Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Harold Jean-Baptiste, Petitioner v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.

Supreme Court briefMar 14, 2023

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APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appeal Order 2-22-23............................. ;

App, 1

Order 9-21-22................... .......................

App.4

Order 09-21-22 (Memorandum Opinion)

App. 5

App. 1

United States Court of Appeals

For The District of Columbia Circuit

No. 22-7128

September Term, 2022

1:22-cv-01499-TNM

Filed On: February 22, 2023

Harold Jean-Baptiste,

Appellant

Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.,

Appellee

BEFORE: Wilkins, Rao, and Walker, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the motion for summary af

firmance, the opposition thereto, the reply, and the surreply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary affir

mance be granted as to all of appellant’s claims other

than the one pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The mer

its of the parties’ positions as to these claims are so

clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers

Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (per curiam). Besides appellant’s claims under

Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986, appellant

forfeited all his claims by failing to raise any of them

App. 2

in opposition to the motion for summary affirmance.

See U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d

488, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As to appellant’s Title VII

claim, the district court correctly dismissed that claim

as barred by the 90-day limitations period. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); Oviedo v. Wash. Metro. Area

Transit Auth., 948 F.3d 386, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Even

assuming that appellant’s earlier lawsuit tolled that

period, he still failed to commence the current suit

within the requisite time frame, and the dismissal of

that earlier suit “without prejudice” did not permit ap

pellant to file a new action without regard to the stat

ute of limitations. See Ciralsky v. C.I.A., 355 F.3d 661,

672. (D.C. Cir. 2004). Appellant’s § 1986 claim similarly

fails based on that statute’s one-year limitations pe

riod. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986. It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own mo

tion, that appellee show cause, within 30 days of the

date of this order, why the court should not summarily

reverse the dismissal of appellant’s § 1985(3) claim in

light of the District of Columbia’s three-year residual

limitations period. See Jones v. Kirchner, 835 F.3d 74,

80-81 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d

220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The response to the order to

show cause may not exceed the length limitations es

tablished by Fed. R. App. R 27(d)(2) (5,200 words if pro

duced using a computer; 20 pages if handwritten or

typewritten). Appellant may file a reply, not to exceed

2,600 words, or 10 pages if it is handwritten or type

written, within 14 days of service of appellee’s re

sponse.

App. 3

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order

to appellant both by certified mail, return receipt re

quested, and by first class mail.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition

will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold

issuance of the mandate herein until resolution of the

remainder of the appeal.

Per Curiam

App. 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE,

Plaintiff,

BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON,

INC.,

Case No. l:22-cv01499 (TNM)

Defendant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Complaint, Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, the parties’ other briefing, and the

law, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying

Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant Booz Allen Hamil

ton’s [7] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part insofar as the dismissal is without

prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

The Clerk of Court is requested to close the case.

This is a final, appealable order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Dated:

September 21, 2022

2022.09.21

[SEAL] 15:53:48 -04'00'

/s/ Trevor N. McFadden_____

TREVOR N. McFADDEN

United States District Judge

App. 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE,

Plaintiff,

BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON,

INC.,

Case No. l:22-cv01499 (TNM)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Filed Sep. 21, 2022)

Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, sues his

former employer, Booz Allen Hamilton for employment

discrimination under Title VII and violations of federal

and state statutes. Booz Allen moves to dismiss JeanBaptiste’s Complaint for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6) and for improper venue under Rule

12(b)(3). The Court will grant in part Booz Allen’s

motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because Jean-Baptiste’s

claims are either time-barred or do not meet minimum

pleading standards, and will deny the motion in part

insofar as the dismissal is without prejudice.1

1 Because the Court grants Booz Allen’s Motion to Dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need not consider the arguments

about improper venue.

