Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Timothy Martin Kendrick, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 2, 2022
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No.
2 °64 97
ORIGINAL
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
filed
DEC 02 2022
"In Re: Timothy Kendrick, PRO SE,
Petitioner
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)
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VS
United States of America,
Respondent
)
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)
)
)
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Timothy M. Kendrick, #09128-029
Federal Correctional Complex - USP-2
P.0. Box 1034
Coleman, Florida
33521
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1)
Does the struckdown 18 U.S,G, §924
(e) (2)(B) (ii)
residual under Johnson(2015) as applied to *ACCA
equally apply to Mandatory Guideline USSG|4B1.2 (a) {ii)
Career Offender cases?
2)
Does a Count 3_(ORS811.540) and Count 2 ("DUI") State
prior conviction qualify as a "crime of violence"
under S4B1.2 (a) (ii) "otherwise" residual for Enhance
ment purposes?
3)
Does the Eighth Circuit application of 0,RS.§811.540
as presented herein qualify a non-violent crime as a
crime of violence?
4)
Does the application of ORSS811.540 as applied in the
EighthiiCircuit (herein) prove the Categorical Approach
"FAULTY" if all the prior conviction counts are unaddressed
during Due Process?
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
............. 2,3,5,6,14
2,6,7,9,11,12,13,14,16,
17, 21
4, 13,17,19,20
3.KENDRICK, 423 F.3d 803
7, 13, 20
4.430.Career Offender...
5,431. Crime of Violence......................7,13,20
6.433 .Felony Fleeing............................ 7, 13, 20
7.Leocal v Ashcroft, 2004 US LEXIS 751l(uS,Nov. 9,2004)...7
8.Begay v United States, 170 2LED2D, 128 S.Ct.1581,
170 LED 2D 490, 553 US 137 (Decided April 16, 2008)....8
8
9.J0H0NS0N 2015) 18 USC§924(e)(2)( B)(ii) ..
10.USSG S4B1.2 (a) (ii) ....................6, 14,16, 18
8, 13
11.28 USC §1651 (a) . . .
12.Leocal______________
v Ashcroft.
..9, 20
13.Jonathan Bradley Peterson v United States, 2009 US App.
9-10
Lexis 23869, No. 07-30465
10,11,13,17
14.Leocal
15 . Begay....................10,11,13,17
16 . Peterson................10,11
17.Case No.2:ll-cv-05798, 12/6/2011 <9th Cir.)....10, 7
18.KENDRICK,....10
11
19.SNYDER,*..
11
20.CREWS,....
11
21.RODRIGUEZ,
12,22
22.JOHNSON,..
23.Appellate Case No.16-2605
12,15
24.Beckles,
12
25.CONSTITUTION,430,431,433.........
13
26.0reg.Rev.Stat.§811.540 (1997)
14
F3d
, 2004 WL 1687924
27.United States v Martin,
18
6th Cir . , ( July , 29,2004")
28.United States v Howze, 343 F.3d 919,
7th Cir.(2003)....18
18
29.United States v James,337 F.3d 387, 4th Cir.(2003)
16
30. Case No. CR-02-2039-2-LRR
4,9,16
31.Appellate Case No.04-3256.
1.Oregon Rev. Statf8i'l.540
2.0RS §811.540 ......................
-3-
STATUTES AND RULES
1.
Oregon Rev. Stat. §811.540 (l997)
(l)A person commits the crime of fleeing or attemnpting,
to elude a police officer if:
2.
(a)
the person is operationg a motor vehicle; and
(b)
A police officer is in uniform and prominently
displaying the police officer'^ badge of office
or operating a vehicle approximately marked
showing it to be an official police vehicle
gives a visual or audible signal to bring the
vehicle to a stop, including any signal by hand,
voice, emergency light or siren, and either;
(A)
The person, while still in the vehicle, knowingly
flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police
officer; or
(B)
The person gets out of the vehicle and knowingly
flees or attempts to elude the police officer.
(Appellate Case No.16-2605, Page 15, (4/2017),
(8th Cir. Court of Appeals.)
18 USSG S4B1.2 (a) (ii)--"crime of violence";
' ♦ . . other-
wise involves conduct that presents a serious petential
risk of physical injury to another."
Appellate Case
No.04-3256, Page 30, filed 12/15/2004).
3.
