Opposition to motion of Senate Appellants, et al. — Thomas C. Alexander, in His Official Capacity as President of the South Carolina Senate, et al., Appellants v. The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al.

No. 22-807

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

THOMAS C. ALEXANDER, ET AL.,

Appellants,

v.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE

OF THE NAACP, ET AL.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of South Carolina

BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION TO AFFIRM

WILLIAM W. WILKINS

JOHN M. GORE

ANDREW A. MATHIAS

Counsel of Record

MAYNARD NEXSEN PC

JOSEPH P. FALVEY

104 S. Main Street, Suite 900 JOSHUA S. HA

JONES DAY

Greenville, SC 29601

51 Louisiana Ave., N.W.

MARK C. MOORE

Washington, DC 20001

HAMILTON B. BARBER

(202) 879-3939

MICHAEL A. PARENTE

jmgore@jonesday.com

MAYNARD NEXSEN PC

1230 Main Street, Suite 700 ROBERT E. TYSON, JR.

VORDMAN CARLISLE

Columbia, SC 29201

TRAYWICK, III

Counsel for House Appellants ROBINSON GRAY STEPP

& LAFFITTE, LLC

Post Office Box 11449 (29211)

Columbia, SC 29201

Counsel for Senate Appellants

(counsel continued on inside cover)

(continued from front cover)

M. ELIZABETH CRUM

MICHAEL R. BURCHSTEAD

BURR & FORMAN LLP

Post Office Box 11390

Columbia, SC 29211

Counsel for State Election

Commission Appellants

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 3

I.

The Panel Failed To Apply The

Presumption Of Good Faith ............................... 3

II.

The Panel Disregarded The

Alternative-Map Requirement........................... 5

III. The Panel Failed To Disentangle

Race From Politics.............................................. 7

IV. The Panel Misconstrued The

Predominance Standard .................................... 8

V.

The Panel Clearly Erred In

Finding Racial Predominance............................ 9

VI. The Panel Failed To Enforce The

Discriminatory Effect Element ........................ 12

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Abbott v. Perez,

138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) ........................................ 3–5

Ala. Legislature Black Caucus v. Alabama,

575 U.S. 254 (2015) ................................................ 4

Backus v. South Carolina

568 U.S. 801 (2012) ............................................ 1–2

Backus v. South Carolina,

857 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D.S.C. 2012)......................... 1

Baumgartner v. United States,

322 U.S. 665 (1944) ................................................ 9

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,

580 U.S. 178 (2017) ............................................ 3–4

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) ........................................ 3–4

Brumfield v. Cain,

576 U.S. 305 (2015) .............................................. 11

City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l

Advert. of Austin,

142 S. Ct. 1464 (2022) .......................................... 10

Colleton Cnty. Council v. McConnell,

201 F. Supp. 2d 618 (D.S.C. 2002)......................... 8

Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal. v. Constr.

Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal.,

508 U.S. 602 (1993) ................................................ 9

Cooper v. Harris,

581 U.S. 285 (2017) .................................. 1, 4–7, 11

iii

Cox v. Larios,

542 U.S. 947 (2004) ................................................ 2

Diaz v. Silver,

978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ........................... 3

Easley v. Cromartie,

532 U.S. 234 (2001) .............................. 2, 5–6, 8–10

Fletcher v. Lamone,

567 U.S. 930 (2012) ................................................ 2

Hunter v. Underwood,

471 U.S. 222 (1985) ................................................ 4

Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist.,

319 U.S. 415 (1943) .............................................. 10

Meadows v. Moon,

952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997) ........................ 3

Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900 (1995) ................................................ 3

Sonoco Prod. Co. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue,

378 S.C. 385 (2008) ................................................ 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court

Practice (11th ed. 2019) ......................................... 2

1

INTRODUCTION

Appellees’ motion only confirms that this Court

should note probable jurisdiction and reverse by

January 1, 2024.1

In 2012, a three-judge panel upheld the Benchmark

Plan against racial gerrymandering challenges not

based on compliance with the Voting Rights Act, but

because the General Assembly affirmatively

“disprove[d] that race was the predominant factor”

and “demonstrat[ed] that [its] decisions adhered to

traditional race-neutral principles.” Backus v. South

Carolina, 857 F. Supp. 2d 553, 560 (D.S.C. 2012). This

Court summarily affirmed. 568 U.S. 801 (2012).

