Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ronald I. Paul, Petitioner v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 14, 2023
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3fa Wife
Supreme Court of tlje ®ntteb States
RONALD I. PAUL.
Petitioner,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; PAUL D. DE HOLCZER,
individually and as a partner of the law Firm of Moses,
Koon & Brackett, PC; MICHAEL H. QUINN,
individually and as senior lawyer of Quinn Law
Firm, LLC; J. CHARLES ORMOND, JR., individually
and as a partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis,
Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Garner; OSCAR K. RUCKER,
in his individual capacity as, Director Rights of Way
South Carolina Department of Transportation;
MACIE M. GRESHAM, in her individual capacity as
Eastern Region Right of Way Program Manager South
Carolina Department of Transportation; NATALIE J.
MOORE, in her individual capacity as assistant chief
counsel South Carolina Department of Transportation,
Respondents.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The South Carolina Court Of Appeals
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Ronald I. Paul
Pro Se Petitioner
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
Cell (803) 414-2305
ronaldipaul@att.net
r
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a settlement agreement in an eminent domain
case with three parties and two of the parties agreed
to a settlement between them, that did not include the
other party, violates the just compensation clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution for the other party, requiring de
claratory relief be entered in favor of the other party.
11
RELATED CASES
2002-CP-400-4800
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs
Keith J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., Case No: 2002CP-400-4800, State of South Carolina, County of Rich
land, Court of Common pleas, Judgment entered
March 11, 2005.
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., Opinion Case No:
2006-UP-360, In the South Carolina Court of Appeal,
Opinion entered October 23, 2006.
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., In the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, Certiorari Denied October 18,
2007.
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., Case No: 2002-CP400-4800, State of South Carolina, County of Richland,
Court of Common pleas, Judgment entered January
28, 2008 and February 5, 2008.
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., Opinion Case No:
2009-UP-228, In the South Carolina Court of Appeal,
Opinion entered May 27, 2009.
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., In the Supreme Court
of South Carolina, Certiorari Denied January 7, 2010.
r
in
RELATED CASES - Continued
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., Case No: 2002-CP400-4800, State of South Carolina, County of Richland,
Court of Common pleas, Judgment entered March
24, 2010.
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., Appeal Dismissed,
Case Tracking Number 2010165247, Trial Court Case
No: 2002-CP-400-4800, In the South Carolina Court of
Appeal, Order entered January 19, 2011.
South Carolina Department of Transportation vs Keith
Buckles and G.L. Buckles et al., In the Supreme Court
of South Carolina, Certiorari Denied October 19, 2011.
2005-CP-400-6516
G.L. Buckles as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Keith Buckles vs Ronald Paul, Case No: 2005-CP400-6516, State of South Carolina, County of Richland,
Court of Common pleas, Judgment entered June 4,
2007.
G.L. Buckles as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Keith Buckles vs Ronald Paul, Opinion Case No:
2009-UP-226, In the South Carolina Court of Appeal,
Opinion entered May 27, 2009.
G.L. Buckles as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Keith Buckles vs Ronald Paul, In the Supreme Court
of South Carolina, Certiorari Denied January 11,2010.
IV
RELATED CASES - Continued
2006-CP-400-6410
Ronald I. Paul vs J. Charles Ormond, Jr., et al. Case
No: 2006-CP-400-6410, State of South Carolina, County
of Richland, Court of Common pleas, Judgment en
tered December 5, 2007.
Ronald I. Paul vs J. Charles Ormond, Jr., et al. Opinion
Case No: 2009-UP-229, In the South Carolina Court of
Appeals, Opinion entered May 27, 2009.
Ronald I. Paul vs J. Charles Ormond, Jr., et al. In the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, Certiorari Denied
March 9, 2010.
2008-CP-400-1259
Ronald I. Paul vs South Carolina Department of Trans
portation et al., Case No: 2008-CP-400-1259, State of
South Carolina, County of Richland, Court of Common
pleas, Judgment entered March 25, 2009.
Ronald I. Paul vs South Carolina Department of Trans
portation et al., Opinion Case No: 2010-UP-504, In the
South Carolina Court of Appeal, Opinion entered No
vember 19, 2010.
Ronald I. Paul vs South Carolina Department of Trans
portation et al., In the Supreme Court of South Caro
lina, Certiorari Denied October 19, 2011.
Ronald I. Paul vs South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, et al., Petition No: 11-7921, In the Supreme
r
V
RELATED CASES - Continued
Court of the United States, Petition Denied April 16,
2012.
FEDERAL CASES
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Transportation,
In the United States District Court for the district of
South Carolina, et al., c/a No. 3:12-cv-01036-CMC-PJG,
Judgment entered February 6, 2013.
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Transportation,
In the United States District Court for the district of
South Carolina, et al., c/a No. 3:13-cv-00367-CMC-PJG,
Judgment entered May 20, 2013.
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Transportation,
In the United States District Court for the district of
South Carolina, et al., c/a No. 3:13-cv-01852-CMC-PJG,
Judgment entered October 8, 2014.
Ronald I. Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, In the United States Court ofAppeals for the
Fourth Circuit, et al., Appeal Case No. 13-2431, Opin
ion entered May 14, 2014.
Ronald I. Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, In the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, et al., Appeal Case No. 14-2146, Opin
ion entered April 8, 2015.
VI
RELATED CASES - Continued
Paul v. de holczer et al., In the United States District
Court for the district of South Carolina c/a No. 3:15-cv02178-CMC-PJG, Judgment entered July 28, 2015.
Ronald I. Paul v. Paul v. de holczer et al., In the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Appeal
Case No. 15-2059, Opinion entered February 4, 2016.
Ronald I. Paul vs Paul D. de Holczer, et al., Petition No
15-8680, In the Supreme Court of the United States,
Case considered closed August 11, 2016.
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Transportation,
et al., In the United States District Court for the dis
trict of South Carolina et al., c/a 3:16-cv-01727-CMCPGJ, Judgment entered November 8, 2016.
Ronald I. Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, In the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, et al., Appeal Case No. 17-1057, Opin
ion entered June 8, 2017.
2018-CP-400-5641
Ronald I. Paul vs South Carolina Department of Trans
portation et al., Case No. 2018-CP-400-5641, State of
South Carolina, County of Richland, Court of Common
pleas, Judgment entered November 13, 2019.
Ronald I. Paul vs South Carolina Department of Trans
portation et al., Appeal Opinion No: 2022-UP-051, In
Vll
RELATED CASES - Continued
the South Carolina Court of Appeal, Opinion entered
February 9, 2022.
Ronald I. Paul vs South Carolina Department of Trans
portation et al., In the Supreme Court of South Caro
lina, Certiorari Denied February 10, 2023.
vm
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED..................................
1
RELATED CASES..................................................
11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................
xi
OPINION BELOW......................................... ........
1
JURISDICTION......................................................
1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI
SIONS INVOLVED............................... ..............
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................
3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION...
3
The Court should review this case to determine if Pe
titioner is entitled to declaratory relief, because a
settlement agreement between the Condemner and
the Land and Building Owners as a matter of law, did
not satisfy the just compensation clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution for all parties, in other words to address
an ongoing or continuing violation of federal law in
the future;
(a) because the settlement sum did not include a
party with a commercial lease;
(b) when the commercial lease owner was not a
party to any settlement negotiations;
(c) when the commercial lease owner did not sign
the consent order to settle the case;
IX
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
(d) when the settlement did not include an ap
praisal sum of the commercial lease owner property at
its highest and best use;
(e) and when there is no dispute between the
parties that the commercial lease owner never agrees
to any settlement.
CONCLUSION
6
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Opinion: South Carolina Court of Appeals’ Un
published Decision............................................... App. 1
Order: South Carolina Court of Appeals’ Order
Denying Petition for Rehearing........................ App. 6
Order: South Carolina Lower Court Order
granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss......App. 8
Order: South Carolina Lower Court Order Deny
ing Motion for Reconsideration
App. 21
Order: South Carolina Supreme Court Denial of
Writ of Certiorari
App. 25
Complaint in this case (2018-CP-400-5641): insert
pages 1,24-28 filed on October 26,2018
App. 27
Transcript: insert pages 1,43-46, and 55 of hear
ing held on August 8, 2019
App. 34
Motion for Reconsideration in lower Court: insert
App. 40
pages 1,16-19
X
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
Final Brief of Appellant in South Carolina Court
of Appeals: insert pages 1, 7,14-17 and 30.... App. 45
Amended Petition: Amended Memorandum in
support of Petition for Rehearing in South
Carolina Court of Appeals: insert pages 1-3
and 12
App. 53
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in South Carolina
Supreme Court: insert pages 1, 4, 8-10 and
24
App. 58
XI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).....................
4
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct.
582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946)......................................
5
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)............
6
Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d
59 (2d Cir. 1983)....................................................
5
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 60 S.Ct. 527, 84
L.Ed. 754 (1940)....................................................
5
State Statute
South Carolina Code section 28-2-40
2,5
United States Constitution
United States Constitution Fifth Amendment........2, 3
United States Constitution Fourteenth Amend
ment
2,3
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certio
rari issue to review the judgment below.
OPINION BELOW
The case is from state courts: (2018-CP-400-5641).
The opinion of the highest state court (South Carolina
Court of Appeals) to review the merits appears at Ap
pendix 1 to the petition and is unpublished. All lower
court opinions are attached in the appendix.
JURISDICTION
The case is from state courts: (2018-CP-400-5641).
The date on which the highest state court (South
Carolina Court of Appeals) decided my case was on
February 9, 2022. A copy of that decision appears at
Appendix 1. A timely petition for rehearing was there
after denied on, March 18, 2022. And a copy of the
order denying rehearing appears at Appendix 6. There
after, a timely petition for writ of certiorari was filed
with the South Carolina Supreme Court on April 14,
2022. And a copy of the order denying the writ of certi
orari appears at Appendix 25.
2
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
I.
South Carolina Code Section 28-2-40. Compromise
or settlement permit.
At any time before or after commencement of
an action, the parties may agree to and
carry out, according to its terms, a compro
mise or settlement as to any matter, including
all or any part of the compensation or other
relief.
