Application — Department of Education, et al., Applicants v. Myra Brown, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 2, 2022
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No. 22A____
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,
APPLICANTS
v.
MYRA BROWN, ET AL.
_______________
APPLICATION TO STAY THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
_______________
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Applicants (defendants-appellants below) are the U.S. Department of Education and Miguel Cardona, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Education.
Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are Myra Brown and
Alexander Taylor.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (N.D. Tex.):
Brown v. Department of Educ., No. 22-cv-908 (Nov. 10, 2022)
United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):
Brown v. Department of Educ., No. 22-11115 (Nov. 30, 2022)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
No. 22A____
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,
APPLICANTS
v.
MYRA BROWN, ET AL.
_______________
APPLICATION TO STAY THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
_______________
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
applicants, respectfully applies to stay the judgment entered on
November 10, 2022, by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas (App., infra, 28a).
This is the second of two cases in which lower courts have
entered nationwide orders blocking the Secretary of Education’s
plan to use his statutory authority to provide debt relief to
student-loan borrowers affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yes-
terday, this Court granted certiorari before judgment in the first
case, Biden v. Nebraska, cert. granted, No. 22-506 (Dec. 1, 2022).
In this case, the district court rejected the only claim in
2
respondents’ complaint but proceeded to vacate the plan based on
a separate claim that respondents themselves never asserted -- and
would not have had standing to assert in any event.
The Fifth
Circuit then denied the government’s stay motion without explanation.
This Court should stay the district court’s judgment, which
flouts fundamental principles of party presentation and Article
III.
If the Court is not prepared to grant that relief, it may
wish to defer this application pending oral argument, treat the
application as a petition for certiorari before judgment, grant
the petition, and hear this case along with Nebraska.
Congress charged the Secretary with administering federal
student-loan programs.
Because borrowers who default on their
student loans face severe financial consequences -- including wage
garnishment, long-term credit damage, and ineligibility for federal benefits -- Congress specifically authorized the Secretary to
waive or modify any applicable statutory or regulatory provision
as he deems necessary to ensure that borrowers affected by a national emergency are not worse off in relation to their student
loans.
See Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act
of 2003 (HEROES Act or Act), Pub L. No. 108-76, § 2, 117 Stat.
904-905 (20 U.S.C. 1098bb). Confronted with the deadliest pandemic
in the Nation’s history, which has wreaked global economic havoc,
both the Trump and Biden Administrations invoked the HEROES Act to
pause repayment obligations and suspend interest accrual on all
3
federally held student loans since March 2020.
That pause is
estimated to have cost the government more than $100 billion.
In August 2022, the Secretary determined that the across-theboard pause on all payments for all borrowers should come to an
end and directed the Department to restart loan payments.
But the
Secretary
resume,
also
found
that
when
repayment
obligations
lower-income borrowers will be at heightened risk of delinquency
and default because of the continuing economic consequences of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The Secretary thus directed the Department to
issue up to $10,000 in student-loan relief to eligible borrowers
with annual incomes under $125,000 ($250,000 for borrowers filing
jointly).
Qualifying Pell Grant recipients, who are at even
greater risk of default, can receive up to $20,000 in relief.
This
relief, the Secretary found, is necessary to ensure that delinquency and default rates among these borrowers would not spike
above pre-pandemic levels.
Respondents are two student-loan borrowers.
Myra Brown is
not eligible for relief under the plan, and Alexander Taylor is
eligible for $10,000 rather than $20,000 in relief.
Respondents
alleged that they were improperly denied the opportunity to comment
on the plan and represented that if the Secretary had proceeded
through notice and comment, they would have urged him to adopt
broader eligibility criteria and to provide greater debt relief.
The district court rejected respondents’ procedural claim, observing that the HEROES Act expressly exempts the Secretary’s actions
4
from notice-and-comment procedures.
Yet even though respondents
had raised only a procedural claim and had not argued that the
Secretary’s provision of debt relief to other borrowers inflicted
any injury on them, the court went on to hold that, as a substantive
matter, the plan exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority.
Based on that holding, the court vacated the plan nationwide -- a
result that afforded no redress to respondents, and actually cost
Taylor $10,000.
The court of appeals, in turn, issued an unrea-
soned order denying a stay pending appeal.
This Court should stay the district court’s judgment pending
appeal and, if necessary, the disposition of a petition for a writ
of certiorari.
The district court profoundly erred by raising and
deciding a claim that respondents did not assert and could not
have asserted consistent with Article III.
And the Secretary’s
plan in any event falls squarely within the plain text of his
statutory authority.
Indeed, the entire purpose of the HEROES Act
is to authorize the Secretary to grant student-loan-related relief
to at-risk borrowers because of a national emergency -- precisely
what the Secretary did here.
In Nebraska, the Court deferred ruling on the government’s
application to vacate the Eighth Circuit’s injunction, treated the
application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment,
granted certiorari, and ordered briefing on a schedule that will
allow the case to be heard in the February 2023 argument session.
Order, Nebraska, supra, No. 22-506 (Dec. 1, 2022).
Here, the
5
government submits that the district court’s extraordinary departure from principles of party presentation and Article III warrants
an immediate stay, without the need for further briefing.
If,
however, the Court is not prepared to grant that relief now, it
may wish to defer a decision on the application pending oral argument, treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, and grant certiorari so that this case can
be heard along with Nebraska. 1
STATEMENT
A.
Background
1.
The Department of Education administers various student-
loan programs under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(Education Act), 20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.
Those programs include
the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (Direct Loans), 20
U.S.C. 1087a-1087j, under which the federal government lends money
directly to students, and the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(Family Education Loans), 20 U.S.C. 1071 to 1087-4, and Federal
Perkins Loan Program (Perkins Loans), 20 U.S.C. 1087aa-1087ii,
under which non-federal lenders issue loans to student borrowers
using federally supported funds.
Although authority to issue new
loans under the latter two programs has expired, many loans remain
outstanding.
Borrowers generally may consolidate their federal
Because respondents challenge the same plan at issue in
Nebraska, the background section and Parts I.C and II of this brief
substantially overlap with the background section and Parts I.B.1
and II of the government’s application in that case.
1
6
student loans into loans held by the federal government. 34 C.F.R.
685.220.
Nearly 43 million borrowers have outstanding loans under
the three programs, and their debts total roughly $1.62 trillion.
Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal Student
Aid Portfolio, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/portfolio (last visited Dec. 1, 2022).
The Education Act charges the Secretary of Education with
carrying out federal student-loan programs.
20 U.S.C. 1070(b).
The Act grants the Secretary substantial “powers and responsibilities,” 20 U.S.C. 1082 (emphasis omitted); see 20 U.S.C. 3441,
3471, including authority to “compromise, waive, or release any
right, title, claim, lien, or demand” acquired in the Secretary’s
performance of his “functions, powers, and duties” in administering the Department’s portfolio of loans, 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(6).
A few months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
Congress enacted the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for
Students Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-122, 115 Stat. 2386, to
“provide the Secretary of Education with specific waiver authority
to respond to conditions in the national emergency declared by the
President on September 14, 2001,” ibid.
Congress authorized the
Secretary to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision
applicable to” student aid programs under Title IV of the Education
Act “as may be necessary to ensure that” borrowers affected by
September 11 and later terrorist attacks are not in a worse
7
position in relation to their student loans.
§ 2(a)(1) and (2),
115 Stat. 2386; see § 5, 115 Stat. 2388.
In 2003, Congress extended and expanded that authority by
enacting the HEROES Act.
Like its predecessor, the HEROES Act
authorizes the Secretary to “waive or modify any statutory or
regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs” under Title IV.
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1).
But the
HEROES Act does not limit relief to borrowers who suffered hardship
as a result of terrorist attacks; rather, it authorizes waiver or
modification “as the Secretary deems necessary in connection with
a war or other military operation or national emergency to provide
the waivers or modifications authorized by paragraph (2).”
Ibid.
Paragraph 2, in turn, authorizes the Secretary “to waive or modify
any provision described in paragraph (1) as may be necessary to
ensure
that”
1098bb(a)(2).
certain
objectives
are
achieved.
20
U.S.C.
The first objective is that “recipients of student
financial assistance under title IV of the [Education] Act who are
affected individuals are not placed in a worse position financially
in relation to that financial assistance because of their status
as affected individuals.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2)(A). An “affected
individual” is defined to include any individual who “resides or
is employed in an area that is declared a disaster area by any
Federal, State, or local official in connection with a national
emergency.”
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(C).
8
Several provisions of the HEROES Act underscore Congress’s
intent to authorize the Secretary to respond quickly and fully to
emergencies and other extraordinary circumstances.
The Secretary
need not act through notice and comment; instead, he need only
publish a notice in the Federal Register setting forth “the waivers
or modifications
* * *
the Secretary deems necessary to achieve
the purposes of this section.”
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1).
Nor need
the Secretary comply with other procedural requirements that would
delay implementation of relief. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(d). In addition,
Congress explicitly provided that “[t]he Secretary is not required
to exercise the waiver or modification authority
by-case basis.”
* * *
on a case-
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(3).
The HEROES Act was originally set to expire in 2005.
117 Stat. 908.
§ 6,
But Congress extended the Act by two years, Act of
Sept. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-78, 119 Stat. 2043, and in 2007
made the Act permanent, Act of Sept. 30, 2007, Pub. L. No. 11093, 121 Stat. 999.
Since 2003, the Secretary has repeatedly in-
voked the Act to provide categorical relief to borrowers affected
by emergencies, including by extending forbearance for Perkins
loans and waiving the requirement that borrowers return overpayments of certain grant funds.
See Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Use of the HEROES Act of 2003 to Cancel the
Principal Amounts of Student Loans, 2022 WL 3975075, at *5-*6 (Aug.
23, 2022) (OLC Op.); App., infra, 31a.
9
2.
In March 2020, President Trump declared a national emer-
gency in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
3 C.F.R. 56 (2020 Comp.).
Proclamation 9994,
That declaration remains in effect, and
the government has declared all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the territories to be disaster areas.
See FEMA, COVID-
19 Disaster Declarations, https://perma.cc/B7KA-W4KD.
COVID-19
has killed more than one million Americans and led to the hospitalization of millions more.
Prevention,
COVID
Data
perma.cc/ZH65-9PX3.
icans a week.
Centers for Disease Control and
Tracker
(Nov.
30,
2022),
https://
COVID-19 continues to kill nearly 2,000 Amer-
Ibid.
The pandemic has also inflicted severe
economic harms, including layoffs, spikes in inflation, rising
delinquency rates on debt, and projected reductions in lifetime
earnings for students who left school during the pandemic.
App., infra, 38a-40a, 46a.
See
These harms have disproportionately
affected lower-income households.
Id. at 38a-39a, 42a-48a.
In response to the pandemic, the federal government provided
substantial relief to borrowers with Department-held loans.
In
March 2020, then-Secretary of Education DeVos invoked the HEROES
Act to pause repayment obligations and suspend interest accrual on
all such loans.
85 Fed. Reg. 79,856, 79,857 (Dec. 11, 2020).
Congress directed the Secretary to extend those policies through
September 2020.
COVID-19 Pandemic Education Relief Act of 2020,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, Div. A, Tit. III, Subtit. B, § 3513, 134 Stat.
404.
Both
the
Trump
and
Biden
Administrations
then
further
10
extended these protections under the HEROES Act.
See, e.g., 85
Fed. Reg. at 79,857; App., infra, 33a-34a.
In August 2022, Secretary Cardona determined that, despite
those measures, any resumption of repayment obligations would put
many lower-income borrowers “at heightened risk of loan delinquency and default” due to the pandemic.
App., infra, 33a.
Secretary thus adopted a two-pronged approach.
The
He announced that
he would extend the pause a final time, through December 31, 2022.
Id. at 34a.
And to ensure that “borrowers are not in a worse
position financially due to the pandemic with regard to their
ability to repay their loans” when payment obligations resume, the
Secretary invoked the HEROES Act and directed the Department to
issue up to $10,000 in student-loan relief to eligible borrowers
with annual incomes under $125,000 ($250,000 for borrowers filing
jointly).
Id. at 33a.
Qualifying Pell Grant recipients, who tend
to have fewer resources and are at greater risk of default, can
receive up to $20,000.
Ibid.
As explained in the supporting analysis on which the Secretary
relied, this relief will mitigate the pandemic’s adverse economic
effects and significantly reduce delinquency and default rates
among those borrowers most affected by the pandemic.
37a, 40a-41a.
App., infra,
The Department analyzed its past experience with
borrowers who transitioned back to repayment after long periods of
forbearance, including after emergencies, and concluded that such
borrowers are typically at “elevated risk of delinquency and
11
default.”
Id. at 38a.
Indeed, default rates increase twentyfold
after the period of non-payment ends, and Pell Grant recipients
affected by such events experience even “larger increases in default.”
Ibid.
The Department reviewed borrower surveys, economic
studies, and credit analyses conducted by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and Federal Reserve Banks that documented current economic conditions borrowers face due to the pandemic, including rising delinquency rates on non-student-loan debt; stark
increases in the number of borrowers that anticipate difficulty
making loan payments; and acute inflationary pressures on household budgets for “basic necessities, including energy, food, and
shelter costs.”
Id. at 39a; see id. at 38a-40a.
The Department
also emphasized the substantial penalties imposed on borrowers who
default on student-loan payments, including 50-to-90-point drops
in credit scores that make insurance, rent, and other financial
products more expensive and limit employment opportunities; exposure to involuntary collection methods; and lost access to affordable or flexible repayment options.
Id. at 40a.
The Department explained that the contemplated debt relief
would ameliorate these harms.
App., infra, 40a-48a.
The Depart-
ment surveyed economic data establishing that borrowers with incomes under $125,000, especially Pell Grant recipients, are more
likely to experience financial hardship in repaying their loans
when payments resume.
Id. at 42a-48a.
Among other things, such
borrowers were disproportionately likely to become unemployed and
12
experience material hardship due to the pandemic, including food
insecurity and difficulty making utility, rent, and mortgage payments.
Id. at 39a, 46a-48a.
As to the amount of debt to be
discharged, the Department observed that “it should discharge an
amount of debt necessary to significantly decrease the rates of
delinquency and default.”
Id. at 41a.
After considering borrower
loan balances and the effectiveness of various monthly payment
reductions in reducing delinquency rates, the Department determined that the $10,000 threshold (and $20,000 for Pell Grant recipients) would “mitigate the risk that delinquency and default
rates will rise above pre-pandemic levels.”
Ibid.
B.
Proceedings Below
1.
Respondents Myra Brown and Alexander Taylor are indi-
viduals with outstanding student loans.
App., infra, 6a.
Brown
is ineligible for relief under the plan because her loans are held
by commercial entities rather than the Department.
Ibid.
Taylor
is eligible for $10,000 in relief, but not for $20,000, because he
did not receive a Pell Grant.
Ibid.
Respondents sued the Department and the Secretary.
Their
complaint asserted a single claim alleging that the Department and
the Secretary improperly promulgated the plan without notice-andcomment rulemaking.
Compl. ¶¶ 62-73.
Respondents asserted that
they were deprived of an opportunity to argue “that their student
loan debt should be forgiven too.”
Id. ¶ 10; see id. ¶¶ 58-61.
Respondents further asserted that the Secretary improperly adopted
13
the plan without engaging in the negotiated-rulemaking process
required by the Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1098a(b)(2).
Compl.
¶¶ 71-72.
2.
On November 10, 2022, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of respondents.
App., infra, 2a-27a.
