Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert Stanley Woods, aka Saladin Rushdan, Petitioner v. Haar, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 2, 2023

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What actually matters in this document.

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IN THE

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SALADIN RUSHDAN (aka:Woods)

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

DR. HAAR, et. al.

— RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Saladin RusHdan (aka: Woods, #B~38236)

(Your Name)

Solano State Prison

P.O. Box 4000

(Address)

Vacaville, California

95696

(City, State, Zip Code)

MAy - 5 2023

(Phone Number)

Rushdan v. Haar

1.)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Does and Out 6'f Court Settlement Agreement "Set the Perimeters"

for future so-called Legitimate Correctional Goals in a specific instance??

Or does a supposed legitimate correctional goal ’negate)'1 a previous Out

of Court Settlement??

2.)

Or did they abrogate that right?

Does one Doctor's opinion negate "many Doctor's" opinion, who

agree that a particular Chronic Medical condition is in fact painful?

3.)

Also, does a supposed Legitimate Correctional Goal allow Prison

Administrators to violate a prisoners 1st Amendment Right to be free from

consistent retaliation???

4.)

Is it Constitutional to deny an "open medical prescription" that

a prisoner has been receiving for decades?

■5.)

(Harmless medication.)

Can "$Monetary concerns" be used to detiry 'g ;pf isonernmddicAl

treatment??

Even though that prisoner has a previous Out of Court Settle

ment, that already agreed to pay for all medical bills?

6.)

When a prisoner offers to sign a "Disclaimer" for medical treat

ment in order to continue "Rehabilitative Efforts," does that constitute

a denial of the right to refuse treatment when prison officials refuse to

accept it?

7.)

(Non-life threatening.)

Can the same Judge (Magistrate), in one Case, "dismiss" another

case that agrees with the premise ruled on in the present case?

8.)

Also, can a (supposed) legitimate correctional goal be justified

as legitimate even if the "motive is corrupt • '•

9.)

Is it Constitutional to force a prisoner to accept a Magistrate

Judge in a Civil Suit?

10.)

When the Director of all prisons maRes a decision on a Grievance

filed by a prisoner, is it binding on lower level prison administrators??

(2)

LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[xl All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

Dr. Haar, CMC-East:'s Chief Medical Executive

Dr. Breen, CMC-East doctor.

Dr. Taylor, CMC-East doctor.

Kenly Kiya Kato - Magistrate Judge

RELATED CASES

Rushdan v. Dr. Haar, et. al. No. 2:19-CV-00695-0DW-KK Central District

(aka: Woods)

California

Rushdan v. Dr. Haar, et. al. No. 22-55253 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Rushdan v. Blain, et. al. No. 2:21-cv-03093-RGK-JDE-KK Central District

California

(3)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

LIST OF PARTIES/RELATED CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES (Attached)

5, 5a,5b

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

CONCLUSION

Rushdan v..Haar

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

"SEE ATTACHED"

STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. 1331

TITLE 42, SECTION 1983 UNITED STATES CODE

RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1-48

OTHER

(4)

PAGE NUMBER

Rushdan v. Haar

CASE LAW

2 Aktar v. Mesa 5 698 F. 3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)

3 Almond v. Wisconsin, 2008 WL 2903574, #1 (E.D. July 24, 2008)

4 Ancata v. Prison Health Services Inc., 769, F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.1995)

5 Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. C. 1504, 84

6 L. 2d, 518 (1985)

7 Booker, supra, at 261, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed 2d 621 Sec. 3553 (a)

8 Baugus v. Brunson, 890 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Cal. 1995)

9 Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F. 3d 1262 J 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)

10 Brown v. Johnson, 387 F. 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004)

Bruce v. Ylst

351 F. 3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003)

Butler v. San Diego Dist. Attorney's Office.5 370 F. 3d 956,5 963

13 (9th Cir. 2004)

14 Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F. 3d 865 (2nd Cir. 1995)

15 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. 3d. 2d 263

16 (1972); O'Jeefe V, Van Boening 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996)

17 Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (Jan. 2, 2007)

18 Dean v. Coughlin, 623 F. Supp. 392, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)

19 Erickson v. Pardus, 551, U.S. 89 (June 4, 2007)

20 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)

21 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837

511 U.S. 825 (1994)

22 Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F. 3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995)

23 Isby v. Clark, 100 F. 3d 502 (7th Cir. 1996)

24 Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F. 3d 330* 332 (9th Cir. 1996)

25 John L. v. Adams, 969 F. 2d 228 (6th Cir. 1992)

26 Johnson v. Meltzer 5 134 F. 3d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1998);citing

27 Farmer 511 U.S. at 837.

28 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977)

(5)

Rushdan v. Haar

GASES cont.........

1 Kessler v. Strecker, 307, U.S. 22, 59 S. Ct. 694, 83 L.E.D. 1082

2 1939 U.S. LEXIS 1081 (1939).

3 Jean Laurent v. Wilkinson, 438 F. Supp. 2d 318, 2006 U.S. Dist.

4 LEXIS 46047

(SDNY 2000)

5 Lavender v. Lampert, 242 F. Supp. 2d 821, 845 (D. Or. 2002)

6 Marks v. United States, 578 F. 2d 261

263 (9th Cir. 1978)

7 Me Alphin v. Toney, 281 F. 3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2002)

8 McElligo11 v.Foley, 182 F. 3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 1999)

9 Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F. 3d 824

10 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (Jan. 18, 1989)

11 Mitchell v. Forsyth7 472 U.S. 511, 526,105 S. Ct. 2806, 86

12 L. Ed 2d, 411 (1985)

13 Monmouth County Correc. Inst, for Inmates v. Lanzaro, 824 F. 2d

14 326-336, 37, 347 (3d. Cir. 1987)

15 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)

16 Nevada Dept, of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F. 3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011)

17 Phelan v. Thompson, 889, F. Supp. 517 (D.N.H. 1994)

18 Quiroz v. Horel, 85 Supp. 3d. 1115, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2015) Emphasis

19 added: (citing: Bruce v. Ylst, 351, F. 3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003)

20 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 102 L. Ed. 2d

21 854, 109 S. Ct. 706

22 Rhodes v. robinson, 408, F. 3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2009)

23 Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F. 3d 1197

24 Ruffin v. Desperio, 97 F. Supp. 2d 346, 353 (W.D.N.Y.2000) E.G.,

25 id. 567, Brodheim v. Cry, 584, F. 3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)

26 Smith v. Maschner, 899 F. 2d 940, 948 (10th Cir. 1990)

27 Sorrels, 29 F. 3d at 971

28 Tolentino V. Friedman, 46 F. 3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995)

(5a)

CASES C6nt

Rushdan v. Haar

1 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)

2 Watison 5 668 F. 3d at 1114-15 (Citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.

3 2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985)

4 Woods v. Smith, 60 F. 3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995)

22:23

r’

(5b)

Rushdan v. Haar

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix "A"

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

5 or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[x] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix "B"_to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[X] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix_____ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the_

appears at Appendix

court

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

■*.

Rushdan v. Haar

JURISDICTION

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was December 19, 2022

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: ____________

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[X] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including May 18, 2025_____(date) on February 11,2023 (date)

in Application No. 22 A 739____

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). (2)

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix_______

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

______________________, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including____

(date) on

(date) in

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

(6)

Rushdan v. Haar

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1.)

FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(BAR AGAINST RETALIATION FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH)

2.)

EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(BAR AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT)

3.)

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION'

(EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW) 28 U.S.C. 1331.

4.)

IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE!

5.)

THIS AMENDMENT IS ENFORCED BY TITLE 42, SECTION 1983, U.S. CODE

(7)

Rushdan v. Haar

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Legal Name: Saladin Rushdan (aka: Woods) is proceeding

Pro Se in this action.

