Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Richard Devillier, et al., Petitioners v. Texas
Supreme Court briefMar 17, 2023
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APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix A—Court of Appeals Opinion (Revised
January 10, 2023) (November 23, 2022)
............................................................ 1a
Appendix B—Memorandum and Recommendation
(July 30, 2021) ................................... 4a
Appendix C—Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s
Memorandum and Recommendation
(August 31, 2021) ............................. 33a
Appendix D—Order Granting Motion for Leave to
Appeal from an Interlocutory Appeal
(October 8, 2021) .............................. 36a
Appendix E—Order Denying Motion to file an Amicus Brief and Petitions for Rehearing
En Banc (January 11, 2023) ............ 38a
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APPENDIX A
REVISED 1/10/2023
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-40750
RICHARD DEVILLIER; WENDY DEVILLIER; STEVEN
DEVILLIER; RHONDA DEVILLIER; BARBARA DEVILLIER;
ET AL,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
STATE OF TEXAS,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
No. 3:20-CV-223
FILED
November 23, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The State of Texas appeals the district court’s
decision that Plaintiffs’ federal Taking Clause claims
against the State may proceed in federal court. Because we hold that the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action
for takings claims against a state,1 we VACATE the
district court’s decision and REMAND for further proceedings. Nothing in this opinion is intended to displace the Supreme Court of Texas’s role as the sole
determinant of Texas state law.2
1 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (“[A]
federal court’s authority to recognize a damages remedy must
rest at bottom on a statute enacted by Congress.”); Azul–Pacifico,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a takings plaintiff has “no cause of action directly
under the United States Constitution”), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1081 (1993).
2 The Supreme Court of Texas recognizes takings claims
under the federal and state constitutions, with differing remedies and constraints turning on the character and nature of the
taking. See City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 178
(Tex. 2022) (“Under our [federal and state] constitutions, waiver
occurs when the government refuses to acknowledge its intentional taking of private property for public use. A suit based on
this waiver is known as an ‘inverse condemnation’ claim.”); see
also Gutersloh v. Texas, No. 93-8729, 25 F.3d 1044, 994 WL
261047, *1 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished per curiam) (“[The
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[ intentionally left blank ]
State] . . . admits, the courts of the State of Texas are open to
inverse condemnation damage claims against state agencies on
the basis of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as on the basis of
the Texas Constitution and laws.”); Allodial Ltd. P’ship v. N. Tex.
Tollway Auth., 176 S.W.3d 680, 683–84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005,
pet. denied) (noting that Texas courts apply a two-year limitations period to takings claims for “damaged” property and a tenyear limitations period to takings claims for “taken” property).
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
RICHARD ALLEN
DEVILLIER, et al.,
Plaintiffs.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:20-CV-00223
VS.
STATE OF TEXAS,
Defendant.
ENTERED
July 30, 2021
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In May 2020, a group of 45 individuals and one
limited liability company (the “Devillier Plaintiffs”)
who own property on the north side of Interstate
Highway 10 (“IH-10”) in Chambers County filed a
lawsuit in Texas state district court, alleging that
their “properties were inundated, taken, destroyed,
and/or damaged by the State of Texas by its design,
construction, operation, and/or maintenance of IH-
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10.” Dkt. 1-2 at 25. In their lawsuit, the Devillier
Plaintiffs sought more than $1 million each for the alleged taking of their property in violation of Article I,
Section 17 of the Texas Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
A month after the Devillier Plaintiffs filed their
original state court lawsuit, the State of Texas (“the
State”) removed the case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. The State then filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint. See
Dkt. 6. On February 22, 2021, I filed a Memorandum
and Recommendation, recommending that the State’s
motion to dismiss be denied. See Dkt. 26. That Memorandum and Recommendation was ultimately
adopted as the opinion of the Court. See Dkt. 35.
A short time after the Devillier Plaintiffs
brought this lawsuit, other property owners represented by the same counsel filed three similar actions
in state district court (two in Chambers County; one
in Jefferson County), alleging the same claims based
on the same factual allegations. Those cases were removed to federal court, and then eventually transferred to the Galveston Division of the Southern District of Texas. In the interests of judicial economy and
efficiency, I consolidated all the actions into this case
on May 17, 2021. See Dkt. 41. I also granted leave to
file an amended pleading.
