Amicus Curiae Brief — Oklahoma, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 24, 2025

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Nos. 23-1067 and 23-1068

IN THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.,

v.

Petitioners,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

PACIFICORP, ET AL.,

v.

Petitioners,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit

BRIEF OF FORMER EPA GENERAL

COUNSELS JONATHAN CANNON, E. DONALD

ELLIOTT, AND AVI GARBOW AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

MATTHEW J. SANDERS

Counsel of Record

DEBORAH A. SIVAS

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC

MILLS LEGAL CLINIC AT

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 736-8775

matthewjsanders@stanford.edu

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4

I.

Section 7607(b)(1)’s History Reflects

Congress’s Intent That the D.C. Circuit

Should Review Nationally Significant EPA

Actions. .................................................................. 4

A. The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments

Provided Centralized Review of MultiCircuit Actions................................................ 5

B. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments

Supported EPA’s Interpretation of the

Venue Provision. ............................................ 7

II. EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and “Based

on a Determination of Nationwide Scope or

Effect” Findings Are Consistent and

Judicious. ............................................................ 12

A. EPA’s Findings for the Disapproval

Action are Consistent With Its

Longstanding Approach to Making

Such Findings............................................... 13

B. EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and

“Based on a Determination of

Nationwide Scope or Effect” Findings

are Judicious. ............................................... 16

ii

C. EPA Correctly Applies Its “Nationally

Applicable”

and

“Based

on

a

Determination of Nationwide Scope or

Effect” Findings to Its Entire Action. ......... 18

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 19

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P.,

572 U.S. 489 (2014) .............................................. 15

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

603 U.S. 369 (2024) ................................................ 4

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,

465 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1972)................... 6, 9, 10, 19

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,

475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19

Southern Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA,

863 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2017) ................................ 19

Udall v. Tallman,

380 U.S. 1 (1965) .................................................. 12

West Virginia v. EPA,

90 F.4th 323 (4th Cir. 2024) ................................ 17

Statutes

42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1)......................................... 2, 13, 18

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.

No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, (1970) .......................... 5

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.

No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, (1977) .................... 7, 8, 11

iv

Other Authorities

37 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (May 31, 1972) ............................ 6

41 Fed. Reg. 56,767 (Dec. 30, 1976) ................ 9, 10, 11

64 Fed. Reg. 28,250 (May 25, 1999) .......................... 15

76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) ..................... 13, 15

79 Fed. Reg. 69,769 (Nov. 24, 2014).......................... 13

83 Fed. Reg. 65,878 (Dec. 21, 2018) .......................... 14

88 Fed. Reg. 9,336 (Feb. 13, 2023) .................... 2, 3, 14

89 Fed. Reg. 104,043 (Dec. 20, 2024) ........................ 16

H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)...................... 8

H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1977) ............................................................ 8, 9, 11

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

(1970) ...................................................................... 5

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici are former General Counsels of the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) who

collectively

served

in

three

Presidential

Administrations.

Jonathan Cannon was EPA’s General Counsel

during the Clinton Administration. Cannon is also the

Blaine T. Phillips Distinguished Professor of

Environmental Law Emeritus at the University of

Virginia School of Law, and was the inaugural

director of the Law School’s Program in Law,

Communities and the Environment. As a professor

and director, Cannon has taught and wrote

extensively about environmental and administrative

law.

E. Donald Elliott was EPA’s General Counsel

during the George H. W. Bush Administration. Elliott

is the Florence Rogatz Professor of Law at Yale Law

School. Elliott has been teaching environmental and

administrative law on the Yale Law faculty for over

40 years.

Avi Garbow was EPA’s General Counsel during

the Obama Administration, and the longest-serving

General Counsel in EPA’s history. Garbow has also

worked for EPA as an attorney, Deputy General

Counsel, and Senior Counselor under three separate

administrations.

1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no person or entity other than amici curiae or their counsel

contributed monetarily to the preparation or submission of this

brief.