Thus, Appellees—like the panel—falter at the outset

by claiming that the Benchmark Plan “intentionally

concentrated Black voters … to comply with …

Section 5.” Mot.33; see App.19a-20a, 27a.

In 2022, the General Assembly “start[ed] with the

[Benchmark Plan]” and “chang[ed]” district lines

“only as needed to comply with the one-person, onevote mandate and to achieve other desired ends.”

Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 338 (2017) (Alito, J.,

concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in

part). Those ends included “creat[ing] a stronger

Republican tilt” in District 1. App.21a. The resulting

Enacted Plan preserves more of the cores of every

district (including 92.78% of District 1’s core) than

every other plan presented at trial; retains the

Charleston County split; increases District 1’s

Republican vote share by 1.36 percentage points (from

1 Appellees agree that expedited consideration is warranted.

Mot.3 n.1.

2

53.03% to 54.39%); and results in a 0.16 percentagepoint increase in District 1’s black voting-age

population (BVAP) (from 16.56% to 16.72%). J.S.3-4,

25, 28-29. These facts alone demonstrate that the

panel legally erred in concluding that District 1 is a

racial gerrymander.

Appellees never mention these facts or explain

away the panel’s myriad legal errors. Appellees also

never explain why the General Assembly would use a

(nonexistent) racial target as a proxy for politics when

it could and did use election data directly for politics.

J.S.5, 32; see States Br.4-5, 10-13. Neither do they

justify the panel’s view that purported racial effects

prove a racial target. J.S.3-5, 14; see States Br.17-21.

Rather than defending the reasoning below, Appellees

resort to smoke-and-mirrors, demanding deference to

nonexistent credibility determinations, misconstruing

the record, citing defective analyses by putative

experts who admittedly did not opine on the General

Assembly’s intent, and invoking evidence that even

the panel “did not rely upon.” Easley v. Cromartie

(Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 250 (2001).

The Court should deny Appellees’ request for

summary affirmance. Appellees have not made the

demanding showing that the panel’s decision is so

“clearly correct” that “oral argument and further

briefing would be a waste of time.”

Stern &

Gressman, Supreme Court Practice chs. 4.27(A), 5.18

(11th ed. 2019); see Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 951

(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Appellees identify no

case in the past quarter century that summarily

affirmed a predominance finding, see Backus, 568 U.S.

801 (affirming in state’s favor); Fletcher v. Lamone,

567 U.S. 930 (2012) (same), and no case at all that did

3

so absent extensive “direct” evidence of racial

predominance, Meadows v. Moon, 952 F. Supp. 1141,

1146-47 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997); Diaz v.

Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 117-19 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 522

U.S. 801 (1997). See Mot.3. If anything, the panel’s

obvious errors warrant summary reversal. J.S.13-37.

At minimum, the Court should note probable

jurisdiction, set this case for argument, and reverse.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Panel Failed To Apply The Presumption

Of Good Faith.

Each of the panel’s failures to apply the

presumption of “good faith,” Miller v. Johnson, 515

U.S. 900, 915 (1995), analyze District 1 “as a whole,”

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S.

178, 192 (2017), and examine the intent of the General

Assembly “as a whole,” Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l

Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2349-50 (2021),

independently warrants reversal, Abbott v. Perez, 138

S. Ct. 2305, 2326 (2018); J.S.14-17.

Appellees acknowledge “the panel did not use the

term ‘good faith,’” but nonetheless contend that it

must have presumed good faith because it “rejected

[their] racial gerrymandering challenges outside of

Charleston County.” Mot.32-33. But those rejections

reflect the weakness of Appellees’ case, not any

adherence to the presumption. Indeed, Appellees

relied on the same inadequate putative expert

evidence to support all their claims. This Court

should not affirm just because a broken clock is right

twice a day.

