Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David Frank Campeau, Jr., et ux., Petitioners v. Edward Sandercock, Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Wayne County, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 9, 2022
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Supreme Court of the United States
David Frank Campeau Jr., a natural born man and Citizen of the United States of
America;
Christin Campeau, a natural born woman and Citizen of the Federal Republic of
Germany
Petitioners,
v.
Kathleen Bausman, Field Office Director of the United States Customs and
Immigrations Service, Philadelphia Field Office.
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Filed by: David Frank Campeau Jr; and,
Christin Campeau
c/o non-domestic
1371 Bridge Street; near;
Honesdale, Pennsylvania (18431)
Telephone: (484)-686-6719
1
Questions Presented for Review:
In accord with the Tenth Amendment, how is it determined whether a power is
reserved to the people or to the State?
Whether the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve the right, power, and
authority to marry, to the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
Whether the statutes at 23 Pa. C.S. §§1103 and 1301 are unconstitutional for
violating the Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments?
Whether a federal officer is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 when the officer’s
action is made by directly applying a State statute; and, said action deprives a citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws?
11
Lower Court Proceedings:
Campeau v. Sandercock. No. 3:21-cv-00280, U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. Judgement entered May 18, 2021.
Campeau v. Sandercock. No. 21-2357, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Judgement entered May 20, 2022
Ill
Table of Contents
Question Presented for Review:........................................................
i
Lower Court Proceedings:...................................................................
11
I.
Jurisdictional Statement:............................................................
1
II.
Federal Constitutional Provisions:.........................................
1
III.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Constitutional Provisions
1
IV.
State Statutes:.................... ......................................................
2
V.
Statement of the Case:...............................................................
2
VI.
Arguments for Granting Certiorari:........................................
5
VII.
Conclusion...................................................................................
8
Table of Authorities
Constitution of the United States of America
Ninth Amendment
6
Tenth Amendment
3, 5, 6
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Article I, Section 25
6
Article I, Sections 1
6
Federal Statutes
28 U.S.C. §1331
4
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)
4
28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(l)
4
42 U.S.C. §1983.......
4, 7,8
State Statutes
23 PaC.S. § 1103
3, 4,7
23 Pa C.S. § 1301
3, 4, 5, 7
Other Provisions
Genesis 1:28
2
IV
Genesis 2:24
2
Cases
Adickes v. Kress Co.. 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)
7
Campeau v. Sandercock. No. 597 M.D. 2015 at 6-7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2016) 5
Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka. 87 U.S 655, 662 (1874)
6
Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).......................................
6
Kach v Hose. 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009)
7
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)
7
McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819)
6
Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
6
Peterson v. City of Greenville. 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963)
7
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families. 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)
6
Yick Wo. V. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 369, 370 (1886)
6
1
I. Jurisdictional Statement:
The statute at 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) provides this Court with the jurisdiction to
review cases in the court of appeals after rendition of judgement.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third District rendered judgement in
this case on May 20, 2022.
Said Court denied a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on August
11, 2022.
In accord with Supreme Court Rules 13(1) and 13(3), this petition has been timely
filed within 90 days of the Order denying said petition for rehearing.
II. Federal Constitutional Provisions:
Ninth Amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
Tenth Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: “No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
III.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Constitutional Provisions
Article I, Section 1. Inherent Rights of Mankind. All men are born equally free
and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.
Article I, Section 2. Political powers. All power is inherent in the people, and
all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace,
safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends they have at all times an
inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such
manner as they may think proper.
Article I, Section 25. Reservation of Powers in people. To guard against
transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that
everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and
shall forever remain inviolate.
2
IV.
State Statutes:
23 Pa. C.S. §1103: No common-law marriage contracted after January 1, 2005,
shall be valid. Nothing in this part shall be deemed or taken to render any commonlaw marriage otherwise lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005, invalid.
23 Pa. C.S. §1301(a): “No person shall be joined in marriage in this
Commonwealth until a marriage license has been obtained.”
