Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ernest Adimora-Nweke, Petitioner v. Steven C. McCraw, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 14, 2022

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Supreme CourtTus"

FILED

NOV 1 4 2022

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SmCEOFTHECLERK

Ernest Adimora-Nweke,

Petitioner,

vs.

Texas Department of Public Safety, Harris County, et al

Respondent(s).

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Ernest Adimora-Nweke

Texas State Bar Number: 24082602

c/o Adimora Law Firm

3050 Post OakBlvd., Suite 510

Houston, TX 77056

281-940-5170 (Office)

ernest@adimoralaw.com

Pro Se Petitioner

In forma Pauperis

Issues Presented

(1) Whether Petitioner’s in forma pauperis status from state court applies post

removal to Federal Court.

(2) Whether Petitioner’s appeal was in good faith (i.e., not frivolous)

A. Whether Petitioner failed to state a federal civil rights claim, inter alia.

Whether Texas Department of Public Safety’s DIC-24 statutory warning form.

required for implied consent to breath or blood draw of subjects, is void of due

process fair notice for non-compliance with Tex. Transp. Code §724.015(a)(6) &

§724.015(a)(8); & warrant the proposed class action injunction & rectification.

II.

Whether probable cause hearings in Harris County are irreparably &

harmfully void of due process for these customs and practices on citizens: (1)

denial of hearing rebuttal rights for the accused, (2) denial of counsel rights for

the accused, and (3) denial of impartial magistrate & tribunal rights; and inter

alia, warrant the proposed class action injunction and rectification.

III.

Whether judicial and prosecutorial absolute immunity, a fallacyfundamental error since 1607, must be abolished, or rendered inapt in

Petitioner’s federal civil rights claims: per Magna Carta Art(s). 39 & 40; Bowser

v. Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (1482); Decl. of Ind.; U.S. Const. Amd. V & XIV; 42.

U.S.C. §1983; Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1869); Bass u. Hoagland,

172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Circ. 1949), Villages of Willowbrook u. Olech, 528 U. S.

562 (2000); & Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020).

B. Whether Petitioner merited independent action, class action, & claims severance.

II.

List of Parties

Petitioner: Ernest Adimora-Nweke.

Respondent(s): Texas Dept, of Public Safety (“TxDPS”) & Harris County (“HC”).

Unserved & putative defendants:

• HC District Attorney’s Office

• HC District Attorney Kim Ogg

• Houston Police Department (“HPD”)

• Hannah O. Yarbrough-Smith

• Jarrod T. Walker

• Damiola Fola Akinfolain

• Former HPD Officer J.J. Barbar

• HPD Officers E.A. Blenton

• HPD Officer J.D. Tallant

• HPD Officer M. Meyer

• HPD Officer M.A. Reyes

• HPD Officer Z. Wang

• Former HPD Officer D.R. Daniel III

• HC Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Veronica Nelson

• Former HC ADA John Patrick Denholm II

• Former HC ADA Elizabeth D. Barron

• Former HC ADA & current HC magistrate judge, Eva G. Flores

• CWS Galleria, 5250, L.P.

• HC Deputy Constable Chad Schoenvogel

• HC Deputy Constable Carmelo Aponte

• Former HC District Court Judge Randy Roll

• HC ADA Jennifer Lawrence

• HC ADA R. Allen Otto

• Former HC ADA Edekel Tecle

• HC Criminal Court at Law Judge Tonya Jones

• HC District Court Judge Barbara J. Stalder

III.

Related Cases

• Adimora-Nweke v. McGraw, U.S. 5th Circ. Case No. 22-20472, Filed on 9/14/2022.

• Adimora-Nweke v. McGraw, U.S. 5th Circ. Case No. 22-20269, Filed on 6/7/2022.

o Judgment of Dismissal for Failure to Pay Appeal Fee on 8/15/2022.

• Adimora-Nweke v. McGraw et al, USDC#: 4:22-cv-00765, Filed on 3/10/2022.

o Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice on 5/25/2022.

• Adimora-Nweke, Ernest v. McGraw, Steven C. (Director of Texas Department of

Public Safety), Independent Action in Equity Cause # 202209293, HC Dist. Court

133, Filed on 2/15/2022. (Transferred to HC Dist. Crt 234; Removed on 3/10/2022)

• Adimora-Nweke v. Yarbrough-Smith et al, USDC#: 4:22-cv-04149, Filed on

12/4/2020. (Original Removed Action)

o Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice on 12/27/2021.

o Denied Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 59 Motion for Reconsideration on 1/26/2022.

• Adimora-Nweke, Ernest v. Yarbrough-Smith, Hannah O., Cause # 202056824, HC

Dist. Court 234, Filed on 9/15/2020. (Original Action; Removed on 12/4/2020)

iii

IV.

Table of Contents

Issues Presented............................

II.

List of Parties..................................

iii

III.

Related Cases...................................

iii

IV.

Table of Contents...........................

Table of Authorities.......................

VI.

Petition for Writ Of Certiorari

VII.

Opinions Below............................... .

VIII.

Jurisdiction.........................................

IX.

Provisions Involved.....................

□ APPX. CITATION #

Statement of the Case

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

By ultimately denying Petitioner his due process petition right to proceed

in forma pauperis in trial court and appellate court, simply due to lack of

funds, the Federal Fifth Circuit (a) departed from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings, and sanctioned such a departure by the trial

court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power; (b)

effectively decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts

with a decision by a state court of last resort; (c) effectively decided an

important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled

by this Court; & (d) effectively decided an important federal question in a

way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court

Issue 1 ...............................................................................

Issue 2(A)(1).......................................................................

Issue 2(A)(II)....................................................................

Issue 2(A)(III)...................................................................

Issue 2(B)..........................................................................

XI.

Conclusion & Relief Requested..........................

XII.

Proof Of Service...........................................................

XIII.

Appendix

□ Cited “RELATED WRIT” OF CERT. APPENDIX (due on Fed. 5th

Circ. Cause 22-20472) NOTICE(D), Pg 3 & Fn. 1

Table of Authorities

Cases

Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d. 619, 632 - 634 (7th Circ. 1973)

Adimora-Nweke v. McGraw, Case No. 22-20269, Filed on

6/7/2022, U.S. Fed. 5th Circ.

Adimora-Nweke v. McGraw, USDC# 4:20-CV-4149, S.D. TX,

Filed 12/4/2020

Adimora-Nweke et al v. Harris Health System et al, USDC#

4:22-CV-04532, S.D. TX, Houston, Removal Filed 12/15/2022

Adimora-Nweke v. Yarbrough, Case No. 21-0800, Filed on

9/20/2021, Texas Supreme Court

Armstrong u. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-552 (1965)

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-1953 (2009)

Baker u. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 - 407 (Tex. 1979)

BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC., 519

S.W.3d 76, 78 (Tex. 2017)

Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Circ. 1949)

BEK Constr. V. NLRB, 536 US 516, 525 (2002)

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)

Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737

(2020)

Bowser v. Collins, Y.B.Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pi. 11 (1483)

Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 343 (1871)

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)

Cary u. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845)

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)

Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. u. Nelson, 889 S.W.2d 312,

318 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 - 486 & 490 (1965)

Driscoll v. Superior Court of Madera County, 2014 WL

333411 (January 30, 2014, Cal. App. 5 Dist.)

Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, fn 11 (11th Cir. 1985)

Eisen u. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607)

Franks u. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 166 — 171 (1978)

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573 (1973)

Gideon u. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)

Grannis u. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914)

Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)

Page(s)

16, 25, 35

4, 20

15, 16

16, 17, 18, 25, 28,31,

32, 34

5, 17

18, 27, 34

15, 33

28, 30, 34

17, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34

16, 22

18, 31

30, 31

14, 16, 17

30, 31, 32

15, 21

26, 28

Hazel-Atlas Co. u. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 - 245

(1944)

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994)

Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F.Supp. 163, 167 (M.D. Fla. 1972)

In re Ernest Adimora-Nweke, Cause No: 22-20472, Filed on

9/14/2022, Fed. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals

In Re John V.N. Yates

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)

Mahone v. Addicks Util Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921,

932 (5th Circ. 1988)

Marshall v Jerrico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-348 (1976)

Miller v. Seeve, (2 Black. Rep. 1141.)

Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)

Milner u. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011)

Mitchell v. Foster, 12 Adolphus Ellis, 472

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,

314(1950)

People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d

66, 69 - 70 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist., 1994)

Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 657 (1912)

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967)

Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914)

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)

Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 74 U.S. 532 (1868)

Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972)

Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900)

Ross v. Nat'l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197

S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex. 2006)

Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868)

Sheldon et al v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850)

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)

The Marshal Sea Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610), 77

Eng. Rep. 1027, 1035 (K.B. 1613)

Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986)

Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Circ. 2011)

U.S. v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 44-46 (1998)

United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters 709, 31 U.S. 691 (1832)

Villages of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 (2000)

Walden v. Craig's Heirs, 14 Peters 147, 39 U.S. 147 (1840)

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)

Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johnson 282, 291 (N.Y. 1810)

21, 26, 28, 29

5, 16

1, 4, 20, 22, 26, 29,

34, 35, 38

16, 17, 23

16, 18, 22, 27, 28

25, 27, 28

21, 26, 28, 32

18, 31

29, 30, 32

17, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34

28, 31, 34

29, 32

30, 32

17, 18, 19

28, 35

25, 29

30, 32

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)

Zeigler v. Jackson, 638 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. Unit B March

1981)

Statutes

28 U.S.C. §1254.

28 U.S.C. §455(a)

28 U.S.C. §455(b)(1)

29 U.S.C. §1291.

42 U.S.C. §1983

42 U.S.C. §1985

42 U.S.C. §1986

42 U.S.C. §1988

Tex. R. App. Pro. Rule 20.1 & 20.1(b)(1)

Tex. Code of Crim. Pro Art. 36.17

Tex. Code of Crim. Pro Art. 28.01, §2

Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 18.01(b)

Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 18.01Q)

Tex. Gout. Code §33.006

Tex. Transp. Code §724.015(a)

Tex. Transp. Code §724.015(a)(1)

Tex. Transp. Code §724.015(a)(2)

Tex. Transp. Code §724.015(a)(6)

Tex. Transp. Code §724.015(a)(7)

Tex. Transp. Code §724.031

Tex. Transp. Code §724.041

Tex. Transp. Code §724.046

Tex. Transp. Code §724.046(a)-(c)

Tex. Transp. Code §724.048(a)-(c)

Tex. Transp. Code Ch. 724, Subchapter C

Tex. Transp. Code Ch. 724, Subchapter D

Tex. Transportation Code §724.001(7)

Tex. Transportation Code § 724.002

Tex. Transportation Code §724.003

Tex. Transportation Code §724.011

Tex. Transportation Code §724.015(a)(l)-(a)(8)

Tex. Transportation Code §724.032(d)

Tex. Transportation Code §724.033(b)

U.S. Const. Amend. I

U.S. Const. Amend. TV

vii

16, 27

Page(s)

3, 4, 11, 13, 14, 16,

19, 23, 26, 28, 29, 33,

34, 35, 36, 37, 28

3, 4, 11, 21, 29

21, 22

14, 15

11-16

13, 14

11, 13

12, 14

12, 14, 17

11, 12

11, 13

5, 16

U.S. Const. Amend. V

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

16, 34

3, 5, 8, 14, 16, 28, 29,

34, 35

5, 35

Page(s)

U.S. Const. Art III, §1

U.S. Const. Art III, §2

Rules of Procedure

Fed. R. App. Pro. Rule 24(a)(1)

Fed. R. App. Pro. Rule 24(a)(3)

Fed. R. App. Pro. Rule 24(a)(3)(A)

Fed. R. App. Pro. Rule 24(a)(5)

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 21

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 23

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 23(a)

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 23(b)

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 23(c)

U.S. Supreme Court Rule 10

U.S. Supreme Court Rule 14.1(f)

Legislative History

The Congressional Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Session. (1871) (Rep.

Platt, Rep. Rainey, Rep. Beatty, Rep. Garfield, Sen. Thurman,

Rep. Lewis, & Rep. Arthur’s congressional remarks — judicial

immunity unavailable for state court judges under Civil Rights

Act of 1871; congress also intended Civil Rights Act as a

specific remedy to harassment litigation and unjust

prosecution injustices in southern courts.)

