Petitioners Brief — Casey Cunningham, et al., Petitioners v. Cornell University, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 22, 2024
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No. 23-1007
In the Supreme Court of the United States
CASEY CUNNINGHAM, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS,
v.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
JEROME J. SCHLICHTER
SEAN E. SOYARS
SCHLICHTER BOGARD
LLP
100 South Fourth Street
Suite 1200
St. Louis, MO 63102
XIAO WANG
Counsel of Record
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
SCHOOL OF LAW SUPREME
COURT LITIGATION CLINIC
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
(434) 924-8956
x.wang@law.virginia.edu
Counsel for Petitioners
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), prohibits a
plan fiduciary from “engag[ing] in a transaction, if he
knows or should know that such transaction
constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods,
services, or facilities between the plan and a party in
interest.” The statute elsewhere defines “party in
interest” broadly to include a variety of parties that
may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B).
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the
text of this prohibition as written. On the other hand,
several other circuits, including the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, have required plaintiffs
to allege additional elements to state a claim because
a “literal reading” of § 1106(a)(1)(C) would
purportedly produce “results that are inconsistent
with ERISA’s statutory purpose.” Albert v. Oshkosh
Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022). The question
presented is:
Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging
that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction
constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or
facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as
proscribed by § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff
must plead and prove additional elements and facts
not contained in § 1106(a)(1)(C)’s text.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners Casey Cunningham, Charles E. Lance,
Stanley T. Marcus, Lydia Pettis, and Joy Veronneau were
plaintiffs in the district court proceedings and appellants
in the court of appeals proceedings.
Respondents Cornell University, the Retirement Plan
Oversight Committee, and Mary G. Opperman were
defendants in the district court proceedings and appellees
in the court of appeals proceedings. CapFinancial
Partners, LLC d/b/a CAPTRUST Financial Advisors was
a defendant in the district court proceedings and appellee
in the court of appeals proceedings, but Petitioners do not
seek relief before this Court on claims as applied to
CapFinancial.
iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (S.D.N.Y.):
Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 1:16-cv06525, 2017 WL 4358769 (Sept. 29, 2017).
Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 1:16-cv06525, 2019 WL 4735876 (Sept. 27, 2019).
United States Court of Appeals (2d Cir.):
Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 21-88, 86
F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023).
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question presented ............................................................... i
Parties to the proceeding .................................................... ii
Related proceedings ...........................................................iii
Table of authorities ............................................................. vi
Introduction .......................................................................... 1
Opinions below ...................................................................... 7
Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 7
Statutory provisions involved ............................................. 7
Statement of the case........................................................... 8
A. Statutory framework. .............................................. 8
B. Factual background. ................................................ 9
C. Proceedings below.................................................. 10
Summary of argument ....................................................... 14
Argument ............................................................................ 20
I. The Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with the
statutory text. ............................................................... 20
A. Petitioners have satisfied the plain language of
§ 1106, and adding atextual elements to that
language is inappropriate. ..................................... 20
B. Section 1108’s exemptions are affirmative
defenses to be pleaded and proven by the
defendant................................................................. 21
C. Traditional tools of statutory construction
confirm Petitioners’ reading. ................................ 25
D. The Second Circuit’s reliance on § 1106(a)’s
“except as provided” language is inapt. ............... 27
v
E. The Second Circuit’s reference to a narrow
criminal law exception to the general rule is
unavailing. ............................................................... 29
II. The Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with the
case law, the law of trusts, and government
practice. ......................................................................... 31
A. Section 1106 establishes a categorical rule for
prohibited transactions. ......................................... 31
B. The common law of trusts supports Petitioners’
reading..................................................................... 35
C. Petitioners’ reading of § 1106 and § 1108 tracks
federal government practice. ................................ 38
III. The Second Circuit’s approach is a “fix” to a nonexistent problem. .......................................................... 41
A. The Second Circuit’s reading is unworkable. ...... 41
B. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions is not absurd. ................... 44
C. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions has not led to a needless
rise in litigation. ...................................................... 46
Conclusion ........................................................................... 49
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
542 U.S. 200 (2004).................................................... 42
Albert v. Oshkosh Corp.,
47 F.4th 570 (7th Cir. 2022) ...............................i, 4, 21
Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,
835 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2016) .........................................
........................................................ 1, 19, 23, 32, 37, 47
Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,
2015 WL 5821772 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015) ............... 39
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian,
590 U.S. 1 (2020) ....................................................... 28
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,
12 F.4th 171 (2d Cir. 2021) ........................ 5, 16, 29, 30
Boggs v. Boggs,
520 U.S. 833 (1997).................................................... 40
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) .............. 1, 3, 5, 39, 42, 47
Bugielski v. AT&T Servs., Inc.,
76 F.4th 894 (9th Cir. 2023) ............................ 3, 20, 45
vii
Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,
885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018) ..................................... 40
Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc.,
508 U.S. 152 (1993)....................................... 3, 8, 17, 32
Conkright v. Frommert,
559 U.S. 506 (2010)....................................... 3, 6, 20, 42
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 188 (1974).................................................... 26
Crooks v. Harrelson,
282 U.S. 55 (1930)...................................................... 44
Cyan Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund,
583 U.S. 416 (2018).................................................... 28
Dupree v. Prudential Ins.,
2007 WL 2263892 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007) ............. 43
Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu,
307 U.S. 5 (1939) ....................................................... 24
Est. of Cowart v. Nickols Drilling Co.,
505 U.S. 469 (1992).................................................... 20
Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
793 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2015) ...................................5, 29
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101 (1989).................................................... 35
viii
Fish v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,
749 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2014) ..................................... 48
FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37 (1948)...................................................2, 22
Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635 (1980)...................................................... 5
Haley v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am.,
54 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2022) ............................ 23, 37, 43
Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc.,
530 U.S. 238 (2000)................... 1, 16, 17, 31, 32, 35, 36
Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Michigan,
751 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 2014) ..................................... 27
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432 (1999)................................... 14, 15, 20, 21
Hughes v. Nw. Univ.,
595 U.S. 170 (2022)...................................................... 1
Hughes v. Nw. Univ.,
63 F.4th 615 (7th Cir. 2023) ....................................... 9
Javierre v. Cent. Altagracia,
217 U.S. 502 (1910).................................................... 22
Jimenez v. Quarterman,
555 U.S. 113 (2009)...................................................6, 7
ix
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav.
Bank,
510 U.S. 86 (1993)...................................................5, 47
Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007).................................................... 24
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P.,
559 U.S. 335 (2010)............................. 13, 14, 33, 34, 35
Kelly v. Johns Hopkins Univ.,
2020 WL 434473 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2020) ................. 46
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc.,
552 U.S. 248 (2008).................................................... 35
Leigh v. Engle,
727 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984) ..................................... 32
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,
517 U.S. 882 (1996)......................................... 42, 45, 48
Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
829 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1987) .................................... 23
Marshall v. Kelly,
465 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Okla. 1978) ........................ 43
Marshall v. Northrop Grumman Corp.,
2020 WL 5668935 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020) .....46, 47
McKelvey v. United States,
260 U.S. 353 (1922).................................................... 22
x
McLaughlin v. Rowley,
698 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Tex. 1988) ........................ 43
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y,
554 U.S. 84 (2008)................. 4, 5, 15, 24, 25, 26, 27, 45
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248 (1993)...................................................... 8
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,
601 U.S. 346 (2024).................................................... 46
Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola,
700 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2012) ...................................27, 28
Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni,
262 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................... 28
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
491 U.S. 440 (1989)......................................... 18, 44, 45
Ramos v. Banner Health,
1 F.4th 769 (10th Cir. 2021) ....................................... 4
Ramos v. Banner Health,
461 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (D. Colo. 2020) ........................ 9
Ruan v. United States,
597 U.S. 450 (2022).................................................... 22
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49 (2005)...................................................... 26
xi
Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry.,
205 U.S. 1 (1907) ....................................................... 22
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85 (1983)...................................................1, 46
Sweda v. Univ. of Pa.,
923 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2019) ...............................3, 4, 21
Taylor v. Sturgell,
553 U.S. 880 (2008)...............................................22, 24
Thole v. U.S. Bank,
590 U.S. 538 (2020).................................................... 48
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. 111 (1985)...............................................44, 45
United States v. Cook,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872) ................... 16, 29, 30, 31
United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875)...................................................... 30
United States v. Dickson,
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141 (1841) ............................. 4, 15, 22
United States v. Just,
74 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 1996) ....................................... 29
United States v. McArthur,
108 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1997) ................................. 31
xii
United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1875).................................................16, 30
United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62 (1971)...................................................... 30
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338 (2013).................................................... 26
Vance v. Terrazas,
444 U.S. 252 (1980).................................................... 24
Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528 (2015).................................................... 26
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI ................................................ 30
RULES, STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS
11 U.S.C. § 550 ............................................................... 29
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 ......................................................... 34
18 U.S.C. § 922 ............................................................... 29
28 U.S.C. § 1254 ............................................................... 7
29 U.S.C.
§ 623................................................................. 24, 25, 27
§ 1001...................................................................7, 8, 42
§ 1002.......................................................... i, 2, 8, 20, 38
§ 1104............................................................................ 1
xiii
§ 1106.................... i, 1–21, 24–28, 31–32, 35–42, 44–47
§ 1108........... 1, 2, 4–9, 11–19, 21–28, 33–34, 36–44, 46
§ 1132–1138 ................................................................ 38
§ 1132.......................................................................... 47
§ 1204.......................................................................... 38
29 C.F.R. § 2550 ................................................. 33, 34, 38
77 Fed. Reg. 5632 (Feb. 3, 2012) .................................. 38
FED. R. CIV. P. 8 .......................................................23, 40
SECONDARY SOURCES
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)................... 29
Robert W. Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees’ Powers
Act and the Basic Principles of Fiduciary
Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801 (1966) ........ 36
David Kotler et al., Navigating the Recent Wave of
Section 36(b) Litigation: What Have We Learned?,
29 INVESTMENT LAWYER 1 (2022) .......................... 35
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2387 (2003) ................................................... 44
Lauren K. Valastro, How Misapplying Twombly
Erodes Retirement Funds, 32 GEO. MASON L. REV.
