Reply Brief — Trevor Murray, Petitioner v. UBS Securities, LLC, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 5, 2023
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No. 22-660
IN THE
TREVOR MURRAY,
v.
Petitioner,
UBS SECURITIES, LLC AND UBS AG,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
Easha Anand
Pamela S. Karlan
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
SUPREME COURT
LITIGATION CLINIC
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Robert B. Stulberg
Patrick J. Walsh
STULBERG & WALSH, LLP
14 Wall Street, Suite 5G
New York, NY 10005
Robert L. Herbst
Counsel of Record
Benjamin J. Ashmore, Sr.
HERBST LAW PLLC
420 Lexington Avenue,
Suite 300
New York, NY 10170
(646) 543-2354
rherbst@herbstlawny.com
Scott A. Korenbaum
SCOTT A. KORENBAUM, ESQ.
14 Wall Street, Suite 1603
New York, NY 10005
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER ............................ 1
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 10
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Babb v. Wilkie,
140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) ........................................... 2
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) ........................................... 7
Coppinger-Martin v. Solis,
627 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................. 3
Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers,
138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) ............................................. 9
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167 (2009) ............................................... 7
Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd.,
2013 WL 6837502 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013) ........... 2
Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma,
140 S. Ct. 768 (2020) ............................................. 2
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul
Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) ......................................... 10
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977) ............................................... 7
Nance v. Ward,
142 S. Ct. 858 (2022) ............................................. 2
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,
136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) ............................................. 2
iii
Statutes
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ................................. 7
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq......................................................... 7
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–203,
124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) .............................. 9
Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109 ......... 4
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 07204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) ....... 1 - 4, 6, 8, 9
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) ............................................. 8
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) .................................... 4
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) .................................... 4
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) ................................ 1, 6
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act, Pub. L. 106-181, 114 Stat 61
(April 5, 2000) ........................................................ 4
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) .............................................. 1
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2) ................................. 4, 6, 8
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i) ................................. 9
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii) .......................... 9, 10
Other Authorities
The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (4th ed. 2000) .......................... 8
Garner, Bryan A., Black’s Law Dictionary (7th
ed. 1999) ................................................................. 8
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th
ed. 1993) ................................................................. 8
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
UBS leads off its argument for denial with the
suggestion (BIO 8-10) that buried in a footnote
midway through the Second Circuit’s opinion (Pet.
App. 11a n.4) lies an alternative basis for the
judgment. That suggestion is entirely specious for the
reasons we explain below.
What is more, UBS’s decision to lead with its
“alternative holding” theory bespeaks the weakness of
its other arguments against review. Unable to deny
there is a circuit split, UBS claims only that the
conflict is shallower than the Second Circuit
acknowledged. Pet. App. 14a n.7. But the petition
confirms it is, in fact, both mature and even deeper
than the Second Circuit realized. Pet. 15-17. UBS also
attempts to characterize the Second Circuit’s analysis
as “textual.” BIO 1, 10, 11, 14. But the most striking
thing about the Second Circuit’s opinion is that it
ignored—to the tune of literally never mentioning—
the relevant text. The Sarbanes Oxley Act’s (SOX)
whistleblower provision directs that in deciding
whether discrimination has occurred, courts must use
the “govern[ing]” framework set out in 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C); Pet. 24-25.
The failure to grapple with the text of Section 42121(b)
explains not only why the Second Circuit reached a
result that conflicts with the approach of four other
courts of appeals (and the Department of Labor to
boot), but also why UBS’s construction of SOX is
wrong.
This Court should grant the petition for certiorari.
1. Split. The court below “recognize[d] that [its]
conclusion depart[ed] from the approach of the Fifth
2
and Ninth Circuits as to the elements of a section
1514A claim.” Pet. App. 14a n.7. The petition for
certiorari shows that the Fourth and Tenth Circuits
similarly disagree with the decision below, amounting
to a 4-1 split. Pet. 16-17.