United States Senate, Federal Bail Procedures: Hearings before

the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the

Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the

Committee on the Judiciary, pg. 123; 89th Congress, 1st session

on S. 1357, S. 646, S. 647, and S. 648; June 15, 16, and 17

(1965)

Articles

Robert Craig Waters, Judicial Immunity Vs. Due Process When

Should A Judge Be Subject To Suit (cato.org), Pgs. 461 - 474, Cato

Journal, Vol.7, No.2 (Fall 1987). Avail. Online at:

https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/catoiournal/1987/ll/ci7n2-13.pdf

Robert S. Irving, Courts—Judicial Immunity—Prospective Relief

and Attorney's Fees Allowed, Pgs. Pgs. 31 - 47, 8 U. ARK. LITTLE

ROCK L. REV. 31 (1985). Avail. Online at:

https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1643&co

ntext=lawreview

U.S. Declaration of Independence Preamble, 7/4/1776

vii

Page(s)

33, 34

3, 5, 19

Page(s)

29, 30

29, 30, 31

VI.

Petition for Writ Of Certiorari

Pro se & in forma pauperis Petitioner, Ernest Adimora-Nweke, respectfully

petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review (a) the 8/15/2022 judgmentmandate of the Fed. 5th Circ Appeals denying in forma pauperis Petitioner’s appeal.

in cause 22-20269, for failure to pay appeal fee; (b) the 5th Circ’s subsequent orders

denying reinstatement, reconsideration, transfer, & expedited appeal; (c) the

applicable District Court’s challenged judgments & orders in causes 4:22-CV-00765

& 4:20-CV-04149; & (d) Petitioner’s “Related Writ” of Certiorari on a 28 U.S.C. §1651

petition, cause 22-20472 from Fed. 5th Circ1; & thereafter, grant reliefs sought.

VII.

Opinions Below (all unpublished)

The 5th Cir Appeals decision denying Petitioner’s appeal, post

Petitioner’s FRAP 24(a) motion(s), is attached at Appendix Pg. ("Appx.,") 6—7.

5th Circ’s orders denying reopen, reconsideration, reinstatement, & expedited

appeal, are attached at Appx. 1—5. Dist. Court’s order denying Petitioner’s

FRAP 24(a) motion is attached at Appx., 15—16. Dist. Court’s dismissal of the

appealed independent action (USDC# 4:22-CV-00765) is at Appx., 17—21. The

magistrate’s dismissal recommendation & opinion, dismissal w/ prejudice

order & judgment, & order denying reconsideration & further motions, from

the original action (USDC# 4:20-CV-04149), are at Appx., 28—52.

1 See, In re Ernest Adimora-Nweke, “APPELLANT’S FRAP Rules 2. 21(c). 27. & 47.7 Motion for In

forma Pauperis, & Extraordinary Writ.” Doc. 00516471675, Cause No: 22-20472, Filed on 9/14/2022,

Fed. 5th Circ. Appeals Crt.; See also, Appx(s). 546 (State Crt. Cases); See also, 1/18/2023 SCOTUS Rule

14.5 Letter (RE: “Related Writ” of Certiorari on Fed. 5th Circ. 1/11/2023 Judgment Mandate on Cause

#22-20472; filed w/n due 90-days; See said “Related Writ” Appx. 907-956, 966, 974-981, 990-991, 993996, 1012-1013, 1029-1048, 1174 (Void Judgements & Orders); 590-664, 1175-1283 (Prior Writ(s)).

VIII. Jurisdiction

Petitioners FRAP 24(a)(5) motion to the Federal 5th Circuit Appeals

Court was denied on 8/15/2022, via a judgement-mandate order of dismissal.2

Petitioner invokes this Court's jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. §1254, upon filing

this writ of certiorari petition within 90 days of Fed.3 5th Circuit’s 8/15/2022

judgment-mandate disposition order. Petitioner’s 6/6/2022 appeal notice, post

U.S. Dist. Court’s 5/25/2022 final judgment, gave 5th Circuit jurisdiction.4

Writ is subject to two welcomed 1/18/2023 & 11/23/2022 Rule 14.5 extensions.

IX.

Provisions Involved

TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE CHAPTER 724. IMPLIED CONSENT

SUBCHAPTER B. TAKING & ANALYSIS OF SPECIMEN

§724.015. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OFFICER BEFORE

REQUESTING SPECIMEN; STATEMENT OF CONSENT, (a) Before requesting a

person to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer shall inform the person orally

& in writing that:

(6) if the officer determines that the person is a resident without a

license to operate a motor vehicle in this state, the department will deny to the person

the issuance of a license, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a

result of the arrest, under the same conditions & for the same periods that would

have applied to a revocation of the person's driver's license if the person had held a

driver's license issued by this state;...

(8) if the person submits to the taking of a blood specimen, the specimen

will be retained & preserved in accordance with Article 38.50. Code of Criminal

Procedure.

Amended by: Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 674 (S.B. 1787), Sec. 1, eff. September

1, 2011. Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 840 (S.B. 335), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021.

2Appx., 5—7.

3 28 U.S.C. §1254.

4 29 U.S.C. §1291.

Legislative History:

United States Senate, Federal Bail Procedures: Hearings before the

Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights & the Subcommittee on Improvements in

Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, pg. 123; 89th Congress, 1st

session on S. 1357, S. 646, S. 647, & S. 648; June 15, 16, & 17 (1965).

“III. Most importantly, we would broaden the coverage of the bill. We would

expand it to include all cases removed to Federal courts from State court as

well as those arising as a result of offense against the United States or a

violation of the District of Columbia Code...

IV(a)... No one should ever be denied release from custody solely because of a

lack of money. A not inappropriate analogy relates to appeals in forma

pauperis. No one is ever prevented from carrying his case up because

of lack of funds...”

The Congressional Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Session. (1871) (Rep. Platt, Rep.

Rainey, Rep. Beatty, Rep. Garfield, Sen. Thurman, Rep. Lewis, & Rep. Arthur’s

congressional remarks — judicial immunity unavailable for state court judges under

Civil Rights Act of 1871; congress also intended Civil Rights Act as a specific remedy

to harassment litigation & unjust prosecution injustices in southern courts.)

Other Statutes & Rules of Procedures Include5:

•

United States Constitution, Amendment(s) I, IV, V, VI, & XIV§1

•

42 U.S.C. §1983, §1985, & §1986

•

Fed. Rules App. Pro. Rule 24

•

Tex. Rules Civ. Pro Rule 145

APPX. CITATION #:

□ Writ of Cert (on Fed. 5th Circ. Case# 22-20269) Appx. #s: 1—589, 1049-1173, & 12841364;

□ “Related Writ” (due on 5*h Cir. C# 22-20472) Cited Appx. #s: 590-1048, 1174-1283.

5 Per Supreme Court Rule 14.1(f), see Appx. l(i)(v) provisions in Appx., 68-76.

Statement of the Case

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

By ultimately denying Petitioner his due process petition right to proceed in

forma pauperis in trial court & appellate court, simply due to lack of funds, the

Federal Fifth Circuit (a) departed from the accepted & usual course of judicial

proceedings, & sanctioned such a departure by the trial court, as to call for an exercise

of this Court's supervisory power; (b) effectively decided an important federal

question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; (c)

effectively decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should

be, settled by this Court; & (d) effectively decided an important federal question in a

way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

SCOTUS must also intervene to review & grant Petitioners related yet

mutually exclusive “Related Writ” of certiorari on a 28 U.S.C. §1651 petition

from Fed. 5th Circuit.6 The §1651 petition’s writ seeks to vacate, inter alia, (a) void

DWI & interference with public duties convictions related to this certiorari petition’s

Issue 2(A)(1) incident7; & (b) 7+ void liberty deprivation orders8 & judgments, from

harassment & unjust prosecutions Petitioner endured in state courts,9 all which give

rise to further 42 U.S.C §1983 et seq claims & damages sought in dist. court.10

6 See, In re Ernest Adimora-Nweke, Supra, fn. 1; See also, Appx. 665-1028.

7 Infra, Pg. 11; See also, supra fn. 1 (“Related Writ” Appx. 974—977).

8 See e.g., Issue 2 (A)(II) {Infra., Pg. 19.); Supra, fn. 1.

9 See, e.g., Adimora-Nweke v. Yarbrough, “Petitioner’s Brief.” Case No. 21-0800, Filed on 9/20/2021,

Texas Supreme Court; See also, Appx. 1284-1364 (Court noticed, pled, & served evidence of resulting

damages (See, Appx. 698, 743, 759, 760, 801, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1120, 1121, 1127, 1130, 1133, 1144).

These are evidence of tortiously interfered &/or harmed business & clients, per the always pled 1st, 4th,

& 14th Amend, civil rights violations in, inter alia, HC Cause # 201917921.); See also, Appx. 435-436.

10 See, 42 U.S.C §1983; §1985; & §1986.

Petitioner seeks to efficiently resolve all claims for damages upon remand of

this appealed civil rights case, & via a severed docket motioned in trial court.11

Issue 1: Whether Petitioner s in forma pauperis status from state court

applies post removal to Federal Court.

In summary, the federal courts do not honor in forma pauperis status from

state courts. Petitioner’s SCOTUS in forma pauperis motion submitted with this

Writ of Certiorari, briefly proves Petitioner warrants to appeal in forma pauperis.

Petitioner appealed to the Federal 5th Circuit, in forma pauperis. The 5th

circuit dismissed the appeal for failure to pay appeal fee.12

In America, no person is ever deprived access to court for lack of funds,

including civil federal appeals post removal.13

Hence the 5th Circuit judgment is an unconstitutional paradox, for flagrant

deprivation of Petitioner’s entitled 1st Amendment appeal-petition rights14; &

warrant this Supreme Courts intervention & supervision.15

11 Appx. 420-432; 512-515.

12 Appx. 5-7.

13 United States Senate. Federal Bail Procedures: Hearings before the Subcommittee ..., Supra, Pg. 3

(“IV(a)... No one should ever be denied release from custody solely because of a lack of money. A not

inappropriate analogy relates to appeals in forma pauperis. No one is ever prevented from

carrying his case up because of lack of funds...”); See also, Tex. R. App. Pro. Rule 20.1; 20.1(b)(1)

14 Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F.Supp. 163, 167 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (“...the constitutional protection of

access to the courts is much broader, for it includes access to all courts, both state & federal, without

regard to the type of petition or relief sought. U.S. Const. Amends. I & XIV, § 1.”); Adams v. Carlson,

488 F.2d. 619, 632 - 634 (7th Circ. 1973) (“’Access to the courts,’ ... is a larger concept than that put

forward by the State. It encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner might require to get a

fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances alleged by him...”);

BEK Constr. V. NLRB, 536 US 516, 525 (2002) (..."the right to petition extends to all departments of

the Government," & that "[t]he right of access to the courts is ... but one aspect of the right of petition.").

15 U.S. Supreme Court Rule 10.

The Original (1st) Action (USDC No. 4:20-CV-04149)

Petitioner filed both the original (1st) suit & the independent (2nd) action in

state court, complied with all petition requirements to proceed in forma pauperis in

the suits, & was eventually granted said right.16 In the 1st action, the clerk only

served TxDPS via Director McGraw.17 TxDPS responded, & immediate^ removed the

action18 to federal court; before Petitioner noticed that none else was served process.

Post removal in said 1st action, upon Petitioner’s efforts to serve additional

parties, the trail court stayed the case & referred it to an unconsented & unneutrally

detached federal trial court magistrate, who — with record knowledge of Petitioner’s

lack of funds & in forma pauperis status pre-removal — deceptively requested

Petitioner to file a 28 U.S.C. §1915 application to proceed without costs.19

At the void §1915 hearing, which occurred on 4/7/2021 & after the FRCP Rule

4 90-day deadline to serve parties had lapsed, the unconsented & unneutrally

detached magistrate deceptively requested that Petitioner either (a) withdraw his

application, or (b) have the case dismissed for failure to state a claim.20 The court

never set a deadline to serve parties.21 Petitioner lacked funds to serve parties,22 yet

had summary judgment (“SJ”) 4th & 14th Amd U.S. Const §1983 claims23 duly pled.

with filed supporting SJ evidence24.