2

Amici write in support of Respondent EPA’s

position that its action to disapprove the 21 state

implementation plans at issue in this case may be

reviewed in only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit under the venue

provision of the Clean Air Act, Section 7607(b)(1) of

Title 42.

Amici have a strong interest, based on their prior

leadership within EPA, in ensuring the agency and

reviewing courts properly interpret the Clean Air Act,

including the venue provision, Section 7607(b)(1). In

addition, by virtue of their significant experience

within EPA, including interpreting and applying

Section 7607(b)(1), as well as their expertise in

environmental and administrative law, amici are

uniquely positioned to offer insight into how that

provision works, Congress’s intent behind the

provision, and EPA’s consistent approach to

interpreting and applying it.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Under Section 7607(b)(1), judicial review of an

EPA action must be had in the D.C. Circuit if the

action is (1) “nationally applicable,” or (2) “locally or

regionally applicable” but is nonetheless “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect.” 42

U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).

As EPA has explained, consolidated review in the

D.C. Circuit of multi-circuit actions avoids piecemeal

litigation, promotes judicial economy, and mitigates

uncertainty and inconsistency for States and

regulated parties. 88 Fed. Reg. 9,336, 9,380 (Feb. 13,

3

2023). EPA notes, “a nationally consistent approach to

the [Clean Air Act’s] mandate concerning interstate

transport of ozone pollution constitutes the best use of

agency resources.” Id. at 9,338. Allowing review of

such actions in multiple regional circuit courts would

significantly impede EPA’s mission of implementing

coordinated national programs to control interstate

air pollution.

The text and legislative and statutory history of

Section 7607(b)(1)—the “venue provision”—support

EPA’s position that the provision allows for

centralized review of actions, like EPA’s disapproval

action at issue in this case, that apply to entities

across multiple circuits. The 1970 version of the venue

provision

evinced

Congress’s

fundamental

understanding that centralized review of actions

“national in scope” was necessary to protect EPA’s

national rulemaking ability under the Clean Air Act.

Then, EPA, buttressed by the courts, interpreted the

venue provision to offer centralized review of multicircuit actions. EPA’s General Counsel recommended

that Congress require challenges to such actions to be

heard in only the D.C. Circuit. In the 1977 Clean Air

Amendments, Congress amended the venue provision,

bringing its language into alignment with EPA’s

interpretation and practice.

In the 48 years since Congress made those

amendments to the venue provision, the provision’s

text has not changed. Neither has EPA’s position

regarding which actions require centralized review—

that is, which actions are “nationally applicable” or

“based on a determination of nationwide scope or

effect.” EPA’s interpretation of Section 7607(b)(1) in

4

this case remains consistent with its prior

interpretations and the letter and spirit of the statute,

and should receive significant “respect” from this

Court under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024). Moreover, EPA rarely finds that

its actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect,” thereby

honoring the role of regional circuit courts in

reviewing locally or regionally applicable actions.

In applying this interpretation to the disapproval

action at issue here, EPA correctly found that its

action is “nationally applicable” and “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect,” and

therefore can be reviewed in only the D.C. Circuit.

ARGUMENT

I.

Section

7607(b)(1)’s

History

Reflects

Congress’s Intent That the D.C. Circuit

Should Review Nationally Significant EPA

Actions.

Congress intended challenges to nationally

significant EPA actions like the disapproval action to

be reviewable in only the D.C. Circuit. Ever since

Congress first wrote a venue provision for the Clean

Air Act in 1970, it has maintained that an EPA action

that affects entities in multiple circuits may be

reviewed by only the D.C. Circuit. EPA interpreted

the provision accordingly, the courts of appeals agreed

with EPA’s interpretation, and in 1977 Congress

enshrined EPA’s and the courts’ interpretation in the

language of the Act itself.

5

A. The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments

Provided Centralized Review of MultiCircuit Actions.