(forthcoming 2025) ...................................................... 6
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 78 .................... 36
xiv
OTHER AUTHORITIES
120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974) ..................................19, 45
120 CONG. REC. 29954 (1974) ....................................... 45
120 CONG. REC. 29957 (1974) ......................................... 8
120 CONG. REC. 30106 (1974) ......................................... 8
S. REP. NO. 93-127 (1973) ........................................19, 45
Dep’t of Labor, Class Exemptions,
https://perma.cc/G2NQ-XF28 ................................. 40
Dep’t of Labor, Individual Exemptions,
https://perma.cc/VW28-7N8Q ................................. 40
Gov. Br., Chao v. Hall Holding,
285 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3041) ........38, 39
Gov. Br., Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co.,
835 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-3569) ... 6, 17, 39,
40
Gov. Br. Opp’n Cert., Chao v. Hall Holding,
537 U.S. 1168 (2003) (No. 02-593)............................ 39
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2008-14; D-11424,
73 Fed. Reg. 70378 (2008) ........................................ 40
1
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 “to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90
(1983). To deliver on that goal, the Act imposes duties of
loyalty and prudence on the fiduciaries who manage
ERISA plans and, through its prohibited-transaction
provisions, “categorically bar[s] certain transactions”
altogether. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 242 (2000).
These mechanisms—fiduciary duties on the one hand,
prohibited transactions on the other—work together to
protect employees. To bring a fiduciary duty claim, for
example, a beneficiary must show the fiduciary’s failure to
act in the beneficiary’s interest or to “discharge their
duties ‘with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing [of] a prudent man
acting in a like capacity.’” Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 595 U.S.
170, 172 (2022) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). For a
prohibited-transaction claim, on the other hand, a
beneficiary need not show harm nor “make any allegation
of unreasonableness” because Congress has already
determined that such transactions are “likely to injure the
pension plan.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d
585, 600–01 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harris Tr., 530 U.S.
at 242). All a plaintiff must do is plead the elements of 29
U.S.C. § 1106; doing so satisfies the “bright-line rule[]”
Congress created for determining whether a transaction
is prohibited. Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co., 835 F.3d 670,
676 (7th Cir. 2016). Once such a showing is made, the plan
fiduciary may invoke, if applicable, one or more of the
exemptions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1108. A fiduciary
2
might, for example, plead and prove facts showing that a
particular transaction was a permissible block trade,
§ 1108(b)(15); a permissible cross trade, § 1108(b)(19); or
constituted a “reasonable arrangement[] with a party in
interest for . . . legal, accounting, or other services
necessary for . . . the plan,” § 1108(b)(2)(A).
This framework—of plaintiffs pleading and proving
liability under one provision and defendants pleading and
proving an exemption from liability under a separate
provision—is unexceptional. Congress routinely writes
laws in this way, and courts, when interpreting them,
apply “the general rule of statutory construction that the
burden of proving justification or exemption under a
special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally
rests on one who claims its benefits.” FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948).
Moreover, what is remarkable here is that
Respondents themselves agree the transactions identified
in the complaint satisfy § 1106.
That is because
§ 1106(a)(1)(C) provides that a “[1] fiduciary with respect
to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a
transaction, [2] if he knows or should know that such
transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of
goods, services, or facilities [3] between the plan and a
party in interest.” Respondents acknowledge they are
fiduciaries to Cornell’s plans. BIO at 3. They agree that
the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of
America-College Retirement Equities Fund (“TIAA”)
and Fidelity Investments Inc. (“Fidelity”) are parties in
interest, as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14). J.A. 291, 301.
And it is undisputed that Respondents transacted with
TIAA and Fidelity for the furnishing of services—
specifically, recordkeeping services—to the plans. BIO at
4. Petitioners, for their part, allege that as beneficiaries
3
to Cornell’s plans, they paid TIAA and Fidelity between
four and five times more each year for recordkeeping than
industry standards. J.A. 65. That allegation, if true,
would mean that the 30,000 participants in Cornell’s
ERISA plans paid millions more than they should have
for recordkeeping. Affording such participants a cause of
action tracks Congress’s vision of using the prohibitedtransaction provisions to address the abuses of plan assets
that were pervasive pre-ERISA. See Comm’r v. Keystone
Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993).
Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have endorsed
this understanding of § 1106. As the Eighth Circuit
observed, “the language of the statute is plain, and it
allocates the burdens of pleading and proof.” Braden, 588
F.3d at 602. The Ninth Circuit embraced this same
understanding, while adding that it was “particularly
reluctant to adopt an atextual interpretation of § 406
because ERISA is ‘an enormously complex and detailed
statute.’” Bugielski v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 76 F.4th 894,
901 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 559
U.S. 506, 509 (2010)).1
On the other hand, several circuits have held that a
literal reading of § 1106 would be too “broad” and would
end up “prohibit[ing] ubiquitous service transactions.”
Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 335–37 (3d Cir. 2019).
These courts have thus required plaintiffs to plead
additional, atextual elements to bring a prohibitedtransaction claim.
And because these additional
requirements have no grounding in § 1106’s text, they
Unless otherwise noted, statutory citations in this brief are to
the U.S. Code. Many cases, however, refer interchangeably to the
ERISA section number. The most relevant section numbers for this
case are ERISA § 406 and § 408, which correspond to 29 U.S.C.
§ 1106 and § 1108, respectively.
1
4
have differed across every circuit. See, e.g., id. at 340
(requiring plaintiff to “plead an element of intent to
benefit the party in interest”); Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47
F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that transactions
must “look[] like self-dealing”); Ramos v. Banner Health,
1 F.4th 769, 787 (10th Cir. 2021) (requiring showing that
the plan and party in interest had a “prior relationship”).
The Second Circuit expressed the same concern that,
“when read in isolation from its exemptions, § 1106(a)
would encompass a vast array of routine transactions.”
P.A. 21a. But its holding charted a different course from
that of the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. Instead, it
held that “at least some of those exemptions—
particularly, the exemption for reasonable and necessary
transactions
codified
by
§ 1108(b)(2)(A)—are
incorporated into § 1106(a)’s prohibitions.” P.A. 18a.
Thus, “to plead a violation of § 1106(a)(1)(C), a complaint
must plausibly allege that a fiduciary has caused the plan
to engage in a transaction that constitutes the furnishing
of services between the plan and a party in interest” and
that the “transaction was unnecessary or involved
unreasonable compensation.” P.A. 18a–19a (cleaned up).
That is a policy fix under the guise of a quasi-textual
solution. It fails as both.
On text, “the general rule of law, which has always
prevailed,” is “that where the enacting clause is general in
its language and objects, and a proviso is afterwards
introduced,” the “proviso carves special exceptions only
out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such
exception, must establish it.” United States v. Dickson,
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 165 (1841). The Court has followed
this rule absent “compelling reasons to think” otherwise.
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y, 554 U.S. 84, 91
5
(2008).
Yet here, those compelling reasons favor
Petitioners, not Respondents.
For one, § 1108 is entitled “Exemptions from
prohibited transactions,” and the text therein repeatedly
refers to “exemption[s].” This Court has, in turn, held
that references in federal law to “exemptions” are
“affirmative defenses,” Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91, for
which “the burden of pleading . . . rests with the
defendant,” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
Next, § 1106(a) begins by referencing § 1108—
“[e]xcept as provided in section 1108 of this title”—before
specifying the elements for proving a prohibitedtransaction claim. Courts have uniformly held that such a
phrase signals an “affirmative defense” that the
defendant must plead and prove. See, e.g., Evankavitch
v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 793 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir.
2015); In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 12 F.4th
171, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2021).
Third, the liability and exemptions provisions are in
different sections of the U.S. Code. Such a structure,
“with exemptions laid out apart from the prohibitions,”
again reflects an affirmative defense. Meacham, 554 U.S.
at 91. That is doubly true where, as here, many of § 1108’s
exemptions require pleading facts that plaintiffs would
not know pre-discovery. See Braden, 588 F.3d at 602 (“It
would be perverse to require plaintiffs bringing
prohibited transaction claims to plead facts that remain in
the sole control of the parties who stand accused of
wrongdoing.”).
Further, as the agency with “enforcement
responsibility for ERISA,” John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 107 n.14
(1993), the Labor Department has consistently
6
interpreted § 1108’s “exemptions [as] affirmative
defenses on which the defendant has the burden of proof,”
Gov. Br. at 9, Allen, 835 F.3d 670 (No. 15-3569).
The Second Circuit’s approach is also a poor policy fix.
In its view, a plain text reading would encompass “a vast
array of routine transactions,” P.A. at 21a, which, per
Respondents, could exacerbate “a dramatic rise in the
number of ERISA lawsuits over recordkeeping fees,”
BIO at 15. But it is unclear why a rise in lawsuits alone
should be cause for alarm. After all, “[m]ultiple federal
courts have acknowledged the important role excessive
fee litigation has played to depress fees and protect
participants’ retirement savings over the past several
years.” Lauren K. Valastro, How Misapplying Twombly
Erodes Retirement Funds, 32 GEO. MASON L. REV.
(forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 17). That result is
consistent with ERISA’s purpose to “ensure that
employees . . . receive the benefits they ha[ve] earned.”
Conkright, 559 U.S. at 516.
Finally, there are few if any actual suits where
plaintiffs plead only the bare elements of a prohibitedtransaction claim. Neither the Second Circuit nor
Respondents have identified any evidence of this
happening, even though parties in the Eighth Circuit
could have done so for the past fifteen years. That is
because there are built-in guardrails against bringing
needless litigation, from the costs and resources required
to bring an ERISA action, to fee-shifting and sanctions, to
standing.
The Second Circuit’s “solution,” in short, searches for
a nonexistent problem. At bottom, the issue here is how
to read § 1106. The answer to that question, “[a]s with any
question of statutory interpretation,” “begins with the
plain language of the statute.” Jimenez v. Quarterman,
7
555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). And “when the statutory
language is plain,” the result is equally straightforward:
“[W]e must enforce it according to its terms.” Id. So too
here. The Court should reverse.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Second Circuit is published at 86
F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023) and is reproduced in the petition
appendix at P.A. 2a–41a. The order of the district court
addressing
Defendants-Respondents’
motion
for
summary judgment is unpublished and is reproduced at
P.A. 43a–86a. The order of the district court addressing
Defendants-Respondents’ motion to dismiss is
unpublished and is reproduced at P.A. 88a–115a.
