Reply Brief — West Virginia, et al., Applicants v. B.P.J., By Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson
Supreme Court briefMar 22, 2023
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No. 22A800
In the Supreme Court of the United States
THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION;
WEST VIRGINIA SECONDARY SCHOOL ACTIVITIES COMMISSION; W. CLAYTON BURCH,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS STATE SUPERINTENDENT; AND LAINEY ARMISTEAD,
Applicants,
v.
B.P.J., BY NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER, HEATHER JACKSON,
Respondent.
——————
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION TO VACATE THE INJUNCTION
ENTERED BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
JOHN J. BURSCH
CHRISTIANA M. KIEFER
440 First Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20001
jbursch@ADFlegal.org
ckiefer@ADFlegal.org
(616) 450-4235
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
LINDSAY S. SEE
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Senior Deputy Solicitor General
JOHANNES S. WIDMALM-DELPHONSE
44180 Riverside Pkwy.
Lansdowne, VA 20176
jwidmalmdelphonese@ADFlegal.org
(571) 707-4655
CURTIS R. A. CAPEHART
Deputy Attorney General
JONATHAN A. SCRUGGS
JACOB P. WARNER
15100 N. 90th Street
Scottsdale, AZ 85260
jscruggs@ADFlegal.org
jwarner@ADFlegal.org
(480) 444-0020
OFFICE OF THE WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
GRANT A. NEWMAN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for State of West Virginia
Counsel for Lainey Armistead
[additional counsel listed after signature page]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents.............................................................................................................. i
Table of Authorities .........................................................................................................ii
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 1
Argument ........................................................................................................................ 2
I.
Under the correct standard, Applicants deserve relief......................................... 2
II. Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits. .................................................... 5
III. The balance of harms strongly favors vacating the injunction. ........................... 10
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Atkin v. State of Kansas,
191 U.S. 207 (1903) .................................................................................................................10
Barthuli v. Bd. of Trustees of Jefferson Elementary Sch. Dist.,
434 U.S. 1337 (1977) .................................................................................................................3
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) ...............................................................................................................8
Brown v. Gilmore,
533 U.S. 1301 (2001) ........................................................................................................... 4, 10
Bucklew v. Precythe,
139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) ...............................................................................................................8
Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47 (1977) .....................................................................................................................6
Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan,
500 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2007) ....................................................................................................2
Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb,
409 U.S. 1235 (1972) ...............................................................................................................11
Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) ...............................................................................................................6, 7
Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agr.,
553 U.S. 591 (2008) ...................................................................................................................6
Glossip v. Gross,
576 U.S. 863 (2015) ...................................................................................................................5
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.,
No. 16-273 .................................................................................................................................9
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183 (2010) ...................................................................................................................2
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Lux v. Rodrigues,
561 U.S. 1306 (2010) .................................................................................................................3
Maryland v. King,
567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ..............................................................................................................11
McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck,
370 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................13
Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cnty.,
450 U.S. 464 (1981) ...................................................................................................................6
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982) ...................................................................................................................6
Mitchell v. Kemp,
107 S. Ct. 3248 (1987) ...............................................................................................................4
Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53 (2001) .................................................................................................................6, 8
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ...................................................................................................................2
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979) ...............................................................................................................5, 6
Purcell v. Gonzalez,
549 U.S. 1 (2006).......................................................................................................................3
State of Tennessee, et al., and Assoc. of Christian Schs. Int’l v. Dept. of Ed.,
No. 22-5807 (6th Cir.) ............................................................................................................10
Strange v. Searcy,
574 U.S. 1145 (2015) ...............................................................................................................11
United States v. Edge Broad. Co.,
509 U.S. 418 (1993) ...................................................................................................................5
United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996) ...................................................................................................................6
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7 (2008)............................................................................................................... 11, 13
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC,
542 U.S. 1305 (2004) .................................................................................................................1
Wise v. Circosta,
978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020) ......................................................................................................4
Other Authorities
App. to Vacate Inj., Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 477 (2022) (No. 22-506),
2022 WL 17330762 ...................................................................................................................2
ATHLETIC.NET, https://bit.ly/3LNISMi (last visited Mar. 21, 2023) ......................................12
Chris W. Surprenant, Accommodating Transgender Athletes, 18 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 905 (2020) ..........................................................................................................7
Pl.’s Mot. to Stay, Exs. A & B, B.P.J. v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., No.