In 1970, when Congress first contemplated judicial

review of EPA’s actions under the Clean Air Act,

Congress aimed to write a venue provision that would

achieve “even and consistent” application of EPA’s

national standards. S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d

Sess. 41 (1970). To this end, Congress specified that

EPA actions that are “national in scope”—defined in

context as actions that impact more than one air

quality control region—should be reviewed by only the

D.C. Circuit.2 Id. Congress worried that, if actions

that impacted entities in more than one circuit could

be challenged in more than one circuit, the courts

could reach conflicting rulings and hamper EPA’s

ability to effectively regulate air quality. Id.

To address that concern, the 1970 Clean Air Act

Amendments included a venue provision that made

any action “promulgating any national primary or

secondary ambient air quality standard,” “emission

standard,” or other specified standards, reviewable in

only the D.C. Circuit. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.

1676, 1708 (1970).

The 1970 venue provision also stated that

“Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating

any implementation plan ... may be filed only ... in the

appropriate circuit.” Id. Thus, the 1970 Clean Air Act

Amendments reflected Congress’s recognition that

2 Congress required centralized review for actions “national

in scope,” while requiring local review for actions that “ran only

to one air quality control region.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196 at 41.

6

EPA actions that are “national in scope” should

receive “even and consistent national application,”

requiring centralized review in the D.C. Circuit.

Unfortunately, the 1970 venue provision proved

difficult to implement. By addressing only particular

EPA actions, the provision left unspecified the venue

for EPA actions that were not listed, and it did not

specify the “appropriate court” for judicial review of

EPA actions regarding an implementation plan. Legal

challenges soon made these shortcomings apparent,

and prompted Congress to clarify its intent.

In 1972, EPA finalized an action approving

numerous States’ proposed SIPs. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842

(May 31, 1972). Several environmental groups

challenged EPA’s action. See Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA (“NRDC I”), 465 F.2d

492, 493 (1st Cir. 1972). The groups argued they were

permitted to sue in every regional circuit because “the

appropriate circuit” referenced in the statutory text

was meant to be synonymous with “local.” Id. at 493.

EPA, meanwhile, argued that the challenges had to be

brought in the D.C. Circuit. The First and D.C.

Circuits agreed with EPA. NRDC I, 465 F.2d at 493;

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (“NRDC

II”), 475 F.2d 968, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Central to EPA’s position was that the action at

issue “nationally and uniformly” approved or

disapproved the SIPs, making challenges in regional

circuits inappropriate and potentially problematic.

NRDC I, 465 F.2d at 493. The First Circuit agreed;

since the issues were the same across circuits,

“litigation in several circuits” could unnecessarily lead

to “possible inconsistent and delayed results.” Id. at

7

495. The D.C. Circuit similarly cautioned that reading

the venue provision to allow non-centralized review of

multi-circuit issues could yield undesirable

consequences, such as multiple reviews of a decision

by EPA concerning an implementation plan for a

single metropolitan area that sits in more than one

circuit. “We doubt that Congress intended such a

result, especially in light of the indication elsewhere

in the Act of a strong congressional concern for

coordinated

decision-making ... over

several

jurisdictions.” NRDC II, 475 F.2d at 969. In other

words, the courts understood that Congress, in the

1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, had aimed to

provide a consistent review process for actions that

applied to entities in more than one circuit, and that

EPA was interpreting the venue provision consistent

with Congress’s intent.

If Congress had other intentions, later

amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1977 and 1990

provided ample opportunity to correct course. Yet the

legislative history shows Congress choosing to double

down on EPA’s interpretation of the venue provision:

that challenges to EPA actions like the one at issue in

this case are “national in scope” and must be reviewed

in the D.C. Circuit.

B. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments

Supported EPA’s Interpretation of the

Venue Provision.

Four years after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in

NRDC II, Congress returned to the venue provision in

the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. Pub. L. No. 9595, 91 Stat. 685, 776 (1977). The Amendments were

prepared by the House Committee on Interstate and

8

Foreign Commerce, which explained its intention

behind the Amendments in an accompanying report.

H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. Rep. No.

