Petitioners Brief — Casey Cunningham, et al., Petitioners v. Cornell University, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 22, 2024

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No. 23-1007

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CASEY CUNNINGHAM, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,

v.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

JEROME J. SCHLICHTER

SEAN E. SOYARS

SCHLICHTER BOGARD

LLP

100 South Fourth Street

Suite 1200

St. Louis, MO 63102

XIAO WANG

Counsel of Record

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

SCHOOL OF LAW SUPREME

COURT LITIGATION CLINIC

580 Massie Road

Charlottesville, VA 22903

(434) 924-8956

x.wang@law.virginia.edu

Counsel for Petitioners

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), prohibits a

plan fiduciary from “engag[ing] in a transaction, if he

knows or should know that such transaction

constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods,

services, or facilities between the plan and a party in

interest.” The statute elsewhere defines “party in

interest” broadly to include a variety of parties that

may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29

U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B).

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the

text of this prohibition as written. On the other hand,

several other circuits, including the Second, Third,

Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, have required plaintiffs

to allege additional elements to state a claim because

a “literal reading” of § 1106(a)(1)(C) would

purportedly produce “results that are inconsistent

with ERISA’s statutory purpose.” Albert v. Oshkosh

Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022). The question

presented is:

Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging

that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction

constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or

facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as

proscribed by § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff

must plead and prove additional elements and facts

not contained in § 1106(a)(1)(C)’s text.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners Casey Cunningham, Charles E. Lance,

Stanley T. Marcus, Lydia Pettis, and Joy Veronneau were

plaintiffs in the district court proceedings and appellants

in the court of appeals proceedings.

Respondents Cornell University, the Retirement Plan

Oversight Committee, and Mary G. Opperman were

defendants in the district court proceedings and appellees

in the court of appeals proceedings. CapFinancial

Partners, LLC d/b/a CAPTRUST Financial Advisors was

a defendant in the district court proceedings and appellee

in the court of appeals proceedings, but Petitioners do not

seek relief before this Court on claims as applied to

CapFinancial.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (S.D.N.Y.):

Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 1:16-cv06525, 2017 WL 4358769 (Sept. 29, 2017).

Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 1:16-cv06525, 2019 WL 4735876 (Sept. 27, 2019).

United States Court of Appeals (2d Cir.):

Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 21-88, 86

F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023).

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question presented ............................................................... i

Parties to the proceeding .................................................... ii

Related proceedings ...........................................................iii

Table of authorities ............................................................. vi

Introduction .......................................................................... 1

Opinions below ...................................................................... 7

Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 7

Statutory provisions involved ............................................. 7

Statement of the case........................................................... 8

A. Statutory framework. .............................................. 8

B. Factual background. ................................................ 9

C. Proceedings below.................................................. 10

Summary of argument ....................................................... 14

Argument ............................................................................ 20

I. The Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with the

statutory text. ............................................................... 20

A. Petitioners have satisfied the plain language of

§ 1106, and adding atextual elements to that

language is inappropriate. ..................................... 20

B. Section 1108’s exemptions are affirmative

defenses to be pleaded and proven by the

defendant................................................................. 21

C. Traditional tools of statutory construction

confirm Petitioners’ reading. ................................ 25

D. The Second Circuit’s reliance on § 1106(a)’s

“except as provided” language is inapt. ............... 27

v

E. The Second Circuit’s reference to a narrow

criminal law exception to the general rule is

unavailing. ............................................................... 29

II. The Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with the

case law, the law of trusts, and government

practice. ......................................................................... 31

A. Section 1106 establishes a categorical rule for

prohibited transactions. ......................................... 31

B. The common law of trusts supports Petitioners’

reading..................................................................... 35

C. Petitioners’ reading of § 1106 and § 1108 tracks

federal government practice. ................................ 38

III. The Second Circuit’s approach is a “fix” to a nonexistent problem. .......................................................... 41

A. The Second Circuit’s reading is unworkable. ...... 41

B. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions is not absurd. ................... 44

C. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions has not led to a needless

rise in litigation. ...................................................... 46

Conclusion ........................................................................... 49

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,

542 U.S. 200 (2004).................................................... 42

Albert v. Oshkosh Corp.,

47 F.4th 570 (7th Cir. 2022) ...............................i, 4, 21

Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,

835 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2016) .........................................

........................................................ 1, 19, 23, 32, 37, 47

Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,

2015 WL 5821772 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015) ............... 39

Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian,

590 U.S. 1 (2020) ....................................................... 28

In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,

12 F.4th 171 (2d Cir. 2021) ........................ 5, 16, 29, 30

Boggs v. Boggs,

520 U.S. 833 (1997).................................................... 40

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) .............. 1, 3, 5, 39, 42, 47

Bugielski v. AT&T Servs., Inc.,

76 F.4th 894 (9th Cir. 2023) ............................ 3, 20, 45

vii

Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,

885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018) ..................................... 40

Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc.,

508 U.S. 152 (1993)....................................... 3, 8, 17, 32

Conkright v. Frommert,

559 U.S. 506 (2010)....................................... 3, 6, 20, 42

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,

417 U.S. 188 (1974).................................................... 26

Crooks v. Harrelson,

282 U.S. 55 (1930)...................................................... 44

Cyan Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund,

583 U.S. 416 (2018).................................................... 28

Dupree v. Prudential Ins.,

2007 WL 2263892 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007) ............. 43

Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu,

307 U.S. 5 (1939) ....................................................... 24

Est. of Cowart v. Nickols Drilling Co.,

505 U.S. 469 (1992).................................................... 20

Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,

793 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2015) ...................................5, 29

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,

489 U.S. 101 (1989).................................................... 35

viii

Fish v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,

749 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2014) ..................................... 48

FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,

334 U.S. 37 (1948)...................................................2, 22

Gomez v. Toledo,

446 U.S. 635 (1980)...................................................... 5

Haley v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am.,

54 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2022) ............................ 23, 37, 43

Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,

Inc.,

530 U.S. 238 (2000)................... 1, 16, 17, 31, 32, 35, 36

Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of

Michigan,

751 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 2014) ..................................... 27

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,

525 U.S. 432 (1999)................................... 14, 15, 20, 21

Hughes v. Nw. Univ.,

595 U.S. 170 (2022)...................................................... 1

Hughes v. Nw. Univ.,

63 F.4th 615 (7th Cir. 2023) ....................................... 9

Javierre v. Cent. Altagracia,

217 U.S. 502 (1910).................................................... 22

Jimenez v. Quarterman,

555 U.S. 113 (2009)...................................................6, 7

ix

John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav.

Bank,

510 U.S. 86 (1993)...................................................5, 47

Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199 (2007).................................................... 24

Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P.,

559 U.S. 335 (2010)............................. 13, 14, 33, 34, 35

Kelly v. Johns Hopkins Univ.,

2020 WL 434473 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2020) ................. 46

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc.,

552 U.S. 248 (2008).................................................... 35

Leigh v. Engle,

727 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984) ..................................... 32

Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,

517 U.S. 882 (1996)......................................... 42, 45, 48

Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc.,

829 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1987) .................................... 23

Marshall v. Kelly,

465 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Okla. 1978) ........................ 43

Marshall v. Northrop Grumman Corp.,

2020 WL 5668935 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020) .....46, 47

McKelvey v. United States,

260 U.S. 353 (1922).................................................... 22

x

McLaughlin v. Rowley,

698 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Tex. 1988) ........................ 43

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y,

554 U.S. 84 (2008)................. 4, 5, 15, 24, 25, 26, 27, 45

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,

508 U.S. 248 (1993)...................................................... 8

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

601 U.S. 346 (2024).................................................... 46

Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola,

700 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2012) ...................................27, 28

Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni,

262 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................... 28

Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

491 U.S. 440 (1989)......................................... 18, 44, 45

Ramos v. Banner Health,

1 F.4th 769 (10th Cir. 2021) ....................................... 4

Ramos v. Banner Health,

461 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (D. Colo. 2020) ........................ 9

Ruan v. United States,

597 U.S. 450 (2022).................................................... 22

Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,

546 U.S. 49 (2005)...................................................... 26

xi

Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry.,

205 U.S. 1 (1907) ....................................................... 22

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

463 U.S. 85 (1983)...................................................1, 46

Sweda v. Univ. of Pa.,

923 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2019) ...............................3, 4, 21

Taylor v. Sturgell,

553 U.S. 880 (2008)...............................................22, 24

Thole v. U.S. Bank,

590 U.S. 538 (2020).................................................... 48

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,

469 U.S. 111 (1985)...............................................44, 45

United States v. Cook,

84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872) ................... 16, 29, 30, 31

United States v. Cruikshank,

92 U.S. 542 (1875)...................................................... 30

United States v. Dickson,

40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141 (1841) ............................. 4, 15, 22

United States v. Just,

74 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 1996) ....................................... 29

United States v. McArthur,

108 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1997) ................................. 31

xii

United States v. Reese,

92 U.S. 214 (1875).................................................16, 30

United States v. Vuitch,

402 U.S. 62 (1971)...................................................... 30

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,

570 U.S. 338 (2013).................................................... 26

Vance v. Terrazas,

444 U.S. 252 (1980).................................................... 24

Yates v. United States,

574 U.S. 528 (2015).................................................... 26

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI ................................................ 30

RULES, STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS

11 U.S.C. § 550 ............................................................... 29

15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 ......................................................... 34

18 U.S.C. § 922 ............................................................... 29

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ............................................................... 7

29 U.S.C.

§ 623................................................................. 24, 25, 27

§ 1001...................................................................7, 8, 42

§ 1002.......................................................... i, 2, 8, 20, 38

§ 1104............................................................................ 1

xiii

§ 1106.................... i, 1–21, 24–28, 31–32, 35–42, 44–47

§ 1108........... 1, 2, 4–9, 11–19, 21–28, 33–34, 36–44, 46

§ 1132–1138 ................................................................ 38

§ 1132.......................................................................... 47

§ 1204.......................................................................... 38

29 C.F.R. § 2550 ................................................. 33, 34, 38

77 Fed. Reg. 5632 (Feb. 3, 2012) .................................. 38

FED. R. CIV. P. 8 .......................................................23, 40

SECONDARY SOURCES

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)................... 29

Robert W. Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees’ Powers

Act and the Basic Principles of Fiduciary

Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801 (1966) ........ 36

David Kotler et al., Navigating the Recent Wave of

Section 36(b) Litigation: What Have We Learned?,

29 INVESTMENT LAWYER 1 (2022) .......................... 35

John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV.