The live pleading is Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Master Complaint (“Complaint”). See Dkt. 43. The
Plaintiffs now consist of 72 individuals, one corpor-
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ation, and four limited liability companies.1 The Complaint alleges that the State constructed an impenetrable concrete barrier along a stretch of Texas highway for purposes of storing stormwater on Plaintiffs’
private property without their consent or
The Plaintiffs are Richard & Wendy Devillier; Steven &
Rhonda Devillier; David & Angela McBride; Bert Hargraves;
Barney & Crystal Threadgill; Barbara Devillier; David Ray;
Gary Herman; Rhonda Glanzer; Chris & Darla Barrow; Dennis
Dugat; Laurence Barron; Deanette Lemon; Jill White; Beverly
Kiker; Yale Devillier, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kyle H. Devillier; Charles Monroe; Jacob &
Angela Fregia; Jerry & Mary Devillier; Zalphia Hankamer;
Larry Bollich; Susan Bollich; Sheila Marino; William Meissner;
Taylor McBride; Brian & Kathleen Abshier; Jina Daigle; Coulon
Devillier; Halley Ray Sr., Halley Ray Jr. & Sheila Moor; John
Rhame; Alex & Tammy Hargraves; William Devillier; Kyle & Allison Wagstaff; Kevin Sonnier; Eugenia Molthen; Bradley Moon;
John Roberts; Marilyn Roberts; Savanna Sanders; Robert &
Tracey Brown; Josh Baker; Lee Blue; Russell Brown; Margaret
Carroll; Kevin Cormier; James & Melissa Davis; Maria Gallegos
& Christopher Ferguson; Angela Hughes; Robert Laird; Harold
Ledoux; Kacey Sandefur; Tifani Staner; Stephen Stelly; Randall
& Patti Stout; Chris Day; Calvin Hill; Michael & Julie Weisse;
Eleanor Leonard; Ivy Hamm Claude Roberts; Bryan Olson;
Caren Nueman; Floyd Cline, Jr.; Kenneth Coleman; Haylea Barrow; Carol Roberts; Jenica Vidrine; Charles Collier; Sharon Crissey; James Brad Crone; Heather & James Coggin; Clovis Melancon; Leroy Speights; Crossroads Asphalt Preservation, Inc.; Fesi
Energy, LLC; Brian Fischer; and Curtis Laird; Devon Boudreaux; Richard Belsey; Sharon Clubb; Janet Dancer; Porter
May; Cindy Perez; Cecile Jimenez; Scott Hamric; Bruce & Tina
Hinds; William Olivier; Esteban Lopez; Billy Stanley; Candace
Abshier; Sean Fillyaw; Autumn Minton; Brandon Sanders; Rodney Badon; Charlie Carter; Myra Wellons; Jerry Stepan; Bryan
Mills; Cat 5 Resources LLC; Jeffrey; Randy & Monica Brazil;
Herbert & Kerry Dillard; Southeast Texas Olive, LLC; and Gulf
Coast Olive Investments, LLC.
1
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compensation in violation of both the Texas and U.S.
Constitutions.
The State has filed a motion to dismiss the
Complaint. See Dkt. 44. The motion is fully briefed
and ripe for decision. See Dkts. 45 (Plaintiffs’ response) and 46 (the State’s reply). Having carefully
reviewed the motion, the responsive briefing, and the
applicable law, I recommend that the motion be DENIED.
BACKGROUND FACTS2
In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
signed into law the Federal Aid Highway Act, allocating billions of dollars to the Federal Highway Administration. The funds were to be dispersed to the states
in a joint effort to construct and maintain an Interstate Highway System. One-third of IH-10, the
fourth-longest Interstate in the system, passes
through Texas on its way from Jacksonville, Florida,
to Santa Monica, California. It is along this one-third
stretch of American ingenuity, east of Houston in
Chambers County, that the present dispute between
individual property rights and state sovereignty
arises.
To facilitate the use of IH-10’s eastbound lanes
as an evacuation route during periods of flooding, the
Texas Department of Transportation recently raised
2 The background facts are taken from the Complaint and are
accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss.
See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369
F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004).
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the elevation of IH-10, widened it from four to six
lanes, and installed a 32-inch impenetrable, solid concrete traffic barrier on the highway’s centerline. The
median barrier looks like this:
Dkt. 43 at 7. This barrier, abnormal for its elimination
of the ordinary ground level drainage slots, effectively
created a dam protecting the southside of the freeway
from flooding by barricading all rainfall on the
northside. Rainfall that would otherwise run overtop
the roadway and continue downstream towards the
Gulf of Mexico instead stopped at the barrier and
caused backwater flooding onto Plaintiffs’ properties
on the northside of the barrier. That is exactly what
happened in August 2017 when Hurricane Harvey
dumped 60 inches of rain along the Texas coast. It
happened again in September 2019 when Tropical
Storm Imelda dropped another 40 inches. Plaintiffs
acknowledge that “the public generally benefits from
the access to transportation along at least a portion of
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this roadway during such rainfall events,” but maintains that “the burden of that benefit falls on Plaintiffs, each of which are forced to store the retained waters on their property without their consent or compensation.” Id. at 8. The Complaint provides visual
proof of the barrier’s impact on the roadway and the
surrounding properties.
Id. at 9–10.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a
defendant may move for a judgment on the pleadings
after filing an answer to the complaint. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(c). District courts review motions filed under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) using the same standard. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th
Cir. 1999) (Rule 12(c) “motions will be treated as a
motion for judgment on the pleadings based on a failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”).