V. Statement of the Case:
Petitioner Christin Campeau (formerly Christin Schwamberger), entered the
United States of America in August of 2014 with a K1 fiance visa for the purpose of
marrying Petitioner David Frank Campeau Jr.
In accord with Petitioners’ God-given inherent right, power and authority to
marry, Petitioners entered into a formal marriage covenant for the purpose of obeying
God’s commands to marry1 and be fruitful and multiply2 by creating children and
raising a family.
Petitioners’ marriage covenant is recorded in writing in an instrument titled:
Marriage Contract, which was executed in the presence of a Notary Public of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on August 29, 2014.
In said instrument, the father of the bride gave consent to Petitioners to so marry;
and, Petitioners voluntarily agreed to be bound by the terms of said covenant.
Following the execution of the Marriage Contract. Petitioners solemnized their
marriage in a formal wedding ceremony with the exchange of oral vows in front of
many witnesses. Said ceremony took place in Wayne County, Pennsylvania.
Additionally, a Certificate of Marriage was created and was signed by the
Petitioners, the father of the bride, and three witnesses who were present at the
formal wedding ceremony.
Christin Campeau, timely filed a Form 1-485, Application to Register Permanent
Residence or Adjust Status with the United States Customs and Immigration
Services (hereinafter “USCIS”) after marrying David Frank Campeau Jr.
In October of 2015, Petitioners attended an interview at the USCIS field office in
1 Genesis 2:24: “Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife:
and they shall be one flesh.” (King James Version)
2 Genesis 1:28: “And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and
replenish the earth...(King James Version)
3
Philadelphia wherein Petitioners presented the interviewer with their Certificate of
Marriage along with a copy of the Marriage Contract.
In November of 2015, USCIS sent Christin Campeau a Notice of Intent to Deny,
Form 1-485 alleging that Petitioners failed to prove Petitioners’ marriage was legal
and recognized by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
In order to obtain evidence that Petitioners’ marriage was recognized by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, David Campeau requested to record the Certificate
of Marriage in the public marriage records of the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne
County, Pennsylvania, which records are overseen by Edward Sandercock,
Prothonotary.
Sandercock refused to record Petitioners’ Certificate of Marriage, alleging: in
order to marry, the Pennsylvania Marriage Law at 23 Pa C.S. §1301 requires a
marriage license; and, 23 Pa C.S. §1103 makes all privately contracted marriages
after January 1, 2005 invalid.
Because 23 Pa C.S. §§1103 and 1301 usurp the God given-inherent right, power,
and authority to marry and perverts said right into a licensed privilege of the State,
David Campeau filed suit against Sandercock in the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, challenging the constitutionality of said statutes and seeking
injunctive relief to compel the recording of Petitioners’ Certificate of Marriage.
Ultimately, Commonwealth Court dismissed Petitioners’ claims for failure state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, alleging that because the Constitution of the
United States of America does not mention marriage, the power to marry is reserved
to the State by the Tenth Amendment.
David Campeau appealed, as a matter of right, to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
In April of 2016, before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rendered judgement
in the matter, the USCIS issued a Decision denying Christin Campeau’s Form 1-485.
Because of the ongoing litigation, Christin Campeau filed a Form I-290B, Notice
of Appeal or Motion, seeking reconsideration of the April Decision regarding said
Form 1-485.
Then in May of 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania without issuing an opinion.
David Campeau then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari in October of
2017, which petition was denied in January of 2018.
After waiting for the USCIS’ reply regarding said Form I-290B for some time,
Christin Campeau finally received a Decision on February 15, 2019.
4
In said Decision, Respondent Kathleen Bausman denied the legal validity of
Petitioners’ lawful marriage, alleging that said marriage did not conform with the
Pennsylvania Marriage Law. Further, Bausman denied in finality, Christin
Campeau’s Form 1-485.