II. U.S. Constitution: Fifth Amendment - Rights
of Persons . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall pri
vate property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immuni
ties of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal
Protection Section 1 . . . No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro
tection of the laws.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondents, in eminent domain case # 2002CP-400-4800 (hereinafter referred to as case 4800). On
or about February-March 23, 2004, Quinn, Buckles,
SCDOT, Rucker, Gresham, Moore and de Holczer agreed
to a settlement between them.
Then all Respondents, including Ormond took a
position claiming and declaring case 4800 had set
tled for just compensation. This was an intentionally
false statement by officer of the court because all
respondents knew without Petitioner’s consent or ap
proval, as a matter of law, respondents could not settle
the case for just compensation.
Now, as set forth above, there exists an actual con
troversy between Petitioner and respondents as to
whether the settlement agreement in case 4800 be
tween Condemner (SCDOT) and the Land and Build
ing Owners (the Buckles) applied equally to the
Commercial Lease Owner (Paul), as just compensa
tion.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The Court should review this case to determine if
Petitioner is entitled to declaratory relief, because a
settlement agreement between the Condemner and
Land and Building Owners as a matter of law, did
not satisfy the just compensation clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
4
Constitution for all parties, in other words to address
an ongoing or continuing violation of federal law in the
future;
(a) because the settlement sum did not include a
party with a commercial lease;
(b) when the commercial lease owner was not a
party to any settlement negotiations;
(c) when the commercial lease owner did not sign
the consent order to settle the case;
(d) when the settlement did not include an ap
praisal sum of the commercial lease owner property at
its highest and best use;
(e) and when there is no dispute between the
parties that the commercial lease owner never agrees
to any settlement.
In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the court held
“a plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive and declar
atory relief to address an ongoing or continuing viola
tion of federal law or a threat of a violation of federal
law in the future.”
On October 21, 2002, the respondents SCDOT,
Oscar K. Rucker, Macie M. Gresham, Natalie J. Moore
and Paul D. de Holczer filed an Amended Condemna
tion Notice against Petitioner Paul. On or about Octo
ber 28,2003, the state official (NOT THE BUCKLES)
terminated Paul’s commercial lease a sealed instru
ment by means of court order, without payment of just
5
compensation to Paul, in other words to be clear, zero
$0.00. dollars and cents
What the lower court ignored is that under South
Carolina Code section 28-2-40. “Compromise or settle
ment permit. At any time before or after commence
ment of an action, the parties may agree to and
carry out, according to its terms, a compromise or set
tlement as to any matter, including all or any part of
the compensation or other relief”. In other words, all
parties must agree to any settlement.
In addition, the lower courts ignored that, “tradi
tionally and for good reasons, statutes of limitation are
not controlling measures of equitable relief. Such stat
utes have been drawn upon by equity solely for the
light they may shed in determining that which is deci
sive for the chancellor’s intervention, namely, whether
the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so
as to make a decree against the defendant unfair.”
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,396,66 S.Ct. 582,
584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946); see Russell v. Todd, supra,
309 U.S. [280] at page 289, 60 S.Ct. [527] at page 532,
84 L.Ed. 754 [(1940)]; Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1983)?
Petitioner has not slept on his rights so as to make
a decree against the defendant unfair, therefore, a stat
ute of limitations defense may not be considered.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). In
this case, however, there is no suggestion Petitioner de
layed seeking relief, in fact, the Record on Appeal
shows, and it cannot be disputed that Paul has been
6
pursuing his rights diligently to this present date and
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way [Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)].
Petitioner implores this court to review his case;
such a settlement agreement can only be considered
contrary to the principles of fairness and what is
right, that was vigorously argued before the lower
Court at every stage: in his Complaint that appears at
Appendix 27, Transcript of oral argument that appears
at Appendix 34, in his Motion for Reconsideration that
appears at Appendix 40, in his Final Brief of Appel
lant that appears at Appendix 45, in his Amended
Petition for rehearing that appears at Appendix 53 and
in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari that appears at
Appendix 58 that was unquestionably and com
pletely ignored by the lower Courts.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari and reverse the decision of the South Caro
lina Court of Appeals, grant Petitioner Declaratory
judgment ordering that the Respondents are prohib
ited from enforcing the settlement agreement between
the Condemner (SCDOT) and the Land and Building
Owners (the Buckles) against the Commercial Lease
Owner (Petitioner) as payment of just compensation
against or/to Petitioner and, are barred for all time
enforcement of the settlement agreement between
SCDOT and Buckles as payment of just compensation
7
against or/to Petitioner, an a order of continuing juris
diction of this Court for the purposes of enforcing any
judgment so ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
Ronald I. Paul
Pro Se Petitioner
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
(803) 414-2305
ronaldipaul@att.net
March 14, 2023
1
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Page
Opinion: South Carolina Court of Appeals’ Un
published Decision............................................... App. 1
Order: South Carolina Court of Appeals’ Order
Denying Petition for Rehearing........................ App. 6
Order: South Carolina Lower Court Order
granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss..... App. 8
Order: South Carolina Lower Court Order Deny
ing Motion for Reconsideration
App. 21
Order: South Carolina Supreme Court Denial of
Writ of Certiorari
App. 25
Complaint in this case (2018-CP-400-5641): insert
pages 1, 24-28 filed on October 26, 2018.......App. 27
Transcript: insert pages 1,43-46, and 55 of hear
ing held on August 8, 2019
App. 34
Motion for Reconsideration in lower Court: in
sert pages 1,16-19
App. 40
Final Brief of Appellant in South Carolina Court
of Appeals: insert pages 1, 7,14-17 and 30 ...App. 45
Amended Petition: Amended Memorandum in
support of Petition for Rehearing in South
Carolina Court of Appeals: insert pages 1-3
and 12
App. 53
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in South Carolina
Supreme Court: insert pages 1, 4, 8-10 and
24
App. 58
App. 1
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL
VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
BY RULE 268(d)(2) SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Ronald I. Paul, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Transportation; Paul
D. de Holczer, individually and as a partner of the
law firm of Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC; Michael H.
Quinn, individually and as senior lawyer of Quinn
Law Firm, LLC; J. Charles Ormond, Jr., individually
and as a partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis,
Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Gamer; Oscar K. Rucker,
in his individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way
South Carolina Department of Transportation;
Macie M. Gresham, in her individual capacity as
Eastern Region Right of Way Program Manager
South Carolina Department of Transportation;
Natalie J. Moore, in her individual capacity as
Assistant Chief Counsel, South Carolina
Department of Transportation, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2019-002076
Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge
App. 2
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-051
Submitted January 1, 2022 - Filed February 9, 2022
AFFIRMED
Ronald I. Paul, of Columbia, pro se.
Michael H. Quinn, of Quinn Law Firm, LLC,
of Columbia, for Respondent Michael H.
Quinn.
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann & Da
vis, P.A., of Columbia, for Respondents South
Carolina Department of Transportation,
Macie M. Gresham, Oscar K. Rucker, and Na
talie J. Moore.
B. Michael Brackett, of Moses & Brackett, and
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann & Da
vis, P.A., both of Columbia, for Respondent
Paul D. de Holczer.
J. Charles Ormond, Jr., of Ormond/Dunn, of
Columbia, for Respondent J. Charles Ormond,
Jr.
PER CURIAM: Ronald I. Paul appeals the circuit
court’s grant of the motions to dismiss by the South
Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT), Paul
D. de Holczer, Natalie J. Moore, Michael H. Quinn, and
J. Charles Ormond, Jr. (collectively, Respondents) un
der Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. On appeal, Paul argues the
App. 3
circuit court erred by (1) dismissing SCDOT as an im
proper party when his complaint contained a state law
claim, (2) determining the statute of limitations gov
erning his claim was three years, (3) not finding the
statute of limitations began to run on the date of the
last overt act of conspiracy, (4) dismissing Respondents
on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, (5)
finding that Quinn and Ormond were not state actors,
and (6) dismissing his complaint with prejudice with
out an opportunity to replead or amend. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following au
thorities:
As to issues two and three, we hold the circuit court
properly granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss be
cause Paul’s complaint reflects he pursued causes of
action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for alleged conduct
that occurred outside the applicable three-year statute
of limitations. See Grimsley v. S.C. Law Enforcement
Div., 396 S.C. 276,281, 721 S.E.2d 423,426 (2012) (“On
appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), an appellate court applies the same standard
of review as the [circuit] court.” (quoting Rydde v. Mor
ris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009))); id.
(“That standard requires the [c]ourt to construe the
complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmovant
and determine if the ‘facts alleged and the inferences
reasonably deducible from the pleadings would entitle
the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case.’ ” (quot
ing Rydde, 381 S.C. at 646, 675 S.E.2d at 433)); Spence
v. Spence, 368 S.C. 106,116,628 S.E.2d 869,874 (2006)
(“In considering such a motion, the [circuit] court must
App. 4
base its ruling solely on allegations set forth in the
complaint.”); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50
(1989) (“[W]here state law provides multiple statutes
of limitations for personal injury actions, courts con
sidering [section] 1983 claims should borrow the gen
eral or residual statute for personal injury actions.”);
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5) (2005) (providing a threeyear limitations period for personal injury actions);
Est. of Mims v. S.C. Dep’t of Disabilities & Special
Needs, 422 S.C. 388, 399, 811 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Ct. App.
2018) (“In South Carolina, [section] 1983 claims are
subject to a three-year statute of limitations.”); Blanck
v. McKeen, 707 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he
time when a [federal] cause of action accrues is gov
erned by federal, not state, law.”); id. (“[T]he statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff dis
covers, or by the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered, the facts forming the basis of his cause of
action.”); id. at 820 (“[A claimant’s] action is timebarred as long as they were ‘on notice’ of the conduct
about which they complain.”).