Petitioner in 2016 Settled Out of Court with the California

Dept, of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (CDCR)

This Settlement was a result of years of Petitioner being

denied Medical Treatment and being constantly transferred to other

prisons .

As a prerequisite to that Settlement (CDCR) Counsel Complained

that the previous Out of Court Settlement reached in 1993 was to

restrictive.

Since it only allowed Petitioner to be Housed, at one

specific prison during the duration of his Medical treatment and

further only allowed Petitioner to be treated by one specific

Doctor.

ment.

The Prison Administration consequently violated that SettleSo (CDCR) changed the language of the last Settlement.

Plaintiff states that on August 31, 2018, Petitioner/Plaintiff

was transferred to CMC-East Prison.

As a result of and authorized

and agreed to transfer from Los Angeles County Prison,

Plaintiff

was offered the transfer as a result of lower- custody,

An of

the options offered, Petitioner/Plaintiff chose CMC-East.

has worked for years to attain such a transfer,

Plaintiff

Because of the fact .

that CMC-East is the only prison that is totally Single-Celled.

Because of Petitioner/Plaintiff's numerous medical issues, his age,

committment offenses and decades in prison,

Plaintiff needed/needs

the Single-Cell status more than anything.

Not only for it's privacy,

but so Plaintiff/Petitioner could have "Rest and Recuperation" after

ongoing surgeries .

But despite Doctor's recommendations CDCR still

refuses to grant Petitioner/Plaintiff Single-Cell Status elsewhere.

(8)

Rushdan v. Haar

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In addition Plaintiff suffers pain 24 hrs. daily.

Another major

2 jjmotivation for single-cell was to be free from late night cellmate

3(assault.

The amount of programs CMC-East has over other prisons,

1 j,as well as the "high rate" of Paroles from CMC-East, being a HUB

5 institution.

CMC-East is the most unique prison in all CDCR, in

6 that it is the "only" prison where prisoners have their own "key"

;

•s

to their cell door.

(For medical emergencies, can't top that.)

A virtual paradise for and old Lifer with the numerous Medical

9 iproblems of Plaintiff.

An although there are many other atypical

advantages offered at CMC-East.

Let's cut to the chase!!

Donovan was originally offered as and option of transfer to the

12 !j Plaintiff at Lancaster.

; j chose CMC .

14 i

Plaintiff soundly "rejected" that offer and

Upon arrival at CMC-East there were no initial major problems.

15 ; Plaintiff brought "Chronic Care" Medical Supplies from Lancaster with

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him, which included <i partial bottle of Peroxide.

The first problem began with Plaintiff's first contact with

defendant Breen!

terested in anything Plaintiff had to say'bout his medical condition.

Defendant Breen was obnoxious, arrogant and disin

20 f Plaintiff apprised defendant Breen of the 2016 Settlement Agreement

2i | therein, CDCR "supposedly" agreed to a "particular type" of Medical

treatment for his Keloid problem.

Yet, defendant Breen refused the

23 ] "suggestion or even existence" of the document as having "any" bearing

on Plaintiff receiving any future medical treatment.

told Plaintiff he would be seen by a person with Dermatological train

25 1;

ing and then "a decision" would be made whether Plaintiff would re-

~ -7

ceive "any treatment" at all.

" 1!

Defendant Breen

'(9)

Contrary to the Settlement.

Rushdan v. Haar

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Plaintiff tnen requested that his Chrono's be updated and recog'7

nized at CMC.

An was refused!

Plaintiff then requested that he be

issued his normal "Chronic Care Supplies" which includes Peroxide

and Anti-Biotic Ointment!

An was refused!

Plaintiff, in desperate# need of refills, contested defendant

Breen's denial, by filing a 602 Medical Grievance, (Informal Level).

Shortly thereafter Plaintiff was told by several prisoners that

3 | CMC-Medical would "ship me out" for filing Grievances.

An I was

told specifically defendant Breen had a nefarious reputation of

having problems with prisoners.

il i!

Their "predictions" came true!

Very quickly and shortly thereafter J

| Plaintiff's Counselor called Plaintiff into his Office. The Couselor

told Plaintiff that a Dr. Haar wanted me shipped out!

An the "excuse"

he gave the Counselor for his motivation was Plaintiff's own 2016

- | Settlement with CDCR.

Plaintiff allowed the Counselor to read the

document for himself and refuted the "false statements" of defendant

17 | Haar.

Afterward the Counselor told Plaintiff he would do everything

18 ; he could to keep Plaintiff at CMC!

At which point Plaintiff "documented" on the "Formal Level" of

20 jj the Grievance that he had received "threats" of transfer shortly

2: | after filing the Medical Grievance.

;

Plaintiff then spoke with one of his building Officers whose

23 I

mother was also a prison guard in the 80's who Plaintiff knew.

2A j

Officer then spoke with the Sergeant and Lieutenant on Plaintiff's

behalf.

Normally the Custody Staff can suspend a prisoner's transfer.

"6 v Which speaks to the level of power defendant Haar has over them.

Defendant Haar "overrode" everyone's attempts to keep Plaintiff.

>/Ti

That

(10)

Rushdan v. Haar

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But, Plaintiff assuming from past experience that he would not

2 jbe transferred at all.

Began involving himself in "positive programs."

3,jPlaintiff got a job * in fact, the best job he's ever had in 50 yrs.

l |of prison.

Plaintiff joined several Self-Help Groups and signed the

5 | waiting list for others.

(All of them will make good witnesses as to

6 | the potential gains Plaintiff lost as result of transfer.)

"During this period," still suffering greatly from medical issues,

Plaintiff again requested to see a doctor,

w if by defendant Taylor.

Plaintiff was then seen

Who basically "repeated" the same "scenario" as

defendant Breen. Both defendant's idea of an examination was to stand

U | several feet away and look at Plaintiff.^-Plaintiff again requested

12 jl his need for his normal "Chronic Dressing Change Supplies." An once

13 l| "again was refused."

Shortly thereafter Plaintiff was seen by a Triage Nurse who told

!4f

if i Plaintiff he could pick up "Supplies" on Monday's at the Supply win

dow and gave Plaintiff a Supply Card.

"But," when Plaintiff went to

i the window to pick them up, he was told that there was no doctors

order.

(Keep in mind, that "weeks" had passed by this time!)

1? i Plaintiff was given a few bandages.

20 !

agent??

’l

But "no" peroxide was issued!

Plaintiff then asked y what good were "dry" supplies without a

Finally

Something to clean the wound — site first?

Nor did

any doctor offer any "substitute."

During this period, Plaintiff suffutred "severe pain" and "many"

<1L—■

infections which drained "pus and blood."

drain.

25;I

many back to back more frequent than normal, Chronic infections.

-7 !.

Many of Plaintiff's previous gains of treatment, were erased!

Which is even more painful.

' •’ilfid

(11)

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Some infections didn't

Because Plaintiff suffered so

Rushdan v. Haar

An his Keloids suffered "trauma" and returned even worse. As proof

Plaintiff saved and dated much of the pus and blood.

Next, after months of Plaintiff thinking he was safe from transfer

'If the CoUnselor told Plaintiff that defendant “Haar was again pushing"to

transfer Plaintiff.

to sign a "disclaimer" and was willing to see any Dermatologist.

Plaintiff told the Counselor that he was willing

j was willing to do anything to keep from being transferred back into

the "hellish" environment that Plaintiff had finally escaped after

decades.

10 i

An to maintain his gains toward Parole suitability,

In-

stead defendant Haar pushed the transfer through on a lie.

1! !!

The "mythological" idea that defendant Haar was somehow complying

i: |j with the 2016 Settlement by "ordering" Plaintiff transferred is at

;» bes t, ludicrous! Especially since "other prisoners"

were seen by a

iia

i4 !j Dermatologist near CMC-East.

On December 23 2018, (not Dec. 2, 2018, as defendants say.) The

Plaintiff was "special transported" to Donovan Prison.

