Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Trevor Murray, Petitioner v. UBS Securities, LLC, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 13, 2023

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A, Opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, August 5,

2022 ..................................................................... 1a

Appendix B, Order of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit (denying

rehearing en banc), September 15, 2022 ......... 18a

Appendix C, Order of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New

York, September 25, 2018 ................................ 19a

Appendix D, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A: Civil action to

protect against retaliation in fraud cases ........ 21a

Appendix E, 49 U.S.C. § 42121: Protection of

employees providing air safety information .... 25a

1a

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2021

(Argued: April 1, 2022

Decided: August 5, 2022)

Docket Nos. 20-4202 (Lead), 21-56 (Con)

_________________________________________________

TREVOR MURRAY,

Plaintiff-Appellee-CrossAppellant,

v.

UBS SECURITIES, LLC, UBS AG,

Defendants-AppellantsCross-Appellees.

_________________________________________________

Before:

PARK, MENASHI, and PÉREZ, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Trevor Murray claims that UBS

Securities, LLC and UBS AG (together, “UBS”) fired

him in retaliation for reporting alleged fraud on

shareholders to his supervisor. Murray sued UBS

under the whistleblower protection provision of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, and

he ultimately prevailed at trial. The district court

(Failla, J.), however, did not instruct the jury that a

SOX antiretaliation claim requires a showing of the

employer’s retaliatory intent. Section 1514A prohibits

publicly traded companies from taking adverse

employment actions to “discriminate against an

employee … because of” any lawful whistleblowing

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act. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). We hold that this provision

requires a whistleblower-employee like Murray to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

employer took the adverse employment action

against the whistleblower-employee with retaliatory

intent—i.e., an intent to “discriminate against an

employee … because of” lawful whistleblowing

activity. The district court’s legal error was not

harmless. We thus vacate the jury’s verdict and

remand to the district court for a new trial.

THOMAS G. HUNGAR (Christopher

Smith, Anna Casey, Gibson, Dunn

& Crutcher LLP, Washington, D.C.;

Gabrielle

Levin,

Gibson,

Dunn

& Crutcher LLP, New York, NY, on the

brief), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Defendants-

Appellants-Cross-Appellees.

ROBERT L. HERBST (Robert B.

Stulberg, Patrick J. Walsh, Stulberg

& Walsh, LLP, New York, NY; Scott A.

Korenbaum, New York, NY; Benjamin J.

Ashmore, Sr., Herbst Law PLLC, New

York, NY, on the brief), Herbst Law

PLLC, New York, NY, for PlaintiffAppellee-Cross-Appellant.

PARK, Circuit Judge:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In 2011, UBS hired Murray as a strategist in its

commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”)

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business. Murray was “responsible for performing

research and creating reports that were distributed

to [UBS’s] current and potential clients about CMBS

products, services and transactions.” Am. Compl. ¶ 2.

As a CMBS strategist, Murray was required by

Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)

regulations to certify that his reports were produced

independently and that they accurately reflected his

own views.1

According to Murray, two leaders of UBS’s

trading desk—Ken Cohen, the head of the CMBS

trading desk, and Dave McNamara, the head CMBS

trader—improperly pressured him to skew his

research and to publish reports to support their

business strategies. For example, Murray testified

that in September 2011, Cohen told him “if we’re

going to accomplish what we want to accomplish as a

business, it’s important that we maintain consistency

of message between originations, trading desk, and

research,” and that “it would be best if you clear your

research articles with the [trading] desk going

forward,” and McNamara agreed. App’x at 254. This

made Murray “very concerned” because he “was faced

with the dilemma of how to maintain a relationship

1

Specifically, Murray was required to “include in [his]

research report[s] a clear and prominent certification . . .

containing . . . [a] statement attesting that all of the views

expressed in the research report accurately reflect the research

analyst’s personal views about any and all of the subject

securities or issuers; and . . . [a] statement attesting that no

part of the research analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be,

directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or

views expressed by the research analyst in the research report.”

17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a).

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with [his] client while maintaining integrity as a

researcher.” Id. at 255.

Murray reported this conduct to his direct

supervisor, Michael Schumacher, in December 2011

and again in January 2012. In December, Murray

met privately with Schumacher and told him:

[M]y relationship with my client had become

untenable, that [Cohen and McNamara] had

told me to preclear my articles, which I had

been doing; that they wanted me … to be

nothing more than a shill for the market. The

only feedback I had gotten [about the articles]

for the most part was just negative. … [I]

[t]old [Schumacher] about the reaction I got

from both [Cohen] and [McNamara] about

[one of my research] article[s] and that I was

like I don’t know how [Cohen] got away with

this.… But this type of relationship was

completely foreign to me; and that it wasn’t

just unethical, it was illegal, and I wanted it

to stop.