L. REV. 2387 (2003) ................................................... 44

Lauren K. Valastro, How Misapplying Twombly

Erodes Retirement Funds, 32 GEO. MASON L. REV.

(forthcoming 2025) ...................................................... 6

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 78 .................... 36

xiv

OTHER AUTHORITIES

120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974) ..................................19, 45

120 CONG. REC. 29954 (1974) ....................................... 45

120 CONG. REC. 29957 (1974) ......................................... 8

120 CONG. REC. 30106 (1974) ......................................... 8

S. REP. NO. 93-127 (1973) ........................................19, 45

Dep’t of Labor, Class Exemptions,

https://perma.cc/G2NQ-XF28 ................................. 40

Dep’t of Labor, Individual Exemptions,

https://perma.cc/VW28-7N8Q ................................. 40

Gov. Br., Chao v. Hall Holding,

285 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3041) ........38, 39

Gov. Br., Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,

835 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-3569) ... 6, 17, 39,

40

Gov. Br. Opp’n Cert., Chao v. Hall Holding,

537 U.S. 1168 (2003) (No. 02-593)............................ 39

Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2008-14; D-11424,

73 Fed. Reg. 70378 (2008) ........................................ 40

1

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 “to promote the interests of

employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit

plans.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90

(1983). To deliver on that goal, the Act imposes duties of

loyalty and prudence on the fiduciaries who manage

ERISA plans and, through its prohibited-transaction

provisions, “categorically bar[s] certain transactions”

altogether. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith

Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 242 (2000).

These mechanisms—fiduciary duties on the one hand,

prohibited transactions on the other—work together to

protect employees. To bring a fiduciary duty claim, for

example, a beneficiary must show the fiduciary’s failure to

act in the beneficiary’s interest or to “discharge their

duties ‘with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under

the circumstances then prevailing [of] a prudent man

acting in a like capacity.’” Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 595 U.S.

170, 172 (2022) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). For a

prohibited-transaction claim, on the other hand, a

beneficiary need not show harm nor “make any allegation

of unreasonableness” because Congress has already

determined that such transactions are “likely to injure the

pension plan.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d

585, 600–01 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harris Tr., 530 U.S.

at 242). All a plaintiff must do is plead the elements of 29

U.S.C. § 1106; doing so satisfies the “bright-line rule[]”

Congress created for determining whether a transaction

is prohibited. Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co., 835 F.3d 670,

676 (7th Cir. 2016). Once such a showing is made, the plan

fiduciary may invoke, if applicable, one or more of the

exemptions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1108. A fiduciary

2

might, for example, plead and prove facts showing that a

particular transaction was a permissible block trade,

§ 1108(b)(15); a permissible cross trade, § 1108(b)(19); or

constituted a “reasonable arrangement[] with a party in

interest for . . . legal, accounting, or other services

necessary for . . . the plan,” § 1108(b)(2)(A).

This framework—of plaintiffs pleading and proving

liability under one provision and defendants pleading and

proving an exemption from liability under a separate

provision—is unexceptional. Congress routinely writes

laws in this way, and courts, when interpreting them,

apply “the general rule of statutory construction that the

burden of proving justification or exemption under a

special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally

rests on one who claims its benefits.” FTC v. Morton Salt

Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948).

Moreover, what is remarkable here is that

Respondents themselves agree the transactions identified

in the complaint satisfy § 1106.

That is because

§ 1106(a)(1)(C) provides that a “[1] fiduciary with respect

to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a

transaction, [2] if he knows or should know that such

transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of

goods, services, or facilities [3] between the plan and a

party in interest.” Respondents acknowledge they are

fiduciaries to Cornell’s plans. BIO at 3. They agree that

the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of

America-College Retirement Equities Fund (“TIAA”)

and Fidelity Investments Inc. (“Fidelity”) are parties in

interest, as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14). J.A. 291, 301.

And it is undisputed that Respondents transacted with

TIAA and Fidelity for the furnishing of services—

specifically, recordkeeping services—to the plans. BIO at

4. Petitioners, for their part, allege that as beneficiaries

3

to Cornell’s plans, they paid TIAA and Fidelity between

four and five times more each year for recordkeeping than

industry standards. J.A. 65. That allegation, if true,

would mean that the 30,000 participants in Cornell’s

ERISA plans paid millions more than they should have

for recordkeeping. Affording such participants a cause of

action tracks Congress’s vision of using the prohibitedtransaction provisions to address the abuses of plan assets

that were pervasive pre-ERISA. See Comm’r v. Keystone

Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993).

Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have endorsed

this understanding of § 1106. As the Eighth Circuit

observed, “the language of the statute is plain, and it

allocates the burdens of pleading and proof.” Braden, 588

F.3d at 602. The Ninth Circuit embraced this same

understanding, while adding that it was “particularly

reluctant to adopt an atextual interpretation of § 406

because ERISA is ‘an enormously complex and detailed

statute.’” Bugielski v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 76 F.4th 894,

901 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 559

U.S. 506, 509 (2010)).1

On the other hand, several circuits have held that a

literal reading of § 1106 would be too “broad” and would

end up “prohibit[ing] ubiquitous service transactions.”

Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 335–37 (3d Cir. 2019).

These courts have thus required plaintiffs to plead

additional, atextual elements to bring a prohibitedtransaction claim.

And because these additional

requirements have no grounding in § 1106’s text, they

Unless otherwise noted, statutory citations in this brief are to

the U.S. Code. Many cases, however, refer interchangeably to the

ERISA section number. The most relevant section numbers for this

case are ERISA § 406 and § 408, which correspond to 29 U.S.C.

§ 1106 and § 1108, respectively.

1

4

have differed across every circuit. See, e.g., id. at 340

(requiring plaintiff to “plead an element of intent to

benefit the party in interest”); Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47

F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that transactions

must “look[] like self-dealing”); Ramos v. Banner Health,

1 F.4th 769, 787 (10th Cir. 2021) (requiring showing that

the plan and party in interest had a “prior relationship”).

The Second Circuit expressed the same concern that,

“when read in isolation from its exemptions, § 1106(a)

would encompass a vast array of routine transactions.”

P.A. 21a. But its holding charted a different course from

that of the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. Instead, it

held that “at least some of those exemptions—

particularly, the exemption for reasonable and necessary

transactions

codified

by

§ 1108(b)(2)(A)—are

incorporated into § 1106(a)’s prohibitions.” P.A. 18a.

Thus, “to plead a violation of § 1106(a)(1)(C), a complaint

must plausibly allege that a fiduciary has caused the plan

to engage in a transaction that constitutes the furnishing

of services between the plan and a party in interest” and

that the “transaction was unnecessary or involved

unreasonable compensation.” P.A. 18a–19a (cleaned up).

That is a policy fix under the guise of a quasi-textual

solution. It fails as both.

On text, “the general rule of law, which has always

prevailed,” is “that where the enacting clause is general in

its language and objects, and a proviso is afterwards

introduced,” the “proviso carves special exceptions only

out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such

exception, must establish it.” United States v. Dickson,

40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 165 (1841). The Court has followed

this rule absent “compelling reasons to think” otherwise.

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y, 554 U.S. 84, 91

5

(2008).

Yet here, those compelling reasons favor

Petitioners, not Respondents.

For one, § 1108 is entitled “Exemptions from

prohibited transactions,” and the text therein repeatedly

refers to “exemption[s].” This Court has, in turn, held

that references in federal law to “exemptions” are

“affirmative defenses,” Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91, for

which “the burden of pleading . . . rests with the

defendant,” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).

Next, § 1106(a) begins by referencing § 1108—

“[e]xcept as provided in section 1108 of this title”—before

specifying the elements for proving a prohibitedtransaction claim. Courts have uniformly held that such a

phrase signals an “affirmative defense” that the

defendant must plead and prove. See, e.g., Evankavitch

v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 793 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir.

2015); In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 12 F.4th

171, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2021).

Third, the liability and exemptions provisions are in

different sections of the U.S. Code. Such a structure,

“with exemptions laid out apart from the prohibitions,”

again reflects an affirmative defense. Meacham, 554 U.S.

at 91. That is doubly true where, as here, many of § 1108’s

exemptions require pleading facts that plaintiffs would

not know pre-discovery. See Braden, 588 F.3d at 602 (“It

would be perverse to require plaintiffs bringing

prohibited transaction claims to plead facts that remain in

the sole control of the parties who stand accused of

wrongdoing.”).

Further, as the agency with “enforcement

responsibility for ERISA,” John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.

Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 107 n.14

(1993), the Labor Department has consistently

6

interpreted § 1108’s “exemptions [as] affirmative

defenses on which the defendant has the burden of proof,”

Gov. Br. at 9, Allen, 835 F.3d 670 (No. 15-3569).

The Second Circuit’s approach is also a poor policy fix.

In its view, a plain text reading would encompass “a vast

array of routine transactions,” P.A. at 21a, which, per

Respondents, could exacerbate “a dramatic rise in the

number of ERISA lawsuits over recordkeeping fees,”

BIO at 15. But it is unclear why a rise in lawsuits alone

should be cause for alarm. After all, “[m]ultiple federal

courts have acknowledged the important role excessive

fee litigation has played to depress fees and protect

participants’ retirement savings over the past several

years.” Lauren K. Valastro, How Misapplying Twombly

Erodes Retirement Funds, 32 GEO. MASON L. REV.

(forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 17). That result is

consistent with ERISA’s purpose to “ensure that

employees . . . receive the benefits they ha[ve] earned.”

Conkright, 559 U.S. at 516.

Finally, there are few if any actual suits where

plaintiffs plead only the bare elements of a prohibitedtransaction claim. Neither the Second Circuit nor

Respondents have identified any evidence of this

happening, even though parties in the Eighth Circuit

could have done so for the past fifteen years. That is

because there are built-in guardrails against bringing

needless litigation, from the costs and resources required

to bring an ERISA action, to fee-shifting and sanctions, to

standing.

The Second Circuit’s “solution,” in short, searches for

a nonexistent problem. At bottom, the issue here is how

to read § 1106. The answer to that question, “[a]s with any

question of statutory interpretation,” “begins with the

plain language of the statute.” Jimenez v. Quarterman,

7

555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). And “when the statutory

language is plain,” the result is equally straightforward:

“[W]e must enforce it according to its terms.” Id. So too

here. The Court should reverse.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Second Circuit is published at 86

F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023) and is reproduced in the petition

appendix at P.A. 2a–41a. The order of the district court

addressing

Defendants-Respondents’

motion

for

summary judgment is unpublished and is reproduced at

P.A. 43a–86a. The order of the district court addressing

Defendants-Respondents’ motion to dismiss is

unpublished and is reproduced at P.A. 88a–115a.