18 USC §924 (e) (2) (B) (ii)--"crime of violence";
' . . .any
felony that otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical unjury to another."
4.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(2004), USSG §4B1.2(a)--
"...the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another."
5.
U.S.S.G. app. C supp. Amendment 798-- (eliminating
the residual clause from the crime of violence
definition at USSG §4B1. l( a) (ii )).
6.
U.S. Constitution--
430.Career Offender; 431.Crime
of Violence; and 433.Felony Fleeing £all KENDRICK,
423 F3d 803, respectively.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.
Sixth Amendment-
"the likelihood of a different
result must be substantial."
2.
Fifth Amendment-
"effects only the actions of the
federal governement."
"cruel and unusual punishment."
3.
Eighth Amendment-
4.
Fourteenth Amendment-
"Due Process Clause";
"protects the accused against conviction except proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged.
- s-
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.
18 USSG S4B1.2(a) (ii)
2.
18 USC §924(e)
3.
18 USC 8924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
4. U.S. Sentencing Guideline §851
5.
Oregon Rev. Stat. §811.540
6.
U.S.S.G. app. C supp. Amendment 798
7.
28 USC §2241
8.
28 USC §2255
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2004
petitioner received an enhanced sentence using
the "otherwise" residual of USSG §4B1.2 (a) (ii) and applied
the "Categorical Approach" to classify a State Prior Con}>
v
viction, (Or. Rev. Stat . §811.540), as a crime of violence that
was a categorical mismatch in direct definition,
The predicate
prior O.RS. §811.540 herein has an included charge of "DUI"
(Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants, here, and through
out), factor that has gone unaddressed to date from the initial
raised ISSUE 2 of petitioner's Direct Appeal.
(Defense Counsel,
same as Trial Counsel) poorly represented this claim regarding
0RS §811.540 and the US Court of Appeals ,j^when addressing
4-Vie. U-S.
i'%*'
~ 6 "*
\\
ORS §811.540, overlooked the ISSUE 2 of "operating while
intoxicated"
but addressed the "INTENT" factor of "level
of risk" instead,
Petitioner has filed.numerous post-
conviction motions for relief of sentence to address the
"DUI" factor as a PRO SE
applicant in his second Motion.
A 28 USC §2241 filed in the 9th Circuit, (Case No. 2:11cv-05798, 12/6/2011, 9th Circuit), the same circuit ORS
§811.540 is from [the State of Oregon) was denied.
Petitioner herein humbly and prayerfully requests
an unobstructed procedural redress by the U,S. Supreme Court
attention to ORS §811.540 as a "crime of violence" including
the "DUI" factor attatched to the ORS §811.540 State Conviction predicate prior which was a superceding indictment
added to each Count of Conviction for enhancement purposes
that did not receive a seperate hearing, post trial
conviction, or Direct Appeal address regarding Leocal v.
Ashcroft.
The US Supreme Court has applied KENDRICK, 423 F3d
803 (2005) to constitutional law under the "US CONSTIT
UTION: 430.Career Offender; 431. Crime of Violence; and
433. Felony Fleeing, (respectively,] without any address of
the
"DUI" factor.
contrast
This application of law is in conflict,
and opposition to the Direct Appeal "Issue 2",
Leocal v Ashcroft, 2004 US Lexis 7511 (u.S . , Nov. 9,
2004)(operating while under
the influence of intoxicants
is not a crime of violence'}), Begay v United States, 170
-7-
LED 2D 490, 553 US 137 (decided April 16, 2008)("DUI"
is a''strict liability*crime; removes the'culpable state
of mind^addressing "INTENT"), and numerous Ninth
Circuit "ACCA" (Armed Career Criminal Act, here and
throughout), cases regarding ORS §811.540 enhancements
which have been remanded under JOHNSON(2015), 18 USC
§924 (e)(2)(B) (ii) struckdown residual which is "interchangable" with USSG §4B1.2 (a)(ii) "otherwise"
residual unequally applied, and without any "DUI" consideration of factor, as well as no career offender
redress to date amongst more than half-dozen postconviction relief of sentence Motion( s )
t
Petitioner hereby humbly and prayerfully requests
the U.S. Supreme Court use its descretionary powers
of authority, with this Court of Appeals dis-approved
Certificate for Writ of Certiorari authorized under
Rule 20 by 28 USC §1651 (a) because
the Great Writ
will be in aid of the Eighth Circuit Appellate Court's
jurisdictionary review, and because adequate relief
under the U.S. Constitution Law cannot be obtained
in any other form or from any other Court.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1.