App. 6

Jean-Baptiste worked for Booz Allen as a data sci

entist. See Am. Compl. (Compl.) K 6, ECF No. 3. Soon

after Booz Allen hired him, Jean-Baptiste submitted a

racial discrimination claim to Booz Allen and the

EEOC. See id. He asserted that he was the “only black

male and Haitian exclusion [sic] from [sic] training

conference essential for [his] role.” Id. ^ 7. He also

claimed that his co-worker stated she “hated black

people” and exhibited hostility toward him. Id. It 8.

And he complained that armed FBI agents accosted

him and searched his office. See id. 1[ 15. Booz Allen

investigated Jean-Baptiste’s claims and found them

meritless. See id. ^[ 21; see also Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss

(Def.’s MTD) at 6, ECF 7-1. Booz Allen then asked

Jean-Baptiste to undergo a fitness for duty exam, but

he did not report for the exam. See Def.’s MTD at 6.

So Booz Allen fired Jean-Baptiste in February 2020,

about seven months after hiring him. See id.

Jean-Baptiste first sued Booz Allen and other fed

eral Defendants in April 2020 alleging violations of

Title VII and his constitutional rights, illegal invasion

of privacy under the Electronic Communications Pri

vacy Act (ECPA), and more. See Jean-Baptiste v. Booz

Allen Hamilton, Inc., et al., No. l:20-cv-02178, ECF

No. 1 (D.D.C. April 30,2020).2 After amending his Com

plaint several times, Jean-Baptiste sought voluntary

2 Jean-Baptiste first sued Booz Allen and the FBI in D.C. Su

perior Court, but Defendants removed the action to this Court in

August 2020.

App. 7

dismissal, which this Court granted. See id., ECF No.

37; see also Minute Order (Sept. 28, 2020).

Jean-Baptiste filed this case nearly two years

later, suing Booz Allen under many of the same theo

ries. See Compl. at 2. He alleges that Booz Allen vio

lated Title VII, ECPA, §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 of

the Civil Rights Act, and other federal and state stat

utes between March 10, 2019 and February 24, 2020.

See, e.g., id. 1 1. Jean-Baptiste seeks a declaratory

judgment, damages, reinstatement of his employment,

and more. Id. at 15-16. Booz Allen argues that JeanBaptiste’s claims must be dismissed because they are

either time-barred or do not meet minimum pleading

standards. The Court agrees with Booz Allen and will

grant its motion in full, except for the request that the

dismissal be with prejudice. Jean-Baptiste’s Motion

to Take Judicial Notice is also pending. See Mot. to

Take Judicial Notice (MJN), ECF No. 13. Because

Jean-Baptiste is pro se, the Court considers the allega

tions in, and attachments to, his motion in this Opin

ion. This Court has jurisdiction over Jean-Baptiste’s

federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,28 U.S.C. § 1343,

and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )(3).

II.

A complaint must contain sufficient factual allega

tions to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded

factual content “allows the court to draw the

App. 8

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). Mere “labels and conclusions,” “formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and

“naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhance

ment” do not suffice. Id.

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court treats

the complaint’s factual allegations as true and grants

the plaintiff the benefit of inferences drawn from the

facts alleged. See Sparrow u. United Air Lines, Inc., 216

F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But the Court need

not accept inferences unsupported by facts alleged in

the complaint. See Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235,

242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Because Jean-Baptiste is pro se, the Court “liber

ally construe[s]” his filings. Erickson u. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court may also consider JeanBaptiste’s supplemental filings “to clarify the precise

claims being urged.” Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d

569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But these relaxed standards

do not relieve Jean-Baptiste of his obligation to comply

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Slovinec

v. Am. Uniu., 520 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D.D.C. 2007).

Rule 8(a) requires a Complaint to contain short

and plain statements of “the grounds for the court’s ju

risdiction” and “the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. And Rule 8(d) requires that each alle

gation “be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(d). Rule 8’s standards ensure that defendants receive

App. 9

fair notice of the claims against them so they can

prepare defenses. See Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v.

Williams, 348 F.3d 1033,1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

III.