JURISDICTION

The Second Circuit issued its opinion on November 14,

2023. It denied a petition for rehearing on December 20,

2023. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

March 11, 2024, and granted on October 4, 2024. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Relevant provisions of the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.,

including 29 U.S.C. § 1106 and § 1108, are reproduced at

P.A. 120a–160a.

8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statutory framework.

ERISA is “the product of a decade of congressional

study” and its “comprehensive and reticulated”

framework recognizes that “the continued well-being and

security of millions of employees and their dependents are

directly affected by [employee benefit] plans.” Mertens v.

Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993); 29 U.S.C.

§ 1001(a).

The prohibited-transaction provisions are central to

that framework. Pre-ERISA, transactions between plans

and interested parties were governed by “the customary

arm’s-length standard of conduct.” Comm’r v. Keystone

Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993). But that

standard “all too frequent[ly]” led to the “misuse,

manipulation, and poor management of pension trust

funds” by plan sponsors and administrators. 120 CONG.

REC. 29957 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff). Congress

responded by “establish[ing]” “[s]tringent standards for

plan fiduciaries, including a broad definition of fiduciary

and detailed prohibited transactions.” 120 CONG. REC.

30106 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn).

As relevant here, § 1106(a) sets out five types of

prohibited transactions, and § 1106(a)(1)(C) specifically

bars “[a] fiduciary with respect to a plan” from “caus[ing]

the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should

know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect

furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan

and a party in interest.” Another provision, § 1002(14)(B),

defines a “party in interest” to include, among other

groups, “a person providing services to [an employee

benefit] plan.” Finally, § 1108 specifies exemptions to

§ 1106(a)’s prohibited transactions.

Section 1108(b)

9

provides twenty-one statutory exemptions, and § 1108(a)

grants the Labor Secretary discretion to recognize

additional administrative exemptions as appropriate.

B. Factual background.

Petitioners comprise a class of current and former

employees who participated in Cornell University’s two

retirement plans, the Cornell University Retirement Plan

for Employees of the Endowed Colleges at Ithaca and the

Cornell University Tax Deferred Annuity Plan (together,

“the Plans”). P.A. 5a–6a. These defined-contribution,

tax-deferred plans serve over 30,000 participants and

manage approximately $3.34 billion in assets. P.A. 6a.

Due to their substantial size and assets, the Plans are

considered “jumbo plans,” with significant bargaining

power in the retirement services market. P.A. 90a;

Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 63 F.4th 615, 635 (7th Cir. 2023).

Respondents are Cornell University, Cornell’s

Retirement Plan Oversight Committee, and the Oversight

Committee chairperson. Each respondent is a Plan

fiduciary. Respondents also retained and paid two outside

companies, TIAA and Fidelity, for investment

management and recordkeeping services. P.A. 8a.

Investment management fees “are associated with the

services of buying, selling, and managing investments.”

Id. Recordkeeping fees “cover necessary administrative

expenses such as tracking account balances and providing

regular account statements.” Id.

There are two common recordkeeping models. First,

plans can pay a flat fee indexed to the number of plan

participants. Id. Because of economies of scale, jumbo

plans generally obtain lower flat fees than smaller plans.

Ramos v. Banner Health, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1102 (D.

Colo. 2020). Second, plans can pay through revenue

10

sharing, with fees calculated based on a set portion of plan

assets. P.A. 8a. As assets grow, fees grow, even if the

number of participants and the services provided do not

increase. Respondents here paid recordkeeping fees

through a revenue sharing model. Id.

C. Proceedings below.

In February 2017, Petitioners filed a complaint in the

Southern District of New York, asserting that

Respondents had engaged in transactions prohibited by

§ 1106(a). Specifically, “because TIAA and Fidelity are

service providers and hence parties in interest, their

furnishing of recordkeeping and administrative services

to the Plans is a prohibited transaction unless Cornell

proves an exemption.” P.A. 25a (cleaned up). Petitioners

also alleged that Respondents “failed to seek bids from

other recordkeepers,” “neglected to monitor the amount

of revenue sharing received” by TIAA and Fidelity, and

“paid substantially more than . . . a reasonable

recordkeeping fee.”

Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted); J.A. 63. According to Petitioners, a reasonable

recordkeeping fee for the Plans would have been “$35 per

participant.” P.A. 25a; J.A. 65. Petitioners paid several

times that: between $115 and $183 per participant in one

plan, and between $145 and $200 per participant in the

other. P.A. 26a; J.A. 65.

Petitioners also brought several related claims.

Petitioners alleged that Respondents’ failure to address

TIAA and Fidelity’s recordkeeping fees breached the

fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence. P.A. 10a.

Petitioners

further

claimed

that

Respondents

imprudently offered, selected, or retained investment

options with “high fees and poor performance relative to

11

other investment options that were readily available.”

P.A. 11a.

In September 2017, the district court granted

Respondents’ motion to dismiss the prohibitedtransaction claims. The court held that, to plead a § 1106

violation, plaintiffs must allege “some evidence of selfdealing or other disloyal conduct.” P.A. 109a. But

Petitioners had, in the court’s view, “offered only

conclusory allegations.” Id. The court also dismissed

Petitioners’ duty of loyalty claims. P.A. 98a, 115a. A

subset of Petitioners’ duty of prudence claims survived

dismissal. P.A. 100a–104a, 115a.

At summary judgment, the district court ruled for

Respondents “on nearly all the remaining claims.” P.A.

12a. One claim, regarding the duty of prudence, survived.

P.A. 13a. In December 2020, the district court approved

a settlement of this remaining claim. Id. The settlement

left the previously dismissed claims available for appeal.

Petitioners subsequently appealed to the Second

Circuit, seeking review of the district court’s disposition

of (1) the prohibited-transaction claim, (2) the breach of

fiduciary duty claim for “failing to monitor and control

recordkeeping fees,” and (3) the claim over the retention

of certain high-cost or underperforming investment

options. P.A. 10a.

On November 14, 2023, the Second Circuit affirmed

the district court’s judgment. P.A. 41a. The court began

by observing that if § 1106(a)(1)(C) were read “in isolation

of the exemptions in § 1108,” it would “appear to prohibit

payments by a plan to any entity providing it with any

services.” P.A. 16a. It further noted that the Third,

Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had, given this possible

outcome, “adopted different means of narrowing the

12

statute” by imposing atextual requirements on plaintiffs

seeking to proceed under § 1106(a). Id. “[O]n the other

hand,” two courts of appeals “have embraced the

expansive reading of the statute that these other circuits

have rejected as absurd.” P.A. 17a. Those courts—the

Eighth and Ninth Circuits—acknowledged the

potentially broad scope of such a reading. But they

nevertheless adopted their more “expansive” reading by

looking to “the language of the statute and [to] traditional

principles of trust law.” Id.

After outlining the various approaches, the Second

Circuit reached for a purported middle ground. It agreed

with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits that “the language of

§ 1106(a)(1) cannot be read to demand explicit allegations

of self-dealing or disloyal conduct.” P.A. 18a (internal

quotation marks omitted). But it disagreed with the

Eighth Circuit that “the § 1108 exemptions should be

understood merely as affirmative defenses.” Id. Instead,

“at least some of those exemptions—particularly, the

exemption for reasonable and necessary transactions

codified by § 1108(b)(2)(A)—are incorporated into

§ 1106(a)’s prohibitions.” Id.

Under the Second Circuit’s rule, to plead a violation of

§ 1106(a)(1)(C), a complaint must not only show that a

transaction involved the “furnishing of services between

the plan and a party in interest,” but also that the

“transaction was unnecessary or involved unreasonable

compensation,” so as to fall outside of § 1108(b)(2). P.A.

18a–19a (ellipses omitted). The court added that, should

plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss, they must continue

marshaling facts negating § 1108’s exemptions: “[A]t the

summary judgment stage,” plaintiffs must “produce

evidence . . . challenging the necessity of the transaction

13

or the reasonableness of the compensation provided.”

P.A. 24a.

The Second Circuit gave three reasons for its decision.

First, it pointed to the statute’s structure. Section

1106(a)’s text “begins with [a] carveout: ‘Except as

provided in section 1108 of this title.’” P.A. 19a (quoting

29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)). Neither § 1106(b) nor § 1106(c)

contains such language. The Second Circuit concluded,

from this difference, that “the exemptions set out in

§ 1108” are “incorporated directly into § 1106(a)’s

definition of prohibited transactions.” Id.

Second, drawing from a handful of criminal cases, the

Second Circuit claimed that § 1108’s exemptions are so

“integral to the offense” that they have become “part of

the offense’s ingredients.” P.A. 20a (cleaned up). The

court reasoned that one cannot “articulate what the

statute seeks to prohibit without reference to the

exception,” and therefore “the exception should be

understood as part of the definition of the prohibited

conduct.” P.A. 21a.

Finally, the court acknowledged that its decision

might appear in tension with common law trust principles,

which generally require the fiduciary to prove exemptions

to liability. P.A. 24a. But the court observed that in an

“analogous” context—i.e., claims under the Investment

Company Act—plaintiffs must first plead that a fee is “so

disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable

relationship to the services rendered.” P.A. 22a (quoting

Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 346 (2010)).

That same framework, the panel ruled, should apply to

§ 1106(a) claims: ERISA plaintiffs must first allege “facts

calling into question the fiduciary’s loyalty by challenging

the necessity of the transaction or the reasonableness of

14

the compensation provided,” before fiduciaries carry the

burden of persuasion. P.A. 24a.

In applying this understanding to Petitioners’

complaint, the Second Circuit acknowledged that

§ 1106(a) claims might ultimately face a higher bar than

breach of fiduciary duty claims. Here, Petitioners alleged

“Cornell failed to seek bids from other recordkeepers and

neglected to monitor the amount of revenue sharing,”

which was sufficient to “state [a] claim for a breach of the

duty of prudence.” P.A. 25a. But because Petitioners had

not shown that the recordkeeping fees were

“disproportionately large,” they could not state a claim

under § 1106(a)(1)(C). P.A. 26a (quoting Jones, 559 U.S.

at 346). After disposing of the prohibited-transaction

claim, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s

judgment as to Petitioners’ remaining claims. Petitioners

filed a petition for certiorari on March 11, 2024, which this

Court granted on October 4, 2024.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.A. Concerned that applying the text of 29 U.S.C.