Id. at 283. According to Murray, Schumacher

responded: “I sympathize with your situation. It is a

tough position to be in when you have a dour view of

the market that is in conflict [with] … your internal

client but it is very important that you do not

alienate your internal client.” Id.

The following month, Murray met with

Schumacher to go over his performance review.

Afterwards, Murray “told [Schumacher] once again

that the situation with [his] client,” referring to the

UBS trading desk, “was bad and getting worse.” Id.

at 294. Murray explained that he had been left out of

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meetings that “would normally be a normal part of

[his] job function” and outlined Cohen and

McNamara’s “constant efforts to skew [his] research

dating back to the beginning.” Id. at 294–95.

Schumacher responded that “these were the confines

under which [you] should expect [your] job to be, …

[you're] going to have to operate, and … just … write

what the business line wanted.” Id. at 295.

Shortly after this, Schumacher emailed his

supervisor, Larry Hatheway, recommending that

UBS “remove [Murray] from our head count.” Id. at

539, 1,544. Alternatively, he suggested that “[i]f Ken

Cohen and the CMBS team want to keep a presence

in analysis, they can move [Murray] onto the desk” as

a desk analyst, unregulated by the SEC. Id. at 539–

40, 1,544. Schumacher continued that “[o]therwise,

we will make the tough call,” which Schumacher

later explained meant that “[Murray] would be a

candidate for termination.” Id. at 540, 1,544. The

CMBS trading desk declined to take Murray on as a

desk analyst, and UBS terminated him in February

2012.

Murray contends that his termination was

retaliation for whistleblowing. UBS asserts that it

terminated Murray due to a shift in strategy

prompted by financial difficulties. Indeed, UBS had

implemented a series of reductions in force, including

one in February 2012 which resulted in the

elimination of Murray’s position.

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B. Procedural History

Murray sued UBS in 2014.2 He alleged that he

was terminated by UBS in response to his complaints

about fraud on shareholders in violation of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s antiretaliation provision, 18

U.S.C. § 1514A.3 The case went to trial before a jury.

UBS moved for judgment as a matter of law, which

the district court denied. The district court then

instructed the jury on the elements of a section

1514A claim:

First, that plaintiff engaged in activity

protected by Sarbanes-Oxley;

Second, that UBS knew that plaintiff engaged

in the protected activity;

Third, that plaintiff suffered an adverse

employment action – here, the termination of

his employment at UBS; and

Fourth, that plaintiff’s protected activity was

a contributing factor in the termination of his

employment.

*

*

*

For a protected activity to be a contributing

factor, it must have either alone or in

combination with other factors tended to

affect in any way UBS’s decision to terminate

plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff is not

Murray first sued UBS in 2012 for violating the DoddFrank Act’s antiretaliation provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h), but

the district court granted UBS’s motion to compel arbitration.

2

Murray also sued for violation of 12 U.S.C. § 5567(b), but

that cause of action is not at issue in this appeal.

3

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required to prove that his protected activity

was the primary motivating factor in his

termination, or that UBS’s articulated

reasons for his termination … was a pretext,

in order to satisfy this element.

App’x at 1,389–90, 1,393. UBS objected to these jury

instructions, arguing that they lacked a key element

of a section 1514A claim: proof of UBS’s retaliatory

intent in taking the adverse employment action. The

district court overruled UBS’s objection and the case

went to the jury, which found UBS liable. The jury

also returned an advisory damages verdict,

determining that Murray should be awarded

$653,300 in back pay, no front pay, and $250,000 in

non-economic damages.

In post-trial briefing, UBS renewed its motion for

judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for

a new trial, and moved to limit Murray’s back-pay

award. The district court denied UBS’s motions. The

district court reasoned that “there is evidence to

support the jury’s finding as to each of the elements

of the Section 1514A offense, principally derived from

Mr. Murray’s testimony.” Sp. App’x at 10. In reaching

this conclusion, the district court again did not view

retaliatory intent as an element of a section 1514A

claim. The district court also adopted the jury’s

advisory verdict on damages.

Murray then moved for statutory attorney’s fees

and costs. The district court entered judgment,

awarding Murray $1,769,387.52 in attorney’s fees

and costs, as well as $653,300 in back pay, no front

pay, and $250,000 in non-economic damages—

identical to the jury’s advisory verdict on damages.

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UBS appealed the district court’s denial of its motion

for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative,

a new trial, while Murray cross-appealed the

damages and attorney’s fees awards.

