Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Richard Devillier, et al., Petitioners v. Texas

Supreme Court briefMar 17, 2023

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A—Court of Appeals Opinion (Revised

January 10, 2023) (November 23, 2022)

............................................................ 1a

Appendix B—Memorandum and Recommendation

(July 30, 2021) ................................... 4a

Appendix C—Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s

Memorandum and Recommendation

(August 31, 2021) ............................. 33a

Appendix D—Order Granting Motion for Leave to

Appeal from an Interlocutory Appeal

(October 8, 2021) .............................. 36a

Appendix E—Order Denying Motion to file an Amicus Brief and Petitions for Rehearing

En Banc (January 11, 2023) ............ 38a



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APPENDIX A

REVISED 1/10/2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-40750

RICHARD DEVILLIER; WENDY DEVILLIER; STEVEN

DEVILLIER; RHONDA DEVILLIER; BARBARA DEVILLIER;

ET AL,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

STATE OF TEXAS,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

No. 3:20-CV-223

FILED

November 23, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk



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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The State of Texas appeals the district court’s

decision that Plaintiffs’ federal Taking Clause claims

against the State may proceed in federal court. Because we hold that the Fifth Amendment Takings

Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action

for takings claims against a state,1 we VACATE the

district court’s decision and REMAND for further proceedings. Nothing in this opinion is intended to displace the Supreme Court of Texas’s role as the sole

determinant of Texas state law.2



1 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (“[A]

federal court’s authority to recognize a damages remedy must

rest at bottom on a statute enacted by Congress.”); Azul–Pacifico,

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992)

(holding that a takings plaintiff has “no cause of action directly

under the United States Constitution”), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

1081 (1993).

2 The Supreme Court of Texas recognizes takings claims

under the federal and state constitutions, with differing remedies and constraints turning on the character and nature of the

taking. See City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 178

(Tex. 2022) (“Under our [federal and state] constitutions, waiver

occurs when the government refuses to acknowledge its intentional taking of private property for public use. A suit based on

this waiver is known as an ‘inverse condemnation’ claim.”); see

also Gutersloh v. Texas, No. 93-8729, 25 F.3d 1044, 994 WL

261047, *1 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished per curiam) (“[The



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[ intentionally left blank ]



State] . . . admits, the courts of the State of Texas are open to

inverse condemnation damage claims against state agencies on

the basis of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as on the basis of

the Texas Constitution and laws.”); Allodial Ltd. P’ship v. N. Tex.

Tollway Auth., 176 S.W.3d 680, 683–84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005,

pet. denied) (noting that Texas courts apply a two-year limitations period to takings claims for “damaged” property and a tenyear limitations period to takings claims for “taken” property).



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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

GALVESTON DIVISION

RICHARD ALLEN

DEVILLIER, et al.,

Plaintiffs.

CIVIL ACTION NO.

3:20-CV-00223

VS.

STATE OF TEXAS,

Defendant.

ENTERED

July 30, 2021

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

In May 2020, a group of 45 individuals and one

limited liability company (the “Devillier Plaintiffs”)

who own property on the north side of Interstate

Highway 10 (“IH-10”) in Chambers County filed a

lawsuit in Texas state district court, alleging that

their “properties were inundated, taken, destroyed,

and/or damaged by the State of Texas by its design,

construction, operation, and/or maintenance of IH-



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10.” Dkt. 1-2 at 25. In their lawsuit, the Devillier

Plaintiffs sought more than $1 million each for the alleged taking of their property in violation of Article I,

Section 17 of the Texas Constitution and the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

A month after the Devillier Plaintiffs filed their

original state court lawsuit, the State of Texas (“the

State”) removed the case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. The State then filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint. See

Dkt. 6. On February 22, 2021, I filed a Memorandum

and Recommendation, recommending that the State’s

motion to dismiss be denied. See Dkt. 26. That Memorandum and Recommendation was ultimately

adopted as the opinion of the Court. See Dkt. 35.

A short time after the Devillier Plaintiffs

brought this lawsuit, other property owners represented by the same counsel filed three similar actions

in state district court (two in Chambers County; one

in Jefferson County), alleging the same claims based

on the same factual allegations. Those cases were removed to federal court, and then eventually transferred to the Galveston Division of the Southern District of Texas. In the interests of judicial economy and

efficiency, I consolidated all the actions into this case

on May 17, 2021. See Dkt. 41. I also granted leave to

file an amended pleading.

