Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Derrick D. Hayes, Petitioner v. Illinois
Supreme Court briefApr 14, 2023
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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
’
200 East Capitol Avenue
SPRINGFIELD,'ILLINOIS 62701-1721
, • ;(217) 782-2035 ;
.
FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE
160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601-3103
(312) 793-1332
TDD: (312)793-6185
January 25, 2023
In re:
People State of Illinois, respondent, v. Derrick D. Hayes,
■ petitioner. Leave to appeal, Appellate Court, Fourth District.
129071
The Supreme Court today DENIED the Petition for Leave to Appeal in the above
entitled cause.
The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate Court on 03/01/2023.
Very truly yours
l*
Clerk of the Supreme Court
tXr
d
2022 11 App (4th) 210409
NO. 4-21-0409
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
FILED
October 6. 2022
Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
Court. IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Plaintiff-Appellee.
v.
DEREK D. HAYES.
.Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Sangamon County
No. I7CF635
Honorable
Raylcne Grischow,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
i;
In February 2021, a jury found defendant, Derek D. Hayes, guilty of first degree
murder (720 1LCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), Ending he personally discharged the firearm
resulting in the death of Sheena Malone, aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 1LCS 5/241.2(a)(2) (West 2016)), and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1),
(a)(3)(A-5) (West 2016)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of 55
years' imprisonment.
112
On appeal, defendant argues (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel
where counsel pursued a theory of second degree murder by provocation at trial and (2) the trial
court erred in denying his requested jury instruction for second degree murder. We disagree and
affirm.
11 3
I. BACKGROUND
‘.14
On May 30, 201 7, a vehicle stopped at the traffic light at the corner of 1st Street
and Ash Street in Springfield. Illinois. Attendees of a barbeque at the house of Sanatra Sullivan
heard sounds like fireworks, and witnesses saw a man leaning out the window of the vehicle with
a gun in hand. A bullet struck and killed Malone.
"i 5
A grand jury indicted defendant with one count of felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(3) (West 2016)) (count I). two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/241.2(a)(2) (West-2016)) (counts II and III), and one count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon
(720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) (West 2016)) (count IV).
16
17
A. Pretrial Motions
In March 2019, the State 11 led a motion to add two additional charges of first
degree murder, adding alternative theories of first degree murder. After a hearing, the court
allowed the Stale to add the two additional counts of first degree murder under the intentional
murder theory (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (a)( 1) (West 2016)) (count V) and the knowing murder theory
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2016)) (count VI). The State subsequently presented the charges to
a grand jury, who returned true bills of indictment on the two additional charges of first degree
murder.
18
In January 2020. defendant filed a motion in limine to present evidence of
collateral crimes. According to defendant, on August 25, 2016, defendant was in the Handy
Pantry located at Spring Street and Cook Street. He exited the store with a bottle of liquor and
noticed his car and brother were missing. An unknown individual struck defendant in the head
with a gun. Defendant received treatment for a laceration to his head as a result of the attack,
which left a scar. Police did not apprehend anyone in relation to the assault. The State offered no
objection, and the trial court allowed defendant's motion in limine. Subsequently, during a final
. *> .
pretrial hearing in February 2021. the .State inquired about any defense intent to submit lesser
included or lesser mitigated offense instructions—like second degree murder. Defense counsel
refused to say. arguing “trials are dynamic" and noting the distinction between required
disclosure of affirmative defenses and the possible tendering of lesser included offenses that
might become relevant as the trial progressed.
II 9
In November 2020. the Stale and defendant filed a joint .motion to dismiss count
1. which the trial court granted.
1110
On February 16, 2021. the State tiled an amended exhibit list, listing the exhibits
it intended to admit during trial. Included in the list was the “Recorded Interview of Defendant."
