Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Terrindez Xsidrick Bryant, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefMar 17, 2023

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NO. __________________

_____________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

______________________________________________________________________

TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT, Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX A

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________________________________________

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Counsel of Record

David R. Bungard

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

jonathan_byrne@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

United States v. Bryant, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2022)

2022 WL 17750684

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

Terrindez Xsidrick BRYANT, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 21-4460

Submitted: September 30, 2022

Decided: December 19, 2022

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at

Charleston. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (2:19-cr-00244-1)

Attorneys and Law Firms

ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston,

West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Ryan A. Keefe,

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston,

West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

*1 Terrindez Xsidrick Bryant appeals his 84-month sentence imposed following a guilty plea to

distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

On appeal, Bryant challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, contending that the

district court failed to address the merits of his argument for a downward variant sentence based on

the disparate treatment of methamphetamine offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm.

United States v. Bryant, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2022)

We “review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines

range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Torres-Reyes, 952

F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). In conducting this review, we must first ensure that the

sentence is procedurally reasonable, “consider[ing] whether the district court properly calculated

the defendant's advisory [G]uidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an

appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the

selected sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If “the district court has not committed

procedural error,” we then assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. United States v.

Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020). *

Bryant does not lodge a separate substantive reasonableness challenge on appeal.

To meet the procedural reasonableness standard, the district court must make an individualized

assessment based on the facts presented, state in open court the reasons supporting its chosen

sentence, address the parties’ non-frivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, and, if it

rejects them, explain why in a manner allowing for meaningful appellate review. United States v.

Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). “The adequacy of the sentencing court's explanation

depends on the complexity of each case.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir.

2017). “The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to

say, depends upon the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The sentencing

court's explanation need not be extensive, but the record must make clear that the judge actually

listened to, considered, and rendered a decision on the[ parties’] arguments such that [we] can

conduct a meaningful review of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 485

(4th Cir. 2018). Generally, an “explanation is sufficient if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines

the defendant's particular history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but

as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in response to defense counsel's arguments” in

mitigation.

Blue, 877 F.3d at 519 (cleaned up).

In evaluating a sentence, we “may not guess at the district court's rationale, searching the record

for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other clues that might explain

a sentence.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In certain circumstances, however, “[t]he context surrounding a district court's

explanation may imbue it with enough content for us to evaluate both whether the court considered

the § 3553(a) factors and whether it did so properly.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d

375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006).

*2 Although the district court rejected Bryant's argument that it should recalculate his offense

level based on perceived discrepancies in the Guidelines, noting its belief that Congress

or the Sentencing Commission should be the entities making these official adjustments, the

United States v. Bryant, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2022)

court recognized its authority to deviate from the Guidelines based on this discrepancy by

acknowledging that its brother courts had done so. In declining to follow these courts, the district

court did not indicate that it believed the Guidelines were mandatory but rather that granting a

variance on the proffered basis was not warranted.

However, the district court explained that it still gave Bryant's arguments “compelling weight”

as “at least a mitigating factor” for determining “where [Bryant] should be sentenced within the

[G]uidelines.” (J.A. 86). The court then imposed a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range,

stating its belief that the chosen sentence “under all the facts and circumstances of this case is

sufficient but not greater than necessary to adequately punish the defendant for his serious offense

behavior, to instill within the defendant and the public a proper respect for the law, and to provide

for a proper period of incapacitation and rehabilitation.” (J.A. 93-94). Thus, the court made clear

that it had listened to and considered Bryant's arguments, but ultimately weighed them differently

than he urged. We find that the district court's explanation for declining to impose a variant sentence

does not amount to procedural error.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

All Citations

Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2022 WL 17750684

End of Document

NO. __________________

_____________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

______________________________________________________________________

TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT, Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX B

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________________________________________

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Counsel of Record

David R. Bungard

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

jonathan_byrne@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

In United States against Cooper, 410 F. Supp. 3d 769,

Judge Goodwin indicated that listing the crime of conspiracy

in the commentary does more than interpret or explain the

guideline text and instead adds an entirely new offense to

the definition of crimes of violence.

is plainly inconsistent with the text of the guidelines and

any inconsistency should be in favor of the text.

was the decision by Judge Chambers in United States v. Bond,

418 F. Supp. 3d 121.

Thus, the commentary

Similar

I think we've got some pretty clear and district law on

this point and I'm going to follow those decisions and I

think they're consistent with evolving Circuit Court

decisions such as United States v. Nasir, N-a-s-i-r, at 982

F.3d 144.

