Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Trevor Murray, Petitioner v. UBS Securities, LLC, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 13, 2023
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APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix A, Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, August 5,
2022 ..................................................................... 1a
Appendix B, Order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit (denying
rehearing en banc), September 15, 2022 ......... 18a
Appendix C, Order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New
York, September 25, 2018 ................................ 19a
Appendix D, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A: Civil action to
protect against retaliation in fraud cases ........ 21a
Appendix E, 49 U.S.C. § 42121: Protection of
employees providing air safety information .... 25a
1a
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2021
(Argued: April 1, 2022
Decided: August 5, 2022)
Docket Nos. 20-4202 (Lead), 21-56 (Con)
_________________________________________________
TREVOR MURRAY,
Plaintiff-Appellee-CrossAppellant,
v.
UBS SECURITIES, LLC, UBS AG,
Defendants-AppellantsCross-Appellees.
_________________________________________________
Before:
PARK, MENASHI, and PÉREZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Trevor Murray claims that UBS
Securities, LLC and UBS AG (together, “UBS”) fired
him in retaliation for reporting alleged fraud on
shareholders to his supervisor. Murray sued UBS
under the whistleblower protection provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, and
he ultimately prevailed at trial. The district court
(Failla, J.), however, did not instruct the jury that a
SOX antiretaliation claim requires a showing of the
employer’s retaliatory intent. Section 1514A prohibits
publicly traded companies from taking adverse
employment actions to “discriminate against an
employee … because of” any lawful whistleblowing
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act. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). We hold that this provision
requires a whistleblower-employee like Murray to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer took the adverse employment action
against the whistleblower-employee with retaliatory
intent—i.e., an intent to “discriminate against an
employee … because of” lawful whistleblowing
activity. The district court’s legal error was not
harmless. We thus vacate the jury’s verdict and
remand to the district court for a new trial.
THOMAS G. HUNGAR (Christopher
Smith, Anna Casey, Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher LLP, Washington, D.C.;
Gabrielle
Levin,
Gibson,
Dunn
& Crutcher LLP, New York, NY, on the
brief), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Defendants-
Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
ROBERT L. HERBST (Robert B.
Stulberg, Patrick J. Walsh, Stulberg
& Walsh, LLP, New York, NY; Scott A.
Korenbaum, New York, NY; Benjamin J.
Ashmore, Sr., Herbst Law PLLC, New
York, NY, on the brief), Herbst Law
PLLC, New York, NY, for PlaintiffAppellee-Cross-Appellant.
PARK, Circuit Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 2011, UBS hired Murray as a strategist in its
commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”)
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business. Murray was “responsible for performing
research and creating reports that were distributed
to [UBS’s] current and potential clients about CMBS
products, services and transactions.” Am. Compl. ¶ 2.
As a CMBS strategist, Murray was required by
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
regulations to certify that his reports were produced
independently and that they accurately reflected his
own views.1
According to Murray, two leaders of UBS’s
trading desk—Ken Cohen, the head of the CMBS
trading desk, and Dave McNamara, the head CMBS
trader—improperly pressured him to skew his
research and to publish reports to support their
business strategies. For example, Murray testified
that in September 2011, Cohen told him “if we’re
going to accomplish what we want to accomplish as a
business, it’s important that we maintain consistency
of message between originations, trading desk, and
research,” and that “it would be best if you clear your
research articles with the [trading] desk going
forward,” and McNamara agreed. App’x at 254. This
made Murray “very concerned” because he “was faced
with the dilemma of how to maintain a relationship
1
Specifically, Murray was required to “include in [his]
research report[s] a clear and prominent certification . . .
containing . . . [a] statement attesting that all of the views
expressed in the research report accurately reflect the research
analyst’s personal views about any and all of the subject
securities or issuers; and . . . [a] statement attesting that no
part of the research analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be,
directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or
views expressed by the research analyst in the research report.”
17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a).
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with [his] client while maintaining integrity as a
researcher.” Id. at 255.
Murray reported this conduct to his direct
supervisor, Michael Schumacher, in December 2011
and again in January 2012. In December, Murray
met privately with Schumacher and told him:
[M]y relationship with my client had become
untenable, that [Cohen and McNamara] had
told me to preclear my articles, which I had
been doing; that they wanted me … to be
nothing more than a shill for the market. The
only feedback I had gotten [about the articles]
for the most part was just negative. … [I]
[t]old [Schumacher] about the reaction I got
from both [Cohen] and [McNamara] about
[one of my research] article[s] and that I was
like I don’t know how [Cohen] got away with
this.… But this type of relationship was
completely foreign to me; and that it wasn’t
just unethical, it was illegal, and I wanted it
to stop.