The live pleading is Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Master Complaint (“Complaint”). See Dkt. 43. The

Plaintiffs now consist of 72 individuals, one corpor-



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ation, and four limited liability companies.1 The Complaint alleges that the State constructed an impenetrable concrete barrier along a stretch of Texas highway for purposes of storing stormwater on Plaintiffs’

private property without their consent or



The Plaintiffs are Richard & Wendy Devillier; Steven &

Rhonda Devillier; David & Angela McBride; Bert Hargraves;

Barney & Crystal Threadgill; Barbara Devillier; David Ray;

Gary Herman; Rhonda Glanzer; Chris & Darla Barrow; Dennis

Dugat; Laurence Barron; Deanette Lemon; Jill White; Beverly

Kiker; Yale Devillier, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kyle H. Devillier; Charles Monroe; Jacob &

Angela Fregia; Jerry & Mary Devillier; Zalphia Hankamer;

Larry Bollich; Susan Bollich; Sheila Marino; William Meissner;

Taylor McBride; Brian & Kathleen Abshier; Jina Daigle; Coulon

Devillier; Halley Ray Sr., Halley Ray Jr. & Sheila Moor; John

Rhame; Alex & Tammy Hargraves; William Devillier; Kyle & Allison Wagstaff; Kevin Sonnier; Eugenia Molthen; Bradley Moon;

John Roberts; Marilyn Roberts; Savanna Sanders; Robert &

Tracey Brown; Josh Baker; Lee Blue; Russell Brown; Margaret

Carroll; Kevin Cormier; James & Melissa Davis; Maria Gallegos

& Christopher Ferguson; Angela Hughes; Robert Laird; Harold

Ledoux; Kacey Sandefur; Tifani Staner; Stephen Stelly; Randall

& Patti Stout; Chris Day; Calvin Hill; Michael & Julie Weisse;

Eleanor Leonard; Ivy Hamm Claude Roberts; Bryan Olson;

Caren Nueman; Floyd Cline, Jr.; Kenneth Coleman; Haylea Barrow; Carol Roberts; Jenica Vidrine; Charles Collier; Sharon Crissey; James Brad Crone; Heather & James Coggin; Clovis Melancon; Leroy Speights; Crossroads Asphalt Preservation, Inc.; Fesi

Energy, LLC; Brian Fischer; and Curtis Laird; Devon Boudreaux; Richard Belsey; Sharon Clubb; Janet Dancer; Porter

May; Cindy Perez; Cecile Jimenez; Scott Hamric; Bruce & Tina

Hinds; William Olivier; Esteban Lopez; Billy Stanley; Candace

Abshier; Sean Fillyaw; Autumn Minton; Brandon Sanders; Rodney Badon; Charlie Carter; Myra Wellons; Jerry Stepan; Bryan

Mills; Cat 5 Resources LLC; Jeffrey; Randy & Monica Brazil;

Herbert & Kerry Dillard; Southeast Texas Olive, LLC; and Gulf

Coast Olive Investments, LLC.

1



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compensation in violation of both the Texas and U.S.

Constitutions.

The State has filed a motion to dismiss the

Complaint. See Dkt. 44. The motion is fully briefed

and ripe for decision. See Dkts. 45 (Plaintiffs’ response) and 46 (the State’s reply). Having carefully

reviewed the motion, the responsive briefing, and the

applicable law, I recommend that the motion be DENIED.

BACKGROUND FACTS2

In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower

signed into law the Federal Aid Highway Act, allocating billions of dollars to the Federal Highway Administration. The funds were to be dispersed to the states

in a joint effort to construct and maintain an Interstate Highway System. One-third of IH-10, the

fourth-longest Interstate in the system, passes

through Texas on its way from Jacksonville, Florida,

to Santa Monica, California. It is along this one-third

stretch of American ingenuity, east of Houston in

Chambers County, that the present dispute between

individual property rights and state sovereignty

arises.

To facilitate the use of IH-10’s eastbound lanes

as an evacuation route during periods of flooding, the

Texas Department of Transportation recently raised



2 The background facts are taken from the Complaint and are

accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss.

See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369

F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004).



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the elevation of IH-10, widened it from four to six

lanes, and installed a 32-inch impenetrable, solid concrete traffic barrier on the highway’s centerline. The

median barrier looks like this:

Dkt. 43 at 7. This barrier, abnormal for its elimination

of the ordinary ground level drainage slots, effectively

created a dam protecting the southside of the freeway

from flooding by barricading all rainfall on the

northside. Rainfall that would otherwise run overtop

the roadway and continue downstream towards the

Gulf of Mexico instead stopped at the barrier and

caused backwater flooding onto Plaintiffs’ properties

on the northside of the barrier. That is exactly what

happened in August 2017 when Hurricane Harvey

dumped 60 inches of rain along the Texas coast. It

happened again in September 2019 when Tropical

Storm Imelda dropped another 40 inches. Plaintiffs

acknowledge that “the public generally benefits from

the access to transportation along at least a portion of



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this roadway during such rainfall events,” but maintains that “the burden of that benefit falls on Plaintiffs, each of which are forced to store the retained waters on their property without their consent or compensation.” Id. at 8. The Complaint provides visual

proof of the barrier’s impact on the roadway and the

surrounding properties.

Id. at 9–10.



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LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a

defendant may move for a judgment on the pleadings

after filing an answer to the complaint. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(c). District courts review motions filed under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) using the same standard. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th

Cir. 1999) (Rule 12(c) “motions will be treated as a

motion for judgment on the pleadings based on a failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”).

A motion for a judgment on the pleadings “should be

granted if there is no issue of material fact and if the

pleadings show that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Morgan v. Medtronic,

Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 959, 962 (S.D. Tex. 2016).