294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Unlike the 1970

venue provision, which directed review of only certain

enumerated actions to the D.C. Circuit, see p. 5,

supra, the 1977 Amendments added a catch-all clause

to direct review of “any other nationally applicable

regulations promulgated, or final action taken” to the

D.C. Circuit, as well. Pub. L. No. 95-95 at 776.

In addition, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments

added a catch-all clause to direct review of “any other

final action ... which is locally or regionally

applicable” to the appropriate circuit. Id. But the

Amendments made an important exception: A

challenge to a locally or regionally applicable action

could be filed in only the D.C. Circuit “if such action is

based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect

and if in taking such action the Administrator finds

and publishes that such action is based on such a

determination.” Id.

These changes to the venue provision enshrined

the First and D.C. Circuits’ 1972 and 1973 decisions

in support of EPA’s interpretation. In NRDC II, the

D.C. Circuit recognized that the provision allowed for

centralized review of “determinations of nationwide

effect”—a phrase that was not yet a term of art. NRDC

II, 475 F.2d at 970. In the Amendments, Congress

modified the venue provision to include almost

precisely the same phrase. Pub. L. No. 95-95 at 776.

The nearly identical language indicates the attention

Congress paid to EPA’s legal arguments in litigation,

9

and Congress’s corresponding intention to keep

review of multi-circuit SIP actions in the D.C. Circuit.

The changes to the venue provision were also

responsive to recommendations from then-EPA

General Counsel G. William Frick. The 1970 version

of the venue provision and the NRDC I and II

decisions prompted recommendations to the House

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce

regarding amendments to the provision. Two sets of

these recommendations influenced the final

amendments enacted in 1977. H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at

324.

The first of the two sets of recommendations was

written by Professor David Currie, while the second

was written by General Counsel Frick. 41 Fed. Reg.

56,767, 56,767-69 (Dec. 30, 1976). Both sets of

recommendations were published in 1976 by the

Administrative Conference of the United States, an

independent federal agency established in part to

“study the efficiency, adequacy and fairness of the

administrative procedure used by administrative

agencies ... and to make recommendations for

improvement” to Congress. Id. at 56,767.

According to Professor Currie, “Congress should

amend [the venue provision] of the Clean Air Act to

make explicit that the Administrator’s action in

approving or promulgating state implementation

plans is reviewable in the circuit containing the state

whose plan is challenged,” not just “the appropriate

court.” Id. at 56,768. General Counsel Frick opposed

that recommendation because, if adopted, it would

foreclose a conclusion that the D.C. Circuit was the

appropriate venue for “matters on which national

10

uniformity is desirable.” Id. Frick agreed that

interpreting “appropriate” to mean “local” was

sensible for challenges involving “issues peculiar to

the affected states.” However, he urged that Congress

maintain the flexible usage of “appropriate” to ensure

the D.C. Circuit would review actions “where ‘national

issues’ are involved” or which “involve generic

determinations of nationwide scope or effect.” Id. at

56,768-69.

In defending centralized review of multi-circuit

issues, Frick cited the NRDC I and NRDC II decisions

of the First and D.C. Circuits. Id. at 56,769. Frick

believed that centralizing judicial review of multicircuit issues in the D.C. Circuit would “tak[e]

advantage of [that court’s] administrative law

expertise and facilitat[e] an orderly development of

the Act, rather than to have such issues decided

separately by a number of courts.” Id. He further

reasoned that the validity of EPA’s actions in such

cases would turn not “on the particulars of its impacts

within a given circuit,” but on general issues, and

therefore that a single court, and the D.C. Circuit

specifically, was best situated to hear challenges to

such actions. Id. And although Professor Currie and

General Counsel Frick disagreed over the

interpretation of “appropriate” in the wake of earlier

litigation, both emphasized the need to avoid “undue

duplication of proceedings” that could be caused by

allowing several circuit courts to independently rule

on a single EPA action. Id. at 56,768-69.