Petitioner was therefore unduly coerced, or

16 Appx. 70-71; 90-106; 235-254.

17 Appx. 100-106; 316.

18 Appx. 56 (Doc. 1); 290-292; See also, USDC # 4:20-CV-4149, S.D. TX, Filed 12/4/2020. Supra, Pg. iii.

19 Appx. Pg. 58—59; 57 (Doc#s. 11, 12, & 21). Court also lost jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §455(a) & (b)(1)

20 Appx. 59-60 (Doc. 48); 117; 116-118; 197.

21 Appx. 56-61; 119.

22 Appx. 100-106; 116-118; 175-177; 198; 203-204; 205; 218-219; 235-254.

23 Appx. 107-140; 313; 317-338.

24 Appx. 141-153; 164-171; 339-340; 341-359; 583-585.

forced, to withdraw the §1915 application — a deprivation of petition due process

rights - than have the case dismissed.25

Hence, the unneutrally detached & unconsented magistrate, deceptively

denied Petitioner of right to proceed without costs & serve additional non-TxDPS

defendants post removal in federal court; & did so without a finding that Petitioner

was not otherwise entitled to proceed without costs, as required under FRAP 24(a)(3).

The magistrate & the trial court judge then subsequently & wrongfully

dismissed the case for failure to state a claim;26 & disallowed service on non-TxDPS

parties on the non-TxDPS claims.27 Thereafter, they denied any further post

judgment motions.28

The orders precluded Petitioner's opportunity to file a FRAP 24(a) post

judgment motion, obtain a 24(a)(3) ruling, & if denied, be entitled to file the a FRAP

24(a)(5) motion in appellate court; in order to appeal in forma pauperise Else,

Petitioner must pay for appeal filing & transcript costs.30

Hence, without funds to pay for appeal costs31, Petitioner's in forma pauperis

procedural appeal rights were wrongfully impeded by the trial court's preclusion of

further motions;32 & by its deceptive forced withdrawal of the §1915 application,

25 Appx. 175-177; 40.

26 Appx. 41-52.

27 Appx. 38-39; 118-119; 353-358.

28 Appx. 39; 534.

29 Appx. 71-72.

89 FRAP R. 24(a)(1).

31 See, e.g., Appx. 100-101; 218-219; 234-254; 534.

32 Appx. 39; 534.

without a finding that Petitioner was not otherwise entitled to proceed without costs

for appeal,33 as required under FRAP 24(a)(3).34

The Independent (2nd) Action in Equity (TJSDC No. 4:22-CV-00765)

Petitioner consequently refiled an independent (2nd) action & class action

motion in state court,35 & again complied with all requirements to proceed in forma

pauperis in the suits, & was again granted the const, right.36

In said 2nd action, Petitioner was able to get both TxDPS & HC respondents

served by the state clerk pre-transfer37, & before any responses & removal of action.38

Once in federal court, the fed. court clerk refused to honor Petitioner's request

to serve additional parties.39 Respondents TxDPS & HC filed dispositive FRCP Rule

12(c) & 12(b)(6) Motions, respectively.40 Petitioner responded.41 The trial court

dismissed the case again without an initial conference or docket scheduling.42

Post filing notice of appeal,43 the 5th Circuit appeal clerk refused to honor

Petitioner's uncontroverted44 pre-removal in forma pauperis status from state court;

& required in forma pauperis Petitioner to file a FRAP 24(a)(1) motion in federal trial

dist. court to obtain an order allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis for

33 Appx. 40; 175-177; 316.

34 FRAPR. 24(a)(3).

35 Appx. 107-140; 313-338; 341-359; 360-382; 531-538.

36 Appx. 90-99; Accord, U.S. Const. Amd. XIV, §1.

37 Appx. 27.

38 Appx. 23 (Doc.l).

39 Appx. 24 (Doc. 17).

40 Appx. 293-312; 391-410.

41 Appx. 531-545; 419-432.

42 Appx. 17-21; 24.

43 Appx. 24.

44 FRAP Rule 24(a)(3); Appx. 90-99.

appeal.45 Petitioner called the clerk & informed her such wasn’t proper per FRAP 24,

& only gives the trial court an opportunity to controvert Petitioner's in forma pauperis

status.46 Yet, Petitioner complied;47 & was invidiously treated as a prisoner;48 as

Petitioner now understands is Fed. Crt. policy to file mail-envelopes of such persons.

Petitioner also requested the transcripts of the 1st actions' 4/7/21 §1915

hearing.49 The trial clerk & court denied the existence of the 4/7/21 hearing; even with

minutes entry from the §1915 hearing docketed.5051 The trial court also denied the

application on non-good faith appeal grounds;52 thereon officially controverting

Petitioner’s in forma pauperis status from state court53 in the 2nd action.54

The 5th Circ. clerk requested Petitioner to pay or reapply per Rule 24.55 To

reapply, Petitioner only required a motion & Appx. 15-16 & 83-89.50

Since both action’s dismissals were for failure to state a claim,57 & since the

FRAP 24(a) motion denial order was on grounds that the appeal was frivolous,58 in

order to show that Petitioner's appeal was in good faith & not frivolous, Petitioner

45 Appx. 11.

46 FRAP R. 24(a)(3)(A).

47 Appx. 25; 83-91.

48 See, e.g., Appx. 89.

49 Appx. 25 (Doc. 26).

50 Appx. 59 & 60 (Docs. 46 & 48).

51 Such deceptive denial of transcripts for appeal petition rights, is (a) fraud by the court per false

representation, & (b) irreparable harm to Petitioner's liberty to appeal or an independent action in

equity; that vitiates the proceedings with causes 4:22-CV-00765 & 4:22-CV-04149, & all entered orders

& judgments, for lack of jurisdictional due process for Petitioner, including lack of impartial tribunal,

magistrate, & judge. See Infra, fn(s) 109, 110, & 111. Hence Petitioner warrants the independent

action sought. See also, Infra, Pg. 36 (Issue 2(B)).

52 Appx. 15-16.

53 Appx. 90-99.

®4 FRAP 24(a)(3)(A); C.f. USDC Cause # 4.-20-CV-04149 (1st Action); Supra 6-8.

55 Appx. 9.

58 FRAP 24(a)(5).

37 Appx. 15-21; 28-52.

58 Appx. 15-16.

had to file a FRAP Rule 24(a)(5) motion showing that Petitioner stated a valid federal

civil rights claim; which is similar but limited in scope to challenging the 12(b)(6)

dismissal orders as required for appeal.59 Hence Petitioner filed his brief, & all §1651

writ remedies needed, in a comprehensive R. 24(a)(5) motion.60

The 5th Circuit refused to read or review the motion, & required Petitioner to

refile the application & motion, with another financial affidavit requirement from

Petitioner.61 Petitioner has & had no funds.62 Petitioner motioned & tried to explain

that a new financial affidavit was unnecessary as already provided to trial court & in

the disregarded-pending 24(a)(5) motion; & that the trial court's reason for denying

Petitioner's FRAP 24(a) application (i.e., non-good-faith63) also rendered any financial

affidavit issue irrelevant & moot.64

5th Circuit seems in support of this writ, & ultimately showed such via (a) the

unconstitutional reason stated in the 8/15/2022 order65, which was issued in light of

Petitioner's FRAP 24(a)(5) in forma pauperis motion66, & (b) the denied transfer &

reconsideration motion issues.67 These are all void orders & judgements due vacated.

59 Appx. 15; 399-400.

60 “APPELLANT’S FRAP Rule 21 Extraordinary Writ: FRAP Rule 21(dl Motion for Additional Word

Count: 24(a’)(5’) Motion & BRIEF.” Adimora-Nweke v. McGraw, Case No. 22-20269, Doc. No.

00516417289, Filed on 8/2/2022, U.S. Fed. 5th Circ.; See e.g., Appx. 15-16 & 77-89 (14 of 349 pgs.).

61 Appx. 8.

62 Appx. 77-89; 219-220.

63 Appx. 15.

64 See, “APPELLANT’S FRAP Rule 27.2.1 Motion to Reinstate Anneal. Supplement. Stay Mandate. &

Transfer Case to D.C. Circuit.” Adimora-Nweke v. McGraw, Fed. 5th Circuit Case No. 22-20269, Doc.

No. 00516436680, Filed on 8/17/2022.

65 Appx. 6.

99 Appx. 77-89.

97 Appx. 498-530.

Petitioner raises issues that occur daily throughout Texas & U.S., with

irreparable harm to fundamental substantive & procedural due process rights of

citizens. Most issues, e.g., Issues 2(A), regard statutory notice violations by

government actors, with inter alia, irreparable harm to citizens & their rights.68

The trial court granted Respondents’ 12(b)(6) dismissals,69 then issued an

impediment order finding; that appealing the independent action was non-goodfaith.70 Petitioner always pled various separate §1983, §1985, & §1986 damage &

class action injunction claims,71 against separate state & local govt defendants;

hailing from 7+ different incidents involving unreasonable search & seizures of

Petitioner, & invidiously, & insidiously denying him liberty, privacy, petition, equal

protection, & due process rights. And such still continues, as well as the severe harm.

No officer witnessed any alleged crime; & no witness duly testified to such.

Hence there is a further compelling reason for this court to intervene, & swiftly

grant Petitioner’s writ, & it’s just remedies sought. SCOTUS is last resort.

Issue 2(A)(1): Whether Texas Department of Public Safety’s DIC-24 statutory

warning form, required for implied consent to breath or blood draw of subjects, is void

of due process fair notice for non-compliance with Tex. Transn. Code §724.015(a)(6)

& (a)(8): & warrant the pled-proposed class action injunction & rectification.

TxDPS’s DIC-24 statutory warning lacks fair notice: a basis for §1983 claim.

The DIC-24 statutory warning form is promulgated by Texas Department of

Public Safety72, for use in situations contemplated per Tex. Transp. Code §724.002 &

Infra, Pss. 11-35.

69 Appx. 17-21.

70Appx. 16.

71 Appx. 107-140; 141-255; 256-276; 313; 316-336; 341-359; 360-382; 441-467; 470-482; 484-497;

512-526.

72 See, Tex. Transportation Code §724.001(7); §724.003; §724.032(d).

§724.011.73 Petitioner was subjected to the DIC-24 form contents, by HPD officers, on

the night of 11/14/18, upon a suspicion of DWI arrest.74

Petitioner

requested

irrelevant

§724.041

Administrative

License

Revocation (“ALR”) Hearing on 11/16/18 (Appx. 141-146); within the §724.015(a)(7)

15-day request period that statutorily lapsed on 11/29/18. TxDPS’s allegedly drafted

& post-mailed a 11/26/18 notice-to-cure hearing request to Petitioner’s office, not to

his home address as stated on the driver’s license.75 Petitioner never received the

11/26/18 notice letter; nor could have received it by the statutory 5-days mail

transmission period76 (i.e., by 12/1/18). to still make any modified §724.041 hearing

request by the statutory request deadline: 11/29/2018.77 Petitioner was denied the

ALR hearing,78 his driver’s license unjustly suspended,79 & Petitioner is subject to a

$125.00 reinstatement fee;80 all without authority,81 nor any fair notice & hearing

opportunity.82 NOTE: Per Appx. 168, 1/14/2018 Order of Suspension was received

on 01/19/2019. Appx. 168 errs stating that Notice was received on 1/19/2018.

73 Id. at §724.002 & §724.011.

74 Appx. 122-126; 146-148.

75 Appx. 166.

76 Id. at §724.033(b) (mail correspondences deemed received 5-days after TxDPS’ dispatch.).

77 Appx. 179-180; 181-200; 202; 208; 216-218; 265.

78 Appx. 167; 259; 262-266.

79 Appx. 164-165; 124; 259; 265.

80 Tex. Transp. Code §724.046; Appx. 124; 190; 202; 213; 259; 265; 283.

81 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (‘“The fundamental requisite

of due process of law is the opportunity to he heard’... This right to he heard has little reality or worth

unless one is informed that the matter is pending & can choose for himself whether to appear or

default, acquiesce or contest... [Notice] must apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action

& afford them an opportunity to present their objections,... must be of such nature as reasonably to

convey the required information,... [&] must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make

their appearance...” (Citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385

(1914); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914); & Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900))).

