Reply Brief — Trevor Murray, Petitioner v. UBS Securities, LLC, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 5, 2023

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No. 22-660

IN THE

TREVOR MURRAY,

v.

Petitioner,

UBS SECURITIES, LLC AND UBS AG,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Easha Anand

Pamela S. Karlan

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

SUPREME COURT

LITIGATION CLINIC

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

Robert B. Stulberg

Patrick J. Walsh

STULBERG & WALSH, LLP

14 Wall Street, Suite 5G

New York, NY 10005

Robert L. Herbst

Counsel of Record

Benjamin J. Ashmore, Sr.

HERBST LAW PLLC

420 Lexington Avenue,

Suite 300

New York, NY 10170

(646) 543-2354

rherbst@herbstlawny.com

Scott A. Korenbaum

SCOTT A. KORENBAUM, ESQ.

14 Wall Street, Suite 1603

New York, NY 10005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER ............................ 1

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 10

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Babb v. Wilkie,

140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) ........................................... 2

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia,

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) ........................................... 7

Coppinger-Martin v. Solis,

627 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................. 3

Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers,

138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) ............................................. 9

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,

557 U.S. 167 (2009) ............................................... 7

Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd.,

2013 WL 6837502 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013) ........... 2

Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma,

140 S. Ct. 768 (2020) ............................................. 2

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul

Home v. Pennsylvania,

140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) ......................................... 10

Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Doyle,

429 U.S. 274 (1977) ............................................... 7

Nance v. Ward,

142 S. Ct. 858 (2022) ............................................. 2

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) ............................................. 2

iii

Statutes

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ................................. 7

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq......................................................... 7

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–203,

124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) .............................. 9

Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109 ......... 4

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 07204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) ....... 1 - 4, 6, 8, 9

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) ............................................. 8

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) .................................... 4

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) .................................... 4

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) ................................ 1, 6

Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and

Reform Act, Pub. L. 106-181, 114 Stat 61

(April 5, 2000) ........................................................ 4

49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) .............................................. 1

49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2) ................................. 4, 6, 8

49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i) ................................. 9

49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii) .......................... 9, 10

Other Authorities

The American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (4th ed. 2000) .......................... 8

Garner, Bryan A., Black’s Law Dictionary (7th

ed. 1999) ................................................................. 8

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th

ed. 1993) ................................................................. 8

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

UBS leads off its argument for denial with the

suggestion (BIO 8-10) that buried in a footnote

midway through the Second Circuit’s opinion (Pet.

App. 11a n.4) lies an alternative basis for the

judgment. That suggestion is entirely specious for the

reasons we explain below.

What is more, UBS’s decision to lead with its

“alternative holding” theory bespeaks the weakness of

its other arguments against review. Unable to deny

there is a circuit split, UBS claims only that the

conflict is shallower than the Second Circuit

acknowledged. Pet. App. 14a n.7. But the petition

confirms it is, in fact, both mature and even deeper

than the Second Circuit realized. Pet. 15-17. UBS also

attempts to characterize the Second Circuit’s analysis

as “textual.” BIO 1, 10, 11, 14. But the most striking

thing about the Second Circuit’s opinion is that it

ignored—to the tune of literally never mentioning—

the relevant text. The Sarbanes Oxley Act’s (SOX)

whistleblower provision directs that in deciding

whether discrimination has occurred, courts must use

the “govern[ing]” framework set out in 49 U.S.C.

§ 42121(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C); Pet. 24-25.

The failure to grapple with the text of Section 42121(b)

explains not only why the Second Circuit reached a

result that conflicts with the approach of four other

courts of appeals (and the Department of Labor to

boot), but also why UBS’s construction of SOX is

wrong.

This Court should grant the petition for certiorari.

1. Split. The court below “recognize[d] that [its]

conclusion depart[ed] from the approach of the Fifth

2

and Ninth Circuits as to the elements of a section

1514A claim.” Pet. App. 14a n.7. The petition for

certiorari shows that the Fourth and Tenth Circuits

similarly disagree with the decision below, amounting

to a 4-1 split. Pet. 16-17.