Although all facts are viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, those facts must “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at

963(quotation omitted). A claim is plausible on its face

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In drawing

that reasonable inference, the court’s review must be

“limited to the complaint, any documents attached to

the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.),

L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th

Cir. 2010). As a general rule, “motions to dismiss are

viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.”



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Sanchez v. County of El Paso, 486 F. App’x 455, 456

(5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

The Court of Federal Claims recently explained

the uphill climb faced by parties seeking to dismiss a

takings claim:

Most takings claims turn on situationspecific factual inquiries. Due to the factintensive nature of takings cases, trial

courts tend to be slow to dismiss them,

and to create a record with detailed findings of fact. More specifically, flooding

cases, like other takings cases, should be

assessed with reference to the particular

circumstances of each case, and not by

resorting to blanket exclusionary rules.

In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658, 664 (2018) (“In re

Upstream I”) (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

A.

PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM

Plaintiffs couch their federal inverse condemnation claim as arising directly under the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fifth

Amendment provides that no “private property [shall]

be taken for public use without just compensation.”

U.S. CONST. amend. V. That prohibition against



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unlawful government takings has long been understood as applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–42 (1897).

In its motion to dismiss, the State argues that

Plaintiffs’ federal inverse condemnation claim should

be dismissed for a number of independent reasons.

First, the State contends that Plaintiffs’ federal takings claim cannot be brought directly under the Fifth

Amendment, but rather must be brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. According to the State, this dooms

Plaintiffs’ federal takings claim because § 1983 claims

cannot be brought against a state actor. Second, the

State argues that Plaintiffs’ federal claims are barred

by the applicable statute of limitations. Third, the

State insists that Plaintiffs have failed to properly

plead a valid federal inverse condemnation claim. I

address each argument separately.

1.

Plaintiffs do not need to bring their

Fifth Amendment takings claim under § 1983.

To begin, the State contends that Plaintiffs

cannot assert a claim directly under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Instead, the State argues,

§ 1983 is the only vehicle by which a constitutional

violation can be brought. Section 1983 provides a remedy against “[e]very person” who, under color of state

law, deprives a citizen of the United States of “any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Collins



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v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).

Section 1983 is not an independent source of constitutional or statutory rights; it simply provides a cause

of action for governmental violations of rights protected by the Constitution or other federal statutes.

See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

At first blush, it would appear largely irrelevant whether Plaintiffs bring their federal inverse

condemnation claim directly under the Fifth Amendment or through § 1983 based on a violation of the

Fifth Amendment. It’s six of one, half dozen of another, right? Wrong. In truth, it makes a huge difference because the State is not a “person” within the

meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). That means Plaintiffs cannot sue a state or a state agency for a constitutional

violation under § 1983. See Arizonans for Off. Eng. v.

Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) (“We have held . . .

that § 1983 actions do not lie against the State.”). As

applied to this case, the net effect of requiring Plaintiffs to bring their federal constitutional takings claim

under § 1983 against the State would be to end the

claim before it even began. This is exactly the approach the State champions. It is a classic Catch-22:

plaintiffs must bring their federal takings claim

against the State under § 1983, but such claims are

dead on arrival because plaintiffs cannot bring their

federal constitutional claims against the State under

§ 1983.

I find the State’s stance incredibly myopic. Relying on a series of cases that declare, largely without

any substantive analysis, that a “[p]laintiff has no



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cause of action directly under the United States Constitution,” the State adopts the position that a litigant

complaining of a violation of the Takings Clause

“must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v.

City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992).

See also Golden Gate Hotel Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of

San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994)

(“[A]ll claims of unjust taking ha[ve] to be brought

pursuant to Section 1983.”). In considering the State’s

argument, it is important to think for a moment about

the dramatic implications of such a rule. Under the

State’s view, it can take property from a private citizen without paying just compensation and the private

citizen would be left without a remedy. Take an example. Person A owns a 20-acre vacant parcel. While

Person A is on a five-year trip around the world, the

State commandeers the property, constructs a state

office building on the property, and utilizes the building on the property—all without the permission of the

property owner. When Person A returns home, the

State tears down the building and returns the property to its original vacant state. This is a classic taking for which Person A is clearly entitled to be compensated. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct.

2162, 2167 (2019) (“A property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his property without paying for it.”);

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537

(2005) (“The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or

physical invasion of private property.”). But not so

fast. Amazingly, the State maintains that Person A

would have no federal constitutional remedy against

the State because a Fifth Amendment takings claim



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can never be brought against a State under § 1983.

This thinking eviscerates hundreds of years of Constitutional law in one fell swoop, and flies in the face of

commonsense. It is pretzel logic.

There is not, as the State suggests, some sort of

“state exception” that excludes state governments

from the reach of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings

Clause. The complete opposite is true. “Historically,

the United States Supreme Court has consistently applied the Takings Clause to the states, and in so doing

recognized, at least tacitly, the right of a citizen to sue

the state under the Takings Clause for just compensation.” Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div. of the Energy, Minerals & Nat. Res. Dep’t, 144 P.3d 87, 90

(N.M. 2006) (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306–09

(2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–

15 (2001); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,

505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30 (1992)). As already noted, the

Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states via

the Fourteenth Amendment. See Murr v. Wisconsin,

137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017).

