it employed “uniform modeling
techniques and a uniform set of air quality metrics to
assess upwind impacts on downwind states,” even
though the action applied to only eight Northeastern
States. 64 Fed. Reg. 28,250, 28,318 (May 25, 1999).
Since 1999, EPA has continued to emphasize the
necessity of centralized review for rules relating to the
interstate transport of emissions. This is
unsurprising; as the Court recognizes, “[a]ir pollution
is transient, heedless of state boundaries,” such that
“most upwind States contribute pollution to multiple
downwind States in varying amounts.” EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L. P., 572 U.S. 489, 496, 516
(2014). Indeed, our review of the Federal Register
shows that, over the last 25 years, more than half of
all EPA implementation plan final rules with “based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”
findings have concerned the interstate transport of
emissions.
16
In sum, EPA’s arguments regarding the proper
venue for review of its 2023 disapproval action are
consistent with longstanding agency practice
spanning Presidential Administrations of both
parties. The disapproval action directly impacts
States in multiple circuits and concerns the interstate
transport of emissions.
B. EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and
“Based
on
a
Determination
of
Nationwide Scope or Effect” Findings
are Judicious.
Petitioners claim that EPA’s interpretation of
Section 7607(b)(1) will leave no challenges in the
regional circuit courts. State Br. 13 (citing West
Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th 323, 325 (4th Cir. 2024)).
Petitioners are mistaken. EPA has been using this
very same interpretation for decades, during which
time it has left judicial review of its actions almost
exclusively to regional circuit courts.
As described above, EPA’s current interpretation
of which actions are “nationally applicable” or “based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”
under Section 7607(b)(1) has remained consistent
with its prior interpretation. Accordingly, if
petitioners were correct, EPA’s history of Clean Air
Act actions would be highly saturated with
“nationally applicable” or “based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect” findings.
This is not the case. Between 1998 and 2023, EPA
published 6,555 final rules modifying part 51 or 52 of
17
the Code of Federal Regulations.4 Only 75 rules (1.1%)
included a “based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect” finding, and only 119 (1.8%) included
a “nationally applicable” finding. Accordingly, judicial
review for the vast majority of the relevant EPA final
rules is left to the appropriate regional circuit. Thus,
EPA has been highly selective in determining which
actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect.” The data
ring true with amici’s experience implementing the
venue provision under Presidential Administrations
of both parties. EPA’s practice is, in amici’s
experience, highly judicious and based on the
statutory text of 7607(b)(1).
As just one of many recent examples of EPA’s
judiciousness, in December, 2024, EPA did not find
that its disapproval of Texas’s SIP was “nationally
applicable” or “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect,” where the SIP fell short of
Clean Air Act enforceability requirements regarding
emissions. 89 Fed. Reg. 104,043 (Dec. 20, 2024).
Rather, as it does for the overwhelming majority of
SIP disapprovals, EPA left judicial review to the
appropriate regional circuit. 89 Fed. Reg. at 104,058.
In fact, though petitioners argue that EPA’s
interpretation of Section 7607(b)(1) would eliminate
non-exempt locally or regionally applicable rules,
State Br. 13, the antithesis is closer to the truth.
Under EPA’s current interpretation, very few rules
Parts 51 and 52 reflect the universe of Clean Air Act
rulemakings regarding implementation plan submissions. 40
C.F.R. pts. 51-52.
4
18
are
“nationally
applicable”
or
“based
on
determinations of nationwide scope or effect.”
Petitioners would narrow these findings further. They
argue, for example, that nationally applicable rules
must directly affect every state, and that the D.C.
Circuit venue provision for actions “based on
determinations of nationwide scope or effect” does not
apply if determinations involve state-specific
observations. Industry Br. 28-29; State Br. 19-20. But
these arguments would render the carefully crafted
venue categories in Section 7607(b)(1) practically
insignificant, and bring the small percentage of
actions reviewable in the D.C. Circuit even closer to
zero. See EPA Br. 41. That outcome would undermine
Congress’s clear intent to ensure judicial economy and
the appropriate uniformity in the implementation of
Clean Air Act programs through centralized review.
C. EPA Correctly Applies Its “Nationally
Applicable”
and
“Based
on
a
Determination of Nationwide Scope or
Effect” Findings to Its Entire Action.
Petitioners urge the Court to consider each of
EPA’s 21 disapprovals at issue in this case as a
separately reviewable action, each belonging in a
regional circuit court. State Br. 22-26. Such
disaggregation would be inconsistent with both the
plain language and history of Section 7607(b)(1) and
EPA’s longstanding practice.
The plain language specifies the venue for the
review of a singular “final action” of EPA, as the court
of appeals recognized. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); Pet. App.
13a. Here, EPA’s final action consists of all 21
disapprovals. The fact that a petitioner may seek to
19
challenge just one disapproval of one SIP does not
change the fact that the relevant “action” for
determining venue, according to the language of
Section 7607(b)(1), is EPA’s entire final action
consisting of all 21 disapprovals. See, e.g., Southern
Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir.
2017) (“[U]nder the straightforward statutory text [of
Section 7607(b)(1)], venue depends entirely on—and
is fixed by—the nature of the agency’s action; the
scope of the petitioner’s challenge has no role to play
in determining venue.”).
EPA’s single action on multiple SIP submissions is
a well-established practice. The early NRDC I and
NRDC II cases discussed above concerned a final
action regarding several SIP submissions. Since then,
EPA has regularly grouped SIP decisions into a single
final action. The reasoning behind this practice is the
same as Congress’s reasoning for providing
centralized review of such actions: It promotes judicial
economy and facilitates the maintenance of national
standards. Congress was aware of this practice when
it crafted the 1977 Amendments, and indeed,
intended Section 7607(b)(1) to channel review of such
multi-circuit actions to the D.C. Circuit.
CONCLUSION
The order of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
20
Respectfully submitted,
MATTHEW J. SANDERS
Counsel of Record
DEBORAH A. SIVAS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC
MILLS LEGAL CLINIC AT
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
(650) 736-8775
matthewjsanders@stanford.edu
January 24, 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.