So, I believe that since this -- the conspiracy here is

an inchoate offense and it's not to be included in the

definition of predicate crimes where the career offender

status under Section 4B1.2(b).

reasons, the objection of the government is overruled.

Therefore, for all of these

Mr. Bungard, did that get it?

Mr. Bungard, do you want to address your objections?

MR. BUNGARD:

Yes, Your Honor.

Let me start with

the calculation of the Base Offense Level.

for this objection is that with the probation officer's

utilization of the ICE guideline the starting Base Offense

And the basis

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

Level in this case is 26.

of meth, the starting Base Offense Level would drop to an

18.

If it was considered as a mixture

So, it's a pretty significant jump here.

And the problem with using the ICE guideline, I think,

goes back to the fact that when this guideline was created

the Sentencing Commission used the same logic that they did

when they established the crack cocaine guideline.

the standard based upon the mandatory minimums that were

going to be imposed.

the fact that there's a five-year mandatory minimum if you

are -- if you are stuck -- if you are caught distributing

five grams of ICE versus -- and the same amount -- the

amount for mixed meth would be 50 grams.

the 10:1 comes from.

study or anything like that.

analysis was criticized by the Supreme Court in Kimbrow

where the 100:1 ratio for crack to powder offenses, that

distinction was found not to be reasonable and the District

Courts had the discretion to vary downward in that.

They set

So the 10:1 ratio actually comes from

So, that's where

It doesn't come from any empirical

And that type of ratio-based

I would just note that on the crack guideline today

there is legislation pending in Congress that may ultimately

direct that there is no more disparity between crack and

powder, that that actually may go to a 1:1.

that it's taken almost 40 years for that to happen

demonstrates that, just the fact that the Sentencing

But the fact

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

Commission may have decided something years ago doesn't mean

it needs to stay the same over time.

The other problem is, is that this type of ratio no

longer reflects the culpability of someone like Mr. Bryant

who was not involved with the production of meth, who was

just basically a distributor, and I think if you look at how

the cases were initially prosecuted back in the 2000s,

anybody that was charged with a meth case was basically

making it themselves in their houses.

cook recipe and, half the time, they ended up burning their

houses down because they didn't get it right.

THE COURT:

MR. BUNGARD:

They were using a

And injuring their children, right?

And potentially inuring folks, too,

that's correct, Your Honor.

But the quality of meth that was -- that came out at

that time was very poor.

people on home cooks making ICE.

25-30 percent meth out of it, depending on if they knew what

they were doing.

It was not -- you didn't get these

They were lucky to get

But that's not the case today because of the

restrictions that the West Virginia Legislature and other

states have put on the ability of people to go in and

purchase pseudoephedrine.

that could do home cooks.

That limits the amount of people

But the other fact is that meth is being imported today

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

from labs outside of the country.

point down to where ICE is no longer the expensive product

that it was, and it's cheaper for people to buy it being

imported than trying to make it themselves.

THE COURT:

They've brought the price

You've got a lab report in this case

that shows that this was ICE, right?

MR. BUNGARD:

Yes.

That's correct, Your Honor,

yes.

memorandum that the DEA has said that all samples of meth

that came in in 2018 measured 97.2 percent of purity.

that's the -- that is the product that's on the market right

now that people are using.

guideline was originally set up, you know, some 20 years

ago.

And also, I think I mentioned in my sentencing

So,

It wasn't like that when the

The other factor that I would ask the court to consider

is that the decision to test for meth purity is arbitrary

and it varies case to case depending on whether the lab --

the drugs were sent to the West Virginia State Police Lab,

which will simply test to see if the product contains

methamphetamine.