“As an essential element of individual liberty,

the Takings Clause was included in the Bill of Rights

to ensure the protection of private property from an

overreaching government.” Manning, 144 P.3d at 89–

90. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is self-executing in that it creates a substantive right to just

compensation that springs to life when the government takes private property. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482

U.S. 304, 315 (1987). This stands in stark contrast to



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most other constitutional provisions which do not expressly provide a remedy for a constitutional violation. See id. (“We have recognized that a landowner is

entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as

a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation.”

(quotation omitted)). As the Supreme Court in First

English observed:

Claims for just compensation are

grounded in the Constitution itself: The

suits were based on the right to recover

just compensation for property taken by

the United States for public use in the

exercise of its power of eminent domain.

That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the

right was asserted in suits by the owners

did not change the essential nature of the

claim. The form of the remedy did not

qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth

Amendment. Statutory recognition was

not necessary. A promise to pay was not

necessary. Such a promise was implied

because of the duty to pay imposed by the

Amendment. The suits were thus

founded upon the Constitution of the

United States.

Id. at 315 (cleaned up). “[T]he Court has frequently

repeated the view that, in the event of a taking, the

compensation remedy is required by the Constitution.” Id. at 316 (collecting cases).



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Because of the self-executing nature of the

Fifth Amendment, several appellate courts have concluded that a property owner may sue a state directly

for takings in violation of the federal constitution,

without having to proceed under § 1983. See Manning, 144 P.3d at 93 (“The Mannings’ claim does not

rely at all on congressional action. Rather, the just

compensation claim stems directly from the text of the

Constitution through the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments.”); SDDS, Inc. v. State, 650 N.W.2d 1, 9

(S.D. 2002) (“[T]he remedy [of just compensation

found in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause] does

not depend on statutory facilitation. Because it is a

constitutional provision, it is a right of the strongest

character.”); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry,

991 P.2d 563, 567 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (“In short, section 1983 does not provide for the remedy required by

the constitution for a taking of property by the state.”).

This analysis is sound, and supported by basic logic.

“Holding otherwise would expose more citizens to takings without adequate compensation, contrary to the

protections our Constitution provides.” Manning, 144

P.3d at 92.

Admittedly, federal courts rarely hear federal

takings claims against a state because a property

owner cannot sue a state in federal court under the

Eleventh Amendment. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,

535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002) (“The Eleventh Amendment

grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by

citizens of other States, and by its own citizens as

well.” (citation omitted)). Virtually the only time a

takings claim against a state ends up in federal court



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is when a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing a lawsuit to federal court. See id.

(holding that “the State’s act of removing a lawsuit

from state court to federal court waives [Eleventh

Amendment] immunity.”).3 That is exactly what occurred here.

To be clear, an individual is always free to file

suit against a governmental entity, other than a state

or state actor, under § 1983 for the “deprivation” of a

right “secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This includes the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.

Most of the time, a property owner will find it advantageous to sue under § 1983 because a prevailing

§ 1983 plaintiff may, at the district court’s discretion,

obtain attorney’s fees. See id. § 1988(b). Simply because a § 1983 action cannot be brought against a

state government or a state actor, however, does not

mean that a property owner is left without a remedy

when it comes to a Fifth Amendment takings claim.

In such a situation, a property owner can sue the

State directly under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings

Clause. A takings plaintiff is not required to invoke

§ 1983.



3 Technically, a property owner could sue a state directly in fed-

eral court and the state could elect to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by failing to raise sovereign immunity as a defense.



2.

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The statute of limitations does not

bar Plaintiffs’ federal inverse condemnation claim.

The State’s statute of limitations argument is

based entirely on the idea that Plaintiffs must bring

their claim under § 1983. “Courts considering claims

brought under § 1983 must borrow the relevant

state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” Redburn v. City of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486, 496

(5th Cir. 2018). In Texas, the statute of limitations for

personal injury actions is two years. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a).

The State asserts that Plaintiffs’ federal claims

accrued when Hurricane Harvey hit the Texas Gulf

Coast region in August 2017. Because Plaintiffs filed

their lawsuit in May of 2020, more than two years after the federal claims allegedly accrued, the State

maintains that any federal takings claim brought under § 1983 is time-barred. The State’s limitations argument misses the mark completely. Although individuals seeking to vindicate their constitutional

rights commonly use § 1983, Plaintiffs in this case do

not rely on, invoke, or even reference § 1983 anywhere

in the Complaint. Instead, Plaintiffs have sued the

State for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because the constitution’s framers did not supply a limitations period for a Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation claim against a state, I am



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required to “borrow” a period from state or federal

law. See N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33

(1995). Rather than look to the limitations period generally used for § 1983 claims, Plaintiffs urge me to

borrow the 10-year period set by Texas law for adverse possession cases or the six-year period established by Congress for inverse condemnation claims

against the federal government. See Dkt. 45 at 13–14

(citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.026 and 28

U.S.C. § 2501 respectively). In this case, it does not

matter whether I select a six-year or 10-year limitations period. Plaintiffs are well within the statute of

limitations either way because they filed this action

less than three years after the State contends the limitation period began to run.