A motion for a judgment on the pleadings “should be
granted if there is no issue of material fact and if the
pleadings show that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Morgan v. Medtronic,
Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 959, 962 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
Although all facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, those facts must “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
963(quotation omitted). A claim is plausible on its face
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In drawing
that reasonable inference, the court’s review must be
“limited to the complaint, any documents attached to
the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.),
L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th
Cir. 2010). As a general rule, “motions to dismiss are
viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.”
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Sanchez v. County of El Paso, 486 F. App’x 455, 456
(5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
The Court of Federal Claims recently explained
the uphill climb faced by parties seeking to dismiss a
takings claim:
Most takings claims turn on situationspecific factual inquiries. Due to the factintensive nature of takings cases, trial
courts tend to be slow to dismiss them,
and to create a record with detailed findings of fact. More specifically, flooding
cases, like other takings cases, should be
assessed with reference to the particular
circumstances of each case, and not by
resorting to blanket exclusionary rules.
In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658, 664 (2018) (“In re
Upstream I”) (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
A.
PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM
Plaintiffs couch their federal inverse condemnation claim as arising directly under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fifth
Amendment provides that no “private property [shall]
be taken for public use without just compensation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V. That prohibition against
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unlawful government takings has long been understood as applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–42 (1897).
In its motion to dismiss, the State argues that
Plaintiffs’ federal inverse condemnation claim should
be dismissed for a number of independent reasons.
First, the State contends that Plaintiffs’ federal takings claim cannot be brought directly under the Fifth
Amendment, but rather must be brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. According to the State, this dooms
Plaintiffs’ federal takings claim because § 1983 claims
cannot be brought against a state actor. Second, the
State argues that Plaintiffs’ federal claims are barred
by the applicable statute of limitations. Third, the
State insists that Plaintiffs have failed to properly
plead a valid federal inverse condemnation claim. I
address each argument separately.
1.
Plaintiffs do not need to bring their
Fifth Amendment takings claim under § 1983.
To begin, the State contends that Plaintiffs
cannot assert a claim directly under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Instead, the State argues,
§ 1983 is the only vehicle by which a constitutional
violation can be brought. Section 1983 provides a remedy against “[e]very person” who, under color of state
law, deprives a citizen of the United States of “any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Collins
13a
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).
Section 1983 is not an independent source of constitutional or statutory rights; it simply provides a cause
of action for governmental violations of rights protected by the Constitution or other federal statutes.
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
At first blush, it would appear largely irrelevant whether Plaintiffs bring their federal inverse
condemnation claim directly under the Fifth Amendment or through § 1983 based on a violation of the
Fifth Amendment. It’s six of one, half dozen of another, right? Wrong. In truth, it makes a huge difference because the State is not a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). That means Plaintiffs cannot sue a state or a state agency for a constitutional
violation under § 1983. See Arizonans for Off. Eng. v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) (“We have held . . .
that § 1983 actions do not lie against the State.”). As
applied to this case, the net effect of requiring Plaintiffs to bring their federal constitutional takings claim
under § 1983 against the State would be to end the
claim before it even began. This is exactly the approach the State champions. It is a classic Catch-22:
plaintiffs must bring their federal takings claim
against the State under § 1983, but such claims are
dead on arrival because plaintiffs cannot bring their
federal constitutional claims against the State under
§ 1983.
I find the State’s stance incredibly myopic. Relying on a series of cases that declare, largely without
any substantive analysis, that a “[p]laintiff has no
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cause of action directly under the United States Constitution,” the State adopts the position that a litigant
complaining of a violation of the Takings Clause
“must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992).
See also Golden Gate Hotel Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[A]ll claims of unjust taking ha[ve] to be brought
pursuant to Section 1983.”). In considering the State’s
argument, it is important to think for a moment about
the dramatic implications of such a rule. Under the
State’s view, it can take property from a private citizen without paying just compensation and the private
citizen would be left without a remedy. Take an example. Person A owns a 20-acre vacant parcel. While
Person A is on a five-year trip around the world, the
State commandeers the property, constructs a state
office building on the property, and utilizes the building on the property—all without the permission of the
property owner. When Person A returns home, the
State tears down the building and returns the property to its original vacant state. This is a classic taking for which Person A is clearly entitled to be compensated. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct.
2162, 2167 (2019) (“A property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his property without paying for it.”);
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537
(2005) (“The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or
physical invasion of private property.”). But not so
fast. Amazingly, the State maintains that Person A
would have no federal constitutional remedy against
the State because a Fifth Amendment takings claim
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can never be brought against a State under § 1983.
This thinking eviscerates hundreds of years of Constitutional law in one fell swoop, and flies in the face of
commonsense. It is pretzel logic.
There is not, as the State suggests, some sort of
“state exception” that excludes state governments
from the reach of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause. The complete opposite is true. “Historically,
the United States Supreme Court has consistently applied the Takings Clause to the states, and in so doing
recognized, at least tacitly, the right of a citizen to sue
the state under the Takings Clause for just compensation.” Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div. of the Energy, Minerals & Nat. Res. Dep’t, 144 P.3d 87, 90
(N.M. 2006) (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306–09
(2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–
15 (2001); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30 (1992)). As already noted, the
Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Murr v. Wisconsin,
137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017).