They previously filed additional discovery on February 11. listing “One CD Haves interview
Exhibit; Transcript—Consecutively numbered pages 1-42.“
B. Jury Trial
li 12
On February 22. 2021. defendant's jury trial began. During opening arguments,
defense counsel laid out the case as follows:
“Now, ladies and gentlemen, you might be taken aback to hear this from
me, [defendant’s] advocate, but [defendant] did in fact shoot and kill Sheena
Malone just as the State just told you they would prove. This trial is not some
kind of whodunit. We're not going to ask you to solve a crime.“
Counsel informed the jury its role was to “explain to you why [defendant] did just that.'- Counsel
named Mylas Donald as defendant's intended target and acknowledged defendant's accidental
shooting of Malone did not absolve him of criminal wrongdoing. Instead, counsel explained, “the
reason [defendant] shot and killed Ms. Malone is as equally important as the evidence that's
going to be presented to you that he's the one that did it."
-3-
1. Stale's Case
1 13
Sullivan lived at 1940 South 1st Street and was hosting a barbeque the day of the
11 14
incident to celebrate the birth of her granddaughter. Donald. Sullivan's brother, was present with
his girlfriend. Malone. Sullivan heard a noise which "at first sounded like fireworks, but then it
kept happening.” She looked up and “saw a guy shooting at [them].” Sullivan saw the gunman
“J hJanging out” of the front passenger window of a vehicle stopped at the stoplight. She did not
get a good look at the gunman but described him as a “younger” “dark-skinned” black male with
a lower haircut.
I is
Cassandra Rechner attended the barbeque at 1940 South 1st Street. Rechner heard
a loud bang, and Sullivan pushed Rechner and her child out of the way. Rechner testified she
saw a man holding a gun “hanging” out of the window of an older vehicle, but she did not see
the gunman's face.
Ill 6
Dashayaa Jones. Sullivan's daughter, was also living at 1940 South 1st Street.
-According to Jones, “a car rolled past” the house and “was sitting at the light” at the corner of 1st
Street and Ash Street, when “they just started shooting.” Jones described the vehicle as burgundy
or a “purple red.” The car was older with tinted windows and had black leather bra (a type of
covering over the nose of a vehicle) on the front. She believed an acquaintance's sister owned a
similar car. Jones saw the gunman leaning out of the window of the vehicle. She described him
as “a dark male with a low lade.” meaning “a black male and had a short haircut.” The gunman
was skinny, and Jones estimated him being between 20 and 25 years old.
1117
Brittney Splain, a neighbor of Sullivan's, heard gunshots and then witnessed a car
“speeding through a stop sign.” She described the car as “an older model, shade of purple, fourdoor car.”
-4-
IMS
Kevin Cash, a dispatcher in Sangamon County, received a 911 call related to the
incident. The Stale played a recording of the call for the jury.
1i i9
Jacob Ward, a police officer with the Springfield Police Department, responded to
a call about shots being fired. Ward arrived at 1940 South 1st Street, where a large group of
people surrounded Malone. Ward rendered aid until paramedics arrived and transported Malone
to the hospital. Once paramedics removed Malone from the scene. Ward attempted to speak with
witnesses. A recording of Ward's body-worn camera footage was played for the jury. On crossexamination, Ward stated he attempted to speak to Donald but “fh]e was very emotional and
angry, upset, and [Ward] was unable to speak with him clearly.” Donald was uncooperative and
threatened Ward.
120
Police officers collected video surveillance from a nearby businesses that showed
the suspect vehicle. The surveillance videos were played for the jury.
«,!21
Springfield police officer Robert Fleck testified how several days before the
shooting, he conducted a traffic.stop on a “purplish, four-door sedan*' with a black vinyl car bra
on the front. The driver of the car was Yvette Bustamante.
1122
123
2. Redactions
Before the jury was brought in on the second day of defendant's trial, defense
counsel brought to the court's attention the State's intent to redact two items from the recording
and transcript of defendant's interview with police—namely, two statements from police officers
during the interrogation that implied defendant was justified in shooting at Donald and that
defendant had no intention to shoot the girl. Defense counsel argued the Slate should not be
permitted to redact the statements and must play the interview in full. The Slate contended it was
presenting the interview to the jury because although he initially denied involvement, defendant
-5-
ultimately confessed to the shooting during the course of the interrogation, explaining it was the
result of being robbed nine months before. The Slate further argued defendant would have to
introduce the statements supporting his theory of the case during his own casc-in-chief. noting
how defendant's theory of defense acknowledged "he did commit the murder and this is why."