3.

The State waived both its sovereign

immunity from suit and its sovereign immunity from liability.

In two short paragraphs in its Motion to Dismiss, the State argues that Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims under the Fifth Amendment are subject to dismissal because the State enjoys sovereign

immunity against such claims. The Fifth Circuit has

recognized that “state sovereign immunity consists of

two separate and different kinds of immunity, immunity from suit and immunity from liability.” Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 254 (5th Cir.

2005). Immunity from suit bars suit against the State

altogether while immunity from liability bars enforcement of a judgment against a State. See Tooke v. City

of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Immunity

from suit is not at issue here, as the State concedes,



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because removing a case to federal court invokes the

jurisdiction of the federal courts and waives a state’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Benzing, 410 F.3d at 255. The present dispute, instead,

centers on whether the State has waived its immunity

from liability.

The State argues that it has never waived its

immunity from liability. I find this argument untenable. Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, the

State’s version of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings

Clause, provides an undeniable waiver of governmental immunity for claims arising from an unconstitutional taking of property for public use without adequate compensation. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17;

Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.

1980) (“The [Texas] Constitution itself . . . is a waiver

of governmental immunity for the taking, damaging[,] or destruction of property for public use.”); Kirby

Lake Dev. Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 321

S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008),

aff’d, 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010) (“There is a clear

and unambiguous waiver of immunity from suit for

inverse-condemnation claims within the ambit of article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution.”).

Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution

declares that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken,

damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use

without adequate compensation being made, unless

by the consent of such person.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17

(emphasis added). Importantly, the state constitutional provision “confers upon property owners

greater rights of recovery against the government



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than its federal fifth amendment counterpart.” Palacios Seafood, Inc. v. Piling Inc., 888 F.2d 1509, 1513

(5th Cir. 1989). While Article I, section 17 allows for

compensation for both a “taking” and “damaging” of

property, the Fifth Amendment limits compensation

to a “taking” of property. See U.S. CONST. amend V

(“nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation” (emphasis added)). It logically follows that if the State has expressly waived

immunity from liability for the taking of property

without adequate compensation, that clear and unambiguous waiver applies with equal force to takings

claims whether they are based on the Texas Constitution or the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. As Plaintiffs powerfully state: “By waiving immunity from liability for takings claims in its

own courts, the State waived its claim of immunity

from liability for Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment takings

claims as well.” Dkt. 45 at 24. In a nutshell, sovereign

immunity does not shield the State from Plaintiffs’

claims based upon the taking of property. See State v.

Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007).

On a related note, the United States Supreme

Court has held that the “constitutional privilege of a

State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own

courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant

right to disregard the [United States’] Constitution or

valid federal law.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754–

55 (1999). Drawing support from Alden, several state

appellate courts have concluded that, even without an

express waiver of sovereign immunity, the text of the

Fifth Amendment mandates a remedy of just compensation. These courts have held that the purpose of the



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Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause would be subverted if private takings claims against a state were

blocked by sovereign immunity. See Manning, 144

P.2d at 95 (The Fifth Amendment’s “Takings Clause

creates a cause of action against a state which is actionable in state court and to which the state may not

assert immunity.”); SDDS, 650 N.W.2d at 8–9 (“The

Fifth Amendment in general and the takings clause

in particular are integral parts of the Constitution,

and they are made applicable to the states through

the Fourteenth Amendment. It follows that South Dakota’s sovereign immunity is not a bar to SDDS’s

Fifth Amendment takings claim.” (citation omitted));

Boise Cascade, 991 P.2d at 568 (“[A]t least some constitutional claims [including those under the Fifth

Amendment’s Takings Clause] are actionable against

a state, even without a waiver or congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, due to the nature of the

constitutional provision involved.”). I agree with and

adopt the reasoning provided by these courts. See also

Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State

Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L.

REV. 493, 498 (2006) (arguing that the Takings Clause

“trump[s] state sovereign immunity by automatically

abrogating—or stripping—the immunity that states

usually enjoy in actions at law”).

4.

Plaintiffs have properly pled a Fifth

Amendment takings claim.

In seeking relief under the Fifth Amendment’s

Takings Clause, Plaintiffs must first establish that

they had a “valid property interest at the time of the

taking.” In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.)



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Flood-Control Reservoirs, 146 Fed. Cl. 219, 248 (2019)

(“In re Upstream II”). “The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state law defines property interests.” In

re Downstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 147 Fed. Cl. 566, 577 (2020) (quotation

omitted). In Texas, the law recognizes both personal

and real property as interests protected by the Takings Clause. See City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347

S.W.3d 231, 234–36 (Tex. 2011) (takings claim predicated on seizure of automobiles); Steele, 603 S.W.2d at

789 (takings claim predicated, in part, on destruction

of personal belongings).