The court
concluded that respondents have Article III standing to raise their
notice-and-comment claim, explaining that Brown had been injured
because she had received no relief at all under the plan, and that
Taylor had been injured because he had received only $10,000 rather
than $20,000.
Id. at 11a-16a.
Turning to the merits, the district court rejected respondents’ claim that the plan was procedurally defective. App., infra,
18a-19a. The court observed that the HEROES Act expressly provides
that the Secretary need not act through notice and comment; instead, he need only publish a notice in the Federal Register setting forth “the waivers or modifications
* * *
the Secretary
deems necessary to achieve the purposes of this section.”
19a (quoting 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1)).
Id. at
The court rejected the
contention that respondents could establish that the plan fell
outside the Act’s notice-and-comment exemption by showing that the
plan exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority.
Ibid.
Although respondents had raised only a procedural claim, and
although the district court had analyzed their standing only as to
that claim, the court proceeded to hold that the plan is substantively unlawful.
App., infra, 19a-25a.
The court first concluded
14
that, “because the [plan] is an agency action of vast economic and
political significance, the major-questions doctrine applies.”
Id. at 22a.
The court then concluded that the HEROES Act did not
authorize the plan with sufficient clarity to satisfy that doctrine.
Id. at 22a-24a.
vacated it nationwide.
3.
The court declared the plan unlawful and
Id. at 24a-25a.
The government appealed.
After seeking a stay from the
district court, see D. Ct. Doc. 40 (Nov. 15, 2022), the government
sought a stay pending appeal from the Fifth Circuit.
On November
30, 2022, the Fifth Circuit denied the motion in an unreasoned,
per curiam order.
4.
App., infra, 1a.
In the meantime, a group of six States challenged the
plan in federal district court in Missouri. See Nebraska v. Biden,
No. 22-cv-1040, 2022 WL 11728905, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2022).
The district court dismissed that suit for lack of standing, see
id. at *7, but the Eighth Circuit enjoined the plan nationwide
pending appeal, see Nebraska v. Biden, 52 F.4th 1044 (2022).
The
government applied to this Court for vacatur of that injunction.
See Appl. at 1, Biden v. Nebraska (No. 22A444).
This Court de-
ferred consideration of the application pending oral argument,
treated the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari
before judgment, granted the petition, and set the case to be
argued in the February 2023 session. See Order, Biden v. Nebraska,
No. 22-506 (Dec. 1, 2022).
15
5.
On November 22, 2022, in response to the orders in Ne-
braska and this case preventing implementation of the plan, the
Secretary of Education extended the payment pause and suspension
of interest accrual.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Biden-
Harris Administration Continues Fight for Student Debt Relief for
Millions of Borrowers, Extends Student Loan Repayment Pause (Nov.
22, 2022), https://perma.cc/6T7Y-2YK9.
“[E]fforts to block stu-
dent debt relief in the courts,” the Department explained, “have
caused tremendous financial uncertainty for millions of borrowers
who cannot set their family budgets or even plan for the holidays
without a clear picture of their student debt obligations.”
Ibid.
The extension will “alleviate uncertainty for borrowers” while
this Court “review[s] the lower-court orders.”
Ibid.
Payment
obligations will resume “60 days after the Department is permitted
to implement the program or the litigation is resolved,” but no
later than 60 days after June 30, 2023.
Ibid.
ARGUMENT
In considering interim equitable relief such as a stay pending
appeal and certiorari, this Court considers the “likelihood of
success on the merits” and the “equities.”
Alabama Ass’n of Real-
tors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2488-2489 (2021) (per curiam).
The
government is likely to succeed on the merits and the equities
favor staying the judgment.
16
I.
THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS
If the court of appeals finds the plan unlawful, this Court
would likely review that decision invalidating a national program
affecting millions of Americans.
See pp. 37-39, infra.
Indeed,
this Court has already granted certiorari before judgment in response to the Eighth Circuit’s nationwide injunction against the
plan.
And this Court would likely reverse a decision upholding
the district court’s vacatur for multiple independent reasons:
The court erred in considering a claim that respondents never
raised; respondents lack standing to challenge the substantive
lawfulness of the plan; the plan is in any event lawful; and the
court erred in vacating the plan nationwide.
A.
The District Court Erred In Considering A Claim Respondents Neither Pleaded Nor Argued
Throughout the proceedings in the district court, respondents
presented only the claim that the plan was procedurally defective.
Their complaint asserted a single count: “failure to follow proper
rulemaking procedures” under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.
ted).
Compl. 13 (capitalization and emphasis omit-
Their brief likewise raised only one merits argument:
“The
Department violated the APA by adopting the [plan] without following the proper rulemaking procedures.”
(Oct. 10, 2022) (emphasis omitted).
D. Ct. Doc. 4, at 20
And although respondents ar-
gued that the plan was substantively unlawful, they did so only in
service of their claim that it fell outside the HEROES Act’s
17
exception from notice-and-comment procedures.
See, e.g., id. at
29 (“Because the HEROES Act does not authorize the Debt Forgiveness
Program, the Department could not adopt the Program without following the proper rulemaking procedures.”).
The district court correctly rejected that claim.
The HEROES
Act expressly exempts the Secretary from complying with “section
553 of title 5” -- i.e., the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions
-- when “publish[ing] the waivers or modifications of statutory
and regulatory provisions the Secretary deems necessary to achieve
the purposes of this section.”
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1).
As the
district court recognized, that exemption does not depend on
whether, as a substantive matter, the HEROES Act actually authorizes the Secretary’s action.
App., infra, 19a.
Insofar as respondents further challenged (Compl. ¶¶ 71-72)
the Secretary’s compliance with Education Act procedural requirements requiring the Department to engage in negotiated rulemaking
in developing certain proposed rules, see 20 U.S.C. 1098a, the
HEROES Act likewise states that Section 1098a “shall not apply to
the waivers and modifications authorized or required by [the Act].”
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(d).
Because the Secretary issued the challenged
plan pursuant to the HEROES Act, respondents’ procedural objections are meritless.
That should have been the end of the case, but the district
court went on to resolve an additional claim that respondents had
never raised:
that the plan was substantively unlawful because it
18
exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority.
App., infra, 19a-
25a. Respondents themselves had not attempted to raise that claim,
presumably because they recognized that they plainly lack standing
to assert it.
See pp. 18-20, infra.
In deciding that claim sua
sponte, the court violated the bedrock “principle of party presentation.”
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579
(2020). Under that settled principle, courts ordinarily must “rely
on the parties to frame the issues for decision” and confine themselves to “the role of neutral arbiter[s] of matters the parties
present.”
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).
In
and
raising
resolving
a
claim
that
respondents
pressed, the court went “well beyond the pale.”
had
never
Sineneng-Smith,
140 S. Ct. at 1582.
B.
Respondents Lack Standing To Challenge The Substantive
Lawfulness Of The Plan
Article III empowers the federal courts to decide only “Cases”
and “Controversies.”
U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, Cl. 1.
An Article
III case or controversy exists only if the plaintiff has standing
-- that is, only if the plaintiff has suffered a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury, the injury was likely
caused by the defendant, and the injury would likely be redressed
by judicial relief.
2203 (2021).
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190,
And as this Court has repeatedly admonished, “stand-
ing is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate
standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief
19
that they seek.”
Id. at 2208; see, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724, 733-734 (2008).
Even if respondents had standing to raise their notice-andcomment claim, they lack standing to raise (or to have the district
court raise for them) a claim of substantive unlawfulness.
Re-
spondents assert that the plan injures them by denying them a
benefit:
Brown is not eligible for any relief at all, and Taylor
is eligible only for $10,000 rather than $20,000.
11a-16a.
App., infra,
But a judgment that the plan exceeds the Secretary’s
substantive authority would not redress either of those injuries.
It would leave Brown’s financial position unchanged; she would
still receive no relief.
And it would leave Taylor worse off than
before; he would receive neither the $10,000 the plan provides nor
the $20,000 he seeks, but instead nothing at all.
To be sure, the district court found that a judgment on respondents’ procedural challenge would redress respondents’ asserted injury.
App., infra, 15a-16a.
The court perceived “at
least some possibility” that, if the plan were vacated as procedurally defective, the Secretary would redo the plan through notice-and-comment rulemaking, consider respondents’ comments, and,
in light of those comments, make debt relief available to borrowers
like Brown and make the full $20,000 of debt relief available to
borrowers like Taylor.
Id. at 15a.
But that rationale, whatever
its merits, simply does not apply to a claim of substantive unlawfulness.
Indeed, the district court explicitly confirmed that,
20
in its view, “the agency’s misstep is not correctible on remand.”
Id. at 24a.
A judgment that the plan exceeds the Secretary’s
statutory power would not redress the claimed injury; to the contrary, it would carve the injury in stone by ensuring that neither
respondent receives any debt relief at all.
C.
The HEROES Act Authorizes The Plan
The district court did not deny that the HEROES Act, read
most naturally and in light of ordinary principles of statutory
construction, authorizes the Secretary’s plan.
Indeed, the court
recognized that “the Secretary’s action falls within the Act’s
plain text.”
App., infra, 16a.
But the court nonetheless vacated
the plan, holding that that the major questions doctrine applies
and “the Secretary lacks ‘clear Congressional authorization’ to
implement the program.”
omitted).
Id. at 22a (capitalization and emphasis
Both of those conclusions were incorrect.
The major
questions doctrine has no application here and, even if it did,
the Act clearly authorizes the challenged plan.
1.
The plan is authorized by the Act’s plain text
The HEROES Act provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law,” the Secretary may respond to a “national emergency” by waiving or modifying “any statutory or regulatory provision” governing federal student loans “as the Secretary deems
necessary” to “ensure” that loan recipients who are “affected individuals” are not “placed in a worse position financially” because
21
of the emergency. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1) and (2). The Secretary’s
action falls squarely within that specific grant of authority.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a “national emergency declared by
the President of the United States.”
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(4); see 87
Fed. Reg. 10,289, 10,289 (Feb. 23, 2022).
Both the Trump and Biden
Administrations previously invoked the HEROES Act to categorically
suspend payments and interest accrual on all Department-held loans
in light of the pandemic.
See pp. 9-10, supra.
Neither the
district court nor respondents have suggested that those actions
were unlawful.
Similarly, all student-loan borrowers are “affected individuals” under the HEROES Act.
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2)(A).
The vast
majority qualify based on where they “reside[]” or are “employed,”
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2):
The 50 States, the District of Columbia, and
all five permanently populated United States territories have been
designated as COVID-19 disaster areas.
See p. 9, supra.
And
because the pandemic has inflicted global economic harms, with
particularly severe effects on lower-income borrowers, the Secretary reasonably “determined” that the small fraction of eligible
borrowers living and working abroad qualify because they have suffered
“direct
economic
U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(D).
hardship”
due
to
the
pandemic.
20
Again, the payment pauses adopted by both
the Trump and Biden Administrations rested on the same understanding of “affected individual.”
22
The Secretary reasonably “deem[ed]” relief “necessary to ensure” that a subset of these affected individuals –- namely, those
with lower incomes -- “are not placed in a worse position” in
relation to their student-loan obligations “because of their status as affected individuals,” i.e., because of the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1) and (2).
That deter-
mination was supported by analysis and evidence showing that, because of the pandemic, such borrowers were at particularly high
risk of delinquency and default once payment obligations restart.
See pp. 10-12, supra.
Finally, the Act authorizes the type of relief that the Secretary granted.
The provisions governing student-loan repayment
obligations, cancellation, and discharge are “statutory or regulatory provision[s] applicable to the student financial assistance
programs under title IV.”
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1); see, e.g., 20
U.S.C. 1087 (2018 & Supp. I 2019), 1087dd(g); 34 C.F.R. 682.402,
685.212.
The Secretary thus properly “waiv[ed] or modif[ied]”
those provisions to reduce the scope of vulnerable borrowers’ payment obligations to ensure that they are not worse off in relation
to their student-loan obligations because of the pandemic.
20
U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1); App., infra, 29a, 33a.
2.
The major questions doctrine provides no reason to
depart from the Act’s plain text
The district court held that the major questions doctrine
compels a different result, App., infra, 19a-23a, but that doctrine
23
provides no sound reason to depart from a straightforward application of the statutory text. In “extraordinary cases,” this Court
has required that an agency “point to ‘clear congressional authorization’” -- rather than a more ordinary “textual basis” -- “for
the power it claims.”
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609
(2022) (citation omitted); see id. at 2607-2609.
This case lacks
the hallmarks of those extraordinary cases, and clear authorization exists in any event.
a.
The district court believed that the major questions
doctrine applies “because the Program is an agency action of vast
economic and political significance.”
App., infra, 22a.
But this
Court has never treated the major questions doctrine as a license
for courts to override statutory text simply because an agency’s
action is controversial or has substantial economic effects.
In-
stead, the doctrine applies when an agency claims an “[e]xtraordinary grant[] of regulatory authority” based on “‘modest words,’
‘vague terms,’ or ‘subtle device[s]’” and the “‘history and the
breadth’” of that asserted power provide “‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’” meant to confer such authority.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608-2609 (citations omitted; third
set of brackets in original).
No such reason exists here.
This is not a case where the
agency has “‘no comparative expertise’ in making [the relevant]
policy judgments,” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2613 (citation
omitted); relied on “‘ancillary’” provisions to locate “newfound
24
power,” id. at 2610 (citation omitted); or asserted authority that
falls outside the agency’s “particular domain,” Alabama Ass’n of
Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489.
Rather, the Department of Education
-- i.e., the federal agency primarily responsible for administering federal student loans -- has modified the scope of those loan
obligations because of a national emergency, pursuant to the central provision of the HEROES Act, which expressly authorizes the
Secretary to do just that.
The plan “fits neatly within the
language of the statute,” Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647, 652
(2022) (per curiam), because the entire point of the HEROES Act is
to authorize the Secretary to grant student-loan debt relief to
mitigate economic harms borrowers face from national emergencies.
Nor is the asserted agency power here “‘transformative’” or
“sweeping.”
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608, 2610 (citation
omitted).
Although the HEROES Act gives the Secretary powerful
tools to address the situations encompassed by the Act, it applies
only in a limited set of circumstances (including a “national
emergency,” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1)); authorizes relief only for a
defined class of individuals, 20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2) (defining “affected individual”); to accomplish limited objectives (such as
“ensur[ing]” that these individuals are not “placed in a worse
position
financially”
in
relation
to
their
loans,
20
U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(2)(A)); through specific measures (waiving or modifying
applicable student-loan requirements, 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1)).
In
keeping with that authority, the Secretary issued relief to ensure
25
that vulnerable borrowers would not be worse off in relation to
their student loans due to the pandemic.
This case is thus far
afield from cases like West Virginia, where the Court found that
the agency action at issue would have required a complete reorganization of American energy infrastructure.
142 S. Ct. at 2604.
Indeed, unlike every case where this Court has invoked the
major questions doctrine, this case does not involve any assertion
of regulatory authority at all.
Instead, it involves the exercise
of authority over a government benefit program to lift otherwise
applicable requirements on beneficiaries.
The district court be-
lieved the major questions doctrine applies even to “the disbursement of a federal benefit,” App., infra, 22a, but offered no sound
basis for expanding that doctrine -- which the Court has applied
only to claims of an “[e]xtraordinary grant[] of regulatory authority,” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609 -- to this novel
context.
The district court suggested that “Congress’s extensive consideration of various bills attempting to forgive student loans
and failure to pass such bills” further justified applying the
major questions doctrine.
App., infra, 21a.