Id. at 283. According to Murray, Schumacher
responded: “I sympathize with your situation. It is a
tough position to be in when you have a dour view of
the market that is in conflict [with] … your internal
client but it is very important that you do not
alienate your internal client.” Id.
The following month, Murray met with
Schumacher to go over his performance review.
Afterwards, Murray “told [Schumacher] once again
that the situation with [his] client,” referring to the
UBS trading desk, “was bad and getting worse.” Id.
at 294. Murray explained that he had been left out of
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meetings that “would normally be a normal part of
[his] job function” and outlined Cohen and
McNamara’s “constant efforts to skew [his] research
dating back to the beginning.” Id. at 294–95.
Schumacher responded that “these were the confines
under which [you] should expect [your] job to be, …
[you're] going to have to operate, and … just … write
what the business line wanted.” Id. at 295.
Shortly after this, Schumacher emailed his
supervisor, Larry Hatheway, recommending that
UBS “remove [Murray] from our head count.” Id. at
539, 1,544. Alternatively, he suggested that “[i]f Ken
Cohen and the CMBS team want to keep a presence
in analysis, they can move [Murray] onto the desk” as
a desk analyst, unregulated by the SEC. Id. at 539–
40, 1,544. Schumacher continued that “[o]therwise,
we will make the tough call,” which Schumacher
later explained meant that “[Murray] would be a
candidate for termination.” Id. at 540, 1,544. The
CMBS trading desk declined to take Murray on as a
desk analyst, and UBS terminated him in February
2012.
Murray contends that his termination was
retaliation for whistleblowing. UBS asserts that it
terminated Murray due to a shift in strategy
prompted by financial difficulties. Indeed, UBS had
implemented a series of reductions in force, including
one in February 2012 which resulted in the
elimination of Murray’s position.
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B. Procedural History
Murray sued UBS in 2014.2 He alleged that he
was terminated by UBS in response to his complaints
about fraud on shareholders in violation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s antiretaliation provision, 18
U.S.C. § 1514A.3 The case went to trial before a jury.
UBS moved for judgment as a matter of law, which
the district court denied. The district court then
instructed the jury on the elements of a section
1514A claim:
First, that plaintiff engaged in activity
protected by Sarbanes-Oxley;
Second, that UBS knew that plaintiff engaged
in the protected activity;
Third, that plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action – here, the termination of
his employment at UBS; and
Fourth, that plaintiff’s protected activity was
a contributing factor in the termination of his
employment.
*
*
*
For a protected activity to be a contributing
factor, it must have either alone or in
combination with other factors tended to
affect in any way UBS’s decision to terminate
plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff is not
Murray first sued UBS in 2012 for violating the DoddFrank Act’s antiretaliation provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h), but
the district court granted UBS’s motion to compel arbitration.
2
Murray also sued for violation of 12 U.S.C. § 5567(b), but
that cause of action is not at issue in this appeal.
3
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required to prove that his protected activity
was the primary motivating factor in his
termination, or that UBS’s articulated
reasons for his termination … was a pretext,
in order to satisfy this element.
App’x at 1,389–90, 1,393. UBS objected to these jury
instructions, arguing that they lacked a key element
of a section 1514A claim: proof of UBS’s retaliatory
intent in taking the adverse employment action. The
district court overruled UBS’s objection and the case
went to the jury, which found UBS liable. The jury
also returned an advisory damages verdict,
determining that Murray should be awarded
$653,300 in back pay, no front pay, and $250,000 in
non-economic damages.
In post-trial briefing, UBS renewed its motion for
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for
a new trial, and moved to limit Murray’s back-pay
award. The district court denied UBS’s motions. The
district court reasoned that “there is evidence to
support the jury’s finding as to each of the elements
of the Section 1514A offense, principally derived from
Mr. Murray’s testimony.” Sp. App’x at 10. In reaching
this conclusion, the district court again did not view
retaliatory intent as an element of a section 1514A
claim. The district court also adopted the jury’s
advisory verdict on damages.
Murray then moved for statutory attorney’s fees
and costs. The district court entered judgment,
awarding Murray $1,769,387.52 in attorney’s fees
and costs, as well as $653,300 in back pay, no front
pay, and $250,000 in non-economic damages—
identical to the jury’s advisory verdict on damages.