82 Cf., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (fair due process notice & hearing required before driver’s

license revocations).

The applicable versions of the DIC-24 statutory warning form at issue, are the

versions in place post the 2011 & 2021 Texas congress amendments of §724.015(a).83

Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Officers used a copy of the pre-2021 amendment

version against Petitioner on the night of 11/14/2018.84 It lacks §724.015(a)(6).85

The 2021 Texas Congressional amendment of §724.015(a), simply added an

additional subsection, §724.015(a)(8); with additional statutory disclosures to be

provided citizens/subjects, orally & in writing, as required under §724.015(a).86

Petitioner, while drafting this certiorari writ, noticed online at TxDPS’ website

(https://www.dps.texas.gov/Internetforms/Forms/DIC-24.pdf)

that

TxDPS

adjusted the DIC-24 warning in 9/2021, post the 2021 amendment of §724.015(a), &

during the original litigation, to unreasonably & inconspicuously include the §(a)(8)

2021 Congress amendment’s addition. Yet the current version still excludes §(a)(6)87.

Hence, Texas’ DIC-24 form & statutory warnings, have been void since 2011 ;88

& is prima facie self-authenticating proof of deliberate indifference to due process

implied consent right of each subject, per its continued excluded §(a)(6).

The contents of the DIC-24 form, is supposed to contain the statutory required

fair notice disclosures enumerated in §724.015(a); required for implied consent

authority of government to vest, for the sake of blood or breath draw of subjects.89

The deficiency of the DIC-24 forms as to required enumerated disclosures,

83 Appx. 145; 465.

84 Appx. 171.

85 Id.

86 Appx. 68-69.

87 Appx. 68; See also, https://www.dps.texas.gov/Internetforms/Forms/DIC-24.pdf; See also, Appx. 508-511.

88 Id; See also, Appx. 69; 230-232.

89 See, Tex. Transp. Code §724.015(a)(l)-(a)(8); §724.003; Appx. 123; 508.

trigger both procedural due process fair notice issues, & substantive due process

liberty, privacy, & bodily integrity violation issues, with remedies for the resulting

harm(s) available to citizens under 42 U.S.C. §1983.90

Oral & written provision of the statutory warnings of §724.015(a)(1) - (a)(8), to

subjected citizens, are also prerequisites before govt, can request a citizen to submit.

to a breath or blood draw, & before any citizen’s “refusal” logically occurs.91

The term “refusal” is an important prerequisite on the civil aspect, as it vests

any jurisdictional authority of government to (1) admit the refusal in subsequent

prosecution;92 (2) permanently or temporarily suspend, revoke, or deny the subject’s

license to operate a motor vehicle - including as allowed in Subchapter C;93 (3)

institute any Subchapter D Administrative Hearings,94 or compel hearing requests

by the 15-day deadline from the subject, which triggers the citizen-subject’s motor

vehicle license revocation, suspension, or denial;95 or (4) require any motor vehicle

license reinstatement fees, costs, or charges from or the citizen-subject.96

For criminal proceedings, “refusal” vests the jurisdictional authority of

government to apply for or issue a search warrant authorizing a blood specimen to be

taken from the citizen-subject.97 But Ch. 724 & its provisions & proceedings, are

90 See, U.S. Const. Amd. XIV, §1; See also, 42 U.S.C. §1983; Accord, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-552 (1965)

(holding that subsequent hearing is no remedy for deprivation of due process notice & hearing, but

vacating the entered orders or judgments); Appx. 135.

91 §724.015(a); Appx. 128; 256; 262-263; 270.

92 §724.015(a)(1).

93 §724.015(a)(2) & (a)(6); See also, Tex. Transp. Code Ch. 724, Subchapter C (“SUSPENSION OR

DENIAL OF LICENSE ON REFUSAL OF SPECIMEN”); §724.031 et seq.

94 Tex. Transp. Code Ch. 724, Subchapter D (“HEARING”); §724.041 et seq.

95 §724.015(a)(7); §724.041 et seq.; §724.031 et seq.

96 §724.046(a)-(c).

97 Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 18.01Q).

strictly civil matters, & mutually exclusive from any related criminal proceedings. 98

Hence, inter alia, without the DIC-24 statutory warning notice form contents

in strict compliance" with §724.015(a), government agents (1) lack authority to apply

for or issue a warrant to obtain blood specimen from subjects; (2) lack authority to

draw blood specimens from subjects; (3) lack authority to temporarily or permanently

suspend, revoke, or deny subjects of motor vehicle operation privileges; (4) lack

authority to institute Administrative Hearings, or compel hearing request deadlines;

& (5) lack authority cause subjects any resulting penalty, fees, or costs.

Without the DIC-24 form in strict compliance with §724.015(a), the state only

has authority to obtain a search warrant to collect the subject’s breath sample.100 &

therefore, all or a super-majority of blood samples collected since 2011, & collected

pursuant to Tex, Transp. Code. Ch. 724, & Tex Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 18.01(j), have

been illegally obtained evidence,101 unreasonably searched & seized without

jurisdictional authority, from unconstitutionally invaded citizens or subjects.

Tex. Transp. Code §724.048(a)-(c).

99 Accord, BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC., 519 S.W.3d 76, 78 (Tex. 2017)

(“Today's case asks whether a notice provision in the Texas Premium Finance Act should be read as

written, or instead whether the Court should adopt a ‘substantial compliance’ approach that excuses

slipups. We opt for the former. The Legislature has codified ‘substantial compliance’ throughout Texas

law — including in other Insurance Code notice provisions — forgiving less-than-strict conformity with

various statutory commands. But it did not do so here. We decline to engraft what lawmakers declined

to enact... This notice requirement is unambiguous, & ‘[w]here text is clear, text is determinative.’

Plain language disallows ad-libbing, a cardinal principle we have reaffirmed regularly...The

Legislature ‘expresses its intent by the words it enacts & declares to be the law.’ Our refusal to engraft

a ‘substantial compliance’ exception seems particularly prudent given how ubiquitous ‘substantial

compliance’ is throughout Texas law.”); Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731,1737

(2020) (“When the express terms of a statute give us one answer & extratextual considerations suggest

another, it's no contest. Only the written word is the law, & all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).

100 Id.; Accord, Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 18.01(j).

101 Accord, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 166 — 171 (1978).

Petitioner pled & raised these issues in the governing complaints,102 & in the

class action & partial summary judgment motions filed in the original & independent

actions with causes 4:20-CV-04149103 & 4:22-CV-00765104 respectively.

Petitioner also duly raised the issues before Fed. 5th Circ.105 Petitioner also

raised these issues in his disregarded FRAP 24(a)(5) motion for appeal &

extraordinary writ,106 in his denied motion for reinstatement, & in his denied 8/17/22

reconsideration motion;107 all in Fed. 5th Circ Case# 22-20269.

The trial courts & appellate courts have ruled contrary to governing laws,108 &

acted contrary to basic acceptable constitutional standards.109 Such results in (a)

invidious, insidious, & irrational discrimination against Petitioner, to the deprivation

of his petition110 & due process rights, & to the deprivation of equal protection & due

102 Appx. 107-140; 141-255; 313-340; 341-359; 583-585.

103 Appx. 441-467; 470-482.

104 Appx. 256-276; 360-382; 419-440.

105 Appx. 498; 503-530.

106 Appx. 503 (“Doc. 00516417289 in Case: 22-20269, filed on 8/2/22, Fed. 5th Circ.”).

107 Appx. 503 (“Doc. 00516436680 in Case: 22-20269, filed on 8/17/22, Fed. 5th Circ.”).

108 BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC 519 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. 2017); Ex Parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908); & Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Tex. Transp. Code

§724.015(a); 42 U.S.C. §1983; U.S. Const. Amd. I, IV, V, XIV, §1.

109 See e.g., Marshall v Jerrico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person

to an impartial & disinterested tribunal in both civil & criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality

in adjudicative proceedings safeguards... the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations & the

promotion of participation & dialogue by affected individuals in the decision-making process.... by

ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he

may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him. The

requirement of neutrality has been jealously guarded by this [U.S. Supreme] Court.”); See also,

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Yick Wo o. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);

Accord, Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Circ. 1949) (“We believe that a judgment, whether in

a civil or criminal case, reached without due process of law is without jurisdiction & void, & attackable

collaterally by habeas corpus if for crime, or by resistance to its enforcement if a civil judgment for

money, because the United States is forbidden by the fundamental law to take either life, liberty or

property without due process of law, & its courts are included in this prohibition.”).

110 Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F.Supp. 163, 167 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (“...the constitutional protection of

access to the courts is much broader, for it includes access to all courts, both state & federal, without

regard to the type of petition or relief sought. U.S. Const. Amends. I & XIV, § 1.”); Adams v. Carlson,

488 F.2d. 619, 632 — 634 (7th Circ. 1973) (“Access to the courts,’... is a larger concept than that put

process rights of similarly subjects of §725.015(a); & (b) void harmful orders.111

Such is sufficient compelling reason for this court to intervene, swiftly grant

Petitioner’s writ, & grant the class action & §1983 injunction remedies sought on the

void DIC-24 form & the resulting petition, equal protection & due process rights

deprivations, & irreparable harm on Petitioner & subjected-citizens.112

TxDPS’s state-wide used DIC-24 form, & the §724.046 $125 reinstatement fee

still required of Petitioner, also (a) vests legal action standing for Petitioner,113 & (b)

assures that Petitioner’s continuously pled elements for class action114 are met for

Petitioner’s warranted class action injunction relief sought115.

That Petitioner filed his independent action in state court116 was immaterial

because an independent action in equity is a federal cause of action in equity;117

federal claims can be raised in state court;118 & logically, any requirement of

forward by the State. It encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner might require to get a

fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances alleged by him...”);

BEK Constr. V. NLRB, 536 US 516, 525 (2002) (..."the right to petition extends to all departments of

the Government," & that "[t]he right of access to the courts is ... but one aspect of the right of petition.").

111 Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Circ. 1949); See also, Bradley u. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 343

(1871) (“Admit that the court may proceed summarily, still summary jurisdiction is not arbitrary

power; & a summons & opportunity of being heard is a fundamental principle of all justice... Without

then having summoned [Petitioner], & having given to him an opportunity to be heard, the court had

no jurisdiction of [Petitioner]'s person or of any case relating to him. It is not enough that it have

jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complainant generally; it must have jurisdiction over the

particular case, & if it have not, the judgment is void ab initio.”).

112 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (no absolute immunity from §1983 injunctions); Accord, Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); See also, Appx. 116-118; 124; 128-135; 149-152; 449-453; 512-530.

113 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).

114 See, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rules 23(a), 23(b), & 23(c).

115 Appx. 512-530.

113 Appx. 107-414; 313; 341.

117 U.S. v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 44-46 (1998) (discussing bill of review procedural remedy replaced by

“independent action in equity,” a federal “equity” original action.).

118 Driscoll v. Superior Court of Madera County, 2014 WL 333411 (January 30, 2014, Cal. App. 5 Dist.)

(“The Supreme Court has ‘consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, & are thus

presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United State’... ‘[T]he

presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted [(1)] by an explicit statutory directive, [(2)] by

unmistakable implication from legislative history, or [(3)] by a clear incompatibility between state17

Petitioner to seek review before a biased court or forum that deceptively issued the

challenged void judgment, would be unconstitutionally futile.

In the latter, Petitioner would be unreasonably forced to subject himself to the

same court or forum that denied him of petition rights. Any such requirement to

attack, or seek review of void judgment only from the issuing court or federal courts,

fails equal protection principles, & is unconstitutional due process.119

A void judgment is null ab initio; has no effect from the outset;120 & can be

collaterally attacked in any proceeding where raised.121 Petitioner was not restricted

to collaterally attack the void judgments in federal court. State court was allowed.

Post removal, the use of the term "bill of review" or "bill of review/independent

action in equity" in the pleadings or documents filed122 became irrelevant & moot. In

fed. court, pleadings are construed on pled facts & Iqbal's plausibility contextual

standard.123 Petitioner factually pled elements & standard for independent action,124

court jurisdiction & federal interests...’ citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) & Gulf Offshore

Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).”).