Moreover, Appellees are wrong that the

presumption “only forbids flipping the evidentiary

4

burden,” Mot.33 (cleaned up), because any lowering of

a plaintiff’s burden is legal error, see Abbott, 138 S. Ct.

at 2324-25. Regardless, the panel did flip the burden

by disregarding direct evidence of partisan motivation

and equating the purported racial effect of partisan

line-drawing with racial predominance. J.S.13-35;

States Br.9-10. That was not a failure to use “magic

words,” Mot.32, but to follow the Court’s precedents,

J.S.14-17.

Appellees next argue that the panel analyzed

District 1 holistically because it rejected challenges in

Jasper and Dorchester Counties. Mot.30-31. But

upholding two of the three challenged counties in

District 1 underscores that District 1 “as a whole” was

not gerrymandered. Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 192.

And the panel nowhere mentioned other facts

demonstrating that politics more readily explains

District 1 as a whole than race, such as that the

change in District 1’s political composition dwarfs the

change in its BVAP. J.S.17-25, 31-35.

Finally, Appellees suggest that, instead of

analyzing the intent of a legislature holistically, a

factfinder can just consider the intent of some subset

of legislators and staff. Mot.31. But plaintiffs must

“prove that the … Legislature acted in bad faith and

engaged in intentional discrimination,” Abbott, 138 S.

Ct. at 2327 (emphasis added), “as a whole,” Brnovich,

141 S. Ct. at 2349-50. And courts avoid invalidating

a statute “on the basis of what fewer than a handful

of [legislators] said about it.” Hunter v. Underwood,

471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985).

Anyway, both cases Appellees cite—Cooper and

Alabama Legislature Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575

5

U.S. 254 (2015)—involved direct evidence, such as

legislator admissions, that race predominated. No

such direct evidence exists here. Rather, “[t]he only

direct evidence” demonstrated that the General

Assembly’s “intent was” partisan and “legitimate.”

Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2327; J.S.9-11, 21. The panel

ignored that evidence, and the Court should reverse.

II. The Panel Disregarded The Alternative-Map

Requirement.

The panel further erred by relieving Appellees of

the alternative-map requirement. J.S.17-20.

Appellees contend that Cooper disposed of that

requirement. Mot.33-34. Not so. The Cooper majority

did not require an alternative map because that case

was “most unlike Cromartie II.” 581 U.S. at 322.

Indeed, unlike Cromartie II and this case, Cooper

involved direct evidence of racial predominance: two

legislators “publicly stated that racial considerations

lay behind District 12’s augmented BVAP.” Id. at 310.

But the Cooper majority reiterated that, in cases like

this one with “meager direct evidence of a racial

gerrymander,” “only” an alternative plan can “carry

the day” and satisfy the plaintiff’s burden. Id. at 322.

And the Cooper dissenters (correctly) stated that the

alternative-map requirement abides in all but the

most “exceptional” cases. Id. at 335 (Alito, J.,

concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in

part).

Appellees newly claim they presented alternative

plans that “maintained CD1’s Republican advantage

without artificially freezing its BVAP at 17%.”

Mot.34; id. at 17 n.11. Even if true, that would

demonstrate the panel’s clear error in concluding that

6

the General Assembly “need[ed]” to limit District 1’s

BVAP to 17% to achieve its partisan objective.

App.23a; States Br.4 n.2. Anyway, none of these

belatedly identified plans satisfies the Cromartie

II/Cooper standard.

First, Appellees vaguely reference “four” plans that

allegedly yield Republican-leaning District 1s “with

BVAPs above 21.1%” (apparently the Senate

Amendment 2a, League of Women Voters, Harrison,

and Roberts plans).

Mot.17 n.11 (citing

Supp.App.141a-143a; App.526a-527a). But Appellees

misstate these plans’ political effects by citing 2018

state-office-election results. App.526a-527a. All of

these plans make District 1 majority-Democratic on

the 2020 presidential election results, which are what

Mr. Roberts and the General Assembly considered.