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UBS appealed the district court’s denial of its motion
for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative,
a new trial, while Murray cross-appealed the
damages and attorney’s fees awards.
II. DISCUSSION
This appeal presents the question whether the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s antiretaliation provision
requires a whistleblower-employee to prove
retaliatory intent. We review this legal question de
novo. See United States v. Williams, 733 F.3d 448,
452 (2d Cir. 2013).
UBS argues that the district court erred by
failing to instruct the jury that Murray had to prove
UBS’s retaliatory intent to prevail on his section
1514A claim. Murray responds that there was no
such error because retaliatory intent is not an
element of a section 1514A claim. We conclude based
on the plain meaning of the statutory language and
our interpretation of a nearly identical statute that
retaliatory intent is an element of a section 1514A
claim. The district court committed a non-harmless
error by failing to instruct the jury accordingly. We
thus vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial
on liability and do not reach the cross-appeal.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
Antiretaliation Provision
First, the plain meaning of the statutory
language makes clear that retaliatory intent is an
element of a section 1514A claim. To interpret
statutory language, “we begin with the statute’s text
because ‘we assume that the ordinary meaning of the
statutory language accurately expresses the
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legislative purpose.”’ Friends of the E. Hampton
Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton, 841 F.3d 133,
147 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue
Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 376 (2013)). “[U]nless otherwise
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Harris v.
Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted). “If the statutory language is unambiguous
and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent
… the inquiry ceases.” Friends of the E. Hampton
Airport, 841 F.3d at 147–48 (citation omitted).
The unambiguous, ordinary meaning of section
1514A’s statutory language requires retaliatory
intent. Section 1514A directs that no covered
employer “may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass, or in any other manner discriminate against
an employee … because of” whistleblowing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a) (emphasis added). To “discriminate”
means “[t]o act on the basis of prejudice,” which
requires a conscious decision to act based on a
protected characteristic or action. Discriminate,
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY
(1994); see Discriminate, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY (2001) (to “make an unjust or prejudicial
distinction in the treatment of different categories of
people”). And “because of” means “by reason of” or “on
account of,” connoting a causal relationship between
the parts of the sentence the phrase connects. See
Because of, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 2000); Because of, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993).
10a
The statute thus prohibits discriminatory actions
caused by—or “because of”—whistleblowing, and
actions are “discriminat[ory]” when they are based on
the employer’s conscious disfavor of an employee for
whistleblowing. Cf. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free
Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining
that, in the Title VII context, “an action is ‘because of’
a plaintiff’s [protected characteristic] where it was a
‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor contributing to the
employer’s decision to take the action”). A
discriminatory action “because of” whistleblowing
therefore necessarily requires retaliatory intent—
i.e., that the employer’s adverse action was motivated
by the employee’s whistleblowing. The plain meaning
of section 1514A’s statutory language thus compels
our conclusion that retaliatory intent is required to
sustain a SOX antiretaliation claim.
We have previously articulated the elements of a
SOX antiretaliation claim in Bechtel v. Admin. Rev.
Bd., 710 F.3d 443 (2d Cir. 2013). There, we explained
that “an employee must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that (1) [he] engaged in protected
activity; (2) the employer knew that [he] engaged in
the protected activity; (3) [he] suffered an
unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected
activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
action.” Id. at 447 (citation omitted). The district
court instructed the jury that “[f]or a protected
activity to be a contributing factor, it must have
either alone or in combination with other factors
tended to affect in any way UBS’s decision to
terminate plaintiff’s employment.” App’x at 1,393.
But this explanation of the contributing factor
element fails to account for the statute’s explicit
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requirement that the employer’s conduct be
“discriminat[ory].”4 We therefore hold that to prevail
on the “contributing factor” element of a SOX
antiretaliation claim, a whistleblower-employee must
prove that the employer took the adverse
employment action against the whistlebloweremployee with retaliatory intent—i.e., an intent to
“discriminate against an employee … because of”
lawful whistleblowing activity.
B. Consistency with Our Interpretation of a Nearly
Identical Provision in the Federal Railroad Safety
Act
This reading of the SOX antiretaliation provision
is consistent with our interpretation of nearly
identical language in the Federal Railroad Safety
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a) (“FRSA”). See Tompkins v.
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 983 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.