119 See, Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Circ. 1949); Marshall v Jerrico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242

(1980); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Accord, People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake

Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66, 69 - 70 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist., 1994).

120 Accord, Commonwealth LAND Title Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 889 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex.App. - Houston

[14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“...when a document is void or void ab initio it is as if it did not exist

because it has no effect from the outset...”).

121 Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Circ. 1949); See also, People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake

Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66, 69 — 70 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist., 1994) (“A void judgment, ‘that is, one entered

by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties, the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to

enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any

court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court.’”) (Bold

emphasis added).

122 See, e.g., Appx. 107-414; 313; 341.

123 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-1953 (2009); See also, Appx. 399-401.

124 Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Circ. 2011) (“...[f]ive elements of an independent action

in equity: (1) a prior judgment which ‘in equity & good conscience’ should not be enforced; (2) a

meritorious claim in the underlying case; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which prevented the party

from obtaining the benefit of their claim; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of the party;

& (5) the absence of an adequate remedy at law.”); U.S. v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998) (independent

similar to bill of review.125

Petitioner’s proposed solution rectifies due process for all subjects.126

Issue 2(A)(II): Whether probable cause proceedings in Harris County are

irreparably & harmfully void of due process for these customs & practices on detained

citizens: (1) denial of hearing rebuttal rights for the accused. (2) denial of counsel

rights for the accused. & (3) denial of impartial magistrate & tribunal rights: & inter

alia, warrant the proposed class action injunction & rectification.

Petitioner, an American of Nigerian origin, also inter alia, an international

business, qui tam, & civil rights attorney, is subject to invidious racism, harmful

harassment litigations, & unjust criminal prosecution conspiracies in the southern

courts; the type sought precluded by Congress in drafting §1983.127 Amongst others,

govt, co-conspirators seek to (a) falsely portray Petitioner as a felon & habitual

action in equity “available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice”); Accord, Hazel-Atlas Co. v.

Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 - 245 (1944) (court of equity authority to set aside final judgments

after term available “where enforcement of the judgment is “manifestly unconscionable,...” (Citing

Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 657 (1912))); See also, Issue 2(B), Infra, pg. 36-38.

125 Ross v. Nat'l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex. 2006)

(“’Traditionally, a bill of review requires proof of three elements: (1) a meritorious defense, (2) that was

not asserted due to fraud, accident, or wrongful act of an opponent or official mistake, (3) unmixed

with any fault or negligence by the movant.’" (Citing Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 — 407

(Tex. 1979))”).

126 Appx. 512-529; 516-522.

127 See, Supra, Pg. 3, “United States Senate, Federal Bail Procedures...”; See also, Appx. 546.

criminal;128 terrorize him & family; & (c) deprive him of all rights, remedy, &

resources. 129

Petitioner was, & is still continuously, subjected to void & harmful probable

cause (“PC”) detention proceedings: Inter alia,

•

on 6/7/2019, at Mykawa Jail, Houston, TX, post a warrantless arrest of Petitioner

around 4:30am, (fraudulently planned & executed against Petitioner by CWS

Galleria, 5250, L.P staff Damiola Akinfolarin, resident Yarbrough, & HPD officers

Blanton, Barbar, ADA Nelson; during which Petitioner was invited on 5250

property to be falsely arrested); for a fabricated criminal trespass charge: cause

# 2210800. The case was dismissed at 1st in-Court visit, for no PC130.

•

on 7/8/2019, at Mykawa Jail, Houston, TX, after being targeted & assaulted131,

then framed, falsely arrested, charged, & detained by co-conspirators ADA

128 See, e.g., Appx. 546; See also, Adimora-Nweke v. Yarbrough, “Petitioner’s Brief.” Case No. 21-0800,

Filed on 9/20/2021, Texas Supreme Court, writ denied. (Contesting a void judgment entered without

personal or subject matter jurisdiction — i.e., no notice or service or process to Petitioner of protective

order (“PO”) proceedings filed against him. It resulted in void two ex-parte POs & a void final judgment

PO entered against Petitioner.).

The govt, staff (inter alia, HPD officers, HC Constables, Starr, & Flores (who Petitioner now

understands was intimately related with the PO complainant co-conspirator Yarbrough, & was also a

former DOJ intern at S.D. TX Houston Div. & affiliated with the void §1915 hearing magistrate))

fraudulently agreed & acted to interfere with & maliciously harm Petitioner, his civil rights, & his

income opportunities (see e.g., Adimora-Nweke et al v. Harris Health System, et al, USDC # 4:22-CV04352, S.D. Tex. Houston, Doc. 1-1. Removal Filed 12/15/2022; see also, Appx. 431); & harm his & his

family’s health, safety, & security.

Petitioner ceased & evaded Yarbrough contact efforts since -2/7/2019. She, HPD,

ADAs, et al, then maliciously fabricated harmful-false allegations for a PO, & filed Cause# 201917921

-3/11/2019 in co-conspirator judge Barbara Starr’s HC Court 280. (Appx. 926). They evaded serving

Petitioner notice - including of two ex-parte orders entered against him, based on perjury-fraudulent

instruments; all to obtain the two void, harmful, & unnoticed ex-parte orders (Appx. 908-916), & a

void final judgment (Appx. 917-925) entered 44 days past Tex. Fam. Code Ch. 84 statutory deadline

for any PO hearing; without notice or fair hearing opportunity for Petitioner (Appx. 917, 926-927); &

to subject Petitioner to continuous malicious warrantless searches, business & home invasions,

arrests, detentions, liberty & privacy harm (Appx. 942-943). There’s no valid-filed TCRP Rule 107

return-of-service (Appx. 926). Cause #201917921 is another void & malicious action, done to harm.

The void judgments & orders from Cause# 201917921 (TxSCT Case No. 21-0800), & more void

criminal proceedings, orders, & judgments (Appx. 546) instituted or entered against Petitioner, are

now sought vacated via the §1651 5th Circuit writ petition, (originally via state habeas corpus writ

action in 1648314AZ (Appx, 546)) as Petitioner seeks to bring §1983 claims for all direct or indirectcollateral resulting money damages (See e.g., Appx. 431, 435-436, & 1284-1364), in the sought severed

docket of the 1st & 2nd appealed action (Appx. 116; 193-200; 305; 512-514 (“The B Case”)).

129 See e.g., Appx. 485-492; 546; See also, In re Ernest Adimora-Nweke, Supra, fn. 1 & fn. 6.

130 Appx. 339; 546.

131 Appx. 583-585. (This Affid. was appended & incorporated into 4:20-CV-04149 complaint facts).

Denholm, HPD officer Reyes, an undercover HPD officer resident of 5250 ppty, &

Akinfolarin for a fabricated assault with bodily injury charge, cause #

2214242.132 Akinfolarin alerted HPD upon sight of Petitioner, then proceeded to

assault & harm Petitioner on the property133. A co-conspirator undercover officer

arrived & fabricated a defense story for Akinfolarin framing Petitioner as the

assailant. Co-conspirator HPD Reyes then arrived & arrested Petitioner,

refusing to review the surveillance footage available & offered him as he

fabricated a statement proposed by ADA Denholm, Akinfolarin, & the

undercover, in order to falsely charge. Thereafter, Reyes & HPD officers, ADA

Edekel Tecle, Akinfolarin, & CWS Galleria, 5250, L.P’s counsel, tamper-altered

the surveillance video footage subpoena’d to fit their fabricated allegations. The

case was dismissed after months of harm & no hearing, via a void/false order. The

false PC & terms need vacated. Petitioner’s claims & injuries are actionable.134

•

on 9/7/2019, at Mykawa Jail, Houston, TX, post a warrantless arrest of Petitioner

at his home around 3:30am; for another Yarbrough, ADA & HPD Tallant

fabricated robbery (of Yarbrough) charge; cause # 1598318. Grand jury later

found no PC,135 & the case/charge was effectively dismissed.136

•

respectively, (a) on 10/3/2019, at HC Jail, Houston, TX, & (b) on 10/7/2019,

10/21/2019, 10/24/2019, & 11/22/2021 in HC Dist. Crt. 179, Houston, TX; post a

10/3/2019 warrantless search & seizure of Petitioner & his iPhone, at Petitioner’s

home around 6:30am, & for crim. cause # 1648314 (Appx. 942—944): another

insidious & malicious prosec. act of Yarbrough, Flores, Hartman, Barron, Dolph,

& Starr’s fabricated agg. sex. assault (of Yarbrough) charge from civil PO case

#201917921; & while the PO case was on appeal; & they knew & had exculp. evid.

•

around 2/13/2020 & 10/26/2021, post void indictment proceedings & orders

illegally instituted & obtained (Appx. 941, 945—952) by ADA co-conspirators Otto

& Lawrence in cause #s 1648314 & # 1745037137, case #s 1745037 & 1648314 were

132 Appx. 546.

133 Appx. 583-585.

134 42 U.S.C. §1983, §1985 & §1986; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994); Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225 (1972).

135 Appx. 340; 546.

136 Appx. 546.

137 Cause # 1745037, Filed on 10/26/2022, in HC Dist. Crt. #179, then transferred with cause #1648314

to Court 351, was another ADA & HPD conspired-fabricated burglary felony charge, filed against

Petitioner, & based on the void & uninvestigated sworn complaint in cause #1648314 (Appx. 942-944).

Inter alia, cause # 1648314’s sworn affidavit complaint is void of a credible affiant, & of PC on

its face. The sworn complaint’s statements also falsely alleges that HPD officer Dolph III [acting with

HC], obtained a warrant & secretly collected evidence from Petitioner’s iPhone, Uber account, etc. Yet,

no warrant existed in fact; nor was one filed as required per Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 18.01(b). See,

Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 18.01(b) A neutral-detached magistrate & grand jury must duly inquire

on the alleged warrant, as required filed. Accord, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

fraudulently dismissed ~ 1/14/2022; after two years of racial-terrorism on

Petitioner, his business, & his family;138 & without any notice, examining trial, or

fair hearing for Petitioner.139

138

See e.g., Appx. 590—664; 665-1028; See also, Appx: 546 (Cause #1648314A; a void bond forfeiture

proceeding with a void final judgment (Appx. 937), maliciously instituted with a void Judgement NISI

(Appx. 938); & lacks any due process fair notice or hearing for Petitioner.)

Petitioner’s iPhone was fraudulently seized without warrant upon the 6:30am 10/3/2019 arrest

at his home by HPD officers, for the fabricated aggravated sexual assault criminal charge filed with

Cause# 1648314. Post a void initial-magistrate PC initial-detention hearing on 10/3/2019 in HC jail,

Petitioner appeared in assigned Court 179 for Cause# 1648314 on 10/8/2019; was denied another

rebuttal opportunity on PC; & the case reset to 11/21/2019. Petitioner then made bail, on 10/8/2019.

Co-conspirators HC clerks, Otto, & Roll, (in furtherance of the malicious harassment & harm

on Petitioner & his liberty per cause 1648314 allegations, & per Issue 2(a)(I)’s DWI & interference

charges simultaneously pending in HC Court 15 (cause #s 2233594 & 2233595 (Appx. 546)) re-set a

void Crt. setting for 10/14/2019, without 10-days advanced notice entitled Petitioner. Tex. Code of

Crim. Pro Art. 28.01, §2. Note: Hence the NISI for cause 1648314A is void; no legal basis or authority.

Petitioner was alerted late on 10/14/2019; appeared on 10/15/2019 early morning to inquire; was

immediately arrested & detained in HC jail without hearing or bail for a week; then kept in jail on a

suppressive $200K bail while Roll, Otto, HC Clerk, & Sheriff, executed the forfeiture proceeding (i.e.,

HC Dist. Crt 179, Case# 1648314A) against Petitioner without any notice to state-custody-held,

targeted, & harmed Petitioner. See e.g., Appx. 431 (20191119_163050 & 20191119_163057 files))

Roll reduced Petitioner’s $200K bail to $75K, after executing cause# 1648314A’s void final

bond forfeiture judgment. Petitioner found out about the bond forfeiture case# 1648314A after making

bail & returning to his office. Notices were deceptively mailed to Petitioner’s office, while inter alia, j.