Jean-Baptiste alleges that Booz Allen violated

Title VII by fostering a hostile work environment and

by discriminating against him based on race. See

Compl. M 24, 30, 37, 39. Booz Allen argues that his

claims must be dismissed because they are timebarred. See Def.’s MTD at 9-10.

Booz Allen terminated Jean-Baptiste’s employ

ment on February 24,2020. See Compl. I 6; Def.’s MTD

at 6. Jean-Baptiste claims he received a Right to Sue

Letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Com

mission (EEOC) on February 5, 2020, a prerequisite

to bringing an employment discrimination suit. See

Compl. % 4. And he submits a copy of the letter, though

it is dated February 14, 2020. See MJN, Ex.l. Regard

less of when in February 2020 Jean-Baptiste received

the letter, Booz Allen is correct that his claim is timebarred.

“A person aggrieved under Title VII who seeks to

file a civil action must do so within ninety days from

receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue notice.” Griffin v.

Acacia Life Ins. Co., 151 F. Supp. 2d 78, 80 (D.D.C.

2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). And courts

strictly construe the 90-day deadline for Title VII

App. 10

claims, even in pro se cases. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Vilsack,

763 F. Supp. 2d 168, 173 (D.D.C. 2011). Jean-Baptiste

sued Booz Allen in May 2022—far outside the 90-day

period which began in February 2020. Even if the

90-day time limit were equitably tolled during JeanBaptiste’s first lawsuit, his suit here remains untimely

because he filed it nearly twenty months after he vol

untarily dismissed his prior action.3

Jean-Baptiste next alleges that Booz Allen vio

lated his rights under ECPA by monitoring his com

puter. See, e.g., Compl. I'll 24, 35. Booz Allen argues

that this claim must also be dismissed because it is

time-barred. See Def.’s MTD at 10-12.

ECPA provides that a civil action “may not be com

menced later than two years after the date upon which

the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity to dis

cover the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e). To the extent

comprehensible, Jean-Baptiste’s Complaint alleges

that Booz Allen most recently illegally intercepted his

communications on September 27, 2019. See Compl.

H 15; Def.’s MTD at 11. So Jean-Baptiste had until Sep

tember 27, 2021 to sue under ECPA. See 18 U.S.C.

3 And Jean-Baptiste bears a heavy burden in showing he is

entitled to equitable tolling. See, e.g., Miller v. Downtown Bid

Servs. Corp., 281 F. Supp. 3d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2017) (explaining

that a plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling “only if” he shows

that he “has been pursuing his rights diligently” and “some ex

traordinary circumstance” prevented a timely filing). He does not

carry that burden here.

App. 11

§ 2520(e). Because he did not sue until May 2022, this

claim is also time-barred. Jean-Baptiste has no mean

ingful rebuttal to Booz Allen’s arguments. See, e.g., Pl.’s

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Opp’n) at 4, ECF No. 9.

Though Jean-Baptiste states that he had two years to

refile his original Complaint against Booz Allen, see,

e.g., id. at 5, he cites no authority for this proposition,

nor does this Court know of any. Thus, the Court will

dismiss his ECPA claim.

Jean-Baptiste also alleges that Booz Allen violated

§§ 1985(3) and 1986 of the Civil Rights Act. See Compl.

33-34. Once again, Booz Allen argues that these

claims are time-barred. See Def.’s MTD at 13—14.

Section 1985(3) permits suit if two or more people

“conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either di

rectly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the

equal protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). And

§ 1986 allows a derivative suit against a person who

knew of violations under § 1985 but neglected to pre

vent them. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Typically, the viability

of a § 1986 claim depends on a meritorious § 1985

claim. See, e.g., Philogene v. District of Columbia, 864

F. Supp. 2d 127,132 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing a § 1986

claim after finding that the plaintiff did not adequately

state a claim under § 1985).

Jean-Baptiste alleges that Booz Allen conspired to

interfere with his civil rights in violation of § 1985(3).