2:21-cv-00316 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 20, 2023) ............................................................................12
iv
INTRODUCTION
This Application is not controversial. The sole question is whether the Fourth
Circuit properly enjoined enforcement of a sovereign State’s law based on an apparent
belief that local officials must use gender identity instead of sex to mark the line between
male and female sports. The district court, after thoroughly reviewing a complete record,
held that a State can assign athletic teams by sex without offending the Equal Protection
Clause or Title IX, particularly when all parties recognize the benefits from separate sports
teams, and where biological differences between males and females are the very reason
those separate teams exist.
Yet two Fourth Circuit judges summarily awarded
extraordinary relief based on an unexplained view to the contrary, giving short shrift to the
trial court’s careful work.
Respondent hardly tries to defend that split decision on its merits—nor does
Respondent explain how “the most critical and exigent circumstances” justified the Fourth
Circuit’s intervention in the first place. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 542 U.S. 1305, 1306
(2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers) (cleaned up). Instead, Respondent largely pleads “no
harm no foul” by trying to rewrite the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the narrowest possible
terms. But this case is about more than just one plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit’s order harms
girls by displacing them from athletic standings and women’s sports teams. And it harms
the voters of West Virginia by cancelling their legislative choices by flat judicial decree. A
bare majority of two appellate judges should not be allowed to undo half a century of wellunderstood law and practice when it comes to interscholastic sports. This Court should
vacate the injunction.
1
ARGUMENT
I.
Under the correct standard, Applicants deserve relief.
Applicants invoked the correct legal standard. In suggesting otherwise, Respondent
misunderstands both the form of the order below and the nature of the relief that
Applicants seek from this Court.
A. To be clear: Applicants have asked this Court for immediate relief from the
Fourth Circuit’s order entering an injunction, not for “an emergency stay” or to “vacate [a]
stay” below. Opp. 20. The difference is critical. A request to vacate an injunction hinges
on the traditional factors associated with injunctive relief, including the party’s arguments
for the injunction below and the court’s reasons (or lack thereof) for issuing it. E.g., App.
to Vacate Inj., Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 477 (2022) (No. 22-506), 2022 WL 17330762, at
*15 (United States arguing “the likelihood of success on the merits and the equities” in
applying for immediate relief from the Eighth Circuit’s “unsupported” order entering
injunction) (cleaned up)). The decision should account for a loss in the district court. E.g.,
Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
(“Once a plaintiff has litigated and lost, a higher standard is required for an injunction
pending appeal.”). In contrast, a request for a stay asks the Court to “suspend judicial
alteration of the status quo,” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 429 (2009), and requires an
applicant to satisfy an entirely different set of factors, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183,
190 (2010) (per curiam). Applicants are challenging an injunction, so the traditional factors
for analyzing an injunction apply.
2
Respondent has confused this remedy issue before. At the front end of the appeal
below, Respondent moved for a “stay” of the district court’s order granting summary
judgment and dissolving its earlier preliminary injunction. But the Fourth Circuit at least
saw Respondent’s request for what it was: a motion for “the extraordinary interim remedy
of a mandatory injunction.” Barthuli v. Bd. of Trustees of Jefferson Elementary Sch. Dist.,
434 U.S. 1337, 1339 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); cf. Appl. App. 1a-2a (construing
“motion for stay pending appeal … as a motion for an injunction pending appeal” and
granting the motion).
Indeed, it was the district court’s judgment—not the Fourth
Circuit’s—that restored the status quo.
So a “stay” of that judgment would have
“amount[ed] to nothing more than a mere declaration in the air” and “accomplish[ed]
nothing whatever for” Respondent on appeal. Barthuli, 434 U.S. at 1339 (cleaned up). Yet
instead of explaining how Respondent had made and met the “indisputably clear” case for
the Fourth Circuit to issue the extraordinary relief of a mandatory injunction, Lux v.
Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306, 1307 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (cleaned up), the Fourth
Circuit said nothing. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating
injunction entered by two circuit judges via “bare order” that included “no explanation …
showing the ruling and findings of the District Court to be incorrect”).