II. DISCUSSION

This appeal presents the question whether the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s antiretaliation provision

requires a whistleblower-employee to prove

retaliatory intent. We review this legal question de

novo. See United States v. Williams, 733 F.3d 448,

452 (2d Cir. 2013).

UBS argues that the district court erred by

failing to instruct the jury that Murray had to prove

UBS’s retaliatory intent to prevail on his section

1514A claim. Murray responds that there was no

such error because retaliatory intent is not an

element of a section 1514A claim. We conclude based

on the plain meaning of the statutory language and

our interpretation of a nearly identical statute that

retaliatory intent is an element of a section 1514A

claim. The district court committed a non-harmless

error by failing to instruct the jury accordingly. We

thus vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial

on liability and do not reach the cross-appeal.

A. The Plain Meaning of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s

Antiretaliation Provision

First, the plain meaning of the statutory

language makes clear that retaliatory intent is an

element of a section 1514A claim. To interpret

statutory language, “we begin with the statute’s text

because ‘we assume that the ordinary meaning of the

statutory language accurately expresses the

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legislative purpose.”’ Friends of the E. Hampton

Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton, 841 F.3d 133,

147 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue

Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 376 (2013)). “[U]nless otherwise

defined, words will be interpreted as taking their

ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Harris v.

Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted). “If the statutory language is unambiguous

and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent

… the inquiry ceases.” Friends of the E. Hampton

Airport, 841 F.3d at 147–48 (citation omitted).

The unambiguous, ordinary meaning of section

1514A’s statutory language requires retaliatory

intent. Section 1514A directs that no covered

employer “may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,

harass, or in any other manner discriminate against

an employee … because of” whistleblowing. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1514A(a) (emphasis added). To “discriminate”

means “[t]o act on the basis of prejudice,” which

requires a conscious decision to act based on a

protected characteristic or action. Discriminate,

WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY

(1994); see Discriminate, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN

DICTIONARY (2001) (to “make an unjust or prejudicial

distinction in the treatment of different categories of

people”). And “because of” means “by reason of” or “on

account of,” connoting a causal relationship between

the parts of the sentence the phrase connects. See

Because of, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

(4th ed. 2000); Because of, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993).

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The statute thus prohibits discriminatory actions

caused by—or “because of”—whistleblowing, and

actions are “discriminat[ory]” when they are based on

the employer’s conscious disfavor of an employee for

whistleblowing. Cf. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free

Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining

that, in the Title VII context, “an action is ‘because of’

a plaintiff’s [protected characteristic] where it was a

‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor contributing to the

employer’s decision to take the action”). A

discriminatory action “because of” whistleblowing

therefore necessarily requires retaliatory intent—

i.e., that the employer’s adverse action was motivated

by the employee’s whistleblowing. The plain meaning

of section 1514A’s statutory language thus compels

our conclusion that retaliatory intent is required to

sustain a SOX antiretaliation claim.

We have previously articulated the elements of a

SOX antiretaliation claim in Bechtel v. Admin. Rev.

Bd., 710 F.3d 443 (2d Cir. 2013). There, we explained

that “an employee must prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that (1) [he] engaged in protected

activity; (2) the employer knew that [he] engaged in

the protected activity; (3) [he] suffered an

unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected

activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable

action.” Id. at 447 (citation omitted). The district

court instructed the jury that “[f]or a protected

activity to be a contributing factor, it must have

either alone or in combination with other factors

tended to affect in any way UBS’s decision to

terminate plaintiff’s employment.” App’x at 1,393.

But this explanation of the contributing factor

element fails to account for the statute’s explicit

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requirement that the employer’s conduct be

“discriminat[ory].”4 We therefore hold that to prevail

on the “contributing factor” element of a SOX

antiretaliation claim, a whistleblower-employee must

prove that the employer took the adverse

employment action against the whistlebloweremployee with retaliatory intent—i.e., an intent to

“discriminate against an employee … because of”

lawful whistleblowing activity.

B. Consistency with Our Interpretation of a Nearly

Identical Provision in the Federal Railroad Safety

Act

This reading of the SOX antiretaliation provision

is consistent with our interpretation of nearly

identical language in the Federal Railroad Safety

Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a) (“FRSA”). See Tompkins v.

Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 983 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.

2020).5 We generally interpret identical language in

different statutes to have the same meaning. See,

The inadequacy of the “contributing factor” standard

utilized by the district court is illuminated by the fact that

“tended to affect in any way UBS’s decision to terminate

plaintiff’s employment” could include a scenario in which

Murray’s whistleblowing resulted in termination, but also a

scenario in which, by virtue of his whistleblowing activity,

Murray was insulated from a termination to which he would

otherwise have been subjected sooner. In addition, “tended to

affect” increases the level of abstraction such that a jury might

look beyond whether the whistleblowing activity actually caused

the termination to whether it was the sort of behavior that

would tend to affect a termination decision.