But each bill the
court cited meaningfully differed from the relief the Secretary
authorized. 2
The far more relevant congressional action is a
See, e.g., H.R. 2034, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021)
(proposing discharge of entire loan balances); H.R. 6800, 116th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 150117(h) (2020) (omnibus $3 trillion relief
package that included many other contested provisions); S. 2235,
2
26
measure included in pandemic-relief legislation enacted in 2021.
At that time, when the possibility of forgiveness under the HEROES
Act was already being publicly debated, Congress anticipated the
possibility of such relief by adopting a “Special Rule for Discharges in 2021 Through 2025” that makes student-loan discharges
during that period tax-free. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021,
Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9675(a), 135 Stat. 185-186.
b.
Even if the major questions doctrine applied, it would
not support vacatur of the plan.
Section 1098bb(a) of the HEROES
Act is not a “vague statutory grant,” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at
2614; rather, Congress clearly authorized the Secretary to ensure
that student-loan borrowers are not placed in a worse financial
position because of a national emergency, and the Secretary complied with the Act’s plain terms in affording a limited measure of
relief to borrowers at risk because of COVID-19.
See pp. 20-22,
supra.
The district court disagreed for three reasons:
(1) the Act
does not use the term “loan forgiveness”; (2) the pandemic does
not justify the proposed relief; and (3) the asserted power is
“‘unheralded.’”
App., infra, 22a-24a (citation omitted).
Each
contention lacks merit.
First, the HEROES Act does not enumerate any of the specific
forms of relief the Secretary has long issued under the Act -116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019) (proposing discharge of up to $50,000
before the pandemic).
27
including
extending
forbearance,
suspending
interest
accrual,
waiving the requirement that borrowers return overpayments of certain grant funds, and altering the requirements for loan deferrals.
See OLC Op., 2022 WL 3975075, at *5-*6.
Rather, the Act ensures
that the Secretary can act quickly and effectively to afford relief
to student-loan borrowers affected by national emergencies by authorizing the Secretary to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance
programs under title IV.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1) (emphasis added);
see United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“[T]he word
‘any’ has an expansive meaning.”) (citation omitted).
To waive is
“[t]o abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, privilege, right,
etc.)” or “to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily,” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1894 (11th ed. 2019); to modify is “[t]o make somewhat
different” or “to reduce in degree or extent,” id. at 1203.
The
Act thus authorizes the Secretary to eliminate or to reduce by
some degree a borrower’s obligation to comply with any Title IV
student-aid provision so long as the other requirements of the
statute are satisfied.
Among the Title IV provisions eligible for
waiver or modification are those that establish the obligation to
repay loans and the circumstances in which such obligations can be
cancelled or discharged.
See p. 22, supra.
Congress, moreover, expressly contemplated the Secretary’s
exercise of discretion in fashioning appropriate relief, authorizing the Secretary to waive or modify “any” applicable Title IV
28
statutory or regulatory provision “as the Secretary deems necessary.”
600
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1); see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
(1988)
“‘deem[ed]
(statutory
* * *
authority
to
take
actions
an
official
necessary or advisable’” conveyed “deference”)
(emphasis omitted).
Congress underscored the point in the fol-
lowing paragraph, authorizing the Secretary to waive or modify any
such provision “as may be necessary” to “ensure” the Act’s objectives.
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2) (emphasis added); see City of New
York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 67 (1988) (holding that the phrase “‘may
be necessary’” confers “legitimate discretionary power” on the
agency) (citation omitted).
Second, the proposed relief directly targets those borrowers
facing “a worse position financially” in relation to their student
loans “because of” the invoked national emergency, 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(2)(A) -- here, the COVID-19 pandemic.
The evidence be-
fore the Secretary showed that borrowers with individual incomes
below $125,000 or household incomes below $250,000 were most likely
to have experienced job loss, non-student-loan debt delinquency,
and other material hardships as a result of the pandemic, and thus
faced the highest risk of delinquency and default when studentloan obligations resume.
10-11, supra.
See App., infra, 39a, 42a, 46a-48a; pp.
And the evidence further showed that reducing the
principal owed by such borrowers by the proposed amounts, and
reducing their monthly payments accordingly, would ameliorate the
29
“risk that delinquency and default rates will rise above prepandemic levels.”
App., infra, 41a; pp. 11-12, supra.
The district court’s suggestion that “it is unclear if COVID19 is still a ‘national emergency’ under the Act,” App., infra,
23a, is baseless.
The Act defines that term as “a national emer-
gency declared by the President of the United States,” 20 U.S.C.
1098ee(4), and the presidential declaration identifying the COVID19 pandemic as a national emergency remains in effect.
supra.
See p. 9,
Moreover, the Secretary is not asserting the power to “use
the HEROES Act to forgive student-loan debt” “in ten years
because of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
App., infra, 23a.
* * *
Rather, the
plan reflects the Secretary’s determination that a one-time discharge of a limited measure of debt for a subset of affected
borrowers is necessary to ensure that those borrowers are not
placed in a worse position as they and the country work to recover
from the immediate and devastating effects of COVID-19.
Other
emergencies may be different in kind, scope, or scale, and may
require different relief -- but always subject to the terms of the
HEROES Act, which limit (1) the circumstances in which the Secretary can act; (2) the class of individuals eligible for relief;
(3) the objectives any relief must aim to accomplish; and (4) the
measures the Secretary may implement.
See pp. 20-22, supra.
Third, the Secretary has not relied on a “rarely invoked
statutory provision” to claim “‘unheralded power.’”
App., infra,
24a (quoting West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2625 (Gorsuch, J.,
30
concurring)).
Since its enactment in 2003, the Department has
repeatedly invoked the HEROES Act to provide class-wide relief to
certain borrowers, see p. 8, supra, and since March 2020, both the
Trump and Biden Administrations have invoked the Act to issue
relief to all borrowers, see pp. 9-10, supra.
These previous invocations of the HEROES Act -- by both the
Trump and Biden Administrations -- likewise had permanent and substantial
economic
effects.
Most
significantly,
the
previous
COVID-19 relief measures, including the suspension of loan payments and interest accrual, are estimated to have cost the federal
government $102 billion.
Student Loans:
See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
Education Has Increased Federal Cost Estimates of
Direct Loans by Billions due to Programmatic and Other Changes 14
(July 2022).
The Department has estimated that these measures
saved the average borrower approximately $233 a month -- comparable
to the $200 to $300 reduction in monthly payments that the Department estimates will be achieved by the challenged plan.
infra, 41a-42a.
See App.,
Moreover, because the months during which these
measures were in effect count toward the income-driven repayment
and public service loan forgiveness programs, these measures resulted in additional debt cancellation for borrowers eligible for
those programs.
See Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ.,
Relief:
COVID-19
Income-Driven
Repayment
(IDR)
Plans,
https://perma.cc/Q9WK-5YDE (last visited Dec. 2, 2022); Office of
Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., COVID-19 Relief: Public
31
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF), https://perma.cc/M6NV-ENSU (last
visited Dec. 2, 2022).
Likewise, the Secretary in December 2020
expanded eligibility for defenses to repayment by allowing certain
borrowers to have their claims evaluated under more beneficial
standards due to pandemic-related difficulties, 85 Fed. Reg. at
79,862, which “will almost certainly reduce the amount of principal
repaid by borrowers,” OLC Op., 2022 WL 3975075, at *12.
Pre-2020 invocations of the Act similarly resulted in forgiveness of affected borrowers’ debt obligations.
For example,
the Secretary in 2003 waived the requirement that affected borrowers return overpayments of certain grant funds.
69,312, 69,314 (Dec. 12, 2003).
68 Fed. Reg.
To the extent the Secretary’s
pre-pandemic actions under the Act were narrower in certain respects, that reflects the pandemic’s unprecedented scope, not any
established understanding of the Act’s limits.
It is only natural
that the Secretary’s response to an unprecedented pandemic will go
“further than what the Secretary has done in the past” in response
to less severe or less widespread exigencies. Missouri, 142 S. Ct.
at 653.
D.
The District Court Erred By Vacating The Plan On A Universal Basis
Even if respondents had standing and even if the plan exceeded
the Secretary’s statutory authority, the district court erred in
“vacat[ing]” the plan on a universal basis.
(capitalization and emphasis omitted).
App., infra, 28a
As Members of this Court
32
have recognized, such universal remedies are “inconsistent with
longstanding limits on equitable relief and the power of Article
III courts” and impose a severe “toll on the federal court system.”
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); see DHS v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599-601 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay).
The district court concluded that universal vacatur was authorized by 5 U.S.C. 706(2), which provides that a reviewing court
shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions” found to be unlawful.
App., infra, 25a.
Many lower
court decisions have applied the same understanding of Section
706(2).
But this Court has never squarely considered the issue.
And as the government has long argued, the “unremarkable language”
in Section 706(2) should not be interpreted to “upset the bedrock
practice of case-by-case judgments with respect to the parties in
each case or create a new and far-reaching power” to grant universal vacatur.
Arizona v. Biden, 40 F.4th 375, 396 (6th Cir.
2022) (Sutton, C.J., concurring).
Instead, Section 706(2) simply
directs a court to disregard unlawful “agency action, findings,
and conclusions” in resolving the case before it. 5 U.S.C. 706(2);
see U.S. Br. at 40-44, United States v. Texas, No. 22-58 (argued
Nov. 29, 2022). 3
See also, e.g., Gov’t Reply Br. at 23-24, Little Sisters of
the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367
(2020) (No. 19-454); Gov’t Br. at 40-43 & n.15, Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (No. 07-463); Memorandum from
Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions to Heads of Civil Litigating
3
33
That understanding is consistent with the ordinary meaning of
“set aside,” which can “refer to a court’s decision to regard a
purportedly valid juridical act as ineffective.”
John Harrison,
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act Does Not Call for
Universal Injunctions or Other Universal Remedies, 37 Yale J. on
Reg. Bull. 37, 43 (2020) (Harrison).
Treating Section 706(2) as
an instruction to disregard unlawful agency action is the only
interpretation consistent with the statutory context.
That pro-
vision applies in all forms of action governed by the APA, including actions for writs of “habeas corpus” and “in civil or criminal
proceedings for judicial enforcement.”
5 U.S.C. 703.
Courts
hearing such actions thus must “set aside” unlawful agency action
under Section 706(2), yet no one would suggest that a court hearing
a habeas petition or a criminal or civil enforcement action could
vacate a regulation.
In contrast, Section 706(2) fits naturally
in those contexts if it is understood as an instruction to disregard unlawful agency actions, conclusions, and findings.
Of course, when a court declines to give effect to an agency
action in the case before it on the ground that the action is
unlawful, it may issue appropriate relief.
In some circumstances,
the Hobbs Act or another special statutory review provision authorizes a reviewing court -- often, a court of appeals -- to act
Components & United States Attorneys, Litigation Guidelines for
Cases Presenting the Possibility of Nationwide Injunctions at 7
(Sept. 13, 2018) (“Universal vacatur is not contemplated by the
APA.”) (capitalization altered and emphasis omitted).
34
directly upon the challenged agency action in the way an appellate
court acts upon a lower court’s judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. 2342.
But absent such a “special statutory review proceeding,” 5 U.S.C.
703 points outside the APA for the available remedies, specifying
that “[t]he form of proceeding” is a traditional “form of legal
action,” such as “actions for declaratory judgments or writs of
prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus.”
Here, if
respondents had standing and were entitled to prevail on the merits, the district court should have granted appropriately tailored
injunctive relief -- not a universal vacatur that blocked the
application of the plan to millions of other borrowers who are not
parties to this suit.
II.
THE EQUITIES FAVOR A STAY
The harm to the government and the public from vacating the
Secretary’s action is significant.
The HEROES Act reflects Con-
gress’s judgment that the Secretary must be able to act quickly
and effectively to afford relief to student-loan borrowers affected by national emergencies.
See pp. 8, 20-22, supra.
Here,
the Secretary has crafted relief to protect vulnerable borrowers
from delinquency and default (and thus from wage garnishment,
credit-report damage, and seizure of federal benefits, see Office
of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Student Loan Delinquency and Default, https://perma.cc/4A6N-DA5Z; D. Ct. Doc. 42, at
¶ 6 (Kvaal Decl.) (Nov. 15, 2022)).
The record includes ample
evidence of the severity of the problem and the consequences of
35
failing to act.
See pp. 10-12, supra.
The injunction thus frus-
trates the government’s ability to respond to the harmful economic
consequences of a devastating pandemic with the policies it has
determined are necessary.
See Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301,
1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (barring a sovereign from
“employ[ing] a duly enacted statute to help prevent
* * *
inju-
ries constitutes irreparable harm”); INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of L.A. County Fed’n of Labor, 510 U.S. 1301, 13051306 (1993) (O’Connor, J., in chambers) (emphasizing harm from
“improper intrusion by a federal court into the workings of a
coordinate branch of the Government”).
Indeed, the district court’s vacatur (along with the Eighth
Circuit’s injunction) has already frustrated -- and continues to
frustrate -- the Secretary’s previously announced plan to resume
student-loan payment obligations more broadly.
The debt-relief
measure was an integral component of the Secretary’s simultaneous
decision to restart such obligations after a lengthy period of
forbearance during a devastating global pandemic.
33a-34a; p. 10, supra.
App., infra,
The injunction and vacatur thus placed the
Secretary in an unwarranted dilemma:
Restart payments as previ-
ously planned -- and thereby invite the cascade of delinquencies
and defaults that prompted the Secretary to adopt the debt-relief
measure in the first place -- or continue forbearance, at significant cost to the government.
The Secretary ultimately determined
that the latter course was preferable, announcing on November 22
36
his decision to extend the payment pause and suspension of interest
accrual in light of the court orders blocking implementation of
the plan.
See p. 15, supra.
So long as they remain in effect,
the district court’s vacatur and the Eighth Circuit’s injunction
undermine the government’s ability to effectuate its chosen policy.
At the same time, the vacatur and injunction leave vulnerable
borrowers in untenable limbo.
Eligible borrowers have been told
that they will be able to obtain meaningful debt relief:
for the
average borrower, the relief contemplated by the plan would result
in $200 to $300 reductions in monthly payments.
Kvaal Decl. ¶ 6.
Those amounts are substantial to anyone attempting to responsibly
manage his finances -– and all the more so for lower-income borrowers eligible for relief under the plan.
App., infra, 40a-42a.
Yet because of the vacatur and injunction, the borrowers most
likely to default if payment obligations resume without some relief
face prolonged uncertainty about the scope of their payment obligations and when those obligations will resume.
So long as that
uncertainty continues, many borrowers will lack information they
need to decide whether they can afford to change jobs, buy a home
or a car, or assume other long-term financial obligations.
On the other side of the ledger, respondents would not face
any injury -- much less irreparable harm if the district court’s
judgment were stayed.
Respondents have not even established the
injury necessary for standing, see pp. 18-20, supra.
And, more
37
fundamentally, they have never explained how they have any interest
whatsoever in denying debt relief to millions of other borrowers.
Indeed, the only practical consequence of the vacatur for respondents has been to deny respondent Taylor $10,000 in debt relief
that he otherwise would have received.
Allowing such uninjured
plaintiffs to block a nationwide program based on a claim they
never brought is profoundly inequitable.
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT MAY WISH TO TREAT THIS APPLICATION AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should stay the judgment
entered by the Northern District of Texas.
The Court deferred
consideration of the government’s application to vacate the injunction entered by the Eighth Circuit in Biden v. Nebraska, No.
22-506, instead granting certiorari before judgment and setting
the case for expedited briefing and argument during the Court’s
February 2023 sitting, presumably because the Court believes the
issues presented in that case warrant “full briefing and oral
argument,” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2496
(2021) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Here, however, the defects in
the district court’s judgment are obvious and insurmountable:
re-
spondents plainly lack standing to assert -- and never in fact
asserted -- the only claim on which the district court based its
judgment.