The "DUI" factor included with ORS §811.540 was not
addressed during trial by either party.
2.
Defense Counsel, (both Trial and Direct Appeal Counsel,
Mr. Charles H. Nadler, here, and throughout), raised
* ISSUE 2Jin Appellate Case No.04-3256 "operating while
under the influence is not a crime of violence" and
failed to relate it to ORS §811.540.
V
3.
«9
Issue 2 of Direct Appeal, the Leocal v Ashcroft decision
issued by the U.S. Supreme Court was issued two months
after trial and before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit ruled on the Direct Appeal.
4.
The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit neglected,
v
refused, or overlooked the address of the Issue 2
...
raised by defense counsel in petitioner's Direct Appeal
No. 04-3256.
5.
In January of 2008 petitioner filed a 28 USC §2255
.
Motion to the District Court in the Eighth Circuit
including an "opinion" out of the Ninth Circuit showing
an "ACCA" case was remanded regarding ORS §811.540.
(Jonathan Bradley Peterson v United States, 2009 US
Applexis 23869, No. 07-30465)(Attempting to Elude a
Police Officer is not categorically a crime of violence).
6.
On July 15, 2008, HONORABLE LINDA R. READE,DENIED #5
(above) ruling (l)Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis]
-4-
(2)28 USC §2255 MOTION; and (3)Certificate of Appealability-- "DENIED".
7.
Petitioner did not file a Certificate of Appealability
for reasoning shown in #6 (above)(See Case No. 6:08-cv02004-LRR, (Filed 7/15/08)).
8.
On July 14, 2011, petitioner filed a
28 USC §2241
Motion in the Ninth Circuit in the Central District of
California raising Leocal, Begay. and Peterson (mentioned
herein) regarding ORS §811.540 (and other trial issues.)
ORS §811.540 is located in the State Of Oregon (9th
Circuit).
9.
The Ninth Circuit avoided address of the 28 USC §2241
Motion denying it by "lack of jurisdiction" reasoning.
(See Case No. 2: ll-cv-05798 , 12/6/2011,
10.
(9th cir.)).
Conflict begins in the Eighth Circuit and Ninth Circuit
regarding ORS §811.540 post-conviction relief regarding
Peterson (9th Cir.) and Kendrick, (8th Cir.) (7.00S)
11.
Petitioner attempts to address the ORS §811.540 and
"DUI" convictionin 28 USC §2241 Motion in #9 (above)
using Leocal, Begay, & Peterson regarding "state of
mind" and "definition of". (20ll)
12.
At this time niether Circuit addresses the accompany
ing "DUI" inclusion or the "definition of" ORS f811.540
and its relation to federal law.
13.
In 2014, petitioner refiled a 28 USC §2255 Motion
J
>■
~K>-
(after transfer), No.14-1644, seeking review with the
inclusion of the §2241 Motion (above) using the Saviings
Clause" and the "Request For Reconsideration" Supplemental
Brief which was sent before the decision^as declared.
14.
Petitioner raised numerous ORS §811.540 reversals in
Begay, Snyder, Crews, and Rodriguez.
(See "Table of
Authorities") .
15.
Petitioner, to this date, filed all initial pleadings
PRO SE and was always denied except for the Appellate
Case No.16-2605. Where I was represented by appointed
counsel,
16.
Mr. James Whalen,
(2015),(here, and throughout).
In 2016, petitioner timely filed under JOHNSON(2015),
Appellate Case No. 16-2605, and was GRANTED permission
for a successive §2255 Motion and appointed Mr. James
Whalen as Appellate Counsel.
17.
*)
Mr. Whalen addressed the "categorical mismatch" of ORS
§811.540 and the relativity of the §924[e) and §4B1.2 (a) If ii)
residual,
(and Cal.Pen. Code §459, Burglary, regarding
§851 enhancement). (Appellate Case No.16-2605)(8th Cir.).
18.
Appellate Case No.16-2605 DENIED under Beckles, and
"Advisory Guideline Case".
19.
(2017)
Today, petitioner presents facts not just overlooked, but
also facts unavailable at trial.