4

We note that the district court did not have the benefit of

our decision in Tompkins during the pendency of Murray’s trial;

Tompkins was decided one day after the district court entered

final judgment in this case.

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e.g., Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428

(1973) (“The similarity of language in § 718 and

§ 204(b) is, of course, a strong indication that the two

statutes should be interpreted pari passu.”); Wasser

v. N.Y. State Off. of Vocational & Educ. Servs. for

Individuals with Disabilities, 602 F.3d 476, 479 (2d

Cir. 2010) (“Given the similarity between, and in fact

the nearly identical wording of, 29 U.S.C.

§ 722(c)(5)(J)(ii) and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C), we see

no basis for interpreting the standard of review

required by these provisions differently.”).

The relevant statutory language of the SOX and

the FRSA is nearly identical. Compare 18 U.S.C.

§ 1514A(a) (No covered employer “may discharge,

demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other

manner discriminate against an employee in the

terms and conditions of employment because of any

lawful act done by the employee … to provide

information, cause information to be provided, or

otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any

conduct which the employee reasonably believes

constitutes a violation of [federal law].”), with 49

U.S.C. § 20109(a) (A covered railroad carrier “may

not discharge, demote, suspend, reprimand, or in any

other way discriminate against an employee if such

discrimination is due, in whole or in part, to the

employee’s lawful, good faith act done, or perceived

by the employer to have been done or about to be

done … to provide information, directly cause

information to be provided, or otherwise directly

assist in any investigation regarding any conduct

which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a

violation of any [federal law].”). Accordingly, our

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articulations of the elements of these claims must

likewise be consistent.6

In Tompkins, we interpreted the whistleblower

antiretaliation provision of the FRSA and held that

“some evidence of retaliatory intent is a necessary

component of an FRSA claim.” 983 F.3d at 82; see

also Armstrong v. BNSF Ry. Co., 880 F.3d 377, 382

(7th Cir. 2018) (“The [FRSA] prohibits intentional

discrimination in response to an employee’s

performance of a protected activity. That is to say, an

employer violates the statute only if the adverse

employment action is, at some level, motivated by

discriminatory animus.” (citation omitted) (emphasis

in original)). We pointed to the language specifically

referencing discrimination— i.e., “that a rail carrier

may not discharge ‘or in any other way discriminate

against’ an employee for engaging in protected

activity”—as requiring evidence of retaliatory intent

for an FRSA claim. Tompkins, 983 F.3d at 82

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). We also

explained that “the essence of such a tort is

Compare Bechtel, 710 F.3d at 447 (To prevail on a SOX

antiretaliation claim, “an employee must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) [he] engaged in protected

activity; (2) the employer knew that [he] engaged in the

protected activity; (3) [he] suffered an unfavorable personnel

action; and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor in

the unfavorable action.” (citation omitted)), with Tompkins, 983

F.3d at 80 (To prevail on an FRSA antiretaliation claim, “a

plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1)

the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer

knew that the plaintiff engaged in the protected activity; (3) the

plaintiff suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the

protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable

action.” (cleaned up)).

6

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discriminatory animus, which in turn requires the

employee to prove that she was the victim of

intentional retaliation prompted by her protected

activity.” Id. (cleaned up).

The unambiguous, ordinary meaning of section

1514A’s statutory language, along with our identical

interpretation of the FRSA antiretaliation provision,

thus compel the conclusion that a SOX

antiretaliation claim requires a showing that the

employer took the adverse employment action

against the whistleblower-employee with retaliatory

intent.7 As in Tompkins, the whistleblower-employee

need not show that retaliatory intent “was the sole

factor affecting the discipline or that the employer

We recognize that our conclusion departs from the

approach of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits as to the elements of a

section 1514A claim. See Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd.,

771 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that retaliatory intent

is not an element of a section 1514A claim); Coppinger-Martin v.

Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). In our view,

those courts overlooked the plain meaning of the text. Moreover,

we note that the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have

interpreted the same language in the FRSA to require a

showing of retaliatory intent. See Tompkins, 983 F.3d at 82;

Armstrong, 880 F.3d at 382; Kuduk v. BNSF Ry. Co., 768 F.3d

786, 791 (8th Cir. 2014). But see Frost v. BNSF Ry. Co., 914

F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that an FRSA

antiretaliation claim does not require proof of retaliatory

intent); Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d

152, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (same). We also note that three circuits

have declined to decide the issue of whether retaliatory intent is

an element of a section 1514A claim. See Wiest v. Tyco

Electronics Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Feldman v.