JURISDICTION
The Second Circuit issued its opinion on November 14,
2023. It denied a petition for rehearing on December 20,
2023. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
March 11, 2024, and granted on October 4, 2024. This
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Relevant provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.,
including 29 U.S.C. § 1106 and § 1108, are reproduced at
P.A. 120a–160a.
8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statutory framework.
ERISA is “the product of a decade of congressional
study” and its “comprehensive and reticulated”
framework recognizes that “the continued well-being and
security of millions of employees and their dependents are
directly affected by [employee benefit] plans.” Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a).
The prohibited-transaction provisions are central to
that framework. Pre-ERISA, transactions between plans
and interested parties were governed by “the customary
arm’s-length standard of conduct.” Comm’r v. Keystone
Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993). But that
standard “all too frequent[ly]” led to the “misuse,
manipulation, and poor management of pension trust
funds” by plan sponsors and administrators. 120 CONG.
REC. 29957 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff). Congress
responded by “establish[ing]” “[s]tringent standards for
plan fiduciaries, including a broad definition of fiduciary
and detailed prohibited transactions.” 120 CONG. REC.
30106 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn).
As relevant here, § 1106(a) sets out five types of
prohibited transactions, and § 1106(a)(1)(C) specifically
bars “[a] fiduciary with respect to a plan” from “caus[ing]
the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should
know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect
furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan
and a party in interest.” Another provision, § 1002(14)(B),
defines a “party in interest” to include, among other
groups, “a person providing services to [an employee
benefit] plan.” Finally, § 1108 specifies exemptions to
§ 1106(a)’s prohibited transactions.
Section 1108(b)
9
provides twenty-one statutory exemptions, and § 1108(a)
grants the Labor Secretary discretion to recognize
additional administrative exemptions as appropriate.
B. Factual background.
Petitioners comprise a class of current and former
employees who participated in Cornell University’s two
retirement plans, the Cornell University Retirement Plan
for Employees of the Endowed Colleges at Ithaca and the
Cornell University Tax Deferred Annuity Plan (together,
“the Plans”). P.A. 5a–6a. These defined-contribution,
tax-deferred plans serve over 30,000 participants and
manage approximately $3.34 billion in assets. P.A. 6a.
Due to their substantial size and assets, the Plans are
considered “jumbo plans,” with significant bargaining
power in the retirement services market. P.A. 90a;
Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 63 F.4th 615, 635 (7th Cir. 2023).
Respondents are Cornell University, Cornell’s
Retirement Plan Oversight Committee, and the Oversight
Committee chairperson. Each respondent is a Plan
fiduciary. Respondents also retained and paid two outside
companies, TIAA and Fidelity, for investment
management and recordkeeping services. P.A. 8a.
Investment management fees “are associated with the
services of buying, selling, and managing investments.”
Id. Recordkeeping fees “cover necessary administrative
expenses such as tracking account balances and providing
regular account statements.” Id.
There are two common recordkeeping models. First,
plans can pay a flat fee indexed to the number of plan
participants. Id. Because of economies of scale, jumbo
plans generally obtain lower flat fees than smaller plans.
Ramos v. Banner Health, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1102 (D.
Colo. 2020). Second, plans can pay through revenue
10
sharing, with fees calculated based on a set portion of plan
assets. P.A. 8a. As assets grow, fees grow, even if the
number of participants and the services provided do not
increase. Respondents here paid recordkeeping fees
through a revenue sharing model. Id.
C. Proceedings below.
In February 2017, Petitioners filed a complaint in the
Southern District of New York, asserting that
Respondents had engaged in transactions prohibited by
§ 1106(a). Specifically, “because TIAA and Fidelity are
service providers and hence parties in interest, their
furnishing of recordkeeping and administrative services
to the Plans is a prohibited transaction unless Cornell
proves an exemption.” P.A. 25a (cleaned up). Petitioners
also alleged that Respondents “failed to seek bids from
other recordkeepers,” “neglected to monitor the amount
of revenue sharing received” by TIAA and Fidelity, and
“paid substantially more than . . . a reasonable
recordkeeping fee.”
Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); J.A. 63. According to Petitioners, a reasonable
recordkeeping fee for the Plans would have been “$35 per
participant.” P.A. 25a; J.A. 65. Petitioners paid several
times that: between $115 and $183 per participant in one
plan, and between $145 and $200 per participant in the
other. P.A. 26a; J.A. 65.
Petitioners also brought several related claims.
Petitioners alleged that Respondents’ failure to address
TIAA and Fidelity’s recordkeeping fees breached the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence. P.A. 10a.
Petitioners
further
claimed
that
Respondents
imprudently offered, selected, or retained investment
options with “high fees and poor performance relative to
11
other investment options that were readily available.”
P.A. 11a.
In September 2017, the district court granted
Respondents’ motion to dismiss the prohibitedtransaction claims. The court held that, to plead a § 1106
violation, plaintiffs must allege “some evidence of selfdealing or other disloyal conduct.” P.A. 109a. But
Petitioners had, in the court’s view, “offered only
conclusory allegations.” Id. The court also dismissed
Petitioners’ duty of loyalty claims. P.A. 98a, 115a. A
subset of Petitioners’ duty of prudence claims survived
dismissal. P.A. 100a–104a, 115a.
At summary judgment, the district court ruled for
Respondents “on nearly all the remaining claims.” P.A.
12a. One claim, regarding the duty of prudence, survived.
P.A. 13a. In December 2020, the district court approved
a settlement of this remaining claim. Id. The settlement
left the previously dismissed claims available for appeal.
Petitioners subsequently appealed to the Second
Circuit, seeking review of the district court’s disposition
of (1) the prohibited-transaction claim, (2) the breach of
fiduciary duty claim for “failing to monitor and control
recordkeeping fees,” and (3) the claim over the retention
of certain high-cost or underperforming investment
options. P.A. 10a.
On November 14, 2023, the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court’s judgment. P.A. 41a. The court began
by observing that if § 1106(a)(1)(C) were read “in isolation
of the exemptions in § 1108,” it would “appear to prohibit
payments by a plan to any entity providing it with any
services.” P.A. 16a. It further noted that the Third,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had, given this possible
outcome, “adopted different means of narrowing the
12
statute” by imposing atextual requirements on plaintiffs
seeking to proceed under § 1106(a). Id. “[O]n the other
hand,” two courts of appeals “have embraced the
expansive reading of the statute that these other circuits
have rejected as absurd.” P.A. 17a. Those courts—the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits—acknowledged the
potentially broad scope of such a reading. But they
nevertheless adopted their more “expansive” reading by
looking to “the language of the statute and [to] traditional
principles of trust law.” Id.
After outlining the various approaches, the Second
Circuit reached for a purported middle ground. It agreed
with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits that “the language of
§ 1106(a)(1) cannot be read to demand explicit allegations
of self-dealing or disloyal conduct.” P.A. 18a (internal
quotation marks omitted). But it disagreed with the
Eighth Circuit that “the § 1108 exemptions should be
understood merely as affirmative defenses.” Id. Instead,
“at least some of those exemptions—particularly, the
exemption for reasonable and necessary transactions
codified by § 1108(b)(2)(A)—are incorporated into
§ 1106(a)’s prohibitions.” Id.
Under the Second Circuit’s rule, to plead a violation of
§ 1106(a)(1)(C), a complaint must not only show that a
transaction involved the “furnishing of services between
the plan and a party in interest,” but also that the
“transaction was unnecessary or involved unreasonable
compensation,” so as to fall outside of § 1108(b)(2). P.A.
18a–19a (ellipses omitted). The court added that, should
plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss, they must continue
marshaling facts negating § 1108’s exemptions: “[A]t the
summary judgment stage,” plaintiffs must “produce
evidence . . . challenging the necessity of the transaction
13
or the reasonableness of the compensation provided.”
P.A. 24a.
The Second Circuit gave three reasons for its decision.
First, it pointed to the statute’s structure. Section
1106(a)’s text “begins with [a] carveout: ‘Except as
provided in section 1108 of this title.’” P.A. 19a (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)). Neither § 1106(b) nor § 1106(c)
contains such language. The Second Circuit concluded,
from this difference, that “the exemptions set out in
§ 1108” are “incorporated directly into § 1106(a)’s
definition of prohibited transactions.” Id.
Second, drawing from a handful of criminal cases, the
Second Circuit claimed that § 1108’s exemptions are so
“integral to the offense” that they have become “part of
the offense’s ingredients.” P.A. 20a (cleaned up). The
court reasoned that one cannot “articulate what the
statute seeks to prohibit without reference to the
exception,” and therefore “the exception should be
understood as part of the definition of the prohibited
conduct.” P.A. 21a.
Finally, the court acknowledged that its decision
might appear in tension with common law trust principles,
which generally require the fiduciary to prove exemptions
to liability. P.A. 24a. But the court observed that in an
“analogous” context—i.e., claims under the Investment
Company Act—plaintiffs must first plead that a fee is “so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered.” P.A. 22a (quoting
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 346 (2010)).
That same framework, the panel ruled, should apply to
§ 1106(a) claims: ERISA plaintiffs must first allege “facts
calling into question the fiduciary’s loyalty by challenging
the necessity of the transaction or the reasonableness of
14
the compensation provided,” before fiduciaries carry the
burden of persuasion. P.A. 24a.
In applying this understanding to Petitioners’
complaint, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
§ 1106(a) claims might ultimately face a higher bar than
breach of fiduciary duty claims. Here, Petitioners alleged
“Cornell failed to seek bids from other recordkeepers and
neglected to monitor the amount of revenue sharing,”
which was sufficient to “state [a] claim for a breach of the
duty of prudence.” P.A. 25a. But because Petitioners had
not shown that the recordkeeping fees were
“disproportionately large,” they could not state a claim
under § 1106(a)(1)(C). P.A. 26a (quoting Jones, 559 U.S.
at 346). After disposing of the prohibited-transaction
claim, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment as to Petitioners’ remaining claims. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari on March 11, 2024, which this
Court granted on October 4, 2024.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.A. Concerned that applying the text of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1106(a) as written would cast too wide a net for liability,
the Second Circuit below joined several other circuits in
imposing on plaintiffs additional pleading requirements
not found in that statutory provision’s plain language. But
it did so in unique fashion—by incorporating § 1108’s
exemptions into the plaintiff’s pleading burden. Thus, to
state a claim, plaintiffs must not only plead liability under
§ 1106(a), but also negate the applicability of any
exemptions from liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1108.