This Motion should
prove facts unavailable to date regarding Circuit conflict,
U.S.Supreme Court precedent(s) rulings, and a detrimental
-11-
clear error by the lower courts which prove a
faulty
categorical approach" when due process and attention to
detail are disregarded, also proving grounds of compelling
reasoning(s) to GRANT and ISSUE a Writ of Certiorari by
this Honorable Court, excorsizing its authoritative power
to correct this scenario erroneously attended due this
petitioner.
Previously, the new FACTS unavailable for consid
eration are as follows:
(A) There is a "DUI" Count (2) included in the
predicate prior ORS§811.540 Count(3) sentenced
together where the U.S. Supreme Court has issued two
Supreme Court precedents. Retroactivity is not needed
and petitioner is not "time barred" because the Leocal
issue was raised on Direct Appeal by defense counsel
which preserves this issue for collateral review.
Begay supports Leocal. Together, Leocal (operating
while intoxicated a vehicle" ) and Be^ay ( DUI has
no 'culpable state of mind'; removing intent :? and.
"DUI" is a 'strict liability' crime and not a criminal
crime), negating 0RS§811.540 with a DUI factor null
and void"for any "crime of violence" application of
law undeb federal regulations. These two Supreme Court
precedents negates ORS§811.540 as a crime of violence
by direct definition of, and negates ORS§811.540 as
a "crime of violence" for enhjancement purposes; and
a
(B) Under the CONSTITUTION Law, specifically:
"430. Career Offender; 431. Crime of Violence;. and
433. Felony Fleeing--as defined by KENDRICK, 423 F.3d
803", hereby constitutes a subject matter for discre
tionary review by the U.S. Supreme Court for this
request for the issueance of the'Certificate of Extra
ordinary Writ of Certiorari^ under 28 USC §1651(a)
because the case law, KENDRICK, 423 F3d 803 under the
CONSTITUTION #'s 430, 431, and 433 not only misrepresents the above mentioned facts, but misapplies this
case due to unmitigated issues regarding "DUI" and
-\l'
§924(e)(2) (B)(ii)/ §4B1.2 (a) (ii) relativity isssues
causing: judicial conflict between Circuits and
Statutes. The following presented conflicts are
presented below to verify the compelling reasons
for GRANTING of the Extraordinary Writ of Certiorari:
CONFLICT I
(A)
Definition of 0.R.S.§811.540 in comparrison to
U.S.S.G.§4B1.2(a)(ii);
(interchangability):
USSG §4B1.2(a) (ii) -- definition of a "crime of
violence is "(2) is a burglary of a swelling, arson
extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another."
( Underlined portion is used during sentencing
at trial and filed Motions.)
Oreg.Rev. Stat.§811.540 (1997) definition s tates:
"(l) A person commit(s) the crime of fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer if: (a) the
person is operating a motor vehicle; and (b) A police
officer is in uniform and prominently displaying the
police officer's badge of office or operating a vehicle
approximately marked showing it to be an official
police vehicle gives a visual or audible signal to stop
the vehicle, including any signal by hand, voice,
emergency light or siren, and either: (a) The person,
'13-
while still in the vehicle, knowingly flees or attempts
to elude a pursuing police officer; or (B) The person
gets out of the vehicle and knowingly flees or attempts
to elude the police officer."
Oregon Rev. Stat. §811.540 (1997)
as depicted,(quoting Appellate Case No.16-2605, Page 15
4/2017)(8th Cir. Court of Appeals).
This presentation shows the First Extraordinary Cir
cumstance because the* wording of 0.R.S.§811.540 definition
is a "categorical mismatch" when compared to USSG§4B1.2 (a)(ii)
or 18 USC §924(e)(2)fB)(ii) "otherwise" residual definition;
and
CONFLICT II
A multiple count State Prior Conviction is requiring
redress after a U.S.Supreme Court ruling intervienes
petitioner's Trial and Direct Appeal Due Process pro
ceedings which are poorly represented.
During the sentencing hearing of petitioner's trial,
(Case No. CR-02-2039-2-LRR, Page 9) states "The United
States believes Mr. Kendrick qualifies as a career offender
based on that conviction for fleeing and eluding."
Further,
(on Pages 14-15,) it states "We believe that this is a case
that under the "otherwise" clause of §4B1.1 qualifies as a
"crime of.violence".