UBS doesn’t deny that there is a split between the
court below and the Fifth Circuit. That alone is enough
to grant certiorari. Even if the split were only 1-1, this
Court routinely grants certiorari to resolve that sort of
conflict. 1 UBS asserts that “there is every reason to
believe that the Fifth Circuit may reconsider its
approach once it is given the opportunity to consider
for the first time the textual analysis that the Second
Circuit found compelling.” BIO 11. But this Court
would never grant review if the possibility that a
circuit “may reconsider its approach” were enough to
deny certiorari in the face of a square split. And in any
event, the Fifth Circuit already did consider, and
reject, the “textual analysis that the Second Circuit
found compelling.” See Reply Br. of Pet’r Halliburton,
Inc., at *19, Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd.,
2013 WL 6837502 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013) (arguing
that employee must show “retaliatory motive,” unlike
in the WPA context, because “the text of the WPA
differs significantly from that of SOX”).
UBS next argues that both the Second Circuit and
Murray are wrong that the Ninth Circuit is on the
other side of the split. BIO 12; see Pet. App. 14a n.7.
See, e.g., Pet. 15-17, Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 858 (2022)
(No. 21-439); Pet. 20-23, Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020)
(No. 18-882); Pet. 12-15, Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma,
140 S. Ct. 768 (2020) (No. 18-1116); Pet. 11, U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290).
1
3
But as UBS admits, the Ninth Circuit has squarely
held that a petitioner need not make a conclusive
showing of retaliatory intent at the prima facie stage.
BIO 12. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “the employee
need only make a prima facie showing that the
protected behavior or conduct was a contributing
factor in the unfavorable personnel action”—no
“additional proof of [the employer’s] motivation” is
needed. Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750
(9th Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit, by contrast, held
that Murray did need to prove something more than
that his protected conduct was a contributing factor as
part of his prima facie case. Pet. App. 11a; see BIO 6
(describing Second Circuit’s holding).
Finally, the petition explained that the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits have rejected the idea that a plaintiff
must make some showing of intent separate and apart
from his burden to show that protected conduct was a
contributing factor in the wrongful conduct. Pet. 1617. UBS accuses the petition of “conflat[ing]” intent
and “causal nexus.” BIO 13-14. But UBS does not deny
that the Fourth and Tenth circuits, unlike the Second,
would have upheld the verdict in Murray’s favor.
2. Importance. UBS doesn’t deny that the SOX
whistleblower provision is important, governing
adjudication of some 850 claims per year and
protecting countless whistleblowers in thousands of
public companies. See Pet. 17-18. Nor does it deny that
the Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with that of the
Department of Labor. See id. at 19-21. And it cannot
deny that at least ten other statutes incorporate the
same governing framework. See id. at 21-22.
UBS instead raises two arguments. First, it argues
that the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the
4
whistleblower statute does not matter because the
SEC, not the Department of Labor, is responsible for
promulgating rules regarding SOX. BIO 20-21. But it
is the Department of Labor, and not the SEC, that
adjudicates whistleblower claims in the first instance.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, this
Court should be concerned that the Labor Department
and the Second Circuit read the SOX “govern[ing]”
framework differently. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A).
Second, UBS argues that this Court should ignore
all the other statutes that incorporate 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121(b)(2) by reference—the so-called AIR-21
statutes—because an answer to the question
presented in this case “would not necessarily yield a
transferable answer for other statutes with different
texts.” BIO 21. To be sure, there might be reasons why
some AIR-21 statutes should be construed differently,
although the court below relied for its construction of
SOX on a decision construing the Federal Railroad
Safety Act, Pet. App. 11a. In any case, surely a
decision from this Court would provide some guidance.
For instance, a decision by this Court might make
clear that judges shouldn’t substitute their own
procedures
for
finding
“discrimination”
and
“retaliation” for those prescribed by Congress in
AIR-21.
3. Vehicle. As the petition explains, this case is a
clean vehicle for addressing the question presented.
Pet. 23-24. Every other issue related to liability has
been decided in Murray’s favor. Pet. App. 16a-17a. The
Second Circuit’s opinion starts by asking “whether the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s antiretaliation provision
requires a whistleblower-employee to prove
retaliatory intent,” id. 8a; it ends by vacating the
5
verdict because the district court “fail[ed] to instruct
the jury on Murray’s burden to prove UBS’s retaliatory
intent,” id. 17a; and in between, it discusses only that
single issue.
UBS nevertheless insists that the Second Circuit
issued a “separate[]” holding—actually, two
“separate[]” holdings—buried in a footnote ten pages
into the opinion. BIO 8-10. In the footnote, the Second
Circuit discussed two hypothetical “scenario[s],” Pet.