Because Christin Campeau had exhausted all administrative remedies available
through the USCIS; and, David Campeau had exhausted all remedies in the
Pennsylvania State courts, Petitioners filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 lawsuit in the District
Court against both Edward Sandercock in his capacity as Prothonotary and Kathleen
Bausman in her capacity as written in the caption of this matter.
In accord with 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(l), the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania has venue jurisdiction over this matter because:
Petitioners’ marriage and Sandercock’s actions occurred in Wayne County,
Pennsylvania; and, Plaintiffs live in Wayne County, Pennsylvania; which county is
within the jurisdictional venue of said District Court.
In accord with 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3), said District Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioners’ 42 U.S.C. §1983 lawsuit.
In said suit, Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the alleged statutes at
23 Pa. C.S §§1103 and 1301 for violating the Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America.
Petitioners also brought claims against Sandercock and Bausman for depriving,
under color of said statutes, Petitioners’: right to marry; the rights, privileges and
immunities pertaining to marriage; right to due process of law; right to equal
protection of the laws; and, right to good reputation.
In addition, Petitioners brought a claim against Sandercock for depriving, under
color of said statutes, Petitioners’ right to the people’s public record.
Sandercock and Bausman both filed motions to dismiss Petitioners’ claims.
Sandercock moved to dismiss for untimeliness. Bausman moved to dismiss pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) but did not argue Petitioners’ complaint was untimely.
When considering the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation regarding
Sandercocks’ motion to dismiss, the District Judge entered an Order adopting said
Report, and dismissing Petitioners’ Complaint in its entirety.3
The Order also denied Bausman’s motion to dismiss as moot and ordered the case
3 Before the District Court was the report of the magistrate judge concerning Sandercocks’ motion to
dismiss the causes of action against Sandercock. Instead of dismissing only the claims against
Sandercock, the District Court sua sponted dismissed all of Petitioners’ claims as untimely.
5
to be closed.
Petitioners the Filed a motion to alter or amend the District Court’s order, but
said motion was denied.
A timely appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
followed.
On appeal, Petitioners conceded that their claims against Sandercock were
untimely. Respectively, the only matter before the appellate court was Petitioners’
claims against Bausman.
In the Opinion, the Third Circuit Court assumed arguendo that Petitioners’ claims
against Bausman were timely but affirmed the District Court ruling on the alternate
means of failure to state a claim.
Petitioners filed a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc but said
petition was denied.
This Petition for a Writ of Certiorari follows.
VI. Arguments for Granting Certiorari:
A. This Court Should Grant Certiorari to Clarify How to Properly Apply
the Tenth Amendment
In dismissing Petitioners’ claim that the 23 Pa. C.S. §§1103 and 1301 are
unconstitutional, the Court ruled that “State laws requiring a marriage license do
not violate [the right to marry], as has been made plain to David Campeau in his
litigation before”, citing Campeau v. Sandercock. No. 597 M.D. 2015 at 6-7 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2016). In said case, the Commonwealth Court ruled on page 6
that:
“[T]he Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that powers
not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states or to the people.... Because the United States Constitution does not
address the regulation of marriage, the authority to regulate entry and
dissolution of marriage is left to the states subject to the constitutional rights of
its citizens.”
Because the powers reserved in the Tenth Amendment are reserved either to the
State, or to the people, there must be a standard of review to determine whether a
power is reserved to the people rather than to the State.
Argument 2 of Petitioners’ Complaint demonstrates how such a determination is
made regarding the power to marry by properly applying the law.
As presented in Argument 2 of Appellants Complaint at pages 11-15:
6
1. The people of the United States of American are the sovereigns who delegate
power to the government, and the law (constitutions, et. seq.) is the definition and
limitation of power. See Yick Wo. V. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 369, 370 (1886).
2. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of both State and Federal
governments are governments of enumerated powers, which powers are limited and
defined. See McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819), Citizens’ Savings &
Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka. 87 U.S 655, 662 (1874).
3. The powers enumerated to the States are found in their respective
constitutions.