See Compl. f 34. Because § 1985 does not include a

App. 12

statute of limitations, courts apply the “most appropri

ate or analogous” state law to determine the statute of

limitations. Cf. Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090,

1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying this rule to a § 1981

claim); see also Philogene, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 132-33

(applying this rule to a § 1985 claim). And when two

state laws could apply, District of Columbia choice-oflaw rules require this Court to apply the “tort law of

the jurisdiction that has the ‘most significant relation

ship’ to the dispute.” Wu v. Stomber, 750 F.3d 944, 949

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Washkoviak v. Student Loan

Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 180 (D.C. 2006)). To assess

which state’s relationship is more significant, this

Court considers where the injury occurred, the domi

cile and place of business of the parties, and the place

where their relationship is centered. See id.

Booz Allen contends that the “most appropriate or

analogous” state law is Virginia’s personal injury stat

ute, which requires plaintiffs to bring claims within

two years of the alleged violation. See Def.’s MTD at 13

(citing VA Code § 8.01-243(A)). Booz Allen argues that

Jean-Baptiste’s claims stem from conduct that took

place at its headquarters in Virginia. See id. at 13,18.

And according to the EEOC right-to-sue letter that

Jean-Baptiste submits, he resided in Virginia in Feb

ruary 2020. See MJN, Ex. 1. In any event, JeanBaptiste is now a New York resident. See Compl. % 6.

Jean-Baptiste does not contest that Virginia’s personal

injury law supplies the statute of limitations. See

Opp’n at 6-7. And other than a few passing references

to discrimination within Booz Allen’s District office,

App. 13

see, e.g., Compl. % 4, Jean-Baptiste pleads no facts to

suggest that the District has a more significant rela

tionship to the parties, see generally id.; see also Opp’n

at 2-7. The Court will thus apply the Virginia statute

of limitations.

Jean-Baptiste alleges that the last event involving

conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights occurred

on November 1, 2019. See Compl. % 21. Though JeanBaptiste dates this paragraph “November 1, 2020,” see

id., Booz Allen and this Court construe the year as a

typographical error. For starters, Jean-Baptiste alleges

at the beginning of his Complaint that Booz Allen’s ob

jectionable actions occurred “in the work place since

March 10, 2019 to Feb 24, 2020"—the date on which

Booz Allen fired him. Id. ^[1. His opening paragraph

thus suggests that the conduct about which he sued

occurred during this time frame. And the Complaint

contains other obvious typographical errors, including

one paragraph dated “September 19, 2009,” ten years

before Jean-Baptiste’s employment with Booz Allen

began. Id. ^ 9.

More, Jean-Baptiste’s dated paragraphs largely

proceed sequentially, listing various dates throughout

September 2019. Then, beginning with paragraph 18,

Jean-Baptiste includes three 2020 dates, with a 2019

date sprinkled in the middle. See id.

18-21. These

2020 dates far post-date Jean-Baptiste’s employment

with Booz Allen, and fall outside the period he de

scribes in the first paragraph of his Complaint. See id.

H 1. One of them discusses an incident when he “was

called to his manager’s office” to speak with the head

App. 14

of human resources—an encounter that would have

only occurred during his employment. See id. *][ 18. And

as for his § 1985(3) claim, it is implausible that Booz

Allen could be engaged in conspiracy many months af

ter Jean-Baptiste’s termination that would interfere

with his civil rights. For these reasons, the Court

agrees with Booz Allen that the last allegation involv

ing conspiracy to interfere with Jean-Baptiste’s civil

rights occurred in November 2019, not November

2020.4

Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for tort

claims therefore bars Jean-Baptiste’s § 1985(3)

claim. See Va. Code § 8.01-243(A); see also Harris v.