“As an essential element of individual liberty,
the Takings Clause was included in the Bill of Rights
to ensure the protection of private property from an
overreaching government.” Manning, 144 P.3d at 89–
90. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is self-executing in that it creates a substantive right to just
compensation that springs to life when the government takes private property. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 315 (1987). This stands in stark contrast to
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most other constitutional provisions which do not expressly provide a remedy for a constitutional violation. See id. (“We have recognized that a landowner is
entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as
a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation.”
(quotation omitted)). As the Supreme Court in First
English observed:
Claims for just compensation are
grounded in the Constitution itself: The
suits were based on the right to recover
just compensation for property taken by
the United States for public use in the
exercise of its power of eminent domain.
That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the
right was asserted in suits by the owners
did not change the essential nature of the
claim. The form of the remedy did not
qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth
Amendment. Statutory recognition was
not necessary. A promise to pay was not
necessary. Such a promise was implied
because of the duty to pay imposed by the
Amendment. The suits were thus
founded upon the Constitution of the
United States.
Id. at 315 (cleaned up). “[T]he Court has frequently
repeated the view that, in the event of a taking, the
compensation remedy is required by the Constitution.” Id. at 316 (collecting cases).
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Because of the self-executing nature of the
Fifth Amendment, several appellate courts have concluded that a property owner may sue a state directly
for takings in violation of the federal constitution,
without having to proceed under § 1983. See Manning, 144 P.3d at 93 (“The Mannings’ claim does not
rely at all on congressional action. Rather, the just
compensation claim stems directly from the text of the
Constitution through the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”); SDDS, Inc. v. State, 650 N.W.2d 1, 9
(S.D. 2002) (“[T]he remedy [of just compensation
found in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause] does
not depend on statutory facilitation. Because it is a
constitutional provision, it is a right of the strongest
character.”); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry,
991 P.2d 563, 567 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (“In short, section 1983 does not provide for the remedy required by
the constitution for a taking of property by the state.”).
This analysis is sound, and supported by basic logic.
“Holding otherwise would expose more citizens to takings without adequate compensation, contrary to the
protections our Constitution provides.” Manning, 144
P.3d at 92.
Admittedly, federal courts rarely hear federal
takings claims against a state because a property
owner cannot sue a state in federal court under the
Eleventh Amendment. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,
535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002) (“The Eleventh Amendment
grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by
citizens of other States, and by its own citizens as
well.” (citation omitted)). Virtually the only time a
takings claim against a state ends up in federal court
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is when a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing a lawsuit to federal court. See id.
(holding that “the State’s act of removing a lawsuit
from state court to federal court waives [Eleventh
Amendment] immunity.”).3 That is exactly what occurred here.
To be clear, an individual is always free to file
suit against a governmental entity, other than a state
or state actor, under § 1983 for the “deprivation” of a
right “secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This includes the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
Most of the time, a property owner will find it advantageous to sue under § 1983 because a prevailing
§ 1983 plaintiff may, at the district court’s discretion,
obtain attorney’s fees. See id. § 1988(b). Simply because a § 1983 action cannot be brought against a
state government or a state actor, however, does not
mean that a property owner is left without a remedy
when it comes to a Fifth Amendment takings claim.
In such a situation, a property owner can sue the
State directly under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause. A takings plaintiff is not required to invoke
§ 1983.
3 Technically, a property owner could sue a state directly in fed-
eral court and the state could elect to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by failing to raise sovereign immunity as a defense.
2.
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The statute of limitations does not
bar Plaintiffs’ federal inverse condemnation claim.
The State’s statute of limitations argument is
based entirely on the idea that Plaintiffs must bring
their claim under § 1983. “Courts considering claims
brought under § 1983 must borrow the relevant
state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” Redburn v. City of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486, 496
(5th Cir. 2018). In Texas, the statute of limitations for
personal injury actions is two years. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a).
The State asserts that Plaintiffs’ federal claims
accrued when Hurricane Harvey hit the Texas Gulf
Coast region in August 2017. Because Plaintiffs filed
their lawsuit in May of 2020, more than two years after the federal claims allegedly accrued, the State
maintains that any federal takings claim brought under § 1983 is time-barred. The State’s limitations argument misses the mark completely. Although individuals seeking to vindicate their constitutional
rights commonly use § 1983, Plaintiffs in this case do
not rely on, invoke, or even reference § 1983 anywhere
in the Complaint. Instead, Plaintiffs have sued the
State for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because the constitution’s framers did not supply a limitations period for a Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation claim against a state, I am
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required to “borrow” a period from state or federal
law. See N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33
(1995). Rather than look to the limitations period generally used for § 1983 claims, Plaintiffs urge me to
borrow the 10-year period set by Texas law for adverse possession cases or the six-year period established by Congress for inverse condemnation claims
against the federal government. See Dkt. 45 at 13–14
(citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.026 and 28
U.S.C. § 2501 respectively). In this case, it does not
matter whether I select a six-year or 10-year limitations period. Plaintiffs are well within the statute of
limitations either way because they filed this action
less than three years after the State contends the limitation period began to run.