That instruction, however, violates the fundamental
understanding that when “the statutory language
15
provides a clear answer,” a court’s inquiry “ends.”
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999).
There is no need to add to one statutory provision’s text
by searching for and piling on additional requirements
from a different provision.
I.B. Congress, moreover, wrote § 1108’s exemptions
as affirmative defenses for a defendant to plead and
prove, rather than as something a plaintiff must negate.
This follows from the “general rule of law” that when an
“enacting clause is general,” as § 1106(a) is, and “a proviso
is afterwards introduced” qualifying the enacting clause,
as § 1108(b) is, “that proviso . . . carves special exceptions
only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any
such exception, must establish it.” United States v.
Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 165 (1841). The Court has
applied this familiar framework many times, including to
statutes with a text and structure like the one here. In
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, for
instance, the statute at issue laid out “general
prohibitions . . . subject
to
a
separate
provision . . . creating exemptions,’” including for
reasonableness. 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008). This Court did not
equivocate:
“Given how the statute reads, with
exemptions laid out apart from the prohibitions . . . it is no
surprise that” those exemptions are “affirmative
defenses” to be pleaded and proven by the defendant. Id.
I.C. Traditional statutory construction principles
further support Petitioners’ view. Congress wrote
ERISA bearing in mind the “longstanding convention”
that plaintiffs plead liability and defendants plead
exemptions to liability. Id. If Congress wished to deviate
from that convention, it knew how to do so. It could have
specified that § 1108 provided additional conditions
16
necessary for plaintiffs to make out a claim for liability.
Or Congress could have explicitly written a
reasonableness requirement into § 1106. It did neither.
I.D. The Second Circuit’s reliance on § 1106(a)’s
“except as provided” language lacks merit. The courts of
appeals have uniformly interpreted the phrase as creating
affirmative defenses. Neither the Second Circuit nor
Respondents have pointed to any countervailing
authority.
I.E. The Second Circuit’s use of criminal cases also
misses the mark. The panel leaned most heavily on a rule
from United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872),
but as this Court has explained, that rule is a “rule of
criminal pleading.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
232 (1875) (emphasis added). It applies in a narrow subset
of criminal cases because of tenets—the rule of lenity, the
presumption of innocence, the Sixth Amendment—that
are “inapposite” to the civil context. In re Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 12 F.4th 171, 197 (2d Cir. 2021).
Even if the Cook rule did apply to civil cases, it holds no
force here. That is because, unlike Cook, where a
prohibition could not be applied without reference to an
exemption, the prohibited-transaction provisions here
plainly “articulate what the statute seeks to prohibit
without reference to the exception,” P.A. 21a: namely, the
“furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the
plan and a party in interest,” 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a).
II.A. The Second Circuit’s reading also contravenes
the case law. As this Court has said, “Congress enacted
ERISA § 406(a)(1), which supplements the fiduciary’s
general duty of loyalty to the plan’s beneficiaries, § 404(a),
[to] categorically bar[] certain transactions deemed ‘likely
to injure the pension plan.’” Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v.
17
Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 241–42 (2000)
(quoting Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S.
152, 160 (1993)). But rather than treating § 1106 as a
categorical bar, the panel reduces it to a reasonableness
analysis—exactly what Harris Trust counsels against.
Worse, the court ties § 1108(b)(2)’s “reasonableness” to
the standard from § 36(b) of the Investment Company
Act, a different statute drafted based on different
conditions and different relationships between the
parties. Indeed, no plaintiff has ever managed to prove a
§ 36(b) claim. That result cannot be what Congress
contemplated while drafting § 1106(a), when it wanted to
give plaintiffs a cause of action to redress the myriad
abuses of plan assets rife pre-ERISA.
II.B. The common law of trusts reinforces a plainlanguage reading of § 1106.
That law has long
acknowledged an information asymmetry in a trust
between the fiduciary and beneficiary. Put simply, the
fiduciary knows things the beneficiary does not. The
interplay between § 1106 and § 1108 recognizes and
reflects this asymmetry. Before discovery, beneficiaries
do not know which exemptions a fiduciary might invoke or
how to show that an exemption is not in play. This is why,
to bring a claim, a beneficiary need only plead the
elements of § 1106—i.e., information that it reasonably
might know. Fiduciaries must then show the applicability
of any exemptions based on information that often only
they know.
II.C. The Department of Labor has repeatedly
treated § 1106(a) as establishing categorical prohibitions
and § 1108 as establishing affirmative defenses that
defendants must plead and prove. See Gov. Br. at 9, 19–
20, Allen v. GreatBanc Tr. Co., 835 F.3d 670 (7th Cir.
18
2016) (No. 15-3569). It has espoused that understanding
in litigation and through regulation and guidance.
III.A. A plain-text reading of § 1106 and § 1108 is also
more functional than the Second Circuit’s rule. For the
former, plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of § 1106,
defendants must plead and present evidence supporting
any exemption under § 1108, and the court must evaluate
the evidence in its entirety. That framework embraces
the text and exemplifies how liability and exemption
provisions work throughout the law.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s rule is both
vague and, by its own implicit admission, ill-defined. The
court tells plaintiffs to negate “at least some” of the § 1108
exemptions, even before discovery. P.A. 18a. But it does
not say which ones. It also says nothing about what
should happen when a defendant invokes more than one
§ 1108 exemption. And it offers no guidance on how a
plaintiff could obtain the necessary information to
plausibly negate the many § 1108 exemptions—
particularly when much of the information related to the
exemptions resides in the hands of the fiduciary.
Consequently, to satisfy the Second Circuit’s rule, a
plaintiff would need to correctly predict which exemptions
a defendant might invoke and correctly plead the
negative of each such exemption, all from facts outside an
ordinary plaintiff’s knowledge.
III.B. Applying the plain language of § 1106 and
§ 1108 does not, contra the Second Circuit, produce
absurd results. Invoking absurdity is an extreme
recourse, proper only in the unusual circumstance “where
it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended
the result.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S.
440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But here, the
19
legislative history affirms that the text says what it means
and means what it says. As reflected in the record,
Congress sought to provide “the maximum degree of
protection to working men and women covered by private
retirement programs,” S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 18 (1973), by
“prohibit[ing] fiduciaries from engaging in transactions
involving the transfer of assets between the plan and
parties in interest,” 120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
III.C. A plain-text reading of § 1106 and § 1108 will
not produce a flood of needless litigation. The Eighth
Circuit provides a case in point. That court adopted a
plain-text approach to § 1106 over fifteen years ago. In
the years since, ERISA litigation has not ground the court
to a halt. That is because ERISA litigation is costly and
time-consuming, involving multiple defendants, multiple
plaintiffs, multiple pre-trial motions, and a sprawling set
of possible exemptions. Moreover, under ERISA’s feeshifting provision, losing parties risk bearing significant
costs for bringing cases just to bring them. And were that
not enough, the Federal Rules allow courts to impose
sanctions against plaintiffs who bring suits without basis.
There is not, in short, some surplus of plaintiffs waiting to
bring test cases to delineate ERISA’s outer reach.
ERISA beneficiaries “sue only when . . . there is a reason
to do so.” Allen, 835 F.3d at 677. And the cases they bring
reflect an important step toward promoting ERISA’s
broadly protective purpose.
20
ARGUMENT
I.
THE
SECOND
CIRCUIT’S
APPROACH
CONFLICTS WITH THE STATUTORY TEXT.
A. Petitioners have satisfied the plain language of
§ 1106, and adding atextual elements to that
language is inappropriate.
Here, “[a]s in any case of statutory construction, our
analysis begins with ‘the language of the statute.’”
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)
(quoting Est. of Cowart v. Nickols Drilling Co., 505 U.S.
469, 475 (1992)). “And where the statutory language
provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” Id. That
command should, as the Ninth Circuit underscored, hold
especially true for ERISA, since it “is ‘an enormously
complex and detailed statute.’” Bugielski v. AT&T Servs.,
Inc., 76 F.4th 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Conkright
v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 509 (2010)).
This instruction—to apply the text as written so long
as the language is clear—should make this a
straightforward case.
After all, no one thinks
§ 1106(a)(1)(C) is ambiguous. The language speaks for
itself. It prohibits “[a] fiduciary” from “caus[ing] the plan
to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that
such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing
of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a
party in interest.” And each of those elements is met
here: (1) Respondents are fiduciaries; (2) TIAA and
Fidelity “provid[e] services to” the Plan, making them
“part[ies] in interest”; and (3) Cornell caused the plan to
engage in transactions with TIAA and Fidelity that
constitute a “furnishing of . . . services.”
Id.
§ 1002(14)(B); id. § 1006(a)(1)(C).
21
Yet concerned that such a reading “would prohibit
fiduciaries from paying third parties to perform essential
services,” Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 584 (7th
Cir. 2022), several circuits have grafted additional
atextual pleading requirements onto § 1106(a) for
plaintiffs seeking to bring such claims, see, e.g., id. at 583
(demanding allegations of self-dealing); Sweda v. Univ. of
Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 338 (3d Cir. 2019) (demanding an
“intent to benefit a party in interest”). This Court,
though, has already explained why such a move is
inappropriate. After all, if courts cannot “supplement[]”
ERISA plaintiffs with “extratextual remedies,” Hughes
Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 447, they cannot saddle plaintiffs
with extratextual requirements.
B. Section 1108’s exemptions are affirmative
defenses to be pleaded and proven by the
defendant.
The Second Circuit, to its credit, disclaimed the
atextual approaches taken by these other courts, seeking
instead a textual hook for dismissing Petitioners’ § 1106
claim. P.A. 19a. But its supposed middle ground—to
remodel § 1106(a) by (1) scaffolding onto it “at least some
of th[e] exemptions” from § 1108, (2) particularly
§ 1108(b)(2), which exempts reasonable arrangements for
necessary services, and (3) then requiring plaintiffs to
plead the negative of “at least some of” these
exemptions—is just as unavailing. P.A. 18a.