App. 11a n.4, but neither was at issue in this case.
First, the footnote suggests that in some case, a
jury might impose liability even if a plaintiff’s
whistleblowing activity “insulated [him] from a
termination to which he would otherwise have been
subjected sooner.” Pet. App. 11a n.4. But in this case,
the jury surely did not award Murray nearly $1 million
in damages because his whistleblowing insulated him
from termination. See C.A. J.A. 3056 (damages should
be awarded only if “Defendants improperly retaliated
against Plaintiff for terminating him from UBS”). 2
Second, the footnote noted that in some cases, a
jury might impose liability if a whistleblower’s activity
was “the sort of behavior that would tend to affect a
termination decision,” even if it did not “actually
cause[] the termination.” Pet. App. 11a n.4. But again,
that didn’t happen here: A supplemental instruction
made clear that it was the particular activity in this
UBS is mistaken when it claims that “Petitioner’s counsel
affirmatively argued at trial” that liability could be imposed even
if Murray’s whistleblowing insulated him from termination. BIO
9. UBS’s citation to that effect is to its own reply brief below,
which in turn discusses a colloquy before the judge, not an
argument to the jury. Id. (citing Resp. C.A. Reply Br. 33-35).
2
6
case, not UBS’s general “sort of behavior,” that had to
be the basis for liability. See C.A. J.A. 1415
(supplemental instruction told the jury to consider
whether knowledge of the protected activity “affect[ed]
in any way the decision to terminate Mr. Murray’s
employment?” (emphasis added)).
Lest there be any doubt, if UBS’s “alternative
holdings” really were holdings, one might expect to see
some assessment of whether the district court’s errors
were harmless. After all, the Second Circuit spent
pages of its opinion assessing whether its actual
holding regarding “retaliatory intent” amounted to
harmless error. Pet. App. 15a-17a. But it never once
considered whether the two points in footnote four
were prejudicial, making clear that its discussion of
the hypothetical “scenario[s]” is nothing more than
dicta.
4. Merits. The statute explains precisely how to
determine in a SOX case whether unlawful
discrimination has occurred. Under the “govern[ing]”
framework, a plaintiff must show that protected
conduct “was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
personnel action”—a phrase that has a wellestablished meaning. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C)
(incorporating 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2) by reference);
see also Pet. 6, 16, 29-30. If he does so, then the
employer can prevail only if it shows, “by clear and
convincing evidence, that the employer would have
taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the
absence of that behavior”—that is, that the employer
acted without retaliatory intent. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(b)(2)(C)
(incorporating
49
U.S.C.
§ 42121(b)(2) by reference).
7
The court below did not even acknowledge this
text. UBS makes two arguments to excuse this failure,
but neither is availing.
a. UBS claims that Murray’s reliance on the
incorporated AIR-21 framework “is rooted in a
conflation of intent with causation.” BIO 17. But
many—perhaps most—antidiscrimination statutes
allow intent to be proven by showing causation. Under
Title VII, for instance, proving discriminatory intent
simply requires proving that a decision was made
because of a protected characteristic. See Bostock v.
Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1742 (2020)
(“There is simply no escaping the role intent plays here
. . . . [S]ex is necessarily a but-for cause when an
employer discriminates against homosexual or
transgender employees.”). Proving discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
similarly requires only proof that the plaintiff’s age
was the but-for cause of the adverse employment
action (no need for any more “direct evidence”). Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009).
And to find a retaliatory motive in the First
Amendment context, courts apply a “test of causation,”
looking to whether a plaintiff can show that his
constitutionally protected conduct “was a substantial
factor in the decision” and to whether a defendant can
show “that it would have reached the same
decision . . . . even in the absence of protected
conduct.” Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977). In short, causal
nexus is used to prove discriminatory motive all the
time.
Indeed, the word “discriminate” itself—on which
UBS hangs much of its argument—often means
8
nothing more than that there is a “causal nexus”
between the protected characteristics of the plaintiff
and the defendant’s decisions. SOX itself defines
discrimination—including discharges like Murray’s—
in terms of causation: To “discharge” an employee
“because of” a protected act is one “manner” in which
a company “discriminate[s] against an employee.” 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a). And dictionaries confirm as much.