During the arguments of counsel, both sides acknowledged the defense theory was that the
shooting was “somehow justified or reasonable." After further argument, the court took the
matter under advisement.
1124
II 25
3. State's Case Continued
The parlies stipulated a 1995 Chevrolet Lumina was registered to Bustamante.
Bustamante then took the stand.
?26
Bustamante testified she owned a 1995 Chevrolet Lumina. which was “grayish"
in color, had tinted windows at one point, and had a car bra on the front. A few days before the
shooting, she received a traffic ticket for running a red light while driving the Lumina. Around
the time of the shooting, Bustamante and defendant were “messing around" and in a “romantic
involvement."
1127
Bustamante received a call from defendant and went to pick defendant and his
brother up. Defendant seemed “[r]egular" and not “particularly emotional." Defendant sat in the
front passenger seat, and his brother sat in the back seat. She took the pair to defendant’s mom's
house, and defendant went inside the house for a few minutes, then returned. She did not see
defendant carrying anything. Defendant's brother directed Bustamante where to drive until they
arrived at the stoplight at the corner of 1st Street and Ash Street. Bustamante stopped at the red
light, at which point she noticed defendant rolling down his window. She started to ask him why
since she had the air conditioning on when defendant “just started shooting." Defendant was
-6-
leaning out of the car and fired about six shots. Bustamante was in shock and “didn’t know what
was going on.” She “snapped out of it*’ after defendant’s brother told her to go. and she drove
off. After the shooting, defendant took the tint and car bra off Bustamante’s car, then they drove
the car to Missouri.
<,j28
When Bustamante arrived at court for her traffic violation, detectives asked to
speak to her about the Lumina. Initially, Bustamante lied and told them her transmission was
broken, but she'evenlually talked to detectives about the shooting. Bustamante retrieved the
Lumina. Before police collected the Lumina. defendant attempted to disable the car so it would
not start, cleaned it out. and washed it. Bustamante also agreed to assist in the investigation and
wear a listening device around defendant.
II 29
After Bustamante’s testimony, the court denied the Slate’s request to redact the
police officers’ statements and ruled the defendant’s interview should be played in its entirety if
the Stale intended to play it.
II 30
Detective Donald Edwards administered photo lineups to Sullivan and Jones.
Sullivan did not make any identification from the photo lineups. Jones thought two of the
subjects looked like the gunman but could not make a positive identification.
*ii 3 1
Detective Michael Mazrim of the Springfield Police Department investigated the
shooting. Through interviews and security camera footage, he was able to identify the suspect
vehicle as a 1995 Chevrolet Lumina registered to Bustamante. Alter speaking with Bustamante,
Mazrim obtained a warrant for the overhear, set up the covert recording device with Bustamante,
and helped her with a cover story to not arouse suspicion for her cooperation. The recordings of
the resulting conversations were played for the jury, and the jury was provided with a transcript.
At one point during the conversations. Bustamante slated, “It probably wouldn’t even be this bad
-7-
if you would’ve shot dude and not her, right?” Defendant responded. “I know this. Yvette.”
When talking about how they were going to clean the inside and outside of the car, presumably
to remove any evidence of gunshot residue, defendant mentioned how :‘l was out the window
when I did the s***.':
H32
The State rested without entering defendant's police interview into evidence.
133
4. Defendant's Case
134
Defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.
1 35
Defendant, after receiving admonishments, chose to testify. He testified about the
August 25, 2016. incident nine months before the shooting, l ie recounted how he and his brother
went to the Handy Pantry at Cook and Spring Streets in Springfield. Defendant went inside while
his brother waited in the car. When defendant came out of the Handy Pantry with a bottle of
liquor, he noticed the car and his brother were gone. At this point, an unknown individual struck
defendant in the head with a gun. He fell to the ground and dropped the bottle he was carrying.
Defendant got up to “charge" the assailant but found the assailant pointing the gun at him.
Defendant lied. He received treatment at the hospital for the wound on his head, which left a
scar. Defendant filed a police report, but to his knowledge, the crime was never solved.