§ 1106(a) as written would cast too wide a net for liability,

the Second Circuit below joined several other circuits in

imposing on plaintiffs additional pleading requirements

not found in that statutory provision’s plain language. But

it did so in unique fashion—by incorporating § 1108’s

exemptions into the plaintiff’s pleading burden. Thus, to

state a claim, plaintiffs must not only plead liability under

§ 1106(a), but also negate the applicability of any

exemptions from liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1108.

That instruction, however, violates the fundamental

understanding that when “the statutory language

15

provides a clear answer,” a court’s inquiry “ends.”

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999).

There is no need to add to one statutory provision’s text

by searching for and piling on additional requirements

from a different provision.

I.B. Congress, moreover, wrote § 1108’s exemptions

as affirmative defenses for a defendant to plead and

prove, rather than as something a plaintiff must negate.

This follows from the “general rule of law” that when an

“enacting clause is general,” as § 1106(a) is, and “a proviso

is afterwards introduced” qualifying the enacting clause,

as § 1108(b) is, “that proviso . . . carves special exceptions

only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any

such exception, must establish it.” United States v.

Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 165 (1841). The Court has

applied this familiar framework many times, including to

statutes with a text and structure like the one here. In

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, for

instance, the statute at issue laid out “general

prohibitions . . . subject

to

a

separate

provision . . . creating exemptions,’” including for

reasonableness. 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008). This Court did not

equivocate:

“Given how the statute reads, with

exemptions laid out apart from the prohibitions . . . it is no

surprise that” those exemptions are “affirmative

defenses” to be pleaded and proven by the defendant. Id.

I.C. Traditional statutory construction principles

further support Petitioners’ view. Congress wrote

ERISA bearing in mind the “longstanding convention”

that plaintiffs plead liability and defendants plead

exemptions to liability. Id. If Congress wished to deviate

from that convention, it knew how to do so. It could have

specified that § 1108 provided additional conditions

16

necessary for plaintiffs to make out a claim for liability.

Or Congress could have explicitly written a

reasonableness requirement into § 1106. It did neither.

I.D. The Second Circuit’s reliance on § 1106(a)’s

“except as provided” language lacks merit. The courts of

appeals have uniformly interpreted the phrase as creating

affirmative defenses. Neither the Second Circuit nor

Respondents have pointed to any countervailing

authority.

I.E. The Second Circuit’s use of criminal cases also

misses the mark. The panel leaned most heavily on a rule

from United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872),

but as this Court has explained, that rule is a “rule of

criminal pleading.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,

232 (1875) (emphasis added). It applies in a narrow subset

of criminal cases because of tenets—the rule of lenity, the

presumption of innocence, the Sixth Amendment—that

are “inapposite” to the civil context. In re Bernard L.

Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 12 F.4th 171, 197 (2d Cir. 2021).

Even if the Cook rule did apply to civil cases, it holds no

force here. That is because, unlike Cook, where a

prohibition could not be applied without reference to an

exemption, the prohibited-transaction provisions here

plainly “articulate what the statute seeks to prohibit

without reference to the exception,” P.A. 21a: namely, the

“furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the

plan and a party in interest,” 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a).

II.A. The Second Circuit’s reading also contravenes

the case law. As this Court has said, “Congress enacted

ERISA § 406(a)(1), which supplements the fiduciary’s

general duty of loyalty to the plan’s beneficiaries, § 404(a),

[to] categorically bar[] certain transactions deemed ‘likely

to injure the pension plan.’” Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v.

17

Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 241–42 (2000)

(quoting Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S.

152, 160 (1993)). But rather than treating § 1106 as a

categorical bar, the panel reduces it to a reasonableness

analysis—exactly what Harris Trust counsels against.

Worse, the court ties § 1108(b)(2)’s “reasonableness” to

the standard from § 36(b) of the Investment Company

Act, a different statute drafted based on different

conditions and different relationships between the

parties. Indeed, no plaintiff has ever managed to prove a

§ 36(b) claim. That result cannot be what Congress

contemplated while drafting § 1106(a), when it wanted to

give plaintiffs a cause of action to redress the myriad

abuses of plan assets rife pre-ERISA.

II.B. The common law of trusts reinforces a plainlanguage reading of § 1106.

That law has long

acknowledged an information asymmetry in a trust

between the fiduciary and beneficiary. Put simply, the

fiduciary knows things the beneficiary does not. The

interplay between § 1106 and § 1108 recognizes and

reflects this asymmetry. Before discovery, beneficiaries

do not know which exemptions a fiduciary might invoke or

how to show that an exemption is not in play. This is why,

to bring a claim, a beneficiary need only plead the

elements of § 1106—i.e., information that it reasonably

might know. Fiduciaries must then show the applicability

of any exemptions based on information that often only

they know.

II.C. The Department of Labor has repeatedly

treated § 1106(a) as establishing categorical prohibitions

and § 1108 as establishing affirmative defenses that

defendants must plead and prove. See Gov. Br. at 9, 19–

20, Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co., 835 F.3d 670 (7th Cir.

18

2016) (No. 15-3569). It has espoused that understanding

in litigation and through regulation and guidance.

III.A. A plain-text reading of § 1106 and § 1108 is also

more functional than the Second Circuit’s rule. For the

former, plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of § 1106,

defendants must plead and present evidence supporting

any exemption under § 1108, and the court must evaluate

the evidence in its entirety. That framework embraces

the text and exemplifies how liability and exemption

provisions work throughout the law.

On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s rule is both

vague and, by its own implicit admission, ill-defined. The

court tells plaintiffs to negate “at least some” of the § 1108

exemptions, even before discovery. P.A. 18a. But it does

not say which ones. It also says nothing about what

should happen when a defendant invokes more than one

§ 1108 exemption. And it offers no guidance on how a

plaintiff could obtain the necessary information to

plausibly negate the many § 1108 exemptions—

particularly when much of the information related to the

exemptions resides in the hands of the fiduciary.

Consequently, to satisfy the Second Circuit’s rule, a

plaintiff would need to correctly predict which exemptions

a defendant might invoke and correctly plead the

negative of each such exemption, all from facts outside an

ordinary plaintiff’s knowledge.

III.B. Applying the plain language of § 1106 and

§ 1108 does not, contra the Second Circuit, produce

absurd results. Invoking absurdity is an extreme

recourse, proper only in the unusual circumstance “where

it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended

the result.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S.

440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But here, the

19

legislative history affirms that the text says what it means

and means what it says. As reflected in the record,

Congress sought to provide “the maximum degree of

protection to working men and women covered by private

retirement programs,” S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 18 (1973), by

“prohibit[ing] fiduciaries from engaging in transactions

involving the transfer of assets between the plan and

parties in interest,” 120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974)

(remarks of Sen. Williams).

III.C. A plain-text reading of § 1106 and § 1108 will

not produce a flood of needless litigation. The Eighth

Circuit provides a case in point. That court adopted a

plain-text approach to § 1106 over fifteen years ago. In

the years since, ERISA litigation has not ground the court

to a halt. That is because ERISA litigation is costly and

time-consuming, involving multiple defendants, multiple

plaintiffs, multiple pre-trial motions, and a sprawling set

of possible exemptions. Moreover, under ERISA’s feeshifting provision, losing parties risk bearing significant

costs for bringing cases just to bring them. And were that

not enough, the Federal Rules allow courts to impose

sanctions against plaintiffs who bring suits without basis.

There is not, in short, some surplus of plaintiffs waiting to

bring test cases to delineate ERISA’s outer reach.

ERISA beneficiaries “sue only when . . . there is a reason

to do so.” Allen, 835 F.3d at 677. And the cases they bring

reflect an important step toward promoting ERISA’s

broadly protective purpose.

20

ARGUMENT

I.

THE

SECOND

CIRCUIT’S

APPROACH

CONFLICTS WITH THE STATUTORY TEXT.

A. Petitioners have satisfied the plain language of

§ 1106, and adding atextual elements to that

language is inappropriate.

Here, “[a]s in any case of statutory construction, our

analysis begins with ‘the language of the statute.’”

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)

(quoting Est. of Cowart v. Nickols Drilling Co., 505 U.S.

469, 475 (1992)). “And where the statutory language

provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” Id. That

command should, as the Ninth Circuit underscored, hold

especially true for ERISA, since it “is ‘an enormously

complex and detailed statute.’” Bugielski v. AT&T Servs.,

Inc., 76 F.4th 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Conkright

v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 509 (2010)).

This instruction—to apply the text as written so long

as the language is clear—should make this a

straightforward case.

After all, no one thinks

§ 1106(a)(1)(C) is ambiguous. The language speaks for

itself. It prohibits “[a] fiduciary” from “caus[ing] the plan

to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that

such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing

of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a

party in interest.” And each of those elements is met

here: (1) Respondents are fiduciaries; (2) TIAA and

Fidelity “provid[e] services to” the Plan, making them

“part[ies] in interest”; and (3) Cornell caused the plan to

engage in transactions with TIAA and Fidelity that

constitute a “furnishing of . . . services.”

Id.

§ 1002(14)(B); id. § 1006(a)(1)(C).

21

Yet concerned that such a reading “would prohibit

fiduciaries from paying third parties to perform essential

services,” Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 584 (7th

Cir. 2022), several circuits have grafted additional

atextual pleading requirements onto § 1106(a) for

plaintiffs seeking to bring such claims, see, e.g., id. at 583

(demanding allegations of self-dealing); Sweda v. Univ. of

Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 338 (3d Cir. 2019) (demanding an

“intent to benefit a party in interest”). This Court,

though, has already explained why such a move is

inappropriate. After all, if courts cannot “supplement[]”

ERISA plaintiffs with “extratextual remedies,” Hughes

Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 447, they cannot saddle plaintiffs

with extratextual requirements.

B. Section 1108’s exemptions are affirmative

defenses to be pleaded and proven by the

defendant.

The Second Circuit, to its credit, disclaimed the

atextual approaches taken by these other courts, seeking

instead a textual hook for dismissing Petitioners’ § 1106

claim. P.A. 19a. But its supposed middle ground—to

remodel § 1106(a) by (1) scaffolding onto it “at least some

of th[e] exemptions” from § 1108, (2) particularly

§ 1108(b)(2), which exempts reasonable arrangements for

necessary services, and (3) then requiring plaintiffs to

plead the negative of “at least some of” these

exemptions—is just as unavailing. P.A. 18a.