Finally, (on Page 24,) "The Court did
find that under the "otherwise" clause this qualifies as a
crime of violence", and, (on Page 14,) the Court refers to
"risk" and neglected to address any other State mitigating
factors because the priors were admitted to instead of following
proper inclusion of that predicate priors additional Counts
when there is obvious reason for address. Such as a drug
conviction accompanied by a DUI.
Unfortunately, Trial/Direct
Appeal counsel failed to make this connection, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit failed to address the
'issue 2/raised in that Petition which raised the "DUI" Issue
in LEOCAL r ( iuVlis
jXe&ivtei W«A»\ ~
Two months post-trial, on Nov. 9, 2004, the U.S.
Supreme Court "decided under similar language that operating
while intoxicated is hot a crime of violence", as ident
ically presented in petitioner's Direct Appeal (Appellate
Case No.04-3256, Filed on 12/15/2004.^
The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on Direct Appeal addressed
ORS§811.540 as a "crime of violence" under the "otherwise"
clause referring to Issue 2, yet neglected to comment or
refer to the U.S.Supreme Court precedent raised on Direct
Appeal (because it was not out of the Eighth Circuit or for
other reasoning, as speculated by Defense Counsel.)
I
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This showing that ORS§811.540 as a "crime of violence"
including thef "DUI" factor is in conflict with the two U.S.
Supreme Court precedents regarding
LEOCAL and BEGAY as
mentioned previously.
Wherefore
KENDRICK, 423 F.3d 803, (2004), should not
be a controlling case for any application of law without
addressing
the unmitigated issue of the "DUI" inclusion with
ORS §811.540 as it currently stands.
This is the SECOND Extraordinary Circumstance showing
the "DUI" factor under Leocal and Begay is in direct conflict
here when addressing the two U.S. Supreme Court precedent's)'
decision(s) in comparative relativity to KENDRICK, 423 F3d 803,
as it stands;
and
CONFLICT III
"Due Process" concerns prove that the "Categorical
Approach" could be "FAULTY" if mitigating issues are over
looked, ignored, or avoided.
The Eighth Circuit Courts supports the "crime of
violence" ruling using the "categorical approach" of the
career offender provision, (USSG §4B1.2(a) (ii)),applying
three sister circuit cases:
1) UNITED STATES V MARTIN,
F. 3d___ , 2004
WL 1687924 (6th Cir., July 29, 2004)(Michigan crime
of fleeing and eluding is a crime of violence);
2) UNITED STATES V HOWZE,343 F.3d 919,
(7th
Cir. 2003)(Wisconsin crime of fleeing from an officer
is a crime of violence under §924(e);
3) UNITED STATES V JAMES, 337 F.3d 387, (4th
Cir. 2003)(South Carolina fleeing from an officer is
a crime of violence under 18 USC §924(e)), (as shown
in Direct Appeal Exibits herein, Appellate Case No.
04-3256).
Regarding the "categorical approach", the First Issue
here is that petitioner has no gun in his case at all.
Therefore, cross applying statutes to support an enhancement
is illegal when the applied enhancement in any case has its
own definition used.
A Court cannot use a gun case enhance
ment to support an enhancement of a non-gun case, when that
applied statute has its own definition for enhancement pur
poses. Specifically referring to §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
§4B1.2(a) (ii) "otherwise-residual", which Courts treat as
being "interchangable" when applying increased punishment proves erroneous because, as shown here, post con
viction relief«*the "interchangability"* is segregated.
H*-
The Second Issue is that even considering a compar
ative State statute, all the additional included: (if any)
State Conviction Indicted Convictions must be considered
either during pre-conviction or post-conviction proceedings
in order to fulfill "Due Process" concerns or in honoring
U.S. Supreme Court precedent(s).
Here, KENDRICK, 4?3 F.3d 803
as the controlling example
ot& a "crime of violence" for "Felony Fleeing" or "Attempting
to Elude a Police Officer" which still has unlitigated
faPtor(s) making this case an incomplete case because of the
"DUI" factor -which involves U.S. Supreme Court precedent (s),
Circuit conflict(s), and Statute conflict(s) which must be
addressed in order to have a sound conviction for enhancement purposes and future case law referral,
Because this
case is yet to be completed, KENDRICK, 423 F.3d 803 SHOULD
NOT be used as a controlling-anything, when referring to ;
federal law application enhancing sentences.
This presentation is the THIRD Extraordinary Circum
stance because this case is showing blatant obvious con
flict^) that need to be addressed and only this U.S.