Law Enforcement Assoc’s Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir.

2014); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 717 F.3d

1121, 1136 (10th Cir. 2013).

7

15a

acted only with retaliatory motive.” 983 F.3d at 82.

There must, however, be “more than a temporal

connection between the protected conduct and the

adverse employment action.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Armstrong, 880 F.3d at 382

(“[W]hile a FRSA plaintiff need not show that

retaliation was the sole motivating factor in the

adverse decision, the statutory text requires a

showing that retaliation was a motivating factor.”)

(emphasis in original)).8

C. The Jury Instruction Error Was Not Harmless

We must next determine the appropriate remedy

for the district court’s jury-instruction error. “We

review a claim of error in jury instructions de novo,

reversing only where appellant can show that,

viewing the charge as a whole, there was a

prejudicial error.” Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125,

137 (2d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “An erroneous

instruction requires a new trial unless the error is

harmless and an error is harmless only if the court is

convinced that the error did not influence the jury’s

verdict.” Id. (cleaned up).

This framework is consistent with the goal of section

1514A to “combat what Congress identified as a corporate

culture, supported by law, that discourages employees from

reporting fraudulent behavior . . . [by] protect[ing] employees

when they take lawful acts to disclose information or otherwise

assist . . . in detecting and stopping actions which they

reasonably believe to be fraudulent.” Bechtel, 710 F.3d at 446

(cleaned up); see also Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 383

(2d Cir. 2008) (Section 1514A “protects ‘employees when they

take lawful acts to disclose information or otherwise assist . . .

in detecting and stopping actions which they reasonably believe

to be fraudulent.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 107–146, at 19)).

8

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Because we need to be convinced that the error

did not influence the jury’s verdict, the district court’s

failure to instruct the jury on Murray’s burden to

prove UBS’s retaliatory intent in terminating him

was not harmless. Indeed, the district court itself

remarked that this was “one of the closest [cases] [it]

has ever observed.” Sp. App’x at 55. UBS offered

evidence at trial of non-retaliatory reasons for its

decision to terminate Murray. For example, UBS

witnesses testified that the company was

experiencing

significant

financial

difficulties,

resulting in company-wide layoffs when Murray

reported the alleged misconduct and was ultimately

terminated. In response to a question about why UBS

imposed layoffs, a UBS witness testified: “[In] 2011

our financial performance or the performance of the

firm was not good. We lost billions of dollars that

year and, therefore, we had to layoff people.” App’x at

573; see id. at 575 (citing “a two billion dollar trading

loss” as a cause of “more financial hardship to

[UBS]”). Cohen, the head of the CMBS trading desk,

also testified that Murray’s position as a CMBS

strategist was “not necessary” to generate revenue,

but instead was “nice to have.” Id. at 867. This

evidence supports UBS’s position that it terminated

Murray without retaliatory intent—specifically, that

it did so for the non-retaliatory reason of saving

money during a time of financial difficulty. To be

sure, there was circumstantial evidence at trial that

UBS terminated Murray in retaliation for

whistleblowing. See, e.g., App’x at 649 (testimony

explaining close temporal proximity between

Murray’s whistleblowing and termination); id. at 447

17a

(testimony of Schumacher stating that he gave

Murray a “good” performance evaluation in December

2011, prior to Murray’s purported whistleblowing).

But we do not know whose reasons—UBS’s or

Murray’s—the jury credited, as the jury instructions

did not require the jury to find retaliatory intent. And

although the jury did not find that UBS “prove[d] by

clear and convincing evidence that it would have

taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the

absence of [Murray’s] protected behavior,” Bechtel,

710 F.3d at 447 (citation omitted), this does not mean

that Murray proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that UBS acted with retaliatory intent in

terminating Murray. In other words, even though the

jury found that Murray’s whistleblowing was a

contributing factor to his termination, we cannot

know whether it would have found that UBS acted

with retaliatory intent. We are thus unconvinced that

the erroneous jury instruction did not influence the

verdict, and we accordingly remand to the district

court for a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

Retaliatory intent is an element of a section

1514A claim. This conclusion flows from the plain

meaning of the statutory language and is supported

by our interpretation of nearly identical language in

the FRSA. The district court erred by failing to

instruct the jury on Murray’s burden to prove UBS’s

retaliatory intent in terminating him. The jury

instructions were incorrect as a matter of law, and

the error was not harmless. We thus vacate the jury’s

verdict and remand to the district court for a new

trial.