Right back

17 j into the same environment he had sought to escape from by going to

18 ; CMC-Eas t.

[9 I

Plaintiff was placed back into a violent, always on guard,

stressful, always on lockdown, double cell, hell!

Conditions that

•20 !

still threaten Health and Safety beyond normal. A nightmare, as if

:t | Plaintiff had never left Lancaster. Old San Quentin and Folsom

were

*•

never as violent as Donovan s one year J in ten years.

Plaintiff also

23 1

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has documented diagnosis as having suffered PTSD from his tours in

Vietnam.

Between

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December 2018 and February 2019, according to Ch. 10 News

there were eight (8) Riots and (83) stabbings at Donovan.

(3rd) largest "race riot" in the entire CDCR History!

' .-iied

(12)

An the third

Plaintiff...

Rushdan v. Haar

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...personally watched from his cell, nine (9) inmates beat another

•*>

prisoner for forty-five minutes (45), without a response from guards.

(I timed it!)

tiff's "health and safety" beyond the typical.

on Aug. 23 J 2019, there was another Riot, also on NBC.

there have been several "murders" and Riot on Staff.

Defendant Haar's unnecessary actions endangered Plain

An six months later

Since then

^Special Note: CMC-East Medical already has a "direct history" with

•7

the Plaintiff.

A "history" of Deliberate Indifference, which fueled

the Original 1983 Suit, that gave rise to the "present" Settlement.

Plaintiff challenges the defendants to prove that any other prisoner

11 i! in CDCR, has been transferred forty-one

times.

Plaintiff points

12 Ij out to the Court the "Nexus" that shows a "pattern" of retaliation

against Plaintiff for being a "litigator."

Further J there was "no" legitimate penological gain and the defen

dant's logic of "saving money" and uprooting Plaintiff as a part of

Plaintiff's own Settlement, both stand forth as "flawed concepts."

Their idea is to "not" prevent sickness!

But instead wait until

a "Chronic" problem they know is going to repeat itself then treat

it is also a flawed concept.

ARGUMENT

1.)

See attached Out of Court 2016 Settlement!

(Attachment #1)

Nowhere does it state to transfer the Plaintiff to any Prison with

23 !

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a nearby Dermatologist, as defendants assert! See: (Attachment #8)

Defendant Breen knew better, that was purposeful misreading.

(Attachment #12)

Instead the Settlement "clearly" "clearly" states:...send Plaintiff

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to a Dermatologist "Near" the Institution where he is incarcerated.

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See:

(13)

Rushdan v. Haar

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1 j (Not re-incarcerate Plaintiff somewhere else!)

Nor did the defen

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dants actually obey the actual Settlement and send Plaintiff to the

3 jj nearest Dermatologist.

(See: Attachment #13)

ill 2.)

The "false claim" that defendant Haar was so concerned about

5 j Plaintiff's comfort that he didn't want to see Plaintiff suffer frei

6 |j wuent three hour trips is both "laughable and a lie." The transfer

7 j| was only a "camouflage" for outright unadulterated retaliation!!

A.)

The Settlement calls for Medical treatment "near wherever" the

9 [jI Plaintiff is housed.

See: (Attachments #1 & 46) They admit it!

B.) It's Plaintiff's "right" to "accept or reject" any Medical

i; j) treatment!

(U.S. Constitution)

Plaintiff "points to" the two doctors (Dermatologists revealed

129|i on C.)Discovery).

See:

(Attachment #32)

These Dermatologists were used

14 || for "a11 other prisoners in 2018!" Why not Plaintiff??? (Attachment #37)

15 !!

D.)

Dr. Bradley Kurgis, is located at "Templeton, Ca." approx.

twenty-three (23) miles from CMC-East!!

i7 | has seen since arriving at Donovan.

E.)

19 !

20 1

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Closer then the one Plaintiff

(Attachment #32)

Dr. Geover Fernandez, is located in Bakersfield, Ca. and al-

though roughly a 3 hr. round trip,

Because of all the great advantages

of "Rest and Recuperation" Plaintiff had at CMC, a once every 6 to 8

week visit would 'not' have been a major burden,

)

attempt to point to Plaintiff's complaints at Lancaster.

looks exactly like Donovan,

24 j

and claimed there was "no" local Dermatologist by CMC-East period!

See: (Attachment #16)

*•-•7

Lancaster

3.)

The defendant's

(Attachment #32)!

Yet defendants "lied"

So defendant Haar's excuse for instigating Plaintiff's transfer

is not only a "hoax" but and outright lie!

(14)

The transfer was designed..

Rushdan v. Haar

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..to get rid of a potential problem,

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So by defendants own state-

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ments, "other" prisoners were allowed to see both Dermatologists

between Aug. 2018 and Dec. 2018!

Yet the Plaintiff who had an

Out of Court Settlement was excluded?

A.)

(Attachment #32)

Defendant Haar told the Counselor Mete that his motivation for

Plaintiff's transfer was the 2016 Settlement. See:(Attachment #2)

Yet "now" defendant Haar backtracks on his lies. See:(Attachment #42)

'<!! 4.) The whole idea of any Medical Settlement is to "improve" upon a

9 || Plaintiff's Health and Safety!

Not "endanger" his Health and Safety,

!0 1 Nor is a Settlement designed to "disrupt" the other facets of a Plaintiff's life. Nor, is a Settlement designed to "punish" a Plaintiff!

!2 jj Otherwise, why settle in the first place if the conditions are to re!(

:j | main the same as other prisoners? "To kill the'Plaintiff to cure him."

uj| Despite Plaintiff's objections, despite Plaintiff's past history, de:<

spite the Settlement Contract itself

defendant Haar over-rode all

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those factors.

(Attachment #2)

POINT II

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5.)

The defendant is trying to "con" the Court by. using the term

19 !:

"recommended."

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6 .)

In and attempt to shift the spotlight from himself.

Let s be clear, defendant Haar "orchestrated" the entire transfer.

Were it not for defendant Haar and Breen Plaintiff would normally

still be housed at CMC-East!! See:(Attachment #2)

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7.)

All those "custody officials" agreed that Dr. Haar "determined"

that Plaintiff should be transferred! (An since they put it in

I ni sure they will be willing to testify in Court, at trial

to this genuine fact!

(Attachment #2)

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' ' lied

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8.)

They were only forced to act after defendant Haar's continued

•

(15)

Rushdan v. Haar

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harassment.

9.)

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They delayed as long as possible.

Retaliation!

Off the Record! No names, they told me they did not want to

transfer me and delayed from Sept, to Dec.!

10.)

that equals the Warden's.

tiff is sure direct testimony will reveal that numerous amounts of

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other prisoners have also suffered at the hands of defendant's Haar

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and Breen.

Defendant Haar, as Chief Executive Medical Officer, has power

An even though denied on discovery Plain

For opposing defendant Breen's arrogance.

POINT III

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11.)

1! !iif

for Plaintiff as a patient or his 2016 Settlment!

Point I, amply disproves that defendant Haar had any concern

CMC-East speci-

fically has "history" of "disobeying" even CDC's "higher officials."

Especially where Plaintiff is concerned.

mindset had been eradicated!

!< j

15 I

Plaintiff had hoped that

But, what led to the first Suit and

Settlement was the same mindset and similiar conduct!

(See: Attachements #6 and #10)

17 | 12.)

Rather than obey the then "Director of Corrections" order and

18 ; send Plaintiff "out" to and "outside" "off-site" consult.

CMC-East

Medical "instead" sent Plaintiff to a "prison surgeon," who incidently

happened to be, on trial for murder in the death of a former prisoner

V if at CMC. An when Plaintiff refused the obvious "set-up" (just like)

2018, they transferred Plaintiff out!! See:(Attachment

& 10)

(Dr. Kantor was the Director of County Jails at the time.)