That is because ERISA’s prohibited-transaction

provisions already establish a clear structure: § 1106 sets

out general prohibitions and § 1108 provides for specific

exceptions. Even the Second Circuit recognized that

point. See P.A. 14a, 16a (explaining that § 1106 “consists

of three provisions restricting the set of transactions in

22

which plan fiduciaries may engage,” while § 1108

“provides

certain exemptions

from prohibited

transactions”) (cleaned up).

What the panel failed to recognize, however, was “the

general rule of law, which has always prevailed, and

become consecrated almost as a maxim in the

interpretation of statutes.” United States v. Dickson, 40

U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 165 (1841). That rule provides “that

where the enacting clause is general in its language and

objects”—as it is here—and where “a proviso is

afterwards introduced”—again, as is the case here—the

“proviso . . . carves special exceptions only out of the

enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception,

must establish it as being within the words as well as

within the reasons thereof.” Id. (emphasis added). When

the party relying on an exemption is a defendant, the

exemption is an “affirmative defense,” and it is

“incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove such a

defense.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008). The

plaintiff “has no duty to negative” an “affirmative

defense.” Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 473 (2022)

(Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court has applied this familiar framework many

times over many years for many laws, including rules on

employee compensation, Dickson, 40 U.S. at 143;

transportation safety, Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester &

Pittsburgh Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 10 (1907); antitrust, FTC v.

Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44 (1948); agricultural

policy, Javierre v. Cent. Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508

(1910); claim and issue preclusion, Taylor, 553 U.S. at 907;

and (with a narrow exception, discussed below) criminal

law, McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922).

In this same vein, every court of appeals that has

addressed the specific statutory provisions in this case

23

has—until the decision below—uniformly referred to

§ 1108 as delineating affirmative defenses. As Judge

Wood observed in Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., “the

exemptions from prohibited transactions do not provide

alternative explanations; they assume that a transaction

in the prohibited group occurred, and they add additional

facts showing why that particular one is acceptable.” 835

F.3d 670, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2016). “That is how affirmative

defenses work.” Id. at 677. Allen then cited five other

circuits that “agree with the position that section 408

exemptions are affirmative defenses,” including—

notably—a case from the Second Circuit. Id. at 676 (citing

Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1215

(2d Cir. 1987)). And just one year before the panel’s

decision here, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that

understanding. See Haley v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity

Ass’n of Am., 54 F.4th 115, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2022) (“It is

well settled that this exercise includes any affirmative

defenses, such as the § 408 exemptions.”) (footnote

omitted).

The panel below said nothing about Haley. On Lowen,

it claimed that its decision would “leave undisturbed” the

understanding that “the defendant fiduciary . . . bears the

burden of persuasion with regard to the applicability of

the § 1108 exceptions.” P.A. 23a. According to the panel,

however, a plaintiff must nevertheless bear the burden of

pleading the negative of a § 1108 exemption, even if the

burden of persuasion remains on the defendant.

That, however, is not how either the Federal Rules or

affirmative defenses—as understood by this Court—

work. On the former, Rule 8(c) specifically provides that

“[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively

state any avoidance or affirmative defense”—i.e., they

must plead it. And were there any doubt on that point,

24

this Court has consistently described “an affirmative

defense” as that “which must be pleaded and proved.”

Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 16

(1939); accord Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 269 n.11

(1980); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007); Taylor, 553

U.S. at 907.

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554

U.S. 84 (2008), is particularly instructive, given the

similarities between the text and structure there with the

provisions here. At issue in Meacham was “[t]he ADEA’s

general prohibitions against age discrimination, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 623(a)–(c), (e), [which] are subject to a separate

provision, § 623(f), [that] create[es] exemptions for

employer practices ‘otherwise prohibited under

subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e).’” Id. at 91. Like this case,

the parties disagreed over which side should plead and

prove a particular exemption. And like this case, the

exemption at issue outlined a “reasonableness” exception

to liability. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (“It shall not be

unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise

prohibited . . . based on reasonable factors other than

age.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(A) (“The prohibitions

provided

in section

1106 . . . shall

not

apply

to . . . reasonable arrangements.”).

Faced with these circumstances, Meacham held that

the defendant “must not only produce evidence raising

the defense”—i.e., the burden of pleading—“but also

persuade the factfinder of its merit”—i.e., the burden of

persuasion. 554 U.S. at 87. As Meacham explains,

“[g]iven how the statute reads, with exemptions laid out

apart from the prohibitions (and expressly referring to

the prohibited conduct as such),” it should be “no surprise

that” § 623(f)(1) presents an “affirmative defense[]” under

the ADEA. Id. at 91. “[M]ost lawyers would accept that

25

characterization as a matter of course,” since “there is no

hint in the text that Congress meant § 623(f)(1) to march

out of step” with the “default rule[] [of] placing the burden

of proving an exemption on the party claiming it.” Id. at

91–93.

C. Traditional tools of statutory construction

confirm Petitioners’ reading.

To be sure, Meacham says that courts should apply

this “default rule[]” unless there are “compelling reasons

to think that Congress” meant otherwise. Id. at 91–93.

But here, the most compelling reasons tip in Petitioners’

favor.

First, that plaintiffs plead liability and defendants

plead exemptions to liability is, as Meacham notes, a

“longstanding convention” that forms “part of the

backdrop against which the Congress writes laws.” Id. at

91. But if Congress knew about and legislated against

that convention when it passed the ADEA in 1967, it knew

about the same principle when it enacted ERISA in 1974.

Second, according to the panel, “to plead a violation of

§ 1106(a)(1)(C), a complaint must plausibly allege that a

fiduciary has caused the plan to engage in a transaction

that constitutes the ‘furnishing of services between the

plan and a party in interest’ where that transaction was

unnecessary or involved unreasonable compensation.”

P.A. 18a–19a (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). That

last clause—where that transaction was unnecessary or

involved unreasonable compensation—is not part of

§ 1106(a)(1)(C),

but

imports

language

from

§ 1108(b)(2)(A). Yet Congress knows how to write a

reasonableness requirement. It wrote one seven years

prior in the ADEA and wrote one in § 1108(b). If

Congress wanted § 1106(a)(1)(C) to include the words

26

“where that transaction was unnecessary or involved

unreasonable compensation,” it could have just done so.

It did not.

Third, the word “exemption” is peppered throughout

§ 1108’s text. In other statutes and other contexts,

Congress has referred to “exemptions” interchangeably

with “affirmative defenses.” See Corning Glass Works v.

Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974); Schaffer ex rel.

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57 (2005). It has rarely, if

ever, understood “exemptions” as imposing additional

requirements plaintiffs must negate.

Fourth, “[t]he title of a statute and the heading of a

section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt

about the meaning of a statute.” Yates v. United States,

574 U.S. 528, 540 (2015). That “title” may be “especially

valuable” where “it reinforces what the text’s nouns and

verbs independently suggest.” Id. at 552 (Alito, J.,

concurring). Here, § 1106’s title is plain: “Prohibited

transactions.” Not “Necessary conditions for prohibited

transactions.”

Not “Necessary but not sufficient

conditions for prohibited transactions.”

And not

“Potentially prohibited transactions.” Just “Prohibited

transactions.”

Section 1108’s title is also clear:

“Exemptions from prohibited transactions.” These titles

affirm what the text’s nouns and verbs already suggest:

§ 1106 creates a pathway for plaintiffs to plead liability,

and § 1108 creates specific avenues for defendant

fiduciaries to avoid liability.

Finally, “[j]ust as Congress’ choice of words is

presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural

choices.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.

338, 353 (2013). In Meacham, the Court underscored that

the ADEA laid out its exemptions in a provision separate

from the general prohibitions: the former was in 29 U.S.C.

27

§ 623(f)(1), the latter in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c) and (e). 554

U.S. at 91. Here, ERISA’s prohibitions and exemptions

are not merely laid out in different parts of the same

section, as they were in Meacham. They are spread

across different sections altogether—§ 1106 and § 1108.

That is a deliberate structural choice that courts should

(but the Second Circuit did not) respect.

D. The Second Circuit’s reliance on § 1106(a)’s

“except as provided” language is inapt.

Against this backdrop, the panel marshaled two

primary arguments in response. Both fail.

First, the panel asserted that its reading “flows

directly from the text and structure of the statute,”

because “[t]he text of § 1106(a) begins with the carveout:

‘Except as provided in section 1108 of this title.’” P.A. 19a.

Thus, in the panel’s view, “the exemptions set out in

§ 1108—including, most pertinently, the exemption for

‘reasonable compensation’ paid for ‘necessary services,’

§ 1108(b)(2)(A)—are incorporated directly into § 1106(a)’s

definition of prohibited transactions.” Id. In support of

that conclusion, the panel drew a “contrast to the

language of § 1106(b), governing ‘transactions between

plan and fiduciary,’ which makes no direct reference

to . . . § 1108.” Id.

But that misreads § 1106(a) and § 1106(b). As the

Sixth and Third Circuits have explained, “the majority of

courts that have examined this statutory interpretation

issue have held that § 1108 applies only to transactions

under § 1106(a), not § 1106(b).” Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 751 F.3d 740, 750

(6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 959 (2014). That is

how best to “give meaning to this discrepancy in the § 406

subsections.” Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 95

28

(3d Cir. 2012). “By expressly limiting liability under

§ 406(a) by reference to the exemptions in § 408, then

removing the same limiting principle from § 406(b),

Congress cast § 406(b) as unyielding.” Id.

That division makes sense. Section 1106(a) addresses

transactions between a plan and party in interest,

whereas § 1106(b) covers transactions between a plan and

fiduciary. It is reasonable to believe that for the latter,

§ 1108 is unavailable because these sorts of transactions

carry an even higher risk of abuse. See, e.g., Patelco

Credit Union v. Sahni, 262 F.3d 897, 911 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that § 1108 “does not provide a safe harbor to

fiduciaries who self-deal”). On the other hand, a limited

number of transactions with parties in interest may assist

with the efficient functioning of a plan, so long as certain

specific exemptions and conditions are satisfied.

The Second Circuit’s reference to the words “[e]xcept

as provided,” and its corresponding claim that such

language means § 1108 is “incorporated directly” into

§ 1106(a), is likewise unavailing. See P.A. 19a–20a.