2020).5 We generally interpret identical language in
different statutes to have the same meaning. See,
The inadequacy of the “contributing factor” standard
utilized by the district court is illuminated by the fact that
“tended to affect in any way UBS’s decision to terminate
plaintiff’s employment” could include a scenario in which
Murray’s whistleblowing resulted in termination, but also a
scenario in which, by virtue of his whistleblowing activity,
Murray was insulated from a termination to which he would
otherwise have been subjected sooner. In addition, “tended to
affect” increases the level of abstraction such that a jury might
look beyond whether the whistleblowing activity actually caused
the termination to whether it was the sort of behavior that
would tend to affect a termination decision.
4
We note that the district court did not have the benefit of
our decision in Tompkins during the pendency of Murray’s trial;
Tompkins was decided one day after the district court entered
final judgment in this case.
5
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e.g., Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428
(1973) (“The similarity of language in § 718 and
§ 204(b) is, of course, a strong indication that the two
statutes should be interpreted pari passu.”); Wasser
v. N.Y. State Off. of Vocational & Educ. Servs. for
Individuals with Disabilities, 602 F.3d 476, 479 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“Given the similarity between, and in fact
the nearly identical wording of, 29 U.S.C.
§ 722(c)(5)(J)(ii) and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C), we see
no basis for interpreting the standard of review
required by these provisions differently.”).
The relevant statutory language of the SOX and
the FRSA is nearly identical. Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a) (No covered employer “may discharge,
demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other
manner discriminate against an employee in the
terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the employee … to provide
information, cause information to be provided, or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any
conduct which the employee reasonably believes
constitutes a violation of [federal law].”), with 49
U.S.C. § 20109(a) (A covered railroad carrier “may
not discharge, demote, suspend, reprimand, or in any
other way discriminate against an employee if such
discrimination is due, in whole or in part, to the
employee’s lawful, good faith act done, or perceived
by the employer to have been done or about to be
done … to provide information, directly cause
information to be provided, or otherwise directly
assist in any investigation regarding any conduct
which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a
violation of any [federal law].”). Accordingly, our
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articulations of the elements of these claims must
likewise be consistent.6
In Tompkins, we interpreted the whistleblower
antiretaliation provision of the FRSA and held that
“some evidence of retaliatory intent is a necessary
component of an FRSA claim.” 983 F.3d at 82; see
also Armstrong v. BNSF Ry. Co., 880 F.3d 377, 382
(7th Cir. 2018) (“The [FRSA] prohibits intentional
discrimination in response to an employee’s
performance of a protected activity. That is to say, an
employer violates the statute only if the adverse
employment action is, at some level, motivated by
discriminatory animus.” (citation omitted) (emphasis
in original)). We pointed to the language specifically
referencing discrimination— i.e., “that a rail carrier
may not discharge ‘or in any other way discriminate
against’ an employee for engaging in protected
activity”—as requiring evidence of retaliatory intent
for an FRSA claim. Tompkins, 983 F.3d at 82
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). We also
explained that “the essence of such a tort is
Compare Bechtel, 710 F.3d at 447 (To prevail on a SOX
antiretaliation claim, “an employee must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) [he] engaged in protected
activity; (2) the employer knew that [he] engaged in the
protected activity; (3) [he] suffered an unfavorable personnel
action; and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor in
the unfavorable action.” (citation omitted)), with Tompkins, 983
F.3d at 80 (To prevail on an FRSA antiretaliation claim, “a
plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1)
the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer
knew that the plaintiff engaged in the protected activity; (3) the
plaintiff suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the
protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
action.” (cleaned up)).
6
14a
discriminatory animus, which in turn requires the
employee to prove that she was the victim of
intentional retaliation prompted by her protected
activity.” Id. (cleaned up).
The unambiguous, ordinary meaning of section
1514A’s statutory language, along with our identical
interpretation of the FRSA antiretaliation provision,
thus compel the conclusion that a SOX
antiretaliation claim requires a showing that the
employer took the adverse employment action
against the whistleblower-employee with retaliatory
intent.7 As in Tompkins, the whistleblower-employee
need not show that retaliatory intent “was the sole
factor affecting the discipline or that the employer
We recognize that our conclusion departs from the
approach of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits as to the elements of a
section 1514A claim. See Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd.,
771 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that retaliatory intent
is not an element of a section 1514A claim); Coppinger-Martin v.
Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). In our view,
those courts overlooked the plain meaning of the text. Moreover,
we note that the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have
interpreted the same language in the FRSA to require a
showing of retaliatory intent. See Tompkins, 983 F.3d at 82;
Armstrong, 880 F.3d at 382; Kuduk v. BNSF Ry. Co., 768 F.3d
786, 791 (8th Cir. 2014). But see Frost v. BNSF Ry. Co., 914
F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that an FRSA
antiretaliation claim does not require proof of retaliatory
intent); Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d
152, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (same). We also note that three circuits
have declined to decide the issue of whether retaliatory intent is
an element of a section 1514A claim. See Wiest v. Tyco
Electronics Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Feldman v.
Law Enforcement Assoc’s Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir.
2014); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 717 F.3d
1121, 1136 (10th Cir. 2013).
7
15a
acted only with retaliatory motive.” 983 F.3d at 82.
There must, however, be “more than a temporal
connection between the protected conduct and the
adverse employment action.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Armstrong, 880 F.3d at 382
(“[W]hile a FRSA plaintiff need not show that
retaliation was the sole motivating factor in the
adverse decision, the statutory text requires a
showing that retaliation was a motivating factor.”)
(emphasis in original)).8
C. The Jury Instruction Error Was Not Harmless
We must next determine the appropriate remedy
for the district court’s jury-instruction error. “We
review a claim of error in jury instructions de novo,
reversing only where appellant can show that,
viewing the charge as a whole, there was a
prejudicial error.” Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125,
137 (2d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “An erroneous
instruction requires a new trial unless the error is
harmless and an error is harmless only if the court is
convinced that the error did not influence the jury’s
verdict.” Id. (cleaned up).
This framework is consistent with the goal of section
1514A to “combat what Congress identified as a corporate
culture, supported by law, that discourages employees from
reporting fraudulent behavior . . . [by] protect[ing] employees
when they take lawful acts to disclose information or otherwise
assist . . . in detecting and stopping actions which they
reasonably believe to be fraudulent.” Bechtel, 710 F.3d at 446
(cleaned up); see also Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 383
(2d Cir. 2008) (Section 1514A “protects ‘employees when they
take lawful acts to disclose information or otherwise assist . . .
in detecting and stopping actions which they reasonably believe
to be fraudulent.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 107–146, at 19)).
8
16a
Because we need to be convinced that the error
did not influence the jury’s verdict, the district court’s
failure to instruct the jury on Murray’s burden to
prove UBS’s retaliatory intent in terminating him
was not harmless. Indeed, the district court itself
remarked that this was “one of the closest [cases] [it]
has ever observed.” Sp. App’x at 55. UBS offered
evidence at trial of non-retaliatory reasons for its
decision to terminate Murray. For example, UBS
witnesses testified that the company was
experiencing
significant
financial
difficulties,
resulting in company-wide layoffs when Murray
reported the alleged misconduct and was ultimately
terminated. In response to a question about why UBS
imposed layoffs, a UBS witness testified: “[In] 2011
our financial performance or the performance of the
firm was not good. We lost billions of dollars that
year and, therefore, we had to layoff people.” App’x at
573; see id. at 575 (citing “a two billion dollar trading
loss” as a cause of “more financial hardship to
[UBS]”). Cohen, the head of the CMBS trading desk,
also testified that Murray’s position as a CMBS
strategist was “not necessary” to generate revenue,
but instead was “nice to have.” Id. at 867. This
evidence supports UBS’s position that it terminated
Murray without retaliatory intent—specifically, that
it did so for the non-retaliatory reason of saving
money during a time of financial difficulty. To be
sure, there was circumstantial evidence at trial that
UBS terminated Murray in retaliation for
whistleblowing. See, e.g., App’x at 649 (testimony
explaining close temporal proximity between
Murray’s whistleblowing and termination); id. at 447
17a
(testimony of Schumacher stating that he gave
Murray a “good” performance evaluation in December
2011, prior to Murray’s purported whistleblowing).