136
On May 30, 2017. defendant received a call “stating that the guy that robbed me
was down the street from me." Defendant rode with Bustamante to his mom's house, where he
retrieved a gun. Defendant was only planning to confront the person but brought the gun because
he assumed the person who assaulted him would also be armed. When Bustamante stopped at a
red light, defendant, who was riding in the front passenger seat, saw the man he believed had
assaulted him. In defendant's words, “[0]nce 1 seen the guy, my emotions just took over, and 1
intended on trying to kill him.” Defendant began firing his gun. He never intended to hit Malone
-8-
and “felt terrible" when he learned she died. Defendant helped conceal Bustamante’s car because
he was scared qf being arrested. On cross-examination, defendant confirmed he did not know the
person he believed assaulted him was Donald at the time of the shooting but had learned
Donald’s name since the incident.
‘i 37
Springfield police officer Michael Brown testified he investigated the Handy
Pantry assault. After defendant’s report. Brown reviewed surveillance video from Handy Pantry
and confirmed defendant was struck by an unknown assailant with an object that appeared to be
a handgun. Defendant had a visible injury on his head from the assault. Brown stated no one was
ever arrested in connection with the assault and the crime was never solved.
1138
1i 39
5. Jury Ins!ructions and Closing Argument
Defense counsel moved for a jury instruction on second degree murder based on
provocation. In summary, defense counsel acknowledged the time between the armed robbery
and the shooting was longer than normally seen in cases of provocation but argued that seeing
the person who robbed and beat him on the day of the shooting “rekindled the defendant’s
passion’’ and was such that it was sufficient to “trigger the passion of a reasonable man’’ quoting
from Wayne LaPave’s treatise on substantive criminal law (see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 15.2(d) (3d ed. 2021)). As a result, defendant’s “emotion took over and he tried
to kill him.” thereby justifying a second degree murder instruction. The State maintained the
disproportionate nature of defendant’s retaliation to the initial provocation removed his conduct
from any consideration of a second degree murder instruction. They also argued the delay
between the provocation and the shooting was too long, and there was no clear evidence
defendant could even identify the person who originally struck him as the person he was
shooting at on the day in question. After extensive argument from both parties, the court
-9-
concluded il did not “believe the evidence supports the giving of a second-degree murder
instruction55 and denied the jury instruction.
1140
In closing argument, defense counsel reiterated defendant did in fact shoot and
kill Malone, but defendant chose to testify at his trial because “[h]e wanted [the jury] to know
why he killed Sheena Malone/5
1141
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, including a finding
defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused death to another person, aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon, and aggravated discharge of a firearm.
1M2
1i 43
C. Postlrial Motions and Sentencing
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, in part, the trial court erred
when it denied defendant's motion to instruct the jury on second degree murder on a theory of
provocation. The court denied defendant's motion.
144
The trial court determined defendant's other convictions merged into his first
degree murder conviction. For first degree murder, the court sentenced defendant to 30 years in
prison with a firearm enhancement of 25 years, for an aggregate term of 55 years' imprisonment.
1145
1146
1147
This appeal followed.
11. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant argues (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel
where counsel pursued a theory of second degree murder by provocation at trial and (2) the trial
court erred in denying his requested jury instruction for second degree murder. As an aside, we
note a defendant may have the right to argue inconsistent defenses at trial. See People v.
Wheeler, 200 III. App. 3d 301.558 N.E.2d 758 (1990). It seems a less tenable pursuit on appeal.
Defendant argues vociferously on the one hand counsel was ineffective for asserting second
- 10-
degree provocation, contending it was "patently untenable and doomed to fail” and “given the
caselaw and established authority, the judge was never going to grant the requested provocation
instructions" because “no law supported giving such instructions.1' Then, in the next breath.
defendant maintains the trial court committed not just error, but reversible error by refusing to
give the provocation instruction for which he had just contended there was no basis in “caselaw
and established authority”—meaning everything he just argued was not true and indeed there
was sufficient evidence and support in the law for the giving of such an instruction and it was
error for the court not to do so. Regardless, we take each argument in order.