Obenshain, 452 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (E.D. Va. 1978)

(applying this provision of Virginia’s code to a

§ 1985(3) claim). Jean-Baptiste filed his Complaint in

May 2022, more than two years after Booz Allen alleg

edly conspired to interfere with his civil rights. Even if

the statute of limitations were tolled during his prior

action—a five-month period—his claim would still be

untimely here by almost two months. The Court will

4 And even if the year was not a typo, the Court would dis

miss this claim sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(1) as patently frivo

lous. See, e.g., Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C.

2009) (explaining that federal courts are “without power to enter

tain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so at

tenuated and unsubstantiated as to be absolutely devoid of

merit’ ”). Jean-Baptiste does not allege facts sufficient to support

conspiracy between Booz Allen and the FBI. And this Court may

dismiss claims that are “essentially fictitious” including “bizarre

conspiracy theories” under Rule 12(b)(1). See Walsh v. Comey, 118

F. Supp. 3d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2015); Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330

(D.C. Cir. 1994). This is such a claim.

App. 15

thus dismiss Jean-Baptiste’s § 1985(3) claim. And be

cause the Court dismisses his § 1985(3) claim, it also

will dismiss his § 1986 claim, which requires a viable

§ 1985 claim. See, e.g., Philogene, 864 F. Supp. 2d at

132.

Jean-Baptiste also argues that Booz Allen will

fully presented false statements and slandered him in

violation of 28 U.S.C. § 4101 and conspired to deprive

him of his rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. See

Compl. <I(][ 31—32. Booz Allen argues that both claims

must be dismissed because neither statute creates a

private right of action. Def.’s MTD at 13,15.

Congress codified 28 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq. in re

sponse to “a perceived increase in the frequency of

foreign libel judgments inconsistent with the First

Amendment.” Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d

984, 1004 n.22 (9th Cir. 2013). The law renders a for

eign defamation judgment unenforceable in the United

States unless a litigant proves that it tracks the First

Amendment and the forum state’s constitution. See id.

But the law does not create a federal cause of action

for domestic defamation suits. See, e.g., DeLima v.

Google, Inc., 561F. Supp. 3d 123,135 (D.N.H. 2021) (ex

plaining that § 4101 “merely defines the term ‘defama

tion’ for purposes of a statutory scheme that allows

United States courts to recognize or enforce foreign

judgments for defamation”). Jean-Baptiste does not

allege that he has won a foreign defamation judgment.

App. 16

See generally Compl. So the Court will dismiss JeanBaptiste’s claims because § 4101 does not create a pri

vate cause of action for a domestic defamation claim.

Next up is Jean-Baptiste’s claim under 18 U.S.C.

§ 241. Section 241 is a criminal statute under which

the government may charge individuals who “conspire

to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person

. . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or

privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of

the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 241. Courts generally

decline to “infer a private right of action from a ‘bare

criminal statute.’” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First

Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190

(1994) (quoting Cort v.Ash, 422 U.S. 66,80 (1975)). And

the D.C. Circuit has held that § 241 does not create a

private right of action—only the United States as pros

ecutor may sue under this provision. See Crosby v.

Catret, 308 F. App’x 453 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

Thus, the Court will dismiss Jean-Baptiste’s claim un

der 18 U.S.C. § 241.

Jean-Baptiste also argues that Booz Allen con

spired to deprive him of his civil rights in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983, violated the Fourth and Ninth

Amendments, and harmed his “human rights.” See

Compl. W 26-27, 36, 38. Booz Allen argues that these

claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim

for which relief may be granted. Def.’s MTD at 15-16.

App. 17

Jean-Baptiste alleges that Booz Allen conspired to

violate his rights under § 1983, but he neither identi

fies what rights Booz Allen violated, nor provides facts

to support this claim. See Compl. M 24, 27. Basic

pleading standards require more than “labels and con

clusions” and “naked assertion[s] devoid of further fac

tual enhancement.”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).