Supreme Court has the authority and jurisdiction to attend
these issues, which proves posotive for granting the Writ
/f
of Certiorari;
and
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conflict IV
The U.S. Supreme Court has now followed the Eighth
Circuit lead;(as well as almost all the Circuits in the
United States), and has/have applied KENDRICK, 423 F.3d 803
in the lawbooks as an example of a "crime of violence" as
labeled in the CONSTITUTION: 430.Career Offender; 431.
Crime of Violence; and 433. Felony Fleeing.
Petitioner,
must declare that this application of petitioner's case
is applied in error.
All the avenues are not yet closed
because petitioner has not yet
received an unobstructed,
fair, procedural hearing at attending the "DUI" inclusion
with ORS §811.540 which is in conflict with multiple
applications under federal ruling, to date, as provided in
petitioner's Direct Appeal,(multiple filed post-conviction
relief of sentence Motions-- approximately six to date),
which address Direct Appeal Issue 2 using Leocal v Ashcroft
because Due Process was interrupted by poor Court Appointed
Counsel's representation of Issue 2 coinciding with the over
sight of the Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Direct
Appeal address that obviously avoids the "DUI" factor addressed
herein.
The representation to the United States Constitutional
Law using KENDRICK, 423 F.3d 803, while ignoring an unaddressed
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"DUI" factor already ruled upon by the U.S. Supreme Court,
which is now used to enhance sentences and cause conflict in
between Circuits and Statutes is a violation of my Constitu
tional Right of "Due Process" and risks unsound doctrine as
because of the unlitigated "DUI" factor (married, or
included) with ORS §811.540 as the representative of a "crime
of violence" which now calls for the descretionary authority
of the United States Supreme Court's descretionary author
itative powers in view and in light of JOHNSON(2015), SNYDER,
SYKES, LEOCAL, AND BEGAY, ( all'aCCa' cases), and KENDRICK,
( a
career offender case), where conflict and descrepancies
regarding Oregon Rev. Stat.§811.540 is applied with an in
clusion "DUI " factor, not
RjuUi upon OH
by any
This is the FOURTH Extraordinary Circumstance because
U.S. Supreme Court precedent (s) are now in conflict, as
H
\v
//
well as ACCA and Career Offender Statutes, as well as
Circuit application of ORS§811.540, and CONSTITUTION Law,
which support this seeking of the granting of the Great
Writ of Certiorari due to the extraordinary compelling
reasons stated herein this petition.
Due to the conflicting issues presented above by this
PRO SE petitioner, I request this Honorable U.S. Supreme
Court issue a Certificate of an Extraordinary Writ of
Certiorari for the compelling reasons listed herein.
^£0-
CONCLUSION
For the reasons
listed herein, and because of the
U.S. Supreme Court precedent(s) as applied to this case,
petitioner hereby requests review and ruling by the U.S.
to bfi.
Supreme Court,1VACATED in part, and REMAND in part for re
sentence without the "enhancements" in accord with the
enclosed sentencing transcripts (provided herein), which
calls for the resentence of the third alternative sentence
°f 87_ months on each Count, run concurrent, as ordered by
the trial judge with credit for time served and immediate
release (b ecause the exclusion of the "crime of Violence"
also removes the "relevant conduct" drug amount
see sent-
encing transcripts), which proves the Eighth Circuit lower
courts have had ample opportunities to address this issue
and have not done so to date, and that with the application
of the U.S. Supreme Court precedent(s) applied, petitioner
is currently incarcerated illegally because of the unaddressed
"DUI" factor and the "struckdown" "otherwise" residual clause
under JOHNSON(2015), and USSG app. C Amndt. 798, LEOCAL,
and BEGAY, which are all previous rulings which need verification on, clarification on, and application of by this
U.S. Supreme Court's authoritative powers.
PRAYERFULLY, SINCERELY, AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON
THIS _____ day of December.
-HI-
/
7'
V
I/M Timothy! artin Kendrick
Reg. # 09128-029
PRO SE REPRESENTATION
ABBREVIATIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ORS, O.R.S., Or.Rev. Stat.
Oregon Revised Statute
ACCA
.......... Armed Career Criminal Act
.......... United States Sentencing Commision
USSC
"DUI"
Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants
S. Ct.
.......... U.S. Supreme Court
USSG .
..United States Sentencing Guidelines
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