See pp. 16-20, supra.
An immediate stay of the district
court’s unjustified vacatur thus is warranted here.
38
If, however, the Court is not prepared to grant that relief,
it may wish to follow the same course it took in Nebraska by
deferring consideration of the application pending oral argument,
treating this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari
before judgment, granting the petition, and setting this case for
oral argument along with Nebraska.
The government would be pre-
pared to brief this case on a schedule that would allow it to be
argued together with Nebraska during the Court’s February 2023
sitting. If the Court follows that course, the government suggests
that the appropriate questions presented would be (1) whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Secretary’s
statutory authority to adopt the plan, and (2) whether the plan
exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority.
A writ of certiorari before judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2101(e)
is an extraordinary remedy, but -- as in Nebraska -- the issues
presented by the district court’s vacatur of the Secretary’s plan
are “of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation
from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court.”
Sup. Ct. R. 11.
And considering this case
along with Nebraska would allow the Court to consider the full
range of challenges to the plan at once.
CONCLUSION
This Court should stay the judgment of the district court
pending appeal and pending the filing and disposition of any petition for a writ of certiorari.
If, however, the Court is not
39
prepared to grant an immediate stay, it may wish to defer consideration of this application pending oral argument, construe the
application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment,
grant the petition, and hear this case along with Biden v. Nebraska, cert. granted, No. 22-506 (Dec. 1, 2022).
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
DECEMBER 2022
APPENDIX
Court of appeals order denying stay pending
appeal (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2022) ........................... 1a
District court order (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) .............. 2a
District court final judgment
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) ................................ 28a
Memorandum re: Waivers Relating to PandemicConnected General Loan Discharge
(Sept. 27, 2022) ........................................ 29a
Notice of Debt Cancellation Legal Memorandum
(Aug. 30, 2022) ......................................... 30a
Memorandum re: Pandemic-Connected General Loan
Discharge and Payment Pause (Aug. 24, 2022) .............. 33a
Memorandum re: Pandemic-Connected Loan
Cancellation (Aug. 24, 2022) ............................. 35a
Case: 22-11115
Document: 00516562438
Page: 1
Date Filed: 11/30/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
___________
No. 22-11115
___________
Myra Brown; Alexander Taylor,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
United States Department of Education; Miguel
Cardona, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, in his official capacity
as the Secretary of Education,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:22-CV-908
______________________________
Before Elrod, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
IT IS ORDERED that appellants’ opposed motion for stay pending
appeal is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is expedited to the
next available randomly designated regular oral argument panel. The Clerk
is directed to issue a schedule for expedited briefing thereafter.
(1a)
1a
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
MYRA BROWN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 4:22-cv-0908-P
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
ORDER
The Constitution vests “all legislative powers” in Congress. This
power, however, can be delegated to the executive branch. But if the
executive branch seeks to use that delegated power to create a law of
vast economic and political significance, it must have clear congressional
authorization. If not, the executive branch unconstitutionally exercises
“legislative powers” vested in Congress. In this case, the HEROES Act—
a law to provide loan assistance to military personnel defending our
nation—does not provide the executive branch clear congressional
authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program.
The Program is thus an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s
legislative power and must be vacated. 1
1 The Court expresses no opinion on whether the Program constitutes sound or
unsound public policy—a consideration inappropriate for the Court to contemplate—
as it falls outside the Court’s task of merely interpreting the law. See Harris v. Harris,
72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 13, 32 (1878) (“‘Compassion,’ said an eminent Virginia chancellor,
‘ought not to influence a judge, in whom, acting officially, apathy is less a vice than
sympathy.’” (quoting Chancellor George Wythe, Commentary on Field’s Ex’x v.
Harrison & Wife, Wythe’s Reports 282 (Minor’s Ed. 1794))); see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendelton (Aug. 26, 1776), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 505 (Julian P. Boyd, ed. 1950) (“Let mercy be the character of the
law-giver, but let the judge be a mere machine. The mercies of the law will be dispensed
equally and impartially to every description of men; those of the judge, or of the
executive power, will be the eccentric impulses of whimsical, capricious designing
men.”).
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BACKGROUND
A. Title IV of the Higher Education Act
The Department of Education (“Department”) offers two types of
financial aid to help students pay for their college education—grants
and loans. 2 Grants do not have to be repaid. Id. But loans do. Id. Title
IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“HEA”) covers the
administration of three types of federal student loans: (1) Direct Loans;
(2) Federal Family Education Loans (“FFEL”); and (3) Perkins Loans.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1070.
With Direct Loans, the federal government provides loans directly to
borrowers, who are responsible for repaying the government. See 20
U.S.C. § 1087a. With FFEL, the federal government pays lenders to offer
student loans, and the federal government guarantees their repayment.
20 U.S.C. § 1071. With Perkins Loans, colleges loan money to students,
and the federal government guarantees their repayment. § 1087aa. The
HEA also provides how to pay these loans, repayment options, and loan
forgiveness. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.219; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1098e;
1087e(d)(1); 1078(b)(9)(A)(v).
B. Prior Attempts to Provide Loan Forgiveness
With rising college costs, federal student-loan debt has skyrocketed
to more than $1.61 trillion with 43 million borrowers. 3 As a result, there
have been multiple attempts to enact legislation to help alleviate
student-loan debt. For example, in 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren
introduced a bill to provide $50,000 in debt forgiveness for those who
make under $100,000. See S. 2235, 116th Cong. (2019). Similarly,
Representative Al Lawson introduced a bill to forgive the outstanding
loan balance of all borrowers who make under $100,000 individually or
$200,000 if married and filing taxes jointly. See H.R. 2034, 117th Cong.
(2021). But both bills failed.
2 See Types of Aid, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://bit.ly/3S51Heu (last visited Nov.
7, 2022).
3 Federal Student Loan Portfolio, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://bit.ly/3qYd5Nm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2022).
2
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The executive branch has also recently explored its ability to forgive
student loans. Specifically, the Trump administration considered its
statutory authority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for
Students Act of 2003 (“HEROES Act”) to forgive student loans due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. But the Department concluded that it lacked
such authority. 4 House speaker Nancy Pelosi agreed with the
Department’s conclusion: “People think that the president of the United
States has the power for debt forgiveness. . . He does not. He can
postpone, he can delay, but he does not have that power. That has to be
[accomplished through] an act of Congress.” 5
President Biden, however, promised to “forgive all undergraduate
tuition-related federal student debt from two- and four-year public
colleges and universities for debt-holders earning up to $125,000” while
campaigning for the presidency. 6 After becoming president, Biden
instructed the Department to prepare a memorandum exploring
possible legal avenues to justify a loan forgiveness program. 7
The Department did so but changed its tune—concluding that the
HEROES Act allows the executive branch to create a loan-forgiveness
program to address the financial harms of the COVID-19 pandemic. 8
The next day, the White House announced that the President would
“fulfill [his] campaign commitment” by providing debt forgiveness to
millions of borrowers. 9
4 See Reed Rubinstein, Memorandum to Betsy DeVos Secretary of Education, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNS.
https://bit.ly/3LBA36n.
(Jan.
12,
2021,
5:46
PM),
5 Lauren Camera, Pelosi: Biden Lacks Authority to Cancel Student Debt, U.S.
NEWS. & WORLD REPORT (July 28, 2021, 3:16 PM), https://tinyurl.com/33ex63de.
6 Joe Biden, Joe Biden Outlines New Steps to Ease Economic Burden on Working
People, MEDIUM (Apr. 9, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/3cbw4zh2.
7 See L. Egan, Biden to Review Executive Authority to Cancel Student Debt, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 1, 2021, 1:36 PM), https://nbcnews.to/3dD85dV.
8 See Use of the HEROES Act of 2003 to Cancel the Principal Amounts of Student
Loans, 2022 WL 3975075 (O.L.C.), at *1 (Aug. 23, 2022).
9 See FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Student Loan Relief for Borrowers
Who Need It Most, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 24, 2022), https://bit.ly/3dATj7p.
3
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C. The HEROES Act
The HEROES Act grants the Secretary of Education (“Secretary”)
the authority to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision
applicable to the student financial assistance programs under title IV of
the Act [20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.] as the Secretary deems necessary in
connection with a war or other military operation or national
emergency.” § 1098bb(a)(1) (alteration in original). “The term ‘national
emergency’ means a national emergency declared by the President of the
United States.” § 1098ee(4).
The waiver or modification must also “be necessary to ensure that”
certain objectives are achieved. § 1098bb(a)(2). The first of those
objectives is “to ensure that . . . recipients of student financial assistance
under title IV of the [HEA] who are affected individuals are not placed
in a worse position financially in relation to that financial assistance
because of their status as affected individuals.” § 1098bb(a)(2)(A). The
HEROES Act defines “affected individuals” to include people who reside
or are employed “in an area that is declared a disaster area by any
Federal, State, or local official in connection with a national emergency”
or who “suffered direct economic hardship as a direct result of a war or
other military operation or national emergency, as determined by the
Secretary.” § 1098ee(2)(C)–(D).
The second objective provides that “administrative requirements
placed on affected individuals . . . are minimized, to the extent possible
without impairing the integrity of the student financial assistance
programs, to ease the burden on such students and avoid inadvertent,
technical violations or defaults.” § 1098bb(a)(2). 10 If the objectives of
§ 1098bb(a)(2) are met, “[n]otwithstanding section 1232 of this title and
section 553 of title 5, the Secretary shall, by notice in the Federal
Register, publish the waivers or modification.” § 1098bb(b)(1).
HEROES Act provides three additional objectives. § 1098bb(a)(2)(C)–(E).
None of which are at issue or relevant to the Court’s analysis.
10 The
4
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D. Student-Loan Program
The Secretary invoked its authority under the HEROES Act to create
a loan-forgiveness program (“Program”) that would address the
financial harms of the COVID-19 pandemic. 11 The Secretary contends
that COVID-19 pandemic was declared a national emergency by
President Trump in 2020 and thus a “national emergency” under the
HEROES Act. Id. And according to the Secretary, every portion of the
country is a “disaster area due to COVID-19,” and “every person with a
federal student loan under title IV of the HEA” is an affected individual.
Id.
Because the Secretary deemed the objectives of § 1098bb(a)(2) met,
the Secretary provided notice of the waivers and modifications in the
Federal Register. Id. The notice provided that the Secretary modifies “20
U.S.C. 1087, which applies to the Direct Loan Program under 20 U.S.C.
1087a and 1087e; 20 U.S.C. 1087dd(g); and 34 CFR part 674, subpart D,
and 34 CFR 682.402 and 685.212” to provide the debt relief for certain
borrowers who qualify. Id. A borrower qualifies if he (1) individually
makes under $125,000 or $250,000 if married and filing taxes jointly
and (2) has Direct, Perkins, or FFEL loans that are not commercially
held. Id. If a borrower qualifies, the Program provides $20,000 in debt
forgiveness to those who have received a Pell Grant and $10,000 to those
who did not. Id.
E. Procedural History
1. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit
Plaintiffs Myra Brown and Alexander Taylor both have student
loans. ECF No. 1 at 3–4. Brown is ineligible for any debt forgiveness
under the Program because her loans are commercially held. Id. at 3.
And Taylor is ineligible for the full $20,000 in debt forgiveness under
the Program because he did not receive a Pell Grant. Id. at 3–4. Because
Brown loses out on $20,000 in debt forgiveness and Taylor loses out on
11 No.
2022-22205,
87
Fed.
Reg.
61512
(Oct.
12,
2022),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/10/12/2022-22205/federal-studentaid-programs-federal-perkins-loan-program-federal-family-education-loan-programand.
5
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$10,000, they disagree with the lines drawn for the Program’s eligibility
criteria. Id. at 2–3.
Brown and Taylor, however, could not voice their disagreement
because the Program did not undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 12 As a
result, Plaintiffs sued the Department and Secretary, seeking vacatur
of the Program or nationwide injunctive relief for two reasons. First,
they allege that the Program violates the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirements. ECF No. 1 at 13–14. Second, they also contend that the
Secretary lacks the authority to implement the Program under the
HEROES Act. Id. at 4–5.
The same day Plaintiffs sued, they moved to enjoin the Department
“from enforcing, applying, or implementing the Program.” ECF No. 4 at
14. Shortly after, Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion.
ECF No. 24.
2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
Along with opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that
Plaintiffs lack standing. See ECF Nos. 24 at 8–12; 25. And while not
mentioned in their motion, Defendants at the preliminary-injunction
hearing insinuated that not only do Plaintiffs lack standing, but nobody
has standing to challenge the Program. ECF No. 32 at 57–58.
3. Notice of the Court’s Intent to Rule on the Merits
Because of the prejudice Plaintiffs would experience if the Court
delays ruling on the merits, 13 no material facts are in dispute, and the
issues here are pure questions of law, the Court—out of an abundance
of caution—provided the Parties notice of the Court’s intent to advance
12 No.
2022-22205,
87
Fed.
Reg.
61512
(Oct.
12,
2022),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/10/12/2022-22205/federal-studentaid-programs-federal-perkins-loan-program-federal-family-education-loan-programand.
13 See Aila Slisco, Student Loan Debt Relief Checks Could Be Mailed in “Two
(Oct.
27,
2022,
8:52
PM),
Weeks,”
Biden
Says,
NEWSWEEK
https://www.newsweek.com/student-loan-debt-relief-checks-could-mailed-two-weeksbiden-says-1755288 (stating that on November 3, 2022, President Biden proclaimed
that checks could be sent to those who applied for the Program within “two weeks”).
6
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Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction to a determination on the
merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See ECF No. 33. The
notice provided the Parties an opportunity to object to this advancement.
Id. Plaintiffs did not object. See ECF No. 34. But Defendants did and
contend that proceeding to the merits is improper. See ECF No. 35.
Thus, this case presents three issues. First, whether proceeding to
the merits is appropriate. Second, whether the Court has jurisdiction.
And third, whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. The Court addresses
each in turn.
LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” and will be
granted only if the movants carry their burden on four requirements.
Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008). The
movants must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) the threatened
injury to the movant outweighs the threatened harm to the party sought
to be enjoined; and (4) granting the injunctive relief will not disserve the
public interest.” City of Dall. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 285
(5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). “The decision to grant or deny a
preliminary injunction is discretionary with the district court.” Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th
Cir. 1985).
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it could change the
outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). And a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. The Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant but need not comb through the record in
search of evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. See
Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003).
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ANALYSIS
A. Proceeding to the Merits is Appropriate
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, “[b]efore or after beginning
the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may
advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2) (emphasis added). But if “the eventual outcome on the
merits is plain at the preliminary injunction stage, the judge should,
after due notice to the parties, merge the stages and enter a final
judgment.” Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added). Courts typically require that the parties “receive
clear and unambiguous notice [of the court’s intent to consolidate the
trial and the hearing] either before the hearing commences or at a time
which will still afford the parties a full opportunity to present their
respective cases.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)
(quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055,
1057 (7th Cir. 1972)) (alteration in original). Courts may also consolidate
without giving the parties notice if the lack of notice is not prejudicial to
either party. See Wohlfahrt v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 658 F.2d 416, 418 (5th
Cir. 1981).
If consolidation is appropriate, a district court may convert a
plaintiff’s preliminary-injunction motion into a motion for summary
judgment. H & W Indus., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d
172, 177 (5th Cir. 1988). “Summary judgment serves as ‘the mechanism
for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is . . .
consistent with the APA.’” O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 125
(D.D.C. 2019).