Against this legal backdrop, the State first contends that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently show

that they have a compensable property interest. From

the State’s perspective, Plaintiffs have claimed a

property interest in being free from “uncontrollable

flooding resulting from an Act of God.” Dkt. 44 at 10

(citing In re Downstream, 146 Fed. Cl. at 577, 581).

But that is a gross mischaracterization of Plaintiffs’

allegations. Plaintiffs allege that they rented, leased,

or “owned homes, fixtures, businesses, and/or personal property” that were damaged or destroyed by

stormwater stored on their property because the

State erected and maintained an impenetrable concrete barrier that effectively operated as a dam. Dkt.

43 at 11. They further allege that the State’s construction of the barrier inundated their property with

floodwater that prevented them from accessing their

properties and caused “significant erosion and loss of

crops, grasses, and groundcover.” Id. The State’s storage of rainfall on their properties also allegedly

caused “permanent damage, destruction, and loss of



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personal property including appliances, furniture,

tools, machinery, livestock, crops, vehicles, air conditioning units, and similar personal property in addition to the tragic loss of hereditary items and mementoes which can never be replaced.” Id. at 12. These allegations, taken as true, unquestionably allege a compensable property interest for purposes of a Fifth

Amendment takings claim.

The State next argues that its design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the IH-10 concrete barrier is a “legitimate use[] of its police power,

which is an exemption to takings liability and damages in Texas.” Dkt. 44 at 10. There is no question

that Texas property owners hold “their land subject to

the legitimate exercise of the police power to control

and mitigate against flooding.” In re Downstream, 147

Fed. Cl. at 578. At the same time, “the state cannot

commit a physical taking, by taking or destroying

property, and escape liability for compensation by

merely ‘labeling the taking as an exercise of the police

powers.’” City of Dallas, 347 S.W.3d at 254 (Wainwright, J., dissenting) (quoting Steele, 603 S.W.2d at

789). The Texas Supreme Court has described the interplay between the Takings Clause and police power

as follows:

The polic[e] power is not an arbitrary

one, [it has] its limitations. Thus it is

subject to the limitations imposed by the

Constitution upon every power of government, and will not be permitted to invade or impair the fundamental liberties

of the citizen. Also it is founded in public



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necessity and only public necessity can

justify its exercise. . . . But the police

power is subordinate to the right to acquire and own property, and to deal with

it and use it as the owner chooses, so long

as the use harms nobody. [The police

power] may be invoked to abridge the

right of the citizen to use his private

property when such use will endanger

public health, safety, comfort or welfare—and only when this situation

arises.

Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478–79

(Tex. 1934). So while a governmental entity “is not required to make compensation for losses occasioned by

the proper and reasonable exercise of its police

power,” determining whether such exercise was reasonable and proper requires “consider[ation of] all of

the circumstances” using “a fact-sensitive test of reasonableness.” City of Coll. Station v. Turtle Rock

Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984). Further, the

State may invoke the police power to limit a landowner’s property rights “only” where the landowner’s

“use will endanger public health, safety, comfort or

welfare.” Lombardo, 73 S.W.2d at 479.

Plaintiffs claim that the State installed the IH10 barrier “to enhance public safety and to facilitate

use of its eastbound (southside) lanes as an evacuation route during periods of flooding by confining water to the westbound lanes (northside).” Dkt. 43 at 2.

This allegation, taken as true, meets the Plaintiffs’

low pleading burden, especially given the factually



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intensive question presented when a government

raises a police power defense. See In re Upstream II,

146 Fed. Cl. at 263–264 (“[I]t was not that the government had to respond to Tropical Storm Harvey as an

emergency that necessitated the flooding of private

land, but rather that the government had made a calculated decision to allow for flooding these lands years

before Harvey.” (quotation omitted)); In re Upstream

I, 138 Fed. Cl. at 664 (“Due to the fact-intensive nature of takings cases, trial courts tend to be slow to

dismiss them, and to create a record with detailed

findings of fact.” (cleaned up)). At this early pleading

stage, it is entirely inappropriate to throw the case

out on the State’s mere assertion that its efforts to

control and mitigate against flooding constitute legitimate uses of its police power.

The State cites to In re Downstream as binding,

while Plaintiffs allege that In re Upstream I and In re

Upstream II provide the more analogous comparison.

The referenced cases involve takings claims brought

against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for their

operation of the Addicks and Barker Dams, located in

Northwest Houston, during Hurricane Harvey. Judge

Loren Smith described the differences between these

cases as follows:

In [In re Upstream II], Senior Judge

[Charles] Lettow determined that the

taking of upstream property occurred as

a result of the general operation of the

Addicks and Barker Dams and Reservoirs, as a direct result of the Corps’ decision to close the flood gates in order to



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protect properties downstream at the expense of the upstream properties located

within the maximum pool size for the

reservoirs. In contrast, the Downstream

plaintiffs do not allege that the general

operation of the Reservoirs caused the

flooding of their property. Rather, plaintiffs downstream advance a takings theory predicated on the Corps’ decision to

open the flood gates and begin Induced

Surcharge releases . . . . [T]he downstream plaintiffs’ theory of causation ignores the simple fact that the gates were

initially closed for the sole purpose of

protecting their properties from floodwaters, that such mitigation failed because

the impounded storm waters exceeded

the Reservoirs’ controllable capacity, and

that . . . Harvey was the sole and proximate cause of the floodwaters.