13.)

If, as the defense claims, these defendants "read" Plaintiff's

Medical History, all this information is on file,

itself.

14.)

(Attachment #47)

Their Penological gains are "illegitimate" both times.

(16)

:i!

History repeats

"Then . .

Rushdan v. Haar

3.2.

l :-U:

,. A

.‘j

...and Nov/' the language of the "orders" for Plaintiff's Medical

Treatment were plain and simple!

"Yet," both times, "Past and Pre

sent" CMC-East Medical failed to obey and acted in a Deliberately

4 ! Indiffernet manner.

Coincidence?

Same repeat attitude, rather

than send Plaintiff to a "Dermatologist" as set forth in the Settle

ment, defendants again refused and shiiped Plaintiff out!

See:(Attachment #6 & #45)

9 i 15.) An in addition defendants attempt the illogical explanation

9 l!3 that just because Plaintiff was seen by a doctor at Donovan that this

somehow meets the standards of a ligitimate correctional goal.

Now

H |i "had" defendants "obeyed" the Settlement, "that" would have been a

12 !jil legitimate goal!

• ■, I

L J

16.)

For the Record, the Dermatologist Plaintiff has seen while at

Uj Donovan, almost "killed" the Plaintiff.

i •>

"Literally."

Plaintiff

collapsed after treatment and ended up in E.R. on I.V.'s and injections all night!

The MRI showed "air bubbles" in Plaintiff's

■*£

17 j lungs, sinus tract and blood vessels.

But that another Civil issue.

18See Diagnosis : (Attachment # 31)

17.) Plaintiff won't burden this Court.

would have happened if defendant Haar hadn't placed Plaintiff in

i harms way! A.)

But again, none of this

On one hand defendant Haar says a "mythical" Court

Order motivated him to transfer Plaintiff. See:(Attachment #8)

On the other hand defendant claims that noone ordered him to trans-

fer Plaintiff.

18.)

25 il!

for a specific purpose.

-Wei!

\TJ

19.)

See:(Attachment #11)

Plaintiff with decades in prison understands prison is designed

But, Plaintiff reiterates, it was his choice to go to CMC-East.

(17)

Rushdan v. Haar

•v.

s '

■

■.

■. ■*•••-.

-S

': r

■

)

]

. i

Had Plaintiff imagined CMC would transfer him "right out" again he

•->

would have stayed at Lancaster. Chromic 'icondit ions existed before.

3 |J 20.)

Plaintiff also has a documented history of Bone problems along

with his Keloid problems.

out added denial of medication.

Lancaster, Donovan and other Level IV design prisons have "metal-

slabs .

Raised hard Keloids that are painful withCMC-East has Spring beds, while

Plaintiff is in pain everytime he lays down, so why shouldn't

:> II he try to improve his prison condition. See:(Attachements #5,27,28,29)

V| Plaintiff has many medical problems

so a Single Cell is the only

!ij : relief Plaintiff can obtain in and insane prison environment

The

■ j; original Settlement was vacated over the same issue. Single-Cell!

12 I See: (Attachements #20A, #20B, & #21) Doctor s Orders ignored again.

;j !i{ 21.)

Defendant Haar's only defense for placing Plaintiff back at risk

ifijn was that, he had no knowledge of where Plaintiff would be transferred

15 I to. Another lie! He knew! See:(Attachment #36) He did not

care as

1,5 j| long as the Plaintiff was shipped out!

....A prisoner does not have

i7 j to prove a defendant's actual knowledge of the consequences only

is ; knowledge of

Foley 182 F-

pain and illness is asubstantialrisk....(McElligott v.

3d 1248> 1256(11th Cir.

1999)(Attachment

#41)

22.) So if as defendant claims he didn't know the result of Plaintiff's

2 Hi adverse transfer. How then could the defendant possibly "judge"

whether the transfer" "promoted" or "advanced" a legitimate correc

23j tional goal?? (Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15) (Citing Rizzo v. Dawson,

2d I 778 F•2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985)

POINT IV

23.) Defendants Breen and Taylor freely "admit" denying Plaintiff

j wound care supplies . Hydrogen Peroxide! Their attempt to separate...

' ' iiril m

VT2

(18)

Rushdan v. Haar

i. Ji. iei

" 1

i.,

..the "cleaning agent" from the other "dry" supplies such as gauze

jj sponges, telfa, paper tape, etc.

is totally asinine.

■1

See: (Attachment #33 and #44)

Both defendants refused to acknowledge the "Chronic" Medical

issues that Plaintiff was given a "permanent" Chrono for.

other Doctors realized the ongoing Chronic nature of the problems,

CDCR's

7j CDCR,

is supposed to be all one system. See:(Attachment #19 & #43)

5 I 24.)

Very simple, "why issue Plaintiff dry" supplies for wound care

'■5 i!

without:

!0 I

A.) An agent to clean the wound first? Such as peroxide.

B.) An agent to dress the wound after cleaning. Such as

U ii

Anti-Biotic Ointment? See: (Attachment #24)

-1 25.)

That is totally illogical.

One need not be a doctor to use

, I!

Uj!I

S >

common sense! Not opinion! "Chronic Care!" See:(Attachment #45)

26.)

is also a part of CDCR. "For Hydrogen Peroxide." See:(Attachment #3A/B)

27.)

Refusing to issue a needed medication is Deliberate Indifference

to a Serious Medical Need.

18 •

Not just a difference of opinion.

The required subjective showing of deliberate indifference is

satisfied J "when it is established that" the Official knew of and

20 ■j

disregared a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner's health

•*\ ;

or safety." (Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F3d 1393

- 1

1398 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

....conditions that cause "pain" or discomfort or a threat to good

2T !

health are serious. Rule 56 (C), Fed. Rule Civ.P. makes this a genuine

issue of material fact. (Dean v . Coughlin, 623 F. Supp. 392, 404

25|

(S.D.N.Y. 1985)

'.Mip.n .n

(*'5

Plus Plaintiff had an open prescription from Lancaster, which

■I

28.)

Plaintiff has had prescriptions specifically for the same . . .

(19)

Rushdan v. Haar

1•

' i

.."medication" Hydrogen Peroxide for decades.

Plaintiff attaches

2 || only a few examples from "different prisons" at different times

over the years.

29.)

part of that word did defendants not understand in Plaintiff's

There is no difference of opinion on the word CHRONIC!

6 | Medical History??

(

(See: Attachements #15 (Eleven examples)

What

See:(Attachments #5 (A), #34)

"Websters International Dictionary:"

"CHRONIC:. .a.) marked by "long

duration," by "fequent recurrence" over a long time and often by

10 I

"slowly progressing seriousness!!!"

•...Chronic and substantial

pain demonstrates a serious need..(Lavender v. Lampert, 242 F. Supp.

2d 821, 845 (D. Or. 2002). (Attachment #41)

1.2 |

30.)

•J!i 31.)

•

That describes the Plaintiff's Keloid issues perfectly!

Plaintiff cannot "selectively" cause any "exterior" drainage

;;

from his wounds.

wounds is on-going, "Chronic!"

is "pus and blood" drainage.

i / |i

18 =

19 i

But the point is

that the "infection" of. those

An the "end result" of the infections

Had the defendants "actually" examined

Plaintiff, or "actually" listened, they would know that Plaintiff has

"pockets" in his faci*L Keloid, called "sinus tracts." (Attachment #5B)

32.)

An the only way to determine "any infection" would be to:

A.) Accept Plaintiff's word.

Infections are painful so why lie?

;

B.) Use a Q-Tip and insert it into ’the sinus tracts J then send it

to the Lab for a culture.

(Attachments #5A, #5B)

33. )

24 !

25 i

the infection is "so bad" that it has to shoot pus and blood down

Plaintiff neck and clothes.

before in 1992 or 93, before Plaintiff received a response.