3.
The State waived both its sovereign
immunity from suit and its sovereign immunity from liability.
In two short paragraphs in its Motion to Dismiss, the State argues that Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims under the Fifth Amendment are subject to dismissal because the State enjoys sovereign
immunity against such claims. The Fifth Circuit has
recognized that “state sovereign immunity consists of
two separate and different kinds of immunity, immunity from suit and immunity from liability.” Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 254 (5th Cir.
2005). Immunity from suit bars suit against the State
altogether while immunity from liability bars enforcement of a judgment against a State. See Tooke v. City
of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Immunity
from suit is not at issue here, as the State concedes,
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because removing a case to federal court invokes the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and waives a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Benzing, 410 F.3d at 255. The present dispute, instead,
centers on whether the State has waived its immunity
from liability.
The State argues that it has never waived its
immunity from liability. I find this argument untenable. Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, the
State’s version of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause, provides an undeniable waiver of governmental immunity for claims arising from an unconstitutional taking of property for public use without adequate compensation. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17;
Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.
1980) (“The [Texas] Constitution itself . . . is a waiver
of governmental immunity for the taking, damaging[,] or destruction of property for public use.”); Kirby
Lake Dev. Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 321
S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008),
aff’d, 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010) (“There is a clear
and unambiguous waiver of immunity from suit for
inverse-condemnation claims within the ambit of article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution.”).
Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution
declares that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken,
damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use
without adequate compensation being made, unless
by the consent of such person.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17
(emphasis added). Importantly, the state constitutional provision “confers upon property owners
greater rights of recovery against the government
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than its federal fifth amendment counterpart.” Palacios Seafood, Inc. v. Piling Inc., 888 F.2d 1509, 1513
(5th Cir. 1989). While Article I, section 17 allows for
compensation for both a “taking” and “damaging” of
property, the Fifth Amendment limits compensation
to a “taking” of property. See U.S. CONST. amend V
(“nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation” (emphasis added)). It logically follows that if the State has expressly waived
immunity from liability for the taking of property
without adequate compensation, that clear and unambiguous waiver applies with equal force to takings
claims whether they are based on the Texas Constitution or the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. As Plaintiffs powerfully state: “By waiving immunity from liability for takings claims in its
own courts, the State waived its claim of immunity
from liability for Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment takings
claims as well.” Dkt. 45 at 24. In a nutshell, sovereign
immunity does not shield the State from Plaintiffs’
claims based upon the taking of property. See State v.
Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007).
On a related note, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the “constitutional privilege of a
State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own
courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant
right to disregard the [United States’] Constitution or
valid federal law.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754–
55 (1999). Drawing support from Alden, several state
appellate courts have concluded that, even without an
express waiver of sovereign immunity, the text of the
Fifth Amendment mandates a remedy of just compensation. These courts have held that the purpose of the
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Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause would be subverted if private takings claims against a state were
blocked by sovereign immunity. See Manning, 144
P.2d at 95 (The Fifth Amendment’s “Takings Clause
creates a cause of action against a state which is actionable in state court and to which the state may not
assert immunity.”); SDDS, 650 N.W.2d at 8–9 (“The
Fifth Amendment in general and the takings clause
in particular are integral parts of the Constitution,
and they are made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. It follows that South Dakota’s sovereign immunity is not a bar to SDDS’s
Fifth Amendment takings claim.” (citation omitted));
Boise Cascade, 991 P.2d at 568 (“[A]t least some constitutional claims [including those under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause] are actionable against
a state, even without a waiver or congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, due to the nature of the
constitutional provision involved.”). I agree with and
adopt the reasoning provided by these courts. See also
Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 493, 498 (2006) (arguing that the Takings Clause
“trump[s] state sovereign immunity by automatically
abrogating—or stripping—the immunity that states
usually enjoy in actions at law”).
4.
Plaintiffs have properly pled a Fifth
Amendment takings claim.
In seeking relief under the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause, Plaintiffs must first establish that
they had a “valid property interest at the time of the
taking.” In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.)
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Flood-Control Reservoirs, 146 Fed. Cl. 219, 248 (2019)
(“In re Upstream II”). “The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state law defines property interests.” In
re Downstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 147 Fed. Cl. 566, 577 (2020) (quotation
omitted). In Texas, the law recognizes both personal
and real property as interests protected by the Takings Clause. See City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347
S.W.3d 231, 234–36 (Tex. 2011) (takings claim predicated on seizure of automobiles); Steele, 603 S.W.2d at
789 (takings claim predicated, in part, on destruction
of personal belongings).