This Court should reject Respondent’s framing here, just as the Fourth Circuit did.
It should treat the Fourth Circuit’s unreasoned order as the injunction it is—and set it
aside.
B. Respondent also fixates on the irrelevant question of whether this case presents
an “emergency” in some subjective sense. See, e.g., Opp. 1-4, 21, 23-25. The underlying
3
need here is urgent. See infra Section III. But really, the application must turn on whether
Applicants have shown that they are entitled to relief from the Fourth Circuit’s order
enjoining the “enforcement of a presumptively valid state statute.” Brown v. Gilmore, 533
U.S. 1301, 1303 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers). Applicants have done just that.
Relatedly, Applicants have not somehow forfeited their ability to seek relief from
this Court by their decision not to appeal the district court’s earlier preliminary injunction
that rested on an undeveloped record. This Court is generally not in the business of secondguessing “strategic decisions” or narrowing the “wide degree of latitude” attorneys have to
make them. Mitchell v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3248, 3251 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). And this case is no exception, as Applicants’ decision to hold off on an
appeal flowed from a drive to have these issues finally decided on the fullest record possible.
Eventually, that’s exactly what happened. And the district court’s summary-judgment
order proved that Applicants made the right call: Once the district court considered “all of
the evidence in the record,” Appl. App. 28a, it dissolved its injunction. This considered
decision was no “about-face” ruling “without any explanation,” Opp. 16; just reading it is
enough to reject that idea. But faced with a condensed record and a few short days of
review, the Fourth Circuit saw fit to upset the sound decision anyway.
And indeed, once the Fourth Circuit issued its injunction, the same prudence that
stayed Applicants’ hand at the initial preliminary-injunction stage propelled the Application
forward here. With the record below set in stone and the Fourth Circuit’s order lacking
any details or boundaries, this Court provided Applicants the only remaining option to
preserve the status quo during appeal. See Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2020)
4
(en banc) (“[I]t is the state’s action—not any intervening federal court decision—that [sets]
the status quo.”). The Court should now act, too.
II.
Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits.
One of the tells that Respondent wants to focus on anything other than the ordinary
injunction factors (and the Fourth Circuit’s choice to skip over them) is the mere 4.5 pages
the response spends on the merits. Opp. 31-35. Yet likelihood of success is critical to
interlocutory injunctive relief. Cf. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015) (describing
how preliminary injunction “turn[ed] on … likelihood of success on the merits”). And the
merits of this case are simple: Designating sports teams by sex is not controversial or in
dispute. Indeed, B.P.J. wants to benefit from this separation by playing on the girls’ team.
But rather than focus on sex, the response refashions the Sports Act into a law that
deliberately excludes athletes who identify as transgender. Opp. 31. According to the brief,
intermediate scrutiny requires West Virginia to set aside biological factors in the expressly
physical context of sports to accommodate any male who identifies as female. Id. And
further, Respondent thinks Bostock v. Clayton County’s Title VII analysis purportedly
controls this case and dictates that Title IX prohibits excluding biologically male athletes
from women’s sports teams. Opp. 32. Both these positions are wrong.
As this Court has held repeatedly, whether a statute satisfies equal protection does
not depend on “whether the governmental interest is directly advanced as applied to a
single person or entity.” United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427 (1993). Rather,
equal protection focuses on “the basic validity of the legislative classification” and whether
it furthers the government’s objective. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979). That broader perspective explains why plaintiffs bringing equal-protection claims
5
will “generally allege that they have been arbitrarily classified as members of an
‘identifiable group,’” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (quoting Feeney,
442 U.S. at 279), and courts focus on how the legislation affects that group, Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47, 55 (1977). In short, a “broad legislative classification must be judged by
reference to characteristics typical of the affected classes rather than by focusing on
selected, atypical examples.” Id.
Sex-based classifications are no exception. The Court has always looked at a
challenged statute’s disparate treatment of men and women as a whole, not at an equalprotection plaintiff’s individual circumstances. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256. Those cases boil down to the idea that legislatures can
pass laws that “realistically reflect[] the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in
certain circumstances.” Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 469
(1981) (plurality op.); accord Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63-64 (law may impose “a different set of
rules” to prove biological parenthood “with respect to fathers and mothers” because of “the
unique relationship of the mother to the event of birth”).