When Congress finally enacted the 1977 Clean Air

Act Amendments, it both (1) kept the 1970

Amendments’ original language directing any

11

individual SIP approval to the “appropriate court,”

and (2) specified that any locally or regionally

applicable action based on a determination of

nationwide scope or effect could be challenged in only

the D.C. Circuit. Pub. L. No. 95-95 at 776. Thus, it

reinforced EPA’s interpretation. In fact, in the House

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce’s

report explaining changes to the Act, the House

Committee stated that it agreed with the “comments,

concerns, and recommendation ... of the separate

statement of G. William Frick.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294

at 324.

The House Committee’s report also clarified that

“determination of nationwide scope or effect” includes

“a determination which has scope or effect beyond a

single judicial circuit.” Id. at 324. Congress’s

expansive definition of “nationwide” underscored its

primary purpose in updating the venue provision: to

avoid duplicative or inconsistent rulings in order to

maximize the efficacy of EPA’s administrative

programs. Congress’s 1977 Clean Air Act

Amendments represented an effort to centralize

review of issues, including EPA decisions regarding

SIPs, that impact entities in more than one circuit. 41

Fed. Reg. at 56,769; H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 324.

In sum, with every chance to clarify to the

contrary, Congress’s 1977 Amendments supported

EPA’s conclusions regarding how the venue provision

should be construed, and Congress has not amended

the provision further. Overall, the text and history of

Section 7607(b)(1) shows that Congress intended to

allow for centralized review of multi-circuit issues. It

also shows that Congress wrote the provision to be

12

consistent with EPA’s position regarding the types of

actions that require centralized review (that is, which

actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect”).

II.

EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and “Based

on a Determination of Nationwide Scope

or Effect” Findings Are Consistent and

Judicious.

Over time, EPA’s explanations for why it finds

particular actions “nationally applicable” or “based on

a determination of nationwide scope or effect” have

remained consistent with the letter and spirit of

Section 7607(b)(1). Such consistent interpretations by

the agency charged with applying the statute are

entitled to substantial weight under long-established

Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Udall v.

Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). The findings in the

disapproval action are consistent with EPA’s prior

“nationally applicable” and “based on a determination

of nationwide scope or effect” findings.

Moreover, EPA interprets Section 7607(b)(1)

narrowly and judiciously to make such findings. The

agency’s reading has neither deprived regional circuit

courts of their appropriate judicial-review roles nor

resulted in an overload of Clean Air Act cases in the

D.C. Circuit. Rather, EPA makes a finding that an

action is either “nationally applicable” or “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect” in fewer

than two percent of its Clean Air Act final rules

regarding implementation plans.

13

A. EPA’s Findings for the Disapproval

Action

are

Consistent

With

Its

Longstanding Approach to Making

Such Findings.

A locally or regionally applicable action that is

“based on a determination of nationwide scope or

effect” is reviewable in the D.C. Circuit only if EPA

makes and publishes a finding to that effect. 42 U.S.C.

7607(b)(1). EPA can also make and publish a finding

that its action is “nationally applicable,” but such a

finding is not required for review of a nationally

applicable action to be directed to the D.C. Circuit.

Review of EPA’s “nationally applicable” and “based

on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”

findings over time shows that EPA’s arguments

regarding the disapproval action at issue here are

consistent with its longstanding practice and

interpretation of Section 7607(b)(1). A few examples

are illustrative.

In 2011, EPA looked to “a common core of factual

findings and analyses” to explain why it designated a

final action concerning the [interstate] transport of

pollutants as “based on a determination of nationwide

scope or effect.” 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,352 (Aug. 8,

2011). In 2014, EPA similarly found that a

consolidated SIP decision was “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect” because

the States whose SIPs were affected were situated in

different circuits. 79 Fed. Reg. 69,769, 69,772 (Nov.