They will not do a purity analysis.

If the drugs are sent out of state as they were in this

case to a DEA lab, then they are tested for purity.

you've got some instances where some defendants are subject

to this higher purity amount just because of where the lab

work was sent, as opposed to anything they did in the case.

So,

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

I would just point out that we do have three district

judges in this district that have agreed that the 10:1 ratio

is outdated and it's not worthy of deference.

sentencing folks treating ICE meth within the mixed meth

guideline.

And they are

So, I would ask the court to consider that.

Now, with respect to the second objection that I had

with respect to the conversion of money, the first -- the

first part of that is that the $230 that's being considered,

the government does not have sufficient evidence to show

that that cash actually constituted drug proceeds and the

burden is on the government to do that.

The case that I cited in my memorandum, the Hicks case,

had vastly different facts where you had a defendant that

had hundreds of thousands of dollars in his house with a lot

of drugs and an admission that the cash came from

transactions that he had sold drugs in the past.

You don't have that evidence here.

There's no -- the

only drugs that -- there were no drugs found on Mr. Bryant's

person when he got pulled over.

at the house.

is an ordinary amount of money that most people probably

have in their wallets.

that should be converted to drugs or one would think that

that's readily provable that that's drug money.

And Mr. Bryant was never questioned by the police about what

All the drugs had been left

You know, the sum of $230 is, I would submit,

It's not automatically something

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

that money was, so you don't have any information that

suggests that the money should be converted.

THE COURT:

debriefed after he agreed to plead guilty?

Was he asked about it when he was

MR. BUNGARD:

Your Honor.

THE COURT:

MR. BUNGARD:

THE COURT:

The other part is to the extent that

There's no plea agreement here; is

that right?

Oh, okay.

the court --

He was not debriefed in this case,

MR. BUNGARD:

There is no plea agreement, that's

correct.

THE COURT:

MR. BUNGARD:

Okay, yeah.

That's correct.

And should the court decide to use the ICE guideline,

my fallback objection is, if the court is going to consider

the cash, that the cash should not be considered as being

converted to ICE because, again, there's no evidence that

that money came from ICE, as opposed to any other drug.

And I would just note that in cases where we've had

historical evidence of people being involved in meth in the

past or as relevant conduct where there's no lab report that

says the purity, that meth is simply treated as a mixture

meth.

So, here --

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

THE COURT:

While there's a thought in my mind, I

just said a few minutes ago that I was going to follow the

decisions of my brother judges on the -- on the earlier

point, the commentary and its impact.

them on this point.

I hesitate to follow

I think this is a different situation.

Here -- here, they're just basically arbitrarily

changing what the guidelines are and, in that situation,

they were making a decision whether and to what effect they

should -- to what extent they should give effect to the

commentary note.

I'm -- my hands aren't tied on this point by the ruling I

made on the other point a minute ago.

that clear on the record.

You can go ahead.

MR. BUNGARD:

So, I just want to make clear that I think

Yes, sir.

I just want to make

To the extent the court

finds that, what I'm asking the court to consider, if you're

going to consider the money at all, would be to consider it

at a mixed mixture amount, and that would not elevate his

Offense Level above a 26.

of a 28 if the $230 is converted to mixed amount.

THE COURT:

So, he would stay at a 26 instead

Okay.

Let me hear from the government

on these points.

MR. KEEFE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

The government

agrees with the Probation Office and the fact remains that

the sentencing guideline 2D1.1 is still valid.

That's the

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

law.

nothing that the government can say about that.

That's -- that's on the books.

So, there's really

And in the government's eye, it's not really the

defendant who has been victimized or treated unfairly due to

the disparity in terms of the ICE or actual versus the

mixture.

been more victimized by more pure meth that's been coming in

from out of state, out of country labs and, frankly, the

defendant's receiving the benefit of that by selling a

better, more potent product.

It's really the communities at large that have

So, the government does believe that this confirmed --

I believe it's 87 percent purity methamphetamine ICE should

count as ICE.