Here, the Court provided the parties notice and an opportunity to
object. ECF No. 33. Defendants objected, contending that advancing to
a determination on the merits is improper for three reasons. ECF No.
35.
First, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to meet the burden of
proof at the summary-judgment stage to establish standing. Id. at 1–2.
But if this were true, Defendants would not be prejudiced by proceeding
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to the merits because the Court would rule in Defendants favor and
dismiss the case for lack of standing. This argument thus fails.
Second, Defendants have not had an opportunity to conduct
jurisdictional discovery to examine Plaintiffs’ intent to participate in
any comment process and the substance of their comments. But
assuming discovery revealed a fact issue as to Plaintiffs’ intent to
participate in any comment process and the substance of their
comments, those issues are not material to standing or the merits. Thus,
because these facts—even if resolved in Defendants’ favor—would not
“change the outcome of the lawsuit,” this objection is similarly meritless.
Sweetin v. City of Tex. City, 48 F.4th 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2022).
Third, Defendants have not yet produced the data underlying the
Secretary’s decision. ECF No. 35 at 3–4. Like Defendants’ second
objection, the data underlying the Secretary’s decision is not material.
Plaintiffs’ central arguments are whether the Secretary lacks the
authority for the Program and whether the Program had to go through
notice-and-comment procedures before the Secretary implemented the
Program. The data underlying the Secretary’s decision—while part of
the administrative record—is not material to either issue. See Sierra
Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001)
(stating that an issue of statutory construction is “a task which we are
competent to perform without the administrative record”); Alphapointe
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 475 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2020) (stating
that resolving the plaintiffs’ notice-and-comment challenge “requires no
obvious need for the administrative record”).
The cases on which Defendants rely are not to the contrary. In each
case, the issue was whether the agency’s actions were “arbitrary and
capricious,” which concerns the reasonability of an agency’s decisionmaking process. See ECF No. 35 at 3–4; Citizens to Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders,
430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2564
(2019). Plaintiffs bring no such claim. See ECF No. 3. Nor does the data
underlying the Secretary’s decision have any bearing on any of
Plaintiffs’ claims. So even if the data underlying the Secretary’s decision
created a fact issue, that fact issue would not be material as it would not
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“change the outcome of the lawsuit.” Sweetin, 48 F.4th at 391.
Defendants’ third argument thus fails.
Thus, because Defendants identify no reason for delaying a judgment
in this case, the prejudice resulting to Plaintiffs if the Court delays
ruling on the merits, no material facts are in dispute, and the issues
here are pure questions of law, the Court converts Plaintiffs’
preliminary-injunction motion to a determination on the merits.
B. Jurisdiction
For the Court to reach the merits, Plaintiffs must establish the
Court’s jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to
“cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. To satisfy this
requirement, a plaintiff must establish that he has standing—a
“personal stake” in the lawsuit. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554
U.S. 724, 732–33 (2008). At the summary-judgment stage, a plaintiff
must provide evidence of “specific facts” to establish standing. Id. Mere
allegations will not suffice. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
1. Standing
Standing contains three requirements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. First,
there must be a concrete injury in fact that is not conjectural or
hypothetical. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 149 (1990). Second,
there must be causation—a fairly traceable connection between a
plaintiff’s injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976). Third, there must
be redressability—a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the
alleged injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. These three requirements
constitute the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. See
FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). But these
requirements are relaxed when a plaintiff asserts a deprivation of a
procedural right coupled with an associated concrete interest. See Texas
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 150–51 (5th Cir. 2015).
Defendants insinuate that nobody has standing to challenge the
Program—stating, “Article III of the Constitution imposes limitations
on the judiciary. And sometimes the result is that there is executive or
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legislative action for which there isn’t an appropriate plaintiff.” ECF No.
32 at 57. Defendants’ main contention, however, is that Plaintiffs lack
standing. ECF No. 24 at 8. Thus, the Court first addresses whether
anybody has standing to challenge the Program. And if so, whether
Plaintiffs have standing.
a. Defendants’ Contention that No One Has Standing to
Challenge the Program is Incorrect
Defendants seem to argue that no one has standing to challenge the
Program because where the government is providing a benefit, nobody
is harmed by the existence of that benefit. ECF No. 32 at 57–58. And
according to Defendants, “sometimes the result is that there is executive
or legislative action for which there isn’t an appropriate plaintiff.” Id. at
57 (emphasis added). The Court must disagree. The Supreme Court has
recognized that a plaintiff has standing to challenge a government
benefit in many cases. See, e.g., Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)
(holding that plaintiffs who did not qualify for government benefits had
standing); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721, (1986) (holding that the
failure to receive benefits is enough to confer Article III standing).
Because Defendants’ contention that no one has standing to challenge
the Program because it confers a benefit is incorrect, the Court next
turns to whether Plaintiffs have standing.
b. Plaintiffs Have Standing
i.
Injury in fact
Plaintiffs allege that their concrete injury is the deprivation of their
procedural right under the APA to provide meaningful input on any
proposal from the Department to forgive student-loan debt and their
accompanying economic interest in debt forgiveness. ECF No. 4 at 12.
As for Plaintiffs’ alleged deprivation of their procedural right, the
APA requires agencies administering their delegated authority to follow
certain procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. These procedures obligate
agencies to subject their substantive rules to a notice-and-comment
period unless an exception applies. Id. A plaintiff is deprived of “a
procedural right to protect its concrete interests” if an agency violates
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the APA’s procedural requirements. Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 447
(5th Cir. 2019) (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496
(2009)). But a bare assertion of a procedural right violation is not enough
to confer Article III standing. See Shrimpers & Fishermen of RGV v. Tex.
Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 968 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff
must instead show a concrete injury stemming from that procedural
violation. Id.
Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries for two reasons. First,
they argue that Plaintiffs could not have suffered a procedural
deprivation based on the lack of a notice-and-comment period because
the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirement. ECF No. 24 at 8–9. Plaintiffs dispute this and argue that
because the HEROES Act does not authorize the Program, the Program
was promulgated in violation of the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirement. ECF No. 26 at 6–7. Because the Court must “assume, for
purposes of the standing analysis, that [Plaintiffs are] correct on the
merits of [their] claim that the [Program] was promulgated in violation
of the APA,” Plaintiffs have successfully alleged the deprivation of a
procedural right. EEOC, 933 F.3d at 447.
Second, Defendants assert, even if Plaintiffs have established the
violation of a procedural right, there is no accompanying concrete
interest stemming from that violation. ECF No. 24 at 9–11. They
contend that Plaintiffs’ “unhappiness that some other borrowers are
receiving a greater benefit than they are” is not a concrete interest. Id.
But this is untrue. Plaintiffs do not argue that they are injured because
other people are receiving loan forgiveness. Their injury—no matter how
many people are receiving loan forgiveness—is that they personally did
not receive forgiveness and were denied a procedural right to comment
on the Program’s eligibility requirements. Plaintiffs need to prove only
the existence of an associated “concrete interest,” not a guarantee of
concrete harm due to the procedural violation. EEOC, 933 F.3d at 447.
A benefit or legal-entitlement guarantee is not a prerequisite to
successfully establishing standing in the event of a procedural-right
violation. See, e.g., Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
785 F.3d 719, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A “plaintiff suffers a constitutionally
12
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cognizable injury by the loss of an opportunity to pursue a benefit even
though the plaintiff may not be able to show that it was certain to receive
that benefit had it been accorded the lost opportunity.” Id.
Plaintiffs have a concrete interest in having their debts forgiven to a
greater degree. Brown is ineligible for the Program because her loans
are commercially held. And Taylor is ineligible for the full $20,000 in
debt forgiveness under the Program because he did not receive a Pell
Grant in college. Brown and Taylor’s inability to obtain the full benefit
of debt forgiveness under the Program flows directly from the Program’s
eligibility requirements. Thus, Defendants’ procedural error of not
providing for a notice-and-comment period—which the Court must
assume as true for standing—deprived Plaintiffs of “a non-illusory
opportunity to pursue [the] benefit” of greater debt forgiveness and an
opportunity to advocate for the expansion of the eligibility criteria of the
Program. Ecosystem Inv. Partners v. Crosby Dredging, LLC, 729 F.
App’x 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2018).
The first requirement of Article III standing is thus met.
ii.
Causation
Second, Plaintiffs argue that their injury is traceable to Defendants’
actions because Plaintiffs lost the chance to obtain more debt
forgiveness, which flows directly from Defendants’ promulgation of the
Program’s eligibility requirements that failed to undergo a notice-andcomment period. ECF No. 4 at 11–13. Defendants do not contest this
argument. And the Court agrees with Plaintiffs.
A plaintiff only has standing if he can assert a “personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” California. v.
Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2117 (2021). An injury is fairly traceable if a
plaintiff’s “lost chance” to pursue a benefit flows directly from the
procedural violation. Ecosystem Inv. Partners, 729 F. App’x at 293.
Plaintiffs contend that they lost their chance to pursue debt forgiveness
by Defendants’ failure to offer a chance to comment on the Program’s
eligibility requirements. “This injury—denial of the opportunity to
participate—is more than fairly traceable to [the agency’s] alleged
13
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inaction (failure to publish for notice and comment).” Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Newman, 768 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 1991).
Thus, the second requirement of Article III standing is met.
iii.
Redressability
Third, Plaintiffs contend that there is at least some possibility that
Defendants would reconsider the eligibility requirements of the
Program if it were enjoined or vacated, which fulfills the lighter
redressability requirement that applies when a procedural injury is
alleged. ECF No. 26 at 3–4. The Court agrees. To establish standing, a
plaintiff must normally prove that a favorable ruling would redress its
entire injury at the hands of a defendant. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern.
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). But “when a litigant is vested with a
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility
that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to
reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (emphasis added). Even
if this lighter standard applies, a plaintiff must still show that it is
“likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable decision will
redress the [injury].” S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of State
of La., 252 F.3d 781, 788 (5th Cir. 2001).
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury will not
be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court because enjoining or
vacating the Program will not provide Plaintiffs any loan forgiveness.
ECF No. 24 at 11. But Defendants misread the redressability
requirement in the context of procedural injuries. Plaintiffs need only
prove that there is some possibility that Defendants will reconsider the
confines of the Program if it is struck down in its current form. See Tex.
v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 754 (5th Cir. 2015). And “enjoining the
implementation of [the Program] until it undergoes notice and comment
could prompt [the Secretary] to reconsider its decision, which is all a
litigant must show when asserting a procedural right.” Id. at 753–54.
Because Plaintiffs satisfy all three Article III standing requirements,
they may challenge Defendants’ conduct on the merits. As a result, the
14
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Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
(ECF No. 25).
2. Judicial Review
When a party challenges the legality of agency action, the Court must
also ensure that the agency action at issue is reviewable under the APA.
Data Mktg. P’ship, LP v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 45 F.4th 846, 853 (5th Cir.
2022). An agency action is reviewable if (1) there has been a final agency
action and (2) the plaintiff’s injury is within the zone of interests of the
statute allegedly violated. See 5 U.S.C. § 704; Match–E–Be–Nash–She–
Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012).
Neither party disputes that the Program is reviewable under the APA.
Still, judicial review implicates jurisdiction. Data Mktg. P’ship, 45 F.4th
at 853. As a result, the Court must consider whether the Program is
reviewable under the APA to ensure that it does “not exceed the scope
of [its] jurisdiction.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).
a. Final Agency Action
Finality is a “jurisdictional prerequisite of judicial review.” Data
Mktg. P’ship, 45 F.4th at 853 (quotation omitted). The APA provides a
right to judicial review of “final agency action” unless the statute
precludes judicial review or the action falls under agency discretion. 5
U.S.C. § 701(a). To meet the limited agency exception, there must be
“no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of
discretion.” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (quotation
omitted). Actions that fall under agency discretion are rare and only
apply when the standard of review is unclear. 14
The text of the HEROES Act does not preclude judicial review, and
the Secretary’s action falls within the Act’s plain text, which authorizes
waivers or modifications of various student-loan provisions. 20 U.S.C.
14 See, e.g., Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 191 (1993) (holding that an agency’s use of lump-
sum appropriation funds with no designation fell within the agency’s discretion);
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 817, (1992) (holding that an agency’s decision
to fire employee fell within the agency’s discretion); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
830, (1985) (holding that an agency’s decision not to enforce their own policy fell within
the agency’s discretion).
15
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§ 1098bb(a)(1). This provides a clear standard of review. Thus, neither
exception in § 701(a) applies here.
Finality requires two things: (1) the action must be the ending result
or “consummation” of the entire agency decision-making process—not a
tentative or intermediate step in the process—and (2) the action must
determine rights or obligations that produce legal consequences. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597, 599 (2016).
Both conditions of finality are present. First, in the Secretary’s
notice, the Department spells out its decision-making process, legal
basis for the decision, and intent to proceed with the Program. Nothing
in the waiver’s text reflects that the decision to implement the Program
is provisional or still under review. Second, the action—the Program—
forgives around eight million individuals a portion of their legallybinding student loan obligations, costing over $400 billion. This action
affects the rights and obligations of millions of loan recipients and
carries sweeping legal consequences for federal student-loan programs
by changing the terms of the HEA.
The Agency’s action is thus final.
b. Zone of Interests
Along with the finality requirement, the Court may review an agency
action only if a plaintiff’s interests are “arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute that he says was
violated.” Patchak, 567 U.S. at 224. A plaintiff with Article III standing
satisfies the requirement unless their “interests are so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that
it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the
suit.” Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177 (2011)
(quotation omitted). But doing so is not “especially demanding,” and “the
benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.” Patchak, 567 U.S. at 225.
Here, Plaintiffs have Article III standing. And because the Secretary
considers Plaintiffs “affected individuals” under the HEROES Act and
are federal loan recipients excluded from the Program, they satisfy the
zone-of-interest test. The Court may thus review the agency’s
implementation of the Program.
16
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C. Summary Judgment
Article I of the Constitution allows Congress to “delegate” some of its
legislative powers to administrative agencies. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). When
administering their delegated authority, agencies must comply with the
APA’s procedural and substantive requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. The
procedural requirements obligate agencies to subject their substantive
rules to notice and comment unless an exception applies. See 5 U.S.C. §
553. The substantive requirements “‘requires courts to hold unlawful
and set aside agency action’ that is ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations.’” See Texas v. United States, 50 F.4th 498, 525
(5th Cir. 2022) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)).
Plaintiffs argue that the Program violates the APA’s procedural and
substantive requirements. The Court addresses each in turn.
1. APA’s Procedural Requirements
Plaintiffs argue that the Program violates the APA’s procedural
requirements because it did not go through notice and comment before
implementation. ECF No. 4 at 13.
The APA requires agencies to subject their substantive rules to
notice and comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Substantive rules “grant rights,
impose obligations, or produce other significant effects on private
interests.” Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,
908 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701–
02 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A substantive rule is usually unenforceable if it does
not undergo notice and comment. Id. But if the agency’s authorizing
statute expressly exempts the agency’s rules from notice and comment,
the rule is enforceable. 5 U.S.C. § 559.
Plaintiffs argue that the Program is a substantive rule because it
‘“grants rights’ by promising to eliminate individuals’ debt if they meet
certain requirements and ‘imposes obligations’ on the Department to
forgive debt for those who meet the requirements.” See ECF No. 4 at 14
(quoting W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 946 F.3d 227, 237 (5th Cir.