That is because ERISA’s prohibited-transaction
provisions already establish a clear structure: § 1106 sets
out general prohibitions and § 1108 provides for specific
exceptions. Even the Second Circuit recognized that
point. See P.A. 14a, 16a (explaining that § 1106 “consists
of three provisions restricting the set of transactions in
22
which plan fiduciaries may engage,” while § 1108
“provides
certain exemptions
from prohibited
transactions”) (cleaned up).
What the panel failed to recognize, however, was “the
general rule of law, which has always prevailed, and
become consecrated almost as a maxim in the
interpretation of statutes.” United States v. Dickson, 40
U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 165 (1841). That rule provides “that
where the enacting clause is general in its language and
objects”—as it is here—and where “a proviso is
afterwards introduced”—again, as is the case here—the
“proviso . . . carves special exceptions only out of the
enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception,
must establish it as being within the words as well as
within the reasons thereof.” Id. (emphasis added). When
the party relying on an exemption is a defendant, the
exemption is an “affirmative defense,” and it is
“incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove such a
defense.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008). The
plaintiff “has no duty to negative” an “affirmative
defense.” Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 473 (2022)
(Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court has applied this familiar framework many
times over many years for many laws, including rules on
employee compensation, Dickson, 40 U.S. at 143;
transportation safety, Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester &
Pittsburgh Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 10 (1907); antitrust, FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44 (1948); agricultural
policy, Javierre v. Cent. Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508
(1910); claim and issue preclusion, Taylor, 553 U.S. at 907;
and (with a narrow exception, discussed below) criminal
law, McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922).
In this same vein, every court of appeals that has
addressed the specific statutory provisions in this case
23
has—until the decision below—uniformly referred to
§ 1108 as delineating affirmative defenses. As Judge
Wood observed in Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., “the
exemptions from prohibited transactions do not provide
alternative explanations; they assume that a transaction
in the prohibited group occurred, and they add additional
facts showing why that particular one is acceptable.” 835
F.3d 670, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2016). “That is how affirmative
defenses work.” Id. at 677. Allen then cited five other
circuits that “agree with the position that section 408
exemptions are affirmative defenses,” including—
notably—a case from the Second Circuit. Id. at 676 (citing
Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1215
(2d Cir. 1987)). And just one year before the panel’s
decision here, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that
understanding. See Haley v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass’n of Am., 54 F.4th 115, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2022) (“It is
well settled that this exercise includes any affirmative
defenses, such as the § 408 exemptions.”) (footnote
omitted).
The panel below said nothing about Haley. On Lowen,
it claimed that its decision would “leave undisturbed” the
understanding that “the defendant fiduciary . . . bears the
burden of persuasion with regard to the applicability of
the § 1108 exceptions.” P.A. 23a. According to the panel,
however, a plaintiff must nevertheless bear the burden of
pleading the negative of a § 1108 exemption, even if the
burden of persuasion remains on the defendant.
That, however, is not how either the Federal Rules or
affirmative defenses—as understood by this Court—
work. On the former, Rule 8(c) specifically provides that
“[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively
state any avoidance or affirmative defense”—i.e., they
must plead it. And were there any doubt on that point,
24
this Court has consistently described “an affirmative
defense” as that “which must be pleaded and proved.”
Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 16
(1939); accord Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 269 n.11
(1980); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007); Taylor, 553
U.S. at 907.
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554
U.S. 84 (2008), is particularly instructive, given the
similarities between the text and structure there with the
provisions here. At issue in Meacham was “[t]he ADEA’s
general prohibitions against age discrimination, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 623(a)–(c), (e), [which] are subject to a separate
provision, § 623(f), [that] create[es] exemptions for
employer practices ‘otherwise prohibited under
subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e).’” Id. at 91. Like this case,
the parties disagreed over which side should plead and
prove a particular exemption. And like this case, the
exemption at issue outlined a “reasonableness” exception
to liability. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (“It shall not be
unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise
prohibited . . . based on reasonable factors other than
age.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(A) (“The prohibitions
provided
in section
1106 . . . shall
not
apply
to . . . reasonable arrangements.”).
Faced with these circumstances, Meacham held that
the defendant “must not only produce evidence raising
the defense”—i.e., the burden of pleading—“but also
persuade the factfinder of its merit”—i.e., the burden of
persuasion. 554 U.S. at 87. As Meacham explains,
“[g]iven how the statute reads, with exemptions laid out
apart from the prohibitions (and expressly referring to
the prohibited conduct as such),” it should be “no surprise
that” § 623(f)(1) presents an “affirmative defense[]” under
the ADEA. Id. at 91. “[M]ost lawyers would accept that
25
characterization as a matter of course,” since “there is no
hint in the text that Congress meant § 623(f)(1) to march
out of step” with the “default rule[] [of] placing the burden
of proving an exemption on the party claiming it.” Id. at
91–93.
C. Traditional tools of statutory construction
confirm Petitioners’ reading.
To be sure, Meacham says that courts should apply
this “default rule[]” unless there are “compelling reasons
to think that Congress” meant otherwise. Id. at 91–93.
But here, the most compelling reasons tip in Petitioners’
favor.
First, that plaintiffs plead liability and defendants
plead exemptions to liability is, as Meacham notes, a
“longstanding convention” that forms “part of the
backdrop against which the Congress writes laws.” Id. at
91. But if Congress knew about and legislated against
that convention when it passed the ADEA in 1967, it knew
about the same principle when it enacted ERISA in 1974.
Second, according to the panel, “to plead a violation of
§ 1106(a)(1)(C), a complaint must plausibly allege that a
fiduciary has caused the plan to engage in a transaction
that constitutes the ‘furnishing of services between the
plan and a party in interest’ where that transaction was
unnecessary or involved unreasonable compensation.”
P.A. 18a–19a (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). That
last clause—where that transaction was unnecessary or
involved unreasonable compensation—is not part of
§ 1106(a)(1)(C),
but
imports
language
from
§ 1108(b)(2)(A). Yet Congress knows how to write a
reasonableness requirement. It wrote one seven years
prior in the ADEA and wrote one in § 1108(b). If
Congress wanted § 1106(a)(1)(C) to include the words
26
“where that transaction was unnecessary or involved
unreasonable compensation,” it could have just done so.
It did not.
Third, the word “exemption” is peppered throughout
§ 1108’s text. In other statutes and other contexts,
Congress has referred to “exemptions” interchangeably
with “affirmative defenses.” See Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974); Schaffer ex rel.
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57 (2005). It has rarely, if
ever, understood “exemptions” as imposing additional
requirements plaintiffs must negate.
Fourth, “[t]he title of a statute and the heading of a
section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt
about the meaning of a statute.” Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528, 540 (2015). That “title” may be “especially
valuable” where “it reinforces what the text’s nouns and
verbs independently suggest.” Id. at 552 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Here, § 1106’s title is plain: “Prohibited
transactions.” Not “Necessary conditions for prohibited
transactions.”
Not “Necessary but not sufficient
conditions for prohibited transactions.”
And not
“Potentially prohibited transactions.” Just “Prohibited
transactions.”
Section 1108’s title is also clear:
“Exemptions from prohibited transactions.” These titles
affirm what the text’s nouns and verbs already suggest:
§ 1106 creates a pathway for plaintiffs to plead liability,
and § 1108 creates specific avenues for defendant
fiduciaries to avoid liability.
Finally, “[j]ust as Congress’ choice of words is
presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural
choices.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338, 353 (2013). In Meacham, the Court underscored that
the ADEA laid out its exemptions in a provision separate
from the general prohibitions: the former was in 29 U.S.C.
27
§ 623(f)(1), the latter in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c) and (e). 554
U.S. at 91. Here, ERISA’s prohibitions and exemptions
are not merely laid out in different parts of the same
section, as they were in Meacham. They are spread
across different sections altogether—§ 1106 and § 1108.
That is a deliberate structural choice that courts should
(but the Second Circuit did not) respect.
D. The Second Circuit’s reliance on § 1106(a)’s
“except as provided” language is inapt.
Against this backdrop, the panel marshaled two
primary arguments in response. Both fail.
First, the panel asserted that its reading “flows
directly from the text and structure of the statute,”
because “[t]he text of § 1106(a) begins with the carveout:
‘Except as provided in section 1108 of this title.’” P.A. 19a.
Thus, in the panel’s view, “the exemptions set out in
§ 1108—including, most pertinently, the exemption for
‘reasonable compensation’ paid for ‘necessary services,’
§ 1108(b)(2)(A)—are incorporated directly into § 1106(a)’s
definition of prohibited transactions.” Id. In support of
that conclusion, the panel drew a “contrast to the
language of § 1106(b), governing ‘transactions between
plan and fiduciary,’ which makes no direct reference
to . . . § 1108.” Id.
But that misreads § 1106(a) and § 1106(b). As the
Sixth and Third Circuits have explained, “the majority of
courts that have examined this statutory interpretation
issue have held that § 1108 applies only to transactions
under § 1106(a), not § 1106(b).” Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 751 F.3d 740, 750
(6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 959 (2014). That is
how best to “give meaning to this discrepancy in the § 406
subsections.” Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 95
28
(3d Cir. 2012). “By expressly limiting liability under
§ 406(a) by reference to the exemptions in § 408, then
removing the same limiting principle from § 406(b),
Congress cast § 406(b) as unyielding.” Id.
That division makes sense. Section 1106(a) addresses
transactions between a plan and party in interest,
whereas § 1106(b) covers transactions between a plan and
fiduciary. It is reasonable to believe that for the latter,
§ 1108 is unavailable because these sorts of transactions
carry an even higher risk of abuse. See, e.g., Patelco
Credit Union v. Sahni, 262 F.3d 897, 911 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that § 1108 “does not provide a safe harbor to
fiduciaries who self-deal”). On the other hand, a limited
number of transactions with parties in interest may assist
with the efficient functioning of a plan, so long as certain
specific exemptions and conditions are satisfied.
The Second Circuit’s reference to the words “[e]xcept
as provided,” and its corresponding claim that such
language means § 1108 is “incorporated directly” into
§ 1106(a), is likewise unavailing. See P.A. 19a–20a.