4. In the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, there are no grants
of power that delegate to the State the right, power, or authority to marry; rather,
Article I, Sections 1 and 25 together except the right, power, and authority to marry
out of the general powers of government.4
5. Because the right, power, and authority to marry are not delegated to the
State, the same are reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of
the Constitution of the United States of America.
Wherefore, prior rulings of this Court recognized marriage as “a relationship
having its origins entirely apart from the power of the State...” and “the individual’s
freedom to marry and reproduce is ‘older than the Bill of Rights’” Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families. 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977), quoting in part Griswold
v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Throughout the entire history of legal proceedings regarding this matter, the
courts have repeatedly failed to apply any sort of standard of review to determine
whether a power is reserved to a State, or to the people.
Additionally, Petitioners have been unable to find any other cases which set out a
standard of review for properly applying the Tenth Amendment when there is a
controversy between one or more of the people and the State as to which party a power
is reserved to.
Therefore, this Court should grant this Petition for Certiorari and provide the
lower courts with a proper standard of review to apply when determining whether a
power is reserved to the State or to the people.
B.
42 U.S.C. §1983 Can be Applied to Federal Officers When the Officer’s
4 The courts both State and Federal have repeatedly ruled that marriage is a protected right of liberty
and is necessary to the pursuit of happiness. See Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Article
I, Section 25, reserves the inherent right of liberty and pursuit of happiness mentioned in Article I,
Section 1, to the people, and excepts said rights out of the general powers of government to prevent
transgression upon said inherent rights.
7
Action is Made by Directly Applying a State Statute
In the appellate court’s Opinion at footnote 2, the panel stated that dismissal of
the Petitioners’ claims asserted against Kathleen Bausman would also be appropriate
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
alleging:
“42 U.S.C. §1983, which, by its own terms, authorizes suits against state and local
officers; it does not provide a cause of action against federal actors.” See id.;
Kach v Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009)(to state a claim under §1983, a
party must allege deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a
state actor.)”
However, in Kach. Ibid, and the cases cited therein, the issue before the court was
whether a private individual’s action could be considered as state action for the
purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and under what circumstances.
This instant proceeding does not involve a private actor; rather it is a unique
situation wherein, a federal officer’s action was dictated directly by a state statute as
required by federal law. In all of Petitioners’ research, Petitioners have not found a
single case wherein a federal officer’s action was made by directly applying an
unconstitutional state statue and was subsequently sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
This Court has set forth a two-part test to determine whether an action is
considered as state action for the purposes of a §1983 suit:
“First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person
for whom the State is responsible. ...Second, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the State. Luear v. Edmondson Oil Co.. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
In this case, the procedural scheme of mandating a marriage license as a pre
requisite to marriage is the product of the state and therefore satisfies the first part
of the test.
Regarding the second part of the test, this Court has held: “When the State has
commanded a particular result, it has saved to itself the power to determine that
result and thereby 'to a significant extent' has 'become involved' in it."Adickes v.
Kress Co.. 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) quoting in part Peterson v. City of Greenville. 373
U.S. 244, 248 (1963)
In this instance, the statutes at 23 Pa. C.S. §§1103 and 1301, required Bausman
to determine Petitioners’ marriage as invalid. Therefore, the state became involved
in Basuman’s action, satisfying the second part of the test. Therefore, Bausman’s
8
actions are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Whereas the appellate court’s ruling contradicts the application of the two-part
test this Court has put forth to determine whether an action is considered a state
action; and,
Whereas this is the first time a 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit has been brought against a
federal officer directly applying a state law as required by federal law;
Wherefore, this Court should grant certiorari to settle this matter.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners, David Frank Campeau Jr. and Christin
Campeau. request that this Court grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari and
reverse the Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third District.
Date: November 9, 2022.
Respectfully submitted,
David Frank Campeau Jr.; and,
Christin Campeau, Petitioners
c/o non-domestic
1371 Bridge Street; near:
Honesdale, Pennsylvania
(18431)
Telephone: (484)-686-6719
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.