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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

_____________________________________

At a stated term of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood

Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,

in the City of New York, on the 15th day of

September, two thousand twenty-two.

Trevor Murray,

Plaintiff-Appellee-CrossAppellant,

ORDER

Docket Nos:

v.

20-4202 (L)

UBS Securities, LLC, UBS AG,

21-56 (XAP)

Defendants-AppellantsCross-Appellees.

Appellee-Cross-Appellant, Trevor Murray, filed a

petition for panel rehearing, or, in the alternative, for

rehearing en banc. The panel that determined the

appeal has considered the request for panel

rehearing, and the active members of the Court have

considered the request for rehearing en banc.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is

denied.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

[SEAL] /s/ Catherine O’Hagan Wolf

19a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TREVOR MURRAY,

Plaintiff,

14 Civ. 927

(KPF)

v.

UBS SECURITIES, LLC,

et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

USDC SDNY

DOCUMENT

ELECTRONICALLY

FILED

DOC#: ___________

DATE FILED:

September 25, 2018

HON. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:

For the reasons set forth on the record during the

telephonic conference held on today’s date, the

parties’ post-trial motions are resolved as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter

of law, and Defendants’ renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, are

DENIED;

2. Defendants’ motion to limit Plaintiff’s back

pay award is DENIED;

3. Plaintiff’s motion for reinstatement or front

pay is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s motion for the

award of prejudgment interest is GRANTED

insofar as the Court will award prejudgment

interest from February 20, 2012, through the

date of entry of judgment using a weighted

average prime rate of 3.57%, compounded

annually.

20a

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the

motions at docket entries 243, 280, 282, and 285. In

addition, the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate

entries for certain previously decided motions,

including the motions at docket entries 184, 185, 329,

331, and 334.

Finally, the parties are directed to file a joint

letter, on or before October 2, 2018, proposing a

schedule for a motion for attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2018

New York, New York

Katherine Polk Failla

KATHERINE POLK FAILLA

United States District Judge

21a

APPENDIX D

18 U.S.C. § 1514A

§ 1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation

in fraud cases

Effective: July 22, 2010

(a) Whistleblower Protection for Employees of

Publicly Traded Companies.--No company with a

class of securities registered under section 12 of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or

that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.

78o(d)) including any subsidiary or affiliate whose

financial information is included in the consolidated

financial statements of such company, or nationally

recognized statistical rating organization (as defined

in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

(15 U.S.C. 78c), 1 or any officer, employee, contractor,

subcontractor, or agent of such company or nationally

recognized statistical rating organization, may

discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in

any other manner discriminate against an employee

in the terms and conditions of employment because of

any lawful act done by the employee-(1) to provide information, cause information to

be provided, or otherwise assist in an

investigation regarding any conduct which the

employee reasonably believes constitutes a

violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any

rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange

Commission, or any provision of Federal law

relating to fraud against shareholders, when the

22a

information or assistance is provided to or the

investigation is conducted by-(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement

agency;

(B) any Member of Congress or any committee

of Congress; or

(C) a person with supervisory authority over

the employee (or such other person working for

the employer who has the authority to

investigate,

discover,

or

terminate

misconduct); or

(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in,

or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about

to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer)

relating to an alleged violation of section 1341,

1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the

Securities and Exchange Commission, or any

provision of Federal law relating to fraud against

shareholders.

(b) Enforcement Action.-(1) In general.--A person who alleges discharge

or other discrimination by any person in violation

of subsection (a) may seek relief under subsection

(c), by-(A) filing a complaint with the Secretary of

Labor; or

(B) if the Secretary has not issued a final

decision within 180 days of the filing of the

complaint and there is no showing that such

delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant,

bringing an action at law or equity for de novo

23a

review in the appropriate district court of the

United States, which shall have jurisdiction

over such an action without regard to the

amount in controversy.

(2) Procedure.-(A) In general.--An action under paragraph

(1)(A) shall be governed under the rules and

procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title

49, United States Code.

(B) Exception.--Notification made under

section 42121(b)(1) of title 49, United States

Code, shall be made to the person named in

the complaint and to the employer.

(C) Burdens of proof.--An action brought

under paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed by

the legal burdens of proof set forth in section

42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.

(D) Statute of limitations.--An action under

paragraph (1) shall be commenced not later

than 180 days after the date on which the

violation occurs, or after the date on which the

employee became aware of the violation.

(E) Jury trial.--A party to an action brought

under paragraph (1)(B) shall be entitled to

trial by jury.