As to issue six, we hold the circuit court properly dis
missed Paul’s claims with prejudice because Respond
ents’ dismissal was not due to any correctable pleading
deficiency. See Spence, 368 S.C. at 129, 628 S.E.2d at
881 (“When a complaint is dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action, the dismissal generally is without
prejudice. The plaintiff in most cases should be given
an opportunity to file and serve an amended com
plaint.”); Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry Cnty.,
App. 5
426 S.C. 175,189,826 S.E.2d 585,592 (2019) (“A circuit
court does not have ‘discretion’ to dismiss a complaint
with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) without at least considering whether to allow
leave to amend under Rule 15(a)[, SCRCP].”); Alterna
Tax Asset Grp., LLC v. York Cnty., 434 S.C. 328, 334,
863 S.E.2d 465, 468 (Ct. App. 2021) (“[W]e are mind
ful that [circuit] courts should not dismiss pleadings
with prejudice at the 12(b) stage without allowing the
pleader to amend its complaint (unless amendment
would be futile).” (emphasis added)).
Because the resolution of issues two, three, and six are
dispositive, we need not address the remaining issues
on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of George
town, Inc., 335 S.C. 598,613,518 S.E.2d 591,598 (1999)
(ruling an appellate court need not address remaining
issues when its resolution of a prior issue is disposi
tive).
AFFIRMED.1
THOMAS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.
App. 6
The South Carolina Court of Appeals
Ronald I. Paul, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Transportation; Paul
D. de Holczer, individually and as a partner of the
law firm of Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC; Michael H.
Quinn, individually and as senior lawyer of Quinn
Law Firm, LLC; J. Charles Ormond, Jr., individually
and as a partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis,
Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Garner; Oscar K. Rucker,
in his individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way
South Carolina Department of Transportation;
Macie M. Gresham, in her individual capacity as
Eastern Region Right of Way Program Manager
South Carolina Department of Transportation;
Natalie J. Moore, in her individual capacity as
Assistant Chief Counsel, South Carolina
Department of Transportation, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2019-002076
ORDER
After careful consideration of the petition for rehear
ing, the Court is unable to discover that any material
fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or
disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting
App.7
a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is
denied.
/s/ Paula H. Thomas
J.
/s/ John D. Geathers
J.
/s/ Jerry D. Vinson, Jr.
J.
Columbia, South Carolina
cc:
Ronald I. Paul
Andrew F. Lindemann, Esquire
B. Michael Brackett, Esquire
FILED
John Charles Ormond, Jr., Esquire Mar 18 2022
Michael H. Quinn, Esquire
The Honorable Jocelyn Newman
App. 8
STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA
)
COUNTY OF RICHLAND
)
Ronald I. Paul,
)
Plaintiff
v.
)
)
)
)
)
)
IN THE COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS
Civil Action No.
2018-CP-40-5641
South Carolina Department
of Transportations; Paul D,
ORDER GRANTING
)
de Holczer, individually and
MOTIONS TO
as a partner of the law film of )
DISMISS
)
Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC;
Michael H. Quinn, individually ) (Filed Nov. 13, 2019)
and as senior lawyer of Quinn )
Law Firm, LLC; J. Charles
)
Ormond, Jr. individually and )
as partner of the Law Finn
)
of Holler, Dennis, Corbett,
)
Ormond, Plante & Garner;
)
Oscar K. Rucker, in his
)
individual capacity as Director, )
Rights of Way South Carolina )
Department of Transportation; )
Macie M. Gresham, in her
)
individual capacity as Eastern
)
Region Right of Way Program
)
Manager South Carolina
.)
Department of Transportation ’)
Natalie J. Moore, in her
individual capacity as Assistant )
Chief Counsel, South Carolina )
Department of Transportation, )
Defendants.
)
App. 9
This matter is before this Court on the Motions to
Dismiss filed by the Defendants South Carolina De
partment of Transportation (“SCDOT”), Paul D. de
Holczer, Natalie J. Moore, Michael H. Quinn, Quinn
Law Firm, LLC, and J. Charles Ormond, Jr. A hearing
Was held on August 8, 2019, with the pro se Plaintiff
and counsel for these Defendants present. After a re
view of the pleadings, the written submissions of the
parties, and the oral arguments of the parties, this
Court grants the Motions to Dismiss on the bases set
forth below.
Background and Procedural History
This litigation arises from a condemnation action
that was commenced in 2002 by SCDOT and captioned
South Carolina Department of Transportation u. Buck
les, Civil Action Number 2002-CP-40-4800. That con
demnation action was tried by former Circuit Court
Judge Reginald I. Lloyd in October 2004. The Defend
ant Ormond was Ronald Paul’s legal counsel in that
2002 condemnation action. The Defendant Quinn rep
resented Keith Buckles and G.L. Buckles, who were
the landowners in that action, The Defendants de
Holczer and Moore represented SCDOT in that action.
In the Order of Judgment filed March 11, 2005, Judge
Lloyd directed the Clerk of Court to disburse $2,450.00
to the Plaintiff Ronald Paul as the just compensation
payable for his leasehold interest.1 That Order was
1 The pertinent pleadings and orders filed in the 2002 con
demnation action and subsequent litigation commenced by the
Plaintiff have been submitted into the record, and this Court
App. 10
subsequently appealed by Paul, and the Court of Ap
peals affirmed on October 23, 2006. The South Caro
lina Supreme Court later denied a petition for writ of
certiorari.
On February 20, 2008, the Plaintiff Ronald Paul
filed a civil action bearing Civil Action Number 2008CP-40-1259 in the Court of Common Pleas against
most of the same Defendants as in this case, including
SCDOT, de Holczer, and Quinn. That Complaint in
cluded causes of action for civil conspiracy in several
particulars. By Order filed March 25,2009, Special Cir
cuit Court Judge Joseph M. Strickland granted the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on a statute of
limitations defense and other defenses. The Plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dismissal on November 19, 2010. On October 9, 2011,
the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certio
rari.
The Plaintiff thereafter filed several lawsuits in
the United States District Court, including the follow
ing:
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, C/A No. 3:12-1036-CMC-PJG
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, C/A No. 3:13-367-CMC-PJG
takes judicial notice of those pleadings and orders. See, Freeman
v. McBee, 280 S.C. 490, 313 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Ct. App. 1984) (“[a]
court can take judicial notice of its own records, files, and proceed
ings for all proper purposes including facts established in its rec
ords”).
App. 11
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, C/A No. 3:13-1852-CMC-PJG
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation, C/A No. 3:15-2178-CMC-PJG
Paul v. South Carolina Department of Trans
portation., C/A No. 3:16-1727-CrVTC-PGJ
In these federal lawsuits, the Plaintiff alleged causes
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil conspiracy in
which he sought both declaratory and monetary relief.
In the 2012 action, which was brought against the
same Defendants as in the present case, the United
States District Judge Cameron Currie granted the De
fendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice. The
Plaintiff thereafter continued to file the identical or
nearly identical Complaints in 2013, 2015, and 2016,
and each of those lawsuits were dismissed by Judge
Currie without prejudice and without issuance of ser
vice of process. In dismissing the 2016 action, Judge
Currie imposed a pre-filing injunction on the Plaintiff.
In those previous lawsuits, the Plaintiff alleged con
spiracy claims under state and federal law against
the current Defendants arising from the prosecution
of the 2002 condemnation action, including a settle
ment reached with the Buckles parties as well as ac
tions taken during the trial of that case in October
2004.
On October 26,2018, the Plaintiff filed the current
lawsuit in state court. This action includes federal Sec
tion 1983 civil conspiracy claims against the same De
fendants. In lieu of filing Answers, the Defendants
SCDOT, de Holczer, Moore, Quinn, and Ormond filed
App. 12
the Motions to Dismiss currently before this Court as
serting a number of separate and independent bases
for dismissal as discussed below.
Legal Analysis
I.
Statute of Limitations Defense
The applicable statute of limitations for the Plain
tiff’s federal conspiracy claims is three years. The
Plaintiff contends, however, that the applicable statute
of limitations is twenty years. He relies on S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-3-520(b), which provides for a twenty year
statute of limitations for an action upon a sealed in
strument, and argues that his Section 1983 action is
based upon a commercial lease with the Buckles that
constitutes a sealed instrument. The Court finds the
Plaintiff’s position to be unpersuasive. In determining
the proper statute of limitations in a Section 1983
claim, the United States Supreme Court has found
that the federal court should adopt the state law stat
ute of limitations for personal injury. Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). Under South Carolina law,
the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is
three years. See, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5). Conse
quently, it has been held that “[t]he statute of limita
tions for section 1983 causes of action arising in
South Carolina is three yearsHamilton v. Middleton,
2003 WL 23851098 (D.S.C. 2003). See also, Simmons v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority, 694 F.2d 64 (4th
Cir. 1982). In the case at bar, the Plaintiff did not file
his current Complaint until October 26,2018. Thus, all
App. 13
claims arising prior to October 26, 2015 are timebarred.
The record, which includes orders and pleadings
from the prior 2008, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 law
suits, demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s alleged claims
accrued and were known to the Plaintiff prior to Octo
ber 26, 2015. During the hearing, the Plaintiff con
ceded that his current Section 1983 claims are the
same as those previously brought in federal court and
were known to him prior to 2015, and that the acts on
which he is basing his claims occurred prior to that
date. The Court further recognizes that the allegations
of the current Complaint itself reflect that the causes
of action accrued during the course of the 2002 con
demnation action which, including appeals, ended in
October 2007. The Plaintiff’s 2008 state court litiga
tion raised the sane facts and conspiracy claims as
presently re-asserted in the 2018 action. That lawsuit
was dismissed on the merits, and that dismissal was
upheld on appeal. The 2008 action, including appeals,
ended in October 2011. The series of federal court ac
tions further demonstrate that the Plaintiff was well
aware of the existence of his claims prior to October 26,
2015. As a result, this Court concludes that the Plain
tiff’s current Complaint is time-barred and is dis
missed with prejudice.
App. 14
II.
Claim and Issue Preclusion
The Defendants have also asserted res judicata
(claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclu
sion) as additional bases requiring the dismissal of this
action. The Court agrees with the Defendants’ position,
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment
on the merits in a prior action will preclude the parties
from relitigating any issues actually litigated or those
that might have been litigated in the first action.”
Wright v. Marlboro County School District, 317 S.C.
160,452 S.E.2d 12,14 (Ct. App. 1994). “The res judicata
defense requires a showing of three essential elements:
(1) the prior judgment must be final, valid and on the
merits; (2) the parties in the subsequent action must
be identical to those in the first; and (3) the second ac
tion must involve matters properly included in the first
action.” Id. Importantly, “[r]es judicata bars not only
issues litigated in a prior action, but issues that could
have been litigated.” Plum Creek Development Co. v.