1148
•J49
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant alleges defense counsel was ineffective for presenting a defense of
second degree murder under a theory of provocation, as defendant’s situation does not meet the
legal definition of provocation. Defendant contends, therefore, counsel pursued an invalid
defense that not only proved defendant’s guilt., “but did so at the expense of a valid and plausible
defense—challenging [defendant’s] identity as the shooter.” Defendant’s claim on appeal ignores
the record evidence of an extensive and aggressive defense mounted on his behalf by trial
counsel. It also.ignores the dynamics of the trial as it progressed. Prior to trial, defendant’s
counsel was confronted with the fact his client confessed to shooting at Donald who he believed
to be the person responsible for robbing and hitting him with a gun at the Handy Pantry nine
months before. The Stale previously tendered defendant’s interview and a transcript of the
interview in discovery and expressed their intention to use them in evidence at trial. Defendant
knew Detective Mazrim told the grand jury defendant admitted firing several shots in the
direction of the man who robbed him earlier. When defendant sought to have the incident at the
Handy Pantry ruled admissible at trial, the Stale did not oppose the request, noting their intention
to introduce it as well. Defendant was also aware Bustamante would be testifying about driving
him to the location, seeing him shoot from the passenger side window of the car. and the
conversations later when trying to hide or destroy evidence. Defendant’s choice of defense
strategy must be considered in light this evidence.
1i50
1. Standard of Review
A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the
1151
two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Veach,
2017 IL 120649. 'J 29. 89 N.E.3d 366. To prevail on such a claim, “a defendant must show both
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant.” People v. Petrenko, 237 III. 2d 490, 496, 93 I N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (2010). To establish
deficient performance, the defendant must show “counsefs performance ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.’ ” People v. Valdez, 2016 IL I 19860, ‘j 14. 67 N.E.3d 233 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Prejudice is established when a reasonable probability exists that,
but for counsefs unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
People v. Evans, 209 III. 2d 194, 219-20, 808 N.E.2d 939, 953 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the failure to
satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Clendenin,
238 111. 2d 302, 317-18. 939 N.E.2d 310, 319(2010).
1i52
“ ‘Effective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect
representation.
?
Evans, 209 III. 2d at 220 (quoting People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 491-92,
473 N.E.2cl 1227, 1240 (1984)). “Mistakes in trial strategy or tactics do not necessarily render
counsefs representation defective.” People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815,
10, 93
N.E.3d 664. “The decision to rely on one theory of defense to the exclusion of other theories of
- 12 -
defense is a matter of trial strategy.” People v. Clark. 207 111. App. 3d 439, 450, 565 N.E.2d
1373, 1380 (1991). The Illinois Supreme Court wrote. “We have also made it clear that a
reviewing court will be highly deferential to trial counsel on matters of trial strategy, making
every effort to evaluate counsel’s performance from his perspective at the time, rather than
through the lens of hindsight.” People v. Perry. 224 ill. 2d 312, 344, 864 N.E.2d 196, 216
(2007). “(l]n order to establish deficient performance, the defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that the challenged action or inaction may have been the product of sound trial
strategy. [Citations.] Matters of trial strategy are generally immune from claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Manning. 241 III. 2d 319,
327, 948 N.E.2d 542,547 (2011). it, i Only if counsel’s trial strategy is so unsound that he entirely
fails to conduct meaningful adversarial testing of the Slate’s case will ineffective assistance of
counsel be found.
?
People v. Peterson. 201 7 11,. 120331, *,j 80 (quoting Perry. 224 111. 2d at 355-
56). However, a counsel’s failure to understand the law can constitute deficient performance.
See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 192 111. 2d 93, 121,735 N.E.2d 616, 633 (2000).
1153
1154
2. Second Degree Murder by Provocation
We review the standard for finding a defendant guilty of second degree murder by-
provocation to explain counsel’s attempted trial strategy.
1i 55
A person is guilty of second degree murder when he commits the offense of first
degree murder and at the time of killing he (1) is acting under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or (2) he believes the circumstances
justify using self-defense, but his belief is unreasonable. People v. Blackwell, 171 111. 2d 338,
357, 665 N.E.2d 782, 790 (1996). Trial counsel presented a theory based on the former.