Roll, Otto, HC Sheriff & clerk knowingly conspired & kept Petitioner in HCJ; hence void acts. See,

Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972)

Per (1) Issue 2(a)(1); (2) spoliation of all cause #s 2233594 & 2233595 video evidence by HPD;

& (3) co-conspirator Judge Tonya Jones (I) denying Petitioner due process notice & fair hearing, (II)

knowingly admitting false & illegal created evidence pretrial & at trial (e.g., a forged warrant, that

appears months later in court after an illegal & painful blood draw, & that failed Tex. Code Crim Pro.

18.01(b) file-notice requirement on its face, & was not provided Petitioner upon request before the

painful illegal 11/14/2018 blood draw, & evidence based on the illegal forged warrant), (III) not

certifying or filing, & denying Petitioner duly entitled special jury instructions on factually

contested illegally obtained evidence, probable cause & warrant issues (i.e., statutory reversible errors

per inter alia, (i) Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. Art. 36.17 (all proposed jury charges, including special

charges, statutorily required certified & filed by judge as part of clerk record.) & (ii) Thomas

v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986) (denial on jury charge on illegally obtained evidence,

with factual dispute of illegal obtained evidence, is reversible error)), (IV) forsins an indigency petition

for Petitioner in order to appoint & pay a harmful conflict-of-interest & recent ADA counsel for

Petitioner, without Petitioner’s knowledge or consent, while Petitioner was held in HC iail for

1648314A. & repeatedly taken to Crt 179 & Crt 15 to be publicly humiliated: cause #s 2233594 &

2233595 (Appx. 546) resulted in void convictions (Appx. 974-977); convictions Petitioner seeks

vacated via the §1651 or “Related Writ” of Certiorari (Supra, fn. 1 & fn. 6; Appx. 590-664; 665—1028).

Due to Petitioner’s lack of funds, Tonya Jones & the state courts have unconstitutionally

denied Petitioner the trial court proceeding transcripts, & due process rights to fair hearing & appeal,

to vacate the void convictions. (Appx. 970—986, 990—991) The unreasonably denied/withheld Petitioner

transcripts (Appx. 980), show inter alia, the Thomas u. State issue, lack of impartial judge-tribunal

Marshall & Caperton issue, & other §1983 actionable no-notice customs & practices of HPD disclosed

at trial by HPD experts (i.e., HPD does not customarily provide custody subjects with blood-draw

warrants)). Without funds, Petitioner is harmfully denied evidence & justice (Appx. 970-997).

139 Appx. 546.

Petitioner sought to vacate, inter alia, the void PC findings from causes

1648314 & 1745037, via a habeas corpus writ action in HC Crt. 179: cause #

1648314AZ.140 Judge of Crt. 179, a former ADA, recused herself. Petitioner now

leverages the §1651 petition & “Related Writ” to vacate the PC orders, & all other

void liberty deprivation orders & judgments endured; including in cause # 201917921.

The open-dormant cause # 1648314AZ, subjects Petitioner to unreasonable

liberty deprivation.141 Inter alia, another void warrant can be issued in the case,

Petitioner unreasonably arrested, detained, & subject to void proceedings.

Hence, Petitioner has standing (particular injury & redressability)142 for the

pled §1983 injunctions & damage claims, & class action remedies sought143.

NOTE: In Feb 2022, Tx State Bar investigated all allegations & complaints

made against Petitioner144, including case# 201917921, & found not merit. 145

PC determinations before Magistrate or Judge

In Harris County, TX, post an arrest, when subjects are initially presented

before a magistrate or judge, the magistrate or judge first determines PC to detain

the individual, before addressing bail issue. The proceeding goes as follows:

1. Detainee is presented before magistrate or judge; a HC ADA staff is present

for the State of Texas (“State”); & matter goes on-the-record:

140 Appx. 546.

141 Appx. 546.

142 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

Appx. 313-382; 422-425;522-525;535-537; 546.

144

Appx. 546,

145 Appx. 586.

(1) Magistrate or judge reads cause #, & parties are identified;

(2) Magistrate or judge tells Detainee of the charges against them;

(3) State reads the allegations & State’s version of the facts into record, &

makes argument for PC;

(4) Detainee is not allowed to speak nor rebut;

(5) Judge finds PC.

2. Parties remain on record, & move on to bail issue.

(1) State makes argument for bail amount.

(2) Detainee, now a Defendant, is allowed to speak or rebut.

a. Sometimes, during hours of 9 - 5pm, Mon - Fri, Detainees are

provided counsel from Harris County Public Defender’s Office,

only for representation on the bail issue.146

(3) Judge rules on (i.e., determines) bail amount.

Petitioner was subject to such void hearings, inter alia, in HC jail, on

10/3/2019, upon another void arrest & detention, for cause# 1648314’s false charge.147

Petitioner requested, & was denied rebuttal opportunity on the PC issue.148

The unneutrally detached magistrate found PC in the void proceeding.149 The same

magistrate had also issued a void capias warrant for Petitioner the day before, based

on a void sworn affidavit-complaint filed in cause # 1648314 on 10/2/2019, that

contained similar fabricated allegation as the void protective order case #201917921,

& contained more aggravated perjury than one can count.

146 Cf: Appx. 347-348 (Daily probable cause hearing intervals within a 24hr period in HC: Occurs 24/7.).

147 Appx. 342-344; 422-425.

148 Appx. 422-423; Appx. 423 (with “12/30/2022 Notes.”)

149 See e.g., Appx. 234.

The existence of §1(4) & §2(2)(a) in these proceedings, voids the proceedings

for lack of detainees’ equal protection & due process rights.150 Once the judicial

machinery is used against citizens, the citizen is entitled to rebut against any

allegations made against them at any stage.151 In liberty deprivation proceedings,

the citizen must be ensured effective assistance of counsel at all times152. Any court.

magistrate or judge that fails to ensure such due process, lacks jurisdiction.153

Hence, there exists additional compelling reason for this court to intervene154.

& prospectively enjoin such void PC proceedings - nationwide.

Petitioner’s proposed solution, rectifies due process for all subjects.155 A new

“Final Settlement Hearing,” date156 (e.g., 10/10/2023, or 7 months extension from

SCOTUS judgment/reversal) is circumstantially necessary, & hereby requested.

PC determinations before Grand Jury

Another compelling due process issue in PC proceedings nationwide, is

arbitrary enforcement of fair hearing opportunities in closed grand jury proceedings;

by allowing an indictment defense packet at prosecutor’s discretion.

150 See, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (SCOTUS invalidated a statutory scheme that

labeled individuals without an opportunity for a hearing & rebuttal.); See also, Gideon v. Wainright,

372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in crim. proceedings per 6th & 14th Amd. U.S. Const.).

151 Accord, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-348 (1976) (discussing procedural due process & its

factors).

152 Id/, See also, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

153 Adams, 488 F.2d. at 632 - 634 (7th Circ. 1973); Bass, 172 F.2d at 209 (5th Circ. 1949).

154 & also grant the 28 U.S.C. §1651 petition, to rectify the void orders & judgments, including void

probable cause findings in cause #s 1648314, 1598318, & others, as sought in the §1651 petition. Such

allows for due course expungement. See, Tex. Code. Of Crim. Pro. Art. 55.

155 Appx. 313-382; 349-351; 422-429; 522-525; 534-537: & 587-589.

156 See, Appx. 521 (Proposed Plan for TxDPS & McGraw Class Action: #7)

In cause # 1598318, Petitioner was duly noticed, allowed to, & did submit an

indictment defense packet to the grand jury. The grand jury found no PC within 90

days of case filing.157 Case was dismissed, & Petitioner’s §1983 pled false arrest &

false detention claims vested.158

Cause #1648314 was a different beast of burden; per HC ADAs, HPD officers,

& judges’ malice. It was dismissed over two years after its filing159; during which

Petitioner was wrongfully indicted twice on two separate charges, for cause # 1648314

& a created # 1745037; with fabricated allegations & on the same void complaint;

without evidence; without Petitioner’s duly entitled examining trial; without a

hearing before a neutrally detached magistrate or judge; without notice of a grand

jury proceeding; & without an indictment defense packet hearing opportunity.160

Inter alia, the resulting void PC findings in the dismissed cause #s 1648314 &

1745037 — including their felony indictments that are void of due process examining

trial, grand jury proceeding notice, or indictment defense packet hearing opportunity

- remain liberty deprivation issues that Petitioner sought to vacate post-dismissal of

the charges; via the now dormant cause # 1648314AZ habeas corpus writ action in

HC Court 179161, & the §1651 petition162; & for Petitioner’s §1983 claims163.

157 Appx. 340.

158 Id.

169 Appx. 546.

160 See, In re Ernest Adimora-Nweke, Case No. 22-20472, Doc. 00516471675, Pg. 90-119, Fed. 5th

Circ, Filed 9/14/22; Appx. 776-805.

161 Appx. 546; See also, e.g., Appx. 590-664; 1/3/2022 [Renewed] “Application & TCCP Art. 11.05 &

11.11 Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus” & 1/24/2022 “Emergency Motion For Writ Request

Modifications”: Filed in Cause# 1648314AZ, Harris County Court 179, Harris County, TX.

162 See, In re Ernest Adimora-Nweke, Supra, fn. 1. & fn. 6.

163 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994); See also, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573

(1973); Mitchum u. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

The disallowance of the indictment defense packet is an additional due process

violation that voids the applicable indictments against Petitioner in cause #s 1648314

& 1745037. The indictment defense packet is a felony defendant’s least fair hearing

or rebuttal opportunity in the closed grand jury proceeding; & meets fair play.164

Govt’s arbitrary enforcement of such due process hearing opportunity, (i.e.,

indictment defense packet allowed at prosecutors’ discretion), is equal protection165

& due process166 violation in criminal justice administration; with harmful results.

For Petitioner, when granted the liberty at such fair hearing opportunities (i.e.,

liberty to present a defense packet), grand jury found no PC. When denied such

liberties, the grand jury wrongfully & fatally167 found PC.

Hence, the grand jury indictment defense packet, prepared by defendants & at

no cost to govt., is due process warranted & effective fair hearing opportunity; & fatal

indictments rendered without such defense hearing opportunity are void.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (1976); Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (1980).

Accord, Mahone v. Addicks Util Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 932 (5th Circ. 1988) (“As the

Supreme Court explained long ago, equal protection of the law requires not only that laws be equal on

their face, but also that they be executed so as not to deny equality. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356

(1886); accord, Zeigler v. Jackson, 638 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. Unit B March 1981) (‘[T]he unequal

application of a state law, fair on its face, may act as a denial of equal protection.’)”).

166 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“But the concepts of equal protection & due process,

both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The ‘equal protection

of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of law,’ &, therefore,

we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized,

discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”).

167 Fatal because (1) Petitioner was denied fair opportunity to vacate the probable cause findings in

cause #s 1648314 & 1745037; (2) the same void complaint in cause # 1648314, with its fabricated

allegations, was basis for all probable cause findings & indictments in causes 1648314 & 1745037; (3)

HC had exculpatory evidence before the cause 1648314 was filed on 10/2/2019, yet refused to

investigate; (4) probable cause could not be found per Cause 1648314’s sworn affidavit complaint, nor

did the cause # 1648314 complaint allegations ever occur; & (5) no examination trial ever allowed

Petitioner in Causes 1648314 & 1745037, to dispute probable cause.

164

165

This SCOTUS must also intervene, & nationally deem such grand jury

indictment defense packets as standard due process hearing opportunity, or “fair

play,” entitled all defendants to grand jury proceedings.168

Issue 2(A)(III): Whether judicial & prosecutorial absolute immunity, a

fundamental error since 1607. must be abolished, or rendered inapt in

Petitioner’s federal civil rights claims: per Magna Carta Art(s). 39 & 40; Bowser v,

Collins. 145 Eng. Rep. 97 11482): Peel, of Ind.: U.S. Const. Amd. V & XIV: 42. U.S.C.

§1983: Randall v. Brigham. 74 U.S. 523 (18691: Bass u. Hoaeland. 172 F.2d 205. 209

(5th Circ. 19491: Villases of Willowbrook u. Olech. 528 U. S. 562 (2000): & Taylor v.

Rioias. 141 S. Ct. 52 (20201.