2019)). They rely on Bernhardt to support their argument. But this
reliance is misplaced. In Bernhardt, the agency’s statutory authority did
17
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not exempt the agency from notice-and-comment requirements of the
APA. 946 F.3d at 237. The statutory authority here does:
“Notwithstanding section 1232 of this title and section 553 of Title 5, the
Secretary shall by notice in the Federal Register, publish the waivers or
modifications of statutory and regulatory provisions the Secretary
deems necessary to achieve the purposes of this section.”
§ 1098bb(b)(1). 15
Plaintiffs, however, argue that § 1098bb(b)(1) “applies only when the
waiver or modifications are ‘authorized’ under Section 1098bb(a)” and
that the Program is not “authorized” by § 1098bb(a). ECF No. 26 at 7.
Whether the HEROES Act authorizes the Program pertains to the
APA’s substantive requirements. But as a procedural matter, the
Secretary may waive or modify any provision without notice and
comment under the HEROES Act. All the APA requires is that the
Secretary publish the modifications of title IV of the HEA, which the
Secretary has done here.
Thus, because the Program was issued under the HEROES Act,
which exempts notice and comment, the Program did not violate the
APA’s procedural requirements. Whether the HEROES Act authorized
the Program is a different story.
2. APA’s Substantive Requirements
Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary lacks the authority to
implement the Program under the HEROES Act. ECF Nos. 4 at 16; 34
at 4. When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its statutory
authority, courts have generally applied the framework established in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
15 Whether
§ 1098bb(b)(1) exempts notice and comment turns on the word
“notwithstanding.” But a dictionary definition of “notwithstanding” does not answer
that question as “[d]rafters often use nothwithstanding in a catchall provision, where
its supposed referent is unclear.” See A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 126 (2012) (emphasis in original). “A dependent
phrase that begins with notwithstanding indicates that the main clause that it
introduces or follows derogates from the provision to which it refers.” Id. Thus,
“notwithstanding is a fail-safe way of ensuring that the clause it introduces will
absolutely, positively prevail.” Id. at 127. Here, “notwithstanding” in § 1098bb(b)(1)
means without obstruction from the notice and comment requirements. Plaintiffs do
not dispute this meaning.
18
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837, 843–44 (1984). Under Chevron, if a statute is ambiguous about the
issue, courts defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute if it is
“reasonable.” Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218
(2009)). In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has chipped away
at Chevron—giving back “the benefit of doubt about the meaning of an
ambiguous law to the individual” instead of the government. Buffington
v. McDonough, No. 21-972, 2022 WL 16726027, at *5 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2022)
(cleaned up).
The most recent example of Chevron’s fall is the crystallization of the
long-developing major-questions doctrine in West Virginia. v. EPA, 142
S. Ct. 2587 (2022). 16 The doctrine provides that when an agency seeks
to resolve a major question, a “merely plausible textual basis for the
agency action” is not enough. Id. at 2609. “The agency instead must
point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the power it claims. Id.
(quoting Utility Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
Plaintiffs contend that the Program fails under the major-questions
doctrine. The Court thus addresses whether the doctrine applies. And if
so, whether there is “clear congressional authorization” for the
Program. 17
a. The Major-Questions Doctrine Applies
The major-questions doctrine applies if an agency claims the power
to make decisions of vast “economic and political significance.” Id. at
2607–14. It is unclear what exactly constitutes “vast economic
significance.” But courts have generally considered an agency action to
be of vast economic significance if it requires “billions of dollars in
spending.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485 (2015). For example, the
Supreme Court in Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of
16 The major-questions doctrine’s precise relationship to the Chevron framework is
unclear, as the Court did not mention Chevron in that case. Defendants stated at the
preliminary-injunction hearing that Chevron does not apply if the major-questions
doctrine applies. See ECF No. 32. Nor does either party mention Chevron in their
briefs. For those reasons, the Court reasons that Chevron is not applicable here. But
even if it were applicable, the major questions doctrine compels the same result—the
Secretary lacks “clear congressional authorization” to implement the Program—
regardless of how the major-questions doctrine fits into the Chevron framework.
19
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Health & Human Services reasoned that an economic impact of $50
billion was of vast economic significance. 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021).
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in BST Holdings, L.L.C v. OSHA held that
$3 billion in compliance costs was enough to trigger the major-questions
doctrine. 17 F. 4th 604, 617 (5th Cir. 2021). Because the Program will
cost more than $400 billion—over 100 times more than the amount in
BST Holdings and 20 times more than the amount in Alabama
Association of Realtors—it has vast economic significance.
An agency action is politically significant if Congress has been
“engaged in robust debates” over bills authorizing something like the
agency’s action. West Virginia., 142 S. Ct. at 2620–21 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). And if Congress “considered and rejected” such bills, “that
too may be a sign that an agency is attempting to work around the
legislative process to resolve for itself a question of great political
significance.” Id. (cleaned up). For example, in NFIB v. OSHA, the
Supreme Court held that the major-questions doctrine applied when
various vaccine mandate bills considered by Congress had failed, and an
agency sought to mandate COVID-19 vaccines for millions of Americans.
142 S. Ct. 661, 662–66 (2022).
Similarly, Congress has introduced multiple bills to provide student
loan relief to those who make under a certain amount. See S. 2235, 116th
Cong. (2019); H.R. 2034, 117th Cong. (2021). And all have failed. A bill
was also introduced—to respond to the economic impact of COVID-19—
that provided the Secretary the authority to “cancel or repay” federal
student loans up to “$10,000 [of] the outstanding balance” for certain
borrowers. See H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. § 150117(h). But this bill also
failed. Thus, considering Congress’s extensive consideration of various
bills attempting to forgive student loans and failure to pass such bills,
the Program is of vast political significance.
Oddly enough, Defendants do “not deny that this is a case of economic
and political significance.” ECF No. 24 at 22. Instead, they argue that
the doctrine does not apply because “this case involves the disbursement
of a federal benefit to individuals, not the kind of expansive regulation
of private parties that have previously triggered the doctrine.” Id. at
20
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23. 18 But this statement is untrue. See Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585,
606–08 (6th Cir. 2022) (applying the major-questions doctrine to vaccine
mandate for federal employees); Georgia v. President of the U.S., 46
F.4th 1283, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2022) (same). And even if this were true,
the Court would not presume that the doctrine does not apply to an
agency decision of vast economic and political significance because it
involves the disbursement of a federal benefit. Instead, the Court must
“presume that ‘Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself,
not leave those decisions to agencies.’” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609
(quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
Thus, because the Program is an agency action of vast economic and
political significance, the major-questions doctrine applies.
b. The Secretary Lacks “Clear Congressional Authorization” to
Implement the Program
Because the major-questions doctrine applies, the Government’s
assertion of authority is treated with “skepticism.” West Virginia, 142 S.
Ct. at 2614. “To overcome that skepticism, the Government must . . .
point to clear congressional authorization” permitting its action. Id.
(cleaned up). To do so, Defendants point to the HEROES Act. But the
text of the Act points the other way for at least three reasons. See
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845) (“The law as it passed
is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which
that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their intention
from the language there used.”).
First, the HEROES Act does not mention loan forgiveness. If
Congress provided clear congressional authorization for $400 billion in
student loan forgiveness via the HEROES Act, it would have mentioned
loan forgiveness. The Act allows the Secretary only to “waive or modify”
provisions of title IV. The Secretary then uses that provision to rewrite
18 The Court finds it telling that Defendants—rather than addressing Plaintiffs’
arguments that the major-questions doctrine applies—copied and pasted their entire
major-questions doctrine section from another lawsuit challenging the Program.
Compare ECF No. 24 at 22–26, with Nebraska v. Biden, No. 4:22-CV-1040-HEA, ECF
No. 27 at 29–35.
21
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title IV portions to provide for loan forgiveness. 19 But “enabling
legislation” like the HEROES Act is not an “open book to which the
agency may add pages and change the plot line.” West Virginia, 142 S.
Ct. at 2609 (2022); U.S. Fleet Servs. Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 141 F.
Supp. 2d 631, 644 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (Mahon, J.) (refusing to engage in an
exercise of “legal jingoism” requiring the court to insert words into a law
or rule to arrive at a particular party’s interpretation). Agencies may
“not seek to hide elephants in mouseholes.” West Virginia, 142 S. at 2622
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
Second, the portions of the HEROES Act Defendants rely on fail to
provide clear congressional authorization for the Program. Defendants
rely on the COVID-19 pandemic as their justification for the Program.
They contend that the HEROES Act allows the Secretary the authority
to address the financial hardship of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed,
the COVID-19 pandemic falls within the HEROES Act’s definition of an
emergency. § 1098ee(4). But it is unclear whether the Program is
“necessary in connection with [that] national emergency.”
§ 1098bb(a)(1). The COVID-19 pandemic was declared a national
emergency almost three years ago and declared weeks before the
Program by the President as “over.” 20 Thus, it is unclear if COVID-19 is
still a “national emergency” under the Act.
Defendants contend that in ten years, they could still use the
HEROES Act to forgive student loan debt because of the COVID-19
pandemic if the Secretary deems it “necessary.” ECF No. 32, at 69–70.
But a legislative provision with “broad or general language” will not
19 As the Texas Supreme Court recognized 130 years ago:
When the purpose of a legislative enactment is obvious from the language
of the law itself, there is nothing left to construction. In such case it is vain
to ask the courts to attempt to liberate an invisible spirit, supposed to live
concealed within the body of the law, and thus interpret away the manifest
legislative intention by embracing subjects not fairly within the scope of
the statute.
Dodson v. Bunton, 17 S.W. 507, 508 (Tex. 1891).
20 60
Minutes (@60Minutes),
https://tinyurl.com/2s35maau.
22
(Sept.
18,
2022,
7:09
PM),
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supply a clear statement. Id. at 2623. The Department’s reliance on its
ability to modify provisions of title IV “as the Secretary deems necessary
in connection with a . . . national emergency” is the very language that
does not supply a clear statement. See, e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141
S. Ct. at 2489 (“It is hard to see what measures [the Government’s]
interpretation would place outside the CDC’s reach, and the
Government has identified no limit in [42 U.S.C.] § 361(a) beyond the
requirement that the CDC deem a measure ‘necessary.”) (emphasis
added).
Third, “the agency’s past interpretations of the relevant statute” is
another clue that the Secretary lacks clear congressional authorization
for the Program. West Virginia., 142 S. Ct. at 2625 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). “When an agency claims to have found a previously
‘unheralded power’ in a rarely invoked statutory provision, its assertion
generally warrants “a measure of skepticism.” Id. (quoting Utility Air,
573 U. S., at 324). The Department has not “relied on the HEROES Act
or any other statutory, regulatory, or interpretative authority for the
blanket or mass cancellation. . . of student loan principal balances,
and/or the material change of repayment amounts or terms.” See
Memorandum to Betsy DeVos Secretary of Education at 6.
Thus,
because
the
Department
lacks
“clear
congressional
authorization” for the Program under the HEROES Act, the Court
grants summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
c. Vacatur is the Appropriate Remedy
Next, the appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs seek two types of relief—
vacatur of the Program and nationwide injunctive relief. “Vacatur [of an
agency action] retroactively undoes or expunges a past [agency] action
. . . . Unlike an injunction, which merely blocks enforcement, vacatur
unwinds the challenged agency action.” Data Mktg. P’ship, 45 F.4th at
859 (quoting Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Valcq, 16 F.4th 508,
522 (7th Cir. 2021)) (alterations and ellipsis in original). While “[i]t is
not beyond the power of a court, in appropriate circumstances, to issue
a nationwide injunction,” these circumstances do not justify such a
remedy. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015).
23
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Instead, “the ordinary practice is to vacate unlawful agency action.”
Data Mktg. P’ship, 45 F.4th at 859 (quoting United Steel v. Mine Safety
& Health Admin., 925 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2019)). Vacatur is
authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 706, which requires the Court to decide “all
relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions” and “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action “not in
accordance with law,” “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,” or “short of
statutory right.” Because “under our Constitution, the people’s elected
representatives in Congress are the decisionmakers here—and they
have not clearly granted the agency the authority it claims for itself,”
the Program is unlawful. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2626 (2022)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). The Court thus applies the “default rule” and
vacates the Program. See Data Mktg. P’ship, 45 F.4th at 859–60.
Sometimes courts—though authorized by the APA to vacate an
agency action—exercise their discretion to remand the action for
adjustments or another agency review. See, e.g., Texas v. United States,
50 F.4th at 529. In deciding whether to sidestep complete vacatur, courts
consider “(1) the seriousness of the deficiencies of the action, that is, how
likely the agency will be able to justify its decision on remand; and
(2) the disruptive consequences of the vacatur.” Id. If there is a small
defect or deficiency that is quickly curable or an existing complex agency
program that requires major winddown efforts, a court may remand
without vacating the entire action. See, e.g., Lion Health Servs., Inc. v.
Sebelius, 635 F.3d 693, 703 (5th Cir. 2011) (remanding to the agency to
recalculate amounts owed in a manner consistent with the statute).
Both factors weigh against remand. First, the agency’s misstep is not
correctible on remand—it is a complete usurpation of congressional
authorization implicating the separation of powers required by the
Constitution. Second, the Program does not require a significant
administrative winddown period, as loan forgiveness has not started.
Thus, remand is not the appropriate remedy.
For those reasons, vacatur of the Program is the appropriate remedy.
24
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CONCLUSION
This case involves the question of whether Congress—through the
HEROES Act—gave the Secretary authority to implement a Program
that provides debt forgiveness to millions of student-loan borrowers,
totaling over $400 billion. Whether the Program constitutes good public
policy is not the role of this Court to determine. 21 Still, no one can
plausibly deny that it is either one of the largest delegations of
legislative power to the executive branch, or one of the largest exercises
of legislative power without congressional authority in the history of the
United States.
In this country, we are not ruled by an all-powerful executive with a
pen and a phone. Instead, we are ruled by a Constitution that provides
for three distinct and independent branches of government. As
President James Madison warned, “[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 47.
The Court is not blind to the current political division in our country.
But it is fundamental to the survival of our Republic that the separation
of powers as outlined in our Constitution be preserved. And having
interpreted the HEROES Act, the Court holds that it does not provide
“clear congressional authorization” for the Program proposed by the
Secretary.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 3) is
GRANTED and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) is
21 Under our system of government, public policy is typically made by the Congress
through a negotiated-and-reasoned process among the members, with input from the
President, and based on how Congress legislated, those members would then be held
accountable by their constituents each election cycle. See Speaker Sam Rayburn,
quoted in D.B. Hardeman & Donald C. Bacon, RAYBURN: A BIOGRAPHY 429 (1987) (“A
[politician] who is not willing to get out and defend what he has done will ultimately
find himself in poor shape politically.”). As President Lyndon Johnson was found of
admonishing Congress, “Come now, let us reason together.” JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 872 (15th ed. 1980).
25
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DENIED. And the Court DECLARES UNLAWFUL and VACATES
the Program.
SO ORDERED on this 10th day of November 2022.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
26
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
MYRA BROWN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 4:22-cv-0908-P
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
FINAL JUDGMENT
This Final Judgment is issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58. Per the Order entered on November 10, 2022:
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Final Judgment is entered
in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED
and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) is DENIED.
The Court DECLARES UNLAWFUL and VACATES the Program.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a true copy of this Final
Judgment to the Parties.
SO ORDERED on this 10th day of November 2022.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:22-cv-01040-HEA Doc. #: 27-1 Filed: 10/07/22 Page: 27 of 48 PageID #: 696
29a
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20202
DATE:
September 27, 2022
MEMORANDUM TO:
Dr. Nasser Paydar
Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education
Richard Cordray
Chief Operating Officer
Federal Student Aid
A~/
FROM:
Miguel A. Cardona, Ed.D.