- 13 -
«}56
Serious provocation is defined as "conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion
in a reasonable person." 720 ILCS 5/9-2(b) (West 2016). The categories of provocation courts
have recognized as sufficient to warrant a second degree murder instruction based on serious
provocation are (1) mutual quarrel or combat. (2) substantial physical injury or assault, (3) illegal
arrest, and (4) adultery with the offender’s spouse. People v. Page, 193 Ill. 2d 120, 133, 737
N.E.2d 264, 272 (2000). However, serious provocation will only constitute a mitigating factor if
the killing occurs before the defendant has had enough time for tempers to cool. People v.
McDonald, 63 Ill. App. 2d 475, 479, 212 N.E.2d 299, 301 (1965). Whether a sufficient cooling
off period existed depends upon the magnitude of the provoking act and the degree to which
passions have heen aroused in the defendant. People v. Hudson, 71 III. App. 3d 504, 511, 390
N.E.2d 5, 10 (1979).
;
[N]o yardstick of time can be used by the court to measure a reasonable
period of passion but it must vary as do the facts of every case.' ” People v. Yarbrough, 269 111.
App. 3d 96, 101,645 N.E.2d 423, 426 (1994) (quoting People v. Harris, 8 Ill. 2d 431,435, 134
N.E.2d 315, 31 7 (1956)).
1157
In light of the evidence confronting defendant at trial, counsel’s strategy was to
convince the jury the assault nine months before, involving the threat with a gun, which resulted
in substantial physical injury to defendant, was serious provocation. On the date of the shooting,
being informed of the location of the person who robbed and pistol-whipped him nine months
before—a person who had not yet been apprehended for the crime—defendant’s observation of
the person who had done this to him was sufficient provocation for defendant to act under
sudden and intense passion and begin shooting at him. Under counsel’s theory, seeing his
assailant caused defendant to experience flashbacks to his assault, thereby causing an incident
from nine months before to result in a sudden and intense passion that led to the shooting.
- 14-
129071
4 .
S.
tX/vW
STATE OF ILLINOIS
APPELLATE COURT
CLERK OF THE COURT
(217)782-2586
FOURTH DISTRICT
20J W. MONROE STREET
SPRINGFIELD, IL 62704
RESEARCH DIRECTOR
(217) 782-3528
October 28, 2022
RE: People v. Hayes, Derrick D.
General No.: 4-21-0409
Sangamon County
Case No.: 17CF635
The Court today denied the petition for rehearing filed in the above entitled cause.. The mandate
of this Court will issue 35 days from today unless a petition for leave to appeal is filed in the
Illinois Supreme Court.
If the decision is an opinion, it is hereby released today for publication.
(mJU;
Clerk of the Appellate Court
c:
Jennifer Lynn Bontrager
Linda Susan McClain
■i
SUBMITTED - 20157008 - Alicia Corona - 11/3/2022 7:30 AM
129071
«*
People v. Hayes, 2022 IL App (4th) 210409
Decision Under Review:
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 17-CF635; the Hon. Raylene Grischow, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys
for
Appellant:
James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Jennifer L. Bontrager, of
State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys
for
Appellee:
Daniel K. Wright, State’s Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick
. Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Linda S. McClain, of State’s
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the
People.
-20-
SUBMITTED - 20157008 - Alicia Corona - 11/3/2022 7:30 AM
•V
*
J.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Date of Sentence: 6/9/2021
Defendant DOB: 8/16/93
Victim
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
^Sleo
)
)
)
)
)
)
VS.
DERRICK D. HAYES,
Defendant
6/14/2021 1:21 PM
Paul Palazzolo
7th Judicial Circuit
Sangamon County, IL
2017CF000635
CASE NO. 17-CF-635
JUDGMENT-SENTENCE TO ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
WHEREAS the above-named defendant has been adjudged guilty of the offenses enumerated below:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant be and hereby is sentenced to confinement in the Illinois Department of Corrections for the term of
years and months specified for each offense.
STATUTORY
DATE OF
vMSR
SENTENCE
CLASS
CITATION
OFFENSE
OFFENSE
COUNT
720 lLCS5/9-!(a)(l)
5/30/17
FIRST DEGREE
MURDER
and served at 100% pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3
I
55 Years
M
3 Years
The Court finds that the defendant is:
□
Convicted of a Class
offense but sentenced as a class X offender pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b).