But defendants Breen and Taylor's method is to "wait" until

Which is exactly what happened at CMC

Giving

rise to the Original Suit since CMC refused to obey the Director.

.-(20)

’■'•ile.i -it

./T;

Rushdan v. Haar

■

-V'

■'

r-: r

.s'

. V

34.) Plaintiff suffered infections on: September 30, 2018, October

2 j 24, 25,26,27,28, 2018. November 8 J 9, 12, 13,14, 15, 16, 17,18, 2018.

December 5, 7, 12,13, 14,J 15. 16 J 2018, at CMC-East.

An Plaintiff

1 (has a sample culture of each of those infections.

The Court and the

defendants are welcome to "test and culture" each to verfiy there

6 | authenticity!

....worsening illness is indicative of imminent dani

7 j ger. (Brown v. Johnson , 387, F. 3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004)

8) (Almond v. Wisconsin J 2008 WL 2903574, *1 (E.D. Wis. July 24, 2008)

Yet, on pg. 12, of defendants Motion for Summary Judgment defense

states that ..."there was "no" condition that required "immediate

1! j care or treatment" as the "motivation" for defendant Breen referring

■!

jj Plaintiff to somebody other than a Dermatologist! (Attachments #41,#45)

;j ii

Plaintiff has a "Chronic" history of Keloids with complications.

i i |! Not just infections, pus, blood, drainage. But "pain," "pain," and

more "pain." Twenty-four hours a day. Documented problems! Where

in the Settlement does it say that the Plaintiff "should not" receive

i •' j| "immediate care??"

Should he wait a month, a year, how long?

18 ;

19 i!

"the second-guessers" in CDCR, the prison doctors!

-0 !

just regular, without Plaintiff's complications, are painful!

The Off-site Dermatologists have not been as much of a problem as

Keloids alone,

Defen-

\ If

23 iI

dant Taylor is a prime example.

Obviously this defendant did not'

"bother" to "actually" read Plaintiff's Medical History,

99.9% of

all "experts" agree that Keloid as a whole are painful.

But defendant

Taylor invents a note from 2016 UCSF! 1.) Plaintiff stop going to UCSF

in 2012!

Center.

2.) Plaintiff was seen in "2016" by Riverside County Med.

Who told CDCR "specifically" to send Plaintiff to their

"Pain Management Unit."

'V*7

They never did! See:(Attachements #17,#18)

!!■

, (21)

* • .Hc.i! .n

Rushdan v. Haar

"With" Plaintiff's extra complication, they are almost unbear

able!

The defendants quote the symptom of "redness" as a telltale

sign of problems?

Plaintiff is Black-skinned African-American.

He doesn't turn red!

Plaintiff's documented pain alone should

5, have been enough for immediate care.

(The 2016 Settlement was for

the purpose of taking the decision "out" of the hands of prison

doctors.)

...."the existence of "Chronic" and substantial pain

"itself" demonstrates a serious medical need. (Lavender v. Lampert,

9 jj 242 F. Supp. 2d 821, 845 (D. Or. 2002)

...lack of treatment was

worsening his illness, sufficiently pleaded "imminent" danger of

serious physical injury. (Brown v. Johnson, 387 F. 3d 1344, 1350

(11th Cir. 2004) (Me Alphin v. Toney, 281 F. 3d 709, 711 (8th Cir.

2002)

•3

;< *

POINT V

35.)

Defendant Haar claimed and ridiculed Plaintiff's claim that

he spoke with other defendants about Plaintiff and the 602 Grie

vance Plaintiff filed against Dr. Breen. See:(Attachment # 48.........

18 ) Lines 15, 16 of Interrogatory #11)

19 |

More perjury when the defen-

dants procrastinate. (Attachement #38)

Yet "now" defendants "admit" in the Motion for Summary Judgment

2': jj

that defendant Haar and defendant Breen, did indeed discuss the fact

-> ■ j

that Plaintiff had filed a Grievance against Breen.

Why??

That

23 j

discussion was inappropriate, since defendant Haar was not the

2~ j

"Hearing Officer." See:(Attachment #34..pg. 6, lines 21-25.)

36.)

1.)

aii

• < si

jO>

An "assertion" that a state actor took some adverse action

against a prisoner. See:(Attachment #2...Class ification Chrono)

~ 7

• ."I

The Legal Standard for Retaliation Claims is:

(22)

Rushdan v. Haar

2.)

Because of that prisoner's protected conduct. See:(Attachment

■

■7

#8...Their claim and use of the Settlement as protected conduct)

3.)

An that such action "chilled" the prisoner's exercise of his

First Amendment Rights,

See:(Attachment #2...Transfer, loss of

everything Plaintiff worked years for.

Good time, property, free

from major threat of harm with no witnesses.)

4.)

The action

did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

s I! goal.

(See Point III, no need for transfer at all.)

9| (Rhodes v. Robinson, 408, F. 3d, 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)

!0jji! 5.)

CDCR, has a habit of trying to chill Plaintiff's litigation by

11 !!!! using what prisoner's call "bus theraphy."

Plaintiff has been trans-

2 |] ferred more than any other prisoner he knows of. See :(Attachement #9)

POINT 71

U If 37.) TIMING : = In this case the "timing more than proves" direct

"Retaliatory" intention from the very beginning.

;r i

In the Motion For Summary Judgment 9 their words. The defendant

;

claims on (Pg. 17... line 5, that the timing does...not support the

i8 - claim of Retaliation because Dr. Haar's last order to transfer the

!9 ! Plaintiff was four months after the filing of the 602 Grievance.

20 1

•i

22 j

"Not So!"

Another Lie! (Attachment # 39)

Plaintiff filed Grievance on : September 14, 2018 (Attachment #8)

A-) See: Order Referral to Dermatology details:

September 24. 2018.

23 i!

quote:...awaiting custody transfer! See:(Attachment #8)

B.) See Motion for Summary Judgment:...Pg. 6..lines 21-25. September

18, 2018 :

the trouble making Plaintiff on the phone! See:(Attachment #34)

c.)

V)te<! -n

& i

Four Days Later."...Defendant Haar and Breen discussed

On September 24 9 2018: Just "Six days later"

(23)

defendant Haar..

Rushdan v. Haar

■•was "already moving" to get rid of Plaintiff.

•->

By Defendant's own records!

timing" can be shown!

What greater evidence of "quick

An look at the adverse results!

Even though Custody initially delayed the transfer 5 attempting

5 I! to give Plaintiff a break.

Defendant Haar was "plotting and

6 I pushing" to have Plaintiff transferred "mere days" after Plaintiff

7 ! filed a Complaint against "his doctor."

3 J 38.)"Retaliatory motive may be shown by the "timing" of the

o j| allegedly retaliatory act and "other" circumstantial evidence as

io!

well as "direct" evidence!

II :'!

(Quiroz v. Horel

12 j|

(emphasis added) (ci ting : Bruce v. Ylst, 351, F. 3d. 1283, 1289

85 Supp. 3d 1115, 1124, (N.D. Cal. 2015)

(9th Cir. 2003)

ii I

15 I

17 j

A.)

Defendants did not follow any treatment regimen while the

Plaintiff was at CMC-East.

Their idea was to "pass the buck."

...treatment consisted of little more than documenting Plaintiff's

worsening condition...etc...not withstanding frequent examinations

iSand "eventual" referral to a specialist.)

19{

(Ruffin v. Desperio, 97 F. Supp. 2d 346, 353

39.)

’: J|

Twin Case!

(W.D.N.Y. 2000)

Defendants admit that submitting a Grievance is protected

conduct. (E.G., id. 567, Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F. 3d 1262, 1269

(9th Cir. 2009)

23 1

40.)

•Q »

• •lief! .m

The 602 Grievance "did not" complain about the

distance that treatment might entail.

Breen, period!!

~ “7

Defendant Haar and Breen were not "just" discussing Plaintiff's

Medical Treatment.