Secretary of Education
SUBJECT:
Waivers Relating to Pandemic-Connected General Loan Discharge
.
On August 24, 2022, I notified Richard Cordray, Chief Operating Officer of Federal Student Aid,
that I had determined to exercise my discretion under the HEROES Act to issue waivers and
modifications necessary to (1) discharge up to $20,000 in federal student loan balances for
borrowers who meet certain conditions and (2) take all administrative steps necessary to
implement that determination.
In the interim, the Department has developed a comprehensive strategy to implement that
determination. As such, today I am issuing waivers and modifications to the provisions of 20
U.S.C. 1087, which applies to the Direct Loan Program under 20 U.S.C. 1087a and 1087e; 20
U.S.C. 1087dd(g); and 34 CFR part 674, subpart D, §§ 682.402 and 685.212 to provide that,
notwithstanding any other statutory or regulatory provision, the Department will discharge the
balance of a borrower's loans up to a maximum of: (a) $20,000 for borrowers who qualified for
Pell Grants at the time they received the loans and had an Adjusted Gross Income ("AGI") below
$125,000 for an individual taxpayer or $250,000 for borrowers filing jointly or as a Head of
Household for the 2020 or 2021 Federal tax years; or (b) up to a maximum of $10,000 for
borrowers who are eligible under those income thresholds but did not qualify for a Pell Grant at
the time they received the loans. This waiver is applicable to borrowers with outstanding Direct
Loans, FFEL loans held by the Department or subject to collection by a guaranty agency, and
Perkins Loans held by the Department prior to July 1, 2022, and who are determined to be
eligible by the Department.
Please take all necessary actions to implement these waivers and modifications and to provide
notice of these waivers and modifications in the Federal Register.
400 MARYLAND AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20202
www.ed.gov
30a
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information collection requirements and
minimize the public’s reporting burden.
It also helps the public understand the
Department’s information collection
requirements and provide the requested
data in the desired format. ED is
soliciting comments on the proposed
ICR that is described below. The
Department is especially interested in
public comments addressing the
following issues: (1) is this collection
necessary to the proper functions of the
Department; (2) will this information be
processed and used in a timely manner;
(3) is the estimate of burden accurate;
(4) how might the Department enhance
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; and (5) how
might the Department minimize the
burden of this collection on the
respondents, including through the use
of information technology. Please note
that written comments received in
response to this notice will be
considered public record.
Title of Collection: Health Education
Assistance Loan (HEAL) Program Regs.
OMB Control Number: 1845–0125.
Type of Review: Extension without
change of a currently approved
collection.
Respondents/Affected Public:
Individuals and Households; State,
Local, and Tribal Governments.
Total Estimated Number of Annual
Responses: 129,945.
Total Estimated Number of Annual
Burden Hours: 24,120.
Abstract: This is a request for an
extension of OMB approval of
information collection requirements
associated with the Health Education
Assistance Loan (HEAL) Program
regulations for reporting, recordkeeping
and notifications, currently approved
under OMB No. 1845–0125. There has
been no change to the regulatory
language. The previous filing totals were
incorrectly summed and the correct
totals are presented here.
Dated: August 24, 2022.
Kun Mullan,
PRA Coordinator, Strategic Collections and
Clearance Governance and Strategy Division,
Office of Chief Data Officer, Office of
Planning, Evaluation and Policy
Development.
[FR Doc. 2022–18591 Filed 8–29–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Notice Inviting Publishers To Submit
Tests for a Determination of Suitability
for Use in the National Reporting
System for Adult Education
AGENCY: Office of Career, Technical, and
Adult Education, Department of
Education.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The Secretary of Education
invites publishers to submit tests for
review and approval for use in the
National Reporting System for Adult
Education (NRS) and announces the
date by which publishers must submit
these tests. This notice relates to the
approved information collection under
OMB control number 1830–0567.
DATES: Deadline for transmittal of
applications: October 1, 2022.
ADDRESSES: Submit your application by
email to NRS@air.org.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
LeMaster, U.S. Department of
Education, 400 Maryland Avenue SW,
Room 11152, Potomac Center Plaza,
Washington, DC 20202–7240.
Telephone: (202) 245–6218. Email:
John.LeMaster@ed.gov.
If you are deaf, hard of hearing, or
have a speech disability and wish to
access telecommunications relay
services, please dial 7–1–1.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Department’s regulations for Measuring
Educational Gain in the National
Reporting System for Adult Education,
34 CFR part 462 (NRS regulations),
include the procedures for determining
the suitability of tests for use in the
NRS.
There is a review process that will
begin on October 1, 2022. Only tests
submitted by the due date will be
reviewed in that review cycle. If a
publisher submits a test after October 1,
2022, the test will not be reviewed until
the review cycle that begins on October
1, 2023.
Criteria the Secretary Uses: In order
for the Secretary to consider a test
suitable for use in the NRS, the test
must meet the criteria and requirements
established in 34 CFR 462.13.
Submission Requirements:
(a) In preparing your application, you
must comply with the requirements in
34 CFR 462.11.
(b) In accordance with 34 CFR 462.10,
the deadline for transmittal of
applications in this fiscal year is
October 1, 2022.
(c) You must retain a copy of your
sent email message and the email
attachments as proof that you submitted
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your application by 11:59 p.m. local
time on October 1, 2022.
(d) We do not consider applications
submitted after the application deadline
date to be timely for the October 1,
2022, review cycle. If an application is
submitted after the October 1, 2022,
deadline date, the application will be
considered timely for the October 1,
2023, deadline date.
Accessible Format: On request to the
program contact person listed under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT,
individuals with disabilities can obtain
this document and an application
package in an accessible format. The
Department will provide the requestor
with an accessible format that may
include Rich Text Format (RTF) or text
format (txt), a thumb drive, an MP3 file,
braille, large print, audiotape, or
compact disc or other accessible format.
Electronic Access to This Document:
The official version of this document is
the document published in the Federal
Register. You may access the official
edition of the Federal Register and the
Code of Federal Regulations at
www.govinfo.gov. At this site you can
view this document, as well as all other
documents of this Department
published in the Federal Register, in
text or Portable Document Format
(PDF). To use PDF you must have
Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is
available free at the site.
You may also access documents of the
Department published in the Federal
Register by using the article search
feature at www.federalregister.gov.
Specifically, through the advanced
search feature at this site, you can limit
your search to documents published by
the Department.
Authority: 29 U.S.C. 3292.
Amy Loyd,
Assistant Secretary for Career, Technical, and
Adult Education.
[FR Doc. 2022–18624 Filed 8–29–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Notice of Debt Cancellation Legal
Memorandum
AGENCY: Office of the General Counsel,
Department of Education.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The Department publishes
this memorandum on the Secretary’s
legal authority to cancel student debt on
a categorical basis.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Brian Siegel, U.S. Department of
Education, Office of the General
Counsel, 400 Maryland Avenue SW,
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room 6E–105, Washington, DC 20202.
Telephone: (202) 987–1508. Email:
brian.siegel@ed.gov.
If you are deaf, hard of hearing, or
have a speech disability and wish to
access telecommunications relay
services, please dial 7–1–1.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Department publishes this
memorandum on the Secretary’s legal
authority to cancel student debt on a
categorical basis. The debt relief
memorandum is in Appendix A of this
notice.
Accessible Format: On request to the
program contact person listed above
under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT, individuals with disabilities
can obtain this document in an
accessible format. The Department will
provide the requestor with an accessible
format that may include Rich Text
Format (RTF) or text format (txt), a
thumb drive, an MP3 file, braille, large
print, audiotape, or compact disc, or
other accessible format.
Electronic Access to This Document:
The official version of this document is
the document published in the Federal
Register. You may access the official
edition of the Federal Register and the
Code of Federal Regulations at
www.govinfo.gov. At this site you can
view this document, as well as all other
documents of this Department
published in the Federal Register, in
text or Portable Document Format
(PDF). To use PDF you must have
Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is
available free at the site.
You may also access documents of the
Department published in the Federal
Register by using the article search
feature at www.federalregister.gov.
Specifically, through the advanced
search feature at this site, you can limit
your search to documents published by
the Department.
Miguel A. Cardona,
Secretary of Education.
Appendix A—Debt Cancellation Legal
Memorandum
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TO: Miguel A. Cardona Secretary of
Education
FROM: Lisa Brown General Counsel
DATE: August 23, 2022
SUBJECT: The Secretary’s Legal Authority for
Debt Cancellation
Introduction
For the past year and a half, the Office of
General Counsel (‘‘OGC’’), in consultation
with our colleagues at the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel, has
conducted a review of the Secretary’s legal
authority to cancel student debt on a
categorical basis. This review has included
assessing the analysis outlined in a publicly
disseminated January 2021 memorandum
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signed by a former Principal Deputy General
Counsel. As detailed below, we have
determined that the Higher Education Relief
Opportunities for Students (‘‘HEROES’’) Act
of 2003 grants the Secretary authority that
could be used to effectuate a program of
targeted loan cancellation directed at
addressing the financial harms of the
COVID–19 pandemic. We have thus
determined that the January 2021
memorandum was substantively incorrect in
its conclusions.
Given the significant public interest in this
issue, and the potential for public confusion
caused by the public availability of the
January 2021 memorandum, I recommend
making this memorandum publicly available
and publishing it in the Federal Register, so
as to provide the general public with notice
of the Department’s interpretation of the
HEROES Act, consistent with statutory
requirements. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a).1
I. The Secretary’s HEROES Act Authority
The HEROES Act, first enacted in the wake
of the September 11 attacks, provides the
Secretary broad authority to grant relief from
student loan requirements during specific
periods (a war, other military operation, or
national emergency, such as the present
COVID–19 pandemic) and for specific
purposes (including to address the financial
harms of such a war, other military
operation, or emergency). The Secretary of
Education has used this authority, under
both this and every prior administration
since the Act’s passage, to provide relief to
borrowers in connection with a war, other
military operation, or national emergency,
including the ongoing moratorium on student
loan payments and interest.2
Specifically, the HEROES Act authorizes
the Secretary to ‘‘waive or modify any
statutory or regulatory provision applicable
to the student financial assistance programs’’
if the Secretary ‘‘deems’’ such waivers or
modifications ‘‘necessary to ensure’’ at least
one of several enumerated purposes,
including that borrowers are ‘‘not placed in
1 The Office of Legal Counsel has made its own
analysis of the Secretary’s authority, which will be
published in tandem with this memorandum’s
recommended publication.
2 See Federal Student Aid Programs (Student
Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins
Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program, and Federal-Work Study Programs), 85 FR
79,856, 79,856 (Dec. 11, 2020) (‘‘Secretary [DeVos]
is issuing these waivers and modifications under
the authority of the HEROES Act[.]’’); Federal
Student Aid Programs (Student Assistance General
Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal
Family Education Loan Program, and the Federal
Direct Loan Program), 77 FR 59,311, 59,312 (Sept.
27, 2012) (‘‘In accordance with the HEROES Act,
. . . Secretary [Duncan] is providing the waivers
and modifications of statutory and regulatory
provisions applicable to the student financial
assistance programs[.]’’); Federal Student Aid
Programs (Student Assistance General Provisions,
Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Direct Loan
Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program
and the Federal Pell Grant Program), 68 FR 69,312,
69,312 (Dec. 12, 2003) (‘‘Secretary [Paige] is issuing
these waivers and modifications under the
authority of section 2(a) of the Higher Education
Relief Opportunities for Students (HEROES) Act of
2003[.]’’).
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a worse position financially’’ because of a
national emergency. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1),
(2)(A).
Several provisions of the HEROES Act
indicate that Congress intended the Act to
confer broad authority under the
circumstances, and for the purposes,
specified by the Act. First, the Act grants
authority ‘‘[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, unless enacted with
specific reference to this section.’’ Id.
§ 1098bb(a)(1). Second, the Act authorizes
the Secretary to waive or modify ‘‘any’’
statutory or regulatory provision applicable
to the student financial assistance programs.
Id. § 1098bb(a)(1), (a)(2). Third, the Act
expressly authorizes the Secretary to issue
such waivers and modifications as he ‘‘deems
necessary in connection with a war or other
military operation or national emergency.’’
Id. § 1098bb(a)(1). The Supreme Court has
recognized that, in empowering a federal
official to act as that official ‘‘deems
necessary’’ in circumstances specified by a
statute, Congress has granted the official
broad discretion to take such action.3 This
authority is not, however, boundless: it is
limited, inter alia, to periods of a war, other
military operation, or national emergency (id.
§ 1098bb(a)(1)), to certain categories of
eligible individuals or institutions (id.
§ 1098ee(2)), and to a defined set of purposes
(id. § 1098bb(a)(2)(A)–(E)).
In present circumstances, this authority
could be used to effectuate a program of
categorical debt cancellation directed at
addressing the financial harms caused by the
COVID–19 pandemic. The Secretary could
waive or modify statutory and regulatory
provisions to effectuate a certain amount of
cancellation for borrowers who have been
financially harmed because of the COVID–19
pandemic. The Secretary’s determinations
regarding the amount of relief, and the
categories of borrowers for whom relief is
necessary, should be informed by evidence
regarding the financial harms that borrowers
have experienced, or will likely experience,
because of the COVID–19 pandemic. But the
Secretary’s authority can be exercised
categorically to address the situation at hand;
it does not need to be exercised ‘‘on a caseby-case basis.’’ Id. § 1098bb(b)(3). That is, he
is not required to determine or show that any
individual borrower is entitled to a specific
amount of relief, and he instead may provide
relief on a categorical basis as necessary to
address the financial harms of the pandemic.
II. The January 2021 Memorandum
On January 7, 2021, Secretary DeVos
resigned from her position as Secretary of
Education, effective January 8, 2021. On
January 13, a news outlet published a
memorandum signed January 12 by the thenPrincipal Deputy General Counsel, addressed
to ‘‘Betsy DeVos[,] Secretary of Education.’’ 4
3 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (statute
authorizing action when an agency head ‘‘shall
deem such [action] necessary or advisable’’ ‘‘fairly
exudes deference’’ to agency head and ‘‘strongly
suggests that its implementation was ‘committed to
agency discretion by law’ ’’ (second emphasis
added) (some quotation marks omitted)).
4 Michael Stratford, Trump Administration Tries
to Hamstring Biden on Student Loan Forgiveness,
Politico (Jan. 13, 2021).
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Two substantively identical versions of that
memorandum were posted to the website of
the Office of Postsecondary Education, dated
January 12 and January 18 (collectively, the
‘‘January 2021 memorandum’’). Having
reviewed the memorandum in consultation
with the Office of Legal Counsel, we have
determined that although it accurately
describes the core features of the HEROES
Act, its ultimate conclusions are unsupported
and incorrect.5 As such, it should be
rescinded.
As an initial matter, the bulk of the January
2021 memorandum’s discussion of HEROES
Act authority describes and quotes the key
provisions of the HEROES Act. The
memorandum explains that the HEROES Act
provides the Secretary ‘‘authority to provide
specified [6] waivers or modifications to Title
IV federal financial student aid program
statutory and regulatory requirements
because of the declared National
Emergency,’’ identifies that declared
emergency as the COVID–19 national
emergency declared on March 18, 2020, and
characterizes this authority as ‘‘narrowly
cabined’’ to achieving five enumerated
purposes, including ‘‘ensur[ing] that . . .
recipients of student financial assistance
under title IV of the Act who are affected
individuals are not placed in a worse
position financially in relation to that
financial assistance because of their status as
affected individuals.’’ Jan. 2021 Mem. at 5–
6.