But we do not know whose reasons—UBS’s or
Murray’s—the jury credited, as the jury instructions
did not require the jury to find retaliatory intent. And
although the jury did not find that UBS “prove[d] by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have
taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the
absence of [Murray’s] protected behavior,” Bechtel,
710 F.3d at 447 (citation omitted), this does not mean
that Murray proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that UBS acted with retaliatory intent in
terminating Murray. In other words, even though the
jury found that Murray’s whistleblowing was a
contributing factor to his termination, we cannot
know whether it would have found that UBS acted
with retaliatory intent. We are thus unconvinced that
the erroneous jury instruction did not influence the
verdict, and we accordingly remand to the district
court for a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
Retaliatory intent is an element of a section
1514A claim. This conclusion flows from the plain
meaning of the statutory language and is supported
by our interpretation of nearly identical language in
the FRSA. The district court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on Murray’s burden to prove UBS’s
retaliatory intent in terminating him. The jury
instructions were incorrect as a matter of law, and
the error was not harmless. We thus vacate the jury’s
verdict and remand to the district court for a new
trial.
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
_____________________________________
At a stated term of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood
Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
in the City of New York, on the 15th day of
September, two thousand twenty-two.
Trevor Murray,
Plaintiff-Appellee-CrossAppellant,
ORDER
Docket Nos:
v.
20-4202 (L)
UBS Securities, LLC, UBS AG,
21-56 (XAP)
Defendants-AppellantsCross-Appellees.
Appellee-Cross-Appellant, Trevor Murray, filed a
petition for panel rehearing, or, in the alternative, for
rehearing en banc. The panel that determined the
appeal has considered the request for panel
rehearing, and the active members of the Court have
considered the request for rehearing en banc.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is
denied.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
[SEAL] /s/ Catherine O’Hagan Wolf
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TREVOR MURRAY,
Plaintiff,
14 Civ. 927
(KPF)
v.
UBS SECURITIES, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY
FILED
DOC#: ___________
DATE FILED:
September 25, 2018
HON. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
For the reasons set forth on the record during the
telephonic conference held on today’s date, the
parties’ post-trial motions are resolved as follows:
1. Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter
of law, and Defendants’ renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, are
DENIED;
2. Defendants’ motion to limit Plaintiff’s back
pay award is DENIED;
3. Plaintiff’s motion for reinstatement or front
pay is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s motion for the
award of prejudgment interest is GRANTED
insofar as the Court will award prejudgment
interest from February 20, 2012, through the
date of entry of judgment using a weighted
average prime rate of 3.57%, compounded
annually.
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The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the
motions at docket entries 243, 280, 282, and 285. In
addition, the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate
entries for certain previously decided motions,
including the motions at docket entries 184, 185, 329,
331, and 334.
Finally, the parties are directed to file a joint
letter, on or before October 2, 2018, proposing a
schedule for a motion for attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2018
New York, New York
Katherine Polk Failla
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge
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APPENDIX D
18 U.S.C. § 1514A
§ 1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation
in fraud cases
Effective: July 22, 2010
(a) Whistleblower Protection for Employees of
Publicly Traded Companies.--No company with a
class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or
that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78o(d)) including any subsidiary or affiliate whose
financial information is included in the consolidated
financial statements of such company, or nationally
recognized statistical rating organization (as defined
in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78c), 1 or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company or nationally
recognized statistical rating organization, may
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in
any other manner discriminate against an employee
in the terms and conditions of employment because of
any lawful act done by the employee-(1) to provide information, cause information to
be provided, or otherwise assist in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a
violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any
rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders, when the
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information or assistance is provided to or the
investigation is conducted by-(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement
agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee
of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over
the employee (or such other person working for
the employer who has the authority to
investigate,
discover,
or
terminate
misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in,
or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about
to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer)
relating to an alleged violation of section 1341,
1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or any
provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.
(b) Enforcement Action.-(1) In general.--A person who alleges discharge
or other discrimination by any person in violation
of subsection (a) may seek relief under subsection
(c), by-(A) filing a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor; or
(B) if the Secretary has not issued a final
decision within 180 days of the filing of the
complaint and there is no showing that such
delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant,
bringing an action at law or equity for de novo
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review in the appropriate district court of the
United States, which shall have jurisdiction
over such an action without regard to the
amount in controversy.
(2) Procedure.-(A) In general.--An action under paragraph
(1)(A) shall be governed under the rules and
procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title
49, United States Code.
(B) Exception.--Notification made under
section 42121(b)(1) of title 49, United States
Code, shall be made to the person named in
the complaint and to the employer.
(C) Burdens of proof.--An action brought
under paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed by
the legal burdens of proof set forth in section
42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
(D) Statute of limitations.--An action under
paragraph (1) shall be commenced not later
than 180 days after the date on which the
violation occurs, or after the date on which the
employee became aware of the violation.