Conway, 328 S.C. 347, 351, 491 S.E.2d 692 (Ct. App.
1997). See also, Jimmy Martin Realty Group Inc. v,
Fameco Dist., 300 S.C. 192, 386 S.E.2d 803 (Ct. App.
1989).
This Court finds that the Plaintiffs current Com
plaint is barred by res judicata. The Plaintiff has pre
viously litigated the same claims in the 2008 action,
which resulted in a dismissal on the merits as issued
by Judge Strickland. The three elements of res judicata
are all satisfied. The 2008 action is final, valid., and on
the merits. The parties in the 2008 action are identical,
with the exception that Natalie Moore was not a party
App. 15
to that case. Lastly, the conspiracy claims asserted in
both actions are the same. And certainly, even if not
precisely the same, res judicata is a bar to any other
claims that could have been brought as part of the 2008
action, which includes a Section 1983 claim for civil
conspiracy.
Alternatively, the Defendants argue that the
Plaintiffs current Complaint should be dismissed
based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This Court
agrees. Under South Carolina law, collateral estoppel
“prevents a party from relitigating in a subsequent
suit an issue actually and necessarily litigated and de
termined in a prior action.” Jinks v. Richland County,
355 S.C. 341, 585 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2003). “A party
claiming preclusive effect under collateral estoppel
must demonstrate that the particular issue was (1) ac
tually litigated in the prior action; (2) directly deter
mined in the prior action; and (3) necessary to support
the prior judgment.” Crosby v. Prysmian Communica
tions Cable and Systems USA, LLC, 397 S.C. 101, 723
S.E.2d 813, 817 (Ct. App. 2012).
The record includes not only the 2008 dismissal
order issued by Judge Strickland'but also the federal
court orders issued by Judge Currie, all of which ad
dress various defenses and insufficiencies applicable to
the Plaintiffs repetitive Complaints. In fact, in her Or
der in the 2016 action, Judge Currie observed:
Paul is correct in noting that the prior dis
missals were without prejudice and, conse
quently, do not preclude him from filing a new
App. 16
action against the previously named Defend
ants. That the dismissals were without preju
dice does not, however, render them without
meaning. The dismissal Orders (and incorpo
rated Reports) in Paul I, Paul II, Paul III, and
Paul IV stand as authority for the proposition
that the allegations in each of those cases
failed for reasons explained in each of those
Orders (and Reports). It follows that the prior
decisions are on-point authority for dismissal
of Paul’s present complaint to the extent it
merely repeats prior allegations and claims
found in his prior complaints. This is particu
larly true as to Paul III and Paul IV, both of
which the Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed
“for the reasons stated by the district court.”
Paul III, aff’d, 599 EApp’x 108; Paul IV, aff’d,
631 F.App’x 197. Under these circumstances,
the Report properly relied on prior rulings as
to repetitive allegations and claims.
Therefore, in applying the defense of collateral estop
pel, the Court also concludes that the current Com
plaint must be dismissed on the same bases that the
prior Complaints have been dismissed.
III. Defendants Quinn and Ormond Not “State
Actors”
As an additional basis for dismissal, the Defend
ants Quinn, Ormond, and their law firms argue that
they are not “state actors” and were not acting under
“color of state law” in their representation of the Plain
tiff and the Buckles parties in the 2002 condemnation
App. 17
action. In order to state a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the de
fendant deprived him of a federal right, and (2) did so
under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,
640 (1980). The Fourth Circuit has recently held that
“private actors are not amenable to suit under § 1983.
In addition, private attorneys do not act under color of
state law and a § 1983 suit may not be maintained
against an attorney based on his representation.” Marcantoni v. Bealefeld, 734 Fed. Appx. 198, 199 (4th Cir.
2018), The Court, therefore, concludes that the Defend
ants Quinn, Ormond, and their law firms are not
proper parties and are dismissed on this additional
basis.
IV. Defendant SCDOT Not a “Person” Amena
ble to Suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As an additional basis for dismissal, the Defend
ant SCDOT argues that it is not a proper party in any
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
Court agrees. In Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S.
58 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that
the state is not a “person” amenable to suit under Sec
tion 1983. See also, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 T.J.S. 781
(1978); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Haldeman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984). The same is true for a state agency
such as SCDOT. The federal courts have consistently
ruled that South Carolina state agencies such SCDOT
are the arms or alter egos of the state and, therefore,
do not qualify as “persons” amenable to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See e.g, South Carolina Department of
App. 18
Disabilities and Special Needs v. Hoover Universal,
Inc., 535 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008) (SCDMH, as a state
agency and “arm of the state,” is not a “person” amena
ble to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
This Court concludes that the Defendant SCDOT
is not a “person” or proper party not just for money
damages claims but also for claims seeking injunctive
or prospective relief. The United States Supreme Court
has explained that “a State cannot be sued directly in
its own name regardless of the relief sought.” Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,169, n.14 (1985). Similarly, in
Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43
(1997), the Supreme Court held that Ҥ 1983 creates no
remedy against a State.” 520 U.S. at 69. Thus, the De
fendant SCDOT is dismissed on this additional basis.2
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that, based on
the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss are granted and the Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice as to the Defendants South
2 With respect to grounds that may be characterized as plead
ing deficiencies, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, should
generally be without prejudice, and “[t]he plaintiff in most cases
should be given an opportunity to file and serve an amended com
plaint.” Spence v. Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 628 S.E.2d 869, 881 (2006).
However, where the dismissal is premised on legal grounds which
cannot be corrected by an opportunity to amend, the dismissal
should properly be entered with prejudice and without an oppor
tunity to replead or amend. Id. The Court notes that the Plain
tiff’s federal claims are dismissed on the merits and not because
of any correctable pleading deficiency. See, Skydive Myrtle Beach,
Inc. v. Horry County, 426 S.C. 175, 826 S.E.2d 585 (2019).
App. 19
Carolina Department of Transportation, de Holczer,
Moore, Quinn, Ormond, and their law firms.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOCELYN NEWMAN
Presiding Circuit Court Judge,
Fifth Judicial Circuit
App. 20
[SEAL]
Richland Common Pleas
Case Caption: Ronald I Paul vs SC Department Of
Transportation , defendant, et al
Case Number: 2018CP4005641
Type:
Order/Dismissal
So Ordered
Jocelyn Newman
Electronically signed on 2019-11-13 16:01:04 page 10
of 10
App. 21
FORM 4
STATE OF
JUDGMENT IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
A CIVIL CASE
COUNTY OF Richland
IN THE COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS
CASE NO. 2018CP4005641
Ronald I Paul
PLAINTIFF(S)
SC Department Of
Transportation et al
DEFENDANT(S)
DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)
□
JURY VERDICT. This action came before
the court for a trial by jury. The issues have
been tried and a verdict rendered.
0
DECISION BY THE COURT. This action
came to trial or hearing before the court. The
issues have been tried or heard and a decision
rendered.
□
ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):
□ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; □ Rule 41(a), SCRCP
(Vol. Nonsuit); □ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled);
□ Other
□
ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):
□ Rule 40(j), SCRCP; □ Bankruptcy; □ Bind
ing arbitration, subject to right to restore to
confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award;
□ Other
□
STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY
App. 22
□
DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIR
CUIT COURT (CHECKAPPLICABLE BOX)
□ Affirmed; □ Reversed; □ Remanded;
□ Other
NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTI
FYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINIS
TRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
RULING IN THIS A PM APPEAL.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: □ See attached
order (formal order to follow) 0 Statement of Judg
ment by the Court:
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (filed on No
vember 25, 2019) is DENIED without hearing in ac
cordance with Rule 59(f), SCRCP.
ORDER INFORMATION
This order 0 ends □ does not end the case. □ See Page
2 for additional information.
For Clerk of Court Office Use Only
This Judgment was electronically entered by the Clerk
of Court as reflected on the Electronic Time Stamp,
and a
copy mailed first class to any party
not proceeding in the Electronic Filing System on
11126/2019 .
App. 23
Ronald I Paul for Ronald I Paul
Ronald I Paul for Ronald I Paul
NAMES OF TRADITIONAL
FILERS SERVED BY MAIL
Court Reporter:
E-Filing Note: The date of Entry of Judgment is
the same date as reflected on the Electronic File
Stamp and the clerk’s entering of the date of
judgment above is not required in those coun
ties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgment
to parties who are not E-Filers or who are ap
pearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.
App. 24
[SEAL]
Richland Common Pleas
Case Caption: Ronald I Paul vs SC Department Of
Transportation , defendant, et al
Case Number: 2018CP4005641
Type:
Order/Electronic Form 4
So Ordered
Jocelyn Newman
Electronically signed on 2019-11-26 12:24:18 page 3 of
3
App. 25
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
Ronald I. Paul, Petitioner,
v.
South Carolina Department of Transportation; Paul
D. de Holczer, individually and as a partner of the
law firm of Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC; Michael H.
Quinn, individually and as senior lawyer of Quinn
Law Firm, LLC; J. Charles Ormond, Jr., individually
and as a partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis,
Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Gamer; Oscar K. Rucker,
in his individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way
South Carolina Department of Transportation;
Macie M. Gresham, in her individual capacity as
Eastern Region Right of Way Program Manager
South Carolina Department of Transportation;
Natalie J. Moore, in her individual capacity as
Assistant Chief Counsel, South Carolina
Department of Transportation, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2022-000466
ORDER
Based on the vote of the Court, the petition for a writ
of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision in
Paul v. S.C. Dep’t ofTransp., Op. No. 2022-UP-051 (S.C.
Ct. App. filed Feb. 9, 2022), is denied.
FOR THE COURT
BY /s/
Patricia A. Howard
CLERK
App. 26
Columbia, South Carolina
February 10, 2023
cc:
Andrew F. Lindemann, Esquire
John Charles Ormond, Jr., Esquire
Michael H. Quinn, Esquire
Ronald I. Paul
The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings
App. 27
STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
Vs.