24, 2014). And in 2018, EPA found that 20 SIPs had

met their good neighbor provision obligations, and

explained that its approach to regulating ozone

emissions standards had nationwide scope or effect

14

because it was intended to be “consistently

implemented nationwide.” 83 Fed. Reg. 65,878, 65,923

(Dec. 21, 2018). EPA also designated each of these

actions “nationally applicable.”3

In the disapproval action at issue in this case, in

which EPA disapproved multiple SIPs, EPA relied on

similar reasoning to explain its “nationally

applicable” and “based on a determination of

nationwide scope or effect” findings. EPA: (1) based its

actions on a common core of findings and analyses; (2)

reached a decision concerning the SIPs of multiple

States in multiple circuits; and (3) adopted an

approach that effectuates consistent nationwide

implementation of the Clean Air Act. 88 Fed. Reg. at

9,380.

Other patterns in EPA’s venue findings over time

demonstrate that EPA’s findings in the disapproval

action are consistent with its longstanding approach

to making such findings. First, our review of all EPA

final rules regarding implementation plans since 1998

shows that the majority of EPA’s “nationally

applicable” and “based on a determination of

nationwide scope or effect” findings have been made

for rules that involved multiple States but not the

whole country.

3 These justifications may sound broad, but EPA is careful

and precise in making them. As we discuss in more detail in the

next section, in the last 10 years, EPA published “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect” findings in only 41

(1.5%) of its 2,708 Clean Air Act implementation plan final rules.

Similarly, EPA published “nationally applicable” findings in only

50 (1.8%) of those rules.

15

Second, EPA has a long history of making

“nationally applicable” and “based on a determination

of nationwide scope or effect” findings for actions

related to the interstate transport of emissions. For

instance, in 2011, when EPA published its Transport

Rule limiting emissions of certain regulated

pollutants to downwind States, EPA found that “any

final action related to the Transport Rule is

‘nationally applicable’ within the meaning of Section

[7607(b)(1)].” 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,352 (emphasis

added). Further back, in 1999, EPA reasoned that its

consolidated SIP action was “nationally applicable”

and “based on a determination of nationwide scope or

effect” where it employed “uniform modeling

techniques and a uniform set of air quality metrics to

assess upwind impacts on downwind states,” even

though the action applied to only eight Northeastern

States. 64 Fed. Reg. 28,250, 28,318 (May 25, 1999).

Since 1999, EPA has continued to emphasize the

necessity of centralized review for rules relating to the

interstate transport of emissions. This is

unsurprising; as the Court recognizes, “[a]ir pollution

is transient, heedless of state boundaries,” such that

“most upwind States contribute pollution to multiple

downwind States in varying amounts.” EPA v. EME

Homer City Generation, L. P., 572 U.S. 489, 496, 516

(2014). Indeed, our review of the Federal Register

shows that, over the last 25 years, more than half of

all EPA implementation plan final rules with “based

on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”

findings have concerned the interstate transport of

emissions.

16

In sum, EPA’s arguments regarding the proper

venue for review of its 2023 disapproval action are

consistent with longstanding agency practice

spanning Presidential Administrations of both

parties. The disapproval action directly impacts

States in multiple circuits and concerns the interstate

transport of emissions.

B. EPA’s “Nationally Applicable” and

“Based

on

a

Determination

of

Nationwide Scope or Effect” Findings

are Judicious.

Petitioners claim that EPA’s interpretation of

Section 7607(b)(1) will leave no challenges in the

regional circuit courts. State Br. 13 (citing West

Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th 323, 325 (4th Cir. 2024)).

Petitioners are mistaken. EPA has been using this

very same interpretation for decades, during which

time it has left judicial review of its actions almost

exclusively to regional circuit courts.

As described above, EPA’s current interpretation

of which actions are “nationally applicable” or “based

on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”

under Section 7607(b)(1) has remained consistent

with its prior interpretation. Accordingly, if

petitioners were correct, EPA’s history of Clean Air

Act actions would be highly saturated with

“nationally applicable” or “based on a determination

of nationwide scope or effect” findings.

This is not the case. Between 1998 and 2023, EPA

published 6,555 final rules modifying part 51 or 52 of

17

the Code of Federal Regulations.4 Only 75 rules (1.1%)

included a “based on a determination of nationwide

scope or effect” finding, and only 119 (1.8%) included

a “nationally applicable” finding. Accordingly, judicial

review for the vast majority of the relevant EPA final

rules is left to the appropriate regional circuit. Thus,

EPA has been highly selective in determining which

actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a

determination of nationwide scope or effect.” The data

ring true with amici’s experience implementing the

venue provision under Presidential Administrations

of both parties. EPA’s practice is, in amici’s

experience, highly judicious and based on the

statutory text of 7607(b)(1).