To start, “[t]housands of statutory provisions use the

phrase ‘except as provided in . . . ’ followed by a crossreference”

without

“otherwise

expand[ing]

or

contract[ing] the scope” of the section. Atl. Richfield Co.

v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1, 16 (2020) (internal quotation

marks omitted). An “except as provided” proviso only

“indicate[s] that one rule should prevail over another in

any circumstance in which the two conflict.” Cyan Inc. v.

Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 583 U.S. 416, 428 (2018).

It does not, as the Second Circuit claims, “incorporate[]”

the provisions of one section into another. P.A. 19a.

Next, “except” is another way of saying “exception,”

and “[a]n exception in a statute is a clause designed to

29

reserve or exempt some individuals from the general

class.”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)

(emphasis added). Exemptions, in turn, are affirmative

defenses that defendants plead, rather than something

plaintiffs negate. Supporting examples abound.

In Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 793

F.3d 355, 364 n.11, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2015), for instance, the

Third Circuit held that exceptions in the section

mentioned by an “except as provided” clause in the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act constituted defenses that

defendants must plead and prove. The Second Circuit

reached the same conclusion interpreting substantially

identical language in § 550(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,

ruling that a trustee need not “negate [the] exception in

§ 550(b) to state a claim.” In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv.

Sec. LLC, 12 F.4th 171, 197 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

And in United States v. Just, 74 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir.

1996), the Eighth Circuit held that the “except as

provided” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)—prohibiting

possession of a machinegun—created an affirmative

defense for those possessing machineguns “by or under

the authority of, the United States.”

There are, in short, many cases interpreting “except

as provided” that support Petitioners’ reading.

Respondents have identified none, and Petitioners have

found none, supporting the Second Circuit’s contrary

reading.

E. The Second Circuit’s reference to a narrow

criminal law exception to the general rule is

unavailing.

The panel’s second argument leans on various criminal

cases, starting with United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17

Wall.) 168 (1872), for the understanding that “when one

30

cannot articulate what the statute seeks to prohibit

without reference to the exception, then the exception

should be understood as part of the definition of the

prohibited conduct.” P.A. 21a.

But that reliance is misplaced. Cook created “a rule of

criminal pleading,” applicable where necessary to prevent

defects in criminal indictments. United States v. Reese,

92 U.S. 214, 232 (1875). The Second Circuit itself has

recognized this point, explaining—in response to the sort

of argument Respondents make here—that “Cook is

inapposite [because] it is grounded in the interpretation

of a criminal statute.” In re Madoff, 12 F.4th at 197.

There are several reasons why a different rule (or,

more precisely, an exception to the general rule) is

appropriate in a narrow subset of criminal cases.

Substantive canons like the rule of lenity, background

principles like the presumption of innocence, and

constitutional provisions like the Sixth Amendment

impose unique requirements in criminal law that are

absent in civil statutes. The Court has said as much; in a

case decided three years after Cook, it explained that its

discussion in Cook was tied to a defendant’s

“constitutional right ‘to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation.’” United States v. Cruikshank,

92 U.S. 542, 557–58 (1875) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.

VI).

Even so, courts have read and applied Cook narrowly.

They have generally done so when the exception is not

just in the same section but in the same sentence as the

liability provision, treating that placement as a signal of

legislative intent. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S.

62, 68 (1971). But as Just reflects, in the mine-run

criminal matter, an “except as provided” provision—

especially one directing the reader to a separate section

31

of the U.S. Code—signifies an affirmative defense to be

pleaded and proven by the defendant.

And even if Cook were applied to civil cases,

§ 1106(a)(1)(C) would fail its test. That is because Cook

applies only “[w]here a statute defining an offence

contains an exception, in the enacting clause of the

statute, which is so incorporated with the language

defining the offence that the ingredients of the offence

cannot be accurately and clearly described if the

exception is omitted.” 84 U.S. at 173. But § 1106(a)(1)(C)

can be read on its own, barring transactions that involve

a “furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the

plan and a party in interest.” No one disputes what those

words mean or that Respondents’ actions fall within their

ambit. See, e.g., United States v. McArthur, 108 F.3d

1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here one can omit the

exception from the statute without doing violence to the

definition of the offense, the exception is more likely an

affirmative defense.”).

II. THE

SECOND

CIRCUIT’S

APPROACH

CONFLICTS WITH THE CASE LAW, THE LAW OF

TRUSTS, AND GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

By stitching § 1106 and § 1108 together, the Second

Circuit’s decision also contravenes how this Court has

understood ERISA’s prohibited-transaction provisions,

trust law principles, and federal government practice.

A. Section 1106 establishes a categorical rule for

prohibited transactions.

“Congress

enacted

ERISA

§ 406(a)(1)”

to

“supplement[] the fiduciary’s general duty of loyalty to

32

the plan’s beneficiaries, § 404(a), by categorically barring

certain transactions deemed ‘likely to injure the pension

plan.’” Harris Tr., 530 U.S. at 241–42 (quoting Comm’r v.

Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993)). In

other words, § 1106 covers transactions that a breach of

fiduciary duty claim cannot; there would otherwise be

nothing to “supplement[].” Id. Section 1106 reaches

those transactions because “Congress saw fit in ERISA

to create some bright-line rules.” Allen, 835 F.3d at 676.

And since “per se rules” are “much simpler” to apply,

Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 123 (7th Cir. 1984), “a

complaint may fail to state sufficient facts to support a

breach of fiduciary duty claim, yet survive a motion to

dismiss as to a companion prohibited transaction claim

notwithstanding those same deficient facts,” Allen, 835

F.3d at 676.

To see why the Second Circuit’s approach turns that

understanding on its head, look no further than this case.

1. For one, Petitioners’ prohibited-transaction claims

did not “supplement[]” their fiduciary-duty claims. The

former were dismissed on a motion to dismiss. P.A. 108a–

110a. Several of Petitioners’ breach of fiduciary duty

claims, on the other hand, survived the motion to dismiss

and proceeded to summary judgment (and one survived

summary judgment, too). See, e.g., P.A. 85a, 100a.

2. In addition, the Second Circuit’s prescription is

neither a “bright-line rule[]” nor a “categorical[] bar.”

Allen, 835 F.3d at 676; Harris Tr., 530 U.S. at 242. To the

contrary, the panel eschewed a categorical rule for a

context-dependent reasonableness analysis. P.A. 19a

(ellipses omitted). That is exactly what Harris Trust

counsels against.

33

3. Not done, the Second Circuit piles on by anchoring

§ 1108(b)(2) reasonableness to a near-impossible-tosatisfy and entirely inappropriate standard. P.A. 22a.

Importing a standard from the Investment Company Act,

the panel demands future plaintiffs plead that any service

provider compensation be “so disproportionately large

that it bear[] no reasonable relationship to the services

rendered,” before defendants need turn over anything in

discovery, id. (citing Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559

U.S. 335, 346 (2010)). “[F]ees,” in other words, must be

“excessive . . . ‘to the services rendered.’” P.A. 26a

(quoting Jones, 559 U.S. at 346). But that standard lacks

any basis—textual, precedential, or otherwise—and

would cripple ERISA’s remedial framework.

To

begin,

ERISA

already

defines

what

reasonableness is supposed to mean under § 1108(b)(2).

Namely, § 1108(b)(2)(B) provides, for group health plans,

that “[n]o contract or arrangement for services between a

covered plan and a covered service provider . . . is

reasonable within the meaning of [§ 1108(b)(2)] unless the

requirements of this clause are met.” P.A. 124a (footnote

omitted). A substantially identical regulation, 29 C.F.R.

§ 2550.408b-2, extends those requirements to pension

plans.

Importantly, both 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(B) and 29

C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 enumerate a long list of definitions,

formulas, and requirements. See P.A. 124a–133a. Those

include “[a] description of all direct compensation” and

“[a] description of all indirect compensation,” “including

compensation from a vendor to a brokerage firm based on

a structure of incentives,” but “not including

compensation received by an employee from an

employer.” P.A. 128a; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iv).

34

Both § 1108(b)(2)(B) and its regulatory counterpart

further state that the service provider shall “disclose the

information required” to “the responsible plan fiduciary.”

P.A. 129a–130a; accord 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b2(c)(1)(v)(A). If the information is insufficient, the

“service provider shall furnish” additional information

“[u]pon the written request of the responsible plan

fiduciary.” P.A. 130a; accord 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b2(c)(1)(vi)(A).

At no point does § 1108(b)(2)(B) or

§ 2550.408b-2 contemplate this exchange of information to

the beneficiary.

In other words, if the Second Circuit had wanted to

impose a reasonableness requirement, it could have used

the standard already built into § 1108(b)(2)(B), rather

than borrowing the understanding of reasonableness

from a wholly separate statute. Of course, such a

requirement would ignore the fact that § 1108(b)(2)(B)

expressly contemplates that service providers give

fiduciaries, not beneficiaries, the requisite information to

plead reasonableness. Even so, such an approach would

at least respect the definition of reasonableness that

Congress already established in ERISA, rather than

some “analogous” statute.

More importantly, the ICA and ERISA are not

“analogous.” The mutual funds regulated by the ICA are

evaluated by “disinterested directors” that are privileged

with “all [the] information ‘reasonably . . . necessary to

evaluate the terms’ of the adviser’s contract.” Jones, 559

U.S. at 348 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c)). But ERISA

beneficiaries do not, as outlined above, have “all [the]

information.” Id.

Furthermore, as Jones recognizes, Congress drafted

the ICA provision at issue to be “more favorable” to

35

shareholders in some ways (e.g., by making available

some previously unavailable remedies) but made clear

that the ICA would “not permit a compensation

agreement to be reviewed in court for ‘reasonableness.’”

Id. at 341. By holding in Jones that ICA plaintiffs may

plead a claim only if they can show a fee was “so

disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable

relationship to the services rendered,” id. at 346, the

Court was thus not delineating a reasonableness

standard. It was setting the outer bounds of what a

plaintiff must do, in the absence of a standard, to proceed

with a fiduciary duty claim.

The reality of how that standard has played out

crystallizes the point: “[N]o plaintiff ever has prevailed

on a Section 36(b) claim.” David Kotler et al., Navigating

the Recent Wave of Section 36(b) Litigation: What Have

We Learned?, 29 INVESTMENT LAWYER 1, 2 (2022). Thus,

contrary to this Court’s instruction that § 1106 was meant

to “categorically bar[]” certain transactions, Harris Tr.,

530 U.S. at 241–42, importing the ICA’s standard would

categorically shield fiduciaries from liability.

B. The common law of trusts supports Petitioners’

reading.