To start, “[t]housands of statutory provisions use the
phrase ‘except as provided in . . . ’ followed by a crossreference”
without
“otherwise
expand[ing]
or
contract[ing] the scope” of the section. Atl. Richfield Co.
v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1, 16 (2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). An “except as provided” proviso only
“indicate[s] that one rule should prevail over another in
any circumstance in which the two conflict.” Cyan Inc. v.
Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 583 U.S. 416, 428 (2018).
It does not, as the Second Circuit claims, “incorporate[]”
the provisions of one section into another. P.A. 19a.
Next, “except” is another way of saying “exception,”
and “[a]n exception in a statute is a clause designed to
29
reserve or exempt some individuals from the general
class.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
(emphasis added). Exemptions, in turn, are affirmative
defenses that defendants plead, rather than something
plaintiffs negate. Supporting examples abound.
In Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 793
F.3d 355, 364 n.11, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2015), for instance, the
Third Circuit held that exceptions in the section
mentioned by an “except as provided” clause in the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act constituted defenses that
defendants must plead and prove. The Second Circuit
reached the same conclusion interpreting substantially
identical language in § 550(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
ruling that a trustee need not “negate [the] exception in
§ 550(b) to state a claim.” In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv.
Sec. LLC, 12 F.4th 171, 197 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
And in United States v. Just, 74 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir.
1996), the Eighth Circuit held that the “except as
provided” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)—prohibiting
possession of a machinegun—created an affirmative
defense for those possessing machineguns “by or under
the authority of, the United States.”
There are, in short, many cases interpreting “except
as provided” that support Petitioners’ reading.
Respondents have identified none, and Petitioners have
found none, supporting the Second Circuit’s contrary
reading.
E. The Second Circuit’s reference to a narrow
criminal law exception to the general rule is
unavailing.
The panel’s second argument leans on various criminal
cases, starting with United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 168 (1872), for the understanding that “when one
30
cannot articulate what the statute seeks to prohibit
without reference to the exception, then the exception
should be understood as part of the definition of the
prohibited conduct.” P.A. 21a.
But that reliance is misplaced. Cook created “a rule of
criminal pleading,” applicable where necessary to prevent
defects in criminal indictments. United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214, 232 (1875). The Second Circuit itself has
recognized this point, explaining—in response to the sort
of argument Respondents make here—that “Cook is
inapposite [because] it is grounded in the interpretation
of a criminal statute.” In re Madoff, 12 F.4th at 197.
There are several reasons why a different rule (or,
more precisely, an exception to the general rule) is
appropriate in a narrow subset of criminal cases.
Substantive canons like the rule of lenity, background
principles like the presumption of innocence, and
constitutional provisions like the Sixth Amendment
impose unique requirements in criminal law that are
absent in civil statutes. The Court has said as much; in a
case decided three years after Cook, it explained that its
discussion in Cook was tied to a defendant’s
“constitutional right ‘to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation.’” United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 557–58 (1875) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.
VI).
Even so, courts have read and applied Cook narrowly.
They have generally done so when the exception is not
just in the same section but in the same sentence as the
liability provision, treating that placement as a signal of
legislative intent. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S.
62, 68 (1971). But as Just reflects, in the mine-run
criminal matter, an “except as provided” provision—
especially one directing the reader to a separate section
31
of the U.S. Code—signifies an affirmative defense to be
pleaded and proven by the defendant.
And even if Cook were applied to civil cases,
§ 1106(a)(1)(C) would fail its test. That is because Cook
applies only “[w]here a statute defining an offence
contains an exception, in the enacting clause of the
statute, which is so incorporated with the language
defining the offence that the ingredients of the offence
cannot be accurately and clearly described if the
exception is omitted.” 84 U.S. at 173. But § 1106(a)(1)(C)
can be read on its own, barring transactions that involve
a “furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the
plan and a party in interest.” No one disputes what those
words mean or that Respondents’ actions fall within their
ambit. See, e.g., United States v. McArthur, 108 F.3d
1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here one can omit the
exception from the statute without doing violence to the
definition of the offense, the exception is more likely an
affirmative defense.”).
II. THE
SECOND
CIRCUIT’S
APPROACH
CONFLICTS WITH THE CASE LAW, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS, AND GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.
By stitching § 1106 and § 1108 together, the Second
Circuit’s decision also contravenes how this Court has
understood ERISA’s prohibited-transaction provisions,
trust law principles, and federal government practice.
A. Section 1106 establishes a categorical rule for
prohibited transactions.
“Congress
enacted
ERISA
§ 406(a)(1)”
to
“supplement[] the fiduciary’s general duty of loyalty to
32
the plan’s beneficiaries, § 404(a), by categorically barring
certain transactions deemed ‘likely to injure the pension
plan.’” Harris Tr., 530 U.S. at 241–42 (quoting Comm’r v.
Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993)). In
other words, § 1106 covers transactions that a breach of
fiduciary duty claim cannot; there would otherwise be
nothing to “supplement[].” Id. Section 1106 reaches
those transactions because “Congress saw fit in ERISA
to create some bright-line rules.” Allen, 835 F.3d at 676.
And since “per se rules” are “much simpler” to apply,
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 123 (7th Cir. 1984), “a
complaint may fail to state sufficient facts to support a
breach of fiduciary duty claim, yet survive a motion to
dismiss as to a companion prohibited transaction claim
notwithstanding those same deficient facts,” Allen, 835
F.3d at 676.
To see why the Second Circuit’s approach turns that
understanding on its head, look no further than this case.
1. For one, Petitioners’ prohibited-transaction claims
did not “supplement[]” their fiduciary-duty claims. The
former were dismissed on a motion to dismiss. P.A. 108a–
110a. Several of Petitioners’ breach of fiduciary duty
claims, on the other hand, survived the motion to dismiss
and proceeded to summary judgment (and one survived
summary judgment, too). See, e.g., P.A. 85a, 100a.
2. In addition, the Second Circuit’s prescription is
neither a “bright-line rule[]” nor a “categorical[] bar.”
Allen, 835 F.3d at 676; Harris Tr., 530 U.S. at 242. To the
contrary, the panel eschewed a categorical rule for a
context-dependent reasonableness analysis. P.A. 19a
(ellipses omitted). That is exactly what Harris Trust
counsels against.
33
3. Not done, the Second Circuit piles on by anchoring
§ 1108(b)(2) reasonableness to a near-impossible-tosatisfy and entirely inappropriate standard. P.A. 22a.
Importing a standard from the Investment Company Act,
the panel demands future plaintiffs plead that any service
provider compensation be “so disproportionately large
that it bear[] no reasonable relationship to the services
rendered,” before defendants need turn over anything in
discovery, id. (citing Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559
U.S. 335, 346 (2010)). “[F]ees,” in other words, must be
“excessive . . . ‘to the services rendered.’” P.A. 26a
(quoting Jones, 559 U.S. at 346). But that standard lacks
any basis—textual, precedential, or otherwise—and
would cripple ERISA’s remedial framework.
To
begin,
ERISA
already
defines
what
reasonableness is supposed to mean under § 1108(b)(2).
Namely, § 1108(b)(2)(B) provides, for group health plans,
that “[n]o contract or arrangement for services between a
covered plan and a covered service provider . . . is
reasonable within the meaning of [§ 1108(b)(2)] unless the
requirements of this clause are met.” P.A. 124a (footnote
omitted). A substantially identical regulation, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.408b-2, extends those requirements to pension
plans.
Importantly, both 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(B) and 29
C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 enumerate a long list of definitions,
formulas, and requirements. See P.A. 124a–133a. Those
include “[a] description of all direct compensation” and
“[a] description of all indirect compensation,” “including
compensation from a vendor to a brokerage firm based on
a structure of incentives,” but “not including
compensation received by an employee from an
employer.” P.A. 128a; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iv).
34
Both § 1108(b)(2)(B) and its regulatory counterpart
further state that the service provider shall “disclose the
information required” to “the responsible plan fiduciary.”
P.A. 129a–130a; accord 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b2(c)(1)(v)(A). If the information is insufficient, the
“service provider shall furnish” additional information
“[u]pon the written request of the responsible plan
fiduciary.” P.A. 130a; accord 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b2(c)(1)(vi)(A).
At no point does § 1108(b)(2)(B) or
§ 2550.408b-2 contemplate this exchange of information to
the beneficiary.
In other words, if the Second Circuit had wanted to
impose a reasonableness requirement, it could have used
the standard already built into § 1108(b)(2)(B), rather
than borrowing the understanding of reasonableness
from a wholly separate statute. Of course, such a
requirement would ignore the fact that § 1108(b)(2)(B)
expressly contemplates that service providers give
fiduciaries, not beneficiaries, the requisite information to
plead reasonableness. Even so, such an approach would
at least respect the definition of reasonableness that
Congress already established in ERISA, rather than
some “analogous” statute.
More importantly, the ICA and ERISA are not
“analogous.” The mutual funds regulated by the ICA are
evaluated by “disinterested directors” that are privileged
with “all [the] information ‘reasonably . . . necessary to
evaluate the terms’ of the adviser’s contract.” Jones, 559
U.S. at 348 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c)). But ERISA
beneficiaries do not, as outlined above, have “all [the]
information.” Id.
Furthermore, as Jones recognizes, Congress drafted
the ICA provision at issue to be “more favorable” to
35
shareholders in some ways (e.g., by making available
some previously unavailable remedies) but made clear
that the ICA would “not permit a compensation
agreement to be reviewed in court for ‘reasonableness.’”
Id. at 341. By holding in Jones that ICA plaintiffs may
plead a claim only if they can show a fee was “so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered,” id. at 346, the
Court was thus not delineating a reasonableness
standard. It was setting the outer bounds of what a
plaintiff must do, in the absence of a standard, to proceed
with a fiduciary duty claim.
The reality of how that standard has played out
crystallizes the point: “[N]o plaintiff ever has prevailed
on a Section 36(b) claim.” David Kotler et al., Navigating
the Recent Wave of Section 36(b) Litigation: What Have
We Learned?, 29 INVESTMENT LAWYER 1, 2 (2022). Thus,
contrary to this Court’s instruction that § 1106 was meant
to “categorically bar[]” certain transactions, Harris Tr.,
530 U.S. at 241–42, importing the ICA’s standard would
categorically shield fiduciaries from liability.
B. The common law of trusts supports Petitioners’
reading.
The Court has also said that Congress “codif[ied] and
ma[de] applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain principles
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.” Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989);
accord LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S.