UBS doesn’t deny that there is a split between the

court below and the Fifth Circuit. That alone is enough

to grant certiorari. Even if the split were only 1-1, this

Court routinely grants certiorari to resolve that sort of

conflict. 1 UBS asserts that “there is every reason to

believe that the Fifth Circuit may reconsider its

approach once it is given the opportunity to consider

for the first time the textual analysis that the Second

Circuit found compelling.” BIO 11. But this Court

would never grant review if the possibility that a

circuit “may reconsider its approach” were enough to

deny certiorari in the face of a square split. And in any

event, the Fifth Circuit already did consider, and

reject, the “textual analysis that the Second Circuit

found compelling.” See Reply Br. of Pet’r Halliburton,

Inc., at *19, Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd.,

2013 WL 6837502 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013) (arguing

that employee must show “retaliatory motive,” unlike

in the WPA context, because “the text of the WPA

differs significantly from that of SOX”).

UBS next argues that both the Second Circuit and

Murray are wrong that the Ninth Circuit is on the

other side of the split. BIO 12; see Pet. App. 14a n.7.

See, e.g., Pet. 15-17, Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 858 (2022)

(No. 21-439); Pet. 20-23, Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020)

(No. 18-882); Pet. 12-15, Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma,

140 S. Ct. 768 (2020) (No. 18-1116); Pet. 11, U.S. Army Corps of

Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290).

1

3

But as UBS admits, the Ninth Circuit has squarely

held that a petitioner need not make a conclusive

showing of retaliatory intent at the prima facie stage.

BIO 12. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “the employee

need only make a prima facie showing that the

protected behavior or conduct was a contributing

factor in the unfavorable personnel action”—no

“additional proof of [the employer’s] motivation” is

needed. Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750

(9th Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit, by contrast, held

that Murray did need to prove something more than

that his protected conduct was a contributing factor as

part of his prima facie case. Pet. App. 11a; see BIO 6

(describing Second Circuit’s holding).

Finally, the petition explained that the Fourth and

Tenth Circuits have rejected the idea that a plaintiff

must make some showing of intent separate and apart

from his burden to show that protected conduct was a

contributing factor in the wrongful conduct. Pet. 1617. UBS accuses the petition of “conflat[ing]” intent

and “causal nexus.” BIO 13-14. But UBS does not deny

that the Fourth and Tenth circuits, unlike the Second,

would have upheld the verdict in Murray’s favor.

2. Importance. UBS doesn’t deny that the SOX

whistleblower provision is important, governing

adjudication of some 850 claims per year and

protecting countless whistleblowers in thousands of

public companies. See Pet. 17-18. Nor does it deny that

the Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with that of the

Department of Labor. See id. at 19-21. And it cannot

deny that at least ten other statutes incorporate the

same governing framework. See id. at 21-22.

UBS instead raises two arguments. First, it argues

that the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the

4

whistleblower statute does not matter because the

SEC, not the Department of Labor, is responsible for

promulgating rules regarding SOX. BIO 20-21. But it

is the Department of Labor, and not the SEC, that

adjudicates whistleblower claims in the first instance.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, this

Court should be concerned that the Labor Department

and the Second Circuit read the SOX “govern[ing]”

framework differently. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A).

Second, UBS argues that this Court should ignore

all the other statutes that incorporate 49 U.S.C.

§ 42121(b)(2) by reference—the so-called AIR-21

statutes—because an answer to the question

presented in this case “would not necessarily yield a

transferable answer for other statutes with different

texts.” BIO 21. To be sure, there might be reasons why

some AIR-21 statutes should be construed differently,

although the court below relied for its construction of

SOX on a decision construing the Federal Railroad

Safety Act, Pet. App. 11a. In any case, surely a

decision from this Court would provide some guidance.

For instance, a decision by this Court might make

clear that judges shouldn’t substitute their own

procedures

for

finding

“discrimination”

and

“retaliation” for those prescribed by Congress in

AIR-21.

3. Vehicle. As the petition explains, this case is a

clean vehicle for addressing the question presented.

Pet. 23-24. Every other issue related to liability has

been decided in Murray’s favor. Pet. App. 16a-17a. The

Second Circuit’s opinion starts by asking “whether the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s antiretaliation provision

requires a whistleblower-employee to prove

retaliatory intent,” id. 8a; it ends by vacating the

5

verdict because the district court “fail[ed] to instruct

the jury on Murray’s burden to prove UBS’s retaliatory

intent,” id. 17a; and in between, it discusses only that

single issue.

UBS nevertheless insists that the Second Circuit

issued a “separate[]” holding—actually, two

“separate[]” holdings—buried in a footnote ten pages

into the opinion. BIO 8-10. In the footnote, the Second

Circuit discussed two hypothetical “scenario[s],” Pet.