(E) Jury trial.--A party to an action brought
under paragraph (1)(B) shall be entitled to
trial by jury.
(c) Remedies.-(1) In general.--An employee prevailing in any
action under subsection (b)(1) shall be entitled to
all relief necessary to make the employee whole.
(2) Compensatory damages.--Relief for any
action under paragraph (1) shall include--
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(A) reinstatement with the same seniority
status that the employee would have had, but
for the discrimination;
(B) the amount of back pay, with interest; and
(C) compensation for any special damages
sustained as a result of the discrimination,
including litigation costs, expert witness fees,
and reasonable attorney fees.
(d) Rights Retained by Employee.--Nothing in this
section shall be deemed to diminish the rights,
privileges, or remedies of any employee under any
Federal or State law, or under any collective
bargaining agreement.
(e) Nonenforceability of Certain Provisions Waiving
Rights and Remedies or Requiring Arbitration of
Disputes.-(1) Waiver of rights and remedies.--The rights
and remedies provided for in this section may not
be waived by any agreement, policy form, or
condition of employment, including by a
predispute arbitration agreement.
(2) Predispute arbitration agreements.--No
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable, if the agreement requires
arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.
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APPENDIX E
49 U.S.C. § 42121
§ 42121. Protection of employees providing air
safety information
Effective: December 27, 2020
(a) Prohibited discrimination.--A holder of a
certificate under section 44704 or 44705 of this title,
or a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier of such
holder, may not discharge an employee or otherwise
discriminate against an employee with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because the employee (or any person
acting pursuant to a request of the employee)-(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to
provide (with any knowledge of the employer) or
cause to be provided to the employer or Federal
Government information relating to any violation
or alleged violation of any order, regulation, or
standard of the Federal Aviation Administration
or any other provision of Federal law relating to
aviation safety under this subtitle or any other
law of the United States;
(2) has filed, caused to be filed, or is about to file
(with any knowledge of the employer) or cause to
be filed a proceeding relating to any violation or
alleged violation of any order, regulation, or
standard of the Federal Aviation Administration
or any other provision of Federal law relating to
aviation safety under this subtitle or any other
law of the United States;
(3) testified or is about to testify in such a
proceeding; or
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(4) assisted or participated or is about to assist or
participate in such a proceeding.
(b) Department of Labor complaint procedure.-(1) Filing and notification.--A person who
believes that he or she has been discharged or
otherwise discriminated against by any person in
violation of subsection (a) may, not later than 90
days after the date on which such violation
occurs, file (or have any person file on his or her
behalf) a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
alleging such discharge or discrimination. Upon
receipt of such a complaint, the Secretary of
Labor shall notify, in writing, the person named
in the complaint and the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration of the filing of
the complaint, of the allegations contained in the
complaint, of the substance of evidence
supporting
the
complaint,
and
of
the
opportunities that will be afforded to such person
under paragraph (2).
(2) Investigation; preliminary order.-(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of receipt of a complaint filed under
paragraph (1) and after affording the person
named in the complaint an opportunity to
submit to the Secretary of Labor a written
response to the complaint and an opportunity
to meet with a representative of the Secretary
to present statements from witnesses, the
Secretary of Labor shall conduct an
investigation and determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that the complaint
has merit and notify, in writing, the
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complainant and the person alleged to have
committed a violation of subsection (a) of the
Secretary’s findings. If the Secretary of Labor
concludes that there is a reasonable cause to
believe that a violation of subsection (a) has
occurred, the Secretary shall accompany the
Secretary’s findings with a preliminary order
providing the relief prescribed by paragraph
(3)(B). Not later than 30 days after the date of
notification of findings under this paragraph,
either the person alleged to have committed
the violation or the complainant may file
objections to the findings or preliminary order,
or both, and request a hearing on the record.
The filing of such objections shall not operate
to stay any reinstatement remedy contained in
the preliminary order. Such hearings shall be
conducted expeditiously. If a hearing is not
requested in such 30-day period, the
preliminary order shall be deemed a final
order that is not subject to judicial review.
(B) Requirements.-(i) Required showing by complainant.--The
Secretary of Labor shall dismiss a complaint
filed under this subsection and shall not
conduct an investigation otherwise required
under subparagraph (A) unless the
complainant makes a prima facie showing
that any behavior described in paragraphs
(1) through (4) of subsection (a) was a
contributing factor in the unfavorable
personnel action alleged in the complaint.