App.525a; App.94a. And these plans fail to preserve

district cores, maintain communities of interest, or

protect incumbents as well as the Enacted Plan.

App.453a-459a, 479a-485a; Supp.App.141a-143a.

Second, Appellees point to a different map drawn

by Mr. Roberts, Mot.17 n.11, that made all 7 districts

majority-Republican, Supp.App.302a.

That map

dismantled District 6 and drew Congressman Clyburn

out of office, in contravention of Senator Campsen’s

goal to protect all incumbents and keep “a Democrat

and a Republican” representing Charleston County.

App.371a.

These plans do not “achieve[]” the General

Assembly’s “political objectives” nor are as “consistent

with” traditional principles as the Enacted Plan.

Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 258. They cannot insulate

the panel’s erroneous decision from reversal.

7

III. The Panel Failed To Disentangle Race From

Politics.

The panel also reversibly erred by shirking its

“formidable task” and never “disentangl[ing] race

from politics.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 308; J.S.20-25.

Appellees bizarrely suggest the General Assembly

lacked a partisan objective in the Enacted Plan.

Mot.16-17, 26. But even the panel acknowledged the

General Assembly “sought to create a stronger

Republican tilt” in District 1, App.21a, a finding

Appellees elsewhere embrace, see Mot.26.

Moreover, Appellees misrepresent the record on

partisan motivation. True, Senator Campsen denied

that the Enacted Plan violates any legal proscription

against “partisan gerrymandering,” Mot.17, but he

confirmed that “[p]olitics” were at play in District 1

and Charleston County, App.342a-343a. Senator

Rankin, meanwhile, was never present when the

maps were drawn, App.87a, 208a; he said only that

maintaining the 6-1 partisan split was not a

consideration “for [him]” but that otherwise “politics

is a consideration,” Supp.App.424a.

Nor are

Appellees’ citations to staffers’ testimony convincing,

since the staffers confirmed that politics drove the

Enacted Plan and District 1 in testimony Appellees

omit.

See Dkt.462-3 at 139:2-140:17 (Fiffick);

Dkt.462-4 at 142:17-147:12, 148:21-149:11, 193:13-25,

212:6-214:23, 266:11-19 (John); Dkt.462-9 at 339:16340:3, 392:10-393:3, 399:21-23 (Terreni); Dkt.462-10

at 203:13-204:9, 231:13-232:14 (Benson).

Appellees never address the fatal flaws Appellants

identified in the analyses of the two putative experts

the panel invoked—Drs. Imai and Ragusa. Mot.15-19,

8

22, 27. Appellees thus concede that Dr. Imai did not

even consider politics, that both witnesses did not

control for several important traditional principles,

and that Dr. Ragusa committed the same error as the

expert this Court rejected in Cromartie II. J.S.23-24;

see App.409a-410a; States Br.14-17, 20-21. The Court

should reverse.

IV. The Panel Misconstrued The Predominance

Standard.

The panel also improperly lowered Appellees’

demanding burden to prove the General Assembly

subordinated traditional criteria to race. J.S.25-31.

Appellees’ various assertions that the Enacted Plan

violates traditional principles are wrong.

First, Appellees note that District 1 is “noncontiguous by land.” Mot.24. But contiguity by water

is permissible in South Carolina. App.425a, 541a;

Sonoco Prod. Co. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 378 S.C.

385, 392-94 (2008). In fact, Charleston County

contains islands—so every version of District 1,

including Appellees’ versions unifying Charleston

County, are “non-contiguous by land.”

Second, Appellees claim that the Enacted Plan

“fails to respect communities of interest.” Mot.24.

Thus, like the panel, Appellees ignore that preserving

district cores is “the clearest expression” possible of

respect for “communities of interest” and that the

Plan outperforms all alternatives on this principle.

Colleton Cnty. Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d

618, 649 (D.S.C. 2002); J.S.25-26.

Third, Appellees contend the Enacted Plan “splits

10 counties,” including “some” with relatively high

BVAPs. Mot.24. Six of those splits do not involve

9

District 1. App.447a-448a. Moreover, nine of those

counties were split in the constitutional Benchmark

Plan, App.432a-433a—and the split of the tenth,

Jasper, does not evince racial predominance, App.34a35a.