App. 11a n.4, but neither was at issue in this case.

First, the footnote suggests that in some case, a

jury might impose liability even if a plaintiff’s

whistleblowing activity “insulated [him] from a

termination to which he would otherwise have been

subjected sooner.” Pet. App. 11a n.4. But in this case,

the jury surely did not award Murray nearly $1 million

in damages because his whistleblowing insulated him

from termination. See C.A. J.A. 3056 (damages should

be awarded only if “Defendants improperly retaliated

against Plaintiff for terminating him from UBS”). 2

Second, the footnote noted that in some cases, a

jury might impose liability if a whistleblower’s activity

was “the sort of behavior that would tend to affect a

termination decision,” even if it did not “actually

cause[] the termination.” Pet. App. 11a n.4. But again,

that didn’t happen here: A supplemental instruction

made clear that it was the particular activity in this

UBS is mistaken when it claims that “Petitioner’s counsel

affirmatively argued at trial” that liability could be imposed even

if Murray’s whistleblowing insulated him from termination. BIO

9. UBS’s citation to that effect is to its own reply brief below,

which in turn discusses a colloquy before the judge, not an

argument to the jury. Id. (citing Resp. C.A. Reply Br. 33-35).

2

6

case, not UBS’s general “sort of behavior,” that had to

be the basis for liability. See C.A. J.A. 1415

(supplemental instruction told the jury to consider

whether knowledge of the protected activity “affect[ed]

in any way the decision to terminate Mr. Murray’s

employment?” (emphasis added)).

Lest there be any doubt, if UBS’s “alternative

holdings” really were holdings, one might expect to see

some assessment of whether the district court’s errors

were harmless. After all, the Second Circuit spent

pages of its opinion assessing whether its actual

holding regarding “retaliatory intent” amounted to

harmless error. Pet. App. 15a-17a. But it never once

considered whether the two points in footnote four

were prejudicial, making clear that its discussion of

the hypothetical “scenario[s]” is nothing more than

dicta.

4. Merits. The statute explains precisely how to

determine in a SOX case whether unlawful

discrimination has occurred. Under the “govern[ing]”

framework, a plaintiff must show that protected

conduct “was a contributing factor in the unfavorable

personnel action”—a phrase that has a wellestablished meaning. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C)

(incorporating 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2) by reference);

see also Pet. 6, 16, 29-30. If he does so, then the

employer can prevail only if it shows, “by clear and

convincing evidence, that the employer would have

taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the

absence of that behavior”—that is, that the employer

acted without retaliatory intent. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1514A(b)(2)(C)

(incorporating

49

U.S.C.

§ 42121(b)(2) by reference).

7

The court below did not even acknowledge this

text. UBS makes two arguments to excuse this failure,

but neither is availing.

a. UBS claims that Murray’s reliance on the

incorporated AIR-21 framework “is rooted in a

conflation of intent with causation.” BIO 17. But

many—perhaps most—antidiscrimination statutes

allow intent to be proven by showing causation. Under

Title VII, for instance, proving discriminatory intent

simply requires proving that a decision was made

because of a protected characteristic. See Bostock v.

Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1742 (2020)

(“There is simply no escaping the role intent plays here

. . . . [S]ex is necessarily a but-for cause when an

employer discriminates against homosexual or

transgender employees.”). Proving discrimination

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

similarly requires only proof that the plaintiff’s age

was the but-for cause of the adverse employment

action (no need for any more “direct evidence”). Gross

v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009).

And to find a retaliatory motive in the First

Amendment context, courts apply a “test of causation,”

looking to whether a plaintiff can show that his

constitutionally protected conduct “was a substantial

factor in the decision” and to whether a defendant can

show “that it would have reached the same

decision . . . . even in the absence of protected

conduct.” Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977). In short, causal

nexus is used to prove discriminatory motive all the

time.

Indeed, the word “discriminate” itself—on which

UBS hangs much of its argument—often means

8

nothing more than that there is a “causal nexus”

between the protected characteristics of the plaintiff

and the defendant’s decisions. SOX itself defines

discrimination—including discharges like Murray’s—

in terms of causation: To “discharge” an employee

“because of” a protected act is one “manner” in which

a company “discriminate[s] against an employee.” 18

U.S.C. § 1514A(a). And dictionaries confirm as much.