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(ii)
Showing
by
employer.-Notwithstanding a finding by the Secretary
that the complainant has made the showing
required under clause (i), no investigation
otherwise required under subparagraph (A)
shall be conducted if the employer
demonstrates, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the employer would have
taken the same unfavorable personnel
action in the absence of that behavior.
(iii) Criteria for determination by
Secretary.--The Secretary may determine
that a violation of subsection (a) has
occurred
only
if
the
complainant
demonstrates that any behavior described in
paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a)
was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
personnel action alleged in the complaint.
(iv) Prohibition.--Relief may not be ordered
under subparagraph (A) if the employer
demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that the employer would have
taken the same unfavorable personnel
action in the absence of that behavior.
(3) Final order.—
(A) Deadline for issuance; settlement
agreements.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of conclusion of a hearing under
paragraph (2), the Secretary of Labor shall
issue a final order providing the relief
prescribed by this paragraph or denying the
complaint. At any time before issuance of a
final order, a proceeding under this subsection
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may be terminated on the basis of a settlement
agreement entered into by the Secretary of
Labor, the complainant, and the person alleged
to have committed the violation.
(B) Remedy.--If, in response to a complaint
filed under paragraph (1), the Secretary of
Labor determines that a violation of subsection
(a) has occurred, the Secretary of Labor shall
order the person who committed such violation
to-(i) take affirmative action to abate the
violation;
(ii) reinstate the complainant to his or her
former
position
together
with
the
compensation (including back pay) and
restore the terms, conditions, and privileges
associated with his or her employment; and
(iii) provide compensatory damages to the
complainant.
If such an order is issued under this
paragraph, the Secretary of Labor, at the
request of the complainant, shall assess
against the person against whom the order
is issued a sum equal to the aggregate
amount of all costs and expenses (including
attorneys’ and expert witness fees)
reasonably incurred, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, by the complainant for,
or in connection with, the bringing the
complaint upon which the order was issued.
(C) Frivolous complaints.--If the Secretary of
Labor finds that a complaint under paragraph
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(1) is frivolous or has been brought in bad
faith, the Secretary of Labor may award to the
prevailing employer a reasonable attorney’s fee
not exceeding $1,000.
(4) Review.-(A) Appeal to Court of Appeals.--Any person
adversely affected or aggrieved by an order
issued under paragraph (3) may obtain review
of the order in the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the violation,
with respect to which the order was issued,
allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the
complainant resided on the date of such
violation. The petition for review must be filed
not later than 60 days after the date of the
issuance of the final order of the Secretary of
Labor. Review shall conform to chapter 7 of
title
5,
United
States
Code.
The
commencement of proceedings under this
subparagraph shall not, unless ordered by the
court, operate as a stay of the order.
(B) Limitation on collateral attack.--An order
of the Secretary of Labor with respect to which
review could have been obtained under
subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to
judicial review in any criminal or other civil
proceeding.
(5) Enforcement of order by Secretary of
Labor. --Whenever any person has failed to
comply with an order issued under paragraph (3),
the Secretary of Labor may file a civil action in
the United States district court for the district in
which the violation was found to occur to enforce
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such order. In actions brought under this
paragraph, the district courts shall have
jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief
including, but not limited to, injunctive relief and
compensatory damages.
(6) Enforcement of order by parties.-(A) Commencement of action.--A person on
whose behalf an order was issued under
paragraph (3) may commence a civil action
against the person to whom such order was
issued to require compliance with such order.
The appropriate United States district court
shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties, to enforce such order.
(B) Attorney fees.--The court, in issuing any
final order under this paragraph, may award
costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) to any party
whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.
(c) Mandamus.--Any nondiscretionary duty imposed
by this section shall be enforceable in a mandamus
proceeding brought under section 1361 of title 28,
United States Code.
(d) Nonapplicability to deliberate violations.-Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to an
employee of a holder of a certificate issued under
section 44704 or 44705, or a contractor or
subcontractor thereof, who, acting without direction
from
such
certificate-holder,
contractor,
or
subcontractor (or such person’s agent), deliberately
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causes a violation of any requirement relating to
aviation safety under this subtitle or any other law of
the United States.
(e) Contractor defined.--In this section, the term
“contractor” means-(1) a person that performs safety-sensitive
functions by contract for an air carrier or
commercial operator; or
(2) a person that performs safety-sensitive
functions related to the design or production of an
aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or
component thereof by contract for a holder of a
certificate issued under section 44704.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.