Yet defendant Haar discussed Plaintiff's Grievance "off the record".

See: (Attachment #34)

(24)

It complained about defendant

Rushdan v. Haar

■ V~~

. L

V -

A.)

At no time did defendants have any intention of obeying the

■->

Settlement and sending Plaintiff to a Dermatologist.

An they told

Plaintiff that they had no intention of sending him to an outside

Dermatologist.

Using the Settlement only as Retaliation.

See: (Attachment #25)

of 41.)

Defendant Haar "lied" about a Dermatologist not being "near"

7 j CMC-East, as the "motivation" to transfer Plaintiff. (Attachment #32)

Defendant Haar "lied" about the "timing" of his order to transfer

g I!!! Plaintiff.

!0 !

The "order" being mere days later. (Attachment #8)

Defendant Haar "lied" about discussing Plaintiff and the Grie-

Il vance Plaintiff filed with other defendants.

1 3

42.)

(Attachment #34)

Defendant Haar "lied" about any "prison officials" giving him

advice on how to get rid of Plaintiff. (Attachment #35 & 36). . See:

!1|

Interrogatory #14, pg. 12)...

Yet in the Motion for Summary Judg-

15 i

ment pg. 8...lines 10-11.

Defendant Haar admits to calling CDCR's

Office of Legal Affairs!

See: (Attachment #|^f)

POINT VII

18 ;

43.)

iir 1i

prisoner is provided with needed Medical Care!

30 'I

A.)

$C0ST

cannot" and "must not" play any part in whether a

Anyway, CDCR agreeAto The 2016 Settlement to "provide" Plain

tiff with Medical Care for his Keloid problems. "Which includes the

V '■

Cost!"

■

44.)

Now! defendant's claim that "saving money" for CMC by not

having to transport Plaintiff, was a legitimate correctional goal!

Motion For Summary Judgment...Pg. 19..lines 16-17:. ..quote:... to

25 !

transfer Plaintiff had a "net positive" impact on other inmates and

on the "allocation" of prison "resources" generally, given that....

(25). _

.■ I!

Rushdan v. Haar

...Plaintiff would require "limited transportation resources" for

•->

frequent lengthy travel to see a Dermatologist! ! (Attachment #jSf)'*Aif

3 i 45.)

This stands forth as another example of "illegitimate" motives

ill of the defendant.

Again, the Settlement took care of Plaintiff's

5 j individual $costs.

But, cost should never play a part in needed

6j Medical treatment.

...........holding that $cost should not be a factor

in providing medical care for a serious ailment.

(Monmouth County

Correctional Institution for Inmates v. Lanzaro J 834,J F.2d 326-336-

9li 37, 347 (3d. Cir.1987)

(Ancata v. Prison Health Services Inc. 769,

10 II F. 2d 700,704 (11th Cir. 1985)

i ij 46.)

As this Court will note from past Records J Plaintiff's visits

to all past Dermatologist's were "6 to 8 Weeks" so-called frequent

: 3 ji visits .

jii

POINT VIII

15 j I 47.)

loll

Defendant's also state in the Motion for Summary Judgment:

Pg. 18-lines 15,16,17 ..quote:...ensuring the safety and security 9

17 J|

including life and health of inmates is a legitimate correctional

18 <

goal.

;

Defendant's obviously failed miserably.

20 '

Plaintiff to cure him!

-Ml

7 *

(Nevada Dept, of Correc. v. Greene, 648 F.3d, 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2011)

48.)

In essence by defendant's actions in transferring Plaintiff

again, they are saying that "all"

the Counselors, Captain 9 Assoc.

Warden's > Warden, Doctors, Director of Corrections Representatives

etc.

years, yet allowed Plaintiff to be transferred to CMC., were all

■*« ■?

Indifferent to Plaintiff's Medical Needs??

Who knew for years about the Settlement and knew Plaintiff for

(26)

By trying to kill the

' 1!

'i5

I don't think so!

Rushdan v. Haar

•«-,

*1?■

.*• •

«|

Defendant Haar 5 who knew "nothin' about Plaintiff,"wants the

2 J| Court to believe that he was so concerned about Plaintiff that

he ordered Plaintiff to be move into "a worse environment" for

1 j| Plaintiff's Health and Safety!

5 i

But Lancaster Staff who knew Plaintiff for years moved Plaintiff

to a better physical environment, requested by Plaintiff somehow

7 j

ignored Plaintiff's Medical Needs by shipping him to CMC?

*1i!

NO! !

It is "more plausible" based on the evidence that it was

9 il defendant Haar who "was not" concerned at all about Plaintiff's Life

or safety, or health!

1! I!

12 ]!

So he ordered Plaintiff to be sent on a

twelve (12) hour journey because of a Grievance?

What about.subs tan-

tial pam and Chronic serious medical need is hard to understand7

ifIf

;3 |

Plaintiff never again had to expect or could imagine having to go

through the displacement and "pain," of transfer.

POINT IX

17 ij

50.) CDCR HEADQUARTERS:

On 602 Grievance already had made a ruling

18 ■

20 j

on just what CDCR's "interpretation" of exactly what "near" the

institution where Plaintiff is housed...means to CDCR!

In writing!!

An "they" chose not to make any changes to Plaintiff's

Medical treatment, "irrespective of distance!"

made "prior" to Plaintiff's Transfer.

That decision was

An it goes "totally" contrary

to defendant Haar's interpretation and excuses.

(Attachment #4)

51.)

POINT:...Doesn't defendant Haar work for CDCR??

•-

52.)

As for defendants Breen and Taylor, they totally disregarded

and ignored the 2016 Settlement,

of "Contractual" obligation.

Or does he?

All defendant also stand in Breach

The 2016 Settlement is a Contract.

(Although a Separate Suit).

(27)

Rushdan v. Haar

The last Primary Care Provider for Plaintiff was Dr. Tiggs

Brown

scription from Dr. Brown for Hydrogen Peroxide.

are supposed to be a part of CDCR.

Defendant's Breen and Taylor refused to honor thevpre

5 I current.

All prisons

The prescription was

See: (Attachments #3A & B)

POINT X

These defendant's are not eligible for qualified immunity.

All defendants are clearly culpable,

An the .Court must

accept the allegations as true, (they are), when determining

whether a defendant is entitled to immunity.

Diego Dist. Attorney's Office, 370 F. ,3d 956, 963 (9.th Cir.

2004);see also..Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472, U.S. 511, 526, 105

S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2-d41-l-(-m85-)~._____________ 1_____ _________

• 14

All defendants blatantly disregarded a "Chronic" medical

(Butler v. San

problem.

tiff suffers from at 73 yeprs of age.

they offered Plaintiff/Petitioner for 'pain' is totally in-

effective.

prisoners ailments.

Settlement refused outright to send Plaintiff to a Specialist

Their idea is "take one aspirin and call me when you're dead.

Petitioner's decades long history of Chronic Keloid infec-

Not to mention the slew of other ailments the Plain

The actual medication

It is CDCR's "miracle drug." It cures all of

It's "Tylenol."

Defendants, despite the

tionss and consistent extreme pain.

24.

prove that Defendant's Breen and Taylor knew there was a se

rious risk of harm to Plaintiff and disregarded it.

because their were no apparent signs of infection when they

just looked without any examination.

Were evidence enough to

Proven pain is enough!

Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97 (1976)

(28)

Simply

Rushdan v. Haar

•POINT XI

The

Petitioner charged defendants with "corrupt" motives.

District Court and upheld by the 9th Cir. the Magistrate

Judge's statement

were

that regardless of what defendant's motives

they had a legitimate correctional goal.

This Honoralbe Court should note that the defense;"did

not make the claim of "any" legitimate correctional goal in

any of their "original" responses to the Complaint,

it made on any previous similiar Suits.