Finally, Appellees criticize the Enacted Plan for

“mov[ing] more than double the number of people

necessary to address CD1’s population imbalance.”

Mot.25. Appellees’ proposed plans, however, move

even more people in and out of District 1 than the

Enacted Plan. Compare 439a-446a, with 453a-459a,

461a-467a, 468a-477a, 479a-485a. The Court should

reverse.

V. The Panel Clearly Erred In Finding Racial

Predominance.

The aforementioned legal errors aside, the record—

reviewed “extensive[ly]” or otherwise—leaves “the

definite and firm conviction” that the panel erred in

finding predominance. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 243;

J.S.31-35.

A. Leaning heavily on the standard of review,

Appellees argue that any error was not sufficiently

clear to warrant reversal. Mot.19-29. But a “clear

error” is shown by “a degree of certainty” that

Appellees failed to prove predominance “under the

applicable standard of proof”—here, an undeniably

demanding measure. Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal. v.

Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602,

622-23 (1993); see Baumgartner v. United States, 322

U.S. 665, 671 (1944).

Indeed, “extensive” review applies here because

this Court is “the only court of review” and the “key

evidence consisted primarily of documents and expert

10

testimony,” with credibility evaluations playing no

“role.” Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 243; see infra at 1011. Even a cursory review of the record exposes the

clear error in the panel’s regrettable impugning of the

experienced, non-partisan Mr. Roberts and the

General Assembly. J.S.31-35.

B. Unable to defend the panel’s decision on its own

terms, see supra Parts I-IV, Appellees point to an

array of evidence the panel “did not rely upon,”

Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 250. Such evidence “cannot

help” Appellees because the decision below must

stand or fall on the reasoning the panel actually

employed, id., not post hoc efforts to “search the

record” and “supply findings which the trial court

failed to make,” Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist.,

319 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1943); see City of Austin v.

Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1476

(2022).

Anyway, those efforts fail. First, Appellees note

that the General Assembly and staff considered race.

Mot.7-9, 23. But even Appellees concede there is a

difference between “consider[ing]” race and race

“predominat[ing].” Id. at 29 (emphasis original).

Yet they ignore that concession when it suits their

purposes, repeatedly deploying evidence that

individuals were aware of race to assert that they

predominantly used race to draw lines. Id. at 7-9, 23.

Appellees’ toggling between terms like “considered,”

“relied on,” and “aware of” is a shell game with no ball.

See J.S.35.

Second, Appellees contend the panel’s decision rests

on “credibility” determinations that deserve

“deference.” Mot.29. But the panel never made any

11

witness-credibility determinations. It did not, for

example, determine that Mr. Roberts was a non“credible” witness based on “cues” picked up while

“listen[ing]” to his testimony, Cooper, 581 U.S. at 309;

it simply (and baselessly) deemed his explanation

“[im]plausible” because it thought other evidence

showed he “consider[ed] race.”

App.29a-30a.

Weighing evidence and rejecting Defendants’

“contention[s]” in that way, Mot.7, 23, is not a witnesscredibility determination “to which [this] [C]ourt must

defer,” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 323 (2015).

Third, Appellees cite two putative experts’ analyses

that even the panel did not credit. Appellees point to

Dr. Liu’s analysis but overlook that his dataset was

flawed. See Mot.18-19, 27; Tr.601:11-603:17. For

example, he opined the Enacted Plan split 91 VTDs,

Supp.App.90a, when it actually split only 13,

App.447a. He also failed to control for nearly every

traditional districting principle. Tr.606:11-614:1.

Appellees also invoke Dr. Duchin’s testimony,

Mot.10, 22, 26, without mentioning her admitted

failure to control for politics or numerous traditional

criteria, Tr.334:6-24, 405:22-07:20-411:2, 412:17-19.