See, e.g., Discrimination, Bryan A. Garner, Black’s
Law Dictionary 479 (7th ed. 1999) (to “discriminate” is
to “confer[] privileges on a certain class” or “den[y]
privileges to a certain class because of” a protected
characteristic (emphasis added)). 3
And because intent and causation are often
inextricably intertwined, UBS’s argument that
retaliation and discrimination require intent is beside
the point. The question in this case is how to allocate
the burden of proof among plaintiffs and defendants.
Most circuits to have considered the question conclude
that the text of 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2) answers the
question: A plaintiff must show only that protected
conduct contributes to the challenged employment
action (call it causation or intent), and then the burden
See also Discriminate, The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 517 (4th ed. 2000) (“[T]o make
distinctions on the basis of class or category without regard to
individual merit.” (emphasis added)); Discriminate, MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary 332 (10th ed. 1993) (“[T]o make
a difference in treatment or favor on a basis other than individual
merit.” (emphasis added)).
3
9
shifts to the employer to show a nondiscriminatory
reason for its action. 4
In short, the text of SOX lays out how a
discrimination claim—including a finding of any
requisite intent—is to be proven. There is no reason to
deviate from the text of the statute.
b. UBS also posits a series of edge cases where, it
claims, following the procedure laid out in the statute
would mean finding retaliation without bad intent.
BIO 19-20. For starters, UBS provides no evidence
that such cases have ever been brought or that
Congress was concerned about such cases. This Court
“need not dwell on the situation hypothesized,” for it
“veers far from the case before us.” Digit. Realty Tr.,
Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 781 (2018).
Regardless, the framework laid out by the text of
SOX is more than capable of handling such edge cases.
UBS claims that Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138
S. Ct. 767 (2018), “makes clear that the employer’s retaliatory
intent is a required element.” BIO 17. Digital Realty interpreted
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which provides less “far-reaching”
protection for whistleblowers than SOX. Id. at 778. Indeed, the
Court recognized that Dodd-Frank and SOX “differ in important
respects.” Id. at 772. One of the most important ones is that SOX,
but not Dodd-Frank, uses the AIR-21 framework to govern
retaliation claims.
4
In the portion of the analysis that UBS seizes upon, the
Court actually takes the opposite view from UBS: It makes clear
that retaliation may be proven by showing a causal connection
between an internal report and the retaliatory act. See Digital
Realty, 138 S. Ct. at 779. In any event, Digital Realty reiterated
that “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition, we must
follow that definition, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary
meaning.” Id. at 776-77. Here, SOX makes explicit how
retaliation is to be shown. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
10
Take UBS’s hypothetical employee, “William,” whose
specialized skills are useful to just one customer,
whose whistleblowing results in the loss of that
customer, and who is let go because his specialized
skills are no longer useful (but not because the
company was upset that he blew the whistle). BIO 19.
UBS claims that interpreting the statute Murray’s
way would lead to liability for the company, even
though the company didn’t act with a retaliatory
motive. Id. But that’s not right. In UBS’s hypothetical,
if the company can show it “would have taken the
same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of”
William’s protected behavior—that is, that it would
have fired William even if the customer was lost for
reasons that had nothing to do with William—it would
win. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).
And even if UBS did identify a case where the
statute’s explicit directions about proving retaliation
did not perfectly proxy retaliatory intent, that would
still be no reason to ignore the text of the statute in
favor of a court-crafted process for ascertaining intent.
After all, it is not this Court’s role “to rewrite the
statute so that it covers only what we think is
necessary to achieve what we think Congress really
intended.” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter &
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2381
(2020) (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
11
Respectfully submitted,
Easha Anand
Pamela S. Karlan
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
SUPREME COURT
LITIGATION CLINIC
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Robert B. Stulberg
Patrick J. Walsh
STULBERG & WALSH, LLP
14 Wall Street, Suite 5G
New York, NY 10005
April 5, 2023
Robert L. Herbst
Counsel of Record
Benjamin J. Ashmore, Sr.
HERBST LAW PLLC
420 Lexington Avenue,
Suite 300
New York, NY 10170
(646) 543-2354
rherbst@herbstlawny.com
Scott A. Korenbaum
SCOTT A. KORENBAUM, ESQ.
14 Wall Street, Suite 1603
New York, NY 10005
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