It’s impossible to square these precedents with Respondent’s new rule requiring a
gender-identity-based classification here.
Sex-based classifications are valid if “sex
represents a legitimate, accurate proxy” for a permissible objective. Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 204 (1976). And Respondent’s counsel conceded below that gender identity “is not
a useful indicator of athletic performance.” Appl. App. 214a (167:22-168:1). In sports,
6
fairness is an important objective, and fairness is furthered by designating teams based on
the average physiological differences between the sexes.
So West Virginia’s Sport Act is valid under the Court’s equal-protection metrics. It
does not traffic in mere “generalizations” with some “statistical support.” Contra Opp. 33
n.14; see Craig, 429 U.S. at 190 (invalidating law regulating alcohol sales that favored
women because men were more likely to drive drunk). Indeed, under the opposition brief’s
logic, sex itself is a stereotype, which would make all sex-designated sports
unconstitutional. That’s never been the law. See, e.g., Appl. 2-3. Like many laws before it,
the Sports Act just seeks to accommodate physiological differences rooted in biological sex
in a context where those differences matter.
In its limited merits analysis, the opposition brief claims that the Sports Act newly
“singles out” individuals who identify differently from their biological sex, Opp. 31, and
focuses primarily on Respondent alone, failing to grapple with how the Act treats men and
women as a whole. Neither stratagem works.
The Act is not a new “exclusion.” Opp. 31. West Virginia schools have long assigned
athletic teams based on sex, and until recently, everyone understood that meant biological
sex.
It was only after male athletes started competing in women’s sports at the
international, national, and state levels that West Virginia’s Legislature responded by
clarifying that “sex” means “biology” in women’s athletics. See, e.g., Chris W. Surprenant,
Accommodating Transgender Athletes, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 905, 906 (2020)
(explaining that “recent” cases in which “transgender athletes” were “winning events,
7
setting performance records, or otherwise impacting the outcome of competitions” raised
questions about whether and how to accommodate them).
As for focusing on Respondent rather than men and women generally, the opposition
brief argues in a footnote that this Court applies a different kind of “intermediate scrutiny”
for equal protection claims than for other constitutional contexts. Opp. 33 n.14. Not so.
Ngyuen involved an equal-protection claim, and this Court held that “[f]or a gender-based
classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established at least that the
challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.” 533 U.S. at 60-61 (cleaned up). The Application presses the exact same
standard, Appl. 14-21, and Respondent does not contest any of the related argument.
Moreover, a win for Respondent would allow the substantive rule for equal-protection cases
to vary depending on the scope of relief sought. The Court’s precedents say the opposite
here, too, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127 (2019), further undercutting
Respondent’s likelihood of success.
Respondent’s Title IX argument fares no better. As the Applicants have already
explained, Appl. 21-32, applying this Court’s reasoning in Bostock v. Clayton County to
Title IX does not work. Bostock said that sex is not a relevant characteristic to hiring
decisions implicating Title VII. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). But here, sex-based, biological
differences are the foundation for designating separate men’s and women’s sports teams.
So in this context, Respondent is not similarly situated to other female athletes because
8
Respondent’s gender identity is irrelevant to the very reason for establishing separate girls
and boys sports teams.
The opposition brief also claims that West Virginia cannot apply its law to someone
like Respondent who received puberty-delaying treatment followed by hormone therapy.
Opp. 16. That argument ignores relevant record evidence. Professor Brown provided
substantial evidence regarding pre-pubertal male advantage in athletics. Appl. App. 80a92a (describing studies showing boys have greater lean body mass, strength, speed, and
cardiovascular endurance than girls even before puberty). And “there is no published
scientific evidence that the administration of puberty blockers to males before puberty
eliminates the pre-existing athletic advantage that prepubertal males have over
prepubertal females.”
Appl. App. 111a.
Developing evidence like this made all the
difference between the thin record the district court had before it when it originally granted
injunctive relief to Respondent and the fully developed record it carefully considered when
it granted summary judgment to the State. Combined with the lack of evidence suggesting
that pre-pubescent males have no physiological advantages over females, the evidence
supporting the State confirms that the West Virginia Legislature acted reasonably.