And even if, as Booz Allen suggests, Jean-Baptiste at

tempts to also bring his claims about workplace dis

crimination under § 1983, see Def.’s MTD at 16, he

cannot. “When the only § 1983 cause of action is based

on a violation of Title VII, a plaintiff’s exclusive rem

edy is provided by Title VII.” Jones v. District of Colum

bia, 879 F. Supp. 2d 69, 87 (D.D.C. 2012); cf. Great Am.

Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,

375—76 (1997) (holding that rights created by Title VII

cannot be the basis for a § 1985(3) claim). Thus, the

Court will dismiss his § 1983 claims.

Jean-Baptiste next claims that Booz Allen violated

the Fourth and Ninth Amendments. See Compl. M 27,

36. But the Fourth Amendment “proscrib [es] only gov

ernmental action; it is wholly inapplicable” to a search

or seizure conducted by a private entity. United States

v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). And the Ninth

Amendment is a structural constitutional provision

confirming that the enumeration of certain rights

“shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re

tained by the people.” U.S. Const, amend. IX. Jean-Bap

tiste fails to state a claim under the Fourth and Ninth

Amendments because Booz Allen is not a

App. 18

governmental actor. See Def.’s MTD at 15-16. As a re

sult, the Court will dismiss these claims.

Jean-Baptiste also alleges that Booz Allen violated

his “human rights.” See Compl. ff 26, 38. But he nei

ther cites statutory provisions nor articulates a theory

of liability as to how Booz Allen violated his human

rights. See generally Compl. He says only that Booz

Allen “subjected [him] to cruel and violation [sic] of

Human Rights to be free and have equal dignity.”

Compl. %% 26, 38. But that is not enough. Even pro se

plaintiffs must articulate a cause of action for their

claims to give defendants fair notice of the grounds on

which the claim rests. See, e.g., Dougherty u. United

States, 156 F. Supp. 3d 222, 235-36 (D.D.C. 2016). The

Court will therefore dismiss Jean-Baptiste’s claims

that Booz Allen violated his human rights because he

fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

See, e.g., Doe v. Metro. Police Dep’t ofD.C., 445 F.3d 460,

469 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claims un

der Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cause of action).

That leaves Jean-Baptiste’s defamation, slander,

and negligence claims. See, e.g., Compl. M 24, 28, 29.

District courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state-law claims that “form part of the same case

or controversy” as federal claims over which they have

original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But the Court

may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over [claims outside of its original jurisdiction] if . . .

App. 19

the district court has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Gen

erally, when “all federal-law claims are eliminated be

fore trial, the balance of factors to be considered

under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the re

maining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Uniu. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

This is the case here. There is no apparent differ

ence in convenience for the parties by litigating this

case in local versus federal court. As for judicial econ

omy, this case has only been pending here for a short

time and the parties have invested no resources in dis

covery. Finally, because Jean-Baptiste’s claims raise

issues of District and Virginia state law, local courts

are better poised to resolve these issues in the first in

stance. See, e.g., Dyson v. District of Columbia, 808

F. Supp. 2d 84, 88-89 (D.D.C. 2011) (declining supple

mental jurisdiction over claims arising from D.C. law

because “the remaining issues are best resolved by the

state court”). The Court will therefore decline to exer

cise jurisdiction over Jean-Baptiste’s defamation, slan

der, and negligence claims.

IV.

For these reasons, the Court will grant in part

Booz Allen’s Motion to Dismiss Jean-Baptiste’s federal

claims, but it will deny the motion insofar as it re

quests dismissal with prejudice. Dismissals with

App. 20

prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) are disfavored in this

Circuit, and the “standard for dismissing a complaint

with prejudice is high.” Coon v. Wood, 68 F. Supp. 3d

77, 82 (D.D.C. 2014); see also, e.g., Rudder v. Williams,

666 F.3d 790, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that

dismissal with prejudice is “the exception, not the rule”

and that it is “warranted only when the allegation of

other facts consistent with the challenged pleading

could not possibly cure the deficiency”). That is not nec

essarily the case here.

The Court also declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. A

separate Order will issue.