Nor was

So, Petitioner, using the the rationale that CDCR couldn't

have it both ways,

Filed a 1983 Suit against the doctors of

the previous prison.

Using the same premise that defendant

■ Haar used to justify transferring Plaintiff to Donovan State

• 14

Prison.

out to treatment from CMC. (i.e. that CMC claimed they were

so concerned that Plaintiff had to travel to far to see a

Rather than obey the Settlement and send Plaintiff

Drmatologist.)

(Just a lie to get rid of Petitioner.)

Since at the previous prison, Plaintiff had filed a prison

Grievance alleging just that fact.

the Grievance.

CDCR, of course, denied

An I believe set a precedence,

Stated, that

it was okay to "transport" Petitioner "long distances" to

surgery.

Therefore their Superiors laid the groundwork and

set the standard for Petitioner's future Medical Treatment.

Petitioner's logic was that if the Judge accepted CMC's

argument; (about concern for distance for treatment.)

the opposing Suit of Petitioner's original position'which

CDCR Headquarters denid, would prevail! (Attachment #4)

Yet, the "same" Magistrate Judge rejected the other

(29)

Then,

Rushdan v. Haar

. 2

...Suit outright.

Petitioner asserts that the denial was not

only prejudicial, but also contradictory on the part of that

Judge.

Another point is that Plaintiff/Petitioner never ag-

reed to a Magistrate Judge to hear the case.

Suits Petitioner has ever filed, he has never experienced any

Judge who "granted defendants Motions" on the "same day" they

were filed.

As this Judge has done.

An of all the

Petitioner complained

01 |but to no avail.

-''Another point, is that the Cases cited by the Court to

deny Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment, do not have

any applicable legal standing in Petitioner's Case.

One example is Padgett v. Wright...etc.

•Plaintiff/Petitio-

1 ^

ner did not raise any new arguments, as stated in that case.

merely using their own statements to prove their lies.

Only merely answered defendant's assertions in their responses

In Petitioner's case, as in Farmer v. Brennan, the prison

"inexplicably" discareded it's own rules and in doing so ,

evinced Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff's Serious Medi-

cal Condition.

2021

By the contradictory act of only issuing bandages for wounds

without issuing any cleaning agent or gauze for sanitizing

those wounds.

Petitioner more than demonstrated and "excessive" risk to

his health and safety,

cation.

continued health.

decades.

open "prescription by attaching a copy of the label for it.

By defendant's denial of needed medi-

Petitioner demonstrated an excessive risk to his

He had been receiving that medication for

In addition Petitioner proved that he still had and

(30)

Rushdan v. Haar

1 In addition Petitioner more than showed a very substantial and

2 motivating factor behind defendant's conduct.

An only put forth

3 evidence designed to show defendant's present and past retaliatory

4 motives.

That motive should have been taken in the light most

5 vacorable to Plaintiff and presented as a dispute of a genuine

6 issue of material fact. (Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th

7 Cir. 2003) (Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F. 3d 1262 (Oct. 28, 2009)

The District Court and the 9th Circuit "erred" when it stated

9 that Petitioner failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact

10 as to whether Dr. Haar's (order), to transfer Petitioner did not

11 reasonable advance a legitimate correctional goal.

The "language and excuse" constantly used to absolve defendant

13 Haar, is not the language of "fact!"

Defendants (as I've said

14- before) constantly attempt to convince the Court that defendant

15 Haar merely recommended transfer.

"Not so!"

Defendant's conduct

16 clearly shows he had a personal grudge against Petitioner.

Fact!

Read the "Classification Chrono clearly states very clearly that

18 defendant Haar and defendant Haar alone "determined" that Petitio19 ner should be transferred.

Before Petitioner filed the 602 Com-

20 plaint/Grievance against one of "his" Doctors defendant wasn't

21 concerned about Petitioner's Medical Treatment!

(Attachment #2)

Defendant Haarl'ls authority equals that of a Prison Warden.

In a

23 purposeful "mis-"interpretation of Plaintiff's Out of Court Settle24 ment, defendant Haar lied to the Classification Committee.

In order

25 to retaliate against Plaintiff/Petitioner for filing a Grievance

26 against "his" doctor.

Again the Settlement Agreement language is

27 plain.

"Send Plaintiff to a doctor near the prison where he was

28 at."

CMC has a reputation among prisoners for shipping out prolems .

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Rushdan v. Haar

lFacts of very apparent lies:

1.)

The lie of distance being a factor in Medical Treatment.

(There were two Dermatologists within 25 miles of the prison.)

2.)

$Cos t!

The statement that they needed to save money for other

prisoners treatment.

already "agreed" to pay for Medical costs.) (Attachment #1)

So how could that be a legitimate correctional goal??

3.)

(Petitioner's Out of Court Settlement "

Nor did defendant's "original response" mention $Cost as part

9 of the reason for transferring Petitioner!

A.)

-**23 )

REASONS NORMALLY GIVEN FOR SUPPOSED LEGITIMATE CORRECTIONAL

GOALS:

1.)

Whether the regulation is rationally related to a legiti

mate and neutral governmental objective.

2.)

Whether there are alternative avenues-that remain open

to the prisoners to exercise their rights.

3.)

The impact that accommodating the asserted right will

have on other prisoners and guards and on the allocation

of prison resources .

4.)

Whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives

indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response

by prison officials.

B.)

(As in Petitioner's case).

Why did the Court allow defendants to invent a new reason for

transferring Petitioner, contrary to their original response?

28.

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Rushdan v. Haar

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

1.)

This Petition should be granted, because the U.S. Constitution

was violated.

There was no Legitimate Correctional Goal.

Petitioner understands that prisoners give up many of the rights that

other^citizens have.

But, the use of the term; "legitimate correctio

nal goal" should not be allowed to justify "extreme" abuse of Morality

of Ethics!

"Derrick Chauvin" felt that he had a legitimate goal in

restraining "George Floyd."

to accomplish that goal!

The "difference" was "the method" used

"Corruption and

not be ignored as a "causitive" factor.

personal" retaliation should

In the instant case there was

obviously no legitimate goal:

A.)

There were absolutely "no safety or security" issues.

B.)

There were no life threatening Medical concerns.

C.)

The Out of Court Agreement formed new regulations specifi

cally for Petitioner!

2.)

This Petition should be granted;...to determine if Settlement

Agreements made by "Prison Superiors" are binding on lower level

administrators who work in that prison system.

An therefore, those

lower echelon staff cannot "second guess" or reinterpret what might, or

might not be a legitimate correctional goal.

3.)

This Petition should be granted:...to determine if an Out of

Court Settlement itself sets the precedent and details exactly what a

legitimate correctional goal is for specialized medical treatment for

a specific prisoner.

Therefore "negating" any "Non-emergency" changes

to that Settlement's original interpretation.

4.)

This Petition should be granted:...to set precedence as to the

"degree" of the "right of a prisoner to refuse or forgo" non- life

threatening medical treatment.

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Rushdan v. Haar

1 Such refusal, when based on a "greater" need for "Rehabilitative

2 Programs" that would further help the prisoner gain his freedom.

5.)

This Petition should be grantedto set precedence as to

4 whether prisons can use $Money as and excuse for not giving prisoners

5 needed medical treatment.

(Especially after "having specified" in an

6 Out of Court Settlement" that they agree to pay the Medical Bills?)

6.)

This Petition should be granted:... to determine if it is "un-

8 ethical" for the same Judge to dismiss a Suit that argues and agrees

9 along the same lines as another Suit with different defendants that

10 the same Judge upheld as a "valid argument" for other defendants.

11 "one is wrong, the opposite argument" would be right!

Or the "reverse"

12 one is right and the opposite is wrong!

7.)

This Petition should be granted:... to clarify just -"what'is ,

14 or what isn't" genuine issues of material fact."

8.)