(c) Remedies.-(1) In general.--An employee prevailing in any

action under subsection (b)(1) shall be entitled to

all relief necessary to make the employee whole.

(2) Compensatory damages.--Relief for any

action under paragraph (1) shall include--

24a

(A) reinstatement with the same seniority

status that the employee would have had, but

for the discrimination;

(B) the amount of back pay, with interest; and

(C) compensation for any special damages

sustained as a result of the discrimination,

including litigation costs, expert witness fees,

and reasonable attorney fees.

(d) Rights Retained by Employee.--Nothing in this

section shall be deemed to diminish the rights,

privileges, or remedies of any employee under any

Federal or State law, or under any collective

bargaining agreement.

(e) Nonenforceability of Certain Provisions Waiving

Rights and Remedies or Requiring Arbitration of

Disputes.-(1) Waiver of rights and remedies.--The rights

and remedies provided for in this section may not

be waived by any agreement, policy form, or

condition of employment, including by a

predispute arbitration agreement.

(2) Predispute arbitration agreements.--No

predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid

or enforceable, if the agreement requires

arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.

25a

APPENDIX E

49 U.S.C. § 42121

§ 42121. Protection of employees providing air

safety information

Effective: December 27, 2020

(a) Prohibited discrimination.--A holder of a

certificate under section 44704 or 44705 of this title,

or a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier of such

holder, may not discharge an employee or otherwise

discriminate against an employee with respect to

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment because the employee (or any person

acting pursuant to a request of the employee)-(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to

provide (with any knowledge of the employer) or

cause to be provided to the employer or Federal

Government information relating to any violation

or alleged violation of any order, regulation, or

standard of the Federal Aviation Administration

or any other provision of Federal law relating to

aviation safety under this subtitle or any other

law of the United States;

(2) has filed, caused to be filed, or is about to file

(with any knowledge of the employer) or cause to

be filed a proceeding relating to any violation or

alleged violation of any order, regulation, or

standard of the Federal Aviation Administration

or any other provision of Federal law relating to

aviation safety under this subtitle or any other

law of the United States;

(3) testified or is about to testify in such a

proceeding; or

26a

(4) assisted or participated or is about to assist or

participate in such a proceeding.

(b) Department of Labor complaint procedure.-(1) Filing and notification.--A person who

believes that he or she has been discharged or

otherwise discriminated against by any person in

violation of subsection (a) may, not later than 90

days after the date on which such violation

occurs, file (or have any person file on his or her

behalf) a complaint with the Secretary of Labor

alleging such discharge or discrimination. Upon

receipt of such a complaint, the Secretary of

Labor shall notify, in writing, the person named

in the complaint and the Administrator of the

Federal Aviation Administration of the filing of

the complaint, of the allegations contained in the

complaint, of the substance of evidence

supporting

the

complaint,

and

of

the

opportunities that will be afforded to such person

under paragraph (2).

(2) Investigation; preliminary order.-(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after

the date of receipt of a complaint filed under

paragraph (1) and after affording the person

named in the complaint an opportunity to

submit to the Secretary of Labor a written

response to the complaint and an opportunity

to meet with a representative of the Secretary

to present statements from witnesses, the

Secretary of Labor shall conduct an

investigation and determine whether there is

reasonable cause to believe that the complaint

has merit and notify, in writing, the

27a

complainant and the person alleged to have

committed a violation of subsection (a) of the

Secretary’s findings. If the Secretary of Labor

concludes that there is a reasonable cause to

believe that a violation of subsection (a) has

occurred, the Secretary shall accompany the

Secretary’s findings with a preliminary order

providing the relief prescribed by paragraph

(3)(B). Not later than 30 days after the date of

notification of findings under this paragraph,

either the person alleged to have committed

the violation or the complainant may file

objections to the findings or preliminary order,

or both, and request a hearing on the record.

The filing of such objections shall not operate

to stay any reinstatement remedy contained in

the preliminary order. Such hearings shall be

conducted expeditiously. If a hearing is not

requested in such 30-day period, the

preliminary order shall be deemed a final

order that is not subject to judicial review.

(B) Requirements.-(i) Required showing by complainant.--The

Secretary of Labor shall dismiss a complaint

filed under this subsection and shall not

conduct an investigation otherwise required

under subparagraph (A) unless the

complainant makes a prima facie showing

that any behavior described in paragraphs

(1) through (4) of subsection (a) was a

contributing factor in the unfavorable

personnel action alleged in the complaint.

28a

(ii)

Showing

by

employer.-Notwithstanding a finding by the Secretary

that the complainant has made the showing

required under clause (i), no investigation

otherwise required under subparagraph (A)

shall be conducted if the employer

demonstrates, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the employer would have

taken the same unfavorable personnel

action in the absence of that behavior.