The Court has also said that Congress “codif[ied] and

ma[de] applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain principles

developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.” Firestone

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989);

accord LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S.

248, 253 n.4 (2008) (“The common law of trusts . . . informs

our interpretation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”).

1. That law has long recognized an information

asymmetry between the trustee, who acts as a fiduciary,

36

and the beneficiary.

Namely, these “fiduciary

relationships lend themselves to exploitation” because

“the trustee’s position gives him superior knowledge of all

the facts and circumstances.” Robert W. Hallgring, The

Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act and the Basic Principles

of Fiduciary Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801, 810–

11 (1966). Consequently, at common law, the duty of

loyalty was “particularly intense so that, in most

circumstances, its prohibitions are absolute for

prophylactic reasons.”

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

TRUSTS, § 78 cmt. b.

These principles map well onto the provisions at hand.

As noted, § 1106(a) was “enacted [to] . . . supplement[]”

the duty of loyalty. Harris Tr., 530 U.S. at 241–42. It does

so as the Restatement instructs: through “absolute”

prohibitions. RESTATEMENT § 78 cmt. b. And given the

information asymmetry between beneficiary and

fiduciary, the prohibitions are written broadly so that a

beneficiary may bring a claim based on what they would

reasonably know, rather than on information they do not

reasonably have access to.

2.

Accordingly, a beneficiary may bring a

§ 1106(a)(1)(C) claim when they can show their fiduciary

entered a transaction with a party in interest for the

“furnishing of goods, services, or facilities.” But a

beneficiary would have little reason to know whether that

transaction was reasonable, necessary, and for reasonable

compensation given the information asymmetry outlined.

Nor are service contracts unique. Take a loan between

a plan and an interested party. It would be sensible, given

ERISA’s protective purpose, for Congress to empower

plaintiffs to bring a claim when they know such a loan has

been extended. Section 1106(a)(1)(B) provides as much.

37

See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (barring the “lending of

money or other extension of credit between the plan and

a party in interest”). Section 1108(b)(1), in turn, lays out

an exemption for certain loans. But that exemption

imposes five separate requirements: (1) reasonable

equivalence, (2) non-preferential treatment of highly

compensated employees, (3) compliance with plan

provisions, (4) reasonable interest rates, and (5) adequate

security. It is “implausible that any would-be defendant

would voluntarily turn over confidential financial

information” of this kind—which is exactly why, under

both text and trust law, defendants would need to plead

and prove the exemption. Allen, 835 F.3d at 677.

3. These concerns are not merely hypothetical.

Consider Haley v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n

of America. There, TIAA offered “collateralized loan

products” to beneficiaries of a university retirement plan.

54 F.4th at 118. To defend itself against a § 1106(a) claim,

TIAA invoked two § 1108(b) exemptions: (b)(1), which

exempts loans, and (b)(17), which separately “permits

transactions . . . as long as the plan pays no more and

receives no less than ‘adequate consideration.’” Id. at 120.

As laid out above, (b)(1) requires detailed information on

at least five conditions. And (b)(17) is no different.

Indeed, TIAA argued at class certification—and the

Second Circuit largely agreed—“that individualized proof

must be marshalled from non-party plan fiduciaries

showing how each plan fiduciary valued the assets and

whether, given other options available to the plan, the

fiduciary exercised good faith in selecting the terms

offered by TIAA.” Id. at 122.

There is no scenario where a beneficiary would have

this information—what the party in interest shared with

38

the fiduciary, how the fiduciary valued assets, and

whether the fiduciary exercised good faith—before

discovery. More to the point, Congress was not blind to

that dilemma. To the contrary, it understood fiduciaries

would have the information to plead and prove § 1108

exemptions. In fact, in many instances, it ensured they

would, requiring disclosure to fiduciaries of relevant

information.

See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(B)(iii).

Consistent with the common law, it then placed the onus

on fiduciaries to present such information through one or

more affirmative defenses under § 1108.

C. Petitioners’ reading of § 1106 and § 1108 tracks

federal government practice.

The Department of Labor has primary authority for

administering and enforcing ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1002(13), 1132–1138, 1204(a). It has, in these roles,

often had occasion to address the Act’s prohibitedtransaction provisions.

Its views dovetail with

Petitioners’ understanding.

1. On the exemption at issue, the Department spoke

in plain terms more than a decade ago when it issued a

regulation stating that “a service relationship between a

plan and a service provider would constitute a prohibited

transaction.” 77 Fed. Reg. 5632 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be

codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). It later issued 29 C.F.R.

§ 2550.408b-2, which specified what parties in interest

must disclose to fiduciaries as a prerequisite to claiming a

§ 1108(b)(2) exemption.

2. The Department has espoused a similar

understanding in litigation. In Chao v. Hall Holding, Co.,

285 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.

1168 (2003), the Labor Secretary sued various defendants

39

for “purchasing stock on the [plan’s] behalf without

adequate investigation and [for] overpaying for the

stock.” In relevant part, the Secretary noted that “Hall

Holding was a party in interest because it was a fiduciary

and because it owned more than 10% of Hall Chemical, the

employer of plan participants.” Gov. Br. at 24, Hall

Holding, 285 F.3d 415 (No. 00-3041). “The stock sale

between the plan and Hall Holding was therefore a

prohibited transaction under 29 U.S.C. [§] 1106(a)(1).” Id.

The government acknowledged that “Section 408(e) of

ERISA creates an exemption from Section 406 for ‘the

acquisition or sale by a plan of qualifying employer

securities.’” Id. But it emphasized that defendants “bear

the burden of proving that they meet this exception.” Id.

at 24–25. The Sixth Circuit agreed. 285 F.3d at 437. And

when the defendants in Hall subsequently sought cert.,

the Secretary reiterated that ERISA “prohibited the

[fiduciaries’] stock sale [at issue] unless an exemption

permitted it.” Gov. Br. Opp’n Cert. at 13, Hall Holding,

537 U.S. 1168 (No. 02-593). The Court denied review.

3. The Department followed the same course in Allen

v. GreatBanc, where the plaintiff alleged a defendant had

entered a prohibited transaction because it had engaged

in a sale and loan with a party in interest. 2015 WL

5821772, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015). The district court,

much like the Second Circuit here, reasoned that pleading

that fact alone was insufficient: A plaintiff needed to plead

facts negating the applicability of the exemptions set forth

in § 1108. Id. at *4. The Secretary, in an amicus brief on

appeal, disagreed. It instead endorsed the Eighth

Circuit’s reading from Braden v. Wal-Mart, 588 F.3d 585

(8th Cir. 2009), stating that “the only obligation imposed

on a plaintiff asserting a prohibited transaction claim is to

plead and prove the existence of a transaction prohibited

40

by section 406(a).” Gov. Br. at 18, Allen, 835 F.3d 670 (No.

15-3569).

As the Secretary explained, “section 408 exemptions

are affirmative defenses on which the defendant has the

burden of proof,” and “it is [thus] a defendant’s obligation

to plead the applicability of an affirmative defense, and to

do so consistent with the requirements of Rule 8(a).” Id.

at 9, 19–20. “[A] plaintiff is not required to negate an

affirmative defense in his complaint.” Id. at 19. The

Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and, in so

doing, substantially embraced the Secretary’s

understanding. Allen, 835 F.3d at 677.

4. On top of the twenty-one exemptions in § 1108(b),

§ 1108(a)(2) authorizes the Labor Secretary “to create

exemptions to ERISA’s prohibition on certain plan

holdings, acquisitions, and transactions, but only if doing

so is in the interests of the plan’s ‘participants and

beneficiaries.’” Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 846 (1997).

Parties have not been shy about availing themselves of

this procedure. Since 1996, the government has granted

more than 800 individual exemptions and 17 class

exemptions. Dep’t of Lab., Individual Exemptions,

https://perma.cc/VW28-7N8Q; Dep’t of Lab., Class

Exemptions, https://perma.cc/G2NQ-XF28.

It has

granted those exemptions to service providers like

Fidelity. See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2008-14;

D-11424, 73 Fed. Reg. 70378, 70381 (2008). And it has

granted exemptions where it “[did] not believe Congress

intended to cover” certain relationships. Chamber of

Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 885 F.3d 360, 367 (5th Cir.

2018).

In short, if Respondents wish to avoid § 1106(a),

ERISA provides them several ways to do so. They can

41

plead and later prove their actions fall under § 1108(b)(2).

They can plead another applicable § 1108(b) exemption.

They can seek clarification and coverage under § 1108(a).

What they cannot do is compel plaintiffs to plead facts

they do not know and which they do not, absent discovery,

have access to.

III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPROACH IS A

“FIX” TO A NON-EXISTENT PROBLEM.

Lacking support from the statutory text, case law, or

prior government practice, the Second Circuit turns to a

last redoubt: policy concerns. As the panel below outlines,

it eschewed a “literal reading” of § 1106 in favor of a rule

that, it insists, is more workable and less “absurd.” P.A.

17a. It is neither of those things.

A. The Second Circuit’s reading is unworkable.

1. To start, ERISA already sets out a workable

framework for plaintiffs, defendants, and courts for

prohibited-transaction claims.

For plaintiffs, § 1106 imposes certain bright-line

requirements: e.g., allege a transaction, identify a party in

interest, and show how that transaction constituted a

“furnishing of goods, services, or facilities” between the

plan and that party in interest. Once those boxes are

checked, defendants may plead and later offer evidence of

the applicability of any relevant exemptions. And

courts—as in any other case—evaluate the entirety of

that evidence.

Such a framework “protect[s] . . . the interests of

participants in employee benefit plans” by “provid[ing]

[them with] appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready

42

access to the Federal courts.” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b); Aetna

Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). At the

same time, the framework does not “unduly discourage

employers from offering [ERISA] plans.” Conkright, 559

U.S. at 517. After all, not every transaction provides a

cause of action under § 1106(a). Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,

517 U.S. 882, 895 (1996), for example, held “that the

payment of benefits” to current and former employees

“does not constitute a prohibited transaction.” That is so

even if the payment is large, as in Spink.

What § 1106(a) targets is not the amount of money

that changes hands, but “commercial bargains that

present a special risk . . . because they are struck with

plan insiders.” Id. at 893. These transactions naturally

“involve uses of plan assets that are potentially harmful to

the plan.” Id. In Congress’s judgment, a service contract

between an interested party and a plan fiduciary,

§ 1106(a)(1)(C), is one such potentially harmful

transaction, just as a sale of securities, § 1106(a)(1)(A), a

loan, § 1106(a)(1)(B), or a transfer of property,

§ 1106(a)(1)(D), can be potentially harmful.