Respondent HC, filed a 12(b)(6) motion on all current & putative §1983

damage claims, & injunction class-action, asserting insufficient pleading,

statute of limitations, Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, & absolute immunity, against

Petitioner’s §1983 claims.169

Petitioner met statute of limitations on all claims raised.170

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is inapplicable as all §1983 claims are based on

vested claims after the criminal proceedings were dismissed in favor of

Petitioner171; except void civil liberty deprivation judgments or orders that are

sought vacated via a §1983 injunction172 in the severed “The B Case” docket

for in USDC #s 4:20-CV-04149 & 4:22-CV-00765; via the now dormant habeas

168 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (1976); Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (1980); Bass, 172 F.2d at 209 (5th Circ.

1949).

169 Appx. 391-418 (*excludes attached USDC#4:22-CV-04149 (Doc. 6) Amd. Complaint, Filed on

12/8/2020.

170 Appx. 535.

171 Appx. 339-340; 484-496; 546; See also, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994)

172 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 - 486 & 490 (1965); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573

(1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972);

corpus173 HC Court 179 writ action with cause # 1648314AZ174; via the §1651

Fed. 5th Circ. writ175: case# 22-20472176; & via this certiorari & the

forthcoming “Related Writ.”177 Furthermore, wrongs that cause Petitioner’s

§1983 et seq claims are U.S. Const jurisdictional issues/violations; always w/n

federal court jurisdiction.178 Hence, no Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies.

The absolute immunity issue (i.e., judicial & prosecutorial absolute immunity)

is material for Petitioner’s current vested & other putative 42. U.S.C. §1983, §1985

& §1986 claims.

Said claims include other civil rights claims against

Respondent-HC, & its Court 15, 280 & 179 judges — Tonya Jones, Barbara

Stalder, & Randy Roll; & against current & past govt, staff including ADAs

Nelson, Denholm II, Tecle, Barron, Flores, Lawrence, & Otto.179

Judicial absolute immunity is a fallacy & fundamental error; since 1607.

Judicial absolute immunity did not exist originally at common law.180 Few are

aware. 181 Judicial absolute immunity, also the source of prosecutorial absolute

173 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994).

174 Appx. 546.

175 Id.

176 Supra, fn. 1.

177 Id.

178 See, e.g., U.S. Const. Amd. XIV; 42 U.S.C. §1983; Accord, Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 439 (1971).

179 Supra, fn(s). 1, 128-139; Appx. 485-492.

180 Cf, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984) (wrongfully assuming absolute immunity of judges

at common law; citing Pierson v. Ray); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547. 554-555 (1967) (citing

Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872) use of Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868), & also

wrongfully assuming absolute immunity of judges at English common-law.).

181 See, Robert Craig Waters, Judicial Immunity Vs. Due Process... Pg. 465, Cato Jrl (1987) Available

at: https://www.cato.ors/sites/cato.ors/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1987/11 /ci7n2-13.pdf: See

also, Robert S. Irving, Courts—Judicial Immunity; Pg. 31, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 31 (1985);

Available at: hj^j^lawTeEO.srtorxu.alr^u/cgiMewconteirLcgi?article^l643&conte3ct^awreview1

immunity, was a treasonous fundamental error principle, created as result of Edward

Coke’s fallacy in Floyd v. Barker,182 & later perpetuated by Edward Coke via more

fallacies in The Marshal Sea Case.

Upon its 1607 introduction in Floyd, the principle was contrary to pre-existing

governing law since 1214 (i.e., Magna Carta183 & its Art(s) 39 & 40184); & contrary to

centuries-long-binding common-law principles of Bowser185.

Magna Carta, was the basis for English common-law; & its principles adopted

in U.S. of America.186 As of 1215187, the King lacked absolute authority himself, &

was punishable via suit against his ministers or judges for Magna Carta 39

violations.188 Hence, Coke’s reasoning in Floyd, that unchallenged & absolute

authority of judges derived from the King189, was treasonous & false-authority fallacy

- as it [deceptively] made judges’ authority greater than the King’s authority/limits.

182 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607); See, Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, fn 11 (11th Cir.

1985).

183 Appx. 547-551.

184 Appx. 73.

185 See. Dykes, 776 F. 2d at 955, fn. 11, (Citing Coke’s Marshal Sea Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610)

borrowing of Bowser v. Collins, Y.B.Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pi. 11 (1483) precedent reasoning, holding

that ‘actions taken by a court lacking jurisdiction were coram non judice — i.e., before a person who

was not a judge - & rendered a judge liable for the consequences of his judicial acts.’); Accord, Robert.

S. Irving, Courts—Judicial Immunity: Pg. 32 (1985)

This principle was reiterated in Bradley u. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 343-344 (1871).

SCOTUS then erred in its reasoning in the same opinion by committing the same centuries old

fallacies: false-dilemma, red-herring, & appealing to Coke’s void authority. See, Bradley v. Fisher, U.S.

at 347-349 (Citing Chancellor Kent’s Yates u. Lansing, 5 Johnson 282, 291 (N.Y. 1810), & Coke’s Floyd

v. Barker false-dilemma, red-herring, & appealing to void “King” absolute authority).

186 Appx. 547.

187 Appx. 549.

188 See, e.g. The Case of The Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1035 (K.B. 1613); See also, Robert Craig

Waters, Judicial Immunity v. Due Process: Cato Jrnl. Pg. 465, fn. 16. (Fall 1987).

189 See e.g, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (J. Douglass Dissent, fn. 5) (1967) (“Since the King could do no

wrong, the judges, his delegates for dispensing justice, "ought not to be drawn into question for any

Hence via false authority, false-dilemma & hasty-generalization reasonings190,

Edward Coke fabricated absolute authority & placed judges above the governing

basis for English common-law: the Magna Carta & its Art(s) 39 & 40. He thereby

made judges equal to or above the King: treason.

In Floyd, Coke introduced 3 sound public policies to support judicial

immunity191; yet irrationally argues such policies in support of immunizing civil &

criminal judicial actions (including scandalous, criminal, malicious, or corrupt

activity of judges); contrary to the 3 policies, Magna Carta’s Arts 39 & 40, & Bowser.

The policies, as virtuous as they sound, are irrationally related to scope of

actions absolutely immunized (i.e., scandalous, criminal, malicious, or corrupt

actions). E.g., Fraud by the court, does not lead to public confidence in the judiciary

nor finality of judgment, but a coram non judice act, void ab initio, & duly attackable

collaterally.192

Unconstitutional, illegitimate, scandalous, fraud or fraudulent,

criminal, malicious, or corrupt actions of judges & prosecutors are never compelling

government actions (nor are they legitimate actions of any person) worth

supposed corruption [for this tends] to the slander of the justice of the King." Floyd & Barker, 12 Co.

Rep. 23, 25, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber 1607). Because the judges were the personal

delegates of the King they should be answerable to him alone. Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 539”)

190 Id.; see also, e.g., Bradley, at 348 (Citing Coke’s hasty-generalization & false dilemma fallacy Floyd,

12 Coke, 25 ("...except before the King... [non-judicial immunity] “would tend to the scandal &

subversion of all justice, & those who are the most sincere, would not be free from continual

calumniations.”)); Pulliam, at 466 U.S. at 530 (CitingFloyd, 77 Eng. Rep., at 1307.) Accord, Dykes, 776

F. 2d at 955, fn. 11; See also, Robert. S. Irving, Courts—Judicial Immunity ..., Pg. 32 (1985).

191 See. Dykes, 776 F. 2d at 955, fn. 11 (Citing Floyd’s “public policy reasons for the doctrine: (1) the

need for finality; (2) the need for maintaining public confidence in the system of justice; & (3) the need

for maintaining the independence of the judicial system.”); See also, Robert S. Irving, Courts—Judicial

Immunity...’, Pg. 31.

192 See, Commonwealth LAND Title Ins. Co., (Supra, fn. 120); Bass, (Supra, fn. 109); People ex rel.

Brzica, (Supra, fn. 121).

immunization;193194 whether or not a judge (or prosecutor) in an inferior or superior

court; or in a court of general, limited, or specific jurisdiction.195 Hence, a void

principle.

To justify & bolster the void, principle, courts have introduced the deceptive

dichotomy of “excess of jurisdiction” vs. “absence of jurisdiction” — with the latter

alleged as an act without subject-matter jurisdiction; & have leveraged Coke’s

“scandal preclusion” red-herring or false-dilemma fallacy theory in support196.

This Court & all subsequent adopting courts have unreasonably appealed to

Coke’s void authority & fallacies on absolute immunity; & have further expanded its

scope & reach to prosecutors, magistrates, & more govt, agents; & consequently,

193 Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Circ. 1949) (“We believe that a judgment, whether in a

civil or criminal case, reached without due process of law is without jurisdiction & void, & attackable

collaterally by habeas corpus if for crime, or by resistance to its enforcement if a civil judgment for

money, because the United States is forbidden by the fundamental law to take either life, liberty or

property without due process of law, & its courts are included in this prohibition.”); Accord, Bradley u.

Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 343-344 (1871) (“Without then having summoned Mr. Bradley, & having given to

him an opportunity to be heard, the court had no jurisdiction of Mr. Bradley's person or of any case

relating to him... the judgment is void ah initio... & may be disregarded in any collateral

proceeding.” Citing Mitchell v. Foster, 12 Adolphus Ellis, 472; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters,

709; Walden u. Craig's Heirs, 14 Id. 154.1.

194 Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554 (“This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting

maliciously & corruptly, & it ‘is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for

the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their

functions with independence & without fear of consequences.’ (Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223

(1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 349, note, at 350”).

195 Cf., Yates u. Lansing, 5 Johns. R. 282 (N.Y. 1810); Appx. 555-559; (“Where courts of special &

limited jurisdiction exceed their powers, the whole proceeding is coram non judice, & all concerned in

such void proceedings are held to be liable in trespass (Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Co. 68...) In Miller

v. Seeve, (2 Black. Rep. 1141.) Lord Ch. J. De Grey said, that the judges of the king's superior courts of

general jurisdiction were not liable to answer personally for their errors in judgment. The protection

as to them was absolute & universal; with respect to the inferior courts, it was only while they act

within their jurisdiction.”); Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352 — 356.

196 Accord, Pulliam, at 466 U.S. at 530 {Citing Floyd, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 77 Eng. Rep., at 1307.); Bradley,

80 U.S. 348 (Citing Floyd, 12 Coke, 25, (“... reported by Coke in 1608 where it was laid down that the

judges of the realm could not be drawn in question for any supposed corruption impeaching, the verity

of their records, except before the king himself, & it was observed that if they were required to answer

otherwise, it would ‘tend to the scandal & subversion of all justice, & those who are the most sincere,

would not be free from continual calumniations.’).

deprived citizens of their fundamental rights, & perpetuated damages & irreparable

harm.

Such is the main source of this SCOTUS & other courts’ continuous error in

interpreting absolute immunity of judges & prosecutors, & §1983 provisions.197

Judicial & prosecutorial absolute immunity is inapplicable to §1983 claims.

§1983 on its face grants Petitioner a cause of action for damages against

all persons acting under color of state law to subject or deprive Petitioner of U.S.

Constitutional & federal rights.198

Per §1983 legislative history, Congress discussed & precluded absolute

immunity for judges, & arguably prosecutors per Congress’ disclosed specific remedy

intent for §1983.199

Hence, this Court must now rectify this long-standing

fundamental error, & abolish judicial & prosecutorial absolute immunity, including

in 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims,200 unless specifically conferred upon by statute.

197 See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. at 529; Supra, fn(s). 194 & 196.

199 42 U.S.C. §1983.

199 See, The Congressional Globe. 42d Cong., 1st Session. (1871) (Rep. Platt, Rep. Rainey, Rep. Beatty,

Rep. Garfield, Sen. Thurman, Rep. Lewis, & Rep. Arthur’s congressional remarks - judicial immunity

unavailable for state court judges under Civil Rights Act of 1871; congress also intended Civil Rights

Act as a specific remedy to harassment litigation & unjust prosecution injustices in southern courts.).

200 See, Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731,1737 (2020) (“When the express terms

of a statute give us one answer & extratextual considerations suggest another, it's no contest. Only

the written word is the law, & all persons are entitled to its benefit.”); See also, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at

1749 - 1750 (Citing Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011) ("Legislative history,

for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.")).