(iii) Criteria for determination by

Secretary.--The Secretary may determine

that a violation of subsection (a) has

occurred

only

if

the

complainant

demonstrates that any behavior described in

paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a)

was a contributing factor in the unfavorable

personnel action alleged in the complaint.

(iv) Prohibition.--Relief may not be ordered

under subparagraph (A) if the employer

demonstrates by clear and convincing

evidence that the employer would have

taken the same unfavorable personnel

action in the absence of that behavior.

(3) Final order.—

(A) Deadline for issuance; settlement

agreements.--Not later than 120 days after the

date of conclusion of a hearing under

paragraph (2), the Secretary of Labor shall

issue a final order providing the relief

prescribed by this paragraph or denying the

complaint. At any time before issuance of a

final order, a proceeding under this subsection

29a

may be terminated on the basis of a settlement

agreement entered into by the Secretary of

Labor, the complainant, and the person alleged

to have committed the violation.

(B) Remedy.--If, in response to a complaint

filed under paragraph (1), the Secretary of

Labor determines that a violation of subsection

(a) has occurred, the Secretary of Labor shall

order the person who committed such violation

to-(i) take affirmative action to abate the

violation;

(ii) reinstate the complainant to his or her

former

position

together

with

the

compensation (including back pay) and

restore the terms, conditions, and privileges

associated with his or her employment; and

(iii) provide compensatory damages to the

complainant.

If such an order is issued under this

paragraph, the Secretary of Labor, at the

request of the complainant, shall assess

against the person against whom the order

is issued a sum equal to the aggregate

amount of all costs and expenses (including

attorneys’ and expert witness fees)

reasonably incurred, as determined by the

Secretary of Labor, by the complainant for,

or in connection with, the bringing the

complaint upon which the order was issued.

(C) Frivolous complaints.--If the Secretary of

Labor finds that a complaint under paragraph

30a

(1) is frivolous or has been brought in bad

faith, the Secretary of Labor may award to the

prevailing employer a reasonable attorney’s fee

not exceeding $1,000.

(4) Review.-(A) Appeal to Court of Appeals.--Any person

adversely affected or aggrieved by an order

issued under paragraph (3) may obtain review

of the order in the United States Court of

Appeals for the circuit in which the violation,

with respect to which the order was issued,

allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the

complainant resided on the date of such

violation. The petition for review must be filed

not later than 60 days after the date of the

issuance of the final order of the Secretary of

Labor. Review shall conform to chapter 7 of

title

5,

United

States

Code.

The

commencement of proceedings under this

subparagraph shall not, unless ordered by the

court, operate as a stay of the order.

(B) Limitation on collateral attack.--An order

of the Secretary of Labor with respect to which

review could have been obtained under

subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to

judicial review in any criminal or other civil

proceeding.

(5) Enforcement of order by Secretary of

Labor. --Whenever any person has failed to

comply with an order issued under paragraph (3),

the Secretary of Labor may file a civil action in

the United States district court for the district in

which the violation was found to occur to enforce

31a

such order. In actions brought under this

paragraph, the district courts shall have

jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief

including, but not limited to, injunctive relief and

compensatory damages.

(6) Enforcement of order by parties.-(A) Commencement of action.--A person on

whose behalf an order was issued under

paragraph (3) may commence a civil action

against the person to whom such order was

issued to require compliance with such order.

The appropriate United States district court

shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the

amount in controversy or the citizenship of the

parties, to enforce such order.

(B) Attorney fees.--The court, in issuing any

final order under this paragraph, may award

costs of litigation (including reasonable

attorney and expert witness fees) to any party

whenever the court determines such award is

appropriate.

(c) Mandamus.--Any nondiscretionary duty imposed

by this section shall be enforceable in a mandamus

proceeding brought under section 1361 of title 28,

United States Code.

(d) Nonapplicability to deliberate violations.-Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to an

employee of a holder of a certificate issued under

section 44704 or 44705, or a contractor or

subcontractor thereof, who, acting without direction

from

such

certificate-holder,

contractor,

or

subcontractor (or such person’s agent), deliberately

32a

causes a violation of any requirement relating to

aviation safety under this subtitle or any other law of

the United States.

(e) Contractor defined.--In this section, the term

“contractor” means-(1) a person that performs safety-sensitive

functions by contract for an air carrier or

commercial operator; or

(2) a person that performs safety-sensitive

functions related to the design or production of an

aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or

component thereof by contract for a holder of a

certificate issued under section 44704.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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