In re Downstream, 147 Fed. Cl. at 575 (citations omitted). In short, the downstream plaintiffs sought compensation for the government’s decision to open the

floodgates when the “impounded storm waters exceeded the Reservoirs’ controllable capacity” due to

the exceptional amount of rain caused by Hurricane

Harvey, an “Act of God.” Id. By contrast, the upstream

plaintiffs sought compensation for the government’s

decision to build dams near their properties in the

first place, placing their properties at increased risk

of flooding all for the “sole purpose” of protecting

downstream properties. Id. In In re Upstream II, the

Court of Federal Claims rejected the Army Corps of



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Engineers’ request to dismiss the case on a police

power argument because “the design of the dams contemplated flooding beyond government-owned land

onto private properties.” In re Upstream II, 146 Fed.

Cl. at 263. See also In re Upstream I, 138 Fed. Cl. At

669 (deferring the matter until trial under Rule 12(i)).

The Court of Federal Claims reasoned that “it was not

that the government had to respond to Tropical Storm

Harvey as an emergency . . . but rather that the government had made a calculated decision to allow for

flooding these lands years before Harvey.” In re Upstream II, 146 Fed. Cl. at 263–64.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that the State constructed and maintained the IH-10 concrete centerline barrier for the sole purpose of protecting public

access to the highway’s southside lanes at the expense

of northside property owners. In other words, the

State protected public property and private property

to the south of the barrier only by preventing rainfall

on the northside from following its natural course

south towards the Gulf of Mexico. The State’s barrier

allegedly burdened Plaintiffs’ property with a permanent flowage easement, putting Plaintiffs’ property to

public use without their consent and without just

compensation. This allegation is a direct corollary to

the allegations made by the upstream plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs do not claim that the State took their property by failing to provide “perfect flood control” because, according to Plaintiffs, the concrete barrier

performed exactly as the State intended it to perform—inundating northside property owners with

water that would otherwise flow south towards the

Gulf of Mexico. Again, it is not my role at this



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preliminary juncture in the case to make credibility

determinations or otherwise rule on the merits. These

allegations survive a motion to dismiss.

B.

PLAINTIFFS’ STATE INVERSE CONDEMNATION

CLAIM

The State also argues that Plaintiffs have

failed to state a valid takings claim under Article I,

Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Specifically, the

State avers that Plaintiffs’ state constitutional takings claim fails as a matter of law because (1) they

“cannot point to such evidence . . . that [the Texas Department of Transportation] knew the concrete barrier would create a dam-effect and flood property;” (2)

they “failed to plead (and cannot plead) how the State

made conscious decisions to release water onto their

properties;” and (3) “Plaintiffs lack the pleadings to

show the State’s knowledge and decision-making

showed it knew Plaintiffs’ property would flood.” Dkt.

46 at 7–8. I completely disagree.

As noted, the Texas Constitution provides that

“[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or

destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). That

provision also creates an exception to takings liability

for “an incidental use by (A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the public at large, or (B) an

entity granted the power of eminent domain under

law.” Id. § 17(a)(1)(A)–(B). In other words, “[m]ere

negligence is not a compensable taking.” Van Deelen



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v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-17-00432-CV, 2018

WL 6684278, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Dec. 20, 2018, no pet.). To state a valid takings claim

under the Texas Constitution, Plaintiffs “must prove

(1) the state intentionally performed certain acts, (2)

that resulted in a ‘taking’ of property, (3) for public

use.” Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex. Insulation Co.,

39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001). The first element—

the state’s intent—is satisfied “when a governmental

entity knows that a specific act is causing identifiable

harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain

to result.” Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr,

499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016) (quotation omitted).

There is no doubt in my mind that Plaintiffs

have plausibly stated that the State’s use of their

property was more than incidental, meaning that the

State has no immunity from liability. Not only have

Plaintiffs alleged that the State knew or was substantially certain that the concrete barrier would cause

flooding on the northside of IH-10, see Dkt. 43 at 3–4,

8, 13, 19, and 21, but they have also pointed to specific

ways in which discovery might help them to prove

those allegations at trial. See id. at 21–23. Viewing

the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as I must at this early stage, Plaintiffs have

made a valid claim for inverse condemnation under

Texas law that is plausible on its face. Because I find

that Plaintiffs have made a valid claim for inverse

condemnation, Texas law does not provide the State

with immunity from liability separate from its immunity to suit. See El Dorado Land Co., L.P. v. City

of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex. 2013) (“A

statutory waiver of immunity is unnecessary for a



32a



takings claim because the Texas Constitution waives

governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or

destruction of property for public use.” (quotation

omitted)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons identified above, I recommend

that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Amended Master Complaint (Dkt. 44) be DENIED.