Finally, the opposition brief is wrong in arguing that the issues presented are
unlikely to garner this Court’s review. Opp. 28-30. The Court recognized the importance
of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause issues even without a split in lower-court
authority when it granted review in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., No. 16-273.
(The Court ultimately vacated and remanded the lower court decision for further
consideration based on new Department of Education and Department of Justice guidance.)
9
In this context—as even the opposition brief notes, Opp. 29-30—disputes are pending
across the country involving the issue of biological males who identify as female seeking to
participate in girls’ sports. One, for instance, is a Sixth Circuit case reviewing a district
court injunction of federal administrative guidance prohibiting state and local laws exactly
like West Virginia’s Sports Act. State of Tennessee, et al., and Assoc. of Christian Schs.
Int’l v. Dept. of Ed., No. 22-5807 (6th Cir.). Disputes like these further confirm “this is
precisely the sort of emergency docket application that this Court should review.” Amici
Br. of Ala., Ark., and 19 Other States 7-8.
III. The balance of harms strongly favors vacating the injunction.
The opposition brief is silent on the harms the Fourth Circuit’s injunction imposes
on the State of West Virginia and its residents, and minimizes the injunction’s consequences
for female athletes. This one-sided approach to the equities should not have justified relief
below. The Court should restore the pre-litigation status quo.
A. First, the State and West Virginians generally. State “legislative enactments”
occupy a special place in our system of government. Atkin v. State of Kansas, 191 U.S. 207,
223-24 (1903). Unless one is “plainly and palpably” wrong, it “should be recognized and
enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people.”
Id.
And if enjoining
“enforcement of a presumptively valid state statute” is cause for serious concern, Brown,
533 U.S. at 1303 (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers), then all the more the unreasoned injunction
of a law declared constitutional just 48 days earlier on the basis of a full record and merits
briefing. Respondent’s brief does not acknowledge what the Fourth Circuit’s order means
for members of West Virginia’s Legislature and the voters that put them there. The Sports
10
Act represents the considered judgment of the people through their elected representatives
that all female athletes participate on an equal playing field, no matter how prestigious or
“important” the sporting event. The injunction is an affront to that important legislative
goal.
Instead of confronting this problem, Respondent tries to paint the Application as a
broadside against “common practice … summary orders.” Opp. 25; see also id. at 25 n. 8
(collecting mostly stay rulings). But again, nothing is garden-variety about the Fourth
Circuit’s order; this type of mandatory injunction is justified in “only … the most unusual
case.” Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 409 U.S. 1235, 1235 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers). It should be even more unusual for one to issue with no consideration of each
of the relevant factors, much less “a proper” one. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008). And orders like these are worse yet—and per se “irreparable
injury”—when, as here, “a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted
by representatives of its people.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J., in chambers). The “common practice,” Opp. 25, that the Fourth Circuit’s order
actually implicates, then, is this Court’s “ordinary practice” of “suspend[ing]” injunctions
“pending appellate review” that “declare state laws unconstitutional and enjoin state
officials from enforcing them.” Strange v. Searcy, 574 U.S. 1145 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of the application for a stay). The Applicants urge no more than this
ordinary remedy here, too.
11
B. Second, West Virginia’s women and girls. In addition to enjoining a validly
enacted law, leaving the injunction in place will severely injure women and girls’ right to
equal competitive opportunity.
It already has. Though the opposition brief denies that B.P.J. displaced anyone
while the preliminary injunction was in place, Opp. 36-37, it concedes elsewhere that B.P.J.
finished in front of numerous female runners, Opp. 9 & 9 n.2. This competitive displacement
has happened 105 times.* For example, finishing “35 out of 53 participants in discus,” Opp.
Supp. App. 218a, means that B.P.J. displaced 18 female athletes who would have finished
higher. The same was true when Respondent displaced other athletes at other events last
fall. See Pl.’s Mot. to Stay, Exs. A & B, B.P.J. v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-cv00316 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 20, 2023), ECF No. 515-4; see also Athletic.net,
https://bit.ly/3LAf1Hk (last visited Mar. 21, 2023). Respondent’s brief suggests that no one
should be bothered by a male participant placing ahead of “a few other runners.” Opp. 37.