)
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )
OF TRANSPORTATIONS: PAUL )
IN THE
COURT OF
COMMON
PLEAS
RONALD I. PAUL
D. DE HOLCZER, individually
)
and as a partner of the law firm of )
Moses. Komi & Brackett, PC;
)
MICHAEL H. QUINN, individually j
and as senior lawyer of Quinn Law \
Firm, LLC; J. CHARLES ORMOND, )
JR., individually and as partner
)
of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis, )
Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Gamer;
)
OSCAR K. RUCKER, in his
individual capacity as Director, )
)
Rights of Way South Carolina
)
Department of Transportation;
)
MACIE M. GRESHAM, in her
)
individual capacity as Eastern
)
Region Right of Way Program
)
Manager South Carolina
)
Department of Transportation;
)
NATALIE J. MOORE, in her
individual capacity as Assistant )
)
Chief Counsel, South Carolina
Department of Transportation.
)
Defendants.
)
CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO.
COMPLAINT
CIVIL
CONSPIRACY
42 USC 1983
(JURY TRIAL
DEMANDED)
App. 28
INTRODUCTION
1. The Plaintiff, RONALD I. PAUL, complaining of
the Defendants, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATIONS; OSCAR K. RUCKER, in his
individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way South
Carolina Department of Transportation; MACIE M.
GRESHAM, in her individual capacity as Eastern
COUNT ONE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 42 U.S.C. 1983
101. Paragraphs 1 through 100 above are set forth
herein as if more fully stated in their entirety.
102. In that, in case 4800, on or about February March 23, 2004 Quinn, Buckles, SCOOT, Rucker,
Gresham, Moore and de Holczer agreed to a settle
ment between them.
103. In that all defendants, including Ormond took a
position claiming and declaring case 4800 had settled
for just compensation. This was an intentionally false
statement, because all defendants knew without Paul’s
consent or approval, as a matter of law, defendants
could not settle the case for just compensation,
104. Now, as set forth above, there exists an actual
controversy between Plaintiff and Defendants as to
whether the settlement agreement in case 4800 be
tween SCDOT and the Buckles applied equally to Paul,
as just compensation.
App. 29
105. Therefore, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and
a judicial determination pursuant to:
Section 28-2-10, et seq and 28-2-40. Compromise or set
tlement permit. At any time before or after commence
ment of an action, the parties may agree to and carry
out, according to its terms, a compromise or settlement
as to any matter, including all or any part of the com
pensation or other relief and, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 2202
and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
follows:
(a) That Defendants are prohibited / barred from
enforcing the settlement agreement between
SCDOT and the Buckles as payment of just
compensation against or/ to Paul, because the
evidence shows Paul never agree to any set
tlement;
(b) That Defendants are prohibited / barred for
all time enforcement of the settlement agree
ment between SCDOT and Buckles as pay
ment of just compensation against or/to Paul,
because Paul was not a party to any settle
ment negotiations;
(c) That Defendants are prohibited / barred for
all time enforcement of the settlement agree
ment between SCDOT and Buckles as pay
ment of just compensation against or/ to Paul,
because Paul did not sign the consent order to
settle the case;
(d) That Defendants are prohibited / barred for
all time enforcement of the settlement agree
ment between SCDOT and Buckles as pay
ment ofjust compensation against or/ to Paul,
App. 30
because the settlement did not include an ap
praisal of Paul property (highest and best
use).
106. Because of the foregoing Paul has suffered a de
nial of its Constitutional rights, the right to payment
for taking of his property as otherwise allowed in ac
cordance with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend
ment, in other words to be clearly, zero $0.00. dollars
and cents, and the resultant financial damages approx
imating $310,000.00.
COUNT TWO
CIVIL CONSPIRACY
42 U.S.C. 1983
107. Paragraphs 1 through 117 above are set forth
herein as if more fully stated in their entirety.
108. In case 4800, the Defendants have conspired to
deprive Paul of his Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution;
(a) in that the Defendants acted jointly in con
cert in February 2004, March 2004, September 7,
2004, October 14,2004, October 20, 2004 and Jan
uary 8, 2008, to deprive Paul of payment for his
property taken in October 2002, pursuant to the
South Carolina Eminent Domain Procedures Act,
Section 28-2-10, et seq., in that all defendants,
including Ormond took a position claiming and
declaring case 4800 had settled for just compensa
tion. This was an intentionally false statement, be
cause all defendants knew without Paul’s consent
App. 31
or approval, as a matter of law, defendants could
not settle the case for just compensation,
(b) in furtherance of the conspiracy the defend
ant Paul D. de Holczer stated that Paul have no
right to have a jury trial which resulted in depri
vation of a constitutional right, his rights to have
a trial by jury and,
(c) in furtherance of the conspiracy the defend
ant Michael H. Quinn threaten Paul’s expert wit
nesses with criminal prosecution and threaten to
have his expert witnesses arrested, if they testi
fied.
109. Because of the foregoing Paul has suffered a de
nial of its Constitutional rights, the inability to set
forth all his evidences, before a jury, as otherwise al
lowed in accordance with the State and Federal Con
stitutionally established and protected safeguards
designed to prevent just such occurrences and, the re
sultant financial damages approximating $310,000.00.
110. Further, because of the foregoing actions the De
fendants have deprived Paul of its property without
just compensation and Paul has suffered a denial of its
Constitutional rights, the right to payment for taking
of his property as otherwise allowed in accordance
with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in
other words to he clearly, zero $0.00. dollars and cents,
and the resultant financial damages approximating
$310,000.00.
App. 32
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, Paul requests
the following relief
1. A judgment for monetary damages for the losses
suffered because of the actions of the Defendants in the
violation of Paul’s civil rights and for consequential
damages, in an amount to be determined at trial, and
approximating $310,000.00;
2. Declaratory judgment ordering that the Defend
ants are prohibited from enforcing the settlement
agreement between SCDOT and the Buckles against
Paul as payment of just compensation against or/ to
Paul and, are barred for all time enforcement of the
settlement agreement between SCDOT and Buckles as
payment of just compensation against or/ to Paul;
3. An order of continuing jurisdiction of this Court for
the purposes of enforcing any judgment so ordered;
4. A judgment for monetary damages Actual, Conse
quential and Special damages as a direct and proxi
mate result of All Defendant’s covert and overt acts
and omissions, Plaintiff has been injured for which
SCDOT/ Rucker/ Gresham/ Moore and de Holczer and
Quinn and Ormond are liable, for property and prop
erty rights at 2115 two notch rd $310,000.00 and for
property and property rights at 2318 two notch rd
$528,000.00. Plaintiff would have had his property,
property rights, goodwill, going concern value, liveli
hood and financial health for another twenty years un
til his retirement at age or between ages sixty-two to
sixty-seven;
App. 33
5. A judgment for monetary damages against
SCDOT/ Rucker/ Gresham/ Moore and de Holczer and
Quinn and Ormond for Actual, Consequential and Spe
cial Damages for $838,000.00 Dollars, plus interest
and prejudgment interest;
6. Punitive damages in an amount to be assessed by
the jury as just and proper and in an amount enough
to punish SCDOT/ Rucker/ Gresham/ Moore and de
Holczer and Quinn and Ormond to deter future mis
conduct, for ALL defendants intentional, willful, wan
ton, and reckless covert and overt acts;
7. Grant Plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attor
neys’ fees and other expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988; and,
8. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem ap
propriate.
Jury Trial is demanded.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Signed this 26 day of October 2018, respectfully sub
mitted,
/s/ Ronald I. Paul
Ronald I. Paul
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
Plaintiff, Pro se (803) 414-2305
App. 34
State of South Carolina ) In the Court of Common Pleas
)
Fifth Judicial Circuit
County of Richland
)
2018-CP-40-05641
Ronald I. Paul,
Plaintiff,
vs.
)
)
)
)
South Carolina Department )
of Transportation, et al,
)
Defendants.
August 8, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina
Before:
The Honorable Jocelyn Newman, Judge
Appearances:
Ronald I. Paul,
Pro se Plaintiff
Andrew Lindemann, Esquire,
Michael Quinn, Esquire
J. Charles Ormand, Esquire
Attorneys for the Defendants
Bonnie H. Kelly, CVR
Circuit Court Reporter
[43] attorneys, we was representing such and such peo
ple.” But that’s not the law. So I list it in there that they
can sue that they conspired with State officials or acted
under color of law. And they did both of them. And
App. 35
that’s in the four corners of the complaint. They didn’t
address that.
Next, Your Honor, Defendant South Carolina De
partment of Transportation claim they’s [sic] not a per
son subject to suit under 42 USC 1983. Now, they [sic]
not a person, Your Honor, far as money damages, but —
but derogatory relief — I mean, declaratory relief, they
are a person. Let me explain that, Your Honor.
Because I have no other choice or no other way to
get relief but for derogatory relief -1 mean, declaratory
relief. Now, what take places, Your Honor, every time I
come to court to try to get paid for my property taken
that I wasn’t paid for, here comes South Carolina De
partment of Transportation with this settlement
agreement beating across my head, “The case settled
for just compensation. The case settled for just com
pensation.”
In other words, the settlement between South Car
olina Department of Transportation and the Buckles
apply to you, too. I had nothing to do with it, I knew
nothing about it. It didn’t involve my property. You [44]
didn’t talk to me about it. How does this refer to me?
So that’s why I need declaratory relief on this issue to
stop them from running with that settlement agree
ment that don’t [sic] have nothing to do with me, beat
ing me across the head with it.
Two reasons, Your Honor. It occurs to South Caro
lina Department of Transportation in the order or they
authorized the Defendants to act in such a manner. In
other words, Your Honor, claim and declaring the case
App. 36
had settled for just compensation without my approval
or without my consent. They can’t - they cannot settle
this case with just some text because I was a party, too.
I was a party to it, I have a commercial lease filed. So
they cannot settle this case as a matter of law for just
compensation.
But here go South Carolina Department of Trans
portation with this settle agreement that’s - that have
just a period. They don’t know where it’s at now. Claim
it - it never was one. Beating me across the head with
it. There’s no - case settled for just compensation sub
ject.