It is no surprise that the panel declined to rely on her

assertion that the Enacted Plan reconfigured Districts

1 and 6 in “scattered chunks and shards” that did not

“heal[] key splits.” Mot.10. As her own color-coded

map shows, the blue “chunks and shards” represent

areas moved to reunite Beaufort and Berkeley

Counties, id., and other changes she criticized

conformed district lines to county boundaries, id. at

12-13. She even admitted considering only a few

cherry-picked

communities

of

interest

that

“definitely” were not “the only [ones] identified by the

12

public testimony” or considered by the General

Assembly.

Tr.412:17-19, 414:1-415:2.

The

permissible legislative decision to unify certain

political subdivisions and communities rather than

Dr. Duchin’s handpicked ones was not racial

gerrymandering.

Finally, the record is so deficient that Appellees

invoke “facts” that are incorrect or irrelevant. Mr.

Roberts never conceded that he drew the line between

Districts 1 and 6 to “follow the migration of African

Americans from the city of Charleston.” Mot.8. The

presiding judge made that assertion, to which Mr.

Roberts responded: “I haven’t studied the migration.”

App.258a. Nor did Mr. Roberts testify that mapdrawing software displayed BVAP data on the screen

at all times. Mot.23. He instead explained that users

could see BVAP data only by scrolling “down” or

“over”; “otherwise, it’s not displayed on the screen.”

App.208a. And Appellees’ repeated references to

District 6, including their cartoon of a “two-headed

dragon,” e.g., Mot.11-13, are irrelevant because

Appellees do not challenge District 6, J.S.12; Mot.4.

The Court should reverse the panel’s clearly

erroneous decision.

VI. The Panel Failed To Enforce

Discriminatory Effect Element.

The

Appellees do not cure the panel’s failure to enforce

the discriminatory effect element of their intentional

discrimination claim. J.S.35-37.

Trying to cobble together the required finding,

Appellees cite the panel’s observations that the

Enacted Plan moved some African-American voters

out of District 1 and avoided making it a “toss up

13

district.” Mot.37. Those observations, however, do

not assess how the Plan affected similarly situated

white Democratic voters and thus are insufficient.

J.S.35-36. Appellees also gesture to various “record

evidence” the panel did not rely on, Mot.37-38, once

again misguidedly seeking to make the panel’s

findings for it, supra at 10.

In all events, Appellees at most contend that “the

Enacted Plan treated Black voters differently than …

White voters … of the same political party.” Mot.38.

Not true. The Plan treated all Democratic voters the

same and all Republican voters the same—regardless

of race. J.S.35-37. Anyway, Appellees must show that

the Plan dilutes the votes of African-American

Democrats compared to white Democrats. J.S.36-37.

Appellees do not even try, nor could they, because it is

undisputed that the Plan likely disadvantages just as

many or more white Democrats as African-American

Democrats in District 1. J.S.37.

CONCLUSION

The Court should note probable jurisdiction and

reverse.

14

April 2023

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM W. WILKINS

ANDREW A. MATHIAS

MAYNARD NEXSEN PC

104 S. Main Street, Suite 900

Greenville, SC 29601

JOHN M. GORE

Counsel of Record

JOSEPH P. FALVEY

JOSHUA S. HA

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

jmgore@jonesday.com

MARK C. MOORE

HAMILTON B. BARBER

MICHAEL A. PARENTE

MAYNARD NEXSEN PC

1230 Main Street, Suite 700

Columbia, SC 29201

ROBERT E. TYSON, JR.

VORDMAN CARLISLE

TRAYWICK, III

Counsel for House Appellants ROBINSON GRAY STEPP

G. Murrell Smith, Jr., Chris & LAFFITTE, LLC

Murphy, and Wallace H.

Post Office Box 11449 (29211)

Jordan

Columbia, SC 29201

M. ELIZABETH CRUM

MICHAEL R. BURCHSTEAD

BURR & FORMAN LLP

Post Office Box 11390

Columbia, SC 29211

Counsel for State Election

Commission Appellants

Howard Knapp, John Wells,

Joanne Day, Clifford J.

Edler, Linda McCall, and

Scott Moseley

Counsel for Senate Appellants

Thomas C. Alexander and

Luke A. Rankin