248, 253 n.4 (2008) (“The common law of trusts . . . informs
our interpretation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”).
1. That law has long recognized an information
asymmetry between the trustee, who acts as a fiduciary,
36
and the beneficiary.
Namely, these “fiduciary
relationships lend themselves to exploitation” because
“the trustee’s position gives him superior knowledge of all
the facts and circumstances.” Robert W. Hallgring, The
Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act and the Basic Principles
of Fiduciary Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801, 810–
11 (1966). Consequently, at common law, the duty of
loyalty was “particularly intense so that, in most
circumstances, its prohibitions are absolute for
prophylactic reasons.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS, § 78 cmt. b.
These principles map well onto the provisions at hand.
As noted, § 1106(a) was “enacted [to] . . . supplement[]”
the duty of loyalty. Harris Tr., 530 U.S. at 241–42. It does
so as the Restatement instructs: through “absolute”
prohibitions. RESTATEMENT § 78 cmt. b. And given the
information asymmetry between beneficiary and
fiduciary, the prohibitions are written broadly so that a
beneficiary may bring a claim based on what they would
reasonably know, rather than on information they do not
reasonably have access to.
2.
Accordingly, a beneficiary may bring a
§ 1106(a)(1)(C) claim when they can show their fiduciary
entered a transaction with a party in interest for the
“furnishing of goods, services, or facilities.” But a
beneficiary would have little reason to know whether that
transaction was reasonable, necessary, and for reasonable
compensation given the information asymmetry outlined.
Nor are service contracts unique. Take a loan between
a plan and an interested party. It would be sensible, given
ERISA’s protective purpose, for Congress to empower
plaintiffs to bring a claim when they know such a loan has
been extended. Section 1106(a)(1)(B) provides as much.
37
See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (barring the “lending of
money or other extension of credit between the plan and
a party in interest”). Section 1108(b)(1), in turn, lays out
an exemption for certain loans. But that exemption
imposes five separate requirements: (1) reasonable
equivalence, (2) non-preferential treatment of highly
compensated employees, (3) compliance with plan
provisions, (4) reasonable interest rates, and (5) adequate
security. It is “implausible that any would-be defendant
would voluntarily turn over confidential financial
information” of this kind—which is exactly why, under
both text and trust law, defendants would need to plead
and prove the exemption. Allen, 835 F.3d at 677.
3. These concerns are not merely hypothetical.
Consider Haley v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n
of America. There, TIAA offered “collateralized loan
products” to beneficiaries of a university retirement plan.
54 F.4th at 118. To defend itself against a § 1106(a) claim,
TIAA invoked two § 1108(b) exemptions: (b)(1), which
exempts loans, and (b)(17), which separately “permits
transactions . . . as long as the plan pays no more and
receives no less than ‘adequate consideration.’” Id. at 120.
As laid out above, (b)(1) requires detailed information on
at least five conditions. And (b)(17) is no different.
Indeed, TIAA argued at class certification—and the
Second Circuit largely agreed—“that individualized proof
must be marshalled from non-party plan fiduciaries
showing how each plan fiduciary valued the assets and
whether, given other options available to the plan, the
fiduciary exercised good faith in selecting the terms
offered by TIAA.” Id. at 122.
There is no scenario where a beneficiary would have
this information—what the party in interest shared with
38
the fiduciary, how the fiduciary valued assets, and
whether the fiduciary exercised good faith—before
discovery. More to the point, Congress was not blind to
that dilemma. To the contrary, it understood fiduciaries
would have the information to plead and prove § 1108
exemptions. In fact, in many instances, it ensured they
would, requiring disclosure to fiduciaries of relevant
information.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(B)(iii).
Consistent with the common law, it then placed the onus
on fiduciaries to present such information through one or
more affirmative defenses under § 1108.
C. Petitioners’ reading of § 1106 and § 1108 tracks
federal government practice.
The Department of Labor has primary authority for
administering and enforcing ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(13), 1132–1138, 1204(a). It has, in these roles,
often had occasion to address the Act’s prohibitedtransaction provisions.
Its views dovetail with
Petitioners’ understanding.
1. On the exemption at issue, the Department spoke
in plain terms more than a decade ago when it issued a
regulation stating that “a service relationship between a
plan and a service provider would constitute a prohibited
transaction.” 77 Fed. Reg. 5632 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). It later issued 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.408b-2, which specified what parties in interest
must disclose to fiduciaries as a prerequisite to claiming a
§ 1108(b)(2) exemption.
2. The Department has espoused a similar
understanding in litigation. In Chao v. Hall Holding, Co.,
285 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1168 (2003), the Labor Secretary sued various defendants
39
for “purchasing stock on the [plan’s] behalf without
adequate investigation and [for] overpaying for the
stock.” In relevant part, the Secretary noted that “Hall
Holding was a party in interest because it was a fiduciary
and because it owned more than 10% of Hall Chemical, the
employer of plan participants.” Gov. Br. at 24, Hall
Holding, 285 F.3d 415 (No. 00-3041). “The stock sale
between the plan and Hall Holding was therefore a
prohibited transaction under 29 U.S.C. [§] 1106(a)(1).” Id.
The government acknowledged that “Section 408(e) of
ERISA creates an exemption from Section 406 for ‘the
acquisition or sale by a plan of qualifying employer
securities.’” Id. But it emphasized that defendants “bear
the burden of proving that they meet this exception.” Id.
at 24–25. The Sixth Circuit agreed. 285 F.3d at 437. And
when the defendants in Hall subsequently sought cert.,
the Secretary reiterated that ERISA “prohibited the
[fiduciaries’] stock sale [at issue] unless an exemption
permitted it.” Gov. Br. Opp’n Cert. at 13, Hall Holding,
537 U.S. 1168 (No. 02-593). The Court denied review.
3. The Department followed the same course in Allen
v. GreatBanc, where the plaintiff alleged a defendant had
entered a prohibited transaction because it had engaged
in a sale and loan with a party in interest. 2015 WL
5821772, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015). The district court,
much like the Second Circuit here, reasoned that pleading
that fact alone was insufficient: A plaintiff needed to plead
facts negating the applicability of the exemptions set forth
in § 1108. Id. at *4. The Secretary, in an amicus brief on
appeal, disagreed. It instead endorsed the Eighth
Circuit’s reading from Braden v. Wal-Mart, 588 F.3d 585
(8th Cir. 2009), stating that “the only obligation imposed
on a plaintiff asserting a prohibited transaction claim is to
plead and prove the existence of a transaction prohibited
40
by section 406(a).” Gov. Br. at 18, Allen, 835 F.3d 670 (No.
15-3569).
As the Secretary explained, “section 408 exemptions
are affirmative defenses on which the defendant has the
burden of proof,” and “it is [thus] a defendant’s obligation
to plead the applicability of an affirmative defense, and to
do so consistent with the requirements of Rule 8(a).” Id.
at 9, 19–20. “[A] plaintiff is not required to negate an
affirmative defense in his complaint.” Id. at 19. The
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and, in so
doing, substantially embraced the Secretary’s
understanding. Allen, 835 F.3d at 677.
4. On top of the twenty-one exemptions in § 1108(b),
§ 1108(a)(2) authorizes the Labor Secretary “to create
exemptions to ERISA’s prohibition on certain plan
holdings, acquisitions, and transactions, but only if doing
so is in the interests of the plan’s ‘participants and
beneficiaries.’” Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 846 (1997).
Parties have not been shy about availing themselves of
this procedure. Since 1996, the government has granted
more than 800 individual exemptions and 17 class
exemptions. Dep’t of Lab., Individual Exemptions,
https://perma.cc/VW28-7N8Q; Dep’t of Lab., Class
Exemptions, https://perma.cc/G2NQ-XF28.
It has
granted those exemptions to service providers like
Fidelity. See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2008-14;
D-11424, 73 Fed. Reg. 70378, 70381 (2008). And it has
granted exemptions where it “[did] not believe Congress
intended to cover” certain relationships. Chamber of
Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 885 F.3d 360, 367 (5th Cir.
2018).
In short, if Respondents wish to avoid § 1106(a),
ERISA provides them several ways to do so. They can
41
plead and later prove their actions fall under § 1108(b)(2).
They can plead another applicable § 1108(b) exemption.
They can seek clarification and coverage under § 1108(a).
What they cannot do is compel plaintiffs to plead facts
they do not know and which they do not, absent discovery,
have access to.
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPROACH IS A
“FIX” TO A NON-EXISTENT PROBLEM.
Lacking support from the statutory text, case law, or
prior government practice, the Second Circuit turns to a
last redoubt: policy concerns. As the panel below outlines,
it eschewed a “literal reading” of § 1106 in favor of a rule
that, it insists, is more workable and less “absurd.” P.A.
17a. It is neither of those things.
A. The Second Circuit’s reading is unworkable.
1. To start, ERISA already sets out a workable
framework for plaintiffs, defendants, and courts for
prohibited-transaction claims.
For plaintiffs, § 1106 imposes certain bright-line
requirements: e.g., allege a transaction, identify a party in
interest, and show how that transaction constituted a
“furnishing of goods, services, or facilities” between the
plan and that party in interest. Once those boxes are
checked, defendants may plead and later offer evidence of
the applicability of any relevant exemptions. And
courts—as in any other case—evaluate the entirety of
that evidence.
Such a framework “protect[s] . . . the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans” by “provid[ing]
[them with] appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
42
access to the Federal courts.” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b); Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). At the
same time, the framework does not “unduly discourage
employers from offering [ERISA] plans.” Conkright, 559
U.S. at 517. After all, not every transaction provides a
cause of action under § 1106(a). Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,
517 U.S. 882, 895 (1996), for example, held “that the
payment of benefits” to current and former employees
“does not constitute a prohibited transaction.” That is so
even if the payment is large, as in Spink.
What § 1106(a) targets is not the amount of money
that changes hands, but “commercial bargains that
present a special risk . . . because they are struck with
plan insiders.” Id. at 893. These transactions naturally
“involve uses of plan assets that are potentially harmful to
the plan.” Id. In Congress’s judgment, a service contract
between an interested party and a plan fiduciary,
§ 1106(a)(1)(C), is one such potentially harmful
transaction, just as a sale of securities, § 1106(a)(1)(A), a
loan, § 1106(a)(1)(B), or a transfer of property,
§ 1106(a)(1)(D), can be potentially harmful.