Against this legal backdrop, the State first contends that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently show
that they have a compensable property interest. From
the State’s perspective, Plaintiffs have claimed a
property interest in being free from “uncontrollable
flooding resulting from an Act of God.” Dkt. 44 at 10
(citing In re Downstream, 146 Fed. Cl. at 577, 581).
But that is a gross mischaracterization of Plaintiffs’
allegations. Plaintiffs allege that they rented, leased,
or “owned homes, fixtures, businesses, and/or personal property” that were damaged or destroyed by
stormwater stored on their property because the
State erected and maintained an impenetrable concrete barrier that effectively operated as a dam. Dkt.
43 at 11. They further allege that the State’s construction of the barrier inundated their property with
floodwater that prevented them from accessing their
properties and caused “significant erosion and loss of
crops, grasses, and groundcover.” Id. The State’s storage of rainfall on their properties also allegedly
caused “permanent damage, destruction, and loss of
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personal property including appliances, furniture,
tools, machinery, livestock, crops, vehicles, air conditioning units, and similar personal property in addition to the tragic loss of hereditary items and mementoes which can never be replaced.” Id. at 12. These allegations, taken as true, unquestionably allege a compensable property interest for purposes of a Fifth
Amendment takings claim.
The State next argues that its design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the IH-10 concrete barrier is a “legitimate use[] of its police power,
which is an exemption to takings liability and damages in Texas.” Dkt. 44 at 10. There is no question
that Texas property owners hold “their land subject to
the legitimate exercise of the police power to control
and mitigate against flooding.” In re Downstream, 147
Fed. Cl. at 578. At the same time, “the state cannot
commit a physical taking, by taking or destroying
property, and escape liability for compensation by
merely ‘labeling the taking as an exercise of the police
powers.’” City of Dallas, 347 S.W.3d at 254 (Wainwright, J., dissenting) (quoting Steele, 603 S.W.2d at
789). The Texas Supreme Court has described the interplay between the Takings Clause and police power
as follows:
The polic[e] power is not an arbitrary
one, [it has] its limitations. Thus it is
subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution upon every power of government, and will not be permitted to invade or impair the fundamental liberties
of the citizen. Also it is founded in public
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necessity and only public necessity can
justify its exercise. . . . But the police
power is subordinate to the right to acquire and own property, and to deal with
it and use it as the owner chooses, so long
as the use harms nobody. [The police
power] may be invoked to abridge the
right of the citizen to use his private
property when such use will endanger
public health, safety, comfort or welfare—and only when this situation
arises.
Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478–79
(Tex. 1934). So while a governmental entity “is not required to make compensation for losses occasioned by
the proper and reasonable exercise of its police
power,” determining whether such exercise was reasonable and proper requires “consider[ation of] all of
the circumstances” using “a fact-sensitive test of reasonableness.” City of Coll. Station v. Turtle Rock
Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984). Further, the
State may invoke the police power to limit a landowner’s property rights “only” where the landowner’s
“use will endanger public health, safety, comfort or
welfare.” Lombardo, 73 S.W.2d at 479.
Plaintiffs claim that the State installed the IH10 barrier “to enhance public safety and to facilitate
use of its eastbound (southside) lanes as an evacuation route during periods of flooding by confining water to the westbound lanes (northside).” Dkt. 43 at 2.
This allegation, taken as true, meets the Plaintiffs’
low pleading burden, especially given the factually
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intensive question presented when a government
raises a police power defense. See In re Upstream II,
146 Fed. Cl. at 263–264 (“[I]t was not that the government had to respond to Tropical Storm Harvey as an
emergency that necessitated the flooding of private
land, but rather that the government had made a calculated decision to allow for flooding these lands years
before Harvey.” (quotation omitted)); In re Upstream
I, 138 Fed. Cl. at 664 (“Due to the fact-intensive nature of takings cases, trial courts tend to be slow to
dismiss them, and to create a record with detailed
findings of fact.” (cleaned up)). At this early pleading
stage, it is entirely inappropriate to throw the case
out on the State’s mere assertion that its efforts to
control and mitigate against flooding constitute legitimate uses of its police power.
The State cites to In re Downstream as binding,
while Plaintiffs allege that In re Upstream I and In re
Upstream II provide the more analogous comparison.
The referenced cases involve takings claims brought
against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for their
operation of the Addicks and Barker Dams, located in
Northwest Houston, during Hurricane Harvey. Judge
Loren Smith described the differences between these
cases as follows:
In [In re Upstream II], Senior Judge
[Charles] Lettow determined that the
taking of upstream property occurred as
a result of the general operation of the
Addicks and Barker Dams and Reservoirs, as a direct result of the Corps’ decision to close the flood gates in order to
28a
protect properties downstream at the expense of the upstream properties located
within the maximum pool size for the
reservoirs. In contrast, the Downstream
plaintiffs do not allege that the general
operation of the Reservoirs caused the
flooding of their property. Rather, plaintiffs downstream advance a takings theory predicated on the Corps’ decision to
open the flood gates and begin Induced
Surcharge releases . . . . [T]he downstream plaintiffs’ theory of causation ignores the simple fact that the gates were
initially closed for the sole purpose of
protecting their properties from floodwaters, that such mitigation failed because
the impounded storm waters exceeded
the Reservoirs’ controllable capacity, and
that . . . Harvey was the sole and proximate cause of the floodwaters.