Jud. & prosec, absolute immunity is Unconstitutional & Un-American

U.S. 1776 Declaration of Independence preamble201, U.S. Const. V & XIV202,

42 U.S.C. §198 3203, & §1983 legislative history, got it right. Even this Court’s

limitations on judicial absolute immunity in Randall v. Brigham204 came close.

Yet, this court since Bradley v. Fisher, has allowed such unconstitutional

& irrational principle205 to serve as leverage for scandalous, malicious,

fraudulent, & corrupt, judges or prosecutors, to exert grievous, & invidious due

process violations or injustices against Petitioner & similar citizens, against

their rights, against their property, & via the justice system.206

Jurisdiction is a simple comprehensive legal issue, with many ways for a judge

to lose it; e.g., via bias or prejudice against party, no party to suit, litigant relative,

fraud, malice, corruption, or criminal activity behind bench, etc.

201 Supra, Pg. vii,

Exceeding

U.S. Declaration of Independence Preamble, 7/4/1776 (“We hold these truths to be

self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain

unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty & the pursuit of Happiness.”).

202 Appx. 73-74.

203 Appx. 74-75.

204 Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 535-536 (1869) (“Judges of limited & inferior authority are

protected only when they act within their jurisdiction... no such limitation exists with respect to judges

of superior or general authority. They are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when

such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless perhaps where the acts in excess of

jurisdiction are done maliciously or corruptly...”).

205 Cf., Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d at 209; Bowser v. Collins, Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 4 (1483); Bolling v.

Sharpe, 347 U.S. at 499 (1954); U.S. Const. Amd. XIV', 42 U.S.C. §1983; The Congressional Globe. 42d

Cong., 1st Session. (1871) (1871 Civil Rights Act provisions congressional debates).

206

Supra, fn. 1; See also, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, fn. 15 (J. Powell Dissent.) (1984); See also,

e.g., In Re John V.N. Yates, Appx. 553-554. (Petitioner epiphanv: Lansing was statutorily liable for

$1,200.); Bradley v. Fisher, at Appx. 566. (Petitioner epiphanv: Without the absolute immunity fallacy

principle, if/since Bradley pled a claim against Judge Fisher, Bradley should not have been precluded

from continuing his suit against Judge Fisher, or anyone, on the merits or to trial.)

jurisdiction amounts to act without jurisdiction, per Constitution due process

limitations207; & legally actionable when harmful208.

There is no absolute immunity from harmful unauthorized acts. Judges are

entitled to the same petition & due process rights & protections as any other citizen

or government-defendant, if wrongfully sued; including govt, counsel defense for govt.

employees, & defense fees & costs under §1988 for all defendants.209

Judicial or prosecutorial absolute immunity, unless conferred by statute210, is

contrary to democracy or republic principles. Such absolute immunity must be

abolished at federal common law; & is the most compelling reason for this writ.

Upon remand, Petitioner would have § 1983 equal protection & due process

conspiracy claims against all govt, persons that include against co-conspirator judges

& prosecutors, per Villages of Willowbrook v. Olech211 at the least212; with inter alia,

(1) no qualified immunity for any individual that actively participate in the harmful

14th Amd. U.S. Constitutional rights conspiracies & violations against Petitioner, &

(2) no qualified immunity for any local govt, entity who’s “custom or practice213”

subject or cause harmful deprivation of Petitioner/class member’s Fed. Const, rights.

207 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845); Sheldon et al v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850) (Congress statutorily

controls court’s authority to act, & may grant, withhold, or limit said courts’ authority); U.S. Const.

Art III, §1 & §2.

208 U.S. Const., Amd. §V & §XIV; 42 U.S.C. §1983 et seq.

209 42 U.S. C. §1988; Supra, f(n) 110 (Citing Adams v. Carlson, 488F.2d. at 632 —634 (7th Circ. 1973)).

210 See, e.g., Tex. Govt. Code §33.006

211 Villages of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 (2000)

212 See, Supra, fn.l; See also, Appx. 546; 107-140; 313-338; 523; 531-538

213 See, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)

Issue 2(B): Whether Petitioner merited independent action, class action. & claims

severance.

Independent Action-In-Eauitv

Pro se Petitioner factually pled unreasonable search & seizure, equal

protection, substantive due process, & procedural due process rights violation §1983

claims; as in Issues 2(A)(1) & 2(A)(II) above.214 Petitioner also pled & raised the

issues & claims in the 1st & 2nd actions’ governing complaints215216 & their respective

class action motions.217218 Petitioner always pled §1983 claims; with due class actions.

In the independent action, pro se Petitioner sufficiently showed fraud or

absence of fault that prevented Petitioner from benefiting from obtaining the benefit

of the pled claims.219 E.g., Petitioner also factually pled & submitted SJ evidence of

deceptive due process wrongs that caused the failure of Petitioner to litigate his

claims in the 1st action: E.g., magistrate’s deceptive requirement of Petitioner to

withdraw his §1915 application or incur a FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, with

knowledge of Petitioner’s financial constraints to serve additional parties; the

subsequent dismissal of the 1st action under 12(b)(6)) with notice of Petitioner’s cost

bearing inability; & then post-judgment disposition knowing HC’s notice-service.220

The repetitively & evidently pled substantive & procedural due process rights

violations of citizens per the void DIC-24 form, & denial of rebuttal opportunities in

HC liberty deprivation PC proceedings, show that grave miscarriage of justice

214 Supra, Pg(s). 11-28.

215 See, e.g., Appx. 484-492; 339-340; 583-585; 1080-1173.

218 Appx. 107-140; 313-359; 339-340.

217 Appx. 441-467; 471-482.

218 Appx. 256-276; 339-358; 360-381; 531-537.

218 Appx. 107-120; 315-317.

228 Id; Appx. 117-120; 119; 353-365.

occurred & still occurs in HC & Texas; show that the original action’s dismissal was

manifestly unconscionable, & also effectuates such injustice in HC & Texas; & show

that the prior dismissals are void of due process, which ‘in equity & good conscience’

should not be enforced. Petitioner pled no adequate remedy.221

Hence Petitioner warranted an independent action; & the denials, reversed.

Class Action

Petitioner pled detail facts to meet the FRCP Rule 23 class action factors or

element, in both the governing complaints222, & in class action-partial SJ motions.223

Petitioner also attached class action SJ evidence to the governing pleadings & SJ

motions224; or duly filed such before dismissal or removal225.

Class action certification require a well pleaded complaint; must be certified

“as soon as possible;” & is not based on the merits of the underlying action.226

Since the class action motions & sufficient supporting evidence were on file

pre-dismissal in both cases, the class action requests should have been granted. The

denial or preclusion of said motions, a due process violation, must be rectified.

Severance of Claims

Petitioner’s complaint in both actions contained invasion of privacy, false

arrest, false detention, excessive force, & due process constitutional violation §1983

claims for damages227 against some parties (e.g., HC, HPD, HCDA, & various

221 Appx. 120; 122; 317; 320; 321; 362; 365; 366.

222 See e.g., Appx. 1134-1173.

223 Supra. fn(s). 23, 24, 71, 102, 143, 214, 215, 220.

224 Appx. 141-171; 256-275; 313-351; 360-381; 419-421; 441-467; 470-482; 512-526.

225 Appx. 419-425; 531-537.

226 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); See also, FRCP Rule 23.

227 See e.g., Appx. 431-432 (with “12/30/2022 Notes”); See also, Supra, fn. 9 & Appx. 1284-1364.

individuals). It also contained the §1983 claims for injunction against TxDPS & HC,

with TxDPS being a different party on a mutually exclusive issue.

Petitioners’ requested severance of claims228 was clearly warranted; to

preclude the confusion of issues, claims, & parties that eventually resulted per the

Federal District Court’s dismissal order in USDC# 4:22-CV-00765.229 Also, inter alia,

Petitioner’s false arrest & detention §1983 damage claims cannot be resolved via

§1983 injunction. Hence, denial or preclusion of severance motions need reversed.

Such allows for optimal case management of issues, claims, & parties; &

further assures that due petition & due process rights of all litigants are sustained.

XI.

Conclusion & Relief Requested

For these compelling reasons above, Petitioner asks this SCOTUS to grant this

writ, & after review, (1) abolish absolute immunity under federal common law, (2)

hold Respondents, putative local govt, actors, & their co-conspirators, are not entitled

to qualified immunity on the §1983 injunction & 42 U.S.C. damages claims; (3) vacate

all orders & judgments entered by the lower courts in 5th Circ. case # 22-20472, in

USDC # 4:20-CV-04149 & 4:22-CV-00765230; (4) enter the relief for Petitioner as

requested,231 w/ extended settlement date; & (5) remand for proceedings.

Petitioner also seeks a “Related Writ” on the filed §1651 petition232; & post

review, vacate all challenged liberty deprivation orders & judgments. Such

allows resolution of Petitioner’s putative 42 U.S.C. damage claims upon remand.

228 Appx. 420-432; 512-515.

229 Appx. 17; FRCP R. 21.

230 Appx. 1-67.

231 Appx. 512-525.

232 Appx. 546; See also, Supra, fn. 1 (Due “Related Writ” of Cert, on 5th Circ. Cause 22-20472).

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Ernest Adimora-Nweke

2/8/2023

XII.

Proof of Service

I, Ernest Adimora-Nweke. do swear or declare that on this date -2/8/2023. (or

before 4/1/2023, as required by SCOTUS Rules 29 (& per SCOTUS Clerk’s 11/23/2022

& 1/18/2023 Rule 14.5 letter), I have served the enclosed (a) MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, (b) PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI, (c) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED W/ EXTENDED WORD &

PG COUNT & APPENDIX, & (d) The APPENDIX (Appx, 1-589, 1049-1173, & 12841364; or -714 pages total), on each party to the above proceeding or that party’s

counsel, & on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope

containing the above documents in the US mail properly addressed to each of them

& with 1st class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a 3rd party commercial carrier for

delivery within 3 calendar days; & via emails below:

A TTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS MCGRA W & TxDPS

SCOT M. GRAYDON (Lead Counsel)

KEN PAXTON

Assistant Attorney General

Attorney General of Texas

scot.graydon@oag.texas.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS HARRIS COUNTY & LINA HIDALGO

STAN CLARK (Lead Counsel)

HON. CHRISTIAN D. MENEFEE

Assistant Harris County Attorney

Harris County Attorney

stan.clark@cao.hctx.net

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true & correct.

2/8/2023. Ernest Adimora-Nweke.

XIII. Appendix

Table of Contents

Date

10/4/2022

Document

Fed. 5th Circuit Order Denying Appellant's Motion

for Reconsideration. Stay the Mandate. & transfer

appeal Cause 22-20269 to the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia.

Appx., Pg (x)

9/8/2022

Fed. 5th Circuit Order Denying Appellant's Motion

for Expedited Ruling on his Motion for

Reconsideration. Stay the Mandate. & transfer

appeal Cause 22-20269 to the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia.

8/17/2022

Fed 5th Circuit Clerk Order Denying Appellant's

Motion to Reopen Cause 22-20269.

8/15/2022

Fed 5th Circuit Judgment Issued As Mandate for

Cause 22-20269.

8/3/2022

Fed 5th Circuit Clerk Order to File FRAP Rule 27

motion or pay $505 fee. & Order to pay $500 writ

fee.

7/1/2022

Fed 5th Circuit Clerk Order to file a Fed. R. App. P.

Rule 24 request to appeal in forma vauveris for

Cause 22-20269. or pay the $505 appeal filing fee.

6/9/2022

Fed 5th Circuit Clerk Notice to pay $505 docket

filing fee for Cause 22-20269 appeal action.

6/23/2022

USDC # 4:22-CV-00765: Court Order Denying

Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (*Filed in 14th

page of Appellant's 5th Circ. Cause 22-20269,

8/2/2022 filed FRAP R. 24(a)(5) motion*).

5/25/2022

USDC # 4:22-CV-00765: Court Order of Dismissal

with Prejudice.

5/25/2022

USDC # 4:22-CV-00765: Final Judgment: Dismissal

with Prejudice.

7/15/2022

USDC # 4:22-CV-00765: Civil Docket.

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