That’s why I’m here in State Court, Your Honor, to
get this issue settled that Judge Curry refused to deal
with in Federal Court, refused to take concurrent ju
risdiction over this. And that’s - she put that in her
[45] order, Your Honor. I - I don’t know where it’s at,
but I think probably Mr. Quinn filed it. But if you need
a copy of it, I can - I can -1 can get it to you.
Your Honor, when you look at Exhibit G (as read):
“Judgement zero public index”; Exhibit H, we see an
amount of $154,300. Now, somebody put that I was
paid that. I — I can tell you, Your Honor, I never was
paid that.
Exhibit K (as read): “ - question that’s not relevant
to the claims or defenses raised in - in this litigation.”
That’s in response from South Carolina Department of
Transportation and others when I requested a copy of
the settlement agreement. They said, “It’s not relevant
at this time. We don’t know where it’s at.”
App. 37
Judge Manning’s order, on page 9, which is Exhibit
I (as read): “Plaintiff’s two motions to compel discov
ery, are denied as moot.”
In other words, I can’t have a settlement agree
ment. Ain’t got nothing to do with me, but you beating
me over my head talking about case settlement just
compensation. In other words, you’re saying I don’t
have no rights to any.
What they doing, they take the settlement agree
ment, beat me over the head with, and then say, “Well,
Judge Lloyd awarded you $2,450 from the settlement
agreement.” I mean, I got nothing to do with the settle
ment agreement. [46] I never agreed to this.
That - this is - that is not - Mr. Quinn is - is one
of the best South Carolina - at least I thought he was
- one of the best attorneys when it comes down to end
of - end of demand. But the statement he just got up
and made is incorrect. I got transcripts of record of Mr.
Quinn in - where he got up and said that McDonald’s
was entitled to one million dollars because it was a
good business. Now, I didn’t bring them [sic] tran
scripts with me, but I got them because I didn’t know
they was [sic] going to argue outside the four corners
of the complaint.
Now, this was - for - I went down - I drove down
and got them [sic] records. This was for a lease, a per
son who leased the property. And they have a McDon
ald’s there, and they condemned that property in county. They were gonna open up that road. And Mr.
Quinn argued that McDonald was entitled to one
App. 38
million dollars, and they only was taking a little corner
of the property, blocking access to something or other,
blocking so the person couldn’t make an immediate left
turn. They had to go up make a right turn or something
or other like that. But they didn’t even take the entire
property.
But today, he argued something different.
Now, like I say, Your Honor, I didn’t bring the
transcript of record, but they filed in Federal Court,
and
[55] CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned Bonnie H. Kelly, previously an
Official Court Reporter for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of
the State of South Carolina, do hereby certify that the
foregoing is a true, accurate transcript of record of all
the proceedings had and evidence introduced in the
hearing of the captioned cause, relative to appeal, in
the Circuit Court for Richland County, South Carolina,
on the 15th day of January, 2020.
App. 39
I do further certify that I am neither of kin, coun
sel, nor interest in any party hereto.
e/Bonnie H. Kelly. CVR
Bonnie H. Kelly, CVR
Court Reporter
Columbia, South Carolina
October 25, 2020
App. 40
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) IN THE COURT
)
OF COMMON
COUNTY OF RICHLAND
)
PLEAS
RONALD I. PAUL
) FIFTH JUDICIAL
)
CIRCUIT
Plaintiff,
)
Vs.
)
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPART- )
)
MENT OF TRANSPORTA
TIONS; PAUL D. DE HOLCZER, )
individually and as a partner of )
the law firm of Moses, Koon & )
Brackett, PC; MICHAEL H.
)
QUINN, individually and as
)
)
senior lawyer of Quinn Law
)
Finn, LLC; J. CHARLES
ORMOND, JR., individually
)
and as partner of the Law Firm )
)
of Holler, Dennis, Corbett,
)
Ormond, Plante & Gamer;
OSCAR K. RUCKER, in his
)
individual capacity as Director, )
Rights of Way South Carolina )
Department of Transportation; )
MACIE M. GRESHAM, in her )
individual capacity as Eastern )
Region Right of Way Program )
)
Manager South Carolina
Department of Transportation; )
NATALIE J. MOORE, in her )
individual capacity as Assistant)
Chief Counsel, South Carolina )
Department of Transportation. )
Defendants.
)
CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO.
2018-CP-400-5641
NOTICE OF
MOTION AND
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA
TION PURSUANT
TO SCRCP 59(e)
App. 41
TO: DEFENDANTS SOUTH CAROLINA DEPART
MENT OF TRANSPORTATIONS; PAUL D. DE
HOLCZER; NATALIE J. MOORE; MICHAEL H.
QUINN AND J. CHARLES ORMOND.
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the
Plaintiff, will move before the Presiding Judge of this
Honorable Court of Common Pleas for Richland
County at the Richland County Courthouse, Columbia,
South Carolina, at such time and
1983 includes private individuals, the term “per
son” in § 1983 includes private individuals and corpo
rations acting under color of law, Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and local governmental
entities and natural persons such as state, county, and
municipal officials, Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
During the hearing on August 8,2019, Plaintiff be
lieve Defendant Quinn appeared to argue the merits
and make arguments outside of the four corners of the
Complaint filed on October 26, 2018, that conflicted
with arguments he made before The Honorable Ed
ward B. Cottingham (Exhibit B and C).
EXCEPTION TO ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY
Defendant SCDOT claimed that SCDOT is not a
“person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff concedes that SCDOT is not a “person”
App. 42
amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary
damages. Plaintiff argues, however, that for purposes
of declaratory relief, his claim may proceed despite the
Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity because
he is seeking declaratory relief a declaration relating
to the future performance of official duties. See Ex
parte Young. 209 U. S. 123 (1908) (recognizing excep
tion to immunity where plaintiff seeks prospective
relief against a state official in his official capacity to
prevent future violations). In addition, Under the Uni
form Declaratory Judgments Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1553-30; Rule 57, SCRCP. “Any person . whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute
. may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising, under the . statute . and obtain a dec
laration of rights, status or other legal relations there
under.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-30 (1976). This case
presented a justiciable controversy. See Graham v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 319 S.C. 69,459 S.E.2d
844 (1995) (justiciable controversy exists when a con
crete issue is present, there is a definite assertion of
legal rights and a positive legal duty which is denied
by the adverse party).
In other words, Plaintiff’s Complaint ask the court
to “declare” a number of facts and legal conclusions to
be true or false, sufficient to convert, the claim to one
for declaratory relief; see Complaint pages 24-25.
Declaratory relief is the only remedy Plaintiff
have against SCDOT. Plaintiff have standing to pursue
declaratory relief against SCOOT. (See exhibits G, H,
K and I page 9 attached to Plaintiff’s Combined
App. 43
Memorandum and Amended Memorandum in opposi
tion to all Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss filed on Feb
ruary 11 and April 5, 2019) because Paul seeks only
declaratory relief to end the ongoing violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the provision known as the Takings Clause, which
states that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation by state officials,
there is no danger that the issuance of an declaratory
relief or a declaration would disturb State sovereignty.
See Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275,
292 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does
not preclude private individuals from bringing suit
against State officials for declaratory relief designed to
remedy ongoing violations of federal law.”).
The Supreme Court has stated that “the question
of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have
the court decide the merits of the dispute or of partic
ular issues.” Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
The standing “inquiry involves both constitutional lim
itations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential
limitations on its exercise.” Id. The constitutional as
pects of standing “import[] justiciability: whether the
plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between
himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art.
III.” Id. (citations omitted). Consequently, “at an irre
ducible minimum, Art. Ill requires the party who in
vokes the court’s authority to ‘show that he personally
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a re
sult of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,’
and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the
App. 44
challenged action’ and ‘is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.’” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Am. ’s United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff disagree and object to Defendant Quinn
Statement of the Facts; Defendants Ormond, SCDOT,
De holczer and Moore backgrounds that are mislead
ing, to the extent they include factual inaccuracies,
contested factual matter and arguments.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court Order
Granting defendants Motions to Dismiss filed on No
vember 13, 2019 should be vacated/reversed and an
order enter denying defendants Motions to Dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ronald I. Paul
Ronald I. Paul
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
Plaintiff, Pro se (803) 414-2305
Columbia, South Carolina
November 25, 2019
App. 45
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals
APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
THE HONORABLE JOCELYN NEWMAN
Circuit Court Judge
Fifth Judicial Circuit
Appellate Case No. 2019-002076
CASE NO: 2018-CP-400-5641
RONALD I. PAUL
Appellant,
V.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR
TATION; PAUL D. DE HOLCZER, individually and as
a partner of the law Finn of Moses, Koon & Brackett,
PC; MICHAEL H. QUINN, individually and as senior
lawyer of Quinn Law Finn, LLC; J. CHARLES OR
MOND, JR., individually and as a partner of the Law
Firm of Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante &
Garner; OSCAR K. RUCKER, in his individual capac
ity as, Director Rights of Way South Carolina Depart
ment of Transportation; MACIE M. GRESHAM, in her
individual capacity as Eastern Region Right of Way
Program Manager South Carolina Department of
Transportation; NATALIE J. MOORE, in her individ
ual capacity as assistant chief counsel South Carolina
Department of Transportation
Respondents.
App. 46
FINAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Ronald I. Paul
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, S.C. 29240
Appellant, Pro Se litigant
(803) 414-2305
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.
Did the Court erred in dismissing the complaint in
its entirely and dismissing SCDOT as an improper
party that contained a State Law claim; action for
declaratory judgment under South Carolina code
section 28-2-10, et seq and 28-2-40, Compromise or
settlement permit, that included all Respondents
SCDOT, Rucker, Gresham, Moore, de Holczer
Quinn and Ormond?
II. Did the Court err in ruling that, as a matter of law,
that the applicable statute of limitations is three
years and dismissing with prejudice?
III. Did the Court err in dismissing case number 2018CP-4011.5641 as a new limitations period is cre
ated with each overt act in furtherance of the con
spiracy, and the statute of limitations begins to
run on the date of the last overt act?
IV. Did the Court erred in granting Respondents mo
tion to dismiss citing res judicata (claim preclu
sion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)
where the united states District Court of South
App. 47
Carolina dismissed the previous cases without
prejudice, is inconsistent with years of United
States Supreme Court and other appellate Court
precedents, and therefore erroneously found that
Appellant’s federal claims were dismissed on the
merits in federal court and not because of any cor
rectable pleading deficiency?