In re Downstream, 147 Fed. Cl. at 575 (citations omitted). In short, the downstream plaintiffs sought compensation for the government’s decision to open the
floodgates when the “impounded storm waters exceeded the Reservoirs’ controllable capacity” due to
the exceptional amount of rain caused by Hurricane
Harvey, an “Act of God.” Id. By contrast, the upstream
plaintiffs sought compensation for the government’s
decision to build dams near their properties in the
first place, placing their properties at increased risk
of flooding all for the “sole purpose” of protecting
downstream properties. Id. In In re Upstream II, the
Court of Federal Claims rejected the Army Corps of
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Engineers’ request to dismiss the case on a police
power argument because “the design of the dams contemplated flooding beyond government-owned land
onto private properties.” In re Upstream II, 146 Fed.
Cl. at 263. See also In re Upstream I, 138 Fed. Cl. At
669 (deferring the matter until trial under Rule 12(i)).
The Court of Federal Claims reasoned that “it was not
that the government had to respond to Tropical Storm
Harvey as an emergency . . . but rather that the government had made a calculated decision to allow for
flooding these lands years before Harvey.” In re Upstream II, 146 Fed. Cl. at 263–64.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that the State constructed and maintained the IH-10 concrete centerline barrier for the sole purpose of protecting public
access to the highway’s southside lanes at the expense
of northside property owners. In other words, the
State protected public property and private property
to the south of the barrier only by preventing rainfall
on the northside from following its natural course
south towards the Gulf of Mexico. The State’s barrier
allegedly burdened Plaintiffs’ property with a permanent flowage easement, putting Plaintiffs’ property to
public use without their consent and without just
compensation. This allegation is a direct corollary to
the allegations made by the upstream plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs do not claim that the State took their property by failing to provide “perfect flood control” because, according to Plaintiffs, the concrete barrier
performed exactly as the State intended it to perform—inundating northside property owners with
water that would otherwise flow south towards the
Gulf of Mexico. Again, it is not my role at this
30a
preliminary juncture in the case to make credibility
determinations or otherwise rule on the merits. These
allegations survive a motion to dismiss.
B.
PLAINTIFFS’ STATE INVERSE CONDEMNATION
CLAIM
The State also argues that Plaintiffs have
failed to state a valid takings claim under Article I,
Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Specifically, the
State avers that Plaintiffs’ state constitutional takings claim fails as a matter of law because (1) they
“cannot point to such evidence . . . that [the Texas Department of Transportation] knew the concrete barrier would create a dam-effect and flood property;” (2)
they “failed to plead (and cannot plead) how the State
made conscious decisions to release water onto their
properties;” and (3) “Plaintiffs lack the pleadings to
show the State’s knowledge and decision-making
showed it knew Plaintiffs’ property would flood.” Dkt.
46 at 7–8. I completely disagree.
As noted, the Texas Constitution provides that
“[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). That
provision also creates an exception to takings liability
for “an incidental use by (A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the public at large, or (B) an
entity granted the power of eminent domain under
law.” Id. § 17(a)(1)(A)–(B). In other words, “[m]ere
negligence is not a compensable taking.” Van Deelen
31a
v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-17-00432-CV, 2018
WL 6684278, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Dec. 20, 2018, no pet.). To state a valid takings claim
under the Texas Constitution, Plaintiffs “must prove
(1) the state intentionally performed certain acts, (2)
that resulted in a ‘taking’ of property, (3) for public
use.” Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex. Insulation Co.,
39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001). The first element—
the state’s intent—is satisfied “when a governmental
entity knows that a specific act is causing identifiable
harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain
to result.” Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr,
499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016) (quotation omitted).
There is no doubt in my mind that Plaintiffs
have plausibly stated that the State’s use of their
property was more than incidental, meaning that the
State has no immunity from liability. Not only have
Plaintiffs alleged that the State knew or was substantially certain that the concrete barrier would cause
flooding on the northside of IH-10, see Dkt. 43 at 3–4,
8, 13, 19, and 21, but they have also pointed to specific
ways in which discovery might help them to prove
those allegations at trial. See id. at 21–23. Viewing
the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as I must at this early stage, Plaintiffs have
made a valid claim for inverse condemnation under
Texas law that is plausible on its face. Because I find
that Plaintiffs have made a valid claim for inverse
condemnation, Texas law does not provide the State
with immunity from liability separate from its immunity to suit. See El Dorado Land Co., L.P. v. City
of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex. 2013) (“A
statutory waiver of immunity is unnecessary for a
32a
takings claim because the Texas Constitution waives
governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or
destruction of property for public use.” (quotation
omitted)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons identified above, I recommend
that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Master Complaint (Dkt. 44) be DENIED.