In terms of the money that the defendant was

mentioning, the case agent indicated that the defendant had

previously sold to the CI for this case about a week or so

prior to this offense, prior to him being found with the

$230 on him, in addition to the buy money.

Probation Office notes, the defendant was not employed at

the time of this offense.

that this money should be attributed to drug weight.

THE COURT:

And, as the

So, the government does believe

All right.

The court is going to

sustain the objection to the conversion of the $230 to

methamphetamine weight here.

amount of money inconsistent with the -- with, in the

It's a -- it is a rather small

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

court's experience, with the amounts of cash that are found

on people who are dealing drugs.

argument to say that this may not have come from drug

proceeds and I think it has to be proven in order to be

counted.

proceeds of drug sales.

I think it's a rational

I believe there's insufficient proof that it was

The defendant was not questioned about the source of

the $230 by law enforcement.

He never admitted it was

proceeds from drug dealing.

And it's not so large an amount

of money for the court to circumstantially conclude it was

drug proceeds.

So, that objection is sustained.

And that reduces the

total drug weight here to 28.02 grams resulting in a Base

Offense Level of 26.

I'm going to deny the objection based on the 10:1

calculation.

pure methamphetamine.

Here, the lab analysis showed that this was

I respectfully disagree with my brother judges on the

role of the court in situations like this.

perceived unfairness is to be corrected, it's up to Congress

and the Sentencing Commission to do so.

with the courts changing it arbitrarily by their judicial

decisions.

I think if the

I have a problem

I think this would amount to an arbitrary judicial

amendment of the guidelines and I think if the guidelines

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

are to be amended, Congress and the Sentencing Commission

ought to be the ones to do so.

objection.

So, I'm going to deny that

I do think, however, that the argument contains

compelling weight and should be considered by the court as

at least a mitigating factor when I look at the guidelines

and where the defendant should be sentenced within the

guidelines.

I'm not sure there was a motion for a downward variance

based on this argument, but if there is, I think at least by

implication there is, and the court would deny any motion

for a downward variance here, but I believe that the point

here is mitigating and should be given serious consideration

in selection of the point within the guidelines where the

defendant is to be sentenced.

Is there anything else the court needs to rule on

before we proceed with the sentencing?

MR. KEEFE:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Bungard?

MR. BUNGARD:

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Mr. Bryant, pursuant to the sentencing

guidelines at your original plea hearing, I deferred the

adjudication of guilt pending receipt of the Presentence

Report.

Having now received that report and ruled upon the

Ayme A. Cochran, RMR, CRR (304) 347-3128

NO. __________________

_____________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

______________________________________________________________________

TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT, Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX C

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________________________________________

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Counsel of Record

David R. Bungard

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

jonathan_byrne@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

Case 2:19-cr-00244 Document 50 Filed 08/26/21 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 161

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Southern District

of West

Virginia

__________

District

of __________

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT

THE DEFENDANT:

✔ pleaded guilty to count(s)

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: 2:19-cr-00244

USM Number: 07666-088

David R. Bungard

Defendant’s Attorney

1 of a 1-count superseding indictment

G pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

which was accepted by the court.

G was found guilty on count(s)

after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section

Nature of Offense

Offense Ended

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

Distribution of 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, its

6/24/2019

Count

salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through

the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to

G The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

G Count(s)

G is

G are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence,

or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution,

the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

8/16/2021

Date of Imposition of Judgment

Signature of Judge

David A. Faber, Senior United States District Judge

Name and Title of Judge

8/26/2021

Date

Case 2:19-cr-00244 Document 50 Filed 08/26/21 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 162

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in Criminal Case

Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT

CASE NUMBER: 2:19-cr-00244

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a

total term of:

84 months

✔ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

that the defendant (1) be incarcerated at the nearest suitable facility to Logan County, West Virginia; (2) receive

intensive drug counseling and treatment, or such drug treatment as may be available; (3) receive a mental health

evaluation; and (4) receive an orthopedic evaluation (in regards to problems with his shoulder).

✔ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

G The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

G at

G a.m.