See, e.g., Discrimination, Bryan A. Garner, Black’s

Law Dictionary 479 (7th ed. 1999) (to “discriminate” is

to “confer[] privileges on a certain class” or “den[y]

privileges to a certain class because of” a protected

characteristic (emphasis added)). 3

And because intent and causation are often

inextricably intertwined, UBS’s argument that

retaliation and discrimination require intent is beside

the point. The question in this case is how to allocate

the burden of proof among plaintiffs and defendants.

Most circuits to have considered the question conclude

that the text of 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2) answers the

question: A plaintiff must show only that protected

conduct contributes to the challenged employment

action (call it causation or intent), and then the burden

See also Discriminate, The American Heritage Dictionary

of the English Language 517 (4th ed. 2000) (“[T]o make

distinctions on the basis of class or category without regard to

individual merit.” (emphasis added)); Discriminate, MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary 332 (10th ed. 1993) (“[T]o make

a difference in treatment or favor on a basis other than individual

merit.” (emphasis added)).

3

9

shifts to the employer to show a nondiscriminatory

reason for its action. 4

In short, the text of SOX lays out how a

discrimination claim—including a finding of any

requisite intent—is to be proven. There is no reason to

deviate from the text of the statute.

b. UBS also posits a series of edge cases where, it

claims, following the procedure laid out in the statute

would mean finding retaliation without bad intent.

BIO 19-20. For starters, UBS provides no evidence

that such cases have ever been brought or that

Congress was concerned about such cases. This Court

“need not dwell on the situation hypothesized,” for it

“veers far from the case before us.” Digit. Realty Tr.,

Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 781 (2018).

Regardless, the framework laid out by the text of

SOX is more than capable of handling such edge cases.

UBS claims that Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138

S. Ct. 767 (2018), “makes clear that the employer’s retaliatory

intent is a required element.” BIO 17. Digital Realty interpreted

the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which provides less “far-reaching”

protection for whistleblowers than SOX. Id. at 778. Indeed, the

Court recognized that Dodd-Frank and SOX “differ in important

respects.” Id. at 772. One of the most important ones is that SOX,

but not Dodd-Frank, uses the AIR-21 framework to govern

retaliation claims.

4

In the portion of the analysis that UBS seizes upon, the

Court actually takes the opposite view from UBS: It makes clear

that retaliation may be proven by showing a causal connection

between an internal report and the retaliatory act. See Digital

Realty, 138 S. Ct. at 779. In any event, Digital Realty reiterated

that “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition, we must

follow that definition, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary

meaning.” Id. at 776-77. Here, SOX makes explicit how

retaliation is to be shown. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

10

Take UBS’s hypothetical employee, “William,” whose

specialized skills are useful to just one customer,

whose whistleblowing results in the loss of that

customer, and who is let go because his specialized

skills are no longer useful (but not because the

company was upset that he blew the whistle). BIO 19.

UBS claims that interpreting the statute Murray’s

way would lead to liability for the company, even

though the company didn’t act with a retaliatory

motive. Id. But that’s not right. In UBS’s hypothetical,

if the company can show it “would have taken the

same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of”

William’s protected behavior—that is, that it would

have fired William even if the customer was lost for

reasons that had nothing to do with William—it would

win. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).

And even if UBS did identify a case where the

statute’s explicit directions about proving retaliation

did not perfectly proxy retaliatory intent, that would

still be no reason to ignore the text of the statute in

favor of a court-crafted process for ascertaining intent.

After all, it is not this Court’s role “to rewrite the

statute so that it covers only what we think is

necessary to achieve what we think Congress really

intended.” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter &

Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2381

(2020) (citation omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

11

Respectfully submitted,

Easha Anand

Pamela S. Karlan

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

SUPREME COURT

LITIGATION CLINIC

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

Robert B. Stulberg

Patrick J. Walsh

STULBERG & WALSH, LLP

14 Wall Street, Suite 5G

New York, NY 10005

April 5, 2023

Robert L. Herbst

Counsel of Record

Benjamin J. Ashmore, Sr.

HERBST LAW PLLC

420 Lexington Avenue,

Suite 300

New York, NY 10170

(646) 543-2354

rherbst@herbstlawny.com

Scott A. Korenbaum

SCOTT A. KORENBAUM, ESQ.

14 Wall Street, Suite 1603

New York, NY 10005

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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