The Clerk shall provide copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation to the respective parties who have fourteen days from receipt to file written objections pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and General Order 2002–13. Failure to
file written objections within the time period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the
factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED this 30th day of July 2021.
/s/ Andrew M. Edison
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
33a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
RICHARD
ALLEN
DEVILLIER, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:20-CV-00223
VS.
STATE OF TEXAS.
ENTERED
August 31, 2021
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
On September 2, 2020, all non-dispositive and
dispositive pretrial matters in this case were referred
to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew M. Edison
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). See Dkt. 14. Judge
Edison filed a memorandum and recommendation on
July 30, 2021, recommending that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Complaint (Dkt. 44) be denied. See Dkt. 50.
34a
On August 13, 2021, the defendant filed its objections to the memorandum and recommendation,
and the plaintiffs responded on August 16, 2021. See
Dkts. 52–53. In accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C), this court is required to “make a de
novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection [has been]
made.” After conducting this de novo review, the court
may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
The court has carefully considered the objections; the memorandum and recommendation; the
pleadings; and the record. Given the amended master
complaint and new motion to dismiss, the court sets
aside its order adopting dated March 30, 2021, (Dkt.
35) and finds that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt.
6) is now moot.
The court accepts Judge Edison’s memorandum and recommendation dated July 30, 2021, and
adopts it as the opinion of the court. It is therefore
ordered that:
(1)
Judge Edison’s memorandum and recommendation (Dkt. 50) is approved and
adopted in its entirety as the holding of
the court; and
(2)
35a
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Complaint (Dkt.
44) is denied.
In adopting Judge Edison’s memorandum and
recommendation, the court finds that there is a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal might materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. This order is certified for permissive interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Signed on Galveston Island this 31st day of August 2021.
/s/ Jeffrey Vincent Brown
JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
36a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-90043
RICHARD DEVILLIER; WENDY DEVILLIER; STEVEN
DEVILLIER; RHONDA DEVILLIER; BARBARA DEVILLIER;
ET AL,
Plaintiffs—Respondents,
versus
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Defendant—Petitioner.
Motion for Leave to Appeal
from an Interlocutory Order
USDC No. 3:20-CV-223; 3:20-CV-379; 3:21-CV-104;
4:21-CV-1521
United States Courts
Southern District of
Texas
FILED
October 8, 2021
[SEAL]
A True Copy
Certified order
issued Oct 08, 2021
/s/ Lyle W. Cayce
37a
Nathan Ochsner,
Clerk of Court
Clerk, U.S. Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Before SMITH, HIGGINSON, and WILLETT, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that the State’s unopposed
petition to appeal the August 31, 2021 interlocutory
order of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas is GRANTED.
38a
APPENDIX E
United States Court of Appeals
FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK
TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,
Suite 115
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
January 11, 2023
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
LISTED BELOW:
No. 21-40750
Devillier v. State of Texas
USDC No. 3:20-CV-223
USDC No. 3:20-CV-379
USDC No. 3:21-CV-104
USDC No. 4:21-CV-1521
Enclosed is an order entered in this case.
See FRAP and Local Rules 41 for stay of the mandate.
Sincerely,
39a
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
/s/ Dantrell L. Johnson
By: Dantrell L. Johnson, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7689
Mr. Daniel Henry Charest
Mr. Charles William Irvine
Mr. Robert McNamara
Mr. Suranjan Matthew Sen
Ms. Natalie Deyo Thompson
Mr. Emery Lawrence Vincent
Mr. Benjamin D. Wilson
40a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-40750
RICHARD DEVILLIER; WENDY DEVILLIER; STEVEN
DEVILLIER; RHONDA DEVILLIER; BARBARA DEVILLIER;
ET AL.,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
STATE OF TEXAS,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:20-CV-223
USDC No. 3:20-CV-379
USDC No. 3:21-CV-104
USDC No. 4:21-CV-1521
ON MOTION TO FILE AN AMICUS BRIEF AND
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON,
Circuit Judges.
41a
PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of Institute
for Justice for leave to file an amicus brief in support
of the Appellees’ petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
Treating the Appellees’ petition for rehearing
en banc as a petition for panel rehearing (5TH CIR. R.
35 I.O.P.), the petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel or judge in regular active service having requested that the court be polled
on rehearing en banc (FED. R. APP. P. 35 and 5TH CIR.
R. 35), the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
Treating the Appellant’s petition for rehearing
en banc as a petition for panel rehearing (5TH CIR. R.
35 I.O.P.), the petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel or judge in regular active service having requested that the court be polled
on rehearing en banc (FED. R. APP. P. 35 and 5TH CIR.
R. 35), the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.