This Petition should be granted:...to set precedence and prevent

16 an "adverse action" being taken against a prisoner attempting to

gain

17 enforcement of his Settlement Agreement in a way not designed to

help

18 him.

But to hurt him.

This Petition should be granted:...to set guidelines for some

9.)

20 type of "Federal Oversight" for Out of Court Settlement Agreements that

21 were reached in a "Federal" Court.

22 Safety of prisoners.

When it involves the Health and

(Regardless of whether it is a Consent Decree.)

23 A Federal Court should automatically retain jurisdiction for it s own

24 decisions.

Petitioner's logic, is that any Settlement reached in

25 Federal Court should be subject to the standards of Breach of Contract.

26 An Agreement reached in State Court would be Breach of Contract for

27 State cases only.

Consider that most prisoners are Pro Se and therefore

not able to afford the large filing fee charged in State Court.

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Rushdan v. Haar

Another major obstacle, using Petitioner's Case as and example

is the constant transfers from County to County.

action alone first began Petitioner has been transferred six

(6) times.

Transfers designed to impede his ability to file a Complaint

to the Courts.

10.)

Since this

Forty three (43) times total, the last 46 years.

The most "glaring fact" is that defendant '.s whole lie

for justification to transfer Petitioner to Donovan, was claimed

need to be closer to a doctor for Medical Treatment.

again Petitioner was transferred.

fer from Donovan Prison Petitioner had a scheduled Outside Medical

Appointment.

only "liars but hypocrites" as well,

again transferred from Folsom Prison to now Solano Prison.

A.)

Yet, once

An on the very day of trans

Which was never completed.

So defendants are not

An further Petitioner was

So the idea that it was a needed legitimate correctional

goal that was used to specifically transfer Petitioner to a

particular prison, Donovan for medical reasons is ludicrous.

B.)

Genuine Fact:

Petitioner has been transferred more times

than any prisoner in the state of California.

I'm a litigator and CDCR are the ones who keep violating their

sworn word in these Settlement Agreements.

C.)

Why? Bus Therapy.

Not me!

All three doctor defendants are conspirators to both

retaliate against Petitioner and continue to practice Deliberate

Indifference to Petitioner's Serious Medical Needs.

CONCLUSION

Any reasonalbe trier of fact would be able to see through the

obvious ruse' used by defendant Haar to get rid of Plaintiff.

Trial Petitioner would have been able to show that CMC-East has...

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Rushdan v. Haar

1 ....a history of retaliatory behavior against prisoners.

But, the

2 so "obvious" lies by defendants clearly show disagreement of genuine

3 issues of material fact:

1.)

First, the lie that defendant Haar told in the response to

5 Petitioner's Complaint.

6 transfer.

Was that he merely recommended Petitioner's

The Classification Committee as you've seen on the Chrono

7 gave the lie to that assertion.

8 actions.

"Determined!"

9 the transfer.

2.)

They used the real word for his

From beginning to end defendant Haar pushed

(Attachment #2)

The "extravagant lie", that any Contract Doctor, with any

11 Department of Corrections, could refuse to treat a specific patient.

12 A patient who has mandated treatment.

13 defies explanation.

Is so blatantly false it

An all the while they are treating other

14 prisoners at the same prison?

That's laughable!

An further, until

15 Discovery defendants lied to the Court by stating the nearest Doctor

16 was in Bakersfield.

To far, so they claimed.

17 were within a 25 mile radius of CMC.

Yet, two Dermatologists

(Attachment #32)

It wasn't until Petitioner, thru' a friend discovered they were

19 so close.

That defendant's came up with the "fairy tale" that the

20 "nearby Dermatologists" weren't accepting any new patients.

A.)

Unless those other patients had life-threatening ailments

or were suffering worse than Petitioner.

of Court Settlement gave him precedence over any other

prisoners.

ferred Petitioner because of a "Court Order."

but if he thought so realistically why didn't he obey it

like a Court Order?

3.)

Petitioner's Out

In Haar's medicaL RECORDS he said he transIt wasn't,

(Attachment #8)

Next lie:...That defendant's were somehow obeying the....

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Rushdan v. Haar

1 ...Out of Court Agreement, by disobeying it!!!

The Settlement

2 Agreement has plain language, quote;...Send Plaintiff to the

3 "nearest Dermatologist" to the prison he is incarcerated in.

4 Again, not send Petitioner to a "prison near a doctor."

4.)

The transfer was vindictive.

It was totally unnecessary.

6 Petitioner as this Court can read on the Classification Chrono

7 offered to sign a "Disclaimer" to refuse or "delay" Medical

8 treatment while he completed programs designed to FACILITATE his

9 release from prison.

5.)

That alone was Cruel and Unusual Punshment.

The California Dept, of Corrections and Rehabilitation(CDCR)

11 is one entity.

The same information and the same conditions existed

12 before Petitioner was transferred to CMC-East.

Yet, "nobody"

13 questions the "fact," that CDCR Headquarters approved the transfer

14 with foreknowledge of Petitioner's Medcal Out of Court Settlement.

15 An later, again approved Petitioner for another transfer.

16 has transferred Petitioner "twice" (2) more.

An since

Yet defendant Haar's

17 whole argument was that Petitioner must be sent to Donovan Prison

18 for Medical Treatment.

6.)

CDCR, violated their own Regulations in addition to the

20 Settlement Agreement.

Without Life-Threatening Circumstances a

21 prisoner can refuse surgery.

The transfer was designed to continue

22 the pursuit of constant "retaliation" against Petitioner.

An to

23 have a "Chilling Effect" by manipulating and "intentional misreading"

24 of Petitioner's own Settlement Agreement.

Finally, defendant Haar's actions do not even pass the "Laugh Test."

26 The illegality and illogic would be so obvious, that any prison offi27 cial that was involved should have known they were breaking the law.

28 (Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed 2d 263 (1972);

(37)

Rushdan v. Haar

1 O'Keefe v. Van Boening 82 F. 3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) Sorrels,

2 290 F. 3d at 971.

(Also, in the current case, despite exact past circumstances,

4 prison officials "may not" defeat a "retaliation claim"... simply

5 by articulating a "general justification" for a "neutral" process,

6 when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

7 action was in retaliation for the exercise of a Constitutional right.

A.)

There is "no possible" was a trier of fact can misinterpret

9 the language of Petitioner's Out of Court Settlement Agreement.

10 would see that defendant Haar only used it as a shield for retalia11 tion against Petitioner.

His numerous lies prove that fact.

First

12 he claimed he didn't discuss the Grievance, then we find that he

13 and defendant Breen discussed everything.

B.)

Bruce, 351 F. 3d at 1289...."the policy against retaliation

15 applies "even" where the action taken would otherwise be permissible.

(Smith v. Maschner

899 F. 2d 940, 948 (10th Cir. 1990); accord

17 Woods v. Smith, 60 F. 3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995).

Bruce clearly has established that prison officials may not abuse

19 a valid procedure as a cover or a ruse to silence of punish a priso20 ner!

351 F. 3d at 1289.

Petitioner's Case is a "text book" example

21 of a blatant misuse of that standard.

Lastly, Petitioner has endured decades of this "pass the beck"

23 medical mis-treatment.

Petitioner seeks justice and accountability

24 for decades of wanton retaliation for his fight to correct a medical

25 condition caused by a CDCR doctor who wantonly excaberated miniscule

26 wounds.

For those reasons, in the interest of Justice this Writ should be

28 granted.

I pray this Honorable Court will also appoint Counsel.

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As Petitioner is sure this Honorable Court knows, I am no Attorney!

Petitioner did the best he could with available resources.

just recently gaining access to a typewriter,

even as I spent months preparing this Writ,

I'm in super-pain

Thank you for your

valuable time and consideration.

Under penalty of perjury the foregoing is true and correct.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

l)ggdL>

Date:

rYjGQ /, Z02.3

(39)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.