0 The Court finds that the defendant is entitled to receive credit for time actually served in custody of 145J days as of the dale of this order
from 6/16/17-6/9/21. The defendant is also entitled to receive credit for the additional time served in custody from the date of tins order until
defendant is received at the Illinois Department of Corrections.
X The Defendant remained in continuous custody from the date of this order.
days from a release
The Defendant did not remain in continuous custody from the date of this order (Less
date of ______ to a surrender date of_________
resulted in great bodily
□ The Court further finds that the conduct leading to conviction for the offense(s) enumerated in count(s)
harm to the victim (730 FLOS 5/3-6-3(aX2)(iii)).
□ The Court further finds that the defendant meets the eligibility requirements for possible placement in the Impact Incarceration Program. (730
ILCS 5/5-4-l(a)).
□ The Court further finds that offense was committed as a result of the use of. abuse of, or addiction to alcohol or a controlled substance and
recommends the defendant for placement in a substance abuse program. (730 ILCS 5/5-4-l(a)).
□ The defendant successfully completed a full-time (60-day or longer) Pre-Trial Program___ Educational/Vocational.__ Substance Abuse;—
Behavior Modification__ Life Skills___ Re-Entry Planning - provided by the county jail while held in pre-trial detention prior to this commitment
and is eligible and shall be awarded additional sentence credit in accordance with 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4) for
.. .total number of days Oi program
participation, if not previously awarded.
□ The defendant passed the high school level test for General Education and Development (GED) on
_
while held in pre-trial
detention prior to this commitment and is eligible to receive Pre-Trial GED Program Credit in accordance with 7^0 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4.1).
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall be awarded 60 days of additional sentence credit, if not previously- awarded.
□ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed on count
County.
the Circuit Court of
D
be concurrent with the sentence imposed in Case Number
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that_____________________________________ —________ -— ---------------------------
The Clerk ofthe Court shell deliver a certified copy ofthis order to the Sheriff. The Sheriff shall take the defendant into custody and deliver
defendant to the Department of Corrections which shall confine said defendant until expiration of this sentence or until otherwise released by
operation of law.
This order is effective immediately.
}
ENTER:
DATE: 6/9/2021
Approved by Conference of Chief Judges 6-20-14 (rev. 10/23/15)
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xvXQj<i
(J)
Honorable Raylene D. Grischow
in
If
IN itiE CIRCUIT COURT OF SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
•'!» f-
PEOPLE OF.THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
VS.
DERRICK D. HAYES,
Defendant
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 17-CF-63S
OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF STATE’S ATTORNEY
PURSUANT TO 730 ILCS S/5-4-lfd)
NAME:
DERRICK D. HAYES
ALIASES:
CRIME(S):
FIRST DEGREE MURDER
PLEA:
S/16/93
DATE OF OFFENSE(S):
5/30/17
DATE OF SENTENCE:
6/9/2021
JAIL CREDIT DUE:
1451 Days
Jury
TYPE OF TRIAL:
SENTENCED):
DATE OF BIRTH:
55 Years DOC/3 Years MSR
CODEFEN DANT(S):
DISPOSITION OF CODEFENDANT(S):
STATE’S ATTORNEY:
Daniel K. Wright and First Assistant State’s Attorney Derek Dion
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Mark Wykoff
PRESIDING JUDGE:
Honorable Raylene D. Grischow
COMPLAINING WITNESS:
HISTORY OF PROBATION IN SANGAMON COUNTY:
AGENCY CONDUCTING PRE-TRIAL OR PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION:
Sangamon County Court Seivices
DESCRIPTION OF EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENSE:
Defendant, while committing a forcible felony, Aggravated Discharge of a Firearm, personally discharged a
firearm from a motor vehicle, striking Sheena Malone, who was not present in the vehicle, thereby causing the
death of Sheena Malone.
This official statement is hereby submitted in accordance with the provisions of 73
;,CS 5/5-4-l(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections.
Derek Di«
First Ass&ant State’s Attorney
Approved by Conference of Chief Jiriges 6-20-14 (rev. 10/23/15)
V
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.