V.
Did the Court erred in granting Respondent’s
Quinn and Ormond motion to dismiss when the
complaint had stated facts to support the Sections
1983 civil conspiracy claim and that they were
state actors, and compounded the error by relying
upon, and unpublished opinion with no preceden
tial value?
VI. Did the Court err in dismissing the Complaint
with prejudice and without an opportunity to re
plead or amend, in this post- Knick world?
ARGUMENTS
I The Court erred in dismissing the complaint
in its entirely and dismissing SCDOT as an im
proper party that contained a State Law claim ;
action for declaratory judgment under South
Carolina code section 28-2-10, et seq and 28-2-40,
Compromise or settlement permit, that included
all Respondents SCDOT, Rucker, Gresham,
Moore, de Holczer Quinn and Ormond.
The Appellant brought a declaratory judgment ac
tion against SCDOT and all the other Respondents
seeking, inter alia, a declaration. (R 55) On pages
24-25, paragraphs 101-106 Appellant’s identify the
App. 48
federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure).1 (R 55-56)
As a basis for the relief sought, the power to issue
a declaratory judgment pursuant to those statutes and
rule are discretionary, as the declaratory relief sought
would—in and of itself—serve a useful purpose in
clarifying the parties’ legal relations.2 (R 55, 434 lines
7-25, 435 lines 1-25, 436 lines 1-25)
The declaratory relief sought was—in fact—a
State Law claim or action under South Carolina code
section 28-2-10, et seq and 28-2-40 Compromise or set
tlement permit; South Carolina code section 15-53-10,
et seq and Rule 57 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure.3 (R 55, 432 lines 17-25, 433 lines 1-7)
1 The district court had declined to exercise supplemental ju
risdiction over the state law claim, dismissing it without preju
dice, (R. 432 lines 17-25, 433 lines 1-7,183)
2 Even though this action is substantively brought under fed
eral law, namely 42 U.S.C 1983 civil conspiracy, the procedural
aspects of the case are governed by the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure See. Norton v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.. 350
S.C. 473, 567 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2002) (federal claim brought in
state court is controlled by federal substantive law and state pro
cedural law”) Therefore, SCRCP 57, is applicable to this case. This
is the same as the language of Federal Rule 57 except that the
appropriate State Code references are substituted for the Federal
statute.
3 Greer v. McFadden. 295 S.C. 14, 17, 366 S.E.2d 263, 265
(Ct. App. 1988) (holding even if a pro se claim is not framed with
expert precision, where the point is clear, the issue should be ad
dressed)
App. 49
THE COURT:
Why did you choose to do
that?
(R 432 line 17)
MR. PAUL: Your Honor, when I was filing in
Federal Court, Judge Curry had - wouldn’t
take concurrent jurisdiction and it’s in one of
her orders. She refused to take concurrent ju
risdiction over the settlement agreement. She
called it a “contract-based claim,” that, you
know, from my understanding, that you need
-to settle that in State Court. I’m not - I’m not
going to deal with the settlement agreement.
You need to deal with that in State Court; but
she didn’t say them [sic] exact words, but she
put it in her order say that it’s a contract State
based claim and she refused to take concur
rent jurisdiction.
She - she didn’t use them [sic] exact
words, but basically, that’s what she said. And
that’s why I’m here in the State Court.
(R 432 lines 18-25, 433 lines 1-7)
Therefore, in case 4800 (2002-CP-400-4800 Emi
nent Domain case hereinafter referred to as “case
4800”). On or about February - March 23,2004 Quinn,
Buckles, SCDOT, Rucker, Gresham, Moore and de
Holczer agreed to a settlement between them. (R 266,
305 lines 13-15)
In that all Respondents, including Ormond took a
position claiming and declaring case 4800 had settled
for just compensation. This was an intentionally false
App. 50
statement, because all Respondents knew without
Paul’s consent or approval, as a matter of law, Re
spondents could not settle the case for just compensa
tion. (R 55-59, 434 lines 7-25, 435 lines 7-25, 436 lines
1-25)
Now, as set forth above, there exists an actual con
troversy between Appellant and Respondents as to
whether the settlement agreement in case 4800 be
tween SCDOT and the Buckles applied equally to Paul,
as just compensation. (R 55, 305)
Therefore, Appellant seek declaratory relief and a
judicial determination pursuant to: (R 55-56, 305 lines
13-21)
ft
Section 28-2-10, et seq and 28-2-40. Compromise or set
tlement permit. At any time before or after commence
ment of an action, the parties may agree to and carry
out, according to its terms, a compromise or settlement
as to any matter, including all or any part of the com
pensation or other relief and, South Carolina code sec
tion 15-53-10, et seq and Rule 57 of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) That Respondents are prohibited / barred
from enforcing the settlement agreement be
tween SCDOT and the Buckles as payment of
just compensation against or/ to Paul, because
the evidence shows Paul never agree to any
settlement;
(b) That Respondents are prohibited / barred for
all time enforcement of the settlement agree
ment between SCDOT and Buckles as pay
ment ofjust compensation against or/ to Paul,
App. 51
because Paul was not a party to any settle
ment negotiations;
(c) That Respondents are prohibited / barred for
all time enforcement of the settlement agree
ment between SCDOT and Buckles as pay
ment of just compensation against or/ to Paul,
because Paul did not sign the consent order to
settle the case;
(d) That Respondents are prohibited / barred for
all time enforcement of the settlement agree
ment between SCDOT and Buckles as pay
ment of just compensation against or/ to Paul,
because the settlement did not include an ap
praisal of Paul property (highest and best use).
“In South Carolina jurisprudence, settlement
agreements are viewed as contracts.” Harris-Jenkins v.
Nissan Car Mart, Inc., 348 S.C. 171, 177, 557 S.E.2d
708, 711 (Ct.App. 2001);Pee Dee Stores, Inc. v. Doyle,
381 S.C. 234, 241, 672 S.E.2d 799, 802 (Ct. App. 2009)
Because of the foregoing Paul has suffered a de
nial of its Constitutional rights, the right to payment
for taking of his property as otherwise allowed in ac
cordance with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend
ment, in other words to be clearly, zero $0.00. dollars
and cents, (R 248-249) and the resultant financial dam
ages approximating $310,000.00. (R 56-57)
The Court concluded that the “Defendant SCDOT
is not a “person” or proper party not just for money
damages claims but also for claims seeking injunctive
or prospective relief. Thus, the Defendant SCDOT is
dismissed on this additional basis”. (R 25) However,
App. 52
count one for declaratory judgment, is a State Law
claim or action that includes SCDOT to resolve an ac
tual controversy. (R 65, 434 line 7- p 436 line 25) See
McCall v. Batson. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985)
Lastly, in count one, Respondents statute of limi
tations argument is without merit, as “statutes of lim
itations are not controlling measures of equitable
relief.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht. 327 U.S. 392, 396, 66
S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) In count one, equi
table relief is all that Appellant has sought. (R 55 #105
(a) (b), 56 (c) (d)
As of today, Respondents have not filed an
swers to the Appellant’s Complaint to this action.
(R 261-262, 265)
CONCLUSION
For these reasons stated, this court should reverse
the judgments orders of the circuit court; reversal and
remand for further proceedings are warranted.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ronald I. Paul
Ronald I. Paul
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
Appellant, Pro se (803) 414-2305
Columbia, South Carolina
January 19, 2021
App. 53
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals
APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
THE HONORABLE JOCELYN NEWMAN
Circuit Court Judge
Fifth Judicial Circuit
Appellate Case No. 2019-002076
CASE NO: 2018-CP-400-5641
RONALD I. PAUL
Appellant,
V.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR
TATION; PAUL D. DE HOLCZER, individually and as
a partner of the law Finn of Moses, Koon & Brackett,
PC; MICHAEL H. QUINN, individually and as senior
lawyer of Quinn Law Finn, LLC; J. CHARLES OR
MOND, JR., individually and as a partner of the Law
Firm of Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante &
Garner; OSCAR K. RUCKER, in his individual capac
ity as, Director Rights of Way South Carolina Depart
ment of Transportation; MACIE M. GRESHAM, in her
individual capacity as Eastern Region Right of Way
Program Manager South Carolina Department of
Transportation; NATALIE J. MOORE, in her individ
ual capacity as assistant chief counsel South Carolina
Department of Transportation
Respondents.
App. 54
AMENDED
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Appellant Ronald I Paul of Richland County,
has petitioned this Court for a rehearing of the recent
decision in Paul v. SCDOT, Op. No. 2022-UP-051 (S.C.
Ct. App. filed February 9,2022). Appellant respectfully
submits that the following points were overlooked or
misapprehended and not address by this Court:
I
Issue one
It appears this Court overlooked or misap
prehended and did not address—in count one—
equitable relief—is all that Appellant has sought.
Therefore, respondent’s statute of limitations ar
gument is without merit, as “statutes of limita
tions are not controlling measures of equitable
relief.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht. 327 U.S. 392,396,
66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946)
See (Br. of Appellant p.16) then go to (R 434 lines 1325) and (R. 435 lines 1-25) then go to (R 55-56) then go
to (R 57 prayer for relief #2Y
1 Under the doctrine of Ex pate Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
a plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive and declaratory relief
to address an ongoing or continuing violation of federal law or a
threat of a violation of federal law in the future. See In re Deposit
App. 55
The Court overlooked that, “traditionally and for
good reasons, statutes of limitation are not controlling
measures of equitable relief. Such statutes have been
drawn upon by equity solely for the light they may
shed in determining that which is decisive for the
chancellor’s intervention, namely, whether the plain
tiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so as to make a
decree against the defendant unfair”. Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90
L.Ed. 743 (1946); See Russell v. Todd, supra, 309 U.S.
[280] at page 289, 80 S.Ct. [527] at page 532, 84 L.Ed.