G p.m.

G as notified by the United States Marshal.

G The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

G before 2 p.m. on

G as notified by the United States Marshal.

G as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Case 2:19-cr-00244 Document 50 Filed 08/26/21 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 163

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT

CASE NUMBER: 2:19-cr-00244

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of:

4 years

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from

imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

G The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse. (check if applicable)

You

must

make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of

restitution. (check if applicable)

G You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check if applicable)

G You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as

directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where you

reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)

G You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check if applicable)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached

page.

Case 2:19-cr-00244 Document 50 Filed 08/26/21 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 164

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT

CASE NUMBER: 2:19-cr-00244

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed

because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation

officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

10.

11.

12.

13.

You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your

release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time

frame.

After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and

when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.

You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the

court or the probation officer.

You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying

the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72

hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to

take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses

you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10

days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of

becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been

convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the

probation officer.

If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was

designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without

first getting the permission of the court.

If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may

require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the

person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.

You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this

judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview of Probation and Supervised

Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature

Date

Case 2:19-cr-00244 Document 50 Filed 08/26/21 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 165

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3C — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT

CASE NUMBER: 2:19-cr-00244

ADDITIONAL STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant shall comply with the Standard Conditions of Supervision adopted by the Southern District of West Virginia

as contained in Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3 as follows:

1) If the offender is unemployed, the probation officer may direct the offender to register and remain active with Workforce

West Virginia.

2) Offenders shall submit to random urinalysis or any drug screening method whenever the same is deemed appropriate

by the probation officer and shall participate in a substance abuse program as directed by the probation officer. Offenders

shall not use any method or device to evade a drug screen.

3) As directed by the probation officer, the defendant will make copayments for drug testing and drug treatment services at

rates determined by the probation officer in accordance with a court-approved schedule based on ability to pay and

availability of third-party payments.

4) A term of community service is imposed on every offender on supervised release or probation. Fifty hours of community

service is imposed on every offender for each year the offender is on supervised release or probation. The obligation for

community service is waived if the offender remains fully employed or actively seeks such employment throughout the

year.

5) The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon (i.e.,

anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person

such as nunchakus or tasers), and shall reside in a residence free from such items.

6) The defendant shall not purchase, possess, or consume any organic or synthetic intoxicants, including bath salts,

synthetic cannabinoids, or other designer stimulants.

Case 2:19-cr-00244 Document 50 Filed 08/26/21 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 166

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT

CASE NUMBER: 2:19-cr-00244

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS

5HVWLWXWLRQ

Assessment

$ 100.00

)LQH

G The determination of restitution is deferred until

-97$$VVHVVPHQW

$9$$$VVHVVPHQW

. An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C) will be

entered after such determination.

G The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in

the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid

before the United States is paid.

Name of Payee

TOTALS

Total Loss***

0.00

Restitution Ordered

Priority or Percentage

0.00

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the

fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject

to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

G the interest requirement is waived for the

G the interest requirement for the

G fine

G restitution.

G restitution is modified as follows:

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on

or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

Case 2:19-cr-00244 Document 50 Filed 08/26/21 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 167

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: TERRINDEZ XSIDRICK BRYANT

CASE NUMBER: 2:19-cr-00244

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

✔ Lump sum payment of $ 100.00

✔

not later than

in accordance with G C,

due immediately, balance due

, or

G D,

G E, or

G Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

G Payment in equal

✔ F below; or

G C,

G D, or

G F below); or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a

term of supervision; or

G Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from

imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay at that time; or

✔ Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

If not paid immediately, the defendant shall pay any remaining balance of the $100 special assessment in

payments of $25 per quarter through participation in the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program. Any remaining balance shall be paid during the term of supervised release in payments of not less than

$25 per month commencing 30 days after release from imprisonment.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during

the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate

Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

G Joint and Several

Case Number

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names

(including defendant number)

Total Amount

Joint and Several

Amount

Corresponding Payee,

if appropriate

G The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

G The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

G The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment,

(5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of

prosecution and court costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.