2. On the other hand, requiring plaintiffs to marshal
and plead evidence to negate every conceivable exemption
would paralyze ERISA enforcement. To see why,
consider the hurdles a plaintiff must overcome to plead a
claim under the Second Circuit’s rule, starting with the
“simplest” case: a defendant that invokes only a single
§ 1108 exemption.
That would still leave plaintiffs in a bind because, “[n]o
matter how clever or diligent, ERISA plaintiffs generally
lack the inside information necessary to make out their
claims in detail unless and until discovery commences.”
Braden, 588 F.3d at 598. The preceding sections cover all
43
that a plaintiff would need to do to negate an exemption
under (b)(1) (for loans); (b)(2) (for services); (b)(3) (for
stock ownership plans); (b)(15) (for block trades); and
(b)(17) (for investment advice). None of these exemptions
are straightforward; all involve facts outside a plaintiff’s
knowledge.
Worse yet, when defendants are sued, many invoke
more than one get-out-of-jail-free card. That happened in
Haley when TIAA invoked § 1108(b)(1) and § 1108(b)(17).
54 F.4th at 120. In Dupree v. Prudential Insurance, 2007
WL 2263892, at *39 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007), the defendant
claimed three: § 1108(b)(2), § 1108(b)(5), and § 1108(b)(8).
Defendants have, indeed, been taking this kitchen-sink
approach to § 1108(b) for decades. See McLaughlin v.
Rowley, 698 F. Supp. 1333, 1339–40 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(§ 1108(b)(1) and § 1108(b)(2)); Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F.
Supp. 341, 351–52 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (same).
To reiterate: Under the Second Circuit’s rule,
plaintiffs must correctly predict every exemption that
could apply and then plead plausible allegations negating
each such exemption even if these exemptions have
conditions which themselves have sub-conditions. If they
fail at any junction, they have no claim, and defendants
need not turn over anything in discovery.
3. To deflect against this concern, the Second Circuit
tries to hedge: “[A]t least some [§ 1108] exemptions,” it
says, must be pleaded by plaintiffs, including § 1108(b)(2).
P.A. 18a. But that obviously does not make the statutory
provisions more workable; it just leaves parties in the
dark about what “some” is supposed to encompass. More
importantly, the text does not hedge. The Second
Circuit’s asserted textual hook—“except as provided”—
does not discriminate between the § 1108 exemptions.
44
Thus, if, as the Second Circuit claims, it “flows directly
from the text” that some of § 1108 exemptions “are
incorporated into § 1106(a)’s prohibitions,” P.A. 18a–19a,
then they all are. The Second Circuit does not identify a
limiting principle to its rule because none exists. The
proper limiting principle is already built into the text:
Plaintiffs plead liability under one provision; defendants
plead any applicable exemption from liability under
another.
B. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions is not absurd.
Following the text as written does not produce
“absurd results.” P.A. 16a. Absurdity, as this Court has
explained, should apply in the “rare and exceptional
circumstance[]” where embracing the plain language
would be “so gross as to shock the general moral or
common sense.” Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60
(1930). A plain language reading is, put another way,
absurd only “where it is quite impossible that Congress
could have intended the result.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t
of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In like manner, leading commentators have
argued that courts “should permit such displacement” of
the text “only when the legislature’s action violates the
Constitution.”
John F. Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2486 (2003). This case
presents none of those circumstances.
1. There is nothing “rare” or “exceptional” about
Congress writing a law with, in the Second Circuit’s
words, a “broad scope” followed by a set of specific
exemptions. P.A. 22a. It writes such laws all the time.
The ADEA, after all, “broadly prohibits arbitrary
discrimination in the workplace based on age.” Trans
45
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985).
But as Meacham demonstrates, that broad prohibition is
subject to several specific exemptions, including a
reasonableness exemption—and those exemptions fall on
the defendant to plead and prove. 554 U.S. at 87.
2. Next, it is not “impossible that Congress could have
intended the result.” Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 471. To
the contrary, the legislative history shows that it
“intended that coverage under the Act be construed
liberally to provide the maximum degree of protection to
working men and women covered by private retirement
programs. Conversely, exemptions should be confined to
their narrow purpose[s].” S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 18 (1973).
Consistent with these intentions, Congress wanted,
through the prohibited-transaction provisions, to
“substantially strengthen[]” pre-ERISA protections by
“establish[ing] new rules that define the transactions that
are prohibited.” 120 CONG. REC. 29954 (1974) (remarks of
Sen. Nelson). And it sought to do so by “prohibit[ing]
fiduciaries from engaging in transactions involving the
transfer of assets between the plan and parties in
interest.” 120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
3. Finally, there is nothing unconstitutional about
Congress writing a law providing for broad liability for
prohibited transactions. That is especially so when the
law provides multiple offramps from liability. Section
1106 does not, for instance, cover all transactions and
payments. Spink, 517 U.S. at 895. Nor does it “prohibit
necessary services or impede necessary service
transactions.” Bugielski, 76 F.4th at 907 (internal
quotation marks omitted). At most, it requires interested
parties to disclose relevant information about potentially
46
prohibited transactions to the fiduciary, outlines how a
fiduciary can ask for more information if it needs to, and
lets a fiduciary avail itself of any potentially applicable
statutory and administrative exemptions. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1108(b)(2)(B). There is nothing absurd about that. It
instead reflects a “statute designed to promote the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
90 (1983).
C. A plain-language reading of the prohibitedtransaction provisions has not led to a needless
rise in litigation.
Underlying the Second Circuit’s contorted textualism
and invocation of absurdity is a pragmatic concern: that a
plain-language reading of § 1106 would “encompass a vast
array of routine transactions.” P.A. 21a. Opening that
window would, Respondents suggest, exacerbate a
“dramatic rise in the number of ERISA lawsuits over
recordkeeping fees in recent years.” BIO at 15. That
concern is both irrelevant and unfounded.
1. It is irrelevant because, “even supposing
[Respondents’] worst predictions come true, that would
be the result of the statute Congress drafted.” Muldrow
v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 358 (2024). And the
result here—more litigation—is consistent with what
Congress had in mind when it enacted ERISA. Indeed,
as lower courts have observed, “excessive fee
litigation . . . has significantly improved [retirement]
plans, brought to light fiduciary misconduct that has
detrimentally impacted the retirement savings of
American workers, and dramatically brought down fees.”
Kelly v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 2020 WL 434473, at *2 (D.
Md. Jan. 28, 2020). This has “led to enormous fee savings
47
for plan participants.” Marshall v. Northrop Grumman
Corp., 2020 WL 5668935, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020).
A statute that leads to more excessive fee lawsuits and
subsequently results in less excessive fees does not
contravene ERISA’s “broadly protective purposes.”
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96 (1993). It reinforces them.
2. It is also unfounded because there is little indication
needless lawsuits are being filed. After all, the parties and
the Second Circuit agree that the Eighth Circuit has
“embraced the expansive reading of” § 1106 in Braden.
P.A. 17a. In the fifteen years since, ERISA cases have not
ground the Eighth Circuit to a halt. Nor has there been
some proliferation of complaints with standalone § 1106
claims and threadbare allegations. Several reasons help
explain that result.
First, bringing an ERISA case is expensive and timeconsuming, involving multiple defendants and many
potential exemptions. The prototypical plaintiff will,
given such constraints, “sue only when . . . there is a
reason to do so.” Allen, 835 F.3d at 677. Plaintiffs do not
sue when they have strong “reason to believe [a]
transaction was exempt under [§ 1108]” or, for that
matter, over “something as trivial as a chair for a person
to sit in.” Id. Though these conditions might formally
satisfy § 1106(a), they would get a plaintiff nowhere in
practice.
Second, ERISA and the Federal Rules include several
mechanisms to deter plaintiffs from bringing cases to test
the waters of the theoretical outer boundaries of § 1106.
ERISA, for instance, permits cost-shifting. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(1). And the Federal Rules allow courts to
impose sanctions when plaintiffs bring groundless
48
litigation. See Fish v. GreatBanc Tr. Co., 749 F.3d 671,
687 (7th Cir. 2014).
Both mechanisms—fees and
sanctions—discourage plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits
just to bring lawsuits. Indeed, the district court here,
following approval of the settlement, determined that
defendants were prevailing parties (even though one of
Petitioners’ claims survived summary judgment) and
awarded them over $25,000 in costs. D. Ct. Dkt. 471 at 7.
Finally, Thole v. U.S. Bank, 590 U.S. 538, 542 (2020),
dismissed an ERISA case for lack of standing. There are
important distinctions between this case and Thole. Thole
involved a different type of plan, a different remedy, and
a different source of injury. The point is not that Thole
bars prohibited-transaction claims based on seemingly
“routine transactions.” P.A. 21a. It is that, recognizing
the possibility of dismissal, few if any plaintiffs will bring
such suits to begin with.
* * *
When Congress enacted ERISA, it opened the door
for beneficiaries to bring claims against fiduciaries for
actions that could be “potentially harmful to the plan.”
Spink, 517 U.S. at 893. But just because it opened that
door does not mean every plaintiff will walk through it.
Instead, as experience instructs, plaintiffs do so only if the
benefits outweigh the costs and risks in a particular case.
And even if they jump through those hoops, there is no
guarantee a plaintiff will carry the day. All it means is
that defendants must plead and prove their own case, and
a court must consider all the evidence to determine
whether a claim should proceed.
49
Rather than applying this sensible framework, the
Second Circuit chose to close the door entirely for all but
the handful of plaintiffs who can guess which exemptions
a defendant might invoke (based on information that
plaintiffs do not have) and plead the negative of those
exemptions (based on information that plaintiffs do not
have). That cannot be what Congress envisioned and is
not what the text provides.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Second Circuit should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
JEROME J. SCHLICHTER
SEAN E. SOYARS
SCHLICHTER BOGARD
LLP
100 South Fourth Street
Suite 1200
St. Louis, MO 63102
XIAO WANG
Counsel of Record
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
SCHOOL OF LAW SUPREME
COURT LITIGATION CLINIC
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
(434) 924-8956
x.wang@law.virginia.edu
Counsel for Petitioners
November 22, 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.