But even mid- or back-of-the-pack placements matter—particularly to athletes trying to
build up finishes, spots, qualifying times, and points to qualify for more competitive races
and future championship competitions. Losing out on a spot on the victor’s podium is not
*
Respondent says this number “mislead[s] the Court.” Opp. 36. But the number comes
from competition results provided by B.P.J. and Athletic.net. See Pl.’s Mot. to Stay, Exs.
A & B, B.P.J. v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-cv-00316 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 20, 2023),
ECF Nos. 515-3, 515-4; see also ATHLETIC.NET, https://bit.ly/3LNISMi (last visited Mar.
21, 2023) (providing click-through links to various competition results B.P.J. participated
in). Respondent also says it is “false” to say that girls are cut from girls’ track if they are
not fast enough in certain events but then admits three sentences later that such cuts
actually happened. Opp. 36.
12
the only way that competitive displacement harms athletes. Accord 67 Female Athletes
Amici Br. 6-20 (detailing harms caused by lost positions).
The opposition brief tries to minimize this harm by redefining “displacement” to
mean only the inability to participate on a sports team at all. Opp. 37 (arguing that no girl
has been “cut from any team due to B.P.J.’s participation”). But this theory would credit
harm to female athletes only when a biological male takes the final spot on a female sports
team.
And of course, Title IX’s promise of equal opportunity guarantee more than
participation trophies. Women and girls deserve fair competition; a fair “chance to be
champions.” McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275,
295 (2d Cir. 2004). It is no answer to tell female athletes that competitive displacement is
not real harm because they are still on the roster. Their loss should not be discounted or
dismissed. And because lost equal opportunity cannot be brought back, it is irreparable.
In addition to the numerous middle school girls who already faced irreparable harm
while the Sports Act was preliminarily enjoined, keeping this injunction and accepting
Respondent’s legal theory would ensure that more women and girls would be harmed in the
future. In fact, the opposition brief has no answer to what West Virginia should do if other
males who identify as female ask to compete on female sports teams in West Virginia, as
has occurred across the country. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 27 (reversing preliminary
injunction in part because “lower courts failed properly to defer to” government officials’
“predictive judgments about how the preliminary injunction would reduce the effectiveness
of” the government program). Respondent chiefly focuses on B.P.J.’s own hurt from not
being permitted to join girls’ sports teams. See Opp. 34, 39. Applicants do not discount
13
that. But that hurt is not greater than the female athletes already displaced by Respondent
and the displaced female athletes to come.
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the Fourth Circuit’s injunction pending appeal.
14
Respectfully submitted.
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
JOHN J. BURSCH
CHRISTIANA M. KIEFER
440 First Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20001
jbursch@ADFlegal.org
ckiefer@ADFlegal.org
(616) 450-4235
LINDSAY S. SEE
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Senior Deputy Solicitor General
JOHANNES S. WIDMALM-DELPHONSE
44180 Riverside Pkwy.
Lansdowne, VA 20176
jwidmalmdelphonese@ADFlegal.org
(571) 707-4655
CURTIS R. A. CAPEHART
Deputy Attorney General
JONATHAN A. SCRUGGS
JACOB P. WARNER
15100 N. 90th Street
Scottsdale, AZ 85260
jscruggs@ADFlegal.org
jwarner@ADFlegal.org
(480) 444-0020
OFFICE OF THE WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
Counsel for Lainey Armistead
Counsel for State of West Virginia
SHUMAN MCCUSKEY SLICER
BAILEY & WYANT, PLLC
ROBERTA F. GREEN
KIMBERLY M. BANDY
1411 Virginia St. E., Suite 200
Charleston, WV 25301
(304) 345-1400
rgreen@shumanlaw.com
kbandy@shumanlaw.com
KELLY C. MORGAN
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR
KRISTEN V. HAMMOND
500 Virginia St. E., Suite 600
Charleston, WV 25301
(303) 345-4222
kmorgan@baileywyant.com
mtaylor@baileywyant.com
khammond@baileywyant.com
GRANT A. NEWMAN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for West Virginia Secondary
School Activities Commission
Counsel for West Virginia State Board
of Education and W. Clayton Burch,
State Superintendent
15
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