754 [ (1940)]; Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704
F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1983)
Appellant has not slept on his rights so as to make
a decree against the defendant unfair,” therefore, a
statute of limitations defense may not be considered.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 892, 396 (1946). In
Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007); Ward v. Thomas,
207 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2000); See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269-78, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d
438 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); id. at 291-96, 117 S.Ct. 2028
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68-70,
106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 66368, 94 S.Ct. 1347; In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 411
F.3d 367, 372 (2d Cir.2005). See generally 17 Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4231 (2d ed. 1988 Supp. 2005); Suffice it to say that
the doctrine remains a land-mark of American constitutional ju
risprudence that operates to end ongoing violations of federal law
and vindicate the overriding “federal interest in assuring the su
premacy of that law.” Green, 474 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 423; see
Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06,
104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
App. 56
this case, however, there is no suggestion Appellant de
layed seeking relief.
If the Complaint was unclear, Respondents should
have requested clarification and Appellant would have
clarified and Amended his Complaint if necessary.2
Here, the circuit court erred in effectively preventing
Appellant from litigating a post-ruling motion to
amend by immediately dismissing the claims “with
prejudice.” Skydive Myrtle Beach. Inc, v. Horry Cntv.
426 S.C. 175 (S.C. 2019) • 826 S.E.2d 585 (Decided Mar
13, 2019).
This area intentionally left blank.
tribunal is generally bound to apply the law in effect
at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so
would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory
or legislative history to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, Appellant re
spectfully requests that the Court rehear its decision
2 Greer v. McFadden. 295 S.C. 14, 17, 366 S.E.2d 263, 265
(Ct. App. 1988) (holding even if a pro se claim is not framed with
expert precision, where the point is clear, the issue should be ad
dressed); Additionally, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardue, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
App. 57
in this case and reverse the decision of the trial court
and remand for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ronald I. Paul
Ronald I. Paul
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
Appellant, Pro se (803) 414-2305
Columbia, South Carolina
February 22, 2022
App. 58
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
THE HONORABLE JOCELYN NEWMAN
Circuit Court Judge
Fifth Judicial Circuit
Appellate Case No. 2019-002076
CASE NO: 2018-CP-400-5641
RONALD I. PAUL
Petitioner,
V.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR
TATION; PAUL D. DE HOLCZER, individually and as
a partner of the law Finn of Moses, Koon & Brackett,
PC; MICHAEL H. QUINN, individually and as senior
lawyer of Quinn Law Finn, LLC; J. CHARLES OR
MOND, JR., individually and as a partner of the Law
Firm of Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante &
Garner; OSCAR K. RUCKER, in his individual capac
ity as, Director Rights of Way South Carolina Depart
ment of Transportation; MACIE M. GRESHAM, in her
individual capacity as Eastern Region Right of Way
Program Manager South Carolina Department of
Transportation; NATALIE J. MOORE, in her individ
ual capacity as assistant chief counsel South Carolina
Department of Transportation
Respondents.
App. 59
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Ronald I. Paul
Post Office Box 4368
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
Petitioner, Pro se (803) 414-2306
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
Pro Se Petitioner certifies that his Petition for Re
hearing was made and finally ruled on by the South
Carolina Court of Appeals on March 18, 2022.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Did the Court of Appeals erred in failing to con
sider or address that—count one—is a state law
claim for equitable relief, in part under the doc
trine of Ex parts Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), seek
ing prospective declaratory relief to address an
ongoing or continuing violation of federal law in
the future only “therefore” respondent’s statute of
limitations argument is without merit, as “stat
utes of limitations are not controlling measures of
equitable relief.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht. 327 U.S.
892, 396, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946)?
a. Did the Courts erred in dismissing the Com
plaint with prejudice and without an opportunity
to replead or amend?
App. 60
II. Did the Court of Appeals erred in failing to deter
mine whether “clearly established” precedent in
Est. of Mims v. S.C. Dep’t of Disabilities & Special
Needs. 422 S.C. 388, 399, 811 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Ct.
App. 2018) certiorari denied August 3, 2018,
read in conjunction with the statute containing a
provision allowing for an extension of the limita
tions period in S.C. Code Ann. §15-3-530(5) to be
‘extended’ by a maximum of twenty years S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-3.520(b)?
III. Did the Court of Appeals erred in failing to deter
mine whether a new limitations period is created
with each overt act in furtherance of a civil con
spiracy claim brought under federal section 42
USC 1983 overt acts that injures Paul, and the
statute of limitations begins to run on the date of
the last overt act?
a. Did the Courts erred in dismissing the Com
plaint with prejudice and without an opportunity
to replead or amend?
IV. Did the Court of Appeals erred in failing to con
sider or address whether Knick v. Township of
Scott. 588 U.S., 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2119) applied ret
roactively in this case under South Carolina com
mon law tolling and rules, extending (equitable
tolling) the start of the limitations period until the
day the United States Supreme Court issued the
opinion, on June 21, 2019?
App. 61
ARGUMENTS
I
ISSUE ONE
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to con
sider or address that—count one—is a state law
claim for equitable relief, in part under the doc
trine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), seek
ing prospective declaratory relief to address an
ongoing or continuing violation of federal law in
the future only “therefore respondent’s statute
of limitations argument is without merit, as ‘stat
utes of limitations are not controlling measures
of equitable relief.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht. 327
U.S. 392, 396, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946)
On or about February - March 23, 2004, Quinn,
Buckles, SCDOT, Rucker, Gresham, Moore and de
Holczer agreed to a settlement between them, Paul
was not a party to this settlement.1 (R 266) then go to
Judge Barber order (R 81-83) This settlement was un
der section 28-2-40. “Compromise or settlement per
mit. At any time before or after commencement of an
action, the parties may agree to and carry out, ac
cording to its terms, a compromise or settlement as to
1 However, Paul was a party in the lawsuit, because on
October 21, 2002, SCDOT, Oscar K, Rucker, Macie M. Gresham,
Natalie J. Moore and Paul D. de Holczer filed an Amended Con
demnation Notice against Paul. On or about October 28, 2003, the
state official (NOT THE BUCKLES) terminated Paul’s commer
cial lease a sealed instrument, without payment of just compen
sation to Paul, in other words to be clearly, zero $0.00. dollars and
cents. (R 39, 248-249)
App. 62
any matter, including all or any part of the compensa
tion or other relief”. (R 71)
Subsequently, all Respondents, including Ormond
took a position claiming and declaring eminent domain
case # 2002-CP-400-4800 (hereinafter referred to as
case 4800) had settled for just compensation. This was
an intentionally false statement, because all Respon
dents knew without Paul’s consent or approval, as a
matter of law, Respondents could not settle the case for
just compensation. See (Br. of Appellant p.16) then go
to (R 434 lines 13-25) and (R 435 lines 1-25) then go to
(R 55-56) then go to (R 57 prayer for relief #2)
FACTS
As of today, there exists an actual controversy be
tween Petitioner and Respondents as to whether the
settlement agreement in case 4800 between SCDOT
and the Buckles applied equally to Paul, as just com
pensation.2 (R 55)
2 Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
a plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive and declaratory relief
to address an ongoing or continuing violation of federal law or a
threat of a violation of federal law in the future. See In re Deposit
Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007); Ward v. Thomas,
207 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2000); See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269-78,117 S.Ct. 2028,138 L.Ed.2d
438 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); id. at 291-96, 117 S.Ct. 2028
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68-70,
106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 66368, 94 S.Ct. 1347; In re Dairy Mart Convenience States, Inc., 411
F.3d 367, 372 (2d Cir.2005). See generally 17 Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
App. 63
LAW AND ARGUMENT
The Court overlooked that “traditionally and for
good reasons, statutes of limitation are not controlling
measures of equitable relief. Such statutes have been
drawn upon by equity solely for the light they may
shed in determining that which is decisive for the
chancellor’s intervention, namely, whether the plain
tiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so as to make a
decree against the defendant unfair”. Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90
L.Ed. 743 (1946); See Russell v. Todd, supra, 309 U.S.
[280] at page 289, 60 S.Ct. [527] at page 532, 84 L.Ed.
754 [ (1940)]; Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704
F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1983)
Petitioner has not slept on his rights so as to make
a decree against the defendant unfair,” therefore, a
statute of limitations defense may not be considered.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). In
this case, however, there is no suggestion Petitioner de
layed seeking relief, in fact, the Record on Appeal
shows, and it cannot be disputed that Paul has been
pursuing his rights diligently to this present date and
extraordinary circumstance (R 55-56) stood in his way
[Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (U.S. 2005)].
Procedure § 4231 (2d ed. 1988 Supp. 2005); Suffice it to say that
the doctrine remains a land-mark of American constitutional ju
risprudence that operates to end ongoing violations of federal law
and vindicate the overriding “federal interest in assuring the
supremacy of that law.” Green, 474 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 423; see
Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06,
104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984),
App. 64
a. The Courts erred in dismissing the Complaint
with prejudice and without an opportunity to replead
or amend.
If the Complaint was unclear, Respondents should
have requested clarification and Petitioner would have
clarified and Amended his Complaint if necessary.3
Here, the courts erred in effectively preventing Peti
tioner from litigating a post-ruling motion to amend by
immediately dismissing the claims “with prejudice.”
Skydive Myrtle Beach. Inc, v. Horrv Cntv. 426 S.C. 175
(S.C. 2019) • 826 S.E.2d 585 (Decided Mar 13, 2019).
begins from the day the United States Supreme Court
issued the opinion, on June 21, 2019. An appellate
court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders
its decision, Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of
Durham. 393 U.S. 268,89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474
(1969); The United States Supreme Court stated “[t]he
general rule ... is that an appellate court must apply
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision” (id.
at 281,89 S.Ct. 518); Bradley v. School Board of City of
Richmond. 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974), “[a] court or ad
ministrative tribunal is generally bound ‘to apply the
law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless
3 Greer v. McFadden. 295 S.C. 14, 17, 366 S.E.2d 263, 265
(Ct. App. 1988) (holding even if a pro se claim is not framed with
expert precision, where the point is clear, the issue should be ad
dressed); Additionally, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
App. 65
doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is
statutory or legislative history to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Petitioner
Ronald I. Paul respectfully requests that this Court
grant his petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ronald I. Paul
Ronald I. Paul
Post Office Box 4353
Columbia, South Carolina 29240
Petitioner, Pro se (803) 414-2305
Columbia, South Carolina
April 14, 2022
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.