As just one of many recent examples of EPA’s

judiciousness, in December, 2024, EPA did not find

that its disapproval of Texas’s SIP was “nationally

applicable” or “based on a determination of

nationwide scope or effect,” where the SIP fell short of

Clean Air Act enforceability requirements regarding

emissions. 89 Fed. Reg. 104,043 (Dec. 20, 2024).

Rather, as it does for the overwhelming majority of

SIP disapprovals, EPA left judicial review to the

appropriate regional circuit. 89 Fed. Reg. at 104,058.

In fact, though petitioners argue that EPA’s

interpretation of Section 7607(b)(1) would eliminate

non-exempt locally or regionally applicable rules,

State Br. 13, the antithesis is closer to the truth.

Under EPA’s current interpretation, very few rules

Parts 51 and 52 reflect the universe of Clean Air Act

rulemakings regarding implementation plan submissions. 40

C.F.R. pts. 51-52.

4

18

are

“nationally

applicable”

or

“based

on

determinations of nationwide scope or effect.”

Petitioners would narrow these findings further. They

argue, for example, that nationally applicable rules

must directly affect every state, and that the D.C.

Circuit venue provision for actions “based on

determinations of nationwide scope or effect” does not

apply if determinations involve state-specific

observations. Industry Br. 28-29; State Br. 19-20. But

these arguments would render the carefully crafted

venue categories in Section 7607(b)(1) practically

insignificant, and bring the small percentage of

actions reviewable in the D.C. Circuit even closer to

zero. See EPA Br. 41. That outcome would undermine

Congress’s clear intent to ensure judicial economy and

the appropriate uniformity in the implementation of

Clean Air Act programs through centralized review.

C. EPA Correctly Applies Its “Nationally

Applicable”

and

“Based

on

a

Determination of Nationwide Scope or

Effect” Findings to Its Entire Action.

Petitioners urge the Court to consider each of

EPA’s 21 disapprovals at issue in this case as a

separately reviewable action, each belonging in a

regional circuit court. State Br. 22-26. Such

disaggregation would be inconsistent with both the

plain language and history of Section 7607(b)(1) and

EPA’s longstanding practice.

The plain language specifies the venue for the

review of a singular “final action” of EPA, as the court

of appeals recognized. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); Pet. App.

13a. Here, EPA’s final action consists of all 21

disapprovals. The fact that a petitioner may seek to

19

challenge just one disapproval of one SIP does not

change the fact that the relevant “action” for

determining venue, according to the language of

Section 7607(b)(1), is EPA’s entire final action

consisting of all 21 disapprovals. See, e.g., Southern

Ill. Power Coop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir.

2017) (“[U]nder the straightforward statutory text [of

Section 7607(b)(1)], venue depends entirely on—and

is fixed by—the nature of the agency’s action; the

scope of the petitioner’s challenge has no role to play

in determining venue.”).

EPA’s single action on multiple SIP submissions is

a well-established practice. The early NRDC I and

NRDC II cases discussed above concerned a final

action regarding several SIP submissions. Since then,

EPA has regularly grouped SIP decisions into a single

final action. The reasoning behind this practice is the

same as Congress’s reasoning for providing

centralized review of such actions: It promotes judicial

economy and facilitates the maintenance of national

standards. Congress was aware of this practice when

it crafted the 1977 Amendments, and indeed,

intended Section 7607(b)(1) to channel review of such

multi-circuit actions to the D.C. Circuit.

CONCLUSION

The order of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

20

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW J. SANDERS

Counsel of Record

DEBORAH A. SIVAS

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC

MILLS LEGAL CLINIC AT

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 736-8775

matthewjsanders@stanford.edu

January 24, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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