The Clerk shall provide copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation to the respective parties who have fourteen days from receipt to file written objections pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and General Order 2002–13. Failure to

file written objections within the time period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the

factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal.

SIGNED this 30th day of July 2021.

/s/ Andrew M. Edison

ANDREW M. EDISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE



33a



APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

GALVESTON DIVISION

RICHARD

ALLEN

DEVILLIER, et al.,

CIVIL ACTION NO.

3:20-CV-00223

VS.

STATE OF TEXAS.

ENTERED

August 31, 2021

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

On September 2, 2020, all non-dispositive and

dispositive pretrial matters in this case were referred

to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew M. Edison

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). See Dkt. 14. Judge

Edison filed a memorandum and recommendation on

July 30, 2021, recommending that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Complaint (Dkt. 44) be denied. See Dkt. 50.



34a



On August 13, 2021, the defendant filed its objections to the memorandum and recommendation,

and the plaintiffs responded on August 16, 2021. See

Dkts. 52–53. In accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C), this court is required to “make a de

novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection [has been]

made.” After conducting this de novo review, the court

may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

The court has carefully considered the objections; the memorandum and recommendation; the

pleadings; and the record. Given the amended master

complaint and new motion to dismiss, the court sets

aside its order adopting dated March 30, 2021, (Dkt.

35) and finds that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt.

6) is now moot.

The court accepts Judge Edison’s memorandum and recommendation dated July 30, 2021, and

adopts it as the opinion of the court. It is therefore

ordered that:

(1)

Judge Edison’s memorandum and recommendation (Dkt. 50) is approved and

adopted in its entirety as the holding of

the court; and



(2)

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Complaint (Dkt.

44) is denied.

In adopting Judge Edison’s memorandum and

recommendation, the court finds that there is a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal might materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. This order is certified for permissive interlocutory appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Signed on Galveston Island this 31st day of August 2021.

/s/ Jeffrey Vincent Brown

JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



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APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-90043

RICHARD DEVILLIER; WENDY DEVILLIER; STEVEN

DEVILLIER; RHONDA DEVILLIER; BARBARA DEVILLIER;

ET AL,

Plaintiffs—Respondents,

versus

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Defendant—Petitioner.

Motion for Leave to Appeal

from an Interlocutory Order

USDC No. 3:20-CV-223; 3:20-CV-379; 3:21-CV-104;

4:21-CV-1521

United States Courts

Southern District of

Texas

FILED

October 8, 2021

[SEAL]

A True Copy

Certified order

issued Oct 08, 2021

/s/ Lyle W. Cayce



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Nathan Ochsner,

Clerk of Court

Clerk, U.S. Court of

Appeals, Fifth Circuit

Before SMITH, HIGGINSON, and WILLETT, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the State’s unopposed

petition to appeal the August 31, 2021 interlocutory

order of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas is GRANTED.



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APPENDIX E

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LYLE W. CAYCE

CLERK

TEL. 504-310-7700

600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,

Suite 115

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

January 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES

LISTED BELOW:

No. 21-40750

Devillier v. State of Texas

USDC No. 3:20-CV-223

USDC No. 3:20-CV-379

USDC No. 3:21-CV-104

USDC No. 4:21-CV-1521

Enclosed is an order entered in this case.

See FRAP and Local Rules 41 for stay of the mandate.



Sincerely,

39a



LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

/s/ Dantrell L. Johnson

By: Dantrell L. Johnson, Deputy Clerk

504-310-7689

Mr. Daniel Henry Charest

Mr. Charles William Irvine

Mr. Robert McNamara

Mr. Suranjan Matthew Sen

Ms. Natalie Deyo Thompson

Mr. Emery Lawrence Vincent

Mr. Benjamin D. Wilson



40a



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-40750

RICHARD DEVILLIER; WENDY DEVILLIER; STEVEN

DEVILLIER; RHONDA DEVILLIER; BARBARA DEVILLIER;

ET AL.,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

STATE OF TEXAS,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:20-CV-223

USDC No. 3:20-CV-379

USDC No. 3:21-CV-104

USDC No. 4:21-CV-1521

ON MOTION TO FILE AN AMICUS BRIEF AND

PETITIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON,

Circuit Judges.



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PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the motion of Institute

for Justice for leave to file an amicus brief in support

of the Appellees’ petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

Treating the Appellees’ petition for rehearing

en banc as a petition for panel rehearing (5TH CIR. R.

35 I.O.P.), the petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel or judge in regular active service having requested that the court be polled

on rehearing en banc (FED. R. APP. P. 35 and 5TH CIR.

R. 35), the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

Treating the Appellant’s petition for rehearing

en banc as a petition for panel rehearing (5TH CIR. R.

35 I.O.P.), the petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel or judge in regular active service having requested that the court be polled

on rehearing en banc (FED. R. APP. P. 35 and 5TH CIR.

R. 35), the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.



This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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