The memorandum goes on to read in
purported limitations on the scope of relief
that may be afforded that are contrary to the
clear text of the Act. The memorandum
5 In addition to determining that the conclusions
contained in the January 2021 memorandum were
substantively incorrect, we have determined that
the memorandum was issued in contravention of
then-effective Department processes for issuing
significant guidance. An Interim Final Rule issued
by the Department on October 5, 2020, pursuant to
Executive Order 13,891, established additional
procedures for the issuance of guidance documents.
See Rulemaking and Guidance Procedures, 85 FR
62,597 (Oct. 5, 2020); see also Exec. Order No.
13,891, 84 FR 55,235 (Oct. 9, 2019). That rule
established new requirements for the issuance of
guidance and ‘‘significant guidance,’’ defining the
latter term to include guidance documents that
‘‘[r]aise novel, legal, or policy issues arising out of
legal mandates [or] the President’s priorities.’’ 85
FR at 62,608. The public dissemination of the
January 2021 memorandum violated a number of
provisions of this rule, including that guidance
must be ‘‘accessible through the Department’s
guidance portal,’’ and that, barring compelling
cause, all significant guidance may be published
only after a 30-day public comment period and
review by the Office of Management and Budget
under Executive Order 12,866 of September 30,
1993. Id. That rule was rescinded in September
2021, 86 FR 53,863 (Sept. 29, 2021), but it was in
effect at the time of the January 2021
memorandum’s publication. Thus, OGC has
determined that the January 2021 memorandum
was not properly promulgated.
6 We read the term ‘‘specified’’ as acknowledging
statutory limits on HEROES Act authority,
including the enumerated purposes of 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(b)(1), and not as suggesting any atextual
limitations on the Act’s clear grant of authority to
waive or modify ‘‘any’’ statutory or regulatory
provision applicable to student aid programs,
provided other HEROES Act requirements are met.
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advances three primary arguments in support
of a conclusion that ‘‘Congress never
intended the HEROES Act as authority for
mass cancellation, compromise, discharge, or
forgiveness of student loan principal
balances, and/or to materially modify
repayment amounts or terms.’’ Jan. 2021
Mem. at 6.
First, the memorandum recites certain
statutory limits on the Secretary’s authority,
including the HEROES Act’s statutory
definition of individuals eligible for relief, 20
U.S.C. 1098ee(2), and the enumerated
purposes for which waivers or modifications
may be issued, id. § 1098bb(a)(2).
The memorandum is correct that such
statutory provisions exist but provides no
support for the suggestion that these
provisions impose limitations beyond their
clear terms. See Jan. 2021 Mem. at 6.
Second, the memorandum points to the
HEROES Act’s references to avoiding
‘‘defaults’’ and a ‘‘cross-cite’’ to a separate
provision of the Higher Education Act
relating to the ‘‘return’’ of student loan funds,
concluding that these provisions ‘‘provide a
strong textual basis for concluding Congress
intended loans to be repaid.’’ Id. But these
provisions—which identify as allowable
purposes issuing waivers or modifications to
avoid defaults and granting relief from
certain requirements that borrowers return
certain payments—in no way impose a
requirement that any exercise of HEROES Act
authority must ensure that every borrower is
left with a remaining balance on their loan.
The reference to ‘‘defaults’’ authorizes the
Secretary to ‘‘avoid’’ defaults; it does not
require that he preserve their possibility. And
the Higher Education Act provisions
regarding the ‘‘return’’ of overpayments relate
only to specific processes and calculations
under which students are required to return
grant and loan assistance if they withdraw
from their school, see 20 U.S.C. 1091b; there
is no conceivable reading of this provision
that reflects a congressional intent that all
borrowers, including those not covered by
the section 1091b overpayment provisions,
are required to repay their loans in full.
Third, the memorandum concludes that
the authority to ‘‘waive or modify any
statutory or regulatory provision’’ is limited
to the definition of ‘‘modify’’ that was
adopted for an unrelated telecommunications
statute, and ‘‘does not authorize major
changes.’’ Jan. 2021 Mem. at 6. The
memorandum draws its definition of modify
from MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am.
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218,
225 (1994). In that case, the statutory
provisions under review applied no clear
limiting principle to a grant of modification
authority to the FCC; the statute allowed
modifications ‘‘in [the FCC’s] discretion and
for good cause shown.’’ Id. at 224 (quoting 47
U.S.C. 203 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV)). Here,
the HEROES Act itself clearly speaks to the
scope of modification authority: the Secretary
may make those modifications as may be
‘‘necessary to ensure’’ specific enumerated
purposes. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb. The Secretary
may not make modifications going beyond
that limit, but nor is he restricted to a degree
of modifications that would fall short of
‘‘ensur[ing]’’ the enumerated purposes are
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achieved. Moreover, the HEROES Act
broadly authorizes the Secretary to act as he
‘‘deems necessary’’ to ‘‘waive or modify’’ any
statutory or regulatory provision applicable
to the student aid program. The January 2021
memorandum’s interpretation of ‘‘modify’’
would read the Act to authorize the Secretary
to waive entirely or to make non-major
changes in the relevant statutory or
regulatory provisions, but not authorize the
Secretary to do anything in between. That
interpretation is illogical, and nothing in the
HEROES Act’s broad grant of authority
supports such a reading.
We have discussed these and other aspects
of the January 2021 memorandum with the
Office of Legal Counsel, and we further find
persuasive the discussion of the January 2021
memorandum offered in the Office of Legal
Counsel’s memorandum, which will be
published in tandem with this
memorandum’s recommended publication.
Conclusion
For the reasons detailed above, I
recommend that you (1) determine that the
January 2021 memorandum is formally
rescinded as substantively incorrect and (2)
authorize publication in the Federal Register
and public posting of this memorandum as
the Department’s interpretation of the
HEROES Act.
[FR Doc. 2022–18731 Filed 8–29–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Proposed Agency Information
Collection
AGENCY: Bonneville Power
Administration, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Submission for Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) review;
comment request.
SUMMARY: The Department of Energy
(DOE), Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA), invites public
comment on a collection of information
that BPA is developing for submission
to OMB pursuant to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. The proposed
collection, Contractor Safety, will be
used to manage portions of the Safety
program that are related to contractors.
These collection instruments allow for
compliance with Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
requirements.
DATES: Comments regarding this
proposed information collection must
be received on or before October 31,
2022. If you anticipate any difficulty in
submitting comments within that
period, contact the person listed in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section as soon as possible.
ADDRESSES: Written comments and
recommendations for the proposed
information collection should be sent
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DELIBERATIVE / PRE-DECISIONAL / CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
THE UNDER SECRETARY
DATE:
August 24, 2022
TO:
Miguel A. Cardona, Ed.D.
Secretary of Education
FROM:
James Kvaal
Under Secretary of Education
SUBJECT:
Pandemic-Connected Loan Cancellation
In March 2020, Congress determined that, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was necessary
to provide relief to student loan borrowers by suspending certain payments and collections
activity, and temporarily setting certain interest rates to zero percent. Under the authority granted
to the Secretary of Education by the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of
2003 (“HEROES Act”), you previously extended this relief through August 31, 2022.
This payment pause has delivered substantial relief to millions of loan borrowers, seeking to
ensure that they are not in a worse position financially due to the pandemic. However, when loan
payments resume, many borrowers will be at heightened risk of loan delinquency and default
that could offset the benefits provided by the pause and leave borrowers worse off than they were
before the pandemic. As outlined in the attached analysis prepared by your advisors, many
borrowers will experience challenges in the transition back to repayment. Additional steps are
needed to address these challenges and reduce the likelihood of delinquency and default to
ensure that borrowers are not in a worse position financially due to the pandemic with regard to
their ability to repay their loans.
In order to ensure that borrowers subject to the payment pause are not placed in a worse position
financially by the COVID-19 national emergency as they restart payments, I recommend that
you exercise your discretion under the HEROES Act to issue waivers and modifications
necessary to effectuate the following actions:
Discharge $10,000 of federal student loan balances for borrowers with individual
incomes of under $125,000 or household incomes of under $250,000 during tax years
2020 or 2021. These discharges would be limited to loans that were originally
outstanding as of June 30, 2022, and that are currently subject to the payment pause,
including Direct Loans, Federal Family Education Loans held by the Department or by
guaranty agencies, and Federal Perkins Loans held by the Department.
Discharge an additional $10,000 in federal student debt for borrowers who meet these
requirements and who also received a Pell Grant at some point in the past.
400 MARYLAND AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20202
www.ed.gov
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Take the administrative steps needed to implement this discharge initiative, including the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of borrower information necessary to
establish eligibility for the discharge under the relevant criteria and provide benefits
under the initiative automatically to as many borrowers as possible utilizing income
information available to the Department in compliance with applicable law.
Develop a simple process for borrowers to attest to their incomes and for FSA to verify
the income of a sample of those borrowers.
Based on current economic and public health conditions, and to provide time to successfully
implement these measures needed to ensure that borrowers are not placed in a worse position
financially due to the pandemic, I also recommend that you extend those waivers and
modifications specified in the December 11, 2020, Federal Register notice (85 Fed. Reg. 79856),
that relate to the payment and collection of, and accumulation of interest on, federal student
loans, and also extend the corresponding pause for Federal Family Education Loan Program
loans held by guaranty agencies, as discussed in Dear Colleague Letter GEN-21-03 through
December 31, 2022. Because this extension is expected to be the final extension of the payment
pause, I further recommend that you direct FSA to take all necessary steps to restart loan
payments after December 31, 2022.
If you approve these recommendations, please sign the attached memorandum to the Chief
Operating Officer of Federal Student Aid.
Attachments:
1. Rationale for Pandemic-Connected Loan Cancellation Program
2. Memorandum to Chief Operating Officer Cordray prepared for your signature
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Rationale for Pandemic-Connected Loan Discharge Program
August 24, 2022
I.
Background
In March 2020, Congress determined that, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was necessary to
provide relief to student loan borrowers by suspending certain payments and collections activity, and
temporarily setting certain interest rates to zero percent. Under the authority granted to the Secretary of
Education by the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (“HEROES Act”), the
Secretary previously extended this relief through August 31, 2022.
This payment pause has delivered substantial relief to millions of loan borrowers, seeking to ensure that
they are not in a worse position financially due to the pandemic. However, when loan payments resume,
many borrowers will be at heightened risk of loan delinquency and default that could offset the benefits
provided by the pause and leave borrowers worse off than they were before the pandemic. Many
borrowers will experience challenges in the transition back to repayment. Additional steps are needed to
address these challenges and reduce the likelihood of delinquency and default to ensure that borrowers are
not in a worse position financially due to the pandemic regarding their ability to repay their loans. As
detailed below, the Department of Education could mitigate these consequences by taking the following
steps:
Discharging $10,000 of federal student loan balances for borrowers with individual incomes of under
$125,000 or household incomes of under $250,000 during tax years 2020 or 2021. These discharges
would be limited to loans that were originally outstanding as of June 30, 2022, and that are currently
subject to the payment pause, including Direct Loans, Federal Family Education Loans held by the
Department or by guaranty agencies, and Federal Perkins Loans held by the Department.
Discharging an additional $10,000 in federal student debt for borrowers who meet these requirements
and who also received a Pell Grant at some point in the past.
This paper summarizes the basis for and key design elements of this proposal and presents relevant
considerations and evidence. It is not an exhaustive list of all the decisions required to operationalize a
pandemic-connected loan discharge program, nor is it a complete inventory of all pieces of supporting
evidence the Department considered.
II.
Analysis
A. Potential Harm to Borrowers from the Pandemic as Payments Restart
The student loan payment pause, initiated at the outset of the pandemic, protected borrowers from
financial harm by allowing them to forgo payments, preventing any interest accrual on their debts, and
halting all collections on student loans. Despite these measures, many student loan borrowers remain at
risk of being placed in a worse position financially as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and its
associated economic effects. Historical evidence suggests that loans are at heightened risk of delinquency
and default as they exit forbearance. Economic conditions and surveys of borrowers suggest that, absent
additional relief, the harmful effects of the pandemic may make repayment more difficult for student loan
borrowers than it was before the pandemic, especially for lower income borrowers.
1
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1. Risk of Delinquency and Default Following Long Periods of Forbearance
Past experience with student loan borrowers transitioning back into repayment after long periods of
forbearance raise concerns about the potential for elevated risk of delinquency and default. Although
there is no exact analogue for the circumstances surrounding the current payment pause, the Department
has previously provided borrowers experiencing local and regional natural disasters, such as hurricanes,
earthquakes, or wildfires, with access to forbearances with similar provisions. When borrowers accessing
natural disaster forbearances transitioned back into repayment, there were documented spikes in student
loan defaults.1
Analysis of the outcomes of borrowers placed in mandatory administrative forbearances triggered by
Hurricanes Maria, Harvey, and Irma and the northern California wildfires in late 2017 show that,
compared to the calendar year before the disaster declaration, the incidence of default increases
substantially six quarters later. Specifically, only 0.3 percent of borrowers entered default in the calendar
year before the declaration, while 6.5 percent of borrowers entered default in the calendar year after they
exited mandatory administrative forbearance.2
Furthermore, Pell Grant recipients affected by these events experienced larger increases in default
compared to non-recipients after exiting mandatory administrative forbearance. While Pell Grant
recipients and non-recipients had similar probabilities of entering default in the calendar year prior to the
disaster declaration, 7 percent of Pell borrowers enter default in the calendar year after exiting mandatory
administrative forbearance compared to 5 percent of non-recipients.3
2. Current Economic Conditions Facing Borrowers
Borrowers themselves report that they will be less likely to keep up with repayments on their student loan
debt when payments resume, despite benefiting from the repayment pause and stimulus support during
the course of the pandemic. Among borrowers with income below $125,000 who had also been making
payments in 2019, a substantially higher number anticipate having trouble making full payments in the
future than reported not making regular payments before the pandemic. For example, of those with
income under $40,000. only 26 percent reported never or occasionally making full payments in 2019, but
51 percent in this group expect to have difficulty making full or even any payments in the future. Of those
with income between $40,000 and $75,000, 18 percent were unable to make full payments in 2019, but 36
percent expect to be unable to cover their monthly payments in the future. Similarly, for borrowers with
income between $75,000 and $125,000, 18 percent reported making occasional or no payments prior to
the pandemic, but 24 percent expect to make less than full payment when the pandemic forbearance
ends.4
Because borrowers expect increased payment difficulties, even after accounting for the benefits they
received from the repayment pause and stimulus, it is likely that the net effect of the pandemic—absent
Kaufman, Ben. "New Data Show Student Loan Defaults Spiked in 2019-A Warning to Industry and DeVos Amid
Economic Fallout," Student Borrower Prot. Ctr., Mar. 13, 2020.
2
Department of Education analysis of administrative data. These analyses are based on borrowers who had at least
one active Department of Education-held loan, were placed in mandatory administrative forbearance for at least one
day in the period spanning a week prior to the disaster start date and 90 days after this date, and who had an address
in a state (and county, when relevant) that was a federally declared disaster area.
3
Ibid. Information on income is not available for most borrowers placed in mandatory administrative forbearance
following these federally declared major disasters, thus a similar analysis exploring default rates among borrowers
with different incomes was not feasible.
4
Akana, Tom, and Dubravka Ritter. "Expectations of Student Loan Repayment, Forbearance, and Cancellation:
Insights from Recent Survey Data." Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2022, Table 1.
1
2
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other compensatory actions—would be to increase delinquency rates further. If borrowers’ recollections
of past repayment success and expectations for future repayment capacity translate directly into their
future repayment success, borrowers’ delinquency ra
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