2. On the other hand, requiring plaintiffs to marshal

and plead evidence to negate every conceivable exemption

would paralyze ERISA enforcement. To see why,

consider the hurdles a plaintiff must overcome to plead a

claim under the Second Circuit’s rule, starting with the

“simplest” case: a defendant that invokes only a single

§ 1108 exemption.

That would still leave plaintiffs in a bind because, “[n]o

matter how clever or diligent, ERISA plaintiffs generally

lack the inside information necessary to make out their

claims in detail unless and until discovery commences.”

Braden, 588 F.3d at 598. The preceding sections cover all

43

that a plaintiff would need to do to negate an exemption

under (b)(1) (for loans); (b)(2) (for services); (b)(3) (for

stock ownership plans); (b)(15) (for block trades); and

(b)(17) (for investment advice). None of these exemptions

are straightforward; all involve facts outside a plaintiff’s

knowledge.

Worse yet, when defendants are sued, many invoke

more than one get-out-of-jail-free card. That happened in

Haley when TIAA invoked § 1108(b)(1) and § 1108(b)(17).

54 F.4th at 120. In Dupree v. Prudential Insurance, 2007

WL 2263892, at *39 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007), the defendant

claimed three: § 1108(b)(2), § 1108(b)(5), and § 1108(b)(8).

Defendants have, indeed, been taking this kitchen-sink

approach to § 1108(b) for decades. See McLaughlin v.

Rowley, 698 F. Supp. 1333, 1339–40 (N.D. Tex. 1988)

(§ 1108(b)(1) and § 1108(b)(2)); Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F.

Supp. 341, 351–52 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (same).

To reiterate: Under the Second Circuit’s rule,

plaintiffs must correctly predict every exemption that

could apply and then plead plausible allegations negating

each such exemption even if these exemptions have

conditions which themselves have sub-conditions. If they

fail at any junction, they have no claim, and defendants

need not turn over anything in discovery.

3. To deflect against this concern, the Second Circuit

tries to hedge: “[A]t least some [§ 1108] exemptions,” it

says, must be pleaded by plaintiffs, including § 1108(b)(2).

P.A. 18a. But that obviously does not make the statutory

provisions more workable; it just leaves parties in the

dark about what “some” is supposed to encompass. More

importantly, the text does not hedge. The Second

Circuit’s asserted textual hook—“except as provided”—

does not discriminate between the § 1108 exemptions.

44

Thus, if, as the Second Circuit claims, it “flows directly

from the text” that some of § 1108 exemptions “are

incorporated into § 1106(a)’s prohibitions,” P.A. 18a–19a,

then they all are. The Second Circuit does not identify a

limiting principle to its rule because none exists. The

proper limiting principle is already built into the text:

Plaintiffs plead liability under one provision; defendants

plead any applicable exemption from liability under

another.

B. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions is not absurd.

Following the text as written does not produce

“absurd results.” P.A. 16a. Absurdity, as this Court has

explained, should apply in the “rare and exceptional

circumstance[]” where embracing the plain language

would be “so gross as to shock the general moral or

common sense.” Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60

(1930). A plain language reading is, put another way,

absurd only “where it is quite impossible that Congress

could have intended the result.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t

of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring). In like manner, leading commentators have

argued that courts “should permit such displacement” of

the text “only when the legislature’s action violates the

Constitution.”

John F. Manning, The Absurdity

Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2486 (2003). This case

presents none of those circumstances.

1. There is nothing “rare” or “exceptional” about

Congress writing a law with, in the Second Circuit’s

words, a “broad scope” followed by a set of specific

exemptions. P.A. 22a. It writes such laws all the time.

The ADEA, after all, “broadly prohibits arbitrary

discrimination in the workplace based on age.” Trans

45

World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985).

But as Meacham demonstrates, that broad prohibition is

subject to several specific exemptions, including a

reasonableness exemption—and those exemptions fall on

the defendant to plead and prove. 554 U.S. at 87.

2. Next, it is not “impossible that Congress could have

intended the result.” Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 471. To

the contrary, the legislative history shows that it

“intended that coverage under the Act be construed

liberally to provide the maximum degree of protection to

working men and women covered by private retirement

programs. Conversely, exemptions should be confined to

their narrow purpose[s].” S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 18 (1973).

Consistent with these intentions, Congress wanted,

through the prohibited-transaction provisions, to

“substantially strengthen[]” pre-ERISA protections by

“establish[ing] new rules that define the transactions that

are prohibited.” 120 CONG. REC. 29954 (1974) (remarks of

Sen. Nelson). And it sought to do so by “prohibit[ing]

fiduciaries from engaging in transactions involving the

transfer of assets between the plan and parties in

interest.” 120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974) (remarks of Sen.

Williams).

3. Finally, there is nothing unconstitutional about

Congress writing a law providing for broad liability for

prohibited transactions. That is especially so when the

law provides multiple offramps from liability. Section

1106 does not, for instance, cover all transactions and

payments. Spink, 517 U.S. at 895. Nor does it “prohibit

necessary services or impede necessary service

transactions.” Bugielski, 76 F.4th at 907 (internal

quotation marks omitted). At most, it requires interested

parties to disclose relevant information about potentially

46

prohibited transactions to the fiduciary, outlines how a

fiduciary can ask for more information if it needs to, and

lets a fiduciary avail itself of any potentially applicable

statutory and administrative exemptions. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1108(b)(2)(B). There is nothing absurd about that. It

instead reflects a “statute designed to promote the

interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee

benefit plans.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,

90 (1983).

C. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions has not led to a needless

rise in litigation.

Underlying the Second Circuit’s contorted textualism

and invocation of absurdity is a pragmatic concern: that a

plain-language reading of § 1106 would “encompass a vast

array of routine transactions.” P.A. 21a. Opening that

window would, Respondents suggest, exacerbate a

“dramatic rise in the number of ERISA lawsuits over

recordkeeping fees in recent years.” BIO at 15. That

concern is both irrelevant and unfounded.

1. It is irrelevant because, “even supposing

[Respondents’] worst predictions come true, that would

be the result of the statute Congress drafted.” Muldrow

v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 358 (2024). And the

result here—more litigation—is consistent with what

Congress had in mind when it enacted ERISA. Indeed,

as lower courts have observed, “excessive fee

litigation . . . has significantly improved [retirement]

plans, brought to light fiduciary misconduct that has

detrimentally impacted the retirement savings of

American workers, and dramatically brought down fees.”

Kelly v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 2020 WL 434473, at *2 (D.

Md. Jan. 28, 2020). This has “led to enormous fee savings

47

for plan participants.” Marshall v. Northrop Grumman

Corp., 2020 WL 5668935, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020).

A statute that leads to more excessive fee lawsuits and

subsequently results in less excessive fees does not

contravene ERISA’s “broadly protective purposes.”

John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav.

Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96 (1993). It reinforces them.

2. It is also unfounded because there is little indication

needless lawsuits are being filed. After all, the parties and

the Second Circuit agree that the Eighth Circuit has

“embraced the expansive reading of” § 1106 in Braden.

P.A. 17a. In the fifteen years since, ERISA cases have not

ground the Eighth Circuit to a halt. Nor has there been

some proliferation of complaints with standalone § 1106

claims and threadbare allegations. Several reasons help

explain that result.

First, bringing an ERISA case is expensive and timeconsuming, involving multiple defendants and many

potential exemptions. The prototypical plaintiff will,

given such constraints, “sue only when . . . there is a

reason to do so.” Allen, 835 F.3d at 677. Plaintiffs do not

sue when they have strong “reason to believe [a]

transaction was exempt under [§ 1108]” or, for that

matter, over “something as trivial as a chair for a person

to sit in.” Id. Though these conditions might formally

satisfy § 1106(a), they would get a plaintiff nowhere in

practice.

Second, ERISA and the Federal Rules include several

mechanisms to deter plaintiffs from bringing cases to test

the waters of the theoretical outer boundaries of § 1106.

ERISA, for instance, permits cost-shifting. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(1). And the Federal Rules allow courts to

impose sanctions when plaintiffs bring groundless

48

litigation. See Fish v. GreatBanc Tr. Co., 749 F.3d 671,

687 (7th Cir. 2014).

Both mechanisms—fees and

sanctions—discourage plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits

just to bring lawsuits. Indeed, the district court here,

following approval of the settlement, determined that

defendants were prevailing parties (even though one of

Petitioners’ claims survived summary judgment) and

awarded them over $25,000 in costs. D. Ct. Dkt. 471 at 7.

Finally, Thole v. U.S. Bank, 590 U.S. 538, 542 (2020),

dismissed an ERISA case for lack of standing. There are

important distinctions between this case and Thole. Thole

involved a different type of plan, a different remedy, and

a different source of injury. The point is not that Thole

bars prohibited-transaction claims based on seemingly

“routine transactions.” P.A. 21a. It is that, recognizing

the possibility of dismissal, few if any plaintiffs will bring

such suits to begin with.

* * *

When Congress enacted ERISA, it opened the door

for beneficiaries to bring claims against fiduciaries for

actions that could be “potentially harmful to the plan.”

Spink, 517 U.S. at 893. But just because it opened that

door does not mean every plaintiff will walk through it.

Instead, as experience instructs, plaintiffs do so only if the

benefits outweigh the costs and risks in a particular case.

And even if they jump through those hoops, there is no

guarantee a plaintiff will carry the day. All it means is

that defendants must plead and prove their own case, and

a court must consider all the evidence to determine

whether a claim should proceed.

49

Rather than applying this sensible framework, the

Second Circuit chose to close the door entirely for all but

the handful of plaintiffs who can guess which exemptions

a defendant might invoke (based on information that

plaintiffs do not have) and plead the negative of those

exemptions (based on information that plaintiffs do not

have). That cannot be what Congress envisioned and is

not what the text provides.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Second Circuit should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

JEROME J. SCHLICHTER

SEAN E. SOYARS

SCHLICHTER BOGARD

LLP

100 South Fourth Street

Suite 1200

St. Louis, MO 63102

XIAO WANG

Counsel of Record

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

SCHOOL OF LAW SUPREME

COURT LITIGATION CLINIC

580 Massie Road

Charlottesville, VA 22903

(434) 924-8956

x.wang@law.virginia.edu

Counsel for Petitioners

November 22, 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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